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Sino–Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in Central Asia and Beyond
Abstract
Sino–Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China–Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long.
... But additional causes of increasing China-Russia cooperation have also been put forward. These include shared illiberal regime types and common preferences regarding norms of sovereignty and human rights (Menon 2009;Rozman 2014;Lukin 2015;Cox 2016;Charap et al. 2017), compatible political models and national identities (Kerr 2005;Ferdinand 2007;Kuchins 2007;Rozman 2014;Trenin 2012;Wishnick 2017), mutual concerns about ethnic separatism (Kerr 2005;Lo 2008;Weitz 2012;Odgaard 2017), prospective gains from economic cooperation (Kerr 2005;Wilson 2004;Swanström 2014;Lukin 2015;Trenin 2012;Gabuev 2016;Charap et al. 2017), and personal affinity among national leaders (Ferdinand 2007;Lo 2008;Gabuev 2016). ...
... Others, including [some] people who are [otherwise] brilliant and sophisticated, are sleepwalkers: they unconsciously use metaphors as models." economic complementarity (Swanström 2014), and national identity (Rozman 2014;Wishnick 2017) to the exclusion of any alternative hypotheses. Yet much of the evidence cited in such works-e.g., China's and Russia's common dissatisfaction with the status quo order, joint membership in the SCO and the BRICS, concerns over NATO expansion, "non-zero sum" characterization of their strategic partnership, opposition to American hegemony, and increasing bilateral trade and investmentis observationally equivalent; that is, it supports multiple alternative hypotheses. ...
It has been widely noted that China and Russia have grown progressively closer over the last two decades. Although the scholarly literature has offered detailed descriptions and various ad hoc explanations of this trend, the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship has been the subject of very little scrutiny using rigorous theory, which has obstructed hypothesis formation and evaluation. Moreover, the cooperative post-Cold War trend in the bilateral relationship seems puzzling for baseline versions of each of the major paradigms of international relations theory: realism, constructivism and liberalism. For realists, China’s rising power, coupled with its geographic proximity and longstanding border disputes with Russia, made it a present and growing threat to Russian security at the end of the Cold War. Why did China’s rise not incur balancing from Russia and increasing bilateral hostility, rather than reconciliation? For constructivists, the stark differences in political ideologies and national cultures, as well as a long history of antagonism, presaged continued post-Cold War animosity. How have these historical animosities and ideological rifts been mitigated or overcome? Finally, both countries were increasingly integrated into the US-led international order immediately following the Cold War, with relatively low interdependence in their bilateral relationship. From a liberal perspective, why did this not prompt the two countries to improve political relations with the West while holding each other at arm’s length? The papers in this special issue develop and apply nuanced theoretical arguments to derive testable hypotheses for the cooperative trend in China–Russia relations. In contrast to existing scholarship, these papers offer generalizable insights that both improve our understanding of a crucially important contemporary case, while also advancing IR theory in substantial ways.
... Even if aims and ideas are shared between Russia and China at the government level, advanced by "Russian newspapers follow[ing] trends . . . and support[ing] the official narrative of Sino-Russian relations" ( Kuteleva and Vasiliev 2021 , 599), these elements fail to translate to people-to-people ties, creating pathways to animosity ( Swanström 2014 ;Røseth 2019 ). And although the CCP has put considerable effort into censoring politically sensitive topics ( Walker 2018 , 15-17), including censoring discussion of Russia's war in Ukraine ( Carlson 2022 , 3), it is not clear that this effort extends to the RFE. ...
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the nature of Sino-Russian relations by applying a multi-vector framework to examine the tenability of the so-called strategic partnership between Russia and China in the Russian Far East (RFE). Addressing a growing body of literature that seeks to move beyond single-factor evaluations of the dyadic relationship, I embrace the principles of analytic eclecticism, borrowing from Voskressenki's (Alexei D. Voskressenski, Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations [London, 2003]) multifactor framework to advance an argument for intertwining the three dominant international relations research traditions—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of the current equilibrium in the RFE, rather than assuming in advance the most pertinent lens. This in turn allows for more effective application of international relations theory to Sino-Russian studies. To accomplish my aim, I incorporate data pertaining to economic, geopolitical, and ideational factors. From these data, I find that the relationship in the RFE is in a state of stable equilibrium, with the most important vectors contributing to the balance for each side at present, geopolitical considerations for Moscow and ideational concerns for Beijing, being conducive to cooperation. The short-term potential for conflict is thus minimal, but a shock in the form of increasing Chinese nationalist hostility toward Russia or continued territorial belligerence by Russia internationally would severely endanger the status quo. By applying a similar approach to other dimensions of the Sino-Russian relationship, scholars can gain greater traction in assessing the robustness of the continually evolving bilateral partnership between these two large and important neighbors.
