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In this chapter, we present the social worlds framework, a form of analysis used in a
wide array of STS studies. The social worlds framework focuses on meaning-making
amongst groups of actors—collectivities of various sorts—and on collective action—
people “doing things together” (Becker, 1986) and working with shared objects,
which in science and technology often include highly specialized tools and
technologies (Clarke & Fujimura, 1992; Star & Ruhleder, 1996). Social worlds are
defined as “universes of discourse,” shared discursive spaces that are profoundly rela-
tional (Strauss, 1978). Over time, social worlds typically segment into multiple worlds,
intersect with other worlds with which they share substantive/topical interests and
commitments, and merge. If and when the number of social worlds becomes large
and crisscrossed with conflicts, different sorts of careers, viewpoints, funding sources,
and so on, the whole is analyzed as an arena. An arena, then, is composed of multi-
ple worlds organized ecologically around issues of mutual concern and commitment
to action.
This framework thus assumes multiple collective actors—social worlds—in all kinds
of negotiations and conflicts, committed to usually on-going participation in broad
substantive arenas. The framework is relentlessly ecological, seeking to understand the
nature of relations and action across the arrays of people and things in the arena, rep-
resentations (narrative, visual, historical, rhetorical), processes of work (including
cooperation without consensus, career paths, and routines/anomalies), and many
sorts of interwoven discourses. The social worlds framework is particularly attentive
to situatedness and contingency, history and fluidity, and commitment and change.
We begin with a brief account of the development of the concept of social worlds
in the American sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism. We then demon-
strate how the social worlds framework is a “theory/method package,” drawing upon
an understanding of perception itself as theory-driven. Next we turn to some of the
key concepts generated through using the social worlds framework. Especially in
studies of scientific work practices, these include boundary objects, segments, doabil-
ity, work objects, bandwagons, implicated actors/actants, and cooperation without
consensus. The social worlds framework has also been especially useful in studies of
controversy and of disciplinary emergence, and we review this work. Recently, the
5 The Social Worlds Framework: A Theory/Methods Package
Adele E. Clarke and Susan Leigh Star
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social worlds framework has become the conceptual infrastructure of situational analy-
sis (Clarke, 2005), a new extension of the grounded theory method, with which the
social worlds framework has long been associated. In conclusion, we offer a brief
overview of the more methodological aspects of the theory/methods package.
SOCIAL WORLDS IN THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST TRADITION
The social worlds framework has its historical roots in Chicago School of Sociology,
originally based at the University of Chicago. Confusingly, the “Chicago School” left
Chicago in the late 1950s. In diaspora, however, we its descendents still refer to it
as the Chicago School of Sociology (not to be confused with the Chicago School of
Economics). Initially, the Chicago School practiced an empirical, urban sociology,
studying different neighborhoods and worksites of the city. The insights of
pragmatist philosophers George Herbert Mead and John Dewey were folded into
these small regional studies by drawing attention to meaning-making, gestures, and
identities. Groups, within which individuals were situated, were regarded as “social
wholes” (Thomas, 1914), making meaning together and acting on the basis of those
meanings. The meanings of phenomena thus lie in their embeddedness in relation-
ships—in universes of discourse (Mead, [1938]1972:518) which Strauss (1978) later
called social worlds.
Early sociological ecologies of these “social wholes” focused on various kinds of
communities (e.g., ethnic enclaves, elite neighborhoods, impoverished slums), dis-
tinctive locales (e.g., taxi dancehalls, the stockyards), and signal events of varying
temporal duration (e.g., strikes). The sociological task was to “to make the group the
focal center and to build up from its discoveries in concrete situations, a knowledge
of the whole . . .” (Eubank in Meltzer et al., 1975:42). One could begin from a place
or a problem. Baszanger and Dodier (1997: 16, emphasis added) have asserted:
Compared with the anthropological tradition, the originality of the first works in the Chicago
tradition was that they did not necessarily integrate the data collected around a collective whole
in terms of a common culture, but in terms of territory or geographic space. The problem with
which these sociologists were concerned was based on human ecology: interactions of human
groups with the natural environment and interactions of human groups in a given geographic
milieu . . . The main point here was to make an inventory of a space by studying the different com-
munities and activities of which it is composed, that is, which encounter and confront each
other in that space.
These “inventories of space” often took the form of maps (see especially Zorbaugh,
1929). The communities, organizations, and kinds of sites and collectivities repre-
sented on such maps were to be explicitly viewed in relation to the sitings or situations
of one another and within their larger contexts, featuring relationality. “The power of the
ecological model underlying the traditional Chicago approach lies in the ability to
focus now on the niche and now on the ecosystem which defined it” (Dingwall, 1999:
217; see also Star, 1995a). This analytic power is retained today.
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In the generation following Mead, just after World War II, several analysts combined
some of the traditional focus on (1) meanings/discourse as related to ethnicity and neigh-
borhood, and (2) the search for identity in the forms of work, practice, and memory. This
synthesis resulted in a sociology that was both material and symbolic, interactive, proces-
sual, and structural. James Carey (2002: 202) claims that Anselm Strauss, one of the prac-
titioners from this period, had invented “a sociology of structuration before Anthony
Giddens invented the word,” grasping structure as emergent in ways that later informed
his social worlds theory (see also Reynolds & Herman-Kinney, 2003).
During the 1950s and 1960s, researchers in this tradition continued studies of “social
wholes” in new ways, shifting to studies of work, occupations, and professions, and
moving from local to national and international groups. Geographic boundaries were
no longer regarded as necessarily salient, and attention shifted to shared discourses as
both making and marking boundaries. Perhaps most significantly, researchers increas-
ingly attended to the relationships of groups to other “social wholes,” the interactions
of collective actors and discourses. In today’s methodological vernacular, many such
studies would be termed “multi-sited.”
