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University of London
Birkbeck College
The Aesthetic Experience of Architecture
Debating the essentialist account of Roger Scruton
Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy
for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy
in the subject area of Aesthetics
London
September 2001
Abstract
The primary purpose was to consider the aesthetic experience of architecture through a
discussion of the single modern work in the aesthetics of architecture, written by
Roger Scruton in 1979, entitled The Aesthetics of Architecture. In doing so, the aim
was to develop an understanding of the problem of architecture in aesthetics by
studying it in its primary mode of apprehension, experience. Scruton claims that
imaginative perception is of the essence of experiencing architecture. By considering
in what the aesthetic experience of architecture consists, it can be proven that
whilst imaginative perception may be possible and necessary for an experience of
architecture to be ‘aesthetic’, it is not sufficient. According to Scruton, engaging
architecture requires imaginative perception. However, we must allow for chance or
untrained aesthetic experiences, for if imagination is active in the sense that one
must be engaged in thought about the object, then surely this is unnecessary.
Imaginative perception does explain much of our experience, but it is perhaps only
one aspect of a complex of attitudes that we can take towards architecture. As
Scruton intimates, the structure of our experience of architecture mirrors that of
perception, this structure containing the levels of literal and imaginative
perception. This explains the how our experience can be imaginative and not
aesthetic, and how it must be imaginative to be aesthetic. From this, we find the
necessity to superimpose upon imaginative experience, an additional level of ‘graded
complex experience’, exemplified in the ‘thick’ conception of the imagination. For
example, ‘rhythm’ is actually there to be discovered in the columns of a mausoleum;
appreciating architecture aesthetically requires more than visual perception.
Scruton’s imagination thus becomes the basic or ‘thin’ conception of experience.
All experience of architecture consists in the exercise of the imaginative capacity,
for otherwise we merely would perceive ‘stuff’ literally. Even in the ‘thick’
conception, it will be impossible to have an aesthetic experience that is not an
engagement of the imagination, owing to the imaginative structure of experience. The
level of ‘complex’ experience explains the range of aesthetic experiences in which the
imaginative capacity is engaged to greater or lesser degree. Whilst every experience
of architecture need only be imaginative, every aesthetic experience must employ
something more that the imagination. As such, we must address the range of aesthetic
experiences, then demarcate as to what constitutes an aesthetic experience, and what
does not. A mind-set defines the range of experiences, allowing not only for the
complex and plural experience akin to a ‘religious awakening’, but also chance or
untrained encounters, as well as simple one-dimensional experiences. Architectural
experience consists in the ‘thin’ level of imaginative perception, upon which supervenes
‘thick’ perception as a central feature of aesthetic experience.
An obvious problem with such pluralist accounts resides in their inability to
provide succinct answers to questions regarding the essence of experience, the value
and importance of architecture and the experiences we derive. But the primary issue
here is not that the competing accounts are incommensurable, rather they are
complementary and interrelated; it’s not that we can offer no correct view, or that
all of these views are equally correct. It is more that there is no single way of
stating the unique fundamental truth about our experience in the way that Scruton
proposes by citing the imaginative perception.
Finally, some of Scruton’s claims following from his presentation of imagination
are purely a manifestation of personal preferences. It might be seen as an attempt to
rationalise and objectify those preferences in the manner so frequently displayed by
others with a manifest bias, as vividly illustrated in his choice of examples, coming
predominantly from classical architecture. It may tentatively be proposed that until
we undertake to delineate a full understanding of the psychology of ‘aesthetic’
perception and experience, we cannot properly say what it would be to experience
architecture aesthetically.
1
Table of Contents
Part I
Introduction
Ii - Purpose and Thesis
Purpose
Scruton’s Theme and Theses
Part II
The Problem of Architecture
IIi – Problems of Aesthetic Experience
IIii – Architecture: Functional or Aesthetic?
Architecture as Problem-Solving
Division of the Aesthetic
Understanding and The Aesthetic Sense
Part III
Locating the Essence of Architecture
IIIi - Previous Accounts
Positive Contributions
Addressing Potential Problems
IIIii – The Essence of Architecture: Imaginative Perception
Pleasure in Imaginative Perception
Pinpointing Imagination
Imaginative Perception in Architecture
Imaginative Experience of Architecture
Features of Imaginative Experience
The Unification of Experience
IIIiii – Complex Experience
Imagination as The Aesthetic Attitude
Complex Experience
Comparing Complex and Imaginative Experience
The Aesthetic ‘Mind-set’ and Experience-criterion
Part IV
Conclusion
Part V
Bibliography
2
Part I - Introduction
Ii - Purpose and Thesis
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to consider the
aesthetic experience of architecture through a discussion of the
primary modern work in the aesthetics of architecture, written by
Roger Scruton in 1979, entitled The Aesthetics of Architecture. In
doing so, my aim is to develop an understanding of the problem of
architecture in aesthetics by studying it in its primary mode of
apprehension, experience. In the field of aesthetics, I believe
architecture is a valid and significant subject for philosophical
speculation. The problem of architecture is of interest owing to its
nature as both a practical enterprise and an art-form in which the
fulfilment of merely practical ends is commonly seen as insufficient.
