No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Towards a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya
Abstract
NATO's recent operation in Libya has been described by some commentators as reflecting a new burden-sharing model, with the US playing a more supportive role and European allies stepping up to provide the bulk of the air strikes. The US administration of President Barack Obama seemed to share this view and has made clear that post-Libya it continues to expect its allies to assume greater responsibility within the alliance. Moreover, unlike previously, changes within the US and the international system are likely to make America less willing and able to provide for the same degree of leadership in NATO that the alliance has been used to. However, this article finds that Operation Unified Protector in Libya has only limited utility as a benchmark for a sustainable burden-sharing model for the alliance. As a result, an ever more fragmented NATO is still in search for a new transatlantic consensus on how to distribute the burdens more equally among its members. While no new generic model is easily available, a move towards a ' post-American' alliance may provide the basis for a more equitable burden-sharing arrangement, one in which European allies assume a greater leadership role and are prepared to invest more in niche military capabilities.
... Kapabiliteter mangler innenfor områder som luft-til-luft-tanking samt felles etterretning, overvåking og rekognosering (Joint ISR). Europa er derfor avhengig av USA for å kunne gjennomføre større operasjoner, som i Libya i 2011 (Hallams & Schreer, 2012). ...
Artikkelen diskuterer EUs nye forsvarspakke med særlig vekt på CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence), PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) og EDF (European Defence Fund). Formålet er å styrke EU som sikkerhetspolitisk aktør og legge grunnlaget for europeisk strategisk autonomi. Forsvarspakken utfordrer norsk sikkerhets-, forsvars- og forsvarsindustripolitikk. Problemstillingene artikkelen besvarer, er: Hva innebærer EUs nye forsvarspakke? Hvordan og hvorfor har norske myndigheter og forsvarsindustri så langt håndtert de endringer som kommer som følge av denne? Vi legger instrumentelle og institusjonelle teorier og perspektiver til grunn for analysen. Instrumentelle teorier forteller at aktørene handler formålsrasjonelt etter en konsekvenslogikk. Institusjonelle teorier forteller at aktørene søker legitimitet og handler i tråd med etablert kultur og forventninger i omgivelsene. EU får en økende betydning der unionens sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk blir likere EUs andre politikkområder. Våre intervjuer med representanter for norske myndigheter og forsvarsindustri forteller at de har fragmentert kunnskap om og forventninger til betydningen av EUs forsvarspakke. Vi konkluderer at aktørene har en instrumentell tilnærming, men at manglende helhetlig forståelse gjør det vanskelig å svare formålsrasjonelt. Aktørene handler derfor også i tråd med et kulturperspektiv.
... 24-5). The resulting complexity was duly reflected by a new wave of literature that centred on the sharing of risks and respon- sibilities in alliance policies and operations (Cimbala and Forster 2005, Sperling and Webber 2009, Ringsmose 2010, Ivanov 2011, Hallams and Schreer 2012, Zyla 2015, Massie 2016a, Becker 2017, Becker and Malesky 2017, Kunertova 2017. These studies proceeded to move beyond the established public-goods or econ- omic theories of burden-sharing and to expand the variables under scrutiny. ...
Does European NATO free-ride on America? This article uses a mixed-methods approach to explore developments after the Cold War. I investigate both “material” measures, such as military expenditure and troop numbers, and a “non-material” indicator that draws on survey data of the public’s willingness to fight for their country. Results and conclusions are not univocal. On the one hand, European NATO members have generally reduced their military spending (relative to GDP), abolished conscription and downsized their military forces. Their citizens’ self-reported willingness to fight has also been quite low after the Cold War, in particular in states that host US military bases. On the other hand, some of these developments can surely be explained by a decrease in threat perceptions in Europe. Trends changed markedly after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, which moved many allies – in particular new NATO member states – to increase their defence efforts.