... However, not only did Russia object to China's economic initiatives such as creating an emergency 'crisis fund' and the SCo development bank, China's motives were questioned by many Central Asian countries (Cooley 2009(Cooley , 2018. While some scholars consider the early Sino-Russian relations more rhetorical than substantive and more fragile than expected (Swanström 2014), others argue that the two countries have become close partners as a result of the bilateral declaration signed between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to link up the Eurasian Economic Union and BRI in 2015 (Li 2018;Kuteleva and Vasiliev 2020), Russia's subsequent 'pivot to Asia' strategy (Lukin 2019), and a shared vision of a Eurasian future (Rolland 2019). Nonetheless, the potential rivalry between the two great powers due to China's hunger for energy and expanding influence in Eurasia should not be overlooked (Freeman 2018;Rolland 2019). ...
Since its independence, Kazakhstan has adopted a multi-vectorism approach to balance between various great powers, especially between Russia and China. Despite extensive theorisation of such foreign policy, scholarly research has rarely investigated the topic beyond diplomatic power dynamics. Based on a systematic search of China’s joint projects in Kazakhstan in the past 30 years, this paper illuminates several unexpected developmental intricacies based on Kazakhstan’s multi-vectorism, its geo-strategic location, the availability of oil-driven sovereign wealth funds, and the public pressure for more responsible industrial policies: (1) China’s ambition to connect to the West has unintentionally amplified Kazakhstan’s multi-vector bargaining power; (2) Kazakhstan’s industrial policies, supported by various financial tools backed by its oil-driven sovereign wealth funds, are integral to its multi-sector economic development and diversification of exports to include more high-value intermediate and consumer goods; and (3) shown via a case study on Kazakhstan’s agricultural development, initial state-level negotiation and sub-national implementation, coupled with a mix of Sinophobic and Sinophilic sentiments, have led to a nuanced path of economic diversification. Given the authoritarian legacy in both China and Kazakhstan, empirical research to compare industry-specific development variations would be enlightening for developing economies to design optimal paths to leverage China’s rising dream and capital.
Open access available at:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2022.2027237
... Sino-Russian relations, however, improved more than Sino-US relations in the post-Cold War period. 30 One of the important reasons for this was the common security concerns of both countries vis-à-vis US hegemony in the international order in the post-Cold War era. Rising economic and regional security concerns also urged both countries to establish the Shanghai Five, a regional cooperation organization, in 1996. ...
... First, it can help understand the state of contemporary China-Russia relations that the existing literature has so far failed to reach a consensus on, as captured by titles such as "Rapprochement or Rivalry?" (Garnett 2000) or "Rivalry or Partnership?" (Bedeski and Swanström 2012) and can be seen in the related studies, which are divided into those that are doubtful about the durability of the China-Russia partnership (Lo 2009;Menon 2009;Brenton 2013;Swanström 2014;Wilson 2016) and those that believe that it has strong foundations or at least that the existing bilateral hurdles are not insurmountable (Wilkins 2008;Ambrosio 2017;Kaczmarski 2017;Odgaard 2017;Wishnick 2017). Second, understanding China's and Russia's reactions can help envisage the limits the two countries' further geopolitical resurgence is likely to face. ...
Although not formal allies, China and Russia have steadily increased their strategic cooperation. However, crises and tensions in each other's areas of strategic interest continue to complicate each country's relations with each other and the rest of the international community. This paper explores China's reaction toward major crises in the post-Soviet space (the Caucasus Crisis of 2008 and the Ukraine Crisis of 2014) and Russia's responses to the South China Sea dispute and shows that they share many similarities. To explain the reaction patterns and better understand the nature of contemporary China-Russia relations, this paper applies a neoclassical realist framework, which helps assess the impact of both system-level and unit-level factors on great powers' behavior. The assessment demonstrates that the observed behavior pattern is an outcome of causal forces of different levels simultaneously pushing in different directions.
... In other words, how durable is this alignment? Several scholars have responded negatively to this question, focusing on a series of complicating issues which will ultimately result in rupturing or, at the very least, downgrading of this relationship (Lo 2008;Bellacqua 2009;Swanström 2014). Some of these issues include: tensions engendered by the disparities of China's rise compared with Russia's relative decline; Chinese migration into Siberia; the potential for rivalry in Central Asia; differences in their respective strategic visions of the bilateral relations; trade imbalances; and their respective relationships with the United States. ...