Many unique questions arise as a result of the juxtaposition of the
practical and the aesthetic. In itself, the aesthetics of
architecture seems to have been somewhat neglected as a topic of
serious inquiry, owing historically to the concentration on theories
of beauty, tragedy and poetry, the aesthetics of painting and music,
and the problem of taste and aesthetic qualities. Here I intend to
consider fundamental issues regarding our experience in the context of
architectural aesthetics as an attempt at their correct understanding,
this being a primary task of aesthetics. We should attempt to
determine the truth and sufficiency of Scruton’s claims that
imaginative perception is of the essence of experiencing architecture.
Scruton’s Theme and Theses
Scruton’s theme is an application of philosophical aesthetics to
architecture as an art-form, the purpose of which is to illustrate the
3
employment of certain concepts to the discussion of buildings, and to
derive an overall conception of the nature and value of the aesthetic
experience of architecture.
1
In this, we may discern a number of main
theses related to the issue of aesthetic experience. First,
architecture and building are no different, and in attempting to prove
this, we shall see that the aesthetic and the functional are mutually
indetachable. Consequently, practical reason, and thereby practical
understanding, are necessary constituents in architectural experience.
Second, existing theory about the aesthetic nature and experience
of architecture ignores fundamental aspects of the enterprise; the
most significant is that of imaginative perception in experience.
Third, in the experience of architecture, the aesthetic understanding
and imaginative perception are inseparable. This understanding is
comprised of an exercise of the aesthetic sense, itself informed by
practical reason. Finally, Scruton’s theories of aesthetic
understanding and imaginative perception may seem to constitute a form
of distinctive aesthetic attitude we are meant to take towards
architecture, the truth of which we shall explore. As part of our
discovery, we will find the term ‘imagination’ is ambiguous and admits
of two distinct uses, and may be employed within different levels of
our experience.
1
Scruton (1979), P. ix-x
4
Part II
The Problem of Architecture
IIi - Problems of Aesthetic Experience
Aesthetic experience is the primary mode of rewardingly engaging
with aesthetic objects, either human artefacts such as painting,
sculpture, architecture and to some extent ‘found objects’, or
instances of nature and natural beauty.
2
This engagement was
traditionally thought to give rise to subjective pleasurable
sentiments
3
that form the basis of positive aesthetic judgements.
Outlining the essential elements of experience in its most general
description will aid in understanding the nature and importance of
experience, its location in the mind and its relation to other mental
phenomena. The aim is to develop a defensible understanding of our
mental capacities for perception, appreciation and experience. In
doing so, we shall begin to identify the characteristics individuating
those capacities. Scruton argues that the pleasure involved in
experiencing architecture is very different from the unmediated,
sensuous pleasure many held it gave rise to. The role of thought is
important in apprehending both pleasure and its relation to perception
in experiencing architecture. We shall find that our thoughts govern
the object of pleasure and that an understanding of the object is
critical to its proper experience. Exactly what this understanding
is, and its relationship to practical reason and aesthetic choice in
experience, are central parts of Scruton’s theory. He holds that the
understanding, practical reason and aesthetic choice are indivisible
elements of this experience. A correct grasp of such capacities will
2
The definition of aesthetic objects is a subject unto itself, one primary offering being,
problematically, anything whatsoever that may be attended to for its own sake alone that gives
rise to a form of pleasure.
3
Such as tender, romantic, or nostalgic feelings or emotions.
5
prove indispensable to understanding the nature of interest in
architecture.
To determine the significance of architectural appreciation (and
the correctness of our account), Scruton feels we must delineate what
the object consists in, or ‘how it must be’. Only then, by
distinguishing between object and response, shall we determine just
what the nature of our aesthetic interest is. We can then discuss the
form of architectural appreciation rather than its object, for
discussing the object merely gives an indication of what we respond to
and what those responses are. It would seem that much ‘architectural
theory’
4
presumes that it is the object of appreciation rather than
appreciation itself that will best inform our aesthetic interest.
These theories attempt to describe the object of interest with a scope
too narrow, each focusing on a certain salient or general feature.
Scruton’s argument is that such a narrow focus is unable to provide a
sufficiently wide conception of aesthetic appreciation. A ‘thin’
conception of the object of appreciation could only ever lead to a
‘thin’ conception of its nature. It is only with a ‘thick’ conception
of our aesthetic interest that we can sufficiently describe our
interest in architecture.
Architectural theory seems aim at formulating principles of
application, or “maxims, rules and precepts which govern, or ought to
govern, the practice of the builder”.
5
Scruton generally sets himself
against these theorists by criticising their attempts to formulate
such rules under the assumption that we already know what we must
achieve. Consequently, he feels they consider not the nature of
architectural success, rather architectural success itself, or ‘how
4
That of Vitruvius, Alberti, Serlio, Vignola and perhaps Ruskin among others. Unfortunately,
much architectural criticism to date fails to maintain the high standards and rigorousness
found in other areas. Particular problems revolve around the dogmatism and unargued generality
6
best to achieve it’. In essence, by pointing to what we should not
do, we might see our aim more closely. The argument here is that much
of architectural theory has missed the point and subsequently its
practitioners misunderstand architecture. Whether this oversight was
intentional on the part of those architectural theorists searching
merely for rules of building is not the issue. Scruton’s assertion is
that their claims to universal validity create a philosophical
challenge. Any theory that maintains a priori status must support its
claims by reference to universal features abstracted from contextual
idiosyncrasies. Architectural theory can be worthwhile in its aims
given that it avoids claims to universal validity. It must accept
that until the nature and essence of architecture (and its success)
are considered, architectural theory fails to provide an adequate
conception of our experience of architecture.
