The Cyberterrorism Threat: Findings from a Survey of Researchers

Abstract

This article reports on a recent research project exploring academic perspectives on the threat posed by cyberterrorism. The project employed a survey method, which returned 118 responses from researchers working across 24 different countries. The article begins with a brief review of existing literature on this topic, distinguishing between those concerned by an imminent threat of cyberterrorism, and other, more skeptical, views. Following a discussion on method, the article's analysis section then details findings from three research questions: (1) Does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? If so, against whom or what?; (2) Has a cyberterrorism attack ever taken place?; and (3) What are the most effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism? Are there significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or counterterrorism? The article concludes by reflecting on areas of continuity and discontinuity between academic debate on cyberterrorism and on terrorism more broadly.

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The Cyberterrorism Threat: Findings
from a Survey of Researchers
Lee Jarvisa, Stuart Macdonaldb & Lella Nouric
a School of Political, Social and International Studies, University of
East Anglia, Norwich, UK
b College of Law, Swansea University, Swansea, UK
c Department of Political and Cultural Studies, Swansea University,
Swansea, UK
Accepted author version posted online: 18 Oct 2013.Published
online: 20 Dec 2013.
To cite this article: Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald & Lella Nouri (2014) The Cyberterrorism
Threat: Findings from a Survey of Researchers, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:1, 68-90, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2014.853603
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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:68–90, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.853603
The Cyberterrorism Threat: Findings from a Survey
of Researchers
LEE JARVIS
School of Political, Social and International Studies
University of East Anglia
Norwich, UK
STUART MACDONALD
College of Law
Swansea University
Swansea, UK
LELLA NOURI
Department of Political and Cultural Studies
Swansea University
Swansea, UK
This article reports on a recent research project exploring academic perspectives on the
threat posed by cyberterrorism. The project employed a survey method, which returned
118 responses from researchers working across 24 different countries. The article begins
with a brief review of existing literature on this topic, distinguishing between those
concerned by an imminent threat of cyberterrorism, and other, more skeptical, views.
Following a discussion on method, the article’s analysis section then details findings
from three research questions: (1) Does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat?
If so, against whom or what?; (2) Has a cyberterrorism attack ever taken place?;
and (3) What are the most effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism? Are there
significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or counterterrorism? The article
concludes by reflecting on areas of continuity and discontinuity between academic
debate on cyberterrorism and on terrorism more broadly.
This article presents original findings from a recent research project focusing on under-
standings of cyberterrorism among the global research community. Its objective is to build
on and complement earlier studies that were integral to mapping the contours of academic
research on terrorism. Foremost among these, of course, was Schmid and Jongman’s Politi-
cal Terrorism,1which included the use of a questionnaire, “...mailed to some two hundred
members of the research community in the field of political terrorism in 1985.”2Silke’s
Received 4 July 2013; accepted 8 September 2013.
Address correspondence Dr. Lee Jarvis, School of Political, Social and International Studies,
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, UK,
NR4 7TJ. E-mail: leejarvis6@hotmail.com
68
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 69
edited Research on Terrorism offers a more recent, but related, review of the state of terror-
ism research, including of the major methodological techniques employed in this field,3and
dominant research trends and interests.4More recently still, Magnus Ranstorp and Silke
published post-9/11 accounts of the primary concerns and limitations of contemporary
terrorism research.5Studies such as these were important in consolidating what was known
and understood about terrorism by the research community at particular moments in time.
The research underpinning this article seeks to do something similar for one of the newest
incarnations or constructions of this form of political violence: cyberterrorism.
The article draws on responses to a survey completed by 118 researchers working in
24 different countries across six continents. It focuses on their views on three sets of issues:
first, whether cyberterrorism constitutes a significant threat and, if so, against what referent;
second, whether a cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place; and, third, the most effective
countermeasures against cyberterrorism and whether these differ significantly from more
traditional forms of counterterrorism. The article proceeds in four sections. It begins with a
review of the relevant academic literature. As a comparatively recent addition to the rubric
of terrorism, scholarship on the specific threat posed by cyberterrorism remains relatively
limited. Despite this, a spectrum of perspectives on this threat’s severity and imminence
are identifiable, with the debate becoming increasingly polarized since the coining of this
then-neologism in the 1980s. The second section details the methodology of the research,
reflecting in particular on the sampling strategy employed and distribution of respondents.
The third section describes and analyzes the research findings. It outlines the diversity
of responses received, arguing that these are the product of conceptual, definitional, and
inferential disagreements. Finally, the article concludes by pointing to the importance of
these findings for examining the relations between cyber- and other forms of terrorism.
The Cyberterrorism Threat: Academic Debate
The extent to which cyberterrorism poses a genuine security threat to any form of referent
object (a state, a corporation, citizens, and so on) is among the most contested of topics
within this research area. In part, this is a product of terminological dispute. More expansive
conceptions of cyberterrorism as any form of online terrorist activity unsurprisingly tend
to be associated with a higher estimated probability of the threat’s materialization than do
more restrictive accounts.6At the same time, as detailed further below, competing threat
assessments remain even if we restrict our focus to narrower understandings of this concept
(described, by some, as “pure cyberterrorism”7), such as the following:
unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the
information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or
its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as
cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property,
or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or
bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe eco-
nomic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures
could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt
nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.8
This section sets out two contrasting perspectives within debate on the threat of cyberter-
rorism when approached in this relatively narrow way: first, a “concerned” view that sees
cyberterrorism as constitutive of a genuine security threat; and, second, a “sceptical” view of
cyberterrorism as little more than hyperbolic media construction. It goes on to explain that
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70 L. Jarvis et al.
sceptical accounts which advance the latter perspective frequently contrast cyberterrorism
per se with other terroristic usages of information technology, which are often seen as
posing a significant threat and requiring, as such, greater attention.
Assessments of cyberterrorism as a significant, and pressing, security challenge were
particularly prominent in early debate on this phenomenon, and remain so within media
and political discourse today.9Among its better known advocates has been Barry Collin
of the U.S. Institute for Security and Intelligence—the individual responsible for coining
the term in the 1980s. As Collin argued in 1997, “make no mistake, the threats are real
today.”10 This, for Collin, is because cyberattacks now pose similar destructive capacity to
traditional physical assaults, including the prospect of multiple casualties and considerable
publicity. Potential threats he identifies include the contamination of food products through
interference with manufacturing processes, and the interception of air traffic control systems
to engender fatal collisions.11
Collin is not alone in hypothesizing such scenarios. Dorothy Denning—perhaps the
highest profile scholar in this field—suggests that while “cyberterrorism has been mainly
theoretical to date; it is something to watch and take reasonable precautions against.”12
Cronin notes that globalization has offered terrorist organizations access to the technologies
required for cyberterrorism as well as the wider audiences and recruitment potentialities
often attributed to this sociopolitical process.13 Gabriel Weimann identifies five factors that
render cyberattacks appealing to terrorists. These include comparatively lower financial
costs; the prospect of anonymity; a wider selection of available targets; the ability to
conduct attacks remotely; and, the potential for multiple casualties.14 Furnell and Warren
argue similarly that, “from the perspective of someone wishing to cause damage, there is
now the capability to undermine and disable a society without a single shot being fired or
missile being launched.”15 This, they add, “enables simultaneous attacks at multiple nodes
worldwide without requiring a large terrorist infrastructure necessary to mount equivalent
attacks using traditional methods.”16 Related utility-maximization arguments suggest it is
inevitable terrorists will employ cyberweaponry if benefits from so doing are likely,17 and/or
if an enemy employs computers and networks as security tools, or maintains dominance
in this area.18 Such thinking is integral to the “electronic pearl harbour”19 scenarios that
dominate much of the non-academic attention cyberterrorism receives.