The relative durability of the growing alignment between Russia and China is perhaps the central question regarding this relationship. This article examines the degree to which cooperation and policy coordination have become institutionalised between these two states through the creation of a complex and self-reinforcing network of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Grounded in the literature on treaty nestedness and utilising social network analysis, this article examines 154 bilateral Russia–China agreements and 54 agreements and declarations signed under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.
Since the collapse of the USSR, the European Union (EU) and China have launched a range of leadership initiatives in Central Asia. Focusing on non-traditional security, connectivity and water management cooperation, this paper contributes to the special issue by highlighting the evolution of the EU's goals and practices in Central Asia, contrasting them with China's leadership strategy, and discussing implications for states in the region. The EU and China have diverging approaches to Central Asia due to differences in foreign policy goals and domestic politics. Nevertheless, as of now there seems to be no rivalry between their projects, as neither claims sole leadership nor builds formal institutions with exclusive membership. The presence of two very different leaders is beneficial for Central Asian states as it has allowed them to draw more material resources, generate new ideas, diversify partners and balance external influence.
It has been widely noted that China and Russia have grown progressively closer over the last two decades. Although the scholarly literature has offered detailed descriptions and various ad hoc explanations of this trend, the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship has been the subject of very little scrutiny using rigorous theory, which has obstructed hypothesis formation and evaluation. Moreover, the cooperative post-Cold War trend in the bilateral relationship seems puzzling for baseline versions of each of the major paradigms of international relations theory: realism, constructivism and liberalism. This introductory chapter reviews the centrality of theory for explanation and critiques prevailing atheoretical approaches to China-Russia scholarship. It then contrasts this past work with the subsequent chapters in the present volume, which develop and apply nuanced theoretical arguments to derive testable hypotheses for the cooperative trend in China–Russia relations. In contrast to existing scholarship, these chapters offer generalizable insights that both improve our understanding of a crucially important contemporary case, while also advancing IR theory in substantial ways.
Russia is one of the founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and, next to China, one of its leaders. While being an active and engaging member of the organization, Russia’s strategy towards SCO remains puzzling. Initially, it sought a pragmatic cooperation with China on solving numerous security issues that plagued post-Soviet Central Asia. However, Russia gradually developed alternative regional bodies (viz. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)) where it is a supreme leader, and which became its preferred tools for interacting with other states in the post-Soviet space. This impacted the place and role of the SCO in Russia’s regional and global strategies. Moreover, Russia’s growing power asymmetry vis-à-vis China added an additional dimension to its consideration of SCO. Hence, Moscow promoted several policies, especially the enlargement, which seemed to undercut SCO’s development. This paper relies on a theoretical framework of the so-called theory of cooperative hegemony, especially the application of one of its main analytical variables – the commitment capacity – to examine Russia’s policy towards SCO. Apart from considerable secondary sources, the article draws upon six semi-structured expert interviews, and a number of primary documents including but not limited to foreign policy concepts, declarations, and charters.
Since the fall of the USSR, Sino-Russian relations have evolved along a paradoxical dichotomy of friendship and mistrust. Experts have widely discussed this phenomenon, but little attention has been paid to historical narratives. Border regions of the Russian Far East are places where memories of a conflicting Imperial past coexist with more recently developed friendly narratives of cooperation and “bon voisinage”. Exhibitions in history museums are interesting objects of study in this context. They selectively display historical contents to visitors and convey a political interpretation of the past. This paper explores the significance of the representations of history in Russian border museums, and that of the Nerchinsk Treaty, within the framework of contemporary Sino-Russian relations. This analysis reveals contradictory elements related to the historical narratives of the history museums of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita and Nerchinsk. On the one hand, it detects a desire to portray a history in a way that expunges elements of contestation and smooths over highly controversial facts. On the other hand, national discourses cannot completely renounce particularistic narratives or obliterate elements of pride considered to be founding elements of Russia’s past. The persistence of tensions triggered by the interpretation of history is then revealed.