However, if we are required to consider appreciation and its
object abstractly, should we not consider experience in its most
general terms, in abstraction from any particular art-form? It is, as
Scruton outlines, the inherently particular attitudes required by the
impersonal and jointly aesthetic and functional characteristics that
define architecture.
6
Why else study a single topic within a category
whose generalised principles were sufficient to sustain interest, were
it not for the deeply idiosyncratic and distinctive qualities of
architecture? The diverse features that exist between architecture
(as an abstract art) and representational art, indicates not only the
many ways in which our experience of architecture may differ from
that has characterised the critical enterprise.
5
Scruton, P. 4
6
This definition is in terms of its creation and engagement. Scruton chooses to use the term
‘enjoyment’, but I prefer the word ‘engagement’ here. The difference signifies an issue to be
resolved below, that of pleasure in the context of architectural appreciation delimiting the
possibility of a non-pleasurable yet fully engaged experience, say that of an ‘objective’
critic aiming to fill column inches (Scruton, P. 5). Furthermore, architecture is impersonal
in the way that it imposes itself as a public object and is not an object of free choice; we
are unable to ignore to a greater degree the existence of buildings in our path.
7
other art-experiences, but also how difficult the task of unravelling
this experience has been for previous theorists.
Whilst other art forms and experiences of them might exemplify
characteristics similar to architecture, we can say that no other
single art form simultaneously possesses all the individuating
features of architecture. However, even if we can pinpoint
characteristic and aesthetically relevant features of architectural
experience, the possibility of considering anything ‘aesthetically’
suggests an important issue. Although we may regard a building as an
aesthetic object, appreciating a building by no means equates with
appreciating it aesthetically. As Scruton indicates, our aesthetic
interest in building may be only ‘peripheral’. It is completely
conceivable that whilst aesthetic constraints are possible, they are
in no way necessary.
7
Is it possible to disengage aesthetic concerns
from the art of building? Can we reduce architecture and its
aesthetic aims to mere ‘construction’ for its own sake?
8
If so, our
interest in a building’s visual properties and its ‘coherence’ is only
a theoretical fabrication of critics and architects concerned to offer
views purely based on ‘the way things should look’. It is the
possibility of treating aesthetic requirements as either secondary and
inessential, or else integral to the true aim of architecture, that we
must address next. Scruton maintains that the functional and the
aesthetic are in fact inseparable, remaining in the ‘foreground’ of
our experience. In this way, he sees the two as fundamental,
indivisible and inextricable aspects of engaging with buildings.
7
This is part of the view in which the essence of our experience consists in experiencing
buildings in terms of their function. P. 19
8
Many contemporary architects would support the view that there is a distinct division between
‘Architecture’ (with a capital A) and construction.
8
IIii – Architecture: Functional or Aesthetic?
Architecture as Problem-solving
The task of the architect is simultaneously one of construction
and aesthetics, as Alberti elucidates, and the notion of the
‘appropriate’ is within the remit of both the builder and the
architect.
9
Their respective aims are in fact one, the aesthetic being
inseparable from other elements of architectural interest. The notion
of the appropriate is central in Scruton’s views. He believes some
theorists and practitioners treat architecture as a species of
problem-solving in which aims are isolated as duties. The true
solution to the architect’s task is located in “a synthesis and not a
mere concatenation of its component parts”,
10
fragmented into multiple
aspects of which the aesthetic requirement is only one.
This point is critical to Scruton’s position on the centrality of
imaginative perception in experience. He interprets a general problem
of aesthetics in the division of aesthetic from non-aesthetic terms,
resulting from philosophical invention.
11
We can argue not only that
this technical obstruction formed by opposing the notions ‘aesthetic’
and ‘functional’ is accurate, but also that Scruton’s interpretation
of this separation actually entails his conclusion. Although
seemingly unwarranted, this separation is necessary to precisify the
notion of the aesthetic. Without this division, the concept remains
too wide in its scope that results in Scruton’s monolithic,
essentialist view of the aesthetic and all that it entails. Scruton
manifests mere personal preference as exemplified in his choice of
examples, taken almost exclusively from classical architecture. This
9
Leon Battista Alberti (1485), Ten Books on Architecture in Scruton, P. 23
10
P. 23
11
Footnote 5, Chapter 2, P. 269. The exposition in this chapter is focused primarily on the
distinction between functional and aesthetic, but he elsewhere alludes to the aesthetic and
non-aesthetic distinction.
9
illustrates his employment of the undivided or synthesised notion of
aesthetic and non-aesthetic aims. Precisifying aesthetic experience
into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions allows us to account for Scruton’s
use of the ambiguous term ‘imagination’, as well as further
misunderstandings that arise from his views.
12
The ‘thin’ conception
entitles imaginative perception and aesthetic values to be essential
features of experience, remaining ‘resident in the background’. The
‘thick’ conception acknowledges the availability of complex multi-
dimensional experience that allows other perceptual or experiential
features to supervene upon the ‘thin’ background elements.