... One must note, however, that the burden remains unequally shared amongst the 28 NATO member states, with only a handful willing to commit troops and actually share the costs and risks involved with conducting offensive military interventions. 99 Pessimists are likely to see this type of leadership as a momentous 'leadership by decoy' strategy to abate the discontent that stemmed from President Bush's directive leadership. Commentators who strongly oppose Obama's policies will no doubt see this behaviour as an abdication of leadership. ...
This article assesses President Obama’s transatlantic leadership style with regard to foreign crises and it contrasts it with the style of the previous Bush administration. It argues that the Obama administration exercises what we call enabling leadership, which implies that the US does lead, but that it does not feel the need to project ‘leadership from the front’. The article first analyses the diplomatic aspect of leadership by focusing on the ‘speaking order’ among the United States and three of its core allies, namely the United Kingdom, France and Canada. It presents a computer-assisted content analysis of the 482 official statements issued by these four states in response to the crisis in Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2012–2013. The paper then performs a detailed analysis of the financial and military contributions of the US and its allies to confront these crises. It provides qualitative and quantitative evidence suggesting that the Obama administration consciously adopted enabling leadership, a strategy that is consistent with the worldview of the president and his foreign policy entourage.
... The humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011 was not Europe's finest hour. Apart from the lack of adequate military capabilities and the reliance on the United States for precision-guided missiles, aerial refuelling capabilities as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Gates 2011; Barry 2011; Hallams and Schreer 2012; Daalder and Stavridis 2012), Europe also lacked internal political consensus (cf. Hill 1993; Toje 2008). ...
The European Union member states split over the military intervention in Libya with France, Germany and the UK voting differently in the United Nations Security Council. This article compares news media in France and Germany to better understand the foreign policy decisions of these key actors. Using a newspaper analysis of 334 articles, it shows that the German domestic debate started very late and was much less stable than the French debate. This supports arguments that Germany's decision-making was erratic. The analysis, however, also shows that the German debate was comprehensive and included an extensive discussion of the legitimacy of intervention. This fits in well with the traditional reluctance of German foreign policy elites to support military action.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the current status of contemporary Anglo-French defence cooperation and consider its relevance to British defence policy. To do so it provides an overview of both existing literature on Anglo-French relations and the historical background of the relationship. It also considers several international relations theories which are relevant to the relationship. To further its analysis it considers three case studies, those being the Lancaster House Treaty, the 2011 intervention in Libya and Brexit. The thesis concludes that defence cooperation with France is of vital importance to the UK, but the relationship has been imperilled by Brexit.
The years following the end of Cold War up until the year 2014 saw a turn in NATO’s burden-sharing disputes from questions of input to output, that is, what could actually be done with the defence capabilities instead of simply looking at financial contributions and the share of GDP spent on defence. In addition, consideration about responsibility-sharing, national caveats, and capability and willingness to participate in operations gained a more prominent role in the Alliance, transforming the burden-sharing debate qualitatively. This turn was driven by two geopolitical changes in the European security environment: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing debate about NATO enlargement on the one hand, and NATO’s emerging interest in out-of-area operations on the other. This chapter analyses the broadening of NATO’s agenda and tasks, and how this expanded the burden-sharing debate from a rather narrow input-focused debate to one that takes into consideration aspects such as responsibility-sharing, national caveats, and capability and willingness to participate in operations.
This article proposes Stephen Jay Gould’s concepts of time’s arrow and time’s cycle as a conceptual tool to analyse NATO’s burden-sharing disputes. It argues that the controversies on burden-sharing in NATO can be assessed in terms of their cyclic or arrow kind nature, rendering some disputes more likely to recur than others and providing different kinds of starting points for their forecasting. The study identifies four cyclic categories in which burden-sharing has transformed into a political debate among NATO members during the post-Cold War era: geopolitical change related to Russia; periods of US foreign political retrenchment or renewal; the passivity or activism of European NATO members; and during NATO or allied out-of-area operations. Moreover, the study suggests an arrow kind of direction in burden-sharing disputes, indicating an expansion of disputes to cover comprehensive security, resilience, security co-operation and diplomacy, and to engulf also NATO partner countries.
