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Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy
Abstract
I am grateful to many people and audiences for helpful discussions of this work while it was in progress, including University of Oslo, Goethe University Frankfurt, the Political Philosophy Workshop at Brown University, CIDE and UNAM in Mexico City, Legal Theory Workshop at University of Pennsylvania, Canadian Political Science Association meetings in Montreal, the seminar of John Ferejohn and Janos Kis (whose comments were especially instructive) at the law school at New York University, the Harvard Government Department colloquium, and a lecture at Franklin and Marshall College. I am also grateful to Nomy Arpaly for numerous helpful discussions of these ideas, and to Charles Larmore, Sharon Krause, and two anonymous referees for valuable discussions of an earlier draft.
... David Estlund (2011) andNicholas Southwood (2016) aim to solve this dilemma in different ways. Both try to reconcile our intuition that "ought" implies "can" (Estlund) or "ought" implies "feasible" (Southwood) with the intuition that agents who are unwilling to comply with moral demands should not be excused by elevating their unwillingness to an empirical constraint on moral requirements. ...
... Accordingly, if we interpret the Pecunians' motivational incapacity as a restriction on feasibility and simultaneously accept that "ought" implies "feasible," we cannot criticize the Pecunians from a moral point of view for failing to work harder at higher marginal tax rates. To let the Pecunians off the hook like this, however, seems to be wrong for moral reasons: it seems to be true that they ought to support the poor by making it true that a more just distribution of goods can be realized (Southwood 2016, 8;Cohen 2008;Estlund 2011). ...
... Thus, this seems to be a case where our moral intuitions diverge: some (e.g., Wiens [2015]) argue that Bill cannot be held responsible, while others (such as Estlund [2011]) argue that the example supports the contention that motivational restrictions do not restrict moral judgment in cases like this-which conflicts with "ought implies feasible." ...
What kinds of feasibility restrictions should be taken into account in practically relevant political philosophy? David Estlund argues that “ought” does not imply “can will,” and, hence, that we should be very cautious regarding the inclusion of motivational restrictions in political philosophy. As Nicholas Southwood and David Wiens point out, however, Estlund’s position clashes with the requirement that “ought” implies “feasible.” The present article argues that even though we must accept that “ought” implies “feasible,” this does not settle the question regarding the adequate set of feasibility restrictions to be included in applied normative thinking. Instead, we need to distinguish different kinds of normative theory that require different sets of feasibility restrictions. For this, the article provides a taxonomy of feasibility restrictions and a preliminary discussion of the adequate set of feasibility restrictions for different kinds of normative theory.
... Whereas realism, I argue, is an approach grounded in our best social-scientific accounts of politics, but not in such a way as to jeopardize the transformative potential of our political imagination. The upshot is that, if we set aside the quasi-technocratic aspirations of a political theory geared to generate immediate policy guidance, realism (rather than nonideal theory) emerges as the best bet for those sympathetic to many of the concerns about fidelity to the facts of real politics raised in current methodological debates (e.g., Estlund, 2014Estlund, , 2017Freeden, 2012;Hamlin & Stemplowska, 2012;Horton, 2017;Miller, 2016;Mills, 2005;Rossi, 2016;Valentini, 2012;Wiens, 2012). ...
... Does that mean that radical realists can prescribe anything that is metaphysically possible, with no regard to feasibility? G.A. Cohen and David Estlund tell us that it is permissible and even advisable to do so (Cohen, 2008;Estlund, 2011Estlund, , 2014. It would be an odd result if radical realism found itself aligned with positions one may call arch-moralistic (or methodologically moralistic, in Estlund's parlance). ...
... Does that mean that radical realists can prescribe anything that is metaphysically possible, with no regard to feasibility? G.A. Cohen and David Estlund tell us that it is permissible and even advisable to do so (Cohen, 2008;Estlund, 2011Estlund, , 2014. It would be an odd result if radical realism found itself aligned with positions one may call arch-moralistic (or methodologically moralistic, in Estlund's parlance). ...
... In one sense a responsiveness to empirical evidence is trivially true of any normative theorising which follows the dictum of 'ought implies can'. By this I mean that if something is physically impossible it is generally acknowledged that it cannot be a normative requirement (Räikkä 1998: 27;Estlund 2007: 258-271;Estlund 2011;Valentini 2017:25). These are often acknowledged, along with logical and metaphysical impossibilities, as a form of 'hard constraint' on theorising (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). ...
... It is certainly possible to analyse political ideals and theories at a high level of abstraction such that they seem more distant from empirical concerns. Much of the methodological debate in political theory regarding the relevance of empirical findings has tended to focus on justice (Cohen 2008;Estlund 2011;Hamlin and Stemploska 2012;McTernan 2019) which itself is a relatively abstract concept. Democracy, on the other hand, has a much more chimeric existence. ...
The dominant justificatory framework for democracy is deliberative democratic theory. It holds that democracy is legitimate to the extent it instantiates, and is guided by, the ideals and processes of good deliberation. This thesis challenges the dominance of the deliberative paradigm by highlighting an under-explored, and yet critical, element of the theory – its dependence on participants’ open-mindedness. The thesis addresses two central issues – the empirical feasibility and normative desirability of open-mindedness. By surveying the psychological literature on directionally motivated reasoning this thesis identifies robust findings across a range of contexts and subjects that people engaged with, or knowledgeable about, politics are systematically closed-minded in a manner resistant to straightforward correction. This analysis is twinned with a novel methodological approach to feasibility. This entails that if we are to maintain any connection to ‘ought implies can’ we cannot draw any firm dividing line in feasibility analysis between impossibility and the types of probabilistic discoveries produced by the social sciences, such as motivated reasoning. Therefore such results have to be accounted for in normative theorising. This thesis builds a novel account of open-mindedness and its related phenomena – credulity and closed-mindedness – and finds that whether one ought to be open-minded is sensitive to a range of contextual criteria. It applies this context-sensitive approach to the case of elected representatives as centrally important figures in modern democracies. In particular, the practice of elections and electoral campaigning require elected representatives to uphold their electoral commitments while in office, an obligation put at risk by open-mindedness. The adversarial political context faced by elected representatives and their limited internal capabilities provides further reasons to deviate from open-mindedness. These findings call into question the central role open-mindedness plays in deliberative democratic theory. As a result, they open up theoretical space to explore alternative justifications for democracy’s legitimacy.
