The Game of the Name in Cryptographic Tables

08/1999; DOI: 10.1007/3-540-46674-6_3
Source: CiteSeer


We present a name-passing calculus that can be regarded as a simplified pi-calculus equipped with a cryptographic table. The latter is a data structure representing the relationships among names. We apply the calculus to the modelling and verification of secrecy and authenticity properties in cryptographic protocols relying on symmetric shared keys. Following classical approaches [8], we formulate the verification task as a reachability problem and prove its decidability assuming finite principals and bounds on the sorts of the messages synthesized by the attacker.

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Available from: Sanjiva Prasad, Jul 21, 2015
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    • "These tools still sometimes limit the number of sessions to guarantee termination. Amadio and Prasad [7] note that authentication can be translated into secrecy, by using a judge process. The translation is limited in that only one message can be registered by the judge, so the verified authentication property is not exactly the same as ours. "
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