Furthermore, the aesthetic synthesis implies Scruton’s
idealisation of the enterprise, exemplified in his misunderstanding of
its complexity. It is conceivable that, in order to execute large
buildings, the best approach is the division of tasks. Here, Scruton
would argue that architecture is no longer “a process through which
aesthetic values permeate the entire conception of the architectural
task”. Nevertheless, part of the remit of a good architect is to
inculcate these values in his staff, his client, and the builders with
whom he works.
13
Aesthetic aims in general should be internalised, in
such a way that solving the problem of ‘appropriateness’ independently
of other concerns is either a mistake or the sign of a bad architect.
Some theorists postulate that a preoccupation with issues of beauty is
self-conscious and leads to arbitrary buildings that take contrived
forms purely because its designer ‘likes the way it looks’.
14
What is
required of agents and architects alike is not the preoccupation with
12
I introduce precisification as a device to clarify the ambiguity of imagination.
13
It is not, as Scruton would think, the division of toilet designs to the toilet designers, or
the façade designs to the façade designers. His approach ignores the fact that these
individuals work as a team in order to achieve exactly that which he claims is only possible
through a kind of unselfconscious ‘evolution’ that achieves its aesthetic goals unmediated by
conscious thought.
14
Joseph Escherick, in P. Heyer (ed.) Architects on Architecture, New Directions in America, (New
York, 1966), in Scruton, p. 25
10
beauty as a goal that this quote suggests, but an extensive grasp of
‘the appropriate’ that becomes an intuitive value.
Division of the Aesthetic
Separating the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic shows confusion
specifically about the nature of practical reason, according to
Scruton. As is exemplified in the above-mentioned problem-solving
approach, it produces deficient solutions by employing confused
thought that utilises inadequate concepts making only ‘superficial
contact with the problem’. Solutions to architectural problems must
provide a basis for practical activity rather than mere theorising.
The architect’s thinking should be natural and responsive to an
‘inherent good sense’ rather than contrived, and entail an intuitive
understanding of the structure of the relationship between the aims
and functions of the enterprise. Such thinking must provide concepts
‘which locate the true nexus of influences in the architectural
problem’, reflective of a kind of rational understanding.
15
This
notion of understanding remains important in Scruton’s scheme and is
discussed in the next section.
Scruton recognises that the aims of architecture, being
simultaneously aesthetic and non-aesthetic, are multiple and
intangible.
16
Architects, cognisant of this and concerned to attend to
their enterprise with due diligence, obtain knowledge and experience
to make suitable decisions, primarily by discerning the ends of their
undertaking. According to Scruton, the architect’s criterion of
15
Previous quotes, p. 28
16
This aspect of the enterprise creates a three-fold problem. The first is that of the
instability of the goal at which the architect aims, itself changing during the course of
solution. The second is that of the relative importance and degree of satisfaction required
for each element of the problem that remains substantially unspecifiable. The third resides in
the fact that there are elements in any relationship to which value is not easy to assign.
This is due in part to our inability to determine in advance, how far we will allow such
elements to remain unresolved, in which case a floor-plan is maximised for revenue at the
expense of dark internal spaces.
11
success lies in presenting a solution that admits of an understanding
by the rational capacities of the user. This requires the architect
to intuitively comprehend both the problem and its solution in advance
of its actual realisation. If, as users of the building, we are
unable to intuitively discern the problem, say that of navigating an
entrance, and its solution, the architect has failed.
17
These issues raise two questions. Firstly, can there be
unselfconscious design that is purely intuitive? Here, self-conscious
design should be contrasted not with unselfconsciousness but with lack
of intuition, of which we may criticise both. Necessity, being the
mother of invention, negates the romantic notion Scruton offers in the
paradigmatic hillside town as ‘evolutionary’ design, responding to ‘an
unformulated cluster of desires and needs, achieved in realisation
unmediated by thought or reflection’. It is, in fact, a necessary
result, conceivably even the consequence of deliberate thought and
self-conscious reflection by ancient agricultural engineers concerned
to evade flooding, thereby self-consciously saving their jobs. These
engineers have created a functional yet paradigmatically aesthetic
solution according to Scruton’s scheme. The ‘thick’ conception of
aesthetic experience accounts for the anomaly in Scruton’s reasoning
that architecture can be functional, aesthetic and self-conscious; it
allows complex reasons for our decisions and actions. Thus, we might
accommodate practical solutions, describe the inculcation of aesthetic
values in the toilet-fitter and allow that design-solutions might be
self-conscious.
Secondly, how, if possible, are we to measure or gauge the
understanding when used as a criterion for success? The problems of
17
Scruton observes that, should there ever be a comprehensive and exhaustive method, procedure or
science by which we might delineate architectural solutions, we would be unable to locate ‘any
real answer’. This is owing to a requirement that any solution must be a basis for practical
12
architecture are so open-ended and varied that one easily wonders
whether the understanding can provide such a criterion, or that
architecture even admits of success-criteria. This open-endedness
should not entail that the task of the architect is
unconceptualizable. Although the limits of intuition may restrict
envisaging a solution, this by no means implies or entails that such
limits also confine a retrospective understanding.