Within these discussions of the threat posed by cyberterrorism, two issues in particular
are frequently invoked: the vulnerability of Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs),
and contemporary dependences on information technologies.20 Although inconsistently
understood, CIIs refer to those services that would have a debilitating impact on national
security and economic and social welfare if destroyed.21 The vulnerability of CII’s is linked,
inter alia, to their connection to the Internet, the infrequency and high cost of software
updates, and the sporadic implementation of attack detection and prevention systems that
can slow services down.22 One of the main challenges involved in CII protection is the
problem of attribution, and the challenge of locating responsibility for attacks. It is difficult,
for example, to be certain whether a system’s failure is accidental or due to a malicious
attack.23 Unlike a physical attack in which action and effect are often near-simultaneous,
the consequences of a cyberattack may not be noticeable for a considerable amount of
time. That it is also possible to disguise one’s identity on the Internet, using such means as
“botnets,”24 further complicates the ability to identify from where an intrusion has derived.
These challenges become more acute still when we recognize the constant increase in
the complexity of information systems, and the gap that has opened with capabilities for
mitigating emergent problems.25
Although concerns such as the above dominated early debate in this area, more recent
scholarship has witnessed the arrival of dissenting voices. Among these, the cyberterrorism
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 71
threat is viewed as little more than a speculative (typically, media) fantasy; an outgrowth,
for some, of the need to replace newly redundant Cold War security imaginaries in the
1980s and 1990s. As an aggregate of terrorism, technology and the unknown, constructions
of cyberterrorism—and related risks—are viewed here as parasitic upon—and multipliers
of— fears over contemporary dependences on information systems.26 Thus, authors such
as Hansen and Nissenbaum deploy securitization theory in an effort to analyze and unravel
cybersecurity discourses.27 Doing so is crucial, they argue, as a means of contesting security
claims in this area that appear either self-evident or unchallengeable due to their framing
in technical, specialized language. As they put it, “cyber securitizations are particularly
powerful precisely because they involve a double move out of the political realm: from the
politicized to the securitized, and from the political to the technified.”28
One of the most sustained deconstructions of the cyberterrorist threat is provided by
Maura Conway.29 Terrorists, she notes, are routinely dehumanized, while technology is
associated with a lack of control over the world. The combination of these specters is,
therefore, ripe for the establishment of worst case scenarios in which entire societies are
“cut off” and thus rendered vulnerable by the “evil” of terrorists.30 Conway suggests that this
construction of worst-case scenarios is a product of media as much as political discourse:
The media plays a key role in the shaping of these assumptions, constructing
these scenarios, and generally informing us as to what is “out there”. It is thus
a prime mover in the process of defining security [...] with the aid of the
mass media, cyberterrorism came to be viewed as the “new” security threat par
excellence.31
Critics of the constructions of threat that surround cyberterrorism forward two further
arguments. First, these discourses are not necessarily driven by—and do not necessarily
correspond with—empirical realities. Bendrath, for example, has mapped dramatic changes
in U.S. perceptions of the cyberworld and the oscillation between cyberterrorism and cy-
berwarfare as the bogeymen du jour irrespective of concrete, “real world,” developments.32
Conway points similarly to the impact of intangibly related events—such as 9/11—to pub-
lic policy on cybersecurity, where, for example, “the Council of Europe rushed through
its Convention on Cybercrime in response to the attack.”33 Second, these authors also
highlight the internalization of these discourses by publics or users of ICT. For instance,
“75% of global internet users believe ‘cyberterrorists’ may, soon inflict massive casualties
on innocent lives by attacking corporate and governmental computer networks” while 45
percent of users agreed completely that “computer terrorism will be a growing problem.”34
Whether accurate or otherwise, in other words, these discourses have real world impacts
across different social strata.
One of the reasons offered for the argument that “pure” cyberterrorism constitutes a
relatively less significant risk is that cyberattacks are comparatively unattractive to terror-
ists. In addition to the fact that they lack theatricality,35 Giacomello, for example, offers
a cost/benefit analysis of cyberterrorism to argue that traditional methods of terrorism
and weapons remain more effective at killing people, and thereby growing the desired
political capital.36 These accounts frequently contrast the possibility of cyberattack with
other terrorist uses of information technology that are regarded as a pressing and largely
overlooked threat. Attention, then, should be given to the wider use of the Internet by
terrorists, including for “recruitment, financing, networking information gathering [and]
sharing information”37 all of which enhance the efficiency and reach of terrorist groups.38
On this view, the nightmare scenarios associated with cyberterrorism should be replaced
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72 L. Jarvis et al.
by a focus on this broad spectrum of activities, with a range of political, policing, and civil
society stakeholders having a role in countering them.39
Within this debate on the level of threat posed by cyberterrorism, issues of spatiality
and jurisdictional responsibility are also prominent, not least over whether the issue is better
understood in national or international terms. Yould, for example, argues that the border-
less nature of cybersecurity challenges, and the globally connected nature of networks and
infrastructure, “undermine—or, at the very least, render contingent—the sovereignty and
significance of the nation-state.”40 Similarly, Cavelty argues that “the vulnerabilities of
modern societies—caused by their dependence on a spectrum of highly interdependent in-
formation systems—have global origins and implications.”41 Other studies go further still,
questioning whether security frameworks and organizations are at all appropriate to tackle
threats in cyberspace.42 Hardy identifies a number of problems in responding to cyberterror-
ism from a national security perspective arguing that differences in the understanding and
legal definition of terrorism have caused vast inconsistencies of prosecution across Western
democracies. For Hardy, this is rooted in the fact that each country has applied its own
understanding to this threat43 and that state-led approaches “fail to recognise the nature of
the globally interdependent network environment and the leading role of the private sector
in this domain.”44
Research Methodology
The above overview demonstrates two things, in particular, about the current state of
scholarship on the threat posed by cyberterrorism. First, and most obviously, there is
considerable diversity of perspective among contributors to debate in this area. As with
debate on the extent to which terrorism more widely poses a current threat, it is difficult to
identify any consensus here.45 Second, and in spite of these disagreements, it is possible
to point to changes of emphasis and perspective in the time that has passed since the term
“cyberterrorism” was first coined. This should, perhaps, be expected given the dramatic
geopolitical and technological developments that have taken place across the globe since
the early 1980s.