At this time, several Chicago-school sociologists initiated the development of
explicit social worlds theory—the high-modern version of studies of “social wholes”
mentioned above. Social worlds (e.g., a recreation group, an occupation, a theoretical
tradition) generate shared perspectives that then form the basis for collective action
while individual and collective identities are constituted through commitments to and
participation in social worlds and arenas (Shibutani, 1955; Strauss, 1959). Commit-
ment is both predisposition to act and a part of identity construction (Becker, 1960,
1967). Strauss (1978, 1982, 1993) and Becker (1982) defined social worlds as groups
with shared commitments to certain activities, sharing resources of many kinds to
achieve their goals and building shared ideologies about how to go about their busi-
ness. Social worlds are universes of discourse (Mead, [1938]1972: 518), principal affilia-
tive mechanisms through which people organize social life.
Until the 1980s, most symbolic interactionist research focused on social worlds cen-
tered around social problems, art, medicine, occupations, and professions (e.g., Becker,
1963, 1982; Bucher & Strauss, 1961; Bucher, 1962; Bucher & Stelling, 1977; Wiener,
1981). Since the early 1980s, as more interactionists became involved in STS, the social
worlds framework has been increasingly used in interactionist research in STS. Initial
work on the material bases of social worlds in life science (Clarke, 1987; Clarke &
Fujimura, 1992) led to many fruitful avenues of inquiry about the nature of tools,
nonhuman components of social worlds (Latour, 1987; Suchman, 1987), and the inter-
action between humans and nonhumans. This in turn encouraged the exploration of
infrastructure as a deeply rooted aspect of social worlds analysis. Contemporarily,
infrastructures (virtual, offline, textual, and technical) are imbricated with the unique
nature of each social world and, especially as scale becomes important, with arenas
(Star & Ruhleder, 1996; Neumann & Star 1996; Star, 1999). Infrastructures can be
understood, in a sense, as frozen discourses that form avenues between social worlds
and into arenas and larger structures.
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Social worlds studies have encompassed examinations of the doing of science; the
organization of scientific work; and the making, distribution, and use of technology
as forms of work. We review many of these below but first address an important
epistemological issue.
THE SOCIAL WORLDS/ARENAS FRAMEWORK AS A THEORY/METHODS PACKAGE
In social science, from William James at the turn of the twentieth century to the
present, considerable and convincing work has been done that asserts the theory-
driven and socially based nature of perception. Particularly in STS, we no longer strug-
gle with the image of some sort of tabula rasa as the beginning moment of research,
to be gradually filled in as we encounter the “real” world. Rather, we understand that
we begin with some combination of previous scholarship, funding opportunities,
materials, mentorship, theoretical traditions and their assumptions, as well as a kind
of deep inertia at the level of research infrastructure (Bowker, 1994; Star & Ruhleder,
1996). Such traditions and assumptions serve as root metaphors applicable to the sit-
uation of inquiry—from social worlds to actor-network theory (e.g., Law & Hassard,
1999) to ethnomethodology (e.g., Lynch, 1985). Blumer ([1969]1993: 24–25, emphases
added) discussed such metaphors as follows:
The Possession and Use of a Prior Picture or Scheme of the Empirical World Under Study . . . [T]his is
an unavoidable prerequisite for any study of the empirical world. One can see the empirical world
only through some scheme or image of it. The entire act of scientific study is oriented and shaped
by the underlying picture of the empirical world that is used. This picture sets the selection and
formulation of problems, the determination of what are data, the means to be used in getting
data, the kinds of relations sought between data, and the forms in which propositions are cast.
The social worlds framework is one such “prior picture or scheme.”
The social worlds framework relies strongly upon George Herbert Mead’s
([1927]1964, [1934]1962) key concepts of perspective and commitment—that all
actors, including social worlds as collective actors, have their own perspectives, sites of
work and commitments to action vis-à-vis the substantive situation/arena. As social
worlds intersect or grow to become arenas, their joint courses of commitment and
(inter)action are articulated through discourses. Discourses here, then, mean these
assemblages of language, motive, and meaning, moving toward mutually understood
modus vivendi—ways of (inter)acting. Perspectives, as defined by Mead to include com-
mitments that stem from work and material contingencies, are discourses in collective,
material action. This concept of “discourse” and its particular history are distinct from
concepts of discourse analysis stemming from European phenomenology and critical
theory (e.g., Jaworski & Coupland, 1999; Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Lynch & Woolgar,
1990).
The particular power of the social worlds framework is that precisely because social
worlds are “universes of discourse” the framework explicitly goes beyond “the usual
sociological suspects”—conventional, highly bounded framings of collective actors
such as organizations, institutions, and even social movements. These “suspects” are
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displaced in the social worlds framework by more open, fluidly bounded, yet discourse-
based forms of collective action. Analysis must take into account more problemati-
cally bounded and contingent discursive as well as organizational arrangements
(Clarke, 1991). Thus, the broader situation is opened up for emergent and ongoing
analysis (Clarke, 2005).
Researchers using this approach in STS have worked from the assumption that the
social worlds framework constitutes a theory/methods package itself rooted in grounded
theory/symbolic interactionism. Such packages1include a set of epistemological and
ontological assumptions, along with concrete practices through which social scien-
tists go about their work, including relating to/with one another and with the various
nonhuman entities involved in the situation. This concept of theory-methods package
focuses on the integral—and ultimately nonfungible—aspects of ontology and episte-
mology. The concept of theory/methods package assumes that ontology and episte-
mology are both co-constitutive (make each other up) and manifest in actual practices.
Star (1989a) demonstrated the materiality and consequentiality of such
theory/methods packages in brain research. Fujimura (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996) pushed
on the modes through which theory/methods packages can travel—by being widely
accepted as part of a “bandwagon” effect. Such packages often travel well in science
because they perform well in situations at hand, such as creating “doable problems”
for research. Bowker and Star (1999) elucidate how, through classification and stan-
dardization processes, computer and information science can dramatically facilitate
such travel.
For most of us using the social worlds framework, the methods “end” of the
theory/methods package has been grounded theory, an approach to analyzing largely
qualitative ethnographic (observational and interview) materials. Developed by
Strauss and Glaser (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss &
Corbin, 1990), it is an abductive approach in which the analyst tacks back and forth
between the empirical materials and conceptual means of expressing them. Today
grounded theory is one of the major approaches used in qualitative analysis globally
(Clarke, 2006a,b).