Understanding and The Aesthetic Sense
We may ask whether the understanding towards which the enterprise
of architecture aims is practical, rational, aesthetic or other.
Scruton’s exposition suggests we rely on practical understanding not
only for making design-decisions, but also for knowledge of the aims
and ends of our actions and lives. Moreover, the part of this
understanding affected by ‘the aesthetic sense’ is “utterly central to
our knowledge of what to do”,
18
thus providing the practical basis
which contemporary design apparently lacks. What this aesthetic sense
is, and what its role is in decision-making, rely on a notion of the
appropriate that is pervasive in its scope and extends across our
needs, preferences, values and desires. Scruton espouses the view
that architecture must be more than a means-to-an-end,
19
and be
characterised by an indivisible interdependence of practical thinking
aiming to produce a result, and theoretical thinking regarding matters
of fact. The end is irreducible to terms of ‘competing functions’
that must be resolved like a problem-solving exercise whose components
are divisible and ‘specifiable in advance’.
20
Thus, Scruton insists
architecture benefits from a consideration of means and ends, this
activity (of construction I assume) rather than any scientifically verifiable optimal solution.
18
p. 30
19
As suggested by the problems encountered with the self-conscious design approach.
20
p. 30
13
context not limiting but informing architecture by the relationship
between the practical and theoretical.
21
Seeing the end of architecture as the mere fulfilment of a need
22
misrepresents the architect’s purpose, as Scruton illustrates. Human
needs supervene upon the animal needs of food and shelter, and are
based on our rationality and represent us as persons whose flourishing
is dependent on our fulfilment as rational beings. Catering to the
fulfilment of the rational agent must inform any ideal of rational
design, which comes with having what one values and not simply
desires. This digression offers insight into the activity of the
architect because values inform and define our conception of an end.
23
The architect, having an end in view, should be able to “envisage what
it would be like to achieve that aim”,
24
and in so doing does not just
know his aim theoretically. The condition of knowing ‘what it would
be like’ implies by its relationship with ends that it does not admit
of reduction to issues of utility, function or efficiency. Rather the
notion is about the quality of an experience in which achieving one’s
aim entails envisaging it. In the architect’s case, this envisaging
is being able to predict the effect of a completed project, and
understanding its relation to the experience of users.
25
Two essential features of this understanding reside in its
imaginative and evaluative nature. It is imaginative due to its
predictive component, encompassing “the envisaging of a non-existent
state of affairs and achieving some effective premonition of its
quality”. It is evaluative because it involves “a sense, not just of
present purposes, but of the appropriateness of one’s action to
21
No respective correspondence is intended between ‘means and ends’, and ‘practical and
theoretical’.
22
Prominent architectural theorists like Le Corbusier, among others proffered this notion.
23
In aid of this distinction, Scruton adds that values are characterisable not by personal
preference or subjective choice, but by their significance to our lives, their authority in our
practical reasoning, and their requirement to be justified by reasons. Unlike mere preference,
values are informed and developed by thought and education, and bring order to our experience
of the world, for it is in terms of our values that we come to see the world.
24
This holds as well for other agents as patrons of architecture. P. 32
14
purposes which it may not yet be possible to define”.
26
Any particular
end of the architect, as in any practical matter, may not be given,
but rather be discovered. In addition, ends are open to qualification
due to our perceptions, values and desires, in just the same way that
our moral values are adjustable.
27
In our choices, whatever aims or ends are given as reasons
actually remain subordinate to a ‘sense’ of the accommodation and
appropriateness of choices to aims. The possession of this sense
requires the acquisition of values that are discovered throughout
one’s lifetime. The notion of discovery implies that, rather than
knowing empirically or through explicit formulation, this sense
becomes intuitive through engaging with the world and determining the
appropriateness of the object to the aim. According to Scruton,
approaching the world with this sense becomes a mode of understanding
in which we attempt to grasp the meaning and appropriateness of our
aims. Thus, manifested in this ‘sense’ (as an accommodation to the
appropriate), aesthetic values are essential to knowledge of what to
do in a practical manner. In the discharge of practical decision-
making activities, we tend to “search for the forms and details that
will be appropriate to our lives”.
28
In exercising the required understanding imbued with the aesthetic
sense, we reflect on the qualities of the object of our interests and
imagine “what it would be like to live with it”. It is an imaginative
and interpretative grasp of the existence of a potential (i.e.
possibly non-existent) object, entity, or concept. “It is to create,
through the present experience, a sense of the object’s
appropriateness, [not just to desires], but to one’s self, as a
25
p. 32
26
Two previous quotes, p. 32-3. Refer also to note 16.
27
As part of Scruton’s larger aim, he wishes to show that our choices come to represent our
selves, and reveal our capacity for reason as a kind of end in itself rather than a means to
something. This is meant to illustrate his further argument that by misunderstanding the
nature of practical reason, architectural theorists also harbour false conceptions of the self.
15
greater entity than the sum of its desires.”
29
Therefore, when we act
towards a ‘ruling purpose’ our choices may not always be rational, for
our action may not take into account those values that an
understanding, maintained by a sense of the appropriate, manifests.
Contrary to the problem-solving approach, ‘the way things look’, the
meaning, and the function of things are not clearly distinguished.