This chapter examines the relations between Libya and countries in the Euro-Atlantic communities from the ousting of Muhammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 to the present day. As this chapter shows, NATO operation Unified Protector was successful on military grounds. However, ensuing attempts to stabilise the country failed to produce significant results. The lack of meaningful EU support during the formal transition process and the interference of external actors complicated an already fragile transition. Taking stock of these lessons, Overcoming these obstacles requires involving militias in the peace process, redistributing oil revenues more equitably within Libyan society, and ensuring more effective cooperation between NATO and the EU, and among individual NATO and EU members.
Both theorists and practitioners continue to show interest in transatlantic burden-sharing. Resource allocation choices – both to and within defense budgets – are grand strategic choices, and membership in alliances and security communities affects how states make those choices. International security and political economy scholarship offers plausible explanations for transatlantic imbalances in military expenditures. However, NATO allies and EU member-states have pledged to one another not just to spend more on defense, but to allocate more defense resources to equipment modernization. Current scholarship does not fully explain the sources of such within-budget choices, which would help anticipate the likelihood of such pledges succeeding. Building on work by security scholars, defense and political economists, and scholars of interorganizational relations, I argue that stringent fiscal rules dampen the kind of defense spending NATO and EU strategists seek. Governments respond to increasingly stringent fiscal rules by reducing overall defense expenditures, while at the same time shifting existing defense resources to personnel, and away from equipment and operational expenditures. I find evidence in support of this argument by using education levels in the states in question as instruments for fiscal rules. This phenomenon represents a significant risk for important transatlantic strategic initiatives, namely NATO’s Wales pledge on defense investment.
This article investigates the relationship between U.S. overseas troops and the willingness of the citizens of host states to fight for their country. The study joins the long-running debate about burden-sharing and free-riding among U.S. allies. Unlike most previous empirical studies, we focus on non-material or intangible measures of the underlying concepts. Our dependent variable estimates the proportion of citizens expressing a willingness to fight for their country. Scores at the aggregate-national as well as the individual level are shaped by the presence of U.S. military forces, which act as a “tripwire” signaling credible security commitments. This increases opportunities of (non-material) free-riding. We present both bivariate and multivariate analyses covering the period 1981–2014 to test this supposition. Findings indicate that once U.S. troop levels reach a certain threshold (between 100 and 500 troops), citizens’ willingness to fight drops significantly. This likely reflects non-material free-riding.
Even though many would have bet on NATO’s demise after the Cold War and consider it now to be an archaic, antiquated alliance - as the reality that led to its formation no longer exists to justify its purpose - the need for collective defence in an increasingly complicated security environment stands as grounds for its ever-growing importance and its need to adapt to a spectrum of challenges that is becoming more diversified. NATO has long surpassed its military defensive role and has adapted to new challenges and new threats, while it has broadened its security agenda accordingly. The ‘out of area’ missions that dragged the Alliance out of its borders brought more meaning to the community of shared values, whilst allowing it to become both a security exporter, and a values and norms exporter. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan comprises NATO’s transformation and adaptation to the new security challenges and its diffusion of norms in the ‘near abroad’.
One of the most dominant security issues of twenty-first century has been the U.S. led battle against transnational terrorism—the aptly named Long War. Over the past fifteen years the Long War has been examined using multiple perspectives; however, one central mechanism is missing in current analyses: defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy enhances the diplomatic and security capacity of a state, providing the only link between executive office and the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, two vital institutions in the Long War. Using a case study of U.S. defence diplomacy in Afghanistan from 2001–2014, the paper argues simply that the practice of defence diplomacy far outweighs current theories on what it is, how it works and why it matters?