As noted earlier, one of the aims of the research underpinning this article was to capture
as fully as possible the current state of academic opinion—and debate—on the threat posed
by cyberterrorism by use of a survey methodology. Employing a combination of closed
and open-ended questions, the survey was distributed to over six hundred academics and
researchers working on terrorism or cyberterrorism. The survey was distributed between
June and November 2012, and employed a purposive sampling strategy to identify potential
respondents. This strategy made use of four primary methods.
First, a targeted literature review was undertaken to identify researchers with a record
of publishing on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed journals, monographs, edited books,
or other relevant literature. This task was completed using the main catalog of the British
Library and a total of 47 other online databases (including JSTOR, Oxford Journals online,
SAGE journals online, Wiley Interscience, Springer Link, IEEE Xplore, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, and Zetoc).46 The search was limited to publications on or since
1 January 2004. To this was added a second set of potential respondents identified by
their standing in the wider terrorism research community. While these individuals may not
directly have published on cyberterrorism, their expertise and knowledge of definitional,
causal, and related debates on terrorism rendered their opinions relevant to this research.
To this end, individuals that had authored an article in any of the following four major
journals on terrorism since 1 January 2009 were added to the sample: Studies in Conflict and
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 73
Terro r i s m ,Terrorism and Political Violence,Critical Studies on Terrorism, and, Perspectives
on Terrorism. Members of the editorial boards of these journals (as of 1 August 2012) were
also added. The first two journals are widely recognized as the most prominent specialist
outlets for publishing peer-reviewed research on terrorist violence.47 As Silke argued in
2004, “Taken together—and bearing in mind their different publishers, separate editorial
teams and largely separate editorial boards (though there is some overlap on this last)—the
two journals can be regarded as providing a reasonably balanced impression of research
activity in the field.”48 The latter two journals were included to take account of the extent to
which terrorism research has expanded dramatically across the last ten years,49 and become
more hotly contested in the process.50
The third sampling technique was a “snowball method” that included respondents iden-
tified to us by individuals who had already completed and returned the survey. And, finally,
we employed targeted requests for respondents disseminated via the mailing lists of two
U.K.-based academic organizations: the Terrorism and Political Violence Association,51
and the British International Studies Association Critical Studies on Terrorism Working
Group.52
This use of a purposive, non-probabilistic, sampling strategy was appropriate to the
survey’s aims.53 Although the method cannot claim any statistical representativeness in
relation to the terrorism research community, such a claim would be difficult to sustain
whatever the sample given the contestable, fluid and porous nature of this population.54
Researchers enter and leave this community according to the evolving nature of their
research interests, and any effort to capture opinion therein can offer only a static snapshot
of a dynamic phenomenon. In this sense, the sacrifice of representativeness in our study is
justified given that no discernible, definitive, population can meaningfully be said to exist.
A second potential limitation derives from the nature of the academic process and its
extended temporalities. By sampling, in part, according to authorship in this area (however
contemporary the published work), this research may provide an already-dated snapshot
of this community. Published work only reports on projects, and perhaps even research
interests, that are now completed. Much of the newest research—in Ph.D. theses, for
instance—will not have entered print yet. By using multiple sampling methods—and espe-
cially the mailing lists of current research communities—this research attempted to mitigate
these concerns. The possibility remains, however, that junior researchers, newcomers to the
field and other groups may be underrepresented in our study.
With these caveats in mind, our survey generated a total of 118 responses from 24 coun-
tries spanning six continents. Forty-one (35 percent) of the 117 respondents who provided
geographical information worked in the United States of America, and 31 (27 percent) in
the United Kingdom. Australia accounted for 7 of our respondents (6 percent), and Canada
4 (3 percent). This weighting toward Anglophonic countries is unfortunate, but to be ex-
pected given that this replicates the geographical trends of terrorism research.55 In terms of
employment status, our sample was divided as follows: Academic Staff (Permanent): 75 (64
percent); Academic Staff (Temporary): 16 (14 percent); Research Student: 9 (8 percent);
Independent Researcher: 11 (9 percent); Retired: 2 (2 percent); and, None of the Above:
5 (4 percent). In relation to disciplinary background, finally, our sample broke down thus:
Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50 percent); Psychology/Anthropology: 20
(15 percent); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17 (12 percent); Law/Criminology: 15
(11 percent); Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7 percent); Independent Researchers/Analysts: 5
(4 percent); and, Economics/Business: 2 (1 percent).56 That half of our sample were Po-
litical Scientists or International Relations scholars again resonates with earlier empirical
studies of contributors to terrorism research.57
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74 L. Jarvis et al.
The survey’s substantive questions focused on four broad categories of question. First,
definitional issues in relation to cyberterrorism and terrorism more widely. Second, the
threat posed by cyberterrorism. Third, issues of response and deterrence. And, fourth,
respondent views of current research in this area, including the challenges facing scholars.
This focus reflected the survey’s overall ambition to investigate prominent contemporary
concerns of the relevant academic community, and to chart parallels with related, earlier,
studies of (non-) cyberterrorism research. In the following, this article turns to the findings
of the survey and their importance in relation to the cyberterrorism threat.
Findings and Analysis58
Three questions in the survey were specifically designed to assess researcher perceptions
on the threat posed by cyberterrorism. These provide the focus for the following discussion,
and were articulated thus:
Question 10: In your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? If so, against
whom or what is the threat focused?
Question 11: With reference to your previous responses, do you consider that a cyberter-
rorism attack has ever taken place?
Question 12: In your view what are the most effective countermeasures against cyberter-
rorism? Are there significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or countert-
errorism?
Each question provided a “free text” boxes for respondents (alongside, in the case of ques-
tion 11, a dropdown menu), in order to capture the widest and fullest range of responses. As
demonstrated below, these responses have been used to generate qualitative and quantitative
findings.
Question 10—on the threat posed by cyberterrorism—was answered by 110 respon-
dents to our survey (response rate: 93 percent). These responses were coded by a quin-
quepartite scale, the findings from which are contained in Figure 1.
In line with the academic literature detailed above, this question generated a diver-
sity of responses. The majority of respondents—58 percent—answered in the affirmative,
although these identified a diverse range of referents (see Table 1). Most common were
states or governments, especially, “certain high profile countries.”59 One respondent, for
instance, identified “powerful states”60; another mentioned the United States, Russia, and
Figure 1. Cyberterrorism: A significant threat?
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 75
Table 1
Referent objects of the cyberterrorism threat
Government/state 23 respondents
Critical infrastructure/computer networks 19 respondents
Civilians/individuals 10 respondents
Organizations/private sector/corporations/economy 10 respondents
Society 3 respondents
Anyone/everyone 3 respondents
Groups 2 respondents
Political elections 1 respondent
Some respondents identified more than one referent.
China as targets.61 The second most common answer was critical infrastructures: finan-
cial institutions;62 transportation networks;63 intelligence networks;64 energy grids;65 water
systems;66 agriculture;67 and emergency services.68 Ten respondents stated that the threat is
focused on civilians and individuals, and the same number stated that the threat is focused
on organizations, the private sector, corporations and/or the economy.