... A democracy-centred ethics, then, enables us to build on the insights of Waldron and Christiano into the nature and justification of basic rights without supposing that we have a very clear idea of the conceptual, moral and political differences between liberal and democratic government. This is desirable because the philosophy of rights is going through a remarkable period of change, with important and unresolved disputes about the best way to think of human rights, and the differences between justice and charity (Cruft et al 2015;Estlund, 2011 and2014). Even conceptual debates about rights are being unsettled by the reasons to suppose that the purpose of some rights is to delineate a socially important status, occupation or relationship, rather than to protect an especially important human interest or choice (Wenar, 2005(Wenar, , 2013(Wenar, , 2015. ...
... 13 See, for example, G.A.Cohen's objections to Rawls' Difference Principle, on the grounds that equality demands a much smaller scope for a 'self-regarding prerogative', or 'personal prerogative' than Rawls and Rawlsians believe. (Gerald A. Cohen, 2008); see also Estlund, 2011 and2014). ...
The core idea of this paper is that we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments to illuminate ethical problems, particularly in the area of political philosophy. Democratic values, rights and institutions lie between the most abstract considerations of ethics and meta-ethics and the most particularised decisions, outcomes and contexts. Hence, this paper argues, we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments, as we best understand them, to structure our theoretical investigations, to test and organise our intuitions and ideas, and to explain and justify our philosophical conclusions in ways analogous to the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories in moral philosophy, or between liberal and republican principles in political philosophy. In this way – or so I will argue – we can interpret and evaluate competing philosophical claims so that they are morally and politically attractive, as well as logically consistent. Specifically, as we will see, a democracy-centred approach to ethics helps to distinguish liberal and democratic approaches to political morality in ways that reflect both the varieties of democratic theory, and the importance of distinguishing democratic from undemocratic forms of liberalism. [First paragraph]
... A democracy-centred ethics, then, enables us to build on the insights of Waldron and Christiano into the nature and justification of basic rights without supposing that we have a very clear idea of the conceptual, moral and political differences between liberal and democratic government. This is desirable because the philosophy of rights is going through a remarkable period of change, with important and unresolved disputes about the best way to think of human rights, and the differences between justice and charity (Cruft et al 2015;Estlund, 2011 and2014). Even conceptual debates about rights are being unsettled by the reasons to suppose that the purpose of some rights is to delineate a socially important status, occupation or relationship, rather than to protect an especially important human interest or choice (Wenar, 2005(Wenar, , 2013(Wenar, , 2015. ...
... 13 See, for example, G.A.Cohen's objections to Rawls' Difference Principle, on the grounds that equality demands a much smaller scope for a 'self-regarding prerogative', or 'personal prerogative' than Rawls and Rawlsians believe. (Gerald A. Cohen, 2008); see also Estlund, 2011 and2014). ...
... The Fundamental Questions are perennial questions in ethics and law, although they are rarely posed alongside each other. The Question of Ownership involves issues of intent and repre sen ta tion, such as whether agents are responsible for the unintended consequences of their actions and whether following orders mitigates responsibility (Estlund, 2007;Finkelstein, 2005). The accused might not be guilty of theft, even if he did take the object intentionally, if he were commanded to do so under the threat of force. ...
... If, through some series of events, the 'victim' were conceived because his family's fortune was stolen, then he would have no claim to compensation. The Question of Fulfilment covers the old issue of whether ' ought implies can' , as well as more recent issues of whether a lack of motivation or feasibility precludes responsibility (Estlund, 2011;Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012). The accused might not be guilty of theft, or might instead be excused, if he had a medical condition that impaired his impulse control. ...
... motivational capacity of human nature. David Estlund (2011) has rejected precisely this kind of claim, holding that 'requirements of social justice are not blocked by facts (if there are any) about human motivational incapacities' (pp. 231-232). ...
... Estlund (2011) explicitly discusses the strains on pp. 226-229.26 ...
In recent work in political philosophy there has been much discussion of two approaches to theorizing about justice that have come to be called ‘ideal theory’ and ‘non-ideal theory’. The distinction was originally articulated by Rawls, who defended his focus on ideal theory in terms of a supposed ‘priority’ of the latter over non-ideal theory. Many critics have rejected this claim of priority and in general have questioned the usefulness of ideal theory. In diagnosing the problem with ideal theory, they have frequently fingered for blame the idealization it involves. In this paper I focus on one particular, much-discussed idealization—full compliance—in order to defend it. Focusing on the assumption, I argue that Rawls’s work is not ideal in the way that it is usually thought to be, is less ideal than is widely recognized, and became less ideal over time. I also argue that critics who in effect claim that it is not realistic enough simply fail to understand Rawls’s central motivation. Finally, I defend the assumption by arguing that there is an important sense in which all theories of justice must assume full compliance. Such an assumption, I argue, is needed if we are to have a plausible basis on which to judge the normative attractiveness of a theory.
... The disagreement begins when we consider what should count as 'accessible', which has to do with how we interpret 'feasible' in the proviso (OF) above. For example, theorists have argued that feasibility should be understood in terms of probability (Lawford-Smith 2013), conditional ability (Estlund, 2011(Estlund, , 2014, possibility (Gheaus, 2013), restricted possibility (Wiens, 2015), rational-volitional capacity (Southwood, 2016), or costliness (Räikkä, 1998). ...
... 10 Both principles are tied to two weak feasibility conditions, demanding that a principle be compatible with the basic features of human nature as we know it and possible to achieve from the status quo (see Buchanan, 2004). These conditions understand feasibility in terms of conditional ability (Estlund, 2011). ...
While methodological and metatheoretical questions pertaining to feasibility have been intensively discussed in the philosophical literature on justice in recent years, these discussions have not permeated the debate on global democracy. The overall aim of this article is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of importing some of the advancements made in this literature into the debate on global democracy, as well as to develop aspects that are relevant for explaining the role of feasibility in normative political theory. This is done by pursuing two arguments. First, to advance the work on the role of feasibility, we suggest as intuitively plausible two metatheoretical constraints on normative political theorizing – the ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’ – which elucidate a number of aspects relevant in determining proper feasibility constraints for an account in political theory. Secondly, to illustrate the usefulness of this feasibility framework, we sketch an account of global democracy consisting of normative principles which respond differently to these aspects and thus are tied to different feasibility constraints as well as exemplify how it may be applied in practice.
... 15 The term seems to be used in my way by, e.g. Estlund (2009) and Wellman (1996) and (2001). Green (2004) uses the term in a similar way. ...