Over the past twenty years, a more Straussian version of grounded theory that is
more constructivist, interactionist, and reflexive has been generated (e.g., Strauss,
1987; Charmaz, 2000). Strauss was also generating his social worlds framework at the
same time. Many of us in STS routinely drew upon both of these (see also Clarke &
Star, 1998), and they have recently been synthesized by Clarke (2005).
The very idea of theory/methods packages assumes that “Method, then, is not the
servant of theory: method actually grounds theory” (Jenks, 1995: 12). This means, of
course, that theory/methods packages are both objects of interactionist science studies
research and that the social worlds framework itself is a theory/methods package.
SENSITIZING CONCEPTS IN THE SOCIAL WORLDS TOOLBOX
Over the years, a toolbox of useful concepts with which to think about the relational
ecologies of social worlds, arenas, and their discourses has been generated. In our
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framework we treat them as what Herbert Blumer ([1969]1993: 147–148) called “sen-
sitizing concepts” (emphases added):
[T]he concepts of our discipline are fundamentally sensitizing instruments. Hence, I call them
“sensitizing concepts” and put them in contrast with definitive concepts ...A definitive concept
refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, and by the aid of a clear definition in
terms of attributes or fixed bench marks ...A sensitizing concept lacks such specification . . .
Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical
instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts
merely suggest directions along which to look.
Sensitizing concepts are thus tools for doing further analysis using this theory-
methods toolkit. They are not intended as ends in themselves, but as means of
analytical entrée and provisional theorizing.2The following are the key concepts devel-
oped to date in social worlds theory:
The Social Worlds/Arenas Framework Conceptual Toolbox for Science Studies3
Universes of discourse Entrepreneurs
Situations Mavericks
Identities Segments/subworlds/reform movements
Commitments Shared ideologies
Bandwagons Primary activities
Intersections Segmentations
Particular sites Technology (ies)
Implicated actors and actants Boundary objects
Work objects Boundary infrastructures
Conventions
We next elucidate each of the concepts listed above, illustrating them with examples
from STS research. In his seminal article on social worlds and arenas, Strauss argued
(1978: 122) that each social world has at least one primary activity, particular sites,
and a technology (inherited or innovative means of carrying out the social world’s
activities) and that once under way, more formal organizations typically evolve to
further one aspect or another of the world’s activities.4People typically participate in
a number of social worlds simultaneously, and such participation usually remains
highly fluid. Entrepreneurs, deeply committed and active individuals (Becker, 1963),
cluster around the core of the world and mobilize those around them.
Activities within all social worlds and arenas include establishing and maintaining
perceptible boundaries between worlds and gaining social legitimation for the world
itself. Indeed, the very history of the social world is commonly constructed or recon-
structed in discursive processes (Strauss, 1982). Of course, individual actors compose
social worlds, but in arenas they commonly act as representatives of their social worlds,
performing their collective identities (Klapp, 1972) as well as generating their careers
(Wiener, 1991). For example, in the fetal surgery operating and recovery rooms, the
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surgeons, neonatologists, and obstetricians have often distinct and sometimes com-
peting agendas of concern as they may see themselves as having different work
objects—primary patients (Casper, 1994, 1998a,b)—at the same time that they are
negotiating career trajectories involving others in those very rooms.
There can also be implicated actors in a social world and/or arena, actors silenced or
only discursively present—constructed by others for their own purposes (Clarke &
Montini, 1993; Clarke, 2005: 46–8). There are at least two kinds of implicated actors.
First are those who are physically present but are generally silenced/ignored/made
invisible by those in power in the social world or arena (Christensen & Casper, 2000;
Star & Strauss, 1999). Second are those implicated actors not physically present in a
given social world but solely discursively constructed and discursively present; they
are conceived, represented, and perhaps targeted by the work of arena participants.
Much of postcolonial literature focuses precisely on this matter. Neither kind of impli-
cated actor is actively involved in the actual negotiations of self-representation in the
social world or arena, nor are their thoughts or opinions or identities explored or
sought out by other actors through any openly empirical mode of inquiry (such as
asking them questions).
Within information technology, computer developers have been notorious for their
stereotyping and disregard of the needs of computer users, classic implicated actors.
Many even called these people “lusers” (Bishop et al., 2000). Currently, this trend is
somewhat offset by the use of ethnographers and other social scientists in usability
laboratories of major corporations for their consumer products. However, at the more
custom level of technically state-of-the-art devices, more elitist practices still prevail
These include “just throw it over the wall” (and let users deal with it as best they can)
and the assumption in computer modeling that “I am the World” (and no one else
needs to be taken into account) (Forsythe, 2001; for studies of users and their roles,
see also Oudshoorn & Pinch, chapter 22 in this volume).
There can, of course, also be implicated actants—implicated nonhuman actors in sit-
uations of concern.5Like implicated humans, implicated actants can be physically
and/or discursively present in the situation of inquiry. That is, human actors (indi-
vidually and/or collectively as social worlds) routinely discursively construct nonhu-
man actants from those human actors’ own perspectives. The analytical question here
is who is discursively constructing what, how, and why?
Every complex social world characteristically has segments, subdivisions or sub-
worlds, shifting as patterns of commitment alter, reorganize, and realign. Bucher
(Bucher & Strauss 1961; Bucher 1962, 1988) named such fluidity and change within
social worlds by extending social movements analysis to frame these as reform move-
ments of various kinds undertaken by segments or subworlds within professions, dis-
ciplines, or other work organizations. Bucher called these “professions in process.”
Drawing on Bucher in her study of cardiovascular epidemiology, Shim (2002, 2005)
found two major segments: mainstream and social epidemiologists. The latter consti-
tute a reform segment or movement, today informing research approaches in new
areas of study including health disparities and population health.
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The concept of staged intersections—one-shot or short-term events where multiple
social worlds in a specific arena come together—is Garrety’s (1998) particular concep-
tual contribution to social worlds theory. The key feature of staged intersections is that
despite the fact that this may be a one-time-only meeting for representatives of those
worlds, the events can be highly consequential for the future of all the social worlds
involved, for that arena—and beyond.