That respondents were divided on both aspects of this question—the extent of threat
posed, and the referent object—was a product of four factors. The first was the importance
of particular understandings of “threat.” This was especially so among those identifying
critical infrastructures and computer networks as the focus of potential attacks. Thus,
some respondents referred to entire economies, transport networks or energy systems be-
ing “at risk,”69 of society’s capacity to function being crippled70 and organizations being
paralyzed,71 and of daily life being seriously disrupted.72 Others, in contrast, described this
risk in terms of “disruption,”73 interruption,74 and “significant ramifications.”75 A second
factor was the logic by which such threats were articulated. Some respondents referred to
the possible emulation of recent events—such as the Stuxnet attack in Iran—by terrorists.76
Others, in contrast, framed this threat in the abstract, discussing, for example, the possibility
of violence against people or property.77 Third, part of this diversity was a product of com-
peting conceptions of cyberterrorism. Replicating the trend noted in the literature review
section, those willing to countenance a wider conception of cyberterrorism identified a
range of possible threat scenarios extending beyond attacks on people, property, or critical
infrastructures and essential services. Four respondents referred to cyberterrorists threat-
ening national security by obtaining sensitive intelligence and classified information.78
Others referred to terrorists committing cybercrime, including obtaining individuals’ bank
details and accessing financial and other information from both public and private sector
institutions.79 One respondent understood cyberterrorism to include online harassment80
and another warned of cyberattacks being perpetrated to influence elections.81
Fourth, respondents’ answers to this question also raised temporal issues. Thus, some
negative responses were qualified with phrasing such as, “at the moment”82 or “at present.”83
Others, meanwhile, were more equivocal, warning that cyberterrorism has the potential to
become a significant threat, if it is not one at present. One respondent, for example, stated:
“Cyberterrorism is a potential threat and a potentially significant one. ...[A]t the moment,
cyberterrorism is not a threat but a risk.”84 Others still, stated that cyberterrorism is currently
a significant threat because of what terrorists might do in the future:
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76 L. Jarvis et al.
Yes. What has been done against the Iranian government recently could poten-
tially be done against any government by any actors, and that is probably just
the beginning.85
Yes, but one that is not yet manifest because terrorists lack the skills to mount
an effective attack.86
It does. However, it is the future of the threat that truly counts and, I think, is
really worrisome.87
The respondents that stated cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant threat offered
three reasons to support their position. First, three respondents pointed to the fact that
cyberterrorism (as they conceptualized this phenomenon) has never occurred.88 One stated
that we have “no precedent and few metrics” to assess the cyberterrorist threat.89 Another
said that “empirical evidence is almost non-existent,” adding that hypothesized scenarios
are often, “blue sky thinking.”90 Second, six respondents stated that terrorist organizations
lack the capability to attack critical infrastructures and essential services.91 Of these, two
doubted whether terrorists will ever acquire this level of expertise,92 while three others
suggested that things might change in the future.93 As one commented, “Non-state actors
don’t seem to have the know-how (yet).”94 Third, two respondents opined that terrorists
lack any motivation to perpetrate cyberterrorist attacks.95 As one explained:
[C]yberterrorism lacks the heroic quality of e.g. a suicide bombing and thus has
less appeal to potential terrorists. I think the self-image can be a very important
factor in a radicalisation process, and in this sense cyberterrorist attacks do not
fulfil this need to the extent that other forms of terrorism do.96
The other went on to suggest that what is significant is not the cyberterrorist threat itself, but
the manner in which this threat has been articulated: “At present, it is not a significant threat.
The hyperbolic inflation of its threat in public discourse and the potential ramifications for
civil liberties is far more significant, in my view.”97 Other respondents expressed similar
sentiments. One stated that cyberterrorism is a significant threat “because ‘we’ (officials,
emergency and military personnel, media again, in the US) act and talk as though it is.”98
Another commented that cyberterrorism “is a threat if it is constituted as such by security
discourse.”99 Views such as these clearly reflect the broadly constructivist position held by
many of the sceptical scholars explored in the above literature review section.
Responses to question 11—on whether a cyberterrorist attack had ever taken place—
raised similar issues. Respondents were invited to select either “Yes” or “No” from a
dropdown menu, with an additional free text box allowing further explanation. Of the
118 respondents, 113 answered this question (response rate: 96 percent). Three of these
selected neither “Yes” nor “No,” explaining that they were unsure. As Figure 2 shows, of
the remaining 110 respondents, remarkably 55 selected “Yes” and 55 selected “No.”
When findings for this question are restricted to those respondents who had earlier
stated that cyberterrorism does constitute a significant threat, only 42 of this sample of
63 (67 percent) believed an attack had yet taken place. This indicates the importance of
deductive reasoning as well as inductive inferences in conceptions of current and future
risks. As might be expected given the comparative novelty of cybersecurity threats, the past
is not necessarily seen as a reliable guide to understanding the present or future.
Respondents who stated that cyberterrorist attacks had taken place offered a number
of examples, listed in Table 2. The table uses the wording provided by respondents, with
the authors’ interpretation of the events contained in the notes below.
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 77
Table 2
Examples of cyberterrorist attacks offered by respondents
Attacks on Estonia134 11 respondents
Stuxnet, Iran135 6 respondents
Attacks on Georgia136 3 respondents
India-Pakistan137 2 respondents
Anonymous138 2 respondents
Turkey PKK collapsed Govt network139 1 respondent
Zapatista spamming140 1 respondent
Wikileaks 1 respondent
Israel-Gaza141 1 respondent
India (social networking)142 1 respondent
Dalai Lama143 1 respondent
Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades144 1 respondent
Aerospace145 1 respondent
Australian sewage leak146 1 respondent
Kyrgyzstan147 1 respondent
Some other respondents gave more general—and quite diverse—examples. These
included: theft of monies to fund terrorist organizations;100 the preparation of terrorist
attacks;101 calls for home-grown terrorism;102 attacks against individuals that governments
perceive as dissidents;103 and cyberespionage.104
The respondents that stated a cyberterrorist attack had not yet taken place did not
explicitly dispute that any of the events in Table 2 had occurred. Rather, they typically
provided reasons for doubting attacks such as these could constitute cyberterrorism. First,
eight respondents invoked an actor-specific definition of cyberterrorsm, arguing that some
of the highest profile cyberattacks to have taken place, such as Stuxnet and upon Estonia,
were not terrorist because they were not perpetrated by non-state groups.105 Some of
these respondents explicated further, suggesting that attacks carried out by state actors
are better understood as cyber warfare. Second, seven respondents said that high profile
cyberattacks could not qualify as (cyber)terrorist because they had not resulted in violence
Figure 2. Has a cyberterrorist attack ever taken place? (All respondents).
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78 L. Jarvis et al.