... There is a large literature on the justification of democracy. This is sometimes, Estlund (2009) and Kolodny (2014a) and (2014b), for instance, both present their defences of democracy as including a defence of the legitimacy of democratic states (though both are also supposed to establish the authority of democratic decisions). (They both use the term 'legitimacy' in roughly the same way as I do.) ...
Enforcement seems to be an essential and ubiquitous feature of state societies. My thesis explores arguments for the kind of general and exclusive moral permission to enforce that states claim, and in particular the role that feasibility considerations play in them. I argue that premises about the infeasibility of alternatives to a state’s enforcement are essential to the success of any such argument. States’ permission to enforce can be justified, if at all, in response to the unfortunate circumstances in which we find ourselves. I develop a general multivocal account of the concept of feasibility, according to which the concept can be made precise in many different ways, no single one of which is obviously privileged as uniquely relevant to moral theory. This account has the result of casting doubt on the assumption that states’ permission to enforce can be taken for granted. Arguments for this permission may succeed when we make their feasibility premises precise in some ways, but not others. Understanding this, I argue, helps illuminate how we ought to think about and treat the state enforcement we face in the real world.
... use, if any, for Rawls' ideal justice. See, for instance,Sen (2009), Valentini (2012,Cohen (2009),Gaus (2016) and Estlund (2019), amongst others. 5 This can be seen as a second form of inability, namely, something that seems to be against the 'nature' of a social agent, or against the 'deepest features of human psychology'(Valentini, 2012, p. 660).Estlund (2011) calls this 'limits to what humans will be able to muster the will to do' (p. 207) despite their recognition of the desirability of the action.Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
This study examines an important aspect of energy history and policy: the intertwinement of energy technologies with ideals. Ideals play an important role in energy visions and innovation pathways. Aspirations to realize technical, social, and political ideals indicate a long-term commitment in the design of energy systems, distinguishable from commitment to other abstract goals, such as values. This study offers an analytical scheme that could help to conceptualize these differences and their impact on energy policy. In the proposed model, two spheres of interaction are highlighted: a material sphere in which values and technologies co-evolve, and an imaginary sphere in which ideals interact with idealized technologies. Furthermore, the relation between these two spheres can be understood in different ways. This study examines three cases that are illustrative of the different roles of ideals in the development of energy technologies and visions: (1) the evolution of safety in nuclear reactor design; (2) visions of atomic power in France; (3) the political idealization of a tidal power scheme in the Severn Estuary. Finally, the developed model implies more general insights for the development of sociotechnical systems. Amongst others, it shows why certain projects and technologies remain a political, but not a techno–economic option.
... In "Political Normativity and the Functional Autonomy of Politics" (Burelli 2022), I sought to defend political realism from its many critics (Erman and Möller 2015;Estlund 2011;2014;Leader Maynard 2021;Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018;Miller 2016). I argued-methodologically-that political normativity can be both autonomous of and prior to moral considerations by interpreting it as a case of functional normativity. ...
My response to Eva Erman & Niklas Möller's reply paper "The Problem of Political Normativity Understood as Functional Normativity"
... If even Rawls' principles survive Cohen's critique, it is more bark than bite. David Estlund has developed a more tempered and nuanced anti-practicalism that evades some of these objections (Estlund, 2011a(Estlund, , 2014(Estlund, , 2019. Unlike Cohen, he grants for the sake of argument that principles of justice may depend on facts and be subject to feasibility requirements (Estlund, 2011a, pp. ...
This essay provide an overview of debates about the method of political philosophy that have recently gripped the field, focusing on the relationship of theory to practice. These debates can be usefully organized using two oppositions that together carve the field into three broad families of views. Call “practicalism” the view that the theory of justice exists to guide political action. Call “utopianism” the view that reflection on the idea of a just society plays an important role in the theory of justice. Call the view that combines the two positions, “utopian practicalism”. On this view, reflection on the nature of a just society has an important role to play in guiding action. There would appear to be two ways to depart from this position: by rejecting the view's utopianism or its practicalism. So we find in the literature three broad camps: utopian practicalists, anti‐utopians, and anti‐practicalists. This essay provide an opinionated overview the ongoing debates between these three broad positions. It touches on the recent cases against practicalism by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund, the comparativist methodologies advocated by anti‐utopians such as Amartya Sen and Gerry Gaus, and systems failure approaches of Elizabeth Anderson and David Wiens. It also considers the recent development of novel utopian practicalist perspectives in the work of theorists including Erik Wright, Tommie Shelby, Lea Ypi, Pablo Gilabert, and Ben Laurence.
... ). Zu Erfolgsaussicht weiterführend:Shue (2018);Southwood (2016Southwood ( , 2019;Estlund (2011).659 Mieth (2012), S. 220.Teil IV -Situative Merkmale: Zulässigkeit, Zumutbarkeit und Aussicht auf Erfolg begründet werden muss. ...
This book deals with the philosophical question of what forms of justice exist to which refugees are entitled, especially in Western democracies. For this purpose, it first addresses the discussion of positive forms of such justice in general, in order to examine the case of refugees on this basis. To this end, the discussion is extended to examine the relevant collective agents such as nation states or the EU. Finally, this book critically examines the possible limitations of governments’ duty to provide justice to refugees based on the criteria of objective needs, competence, admissibility, reasonableness and the prospect of success.
... So would I. Then next, it seems, we should try to discover and point out what's now badly done in cities, because of which they are not run in that way, and what's the smallest thing such that, if it were changed, our 28 David Estlund (2011) argues, against Rawls, that we should not take human nature to be a constraint on political norms. 29 Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν ἀληθές, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν, ἀποδεῖξαι πῇ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ' ἂν εἴη, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι. ...
This paper argues that there are three distinct senses of possibility at play in the Republic’s discussion of whether the best city is possible: natural possibility, possibility for existing cities, and ideal possibility. It is argued that Socrates makes different claims about each of the three political proposals in Book v. (1) Women guardians are argued to be naturally possible. (2) Socrates considers it an open question whether the common family of guardians (the so-called ‘community of women and children’) is naturally possible. He argues, however, that it is ideally possible. (3) The philosopher-king is claimed to be possible in the strongest sense: it is not only naturally possible, it is also possible for existing cities. It is for this reason that the common family of guardians is ideally possible. This clarifies the sense in which the best city is best.