The paper aims to generate a more nuanced understanding of defence diplomacy, as well as identifying it as a key component of the U.S. CT/COIN strategy to achieve its Long War policy objectives.
z Akıllı savunma, küresel finansal krizin olumsuz etkileri çerçevesinde İttifak içerisinde eski bir sorun olan yük paylaşımına bir çözüm getirmek amacıyla oluşturulmuş bir kavramdır. 2011'de Rasmussen'in bu anlayış içerisinde isimlendirdiği akıllı savunma zaman içerisinde siber savunma, Birbirine İrtibatlandırılmış Kuvvetler, füze savunma sistemleri gibi İttifak'ın askeri dönüşümünün parçaları olan birçok program ile bağlantılandırılarak İttifak'ın savunma planlama politikasının temel unsuru haline getirilmiştir. Bu makalenin amacı NATO'nun geleceği tartışmaları açısından anlam taşıyan akıllı savunma girişiminin oluşturulmasında ve geliştirilmesinde etkili olan politika ve süreçleri incelemektir. Çalışmada bu kavram Amerikan dış politikasındaki değişimlerin NATO'ya bir yansıması olarak de-ğerlendirilmektedir. Abstract Smart defense is a concept which was formed to be a solution for an old issue within the Alliance-burden-sharing-in the framework of the negative impact of the global financial crisis. In this sense, Rasmussen named the concept in 2011. Smart defense has been made into a fundamental element of the Alliance's defense planning policy over time, by making many programs connected such as cyber defense , Connected Forces Initiative, missile defense systems which are components of the Alliance's military transformation.
This article argues that NATO is unable to challenge any of President Putin's expansive policies for two key reasons: First, Europe and the United States have conflicting views on what events qualify as key security threats (different threat perceptions). Infused within this paradigm is a nascent European Union strategic culture that views threats differently from the U.S. This in turn undermines NATO, as the Europeans argue for largely nonmilitary or more peacekeeping-oriented approaches to respond to threats that are quintessentially multilateral. Second, even though there are major differences between the NATO states and Russia, the two most pressing issues before the Atlantic Alliance are Iran and Syria. The NATO states know that a resolution to the Syrian civil war or to Iran's nuclear program is unlikely without the support of Moscow, which limits their ability to effectively challenge Russia. This article concludes with a call for NATO to focus on identifying a new agenda for the Atlantic Alliance, one that is more human-security oriented, as it addresses the root causes of instability in and around the Eurozone.
This chapter examines Russia’s exploitation of it’s own strengths and NATO’s vulnerabilities. The chapter argues that Russia’s blurring of military and civilian means in it’s “near abroad” inhibits NATO’s effective use of force for the purpose of policy. Before force is authorised, NATO needs to build legitimacy for its decision-making processes characterised by consensus, accountability, and transparency. Such principles are not particularly prevalent for more authoritarian regimes, such as Russia. To prevent NATO from exploiting its military superiority therefore, Russia employs a broad range of non-military means short of conventional war to preclude unanimous counter-reactions. The purpose is to inhibit well-crafted and effective decision-making processes, both inside a “multi-layered” NATO and a post-modern community of states that finds the use of force as “unappropriated behaviour”.1 Blurring the distinction between military activities and other forms of politics is therefore a critical criteria for success in order to avoid military confrontation. Staying below NATO’s “radar” is as such a fundamental prerequisite in Russia’s operative concept.
On several occasions, US former Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, criticized European NATO allies for not sharing a reasonable part of the military burden within the alliance. In his final policy speech on NATO’s future in Brussels, 20 June 2011, his message was quite clear. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan had exposed ‘significant shortcomings in NATO — in military capabilities, and in political will’. The Libya operation showed similar shortcomings that had the potential to ‘jeopardize the alliance’s ability to conduct an integrated, effective and sustained air-sea campaign’ (Gates, 2011).
