Analogical reasoning—the ability to find and exploit similarities based on relations among entities, rather than solely on the entities themselves—is a key mechanism underlying human intelligence and creativity (Gentner, 2010; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 2010; Holyoak, 2012). Among the species currently extant, the ability to formulate explicit relations and reason about them may be unique to homo sapiens (Penn, Holyoak & Povinelli, 2008). Preschool children can already use simple analogies to solve problems (Brown, Kane & Echols, 1986; Holyoak, Junn & Billman, 1984); however, the ability continues to develop over childhood (e.g., Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Goswami, 1989), and is linked to improvements in executive functions (Richland & Burchinal, 2012) and to maturation of the prefrontal cortex (Knowlton, Morrison, Hummel & Holyoak, 2012). For adults, advanced analogical reasoning impacts a broad range of human endeavours, including mathematics education (Richland, Zur & Holyoak, 2008), engineering design (Chan & Schunn, 2015) and scientific discovery (Dunbar, 1995). Analogies are also ubiquitous in discourse, and can be used for various communicative purposes, such as to subtly express opinions or convey humour. Here is an example from Nasreddin, a Turkish philosopher of the 13th century: “Knowledge is like the carrot, few know by looking at the green top that the best part, the orange part, is there. Like the carrot, if you don't work for it, it will wither away and rot. And finally, like the carrot, there are a great many donkeys and jackasses that are associated with it.”
Broadly speaking, reasoning by analogy involves finding coherent correspondences between disparate situations, focusing on relations between objects rather than specific features of individual objects (for an overview see Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Analogy seems to both require and promote cognitive flexibility, enabling transfer of knowledge and procedures between different contexts to solve novel problems (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983). Furthermore, it has been argued that development of relational reasoning is closely linked to language, especially the acquisition of relational vocabulary (e.g., Gentner & Rattermann, 1991). Given these general characteristics, one might well expect to observe deficits in analogical reasoning among people with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who are often characterized as lacking in cognitive flexibility, oriented toward detailed perceptual features, weak in central coherence, and impaired in language processing, including metaphor comprehension (e.g., Frith, 2003; Kalandadze, Norbury, Nærland & Næss, 2018; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006). It is therefore surprising that some empirical findings (e.g., Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Dawson, Soulières, Gernsbacher, & Mottron, 2007) indicate that analogical reasoning may actually be spared in autism, or even constitute an area of relative cognitive strength.
If analogical reasoning is indeed spared in ASD despite apparent deficits in cognitive processes that have often been linked to this type of reasoning, then it may be useful to reconsider conceptions of the role played by analogy in normal cognitive development. ASD is characterized by a wide range of deficits in social communication (Jones et al., 2014). The status of analogical reasoning in individuals affected by ASD therefore has potential implications for design of interventions to compensate for deficits in social understanding associated with ASD. For individuals with ASD, spared analogical ability could provide a basis for therapeutic interventions (Green et al., 2017; McGregor, Whiten & Blackburn, 1998; Swettenham, 1996).
By performing a systematic literature review and meta-analysis, the present study examines the accumulated evidence regarding analogy performance in the ASD population as it compares to that in typically-developing controls.