... 4 More specifically, Rawls distinguishes partial compliance of the principles of justice and unfavourable conditions as characteristics of the non-ideal society(Rawls 1999, p. 216). Some scholars make finer distinctions about types of feasibility constraints (e.g.,Gilabert 2017;Sirsch 2020;Estlund 2011;Wiens 2016a;Hamlin 2017;Guillery 2021). For the present purpose, the rough distinction of the ideal and nonideal should suffice, since my argument in this paper does not hinge on detailed specification of what the ideal (theory) is. ...
What role does our knowledge about the ideal society play in guiding policymaking in the real world? One intuitive answer is to approximate. Namely, we have a duty to approximate the ideal within the relevant constraints of feasibility. However, political philosophers seem to have what might be called ‘approximatophobia'. Many philosophers, including idealists such as David Estlund, warn against approximation. Their criticism is chiefly motivated by ‘the problem of second best’, which points out that your second-best option may not be closest to your best option. This paper aims to dispel ‘approximatophobia'. The difficulty posed by the problem of second best is often overstated. More positively, I present a novel defence of approximation, arguing that approximation of an ideal can be a reasonably reliable default strategy of action guidance in the real world. Difficulties that may afflict the project of approximation can be mitigated by sophistication of the project of approximation. After showing that critics of approximation overstep their mark in issuing the strong or moderate warning against approximation, I propose an account of sophisticated approximation. It seeks a series of reforms that make existing social institutions closer to the ideal based on careful selection of frame of analysis. Three virtuous correlations are identified as indicators for successful project of approximation, linking descriptive similarity to desirability, feasibility and knowledge of the ideal. I also explain a two-staged strategy of sophisticating the way you approximate the ideal, with an expected positive feedback effect.
... I opt for the term 'strategy' here to denote that the ideal theory and nonideal theory are to be understood as approaches to making the world more just, not as idle modes of inquiry aiming to discern political truth. Some philosophers who might plausibly be labeled ideal theorists, such as G.A. Cohen (2003) or David Estlund (2011a, 2011b2014 are, at least to some extent, okay with their account saying little to nothing on the topic of how to reform society. This essay is unconcerned with ideal theory and nonideal theory, for that matter, that is idle in this respect. ...
The modern social world is unjust. It is also complex. What does this latter fact imply about the kind of approach that should be used in ameliorating the injustice expressed in the former fact? One answer, recently put forth by Jacob Barrett, is that ideal theory, which he understands as being fundamentally defined by the identification and subsequent pursuit of an aspirational macro-level institutional goal, lacks a place in social reform. The reason he thinks ideal theory lacks a place has to do with its inability to deal with complexity. Pace Barrett, I argue that ideal theory, suitably understood, can play a valuable role in social reform in a complex world. While some ideal theorists have underappreciated the extent to which complexity considerations complicate social reform, this does not mean that there is no place for it. This paper surveys the resources ideal theory has available to cope with what I call the challenge of complexity. Although the coping techniques will be successful to varying degrees, I believe, in aggregate, a compelling case can be made that ideal theory can combat the challenge of complexity. Still, one may worry that even if ideal theory can adequately deal with complexity, it cannot adequately deal with ever-changing social circumstances. Call this the dancing landscape objection. A static ideal theory cannot overcome it, but a dynamic ideal theory could. In sum, dynamic ideal theory can contribute to social reform in a complex and mutable social world.
... Some researchers choose biology and psychology as the basis of human sciences. They are opposed by representatives of humanitarian knowledge, among whom there are also many disagreements (Castro, 2005;Chibeni, 2005;Estlund, 2011). Note that philosophers also differ in their orientations in searching for essential and system-forming concepts of a person. ...
The principal goal of the study is to characterize the philosophical discourse of the development and improvement of human nature in the context of its intellectualization. The article uses a set of methods that make it possible to reveal a philosophical analysis of the development and improvement of human nature in the context of its intellectualization, in particular: general scientific methods; logical methods of theoret- ical analysis; technical analysis, clarification. Because of the study, the philosophical aspects of the devel- opment and improvement of human nature in the context of its intellectualization were characterized. The needs of the modern economic, political, spiritual development of society require further, deeper research of the actual problems of the doctrine of man. Therefore, interest in man and humanity is becoming espe- cially acute, prompting to justify social and cultural transformations.
... However, as a part of a much larger conversation over the role of ideal or non-ideal theory within political philosophy, 16 some scholars deny that feasibility can play this role of offering a constraint on justice. So-called 'ideal theorists' maintain that the demands of justice transcend questions of feasibility (Estlund, 2011). 17 While feasibility may be something to consider, the infeasibility of a market need not be an obstacle to its permissibility. ...
The ‘limits of markets’ debate broadly concerns the question of when it is (im)permissible to have a market in some good. Markets can be of tremendous benefit to society, but many have felt that certain goods should not be for sale (e.g., sex, kidneys, bombs). Their sale is argued to be corrupting, exploitative, or to express a form of disrespect. In Markets without Limits, Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski have recently argued to the contrary: For any good, as long as it is permissible to give it for free, then it is permissible to give it for money. Their thesis has led to a number of engaging objections, and I leverage recent work on the nature of feasibility within political philosophy to offer a new challenge.
I argue that feasibility offers a constraint on which markets can be permissibly implemented. Though it may be possible to create a morally acceptable version of an otherwise repugnant market, some of these markets may be infeasible, and so we are not permitted to implement them. After laying out this challenge, I consider several replies. They concern the relevance of feasibility, and whether any markets really are infeasible. This provides an opportunity to explore the dangers of pursuing the infeasible and with markets generally. I conclude by considering what might lead us to pursue these markets despite their infeasibility, or how knowledge of infeasibility may prove useful regardless.
... And we certainly do not want to say that lack of motivation always defeats moral requirement (cf. Estlund 2011). ...
A common objection to a proposal or theory in political philosophy is that it is not feasible to realise what it calls for. This is commonly taken to be sufficient to reject a proposal or theory: feasibility, on this common view, operates as a straightforward constraint on moral and political theory, whatever is not feasible is simply ruled out. This paper seeks to understand what we mean when we say that some proposal or outcome is or is not feasible. It will argue that no single binary definition can be given. Rather, there is a whole range of possible specifications of the term ‘feasible’, each of which selects a range of facts of the world to hold fixed. No single one of these possible specifications, though, is obviously privileged as giving the appropriate understanding of ‘feasibility’ tout court . The upshot of my account of feasibility, then, will be that the common view of feasibility as a straightforward constraint cannot be maintained: in order to reject a moral theory, it will not be sufficient simply to say that it is not feasible.