In a speech at the National Defence University in Washington, DC, in February 2010, former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates talked about the ‘demilitarization of Europe’ (Gates, 2010). When he gave his last major speech at NATO’s ministerial meeting in Brussels in June 2011, he argued that NATO had become a ‘two-tiered’ alliance,
between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions, between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership — be they security guarantees or headquarters billets — but don’t want to share the risks and the costs. (Gates, 2011)
Prior to the NATO summit in Chicago Jon Stewart at ‘The Daily Show’ hosted the American NATO-ambassador Ivo Daalder. Asking whether any NATO members increased their defence budget in times of austerity, he replied: ‘Norway’. ‘So this is the new great power?’ said Stewart, ‘are we going to attack them next?’
When NATO’s Heads of State and Governments assembled in Chicago in May 2012 for the alliance’s 25th summit they did so in a sombre mood. NATO is, arguably, facing the gravest challenge since its creation. A lack of shared purpose translating into weak support for alliance ventures. The unspoken tension was between the American desire to use the alliance’s role as a political and military support framework for its global geopolitics and the European allies who would like to focus on American security guarantees in Europe and less on what they are to be expected to deliver in return. The pending failure of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has increased European scepticism towards out-of-area interventions. American policy-makers added to NATO’s sclerosis by, in 2012, unilaterally reducing the American troop levels stationed in Europe to record lows, adding to concerns regarding the viability of collective defence in an alliance with only one primary security producer. Although the 2010 Strategic Concept stressed that NATO would do both Article 5 defence and out-of-area operations, in reality the members are preparing to do neither (NATO, 2010).
Germany’s behaviour in the run-up of NATO’s 2011 Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya came as a surprise to many allies since Germany did not participate in a military operation which fulfilled the criteria of a right cause (a ‘responsibility to protect’) and proper authority (a UN Security Council mandate), and which was supported by its most important European allies, France and Germany. Consequently, Germany was accused by the international media of moving away from ‘European unity’ while German commentators explained this decision with the country’s pacifist preference, immaturity in foreign and security policy and a preoccupation with domestic politics (Erlanger and Dempsey, 2011). German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also pointed to his country’s ‘tradition of [military] restraint’ as an explanation for Germany’s abstention (Der Spiegel, 2011).
The US “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region, as confirmed in its military dimension by a January 2012 DoD paper,1 came as no surprise. It had been decades in the making. In reality, the United States had been recalibrating its global priorities since the 1980s. Despite the severity of the INF2 crisis that temporarily (1979–1983) refocused strategic attention on Europe,3 the shift in US activities and interests from those of an East-coast establishment to those of a West-coast establishment, which was consecrated under Ronald Reagan’s “Western White House,” was to prove durable. From the moment the Berlin Wall fell, a relative US military disengagement from the European theater was inevitable. This trend was to drive the entire 1990s process of trying to generate, by one means or another, appropriate European military capacity.4 The future of NATO was up for grabs. Considerable pressure was placed on the Europeans to offer payback for 40 years of US security guarantees by agreeing to extend the Alliance to other parts of the world, in short to give both political and material support to US global strategy.5 In 1993, Senator Richard Lugar, the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared, provocatively, that NATO should go “out of area or out of business.”6 The US pressure for a global partnership with the Europeans was predicated on the US assertion that the two entities, given tight geostrategic cooperation, could set the global agenda for the twenty-first century.7
Commenting on NATO’s 2011 intervention on behalf of Libyan rebels fighting to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, a Swiss newspaper of international reputation asserted that the Atlantic Alliance was applying ‘the art of the possible’.1 The author declined to add that NATO’s action came at the end of more than a decade of attempting the near-impossible missions of regime change and nation-building in Afghanistan. What was deemed possible in March 2011 involved a considerable retreat from the ambitions of 2001. The alliance’s transformation — its most fundamental paradigm shift — has been under way for the two decades since the end of the Cold War and was not initiated but rather accelerated by its response to the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11). The transformation is as much the accidental product as it is the deliberate work of 22 years; NATO has attempted since 1989 to anticipate future challenges, and in its strategic concepts has articulated those challenges in a coherent fashion, but it has been conditioned by events as thoroughly as it has foreseen and shaped them. As it winds down its mission in Afghanistan, the alliance is at a watershed. It is not about to dissolve or disintegrate. As a coalition of states bound by shared political values, whose members continue to find it useful militarily and diplomatically, it endures.2