Fujimura (1988, 1996), in her study of the molecularization of biology, called suc-
cessful versions of such reform processes “bandwagons” when they occur on a larger
scale, mobilizing the commitments of many laboratories and related organizations.
This mobilization placed the package of oncogene theory (on the molecular genetic
origins of cancer) and recombinant DNA and other molecular biotechnological
methods at the heart of that social world. This theory/methods package was highly trans-
portable, marketed as a means of constructing highly doable problems in multiple
research centers; well aligned with funding, organizational, material, and other con-
straints upon research; and a means for attacking long-standing problems in many
biological disciplines. Perhaps counterintuitively, Fujimura found no grand marshal
orchestrating the bandwagon but rather a cascading series of decentralized choices,
changes, exchanges, and commitments, vividly demonstrating how widely distributed
a social world can be (see also Star, 1997; Strübing, 1998). The difference between
a bandwagon and an arena is that a bandwagon is more narrowly focused, in a
“fad-like” way, on a single package. An arena is larger, encompassing debates about
packages and worlds involved over a wide range of interests, boundary objects (and
potentially boundary infrastructures), and temporalities (see also Wiener, 2000).
Fujimura (1987) also introduced the useful concept of doable problems in scientific
research. Doable problems require successful alignment across several scales of work
organization. These include (1) the experiment as a set of tasks; (2) the laboratory as
a bundle of experiments and other administrative and professional tasks; and (3) the
wider scientific social world as the work of laboratories, colleagues, sponsors, regula-
tors and other players all focused on the same family of problems. Doability is achieved
by articulating alignment to meet the demands and constraints imposed at all three
scales simultaneously: a problem must provide doable experiments, which are feasi-
ble within the parameters of immediate constraints and opportunities in a given lab-
oratory, and be viewed as worthwhile and supportable work within the larger scientific
world.
In many modern arenas, reform movements have centered around processes of
homogenization, standardization, and formal classifications—things that would orga-
nize and articulate the work of the social worlds in that arena in parallel ways (Star,
1989a, 1995c). Bowker and Star (1999) analyzed how the application of computer and
information science programs in nursing has standardized that work, displacing some
areas of discretion with strict assessments of accountability. Clarke and Casper (1996;
Casper & Clarke, 1998) studied Pap smear classification systems as attempts to impose
standardization in a notoriously ambiguous clinical domain across the heterogeneous
worlds involved in that arena. Timmermans, Berg, and Bowker (Berg, 1997;
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Timmermans, 1999; Timmermans & Berg, 1997, 2003; Berg & Timmermans, 2000; and
Berg & Bowker, 1997) discussed the application of computer-based techniques to
medical practices and how these produce “universalities” in medical work. And Tim-
mermans (2006) followed on with a study of coroners’ classifications of suspicious
deaths. Lampland and Star (under review) have focused on comparative standardiza-
tions across people, techniques, laws, and concepts in their edited volume Formaliz-
ing Practices. And Karnik (1998) explored consequences of classification in the media.
Understanding boundaries has long been important to science studies (Gieryn,
1995) and has become increasingly important in the social sciences (Lamont &
Molnar, 2002). In social worlds theory, Star and Griesemer (1989) developed the
concept of boundary objects for things that exist at junctures where varied social worlds
meet in an arena of mutual concern. Boundary objects can be treaties among coun-
tries, software programs for users in different settings, even concepts themselves. Here
the basic social process of translation allows boundary objects to be (re)constructed
to meet the specific needs or demands placed on it by the different worlds involved
(Star, 1989b). Boundary objects are often very important to many or most of the social
worlds involved and hence can be sites of intense controversy and competition for
the power to define them. The distinctive translations used within different worlds for
their own purposes also enable boundary objects to facilitate cooperation without
consensus.
For example, in Star and Griesemer’s (1989) study of a regional zoology museum
founded at the turn of the twentieth century, the museum’s specimens were bound-
ary objects. There were collections of multiple specimens of each species and sub-
species which, for the zoologists to find them useful, had to be very carefully tagged
as to date and where collected and carefully preserved and taxidermied. Aerial tem-
perature, humidity, rainfall, and precise habitat information on the geographic origins
of specimens all were important. The mammal and bird specimens were usually killed,
gathered, and sent to the museum by amateur collectors and “mercenaries” (paid col-
lectors) of varied backgrounds. Also involved were university administrators, a pow-
erful patron who was herself an amateur collector, curators, research scientists, clerical
staff, members of scientific clubs, and taxidermists. All had particular concerns about
the specimens that needed to be addressed and mutually articulated for the museum’s
collections to “work” well for all involved.
Thus, the study of boundary objects can be an important pathway into complicated
situations, allowing the analyst to study the different participants through their dis-
tinctive relations with and discourses about the specific boundary object in question.
This can help frame the broader situation of inquiry as well. The concept of bound-
ary objects has also been extended. For example, Henderson (1999) included visual
representations as “conscription devices,” weaving this understanding into the analy-
sis of work, power, and the visual practices of engineers. Her work lends powerful,
visual-based sensibility to the boundary objects idea.
Bowker and Star (1999: 313–314) recently raised the conceptual ante with the
concept of “boundary infrastructures” as larger infrastructures of classification deeply
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institutionalized, “sunk into the built environment, . . . objects that cross larger levels
of scale than boundary objects.” These are often digitalized information systems that
link large-scale organizations with multiple purposes and/or constituencies. “Bound-
ary infrastructures by and large do the work that is required to keep things moving
along ...[T]hey deal with regimes and networks of boundary objects (and not of
unitary, well-defined objects).” Boundary infrastructures by no means imply univer-
sal consensus, at whatever level they may be analyzed. For any individual, perspec-
tive, or locale, they can as well produce a misfit with infrastructure, called torque by
Bowker and Star (1999). (The metaphor is like the twisting of steel just a bit out of
alignment.) However, the torque may not be visible or perceptible to most, often until
a social movement makes it so, as with disabled people and the accessibility of
structures.