... The disagreement begins when we consider what should count as 'accessible', which has to do with how we interpret 'feasible' in the proviso (OF) above. For example, theorists have argued that feasibility should be understood in terms of probability (Lawford-Smith 2013), conditional ability (Estlund 2011(Estlund , 2014, possibility (Gheaus 2013), restricted possibility (Wiens 2015), rational-volitional capacity (Southwood 2016), or costliness (Räikkä 1998). ...
... Consider David Estlund, who has argued that justice might require even things of people that they cannot bring themselves to do, such as not favorizing one's own family and friends, or voting for a party whose policies are against one's self-interest (Estlund 2011(Estlund , 2016. Now, perhaps a society in which everyone can bring themselves to do what justice requires is feasibly achievable through adding enough culture and stirring; but perhaps not. ...
... However, one can also make the opposite claim, stating that idealization is an important part of practical political philosophy (Gilabert 2012;Estlund 2011a;Levy 2016;Rawls 1999aRawls , 2001 or that it is, at least, not automatically detrimental to the practical relevance of political philosophical thinking (Valentini 2009). A minimalist defense of idealization argues that idealization is necessary in theory-building: Its function is to set "aside details for tractability's sake" (Schmidtz 2016: 4). ...
Building on the work of John Rawls, this book offers a conception of ideal theory which provides practical guidance and a critical perspective on politics, institutions and society. The author develops this approach by discussing recent criticism of ideal theory by authors such as Amartya Sen and Raymond Geuss. Answering Sen’s criticism, the author proposes a novel account of feasibility in relation to ideal theory, especially with regard to ideal institutional design. As a reply to Geuss’ criticism, he discusses constructivist approaches of moral theory-building. Building on this discussion, the book develops an account of practical ideal–theoretical thinking that can be used for evaluating and criticizing societies and can guide institutional design under nonideal conditions.
... For more on the relationship between motivational capacities and the demands of justice more generally, seeEstlund (2011). Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. ...
... This is the sort of realism that has been thrown up by the ideal and non-ideal theory debate. 31 Accepting most of the major premises of the mainstream liberal political paradigm, this family of approaches aims to bring normative political theory of a familiar Rawlsian type closer to the real world by engaging in fact-sensitive normative theorising, that is, by improving ideal theory through incorporating real features of the world into the act of political theorising itself. 32 Such theories, it is argued, are more likely to be practicable and politically relevant (i.e. ...
In the last decade or so, political realism has become a fashionable phrase to describe a new (or, perhaps, rediscovered) understanding of political theory. Many otherwise disparate thinkers, either willingly contributed to or have retrospectively been thrown into what one of the scholars has likened to a community stew. Among the latter, Michael Oakeshott is highly interesting, given one of the central tenets of contemporary political realism is a reworking of the relationship between politics and philosophy, which Oakeshott famously vehemently rejected. In this chapter, the author considers Michael Oakeshott in relation to contemporary political realism, not primarily because interpreting him as a political realist would enable us to understand him better (though, incidentally, it might), but because, his understanding of the modern political predicament can potentially shed new light on the nature of the relationship between political theory and political practice, which is still a matter of controversy among contemporary realists.
... Estlund responds that if the facts of politics are such that some political philosophers fail to discuss politics, that doesn't matter -we still may be discussing justice(2014: 130-131).15 For this language of bringing oneself to x, seeEstlund 2011;Southwood 2015. ...
Political philosophy offers a range of utopian proposals, from open borders to global egalitarianism. Some object that these proposals ought to be constrained by what is feasible, while others insist that what justice demands does not depend on what we can bring about. Currently, this debate is mired in disputes over the fundamental nature of justice and the ultimate purpose of political philosophy. I take a different approach, proposing that we should consider which facts could fill out a feasibility requirement. This search for the facts requires requires looking to the social sciences, but I argue that it turns out that the social sciences will not provide us with findings that rule out, nor even count against, the kinds of proposals that political philosophers actually make, whether ideal or non-ideal. At the least, to deny this requires adopting deeply controversial commitments within the philosophy of social science. Thus, I conclude that a feasibility requirement has little practical use for political philosophers. Disputes over that requirement ought to be replaced by other, more fruitful ways for political philosophers to address both the findings of social science and the debates over non-ideal theory or political realism.
... If people (indeed, easily) can give money to famine relief, at little cost to themselves, the fact (if a fact) that they are not motivated to do so does not entail that it is infeasible to them. David Estlund (2011Estlund ( , 2014Estlund ( , 2016 similarly argues that motivational deficiencies do not entail infeasibility: 'being unable to bring oneself to do something [apart from in certain pathological circumstances] does not entail being unable to do it ' (2016, p. 353). David Wiens argues against this position, claiming that there are non-trivial cases where the fact that a person cannot motivate herself to act in a certain way entails that she cannot in fact act in that way. ...
Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates—such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and political moralism and political realism—are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’, through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory.
I argue first that some propositions are obligatory without being obligatory for anyone (i.e., they are impersonally obligatory): if each of us has promised to vote and thus has an obligation to vote, then it is obligatory (i.e., morally required) that we all vote, but it is not obligatory for anyone that we all vote (because, for example, what is obligatory for you is that you vote, not that we all vote). I argue next that “ought-implies-can” fails for impersonal obligatoriness: if each of us has promised to (and can) finish first in a given race, and thus it is impersonally obligatory that we all finish first (i.e., that we all finish at the same time), it does not follow that anyone (or we) can make it the case that we all finish first (we may be unable to coordinate). I defend instead the following principle: if a proposition is (impersonally) obligatory—or forbidden—at time t, then it is historically contingent at t (i.e., both the proposition and its negation are logically compatible with the history of the world up to and including t).
The contemporary methodological debate about justice has centered around a dispute about the value of so-called ideal theory. I argue that justice performs a social-guiding function, which explains how people should respond to their limited and fallible abilities to realize justice institutionally. My argument helps to re-orientate the contemporary methodological debate. The obvious disagreement between many prominent supporters and skeptics of ideal theory obscures the fact that they are united by a false assumption: the practical value of justice exclusively consists of its institution-guiding function. To capture the overlooked social-guiding function, a richer normative theory of justice is required; I show how such a theory can be supplied by “ideal-transitional” principles.