Cambridge Core - Environmental Policy, Economics and Law - In Search of Good Energy Policy - edited by Marc Ozawa
This article situates Russian–Chinese relations within a wider emerging infrastructure of multipolarity to consider how such relations signal a complex and multifaceted ‘decentering’ of the global political economy beyond American-centered global governance architecture. Russian–Chinese economic cooperation and economic multipolarity have been some time in the making; however, they are demonstrating new institutional, governance, and reciprocal ‘embeddedness.’ The processes by which such embeddedness has occurred provide the context within which geopolitical and geoeconomic crises are mediated, not the reverse. This article traces emerging economic relations between Russia and China by moving beyond abstract and generalized pronouncements of multipolarity to consider the extent to which such multipolarity is realized via contemporary Russian–Chinese economic relations, and how such relations are constitutive of a post-hegemonic global political economy. The increased complexity of Russian–Chinese economic relations—means that any resultant effects on polarity cannot simply be deduced from each state’s strategic preferences regarding polarity.
Russia and China have been pursuing the Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road initiative since the early 2010s, employing two distinct sets of practices in their respective influence-building endeavours. Russia is interested in creating an exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, in order to bolster its great power status and secure regional primacy. China, in turn, is expanding its economic influence over a vast geographical area disguising economic expansion behind multilateralism. These differences make Sino–Russian competition in Central Asia less plausible.
In the previous chapters I discussed threat narratives that were both targeted by customized political acts and widely accepted by the public as such. What happens when one of the success criteria is not there? If a threat is not existential, does it constitute a successful securitization? If the public is no longer debating it, does it mean that securitization failed? This chapter discusses the cases that cannot be deemed as successful securitizations based on the two aforementioned success criteria: either there is no customized political act or it is not accepted as a threat by the audience.
This study is about international politics of post-cold war period in which US attempted to become the
singular hegemonic power in the international political affairs. The major purpose of the study was to
explore the responses of emerging powers in the international political system to US ambition. The
article will start with a discussion on elements of US Grand Strategy in its foreign affairs. It has been
revealed that strategy was based on modernist premises even though the world has been changed by
globalizing forces. However, the thesis that the end of cold war has brought with the end of sovereignty
of the states was questioned by arguing that sovereignty of small states had decreased, while the
sovereignty of strong states had increased. Rogue states defined by US had become allies of emerging
powers. The regional wars fought by US in different locations simultaneously had weakened its
capacity and economically unsustainable. Economic power of rising powers and military modernization
of their armories had given them impetus to become more and more assertive. China and Russia had
worked together in coalition in international forums to challenged US hegemony. The division within the
allies of US also had weakened its position further. Thus, international politics of the contemporary
world order could best understood multi-polar in character and content. The US attempt at the sole
hegemonic power in international politics has become a dream in the context of emerging powers claim
for greater role in international politics.
Key words: United States, Russia, China, grand strategy, unipolarity, emerging powers.
INTRODUCTION
This study is about international politics of post-cold war period in which US attempted to become the singular hegemonic power in the international political affairs. The major purpose of the study was to explore the responses of emerging powers in the international political system to US ambition. The article will start with a discussion on elements of US Grand Strategy in its foreign affairs. It has been revealed that strategy was based on modernist premises even though the world has been changed by globalizing forces. However, the thesis that the end of cold war has brought with the end of sovereignty of the states was questioned by arguing that sovereignty of small states had decreased, while the sovereignty of strong states had increased. Rogue states defined by US had become allies of emerging powers. The regional wars fought by US in different locations simultaneously had weakened its capacity and economically unsustainable. Economic power of rising powers and military modernization of their armories had given them impetus to become more and more assertive. China and Russia had worked together in coalition in international forums to challenged US hegemony. The division within the allies of US also had weakened its position further. Thus, international politics of the contemporary world order could best understood multi-polar in character and content. The US attempt at the sole hegemonic power in international politics has become a dream in the context of emerging powers claim for greater role in international politics.
This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.
The book explores developments in Russia-China relations in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, arguing that the crisis transformed their bilateral affairs, regional liaisons and, crucially, altered the roles both states play on the international arena. Discussing how Russo-Chinese cooperation has accelerated in energy trade, arms sales and in the Russian Far East, the focus is on how the still mutually advantageous relationship has become more asymmetric than ever, reflecting China's meteoric rise and Russia's decline. These dynamics are explored through three perspectives: domestic, regional and global. Domestically, the book traces the role of political coalitions and key interest groups involved in how the two states shape their reciprocal policies. Changes in the regional dimension are examined with particular reference to a new status quo emerging in Central Asia. The book concludes by explaining how the changing relationship is affecting the international order, including the balance of power vis-à-vis the United States as well as Russia and China's changing attitudes towards global governance.