Thus, ‘aesthetic’ appearances and the ‘reasoned apprehension of ends’
as exemplified in the ‘aesthetic’ sense are inseparable.
The isolation of aims, values and the aesthetic dimension (itself
aligned with an imaginative and creative capacity), is analogous to
Scruton’s following statement. It is the acquisition of the aesthetic
sense, interdependent with practical concerns “in the study of what is
right and appropriate in matters of […] judgement” that is truly
indispensable to the formulation of our values. Through the
cultivation of an ability to make appropriate decisions, choices or
judgements regarding the way things look that incorporate practical
considerations, exemplified in a special kind of understanding, our
values and aims become discernible. This understanding is a form of
practical reasoning that requires education in terms of a deep
comprehension that is acquired rather than merely learned like skills.
It becomes a “capacity to notice things, to make comparisons, to see
[…] forms as meaningful and appropriate accompaniments to human life.”
Though it was previously so elusive and difficult to define, we have,
in the aesthetic sense and understanding, the paradigm elucidation of
‘the aesthetic’. Through the education that Scruton outlines, one
comes to acquire an ability to visualise that enables, defines,
informs and quickens our experience, not only of architecture, but
also of our entire environment and everything in it. Thus, the
28
p. 34
16
architect acquires knowledge of the aims and ends of activities and
not just the means, without which building is impoverished by the lack
of real knowledge of ‘what one is doing’.
In Part III, we begin to focus more closely on our initial goal of
attending to the essence of our experience in order to assess the
truth of Scruton’s claims for the importance of imaginative
perception.
29
p. 34
17
Part III
Locating the Essence of Architecture
IIIi - Previous Accounts
In locating the central element of experience, or the nature of
architectural experience, Scruton believes we should look first at
previous attempts to describe it. As previously mentioned, looking at
ways that address the question improperly might indicate the way to
correctly address it. The most influential doctrines of Functionalism,
Space, Kunstgeschichte, Kunstwollen, and Proportion all purport to
provide notions of the fundamental characteristics of architecture, its
production and experience.
30
Scruton has shown how each insufficiently
addresses what is central to architecture, falling prey to typical
problems of strictly architectural theory that chooses dogma rather than
discourse in ignorance of wider issues. A brief summary follows of the
salient problems that arise from such nescience.
It would suffice to say that all of the above-mentioned theories,
unaware of the complexity of architecture, fail in some fundamental way
to represent this complexity in their attempts to reduce the nature of
architecture to a single underlying feature. For instance,
understanding the parts of a building contributes to an overall
understanding of the building. Without an independent account of the
nature of architecture, we are unable to cast light on the nature of
architectural function, or the way proportion is employed in its
fabrication. Many doctrines are unequivocally a posteriori
generalisations or discoveries of architectural and experiential
features, and so are capable of describing only certain instances of
success rather than universal a priori characteristics. Connections to
18
history or the artists’ intention are obvious examples of such
generalised discoveries. Essentialist theories such as these fail to
recognise the equal priority of the claims of other essentialist
doctrines. The a priori status each claims for itself points reveals
the obvious fact that there are other ways of describing the fundamental
characteristics of architecture than as ‘properties of architectural
space’, form, function, proportion, etc. The theories also fail to meet
certain requirements for a universal scheme of architectural aesthetics,
or as Scruton says, a “general aesthetic of construction”.
31
Such a
scheme must, first, accommodate descriptions of the experience of
architecture and the complexity it involves; second, provide significant
meanings for the vocabulary employed; and third, maintain independently
formulable principles without the need for a complementary or
supplementary scheme. Thus, such theories seem able to provide only a
suggestion of causes rather than an explanation of what they mean, and
why they are valued. Scruton’s findings are significant if we wish to
consider the experience of architecture as of prevailing interest over
the mere explanation of it.
Positive Contributions
In an attempt to redress the problem, Scruton reflects on defining
‘proportion’, as this doctrine is the most developed of architectural
theory. He makes an important move by linking it with the concept of
‘significant detail’, which is to have important implications in his
conclusions regarding imaginative perception. It would seem that our
sense of proportion critically depends on our ability to discern
“detailed correspondences, divergences and variations among [the
30
Unfortunately, I am unable to do justice to the depth and complexity with which these theories
deserve to be addressed.
31
p. 62
19
elements of a building]”.
32
This interest in a ‘sense of detail’
explains why we are able to overlook ‘manifest incongruities’ in our
experience, such as certain proportions being visual rather than
mathematical. It also explains a general inability to discern
‘fittingness’ without attending to varied and detailed features.
Of course, we may admit the possibility of certain principles of
articulated space, artistic intention, necessary function or pleasing
proportions. However, to abstract from them and the attendant sense of
detail any set of universal laws for our engagement with architecture is
to misconstrue the nature of that engagement. Every aspect of our
interest in buildings and their surroundings is concerned with a kind of
spatial, intentional, functional, proportional ‘fittingness’. The
prospect of deriving the meaning of architecture from principles that
contain no awareness of the variety of factors contributing to this
sense of detail seems dim. Our definitions and theories must rely on a
fuller conception of aesthetic interest and its accompanying
terminology. It is only alongside such a conception that proportion,
space, function, etc., become evident, for “[they are] neither clear
enough to provide a basis for criticism, nor comprehensive enough to
summarise our full experience of architecture”.