Por que a teoria política normativa voltada para questões de justiça social e política deveria se ocupar de princípios no âmbito daquilo que John Rawls denominou “teoria ideal”, em contraste com a “teoria não ideal” da justiça? Será que necessitamos desenvolver e refinar uma teoria ideal da justiça para determinar o que a justiça requer nas condições não ideais com as quais no defrontamos? Será que a “teoria ideal” da justiça é capaz de orientar a ação – decisões políticas e escolhas institucionais – em condições não ideais? Se a resposta para essas duas perguntas for “não”, então deveríamos acima de tudo nos empenhar em desenvolver uma teoria não ideal da justiça. Nas versões mais fortes dessa objeção, como a de Amartya Sen em The Ideia of Justice, podemos dispensar inteiramente a teoria ideal da justiça. Contra essa linha de objeção, que também é sustentada, de formas distintas, por autores como Onora O’Neill, Colin Farrelly e Charles Mills, este artigo desenvolve uma argumentação em duas etapas. Em primeiro lugar, sustenta-se que há razões para valorizar a teorização ideal que são independentes da relação que possa ter com a teoria não ideal. Em uma segunda etapa, sustenta-se que a teoria ideal da justiça, embora deixe enorme quantidade de trabalho (empírico e normativo) a ser feito, é imprescindível para determinar o que a justiça requer de nós aqui e agora.
This article provides an account of moral obligations that we have towards present generations, which require us to produce outcomes that are similar to those we would be required to produce if we had moral obligations to future generations. Discharging these duties enables us to secure the kinds of goods for future generations that we intuitively think we ought to provide in the absence of an answer to the non-identity problem. In this sense, the non- identity problem is avoided rather than solved. Nevertheless, a significant upshot of this account is that it provides a basis for practical action in the face of theoretical uncertainty.
Apocalypse, it seems, is everywhere. Preachers with vast followings proclaim the world's end. Apocalyptic fears grip even the non-religious amid climate change, pandemics, and threats of nuclear war. But as these ideas pervade popular discourse, grasping their logic remains elusive. Ben Jones argues that we can gain insight into apocalyptic thought through secular thinkers. He starts with a puzzle: Why would secular thinkers draw on Christian apocalyptic beliefs – often dismissed as bizarre –to interpret politics? The apocalyptic tradition proves appealing in part because it theorizes a special relation between crisis and utopia. Apocalyptic thought points to crisis as the vehicle to bring the impossible within reach, thus offering resources for navigating challenges in ideal theory, which tries to imagine the best and most just society. By examining apocalyptic thought's appeal and risks, this Open Access study arrives at new insights on the limits of ideal theory and utopian hope.
This article analyzes justice as a category. Like all aspects of human activity, justice needs grounds that provide reliability. This article shows that in the history of human thinking, two approaches to comprehending the foundations of justice have been created. The first approach is based on recognition of the dominance of moral principles as the foundation for justice, and independence from empirical reality, political, social changes, and scientific discoveries. This is the independent path, which recognizes the independence of the fundamental principles of justice from facts. The second approach was formulated in the theory of justice by J.Rawls. He made an attempt to create a universal view of justice and was associated with the justification of justice by scientific theories created by scientists in political science, psychology, sociology, and other fields of knowledge. This approach was called dependent way, and its representatives consider justice to be a product of real society and recognize the consent of citizens as the basis of justice, in the normative life of society, giving preference to contractual relations. Both ways of solving the problem of the justice foundations have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither of them, taken separately, gives a satisfactory result. The experience of the Russian unity philosophy reveals a harmonious way to the solution of this problem. It shows that the foundation of justice is created by each individual personally, in condition that any person considers the circumstances of one’s life through the prism of his spiritual nature. This process looks like a practical application of norms that are absolute in nature, while deviations and fluctuations are possible but in the end there is always a return to the original position. The authors call this position flexible transcendence.
In the last couple of years, increased attention has been directed at the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinctively political normativity. With few exceptions, this question has so far only been explored by political realists. However, the discussion about a distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta-theoretical questions of general importance for political theory. Although the terminology varies, it is a widely distributed phenomenon within political theory to rely on a normative source which is said to be political rather than moral, or at least foremost political.
This article tackles the issue of offshore tax sheltering from the perspective of normative political realism. Tax sheltering is a pressing contemporary policy challenge, with hundreds of billions in private assets protected in offshore trusts and shell companies. Indeed, tax sheltering produces a variety of empirical dilemmas that render it a distinctive challenge for global governance. Therefore, it is crucial for normative political theorists to confront this problem. A realist approach offers three distinct advantages, elaborated in the three subsequent sections of the article. First, it relaxes the theoretical burden by starting from the real practice of tax evasion rather than from an abstract theory of equality or justice. Second, this approach recognizes that sheltering is a political harm: a threat to the very maintenance of order, not just a problem of inequality or injustice. If politicians fail at such polity maintenance, realism's ethic of responsibility provides clear political reasons why they should be held accountable. Third, realism's focus on power and its acceptance of coercion open up new strategies for addressing the problem that would not be allowed by theories with a stronger emphasis on consensus.
Il 2020 ha visto la pubblicazione di due notevoli opere sulla filosofia politica: Utopohobia: On the Limits (if any) of Political Philosophy, di David Estlund e What is Political Philosophy?, di Charles Larmore. Ci sarebbe molto da dire su entrambi questi volumi. Tuttavia, lo spazio a disposizione è limitato e impone una scelta. Ho optato per questa: dopo aver offerto una sintesi criminalmente breve del nucleo argomentativo dei due volumi (sezione 2), li metterò in dialogo. Cercherò, in altre parole, di usare alcune risorse offerte dall’uno per interrogare e problematizzare alcuni aspetti centrali dell’altro. Per quanto riguarda Larmore, l’aspetto che discuterò è il primato che egli assegna al disaccordo e al problema della legittimità in filosofia politica: un punto che interrogherò a partire da alcune critiche offerte da Estlund nei primi capitoli del suo libro (sezione 3). Per quanto
riguarda Estlund, mi concentrerò sul tema della severità dei principi di giustizia e, più nello specifico, sulla questione di quanto esigenti possano essere tali principi se devono essere riconosciuti come tali (ossia come principi di giustizia). In merito, alcune delle obiezioni che Larmore muove contro Cohen torneranno utili, anche se solo trasversalmente, per portare Estlund verso alcune conclusioni problematiche (sezione 4).
The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.