Figure 3. Does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? (Those respondents that stated that no
cyberterrorist attack has ever taken place).
against people or property.106 As one respondent explained: “no person has ever been killed
or injured as the result of an attack executed by using weaponised computer code.”107
Third, four respondents argued that there is a distinction between cyberterrorism and
cybercrime.108 One of these argued that, while terrorists might commit cybercrime in order
to facilitate terrorist activity, this does not render the criminal activity terrorist. On this
view, there is a difference between: (a) cyberterrorism and (b) cybercrime committed for
terrorist purposes (such as to raise funds).109 Another respondent argued that hacktivism
must be distinguished from cyberterrorism,110 although two other respondents suggested
that the activities of Anonymous render this distinction more problematic.111 Fourth, four
respondents stated that the cyberattacks that have occurred did not instil fear in a wider
audience and/or were not carried out with an intention to generate such fear.112 Absent
this element of intimidation or coercion, these respondents said that cyberattacks do not
constitute cyberterrorism. Lastly, three respondents said that those who have perpetrated
attacks to date lacked the political or ideological motive necessary for the attack to qualify
as (cyber)terrorist.113
As stated previously, the fact that a respondent believed that no cyberterrorist attack has
ever occurred did not necessarily mean that cyberterrorism was not viewed as a significant
threat. Figure 3 shows the responses to question 10 of those respondents that answered
no to question 11. Interestingly, in spite of the perceived absence of any cyberterrorist
attacks to date, a greater proportion of these respondents stated that cyberterrorism poses
a significant threat than stated it does not (35 percent compared to 29 percent). Moreover,
an additional 15 percent of these respondents stated that cyberterrorism may potentially or
possibly become a significant threat.
The final question to be explored focused more explicitly on issues of vulnerability
and response than of capability and intention. Here, respondents were asked to name the
most effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism, and then to detail whether there are
significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or counterterrorism. Ninety-three
responses were received (response rate: 79 percent), although some respondents only
answered part of the question.
In response to the first part of the question, twelve countermeasures were identified
by at least two respondents (see Figure 4). One—target-hardening—dominated our re-
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 79
Figure 4. The most effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism.
sponses, with 35 respondents mentioning this mechanism. Some of these framed their
comments quite generally, for example: “Enhanced IT security”114 or “Technical secu-
rity measures.”115 Others, in contrast, gave more specific suggestions including “Redun-
dancies in various civilian and critical online systems,”116 “Firewalls,”117 “Closed secure
networks,”118 “Keeping sensitive data in encrypted format,”119 and “Increases in biometric
security systems.”120
A number of other countermeasures were mentioned by only one respondent. These
included: refraining from starting illegal wars;121 switching our focus from non-state to
state actors;122 and, education and humanitarian aid.123
The four most common responses to the second part of this question—on the pecu-
liarities of countering cyberterrorism—are detailed in Figure 5. Seventeen respondents (18
percent) argued that, while the methods employed might be different, countering cybert-
errorism involves the same underlying strategies as other forms of terrorism. By contrast,
16 respondents (17 percent) believed there to be a significant difference with other forms
Figure 5. Differences to other forms of anti- or counterterrorism.
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80 L. Jarvis et al.
of terrorism in that greater technical expertise is required to counter cyberterrorism. These
two viewpoints are not necessarily incompatible. While one focuses on the underlying prin-
ciples (prevention, protection, resilience, etc.), the other focuses on what the application of
these principles looks like in practice. This was summed up neatly by one respondent, who
said “Yes, from technological point of view, not from ideological point of view.”124
The 12 countermeasures listed in Figure 4 were identified by a total of 60
respondents.125 Of these, it is worth noting that 14 had said (in response to question
10) that cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant threat.126 So, the majority of the
respondents that did not regard cyberterrorism as a significant threat nonetheless identified
countermeasures. There were two reasons for this. First, five of these respondents explained
that, while cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant threat, cyberwarfare and cyber-
crime do.127 Measures taken in response to these other threats will also improve security
against cyberterrorism. In the words of one respondent, “defensive measures taken against
cybercrime and cyberwarfare will also work against cyberterrorism.”128 Second, five of
these respondents explained that, while cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant
threat, other forms of terrorism do.129 For these researchers, measures taken to combat
other forms of terrorism will also improve security against cyberterrorism. In fact, one
respondent went further and argued that seeking specifically to tackle cyberterrorism could
prove ultimately counterproductive:
If we develop specific “counter-terrorism” strategies for “cyberterrorism,” then
we risk overlooking the motivations that underlie this impulse towards violence.
Table 3
Has a cyberterrorist attack ever taken place? (By disciplinary background)
All
respondents
Those respondents that
said a cyberterrorist
attack has taken place
Those respondents that
said a cyberterrorist
attack has not taken
place
Group A (Political Science,
International Relations,
et al.)
50% 34% 69%
Group B (Law, Criminology,
et al.)
11% 20% 0%
Group C (Economics,
Business, et al.)
1% 3% 0%
Group D (Engineering,
Computer Science, Cyber,
et al.)
12% 15% 10%
Group E (Psychology,
Anthropology, et al.)
15% 16% 12%
Group F (Literature, Arts,
History, et al.)
7% 5% 7%
Group G (Independent
Researchers, Analysts,
et al.)
4% 7% 2%
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Table 4
Countermeasures against cyberterrorism by disciplinary background
Tota l
Group A
(Political
Science,
International
Relations,
et al.)
Group B
(Law,
Criminology,
et al.)
Group C
(Economics,
Business,
et al.)
Group D
(Engineering,
Computer
Science, Cyber,
et al.)
Group E
(Psychology,
Anthropology,
et al.)
Group F
(Literature,
Arts, History,
et al.)
Group G
(Independent
Researchers,
Analysts, et al.)
Respondents
that
identified
one of the
following 12
measures
60 29 (42%) 7 (10%) 1 (1%) 12 (17%) 11 (16%) 5 (7%) 4 (6%)
Target-
hardening
35 17 (41%) 5 (12%) 1 (2%) 7 (17%) 6 (15%) 4 (10%) 1 (2%)
Refusing to
exaggerate
the threat
8 6 (67%) — — 1 (11%) 2 (22%) — —
Greater
international
co-operation
7 2 (29%) — — 4 (57%) — 1 (14%) —
Utilizing the
same
responses as
for
cybercrime
6 2 (33%) — — 2 (33%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) —
Preventing
radicaliza-
tion
5 4 (80%) — — — 1 (20%) — —
Air-walling 4 3 (75%) — — — 1 (25%) — —
81
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Employing
hackers
3 — 1 (33%) — — 2 (67%) — —
Greater private
sector
involvement
3 2 (67%) — — — — — 1 (33%)
Greater
information-
sharing
3 — — — 1 (33%) — 1 (33%) 1 (33%)
Increased
intelligence
3 2 (66%) — — — 1 (33%) — —
Not
militarizing
cyberspace
2 1 (50%) 1 (50%) — — — — —
Greater
research
2 1 (50%) — — — — — 1 (50%)
82
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 83
Whether an act of terrorism is digitally or physically realized is but a particular
manifestation of these motivations. It is important, therefore, that this basic
rudiment of understanding “terrorism” does not get lost in the “cyberterrorism”
hyperbole.130
Tables 3 and 4 complete this section of the article by detailing responses to questions
11 and 12 by the disciplinary backgrounds of respondents.