33
The single unifying aspect of these five theories resides in the
fact that all fail to give an adequate description of our experience
prior to expounding abstract principles that attempt to mark the success
of architecture. We should attempt to revise the order in which we
approach the enterprise so that we define the experience that is able to
capture architecture as architecture. This must include features that
are a priori central to the core of experience and the essence of
architecture. In so doing we will attempt to locate features that
32
p. 67
20
relate not to the object of architectural interest, but the structure of
interest. These features comprise the experience of architecture
itself, specifically defined by its structure of literal, imaginative
and creative perception, each level supervening upon the previous one,
thus making possible a unique complexity of experience.
Addressing Potential Problems
As a way of illuminating the problem of function among others,
Anthony Skillen, in his review of Scruton, attempts to address the way
we approach art-forms. If we look at paintings and sculpture, and we
listen to music, then we must somehow use buildings. But this seems
to be an insufficient contrast with notions of looking and listening
in other art-forms. Skillen would like us to believe that the notion
‘living with’ sufficiently describes our relationship. However, in
order for this to work we would have to define in what sense we ‘live
with’ architecture. For it seems that in looking and listening there
is an obvious sense of active engagement somehow unrepresented in the
seemingly passive way we might ‘live with’ something.
34
In another
sense, this conception is wide enough in its scope to allow for chance
encounters and untrained experiences that any legitimate aesthetic
theory must allow for. Perhaps we might recast Skillen’s notion as
one of engaging with buildings, for in this sense we could accommodate
a plethora of aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences that seem to
characterise our relationship with buildings, the value of which we
explore next.
In an astute discussion, Skillen seems to be asking why we should
separate issues of beauty from actual structure, function and genuine
33
p. 70
34
For example, I ‘live with’ the mould on my walls, yet I may not aesthetically engage with it,
actively or passively.
21
ways of living. Are these ways not integral to our (aesthetic)
perception and interpretation of ‘beautiful’ objects? Knowing there
is nothing else restraining the Barcelona Telecommunications tower
from toppling but three small steel rods suitably enhances certain
aspects of our experience. This is not to say that the perception of
structure is the essence of architecture, any more than the pure
experience of beauty. In Geoffrey Scott’s characterisation of the
architectural properties of commodity, firmness and delight,
35
it can
be the very sacrifice, compromise or union of these properties that
becomes the object of experience and the subject of a positive or
negative judgement of beauty, as Skillen rightly points out. It seems
to me that such experience and judgement need not consciously focus on
merely the observable, the tangible, or even on the way architects are
able to produce such intangible things as a ‘feel’ or a ‘look’.
“Buildings may celebrate what they do not promote; may highlight what
they do not enhance.”
36
Skillen’s penetrating observation reveals that by focusing on
aesthetics and on appreciation as we have, we are seemingly forced to
concentrate on ‘beauty-as-noticed’.
37
To notice the beauty of an
action, we need not have our attention drawn directly to it, for many
laudable actions are done modestly and without witness. In the same
way, the beauty of an aesthetic object need not have attention drawn
to itself. For beauty can exist on multiple non-visual levels, and
can ‘co-exist’ in direct opposition to other negative qualities, such
as the dishonesty that may be attributed to the aluminium capping on
the steel pins of the telecom tower.
Hence, to ignore the complex interrelationships that are possible
in an experience of architecture would be to misrepresent its nature.
35
Sir Geoffrey Scott (1914), The Architecture of Humanism, in Scruton and Skillen.
36
Skillen, p. 262
37
Skillen, p. 262; This view is unfortunately reduced to a bracketed remark in Skillen.
22
My interpretation of the importance of architecture and the experience
we derive from engaging with it, whether intentional or accidental, is
echoed and finds expression in Skillen’s observation of its being
primarily a relational and contextual matter. Imaginative perception,
visual beauty and daily ‘use’ all seem to refer to and rely upon
complex and interrelated attitudes, actions, events and entire ways of
life. We shall see that although Scruton might accommodate such
complexity in his account of experience, such experience may only be
paradigmatic if it involves other perceptions in the appreciation of
buildings than imaginative perceptions.
Thus presented is a notion of precisifying experience that avoids
dividing the functional and aesthetic aspects of experience. Our
capacity for practical and rational understanding is critical in the
experience of architecture, as exemplified in the aesthetic sense
required by patron and architect visualising or imaginatively
anticipating characteristics of the experience and its object.
Furthermore, architecture as problem-solving overlooks certain
critical issues that are both central and pervasive. Scruton suggests
that it is the aesthetic experience, as well as the values implied by
it, that such an approach neglects. In our next task, we shall see
further reason for the precisification of aesthetics. Such reason
lies in the requirement to explain problems that arise with Scruton’s
thesis of the centrality of imaginative perception as the essence of
experience, referred to earlier as the ‘thin’ conception.