Most recently, Bowker’s (2005) Memory Practices in the Sciences examined the history
of information infrastructures from paper to silicon. Using geology, cybernetics, and
biodiversity as case studies, Bowker analyzed the work that their information infra-
structures have done in mediating the traffic between natural and social worlds. Some
facets of that trafficking are memorialized—preserved in the infrastructure as memory
device—while others are reconfigured or erased. Bowker vividly shows how scientific
infrastructures are projecting our modes of organization onto nature at increasingly
broader scales via emergent, globally used boundary infrastructures.
In sum, then, the conceptual toolbox of social worlds theory permits analyses of a
full array of collective human social entities and their actions, discourses, and related
nonhuman elements in the situation of concern. The key analytical power of social
worlds/arenas theory, so rooted in Chicago social ecologies, is that one can take advan-
tage of the elasticity of the concepts to analyze at multiple levels of complexity. The
utility of social worlds theory for STS was recognized not only by interactionists but
also by others. For example, Becker’s (1982) Art Worlds was taught in STS courses in
the 1980s.6
Over the years, the social worlds/arenas framework has been compared with actor-
network theory (e.g., Law & Hassard, 1999; Neyland, 2006), known as ANT, a major
analytical frame in STS. While we lack space here for an extended comparison, we do
want to state that we view these two approaches as kindred in many ways (especially
compared with earlier approaches to the study of science) and yet also as offering quite
different affordances and accomplishing different analytical ends. The social worlds
framework allows for the drag of history; the cumulative consequences of commit-
ment and action over time are deeply etched. For example, Karin Garrety (1997, 1998)
compared ANT and social worlds approaches in an examination of the cholesterol,
dietary fat, and heart disease controversy which has extended over four decades. She
found the social worlds framework allowed analysis of changes within and across
worlds over time while the scientific “facts” also remained unstable and contested.
In contrast, ANT is excellent at grasping emergent connections that may or may not
gel into social worlds in arenas. Networks (that are not worlds) of many kinds may
also endure and fully deserve analysis. ANT is most robust at this. Because of its
common lead-scientist focus on the perspective of the most powerful, ANT has been
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characterized as a more “executive” vision. ANT concepts of “interessement” and
“obligatory points of passage” are often framed as one-way streets. In contrast, social
worlds theory is insistently pluralist, seeking to analyze all the perspectives in the sit-
uation. But these approaches can also vary in the hands of different researchers and
when the approaches are used for particular purposes.
In comparing Latourian ANT with social worlds/arenas, it has been said that the
centralized nature of power in ANT is more French, whereas for social worlds, the plu-
ralism of perspective is vividly inflected American. Bowker and Latour (1987) made a
somewhat similar argument in their paper comparing French and Anglo-American
science and technology studies. They argued that the rationality/power axis so natural
to French technocracy (and explored in Foucault inter alia) is precisely that which
must be proven in Anglo-American work, since, in the Anglo American context, it is
usually “assumed” that there is no relationship between the two.7
Social Worlds Studies of Controversies and Disciplines
Key sociological differences emerge when researchers focus on studying the work
activities, organization, and discourses of social worlds in science, technology, and/or
(bio)medicine rather than studying individuals. Placing work—action—in the fore-
ground facilitates the analysis of social worlds qua worlds and the elucidation of the
key human and nonhuman elements. For Strauss (1978), Becker (1982), and some
others working with the social worlds framework (e.g., Star, Fujimura, Baszanger,
Clarke, Garrety, Casper, Shim, Shostak, and others), the social worlds and arenas them-
selves became the units of analysis in two main genres of studies of collective dis-
course and action—scientific controversies and disciplines (including boundary
objects and infrastructures). Here we often see the phenomenon identified by inter-
actionists as cooperation without consensus writ large.
Clarke and Montini (1993) provide an accessible example of controversy studies by
focusing on the multiple social worlds involved in the controversy surrounding use
of the abortifacient RU486, also known as “the French abortion pill” in the U.S. The
paper analytically places RU486 in the center and then moves through the specific
perspectives on it of each of the major social worlds involved in the broader abor-
tion/reproduction arena: reproductive and other scientists, birth control/population
control organizations, pharmaceutical companies, medical groups, anti-abortion
groups, pro-choice groups, women’s health movement groups, politicians, Congress,
the FDA, and last but not least, women users/consumers of RU486. Here Clarke initi-
ated the concept of implicated actors discussed earlier. As is often the case, these were
the users/consumers. Clarke and Montini showed that social worlds themselves are
not at all monolithic but commonly contain extensive differences of perspective that
may be more or less contentious. Moreover, contra Mol, they demonstrated how, given
these different perspectives, RU486 is vividly different things to different social worlds
in the arena.8
In their study of the controversy about whether hormone disruption is caused by
exposure to synthetic chemicals in the environment, Christensen and Casper (2000)
used a social worlds/arenas analytic to map the discourse in key documents (see also
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Albrechtsen & Jacob, 1998). They focused on two sets of implicated actors particularly
vulnerable to exposures but excluded from the possibility of scientific claims-making:
farm workers and fetuses. Their focus allowed them to analyze hierarchies of knowl-
edges and to develop policy implications of the possible future inclusion of hereto-
fore silenced but clearly implicated actors.
A number of social worlds/arenas studies take up disciplinary and specialty emer-
gence and competition. One of the earliest was Star’s (1989a) examination of the work
of late nineteenth century British neurophysiologists that investigated the contest in
brain research between “localizationists” who sought to map specific regions and func-
tions and “diffusionists” who argued for an interactive, flexible, and resilient brain
model. The scientists who supported localizationist theories of brain function built a
successful research program (read as social world here) through several strategies: by
gaining control of relevant journals, hospital practices, teaching posts, and other
means of knowledge production and distribution; by screening out those who held
opposing points of view from print and employment; by linking a successful clinical
program with both basic research and a theoretical model; and by uniting against
common enemies with powerful scientists from other fields. Star examined the pro-
duction of robust scientific knowledge through concrete practices and collective
rhetorical strategies.