Table 3 compares the disciplinary backgrounds of those respondents that opined that
a cyberterrorist attack has, and has not, taken place with the backgrounds of the general
pool of respondents. It is worth noting, first, that there were respondents from all seven
groups that believed a cyberterrorist attack has taken place. In contrast, while there were
respondents from five of the disciplinary groups that stated that a cyberterrorist attack has
never taken place, there were no respondents from the other two groups (B and C) that
held this view. This was particularly striking for disciplinary group B (Law, Criminology,
et al.), given that this group accounted for 11 percent of the general pool of respondents.
Also striking was the fact that respondents from Group A (Political Science, Interna-
tional Relations, et al) accounted for 34 percent of those that stated that a cyberterrorist
attack has taken place but 69 percent of those that said that such an attack has never
occurred.
Table 4 shows the disciplinary backgrounds of the respondents that proposed each of
the identified countermeasures. Although the number of respondents is small for many of
them, two interesting findings nonetheless emerge. First, some countermeasures seemed
to be more closely linked to respondents from a particular disciplinary background. For
example, while 42 percent of respondents who identified one of these 12 countermeasures
were from Political Science and International Relations backgrounds (Group A), this group
accounted for 67 percent of those warning against exaggerating the threat, and 80 percent
of those promoting counterradicalization. In a similar vein, 57 percent of the respondents
that argued for enhanced international co-operation were from group D (Engineering,
Computer Science, Cyber, et al.) even though this group only accounted for 17 percent of
all respondents, and 67 percent of those that suggested employing hackers were from group
E (Psychology, Anthropology, et al.) even though this group only accounted for 16 percent
of all respondents. Second, the twelve countermeasures listed in the table were mentioned
by respondents from across all seven disciplinary groups: none were restricted to any one
background. As detailed further below, these two findings point to the importance of a
multidisciplinary approach to responding to cyberterrorism.
Conclusion
As the preceding discussion has shown, there is considerable disagreement within the
academic research community around cyberterrorism. According to the findings of this
project’s survey, no meaningful consensus exists around the extent to which this phe-
nomenon poses a security threat; the potential targets of cyberterrorist attacks; or, indeed,
whether cyberterrorism has even yet occurred. The roots of this disagreement are, in part,
conceptual. As detailed above, different interpretations of “threat” and “significance” as
well as different assessments of imminence were evident throughout the qualitative findings
generated in this research. It was also, however, partly a product of competing logics
for assessing and predicting threat: not least, divergent views on the past’s reliability for
inferential reasoning on the future. Definitional issues were important here too. Although
fifteen different attacks were identified by our respondents as cyberterrorism—attacks
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84 L. Jarvis et al.
stretching, incidentally, across Australia, Estonia, India, Iran, Israel, the United States,
and beyond—others disqualified these for a number of reasons. Thus, the lack of
physical violence or death from attacks launched in cyberspace to date was, for some,
reason not to describe these as cyberterrorism. For others, the lack of fear generated
by cyberattacks (especially, vis-`
a-vis their physical equivalents) was of relevance. For
others still, an actor-specific conception of cyberterrorism was needed to differentiate this
phenomenon from state-based cyberwar attacks. Some respondents, moreover, emphasized
the importance of differentiating cyberterrorism from cybercrime or cyberactivism.
The extent of this disagreement has two obvious parallels. The first, detailed at the start
of this article, is that within the academic literature on the threat of cyberterrorism specifi-
cally. As argued there, this literature has gradually witnessed the emergence of competing
perspectives to counterbalance the earliest—and in some senses most hyperbolic—of pre-
dictions around the likelihood and scale of future attacks. Many of the respondents raised
issues explored in this literature—CII vulnerabilities, the preferences of terrorist actors,
issues of global interconnectivity, and so forth—with a small number of others speaking
instead to the construction of “cyberterrorism” as a present/future threat. The second ob-
vious parallel is existing academic debate on terrorism more widely, which has long been
characterized by competing views of how best to calculate risk in this area.131 In some
senses, at least, current academic perspectives on cyberterrorism may therefore simply
represent an extension of the positions held in relation to its parent concept.
In addition to these contiguities, however, it is also important to note two findings
from the survey that point to the potential distinctiveness of cyberterrorism. First, a number
of the respondents identified the need for specific types of expertise for the countering of
cyberterrorism vis-`
a-vis other terrorisms. While some of these were environment-specific
(e.g., air walling), others invoked the need for new types of partnership between sectors
and actors across the sociopolitical spectrum. While the countering of terrorism has always
evolved over time, and new types of actors have been brought into this public policy area,132
these findings do speak to a debate over the distinctiveness of preventive and responsive
activities in this particular context.
The second respect in which the research findings suggest cyberterrorism is distinct
is the level of contestability surrounding the term. Its parent concept, terrorism, is, of
course, the subject of longstanding—and well-worn—definitional controversies. Whether
particular attacks or uses of violence warrant this terminology is hotly debated: not least
in relation to “state terrorism.” There is also debate over the objective or subjective status
of the labeling of an act as “terrorist” and over the likelihood of future attacks.133 Yet, in
spite of this, one would be hard-pressed to find a researcher willing to argue it has never
occurred. In stark contrast, half of respondents to this survey believed cyberterrorism has
already occurred, while the other half believed it has not. This, we argue, demonstrates
a level of contestability—conceptual and otherwise—that stretches far beyond debate on
offline or non-cyberterrorism.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to all respondents for taking the time to respond to our survey. We thank
Simon Lavis and Joanna Halbert for excellent research assistance throughout this project,
and Thomas Chen, David Mair, and Andrew Whiting for their comments on earlier drafts.
Lastly, we express our gratitude to the Swansea Academy of Learning and Teaching for
their support for this research. Any errors remain ours alone.
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 85
Notes
1. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature, Updated Edition (New Burnswick, NJ:
Transaction, 2008).
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,”
in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge, 2004), pp. 57–71. See also, John Horgan, “The Case for Firsthand Research,” in Andrew Silke,
ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp.
30–56.
4. Andrew Silke, “The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research,” in
Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (Abingdon: Routledge,
2004), pp. 186–213.
5. Magnus Ranstorp, “Mapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11: An Academic Field of Old
Problems and New Prospects,” in Richard Jackson et al., eds., Critical Terrorism Studies: A New
Research Agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 13–33; See also, Andrew Silke, “Contemporary
Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research,” in Richard Jackson et al., eds., Critical Terrorism Studies: A
New Research Agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 34–48.
6. Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, Tom Chen, and Simon Lavis, Cyberterrorism: A Survey of
Researchers, Cyberterrorism Project Research Report No. 1 (Swansea University, 2013). Available
at http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org (accessed 28 June 2013).
7. Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, “Cyberterrorism?” Computers and Security 21 (7) (2002),
p. 637. For an overview of conceptual debate on terrorism more broadly, see: Leonard Weinberg,
Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism
and Political Violence 16(4) (2004), pp. 777–794; Maura Conway, “Reality Bytes: Cyberterrorism
and Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet,” First Monday 7(11) (2002), doi: 10.5210%2Ffm.v7i11.1001 (ac-
cessed 15 May 2013); George K. Kostopoulos, “Cyberterrorism: The Next Arena of Confrontation,”
Communications of the IBIMA 6(1) (2008), pp. 165–169; Peter Neumann, Old and New Terrorism
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).