When the founders of NATO gathered in Washington in 1949, few could have anticipated that the alliance’s first invocation of its Article 5 guarantee would have been triggered by an attack on US territory. It was thus a hugely symbolic moment when, on 12 September 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 in response to the 11 September (9/11) attacks on New York and Washington, America’s allies coming to the aid of a nation experiencing a sense of shock and vulnerability perhaps only equalled by the attack on Pearl Harbor some 60 years earlier. The events of 9/11 had ramifications that reverberated far and wide, not least because of the way Washington responded to the attacks, launching two major wars in the greater Middle East whose consequences are still playing out today; Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq continue to find themselves plagued by violence, instability and an uncertain future, while the United States and many of its NATO allies are emerging from a decade of conflict economically drained and war-weary. As the introduction to this volume suggests, 9/11 was in many ways a transformative event for NATO. In particular, it brought into sharp focus America’s relationship with the alliance, magnifying existing fault lines and cleavages and casting them in a new and more urgent light.
If 9/11 is to be regarded as a watershed in global politics then it would be logical to assume that NATO, the globe’s most durable, extensive and powerful alliance, would be bound up in that process of transformation. For NATO, 9/11 accelerated changes already in train (namely, the need to focus out of area) and in so doing made possible a role for the alliance (fighting an expeditionary war in Afghanistan, for instance) that would otherwise have been inconceivable. A decade on, NATO’s major powers have modified significantly their assumptions of what can be achieved in far-flung operations driven, in part, by the demanding experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, and, in part, by the operational constraints of defence austerity. These processes have shone a light on NATO. Its complex mission in Afghanistan conducted simultaneously with a range of other operations and initiatives (enlargement, missile defence and partnerships) indicates a body that continues to be adaptable and relevant. Yet, at the same time, the multiplication of tasks (some of which have courted the risk of failure) seemingly betoken an alliance that is directionless and stretched to the limit. In that sense, the period since 9/11 has been yet one more chapter of a familiar story of NATO in crisis. What that means and whether it has substance is a question that has policy, empirical and theoretical relevance; this chapter is primarily concerned with the latter.
In the article, milestones in formation of Euro-Atlantic aspirations in the Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) are analyzed, the current stage of each country's integration into the EU and NATO is examined. The region represents the case of transatlantic solidarity with regard to security. The EU and the U.S./NATO share main strategic goals in the Western Balkans: to guarantee Kosovo's independence, to maintain the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to keep the whole region on the Euro-Atlantic track not allowing strategic partnership of any Western Balkan republic with Russia in the situation of Russia-EU/U.S. confrontation over the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions. The region is an illustrative example of the EU/NATO burden sharing in security area. While the EU has gained its strength and become an experienced actor in principal peacekeeping operations in the region, NATO/the U.S. still keep their role as major security guarantors to the most Western Balkans countries. The Ukrainian crisis has intensified the EU/NATO politics in the region and highlighted various degrees of Western Balkan states' solidarity with the anti-Russian course: on one hand, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia have not joined Western sanctions - Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Serbska, even praised Russian unification with the Crimea; Croatia, on the other hand, entirely associated itself with the EU/U.S. position. Europeanization has had an overall negative effect on Russian posture in the region, having considerably complicated the maintenance of its three-fold policy, namely: energy, identity and security. Although it is important to mention that the rising level of Euroscepticism in Serbia and Bosnia, accompanied with Russian activity, has intensified their humanitarian links and cooperation with Russia in the security field. Still the progress in Europeanization is a crucial factor for the Western Balkans stabilization. Peace and stability have not been fully achieved yet. Macedonian unrest may be a signal of general security situation worsening in the Western Balkans.