Clarke (1998) studied the emergence and coalescence of the American reproductive
sciences across the twentieth century as an intersectional discipline dwelling in three
professional domains: biology, medicine, and agriculture. She situates the emergence
of this scientific social world within the larger sociocultural reproductive arena that
included other key worlds including birth control, population control, and eugenics
movements and strong philanthropic sponsors. Reproductive scientists coped strate-
gically with the illegitimacy of this sexuality-laden and therefore suspect research in
their negotiations with various audiences. Clarke (2000) further detailed how it was
only maverick reproductive scientists who actually worked on contraceptive develop-
ment and did so only outside university settings, largely in private research institutes
supported by major philanthropists and/or pharmaceutical companies. The exclusion
of women as patients and users/consumers from participation at design stages has con-
stituted millions of women as implicated rather than agentic actors in the contracep-
tive arena for almost a century. This has contributed to the ongoing spread of sexually
transmitted diseases, including AIDS. Such problematics of agency and choice are com-
monly linked to gender and race in STS.
Sara Shostak (2003, 2005) applied social worlds/arenas theory in an historical soci-
ological analysis of the disciplinary emergence of environmental genetics as an inter-
sectional project. She explored the changing relationships of the social worlds and
segments of pharmacogenetics, molecular epidemiology, genetic epidemiology, eco-
genetics, and toxicology from 1950 to 2000. Her analysis centers on the reconfigura-
tion of these worlds and their relationships to each other in scientific and public
health/policy arenas that are increasingly shaped by desires of environmental health
risk assessment and “regulatory science” practitioners for reliable scientific informa-
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tion about gene-environment interaction. Shostak further explored the construction
and consequences of new technologies (e.g., molecular biomarkers and toxicoge-
nomics) within these worlds and their appropriation and transformation by other
social worlds, including activist movements, especially in local struggles about the
health effects of environmental exposures.9
A number of studies of disciplines and specialties using the social worlds framework
emphasized a key interactionist assumption that cooperation can proceed without con-
sensus, that individuals and collectivities can “set their differences aside,” however
temporarily and contingently, in the interests of individual or shared goals. For
example, Baszanger (1998) examined the emergence of organized pain medicine as
produced through the intersection of segments of multiple specialties in an interna-
tional arena. Demonstrating the capacity for ongoing disunity within a functioning
specialty (cooperation without consensus), Baszanger offered ethnographic case
studies of two paradigmatically different pain clinics in France: one emphasizing anal-
gesia and the other focusing on patient self-management through self-surveillance and
particular self-disciplining practices. The segmental scientific history and theory of
pain medicine were thus inscribed in clinical practices.10
The emergence of fetal surgery, a more rarefied specialty, was studied by Casper
(1998a,b). In these still largely experimental practices, clinicians partially remove a
fetus from a woman’s uterus, operate for a variety of structural problems, and if it sur-
vives, replace it for continued gestation. Fetal surgery has been controversial since its
inception in 1960s New Zealand and Puerto Rico using sheep and chimpanzees as
animal models. Like Baszanger and Star, Casper provided detailed histories of both the
laboratory science and clinical practices. Like Clarke, she found that links to other
social worlds, specifically anti-abortion movements, were characteristic of and impor-
tant to key actors in the social world of this emergent specialty. Building on Mead’s
concept of social objects, Casper (see also 1994, 1998b) developed the concept of work
objects to describe and analyze the tangible and symbolic objects around and with
which social actors work. She analyzed the relations (sometimes cooperative, some-
times vituperative, rarely if ever based on consensus) among the different practition-
ers involved in fetal surgery who struggle over who is the patient—mother or
fetus—and who should have jurisdiction over which patient in the surgical situation
and beyond.
In the field of information technology, changes in engineering design and manu-
facturing teams and the consequences these may have for prototypes as boundary
objects were the focus of a project by Subrahmanian and colleagues (2003). Changes
in the teams, they found, disrupted the modus vivendi that the various groups had
established for cooperation (without consensus) and (re)opened debates about bound-
ary objects per se. Gal and colleagues (2004) followed on with a fascinating study of
AEC, the architecture, engineering and construction industry, focusing on how chang-
ing information technologies, which are themselves the boundary objects operating
between the architectural, engineering and construction worlds, produce changes not
only in the relationships among these worlds but also in the identities of those worlds.
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That is, boundary objects are used not only as translation devices but also as resources
for the formation and expression of professional identities. Using the example of the
introduction of three-dimensional modeling technologies into building design by
architect Frank Gehry, the technology that afforded the possibility of using materials
in innovative ways for which he is now famous, Gal and colleagues argued that
changes in one world may cascade to other worlds through shared boundary objects
(see also Star, 1993, 1995b; Carlile, 2002; Walenstein, 2003). Cooperation without con-
sensus was very much the order of the day.
Another recent social worlds study found both cooperation and consensus prob-
lematic. Tuunainen (2005) examined “disciplinary worlds colliding” in Finland when
a university agronomy department focused on plant production research was
pressured by the government to incorporate new modes of doing science (including
molecular biology, plant physiology, horticulture, and agroecology) and to establish
relations with industry. Tuunainen found the disunity of plant production research
readily observable as the scientists did not create “new hybrid worlds of different dis-
ciplines” (2005: 224) but instead retained their commitments both to their disciplines
of origin and to their historical organizational niches in the university.
In her study of the making of meteorology, Sundberg (2005) focuses on intersec-
tions where modeling practice meets experimentation. New and necessary compo-
nents of simulation models became boundary objects shaping relations between the
disciplinary segments of experimentalists and modelers. In the same vein, Halfon’s
(2006) analysis of the regime change from “population control” to “women’s empow-
erment” enacted as the Cairo consensus foregrounds the scientization of both popu-
lation policy and social movement worlds through the institutionalization of shared
technical language and practices. Making and talking about demographic surveys—
using the science as shared work object—offered “neutral” sites in and through which
the requisite serious negotiations could and did flourish. He reveals the too often invis-
ible work of making change in a complex world.