Two decades of improvement in relations have given strategic significance to the relationship between China and Russia. Taken together, their power projection capabilities are worrying adjacent nations in Central Asia and the Far East, especially when compounded with US regional policies. However, there remain doubts as to the extract nature and extent of the “partnership” between the two giants. To determine whether their “partnership” should be a cause for concern, the authors assess the views each one holds of the other, the consistency of those views over time, and how they have shaped their actual policies. The authors conclude that the relationship between Russia and China is not based on an equal “partnership” where cooperation is the norm. Instead, the relationship is akin to a zero-sum game where each attempts to outmatch the other in their respective quests for power and prestige.
China is already outpacing Russia, which is encountering ever more difficulties in trying to arrange a continental bloc of satellite states. While it may not be possible for China to organize its own version of such a bloc given the deep-rooted regional fears and apprehensions about Chinese objectives, in the coming years it will probably be the primary foreign economic presence in Central Asia, able to cash in on the political advantages that accrue to any such power.
Central Asia and China have been closely intertwined in history and today that relationship has begun to re-emerge. This article analyses the reasons for the close cooperation which has re-emerged in the 1990s and boomed in the twenty-first century. Domestic and internal factors, as well as political and economic considerations are included in the search for an explanation for current relations and future expectations. Despite the fact that China has emerged as one of the world’s most powerful states, its dependence on the Central Asian states in regard to oil and gas but also domestic security is intriguing. The future of Sino-
Central Asian relations is deeply embedded in joint problems and common interests, but also in fear of domination and external intervention.
Article available at: http://www.isdp.eu/publications.html?task=showbib&id=5604&return=
Trade in Eurasia is shifting to growing continental rather than regional ties at the same time as overland transports are becoming a viable option. If trade obstacles could be surmounted, this trend promises to have substantial implications for the landlocked states of Greater Central Asia and their access to world markets.
Article available at: http://www.isdp.eu/publications.html?task=showbib&id=5589&return=
The Sino-Russian Astrategic partnership, formed after decades of rancorous verbal (and sometimes lethal) dispute, we find to be genuine, bespeaking a genuine desire on both sides to put the past behind them and forge a more friendly and mutually profitable relationship. Certainly there are underlying problems and suspicions, but the painstakingly institutionalized, multi-stranded network of exchange and consultation seems quite capable of containing areas of friction. Though primarily oriented to bilateral concerns, the partnership also has a more ambitious international agenda, oriented essentially to the protection of national sovereignty from the forces of globalism and human rights, as typically symbolized by the United States.
Although China and the US are starting their fourth decade of energy cooperation, it is only recently that there has been a concerted US effort to create a framework for US–China bilateral energy relations. The past 30 years have witnessed many successful energy projects that have lacked follow through and institutionalization, often becoming ‘one-off’ exercises that duplicated previous projects. Recent initiatives intend to establish long-term linkages between US and Chinese energy bureaucracies, linking energy efficiency, energy security, and environmental issues. The US is nesting the bilateral relationship in global and Asia–Pacific multilateral energy and environmental regimes, and is also using bilateral agreements as mechanisms to promote domestic energy and environmental reform. This paper will examine US–China relations in the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and the Five-Country Energy Ministerial.
Today many aspects of the Sino-Russian relationship are positive. The “strategic cooperative partnership” is supported by the Treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, as well as membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and a shared commitment to a multipolar world. Nevertheless, the economic foundation of the relationship is weak, energy cooperation has not reached its potential, and the two states have competing interests in Central Asia. Thus, this article argues that although the Sino-Russian relationship is multifaceted and based on practical considerations, there are nevertheless factors that limit the relationship. China and Russia have links with the West that sometimes interfere in their relationship with each other. Moreover, the legacy of history remains in the background of the relationship. Finally, Russia's demographic decline, combined with China's economic growth, creates questions for Russians regarding their long-term security vis-à-vis China.
In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the immediate focus of the organization was to combat the so-called ‘three evils’—ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism—the SCO's long-term viability and effectiveness in promoting regional stability and economic development depend on how member states build up common identity and cooperate on issues of mutual concern. This article looks at China's role in initiating the Shanghai-5/SCO structure within the broader framework of Beijing's foreign and security policy interests and priorities in Central Asia and seeks to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles to its efforts in achieving key objectives for this new regional organization: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; and promotion of economic prosperity. In addition, the article will also examine the extent to which Beijing has used the opportunity to exercise leadership and whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using the SCO as a vehicle.
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