Turkey has been member of NATO for more than six decades. Turkey's contributions to NATO's collective defense have evolved in quantity and quality in step with changes in the ends and means of security. In terms of its contributions to the alliance, two elements of continued stand out. The first one is Turkey's location. Its proximity to zones of risks and threats in NATO's assessments has turned Turkey into an asset. The other element is Turkey's ability to raise and maintain a large army at a relatively low cost. This has been considered Turkey's "competitive edge" in NATO. Its real estate value and its large army constituted the two main pillars of Turkey's contribution to NATO during the Cold War. Turkey has shifted its emphasis away from quantity to quality to meet NATO's evolving requirements for post-Cold War out-of-area collective security missions. Nevetheless, Turkey's real estate value has come a full circle for the alliance with Ankara's decision to host an radar site as part of NATO's Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System.
The thesis analyzes the progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Smart Defense initiative. The venture is analyzed in a wider context of post-Cold War capability ventures in NATO. Smart Defense represents the last in a line of such initiatives. The most notable among these are the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The initiatives had similar goals of bolstering or reforming NATO’s conventional military capabilities. This thesis will assess the causes of shortcomings in past attempts, and this history is an integral part of the comparative approach where the past
process may speak to the progress of Smart Defense. The lessons deriving from past experience is at the core of social sciences, where there have been several large-scale attempt of restructuring on order to counter security threats. The history of these initiatives could help provide a better understanding of the progress of the Smart Defense initiative in NATO. This thesis will apply the concept of the free-rider problem and organizational theory with Christensen et al. perspectives on organizations to explain state behavior with regards to alliance capability endeavors.
The issue of burden sharing in collective defense in the past and present has been the fundamental reason of the rivalries in NATO between Americans and Europeans. Fair burden-sharing focused on preventing the Communist expansion throughout the Cold War. After the Cold War focus of discussions shifted toward providing money and troops for the crisis management, security building, peace support operations, and war against terrorism. This article argues that burden sharing problem in NATO has two major dimensions; (1) every member country struggles to shift some of the burden it carries to others, (2) decisions are made according to the extent of the contribution to the alliance. Since the United States is undoubtedly the major contributor by far, American efforts of shifting some burden to other members and European reaction to American hegemony in the decision making processes are two major elements engendering crises in the organization. These two major consequences of burden sharing rivalries are affected by both international and domestic constraints as well as personalities.
Fifteen years ago, the European Union (EU) launched a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since then, the CSDP has been the focus of a growing body of political and scholarly evaluations. While most commentators have acknowledged shortfalls in European military capabilities, many remain cautiously optimistic about the CSDP’s future. This article uses economic alliance theory to explain why EU member states have failed, so far, to create a potent common defence policy and to evaluate the policy’s future prospects. It demonstrates, through theoretical, case study-based and statistical analysis, that CSDP is more prone to collective action problems than relevant institutional alternatives, and concludes that the best option for Europeans is to refocus attention fully on cooperation within a NATO framework.
Following the end of NATO ‘Operation Unified Protector’ in Libya there has been an intense debate in the international community with respect to the impact of the military engagement on both the emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) norm as well as on the international community's commitment to enforce it. The study examines the impact of the international military intervention in Libya on this debate by looking at whether Operation Unified Protector contributed to strengthening or weakening the development of R2P. To do so, it first examines whether the authorization to use force in Libya was indeed grounded on R2P, as well as whether it was perceived as such by the international community. Secondly, the research examines whether the intervening parties' actual use of force was consistent with R2P. Finally, the research provides an assessment of the current state of R2P post-Libya.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.