The open borders view is frequently dismissed for making infeasible demands. This is a potent strategy. Unlike normative arguments regarding open borders, which tend to be relatively intractable, the charge of infeasibility is supposed to operate as what we call a “normative argument‐stopper.” Nonetheless, we argue that the strategy fails. Bringing about open borders is perfectly feasible on the most plausible account of feasibility. We consider and reject what we take to be the only three credible ways to save the charge of infeasibility: by proposing an alternative account of feasibility; by proposing an alternative, more circumscribed interpretation of the subject‐matter of feasibility claims; and by proposing a more expansive account of the addressees of the demand for open borders. The first fails to vindicate the claim that infeasibility is a normative argument‐stopper. The second does not provide an argument against open borders at all. The third underestimates the power of at least some non‐state actors. We conclude by drawing some lessons for the open borders view and the use of feasibility in politics more generally.
In Utopophobia Estlund offers a prominent version of a conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility (of action). The incentives account preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible. Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. If we accept that ought implies feasible, then we should reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. But we can still recognise normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own.
When we talk about enhancement or modifying the human body, we often put forward the argument of the limits of human nature, and therefore, acts that violate those limits are judged negatively. This view, however, contains assumptions that lead to logical fallacies. In the face of the new era, where scientific and technological achievements are changing human capabilities, we will increasingly be confronted with ethical dilemmas as well as dilemmas at a practical, political and institutional level.
As a guide when dealing with such dilemmas, in this article we will firstly attempt to free ourselves from the logical fallacy of resorting to the argument of violating the limits of human nature, and secondly to see how the prevailing ethical and political stances address the dilemmas associated with human enhancement. For illustration purposes we will adopt two points of view: Iron Man's and Aristotle's.
The first one focuses on human potential, free will and individual rights. The second one focuses on social purpose, social justice and human eudaimonia within the community. Both viewpoints set criteria and conditions for the enhancement and improvement of human nature, but fail to provide a satisfactory answer that could act as a rule in practical terms, so that a future legislator can take a clear stand on these issues.
A safe and at the same time practical approach would be to think beyond personal volition and social purpose, with a general perspective that will help us exculpate and stop demonizing human enhancement. Could there be a minimum “eligibility” condition, according to which any enhancement that satisfies it, could be legitimized in the future? On the way to this quest, it is our duty to approach without fear but with prudence, self-restraint, respect and care for mankind and our fellow man, the inevitable, immediate future that is now visible in front of us. -Full text available in Greek only- Gounaris, A., Chrysopoulos, P. (2019). Iron Man vs Aristotle: Transhumanism, the Limits of Human Nature and the Politics of Prescription Eyeglasses. Theologia. Official Journal of the Church of Greece. v.90.3 pp. 121 – 161 . Γούναρης, Α., Χρυσόπουλος,. Π. (2019). Iron Man vs Αριστοτέλη: ο Τρανσουμανισμός, τα Όρια της Ανθρώπινης Φύσης και η Πολιτική για τα Γυαλιά Μυωπίας. Θεολογία. Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος. τομ. 90ος τεύχος 3ον σ.σ. 121 – 161
„Politiker und Politikerinnen sollten bei ihrem Wettstreit um politische Ämter keine Gewalt anwenden.“ Das ist eines von vielen Beispielen für normativ-evaluative Hypothesen. Während innerhalb der zuständigen politikwissenschaftlichen Teildisziplin „Politische Theorie“ der Methodologie der Ideengeschichte ausreichend Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wird, lernen Studierende bisher sehr wenig darüber, wie methodologisch mit normativen Hypothesen aus der Welt der Politik verfahren werden kann.
Dieses Buch ist in zwei Teilen aufgebaut. Im Grundlagenteil werden die Beweisbarkeit bzw. Falsifizierbarkeit von normativen Hypothesen, der Status von empirischen Daten für normative Hypothesen und die Sein/Sollens-Dichotomie in den Blick genommen. Im Anwendungsteil wird dann anhand eines Beispiels performativ die Praxis des normativen Forschungsansatzes demonstriert. Als Prüfkriterien für normative Hypothesen kommen dabei der Schleier der Unwissenheit, das diskursethische Verfahren, das Verfahren des Unabhängigen Beobachters und der Kategorische Imperativ zum Einsatz.
Der Inhalt
Verortung normativer Forschung innerhalb der Politikwissenschaft.- Charakter und Struktur von normativen Hypothesen.- Die Überprüfung normativer Hypothesen mit Hilfe des Schleiers der Unwissenheit.- Die Überprüfung normativer Hypothesen mit Hilfe des Kategorischen Imperativs.- u.a.
Die Zielgruppen
Dozierende und Studierende der Politikwissenschaft
Der Autor
Dr. Dr. Jörg Tremmel ist apl. Professor am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen.
People tend to be biased and irrational about politics. Should this constrain what our normative theories of democracy can require? David Estlund argues that the answer is ‘no’. He contends that even if such facts show that the requirements of a normative theory are very unlikely to be met, this need not imply that the theory is unduly unrealistic. I argue that the application of Estlund’s argument to political irrationality depends on a false presupposition: mainly, that being rational about politics is something people could easily do if they tried. Since the empirical evidence shows that being rational about politics is actually quite difficult, Estlund’s argument comes up short. Moreover, I argue that the argument cannot plausibly be extended to insulate normative theories of democracy from facts about political irrationality because of the need for constraints of realism to explain the crucial role that appeals to (reasonable) disagreement play within such theories.
Are we able to do everything we ought to do? According to the important but controversial Ought Implies Can principle, the answer is yes. In this book Alex King sheds some much-needed light on this principle. She argues that it is flawed because we are obligated to perform some actions that we cannot perform, and goes on to present a suggested theory for anyone who would deny the principle. She examines the traditional motivations for Ought Implies Can, and finds that they to a large degree do not support it. Using examples like gay rights, addiction, and disability, she argues that we can preserve many of the motivations that led us to the principle by thinking more about what we, as individuals or institutions, can fairly demand of ourselves and each other.
This article analyses utopian and dystopian literature and its role in political education in order to make the case for imparting a ‘utopian aspiration’ that nurtures hope for the pursuit of political ideals. I note an ‘anti‐utopian’ theme in both literature and political philosophy, a theme that emerges in a particularly fascinating pair of works in the dystopian canon, Orwell's 1984 and Zamyatin's We. I argue that Zamyatin's story provides a more nuanced and valuable approach to the problem of political ideals and their potential for harm than the bleak message favoured by Orwell. Utopian and dystopian themes, I contend, can offer an invaluable orientation in political critique and practice if they nourish a utopian aspiration. The idea of hope for the new is a vital part of our political education, which is too easily dismissed by critics who purport to proffer more ‘realistic’ views.