8. Dorothy Denning, “Cyberterrorism” (Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on
Terrorism Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, 2000). Available at
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/∼denning/infosec/cyberterror.html (accessed 15 May 2013).
9. See, for example, U.K. Government, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010).” Available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/
prod consum dg/groups/dg digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg 19164.pdf?CID=PDF
&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr (accessed 15 May 2013); Paul Cornish, David Livingstone, Dave Clemente,
and Claire Yorke, “Cyber Security and the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (2011).” Available
at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178171 (accessed 15 May 2013).
10. Barry Collin, “The Future of Cyberterrorism,” Crime and Justice International 13(2)
(1997), p. 17.
11. Ibid., p. 17.
12. Denning, “Cyberterrorism.”
13. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve Globalisation and International Terrorism,”
International Security 27(3) (2002/03), p. 47.
14. Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?” United States Institute of
Peace Special Report 119 (2004). Available at http://www.usip.org/publications/cyberterrorism-how-
real-threat (accessed 15 May 2013), p. 6.
15. S. M. Furnell and M. J. Warren, “Computer Hacking and Cyber Terrorism: The Real
Threats in the New Millennium?” Computers and Security 18 (1999), p. 28.
16. Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs:
The Growing Threat from Information Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 12(2) (2000),
p. 102.
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86 L. Jarvis et al.
17. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” Survival 42(1)
(2000), pp. 59–75.
18. Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs,”
p. 103.
19. Matthew G. Devost, Brian K. Houghton, and Neal Allen Pollard, “Information Terrorism:
Political Violence in the Information Age,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9(1) (1997), p. 78.
20. For a discussion of the resilience of CIIs to attack that is at odds with most of the
following references, please see: James A. Lewis, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cy-
ber War and Other Cyber Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101 risks of cyberterror.pdf (accessed 16 May 2013), p. 27.
21. Dunn Cavelty, “Critical Information Infrastructure,” p. 16.
22. Clay Wilson, Cyber Threats to Critical Information Infrastructure, “in Tom Chen, Lee
Jarvis, and Stuart Macdonald, eds., Cyber Terrorism: Understanding, Threat and Response (New
York: Springer, 2014, forthcoming).
23. Dunn Cavelty, “Critical Information Infrastructure,” p. 17.
24. “Networks of comprised computers that are controlled remotely to perform large-scale dis-
rupted denial of service (DDoS) attacks, send spam, trojan and phishing emails, distribute pirated me-
dia or conduct other usually illegitimate activities”—Anestis Karasaridis, Brian Rexroad, and David
Hoeflin, “Wide-Scale Botnet Detection and Characterisation” (paper presented at First Workshop on
Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets, 2007). Available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1323135
(accessed 16 May 2013).
25. Myriam Dunn, “Securing the Information Age: The Challenges of Complexity for Critical
Information Infrastructure Protection and IR Theory,” in Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello,
eds., International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 97.
26. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber-Terror—Looming Threat or Phantom Menace? The Fram-
ing of the US Cyber-Threat Debate,” Journal of Information Technology and Politics 4(1) (2007), doi:
0.1300/J516v04n01 03 (accessed 15 May 2013); Maura Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism:
A Study in the Construction of ‘Reality,”’ (2008). Available at http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008–5.pdf
(accessed 16 May 2013).
27. Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security and the Copen-
hagen School,” International Studies Quarterly 53(4) (2009), pp. 1155–1175. For further examples,
see: Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism”; Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber-Terror.”
28. Hansen and Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security and the Copenhagen School,”
p. 1168.
29. Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism,” p. 11.
30. Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 28 (2005), pp. 129–149.
31. Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism,” pp. 43–44.
32. Ralf Bendrath, “The American Cyber-Angst and the Real World—Any Link?” in Robert
Latham, ed., Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between Information and Technology
and Security (London: The New Press, 2003), pp. 49–73.
33. See, for example, Maura Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism,” p. 43; Arash Barfar,
Kiyana Zolfaghar, and Shahriar Mohammadi, “A Framework for Cyber War against International
Terrorism,” International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions 3(1) (2011), doi:
10.1504/IJITST.2011.039677 (accessed 13 May 2013), p. 30.
34. Conway, “Reality Bytes,” p. 13.
35. Maura Conway, “Against Cyberterrorism,” Communications of the ACM 54(2) (2011),
doi: 10.1145/1897816.1897829 (accessed 13 May 2013); Michael Stohl, “Cyber Terrorism: A Clear
and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games?” Crime, Law and Social
Change 46 (2006), doi: 10.1007/s10611–007–9061–9 (accessed 13 May 2013).
36. Giampiero Giacomello, “Bangs for the Buck: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Cyberterrorism,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 387–388.
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 87
37. Maura Conway, “Terrorism and New Media: The Cyber-Battlespace, “ in James J. Forest,
ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives Volume 2
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 365–371.
38. See, for example: Maura Conway, “Terrorism and (Mass) Communication: From Nitro to
the Net,” World Today 60(8/9) (2004), pp. 19–22; Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve Globalisation and
International Terrorism,” pp. 30–58. A related, but distinct, argument is also made within the relevant
literature that identifies advancements in technology and the processes of globalization as a driver of
changes in the hierarchies and structures of terrorist organizations. For a comprehensive discussion of
these issues see: David Ronfeldt and John Arquila, “What Next for Networks and Netwars,” in David
Ronfeldt and John Arquila, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 311–368.
39. Manuel R. Torres Soriano, “The Vulnerabilities of Online Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism 35(4) (2012), p. 275.
40. Rachel E. Yould, “Beyond the American Fortress: Understanding Homeland Security in
the Information Age,” in Robert Latham, ed., Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship
between Information Technology and Security (New York: Social Science Council, 2003), p. 79.
41. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Critical Information Infrastructures: Vulnerabilities, Threats
and Responses,” Disarmament Forum (2007). Available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-
art2643.pdf, (accessed 16 May 2013), p. 19.
42. See, for example: Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” in Christian
Czosseck and Kenneth Geers, eds., The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare (Amster-
dam: IOS Press), pp. 106–117; Donald J. Reed, “Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation
of War and Conflict,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(8) (2008), pp. 684–722.
43. Keiran Hardy, “WWWMDs: Cyber-Attacks Against Infrastructure in Domestic Anti-
Terror Laws,” Computer Law and Security Review 27 (2011), p. 161.
44. Andrew Rathmell, “Controlling Computer Network Operations,” Studies in Conflict &
Terr o rism 26(3) (2003), p. 218.
45. See Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2011), pp. 124–149.
46. The complete list is as follows: ACM Digital Library; Anthropoligical Index Online; Ap-
plied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts; Bibliography of British & Irish History; BioMed Central
Journals; British Humanities Index (CSA); British Periodicals (XML); Business Source Complete
(EBSCO); CINAHL Plus (EBSCO); Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Wiley); Education
Resources Information Centre; Emerald; HeinOnline; HMIC (Ovid); IEEE Xplore; INSPEC (Ovid);
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; IOP Journals Z39; JISC Journals Archives; JSTOR;
Kluwer Law Journals; Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer Link); Lexis Library; Math-
SciNet (AMS); Medline (EBSCO); MLA International Bibliography; Oxford Journals; Periodicals
Archive online; Philosopher’s Index (Ovid); Project Muse; Proquest Business Collection; PsycARTI-
CLES (Ovid); PsycINFO (Ovid); PubMed; Royal Society Journals; SAGE Journals Online; Scopus
(Elsevier); Social Care Online (SCIE); Springer Link (Metapress); Taylor & Francis Online; Web
of Knowledge (Cross Search); Web of Knowledge (ISI); Web of Science (Cross Search); Web of
Science (ISI); Westlaw; Wiley Interscience; and Zetoc.