Last, Strübing (1998) has written on cooperation without consensus in a study of
computer scientists and symbolic interactionist sociologists collaborating over a period
of years, an intersection that has never been fully stabilized. A segment of the com-
puting world focused on Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) was interested in
modeling and supporting spatially and temporally distributed work and decision prac-
tices, often in applied settings. The “distributed” in DAI means modeling problem-
solving across space and time, conducted by many entities that in some senses had
to cooperate. For example, a typical problem would be how to get computers at several
locations, with different kinds of data, to return the answer to a problem, using each
of their local data sets. This problem both reflected and bridged to interactionist con-
cerns with translation issues, complex intersections, and the division of labor in large
scientific projects. Strübing concluded that the sustained collaboration involved not
just “the migration of metaphors” but also the mutual creation and maintenance of
organizational structures for shared work—what Star (1991a) might call “invisible
infrastructures.”
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The concepts of boundary objects, boundary infrastructures, and conscription
devices are now canonically useful, central to understanding the intersections of social
worlds in social worlds/arenas theory in STS and beyond. Discipline-focused studies
utilizing these concepts have examined library science (Albrechtsen & Jacob, 1998),
genetics, geography, and artificial intelligence. Fujimura and Fortun (1996; Fujimura,
1999, 2000) have studied the construction of DNA sequence databases in molecular
biology as internationally utilized boundary infrastructures. Such databases pose
fascinating challenges because they must be both constructed across multiple social
worlds and serve the needs of multiple worlds.
In geography, Harvey and Chrisman (1998) examined boundary objects in the social
construction of geographical information system (GIS) technology. GIS, a major inno-
vation, requires complex relationships between technology and people because it is
used not only as a tool but also as a means of connecting different social groups in
the construction of new localized social arrangements. Harvey and Chrisman view
boundary objects as much like geographic boundaries, separating different social
groups yet at the same time delineating important points of reference between them,
and stabilizing relationships through the negotiation of flexible and dynamic coher-
ences. Such negotiations are fundamental to the construction of GIS technology,
as Harvey and Chrisman illustrate in a study of the use of GIS data standards in the
definition of wetlands.
In public health, Frost and colleagues (2002) used the boundary objects framework
in a study of a public-private partnership project. The project brought together Big
Pharma (Merck) and an international health organization (the Task Force for Child
Survival and Development) to organize the donation by Merck of a drug for the treat-
ment of river blindness endemic in 35 countries. Frost and colleagues asked how such
divergent organizations could cooperate. They argued that the different meanings of
key boundary objects held by the participating groups allowed them both to collab-
orate without having to come to consensus and to maintain their sharply different
organizational missions. The main benefit was that the project itself as boundary
object provided legitimacy to all participants and to the partnership per se. The Mec-
tizan Donation Program has become a model for similar partnerships.
In sum, social worlds theory and especially the concept of boundary objects have
traveled widely and been taken up since the 1980s by researchers from an array of dis-
ciplines that contribute to STS.
A NEW SOCIAL WORLDS THEORY/METHODS PACKAGE: SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
[M]ethodology embraces the entire scientific quest and not merely some selected portion or
aspect of that quest. (Blumer, [1969]1993: 24)
As noted earlier, the methods end of the social worlds theory/methods package has
heretofore largely been held down by Straussian versions of the grounded theory
method of data analysis (Charmaz, 2000; Clarke, 2006a; Star, 1998), including
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feminist versions (Clarke, 2006b). Toward the end of his career, Strauss worked assid-
uously on framing and articulating ways to do grounded theory analysis that included
specifying structural conditions—literally making them visible in the analysis—along
with the analysis of forms of action that traditionally centers grounded theory. To this
end, Strauss (Strauss & Corbin, 1990:163) produced what he called the conditional
matrix to more fully capture the specific conditions under which the action occurs.
Clarke (2003; 2005) developed a sustained critique of this matrix. To accomplish
similar goals she instead took Strauss’s social worlds framework and used it as theo-
retical infrastructure for a new extension of grounded theory. Fusing it with C. Wright
Mills’s (1940), Donna Haraway’s (1991), and others’ conceptions of situated action,
and with analytic concepts of discourse from Foucault and visual cultural studies, she
forged an approach called “situational analysis.”
In situational analysis, the conditions of the situation are in the situation. There is no
such thing as “context.” The conditional elements of the situation need to be speci-
fied in the analysis of the situation itself as they are constitutive of it, not merely sur-
rounding it or framing it or contributing to it. They are it. Ultimately, what structures
and conditions any situation is an empirical question—or set of analytic questions.
Situational analysis then involves the researcher in the making of three kinds of maps
to respond to those empirical questions analytically:
1. Situational maps that lay out the major human, nonhuman, discursive and other
elements in the research situation of inquiry and provoke analysis of relations among
them
2. Social worlds/arenas maps that lay out the collective actors, key nonhuman elements,
and the arena (s) of commitment and discourse within which they are engaged in
ongoing negotiations—mesolevel interpretations of the situation
3. Positional maps that lay out the major positions taken, and not taken, in the data
vis-à-vis particular axes of difference, concern, and controversy around issues in dis-
courses in the situation of inquiry.
All three kinds of maps are intended as analytic exercises, fresh ways into social science
data. They are especially well suited to designing and conducting contemporary
science and technology studies ranging from solely interview-based research to multi-
sited ethnographic projects. Doing situational maps can be especially useful for
ongoing reflexive research design and implementation across the life of the project.
They allow researchers to track all of the elements in the situation and to analyze their
relationality. All the maps can, of course, be done for different historical moments,
allowing comparisons.
Through mapping the data, the analyst constructs the situation of inquiry empiri-
cally. The situation per se becomes the ultimate unit of analysis, and understanding its
elements and their relations is the primary goal. By extending grounded theory to the
study of discourses, situational analysis takes it around the postmodern turn. Histor-
ical, visual, and narrative discourses may each and all be included in research designs
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and in the three kinds of analytic maps. Drawing deeply on Foucault, situational analy-
sis understands discourses as elements in the situation of inquiry. Discursive and
ethnographic/interview data can be analyzed together or comparatively. The posi-
tional maps elucidate positions taken in discourses and innovatively allow researchers
to specify positions not taken, allowing discursive silences to speak (Clarke, in prep.).