Within the last decade or so, political philosophers have undergone intense disagreement over the proper methodology of political philosophy. This paper contributes to and tries to move past this debate by offering a new way of thinking about what it is political philosophers are trying to do. Instead of being either ideal or non-ideal theorists, political philosophers can orient themselves east of Eden or west of Babel. After examining different possible research projects, I argue that the most promising route forward for political philosophers is theorizing that is non-ideal and west of Babel. The paper ends by articulating what such a research program might look like.
Buchanan’s approach to political economy is often characterized as rejecting romance in favour of realism: as taking feasibility seriously. But Buchanan provides no detailed account of his understanding of feasibility. This chapter discusses the idea of feasibility and its role at the constitutional, political and individual levels of Buchanan’s work, offers a reconstruction of Buchanan’s position on feasibility based on the idea of politics as exchange, and locates that position in the context of the more recent discussion of the concept of feasibility in the political philosophy literature.
Many have expected that understanding the evolution of norms should, in some way, bear on our first-order normative outlook: How norms evolve should shape which norms we accept. But recent philosophy has not done much to shore up this expectation. Most existing discussions of evolution and norms either jump headlong into the is/ought gap or else target meta-ethical issues, such as the objectivity of norms. My aim in this paper is to sketch a different way in which evolutionary considerations can feed into normative thinking—focusing on stability. I will discuss two (related) forms of argument that utilize information about social stability drawn from evolutionary models, and employs it to assess claims in political philosophy. One such argument treats stability as feature of social states that may be taken into account alongside other features. The other uses stability as a constraint on the realization of social ideals, via a version of the ought-implies-can maxim. These forms of argument are not new; indeed they have a history going back at least to early modern philosophy. But their marriage with evolutionary information is relatively recent, has a significantly novel character, and has received little attention in recent moral and political philosophy.
When we can’t live up to the ultimate standards of morality, how can moral theory give us guidance? We can distinguish between ideal and non‐ideal theory to see that there are different versions of the voluntarist constraint, ‘ought implies can.’ Ideal moral theory identifies the best standard, so its demands are constrained by one version. Non‐ideal theory tells us what to do given our psychological and motivational shortcomings and so is constrained by others. Moral theory can now both provide an ultimate standard and give us guidance; this view also gives us new insights into demandingness and blame.
There is an important basic similarity underlying a number of recent works in apparently widely separated fields of economic theory. Upon examination, it would appear that the authors have been rediscovering, in some of the many guises given it by various specific problems, a single general theorem. This theorem forms the core of what may be called The General Theory of Second Best. Although the main principles of the theory of second best have undoubtedly gained wide acceptance, no general statement of them seems to exist. Furthermore, the principles often seem to be forgotten in the context of specific problems and, when they are rediscovered and stated in the form pertinent to some problem, this seems to evoke expressions of surprise and doubt rather than of immediate agreement and satisfaction at the discovery of yet another application of the already accepted generalizations.
When soldiers find it morally comfortable to kill civilians and the public accepts such actions easily, philosophers are inclined to ask whether their comfort and acceptance rests on a misunderstanding. If it does, then philosophy could save lives by clearing up the problem. But most recent discussion has been about the wrong issue — whether killing non-combatants is wrong, and if so, why. That is all beside the point. Soldiers who kill civilians, in my experience, believe already that it is a bad thing to do. That they consider their actions at least prima facie wrong is evident from their readiness with excuses and justifications. Indeed, many of them take care to silence their consciences in advance with arguments of self-exoneration for the wrongs they are about to commit. We may reasonably hope that these soldiers would find it harder to kill civilians without those arguments to relieve their anticipated guilt.
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).
G. A. COHEN is Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory and a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. His most recent book is Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge, 1995) and he is a frequent contributor to Philosophy & Public Affairs. The article that appears here is an expanded version of one of his 1996 Gifford Lectures.
28 On the distinction between excuse and justification, see Paul Woodruff Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers at the Expense of Civilians
28 On the distinction between excuse and justification, see Paul Woodruff, " Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers
at the Expense of Civilians, " supplement, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1982): 159-76; and Marcia Baron,
" Justifications and Excuses, " Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2004-2005).
- Donald Moon
Donald Moon, review of Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market, Ethics 94 (October 1983): 146-50, at p.
Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society
See the reply by Carens: "Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian Society," Political Theory 14 (February 1986):
31-49.
This translation is from Practical Philosophy The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
- Grundlegung Kant
- J Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten Mary
- Gregor
Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Vol. 4 of the Academy edition, p. 425. This translation is from
Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanual Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 76.
I am indebted in what I say in this paragraph to Nomy Arpaly
I am indebted in what I say in this paragraph to Nomy Arpaly, "Moral Worth,"
Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 223-45, which is also chapter 3 of her Unprincipled Virtue:
An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
What's Wrong with Possibilism Analysis 69
- Ralph Wedgewood
11 For two recent short discussions, see Christopher Woodard, " What's Wrong with Possibilism, " Analysis 69 (April
2009): 219–26; and Ralph Wedgewood, " Against Actualism, " PEA Soup,
<http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2009/09/against-actualism.html>.
Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?
- Shelly Kagan
and Shelly Kagan, "Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (Summer 1984).
Nicholas Sturgeon reports this observation as lore among Cornell graduate students. See " What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True? " supplement
Nicholas Sturgeon reports this observation as lore among Cornell graduate students. See " What Difference Does It
Make Whether Moral Realism Is True? " supplement, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986).
On the distinction between excuse and justification, see Paul Woodruff
On the distinction between excuse and justification, see Paul Woodruff, "Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers
at the Expense of Civilians," supplement, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1982): 159-76; and Marcia Baron,
"Justifications and Excuses," Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2004-2005).
- Donald Moon
J. Donald Moon, review of Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market, Ethics 94 (October 1983): 146-50, at p.
For some use of these issues in political philosophy, see
- G A Cohen
For some use of these issues in political philosophy, see G. A. Cohen, "Where the Action Is: On the Site of
This translation is from Practical Philosophy
- Grundlegung Kant
- Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten
Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Vol. 4 of the Academy edition, p. 425. This translation is from
Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanual Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 76.
There is dispute about whether an act can be both justified and excused, but that doesn't affect my claim that not all excused acts are justified. For a recent argument that all justified acts are excused but not vice versa, see Mark McBride
There is dispute about whether an act can be both justified and excused, but that doesn't affect my claim that not
all excused acts are justified. For a recent argument that all justified acts are excused but not vice versa, see Mark
McBride, "Justifications and Excuses: Mutually Exclusive?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (June 2011).