47. At the time of writing, Terrorism & Political Violence was ranked 27/78 in International
Relations and 59/141 in Political Science, with an impact factor of 0.814. Studies in Conflict &
Terr o rism was ranked 42/78 in International Relations and 78/141 in Political Science, with an
impact factor of 0.588.
48. Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terror-
ism,” in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2004), p. 61.
49. See, among many others, Jeroen Gunning, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Gov-
ernment & Opposition 42(3) (2007), pp. 363–393.
50. The most obvious example is in the emergence of debates around “Critical Terrorism
Studies” (CTS). Although diverse, proponents of CTS argue for a revisiting of the fundamental
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88 L. Jarvis et al.
ontological, epistemological, normative, and methodological assumptions of terrorism research, as
well as the purposes of scholarship in this field. For overviews, see Jeroen Gunning, “A Case for
Critical Terrorism Studies?”; Richard Jackson et al., Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research
Agenda; Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011);
Lee Jarvis, “The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Security Dialogue 40(1) (2009),
pp. 5–27. For criticism, see John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, “A Case against ‘Critical Terrorism
Studies,”’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 1(1) (2008), pp. 51–64; David M. Jones and M. L. R. Smith,
“We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies ‘on’ Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 32(4) (2009), pp. 292–302.
51. For further information on this association, please see: TAPVA, http://tapva.com (accessed
26 February 2013).
52. Please see the following webpage for more information on this working group: BISA,
http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=93&catid=37&Itemid=68
(accessed 26 February 2013).
53. See Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 245–246.
54. On the transitory nature of terrorism studies as an academic field, see Magnus Ranstorp,
“Mapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11: An Academic Field of Old Problems and New Prospects,”
in Richard Jackson et al., eds., Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2009), pp. 14–15.
55. Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit, Critical Terrorism Studies: An Introduction to Research
Methods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 37.
56. Several of our researchers self-identified according to more than one disciplinary back-
ground.
57. Silke, for instance, points to the dominant and growing hold of political scientists over
terrorism research throughout the 1990s. See, Andrew Silke, “The Road Less Travelled: Recent
Trends in Terrorism Research,” in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements
and Failures (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 193–194.
58. Responses to the survey have been anonymized and arranged numerically from R1 to
R118. Responses have been edited as sparingly as possible to ensure fidelity to our findings.
59. R93.
60. R61.
61. R53.
62. R31, R39, R80, R85, R99.
63. R85, R93, and R99 all referred to transport in general. R25 referred specifically to aviation.
64. R25, R43, R94.
65. R16 and R85 referred to energy grids in general. R31 and R39 referred specifically to
electric grids.
66. R16, R31.
67. R93.
68. R93.
69. R85.
70. R47.
71. R57.
72. R16.
73. R1, R9, R68, R86.
74. R2.
75. R39.
76. R82.
77. R20, R68, R70.
78. R39, R43, R65, R94. One of these (R65) specifically referred to cyberterrorism including
cyber espionage.
79. R1, R65, R80, R94.
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Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 89
80. R80.
81. R22.
82. R95.
83. R45.
84. R90.
85. R82.
86. R4.
87. R9.
88. R34, R45, R73.
89. R34.
90. R73.
91. R11, R21, R45, R52, R63, R73.
92. R21, R73.
93. R11, R45, R52.
94. R11
95. R45, R63.
96. R63.
97. R45.
98. R30.
99. R36.
100. R76.
101. R56.
102. R107.
103. R50.
104. R104.
105. R1, R4, R10, R53, R55, R64, R78, R106.
106. R5, R21, R26, R28, R35, R64, R95.
107. R95.
108. R1, R8, R33, R54.
109. R1.
110. R33.
111. R1, R21.
112. R21, R34, R58, R65.
113. R21, R26, R63.
114. R60.
115. R90.
116. R9.
117. R80.
118. R97.
119. R57.
120. R85.
121. R102.
122. R86.
123. R93.
124. R81.
125. The other 33 respondents that answered this question either: identified a countermeasure
that was not mentioned by any other respondents; or only answered the second part of question 12.
126. R11, R15, R21, R27, R45, R52, R54, R63, R64, R73, R74, R103, R108, R110.
127. R21, R54, R63, R103, R108.
128. R108.
129. R21, R27, R45, R63, R110.
130. R45.
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90 L. Jarvis et al.
131. See, for example, John Mueller’s “Six Rather Unusual Propositions” article and the re-
sponses to it within the same issue: John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions About Terrorism,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 17(4) (2005), 487–505.
132. Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, “Stakeholder Security: The New Western Way of Counter-
Terrorism?” Contemporary Politics 16(2) (2010), 173–188.
133. Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism.
134. The Russian cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007.
135. See further: James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber
War ,” Survival 53(1) (2011), pp. 23–40.
136. The Russian cyberattack on a Georgian government website in 2008.
137. In 2010 the Indian Cyber Army hacked into the website of the Pakistani Army, and the
Pakistan Cyber Army hacked into the website of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation.
138. One respondent referred specifically to Anonymous hacking into the websites of the Boston
and Salt Lake City Police Departments and threatening to release the names and addresses of police
officers (R39). The other referred simply to the group (R101).
139. The Turkish Ministry of Finance’s website was hacked by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) (2011).
140. The Mexican Zapatista group has shut down Mexican police and other websites.
141. Following its air strikes on the Gaza Strip Israel experienced more than 44 million hacking
attempts on government and other finance websites (2012).
142. During the Assam riots threatening messages and pictures were sent to migrant workers
using social networking sites (2012).
143. A Chinese cyber espionage organization targeted the office of the Dalai Lama (2009).
144. The respondent stated that this group are mentioned in the United Kingdom’s CONTEST
strategy. The relevant paragraph reads: “We continue to see no evidence of systematic cyber terrorism
(i.e. terrorist attack on IT systems). But the first recorded incident of a terrorist ‘cyber’ attack
on corporate computer systems took place in 2010.33 The so called ‘here you have’ virus, (the
responsibility for which was claimed by the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades for Electronic Jihad) was
relatively unsophisticated but a likely indicator of a future trend. Since the death of Usama bin Laden,
Al Qa’ida has explicitly called not only for acts of lone or individual terrorism (see para 2.22) but
also for ‘cyber jihad.”’ (CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Cm
8123 (2011), para 2.47)
145. U.S. defense firm Lockheed Martin said it came under a significant cyberattack in 2011.
146. The Maroochy Shire cyberattack (2000).
147. The sustained cyberattack reported in 2009.
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