These innovations may be central to some of the next generation of interactionist
STS studies. For example, Jennifer Fosket (in prep.) used these mapping strategies to
analyze the situatedness of knowledge production in a large-scale, multi-sited clinical
trial of chemoprevention drugs. The trial qua arena involved multiple and quite het-
erogeneous social worlds: pharmaceutical companies, social movements, scientific spe-
cialties, and the FDA. The trial needed to manage not only millions of human and
nonhuman objects but also credibility and legitimacy across diverse settings and in
the face of conflicting demands. Mapping the arena allowed Fosket to specify the
nature of relations among worlds and relations with key elements in the situation,
such as tissue samples. Situational analysis is thus one example of building on the
tradition of social worlds/arenas as a theory/methods package with grounded theory
to build a novel mode of analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the 1980s, the social worlds framework has become mainstream in STS (Clarke
& Star, 2003). Of particular note for us is the link to earlier interactionist studies of
work that began from the premise that science is “just another kind of work,” not
special and different, and that it is about not only ideas but also materialities (see
Mukerji, 1989). The social worlds framework thus seeks to examine all the human and
nonhuman actors and elements contained in a situation from the perspectives of each.
It seeks to analyze the various kinds of work involved in creating and utilizing
sciences, technologies and medicines, elucidating multiple levels of group meaning-
making and material involvements, commitments, and practices.
In sum, the social worlds framework as a theory/methods package enhances ana-
lytic capacities to conduct incisive studies of differences of perspective, of highly
complex situations of action and position, and of the heterogeneous discourses
increasingly characteristic of contemporary technosciences. The concepts of bound-
ary objects and boundary infrastructures offer analytic entrée into sites of intersection
of social worlds and to the negotiations and other work occurring there. The concepts
of implicated actors and actants can be particularly useful in the explicit analysis of
power. Such analyses are both complicated and enhanced by the fact that there are
generally multiple discursive constructions of both the human and nonhuman
actors circulating in any given situation. Situational analysis offers methodo-
logical means of grasping such multiplicities. The social worlds framework
as a theory/methods package can thus be useful in pragmatic empirical science,
technology, and medicine projects.
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Notes
We are most grateful to Olga Amsterdamska, Mike Lynch, Ed Hackett, Judy Wajcman, and the ambi-
tious anonymous reviewers for their patience and exceptionally thoughtful and helpful comments. We
would also like to thank Geof Bowker, Sampsa Hyysalo, and Allan Regenstreif for generous comments
and support.
1. We use the term package to indicate and emphasize the advantages of using the elements of the
social worlds framework together with symbolic interactionist-inflected grounded theory. They “fit”
one another in terms of both ontology and epistemology. See Star (1989a; 1991a,b; 1999) and Clarke
(1991, 2005:2–5, 2006a). We do not mean that one can opt for two items from column A and two from
column B to tailor a package, nor do we mean that one element automatically “comes with” the other
as a prefabricated package. Using a “package” takes all the work involved in learning the practices and
how to articulate them across time and circumstance.
2. Contra Glaser and Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1995), we do not advocate
the generation of formal theory. See also Clarke (2005: 28–29).
3. On universes of discourse, see, for example, Mead (1917), Shibutani (1955); and Strauss (1978). On
situations, see Clarke (2005). On identities and shared ideologies, see, for example, Strauss (1959, 1993;
Bucher & Stelling, 1977). On commitments, entrepreneurs and mavericks, see Becker (1960, 1963, 1982,
1986). On primary activities, sites, and technology (ies), see Strauss (1978) and Strauss et al. (1985). On
subworlds/segments and reform movements, see Bucher (1962; Bucher & Strauss, 1961) and Clarke and
Montini (1993). On bandwagons and doability, see Fujimura (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996). On intersec-
tions and segmentations, see Strauss (1984). On implicated actors and actants, see Clarke and Montini
(1993), Clarke (2005), Christensen and Casper (2000), and Star and Strauss (1999). On boundary objects
and infrastructures, see Star and Griesemer (1989) and Bowker and Star (1999). On work objects, see
Casper (1994, 1998b). On conventions, see Becker (1982) and Star (1991b). On social worlds theory
more generally, see Clarke (2006c).
4. Boundaries of social worlds may cross-cut or be more or less contiguous with those of formal orga-
nizations, distinguishing social worlds/arenas theory from most organizations theory (Strauss 1982,
1993; Clarke 1991, 2005).
5. The term actant is used thanks to Latour (1987). Keating and Cambrosio (2003) have critiqued the
“social worlds” perspective for minimizing the significance of the nonhuman—tools, techniques, and
research materials. This is rather bizarre, since we were among the earliest in STS to write on these
topics. See Clarke (1987), Star (1989a), and Clarke and Fujimura (1992), and for a broader review, Clarke
and Star (2003).
6. Warwick Anderson taught Becker’s book in an STS course at Harvard (personal communication,
2005).
7. Special thanks to Geof Bowker (personal communication, 7/03). See also Star (1991a,b, 1995c),
Fujimura (1991), Clarke and Montini (1993), and Clarke (2005: 60–63).
8. Mol (Mol & Messman, 1996; Mol, 2002) has erroneously insisted that the interactionist concept of
perspective “means” that the “same” thing is merely “viewed” differently across perspectives. On the
contrary, we assert that many different “things” are actually perceived according to perspective. More-
over, actions are taken based on those perceptions of things as different. We suspect that Mol has not
adequately grasped the interactionist assumption that there can be “cooperation without consensus”
illustrated several times in this section, nor that perspective, from an interactionist stance, is not a
cognitive-ideal concept.
9. Ganchoff (2004) examines social worlds and the growing arena of stem cell research and politics.
130 Adele E. Clarke and Susan Leigh Star
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10. Baszanger’s study goes beyond most others in the social worlds/arenas tradition by also studying
patients’ perceptions of and perspectives on pain medicine. Pain itself has simultaneously become a
stand-alone disease label and an arena at the international level.
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