IIIii - The Essence of Architecture: Imaginative Perception
Pleasure in Imaginative Perception
23
In determining the essence of architecture, Scruton sets himself
the task of comparing the types of pleasure that an experience of
architecture gives rise to, thus illustrating the pervasiveness of
imagination in architectural experience. He begins with the observation
that we might approach a study of this experience best through
perception and its associated faculties, one that accounts for the
pleasurable sensations manifested. The aim is to show that these are
not simply sensuous pleasure although, like other pleasures of the
senses, they are immediate. Now compare sensuous to ‘aesthetic
pleasure’, which seems to be dependent on and affected by thought. It
is obvious in this case that our engagement with Beauvais cathedral
would be suitably reduced were we to discover it was made of articulated
plywood. An ‘intellectual’ understanding of, say, the structural
principles involved in the Spanish telecom tower enhances our enjoyment
of its thin spire and tension cables, this understanding manifesting a
conception of the tower as ‘dynamic’. “Architectural pleasure is
governed by a conception of its object, […one] capable of evolution and
transformation through knowledge.”
38
Scruton argues further that there is no ‘unmediated, sensuous
pleasure’ in architecture, observing that “one has to know the use of a
building if one is to enjoy it properly”.
39
Does it not seem that we
find ourselves stumbling upon an unknown building with the pleasureful
exclamation, ‘Wow! What is this place?’? It may be true that our
thought mediates such pleasure, but to read Scruton as saying that the
proper enjoyment of a building consists merely in apprehending its use
40
is a mistake. In support, we shall find, as rational beings, that at
least some kind of thinking influences every instance of pleasure.
Furthermore, one might say that there is no criterion to distinguish
38
P. 72
39
P. 72, my italics.
40
p. 72
24
sensuous and intellectual pleasures. The question remains whether our
thinking regards, or is directed towards, the object of our perception;
whether, for instance, sexual pleasure can be “not just pleasure with
someone but also pleasure at someone”.
41
In recognising these objections, we must embark upon distinguishing
between sensuous and intellectual pleasure. Identifying the causal
relations of thought to pleasure in its intrinsic or essential relations
enables us to make sense of our experience of an unknown building.
Scruton might argue that the surprise of our discovery causes our
pleasure, in which case we might be surprised without thought of the
building. This pleasure is external and independent of any intellectual
apprehension of the object; pleasure is related to thought intrinsically
if a change of thought would remove or change the pleasure. Changing
the thought entails changing the object of pleasure.
42
Perhaps what determines our pleasure is the surprise mixed with
thoughts of the building and what it could be. We must demonstrate that
the pleasure we take in architecture is intrinsic and essentially
related to its object. Upon discovering what we thought was a
spiritually minimal garden pavilion is actually a mausoleum and our
bench is a coffin, the object of our pleasure - the thought of the
peaceful building - changes to an eerie displeasure and a desire to
promptly leave promptly. In this experience, we could have mistaken the
dedication plaque for a headstone. This illustrates that our
displeasure was founded on a mistake. By contrast, sensuous pleasure,
having merely a cause, cannot be mistaken; it does not have a
‘potentially changeable’ object.
43
On the basis of this distinction, Scruton expects to construct a
similar case for the experience of architecture dependent on a thought
41
P. 73, my italics.
42
Similarly in the cathedral example, were we to discover the plywood façade, as our thoughts
change, so to does our pleasure.
25
or conception of its object. A difficulty remains in separating the
thought of a building from its experience. A thought involved in
understanding a building - the thought of peacefulness, for instance -
is fundamentally different from seeing or experiencing it as peaceful.
44
The distinguishing characteristic is that of interpretation through
imagination, a definitive and inseparable part of the experience. We
can see the mausoleum as spiritually peaceful or as a fearful eyesore.
Thus, we are inherently able to interpret the structure in either way;
whether or not we should see it as spiritual out of respect, either
interpretation is inseparable from the way the building looks.
45
Pinpointing Imagination
Two avenues of investigation present themselves at this point.
Accepting the inseparability of interpretation from perception, we
postulate the faculty of imagination as uniting the two, thus marking
the essence of our experience. Alternatively, we deny the centrality of
imagination but maintain that interpretation is inherently present in
perception, yet affirm that imagination plays a role in our
experience.
46
It is the consequence of accepting either we shall focus
on. We must also attempt to clarify, not only certain misunderstandings
that arise from Scruton’s use of the term imagination, but also place
emphasis on understanding imagination in a way that allows for
additional levels of experience.
Seeing a building as architecture should present us with minimal
difficulty in light of our previous findings. Aesthetic values permeate
the task of architecture (and the aesthetic sense) as a kind of
43
p. 74
44
It is not that the thought does not inform the experience, the point here is that the thought
of the building and the experience of the building are different, the latter dependent on the
former.
45
p. 74
46
Skillen seems to support the latter avenue.
26
internalised visualising that combines the aesthetic and non-aesthetic.
Scruton posits an additional comparison in the aesthetic division
between ordinary (literal) perception and imaginative perception. In
what does this difference reside? To begin, he addresses two prominent
attempts at uniting our experience by employing a distinct feature of
our rational capacity in the perception of non-literal objects. This
distinct feature first postulated by Kant is the faculty of imagination,
which unifies our raw sensory perceptions with mental concepts.
47
Perceptual experience seems to require the exercise of a conceptual
faculty in order intelligibly to unite and organise our perceptions
under a common conception, thought or idea. The particular closeness
and interactivity of experience and concept, or perception and thought,
is at issue. Kant postulates this interactivity as guided by the
imagination which pervades every aspect of our experience; in ordinary
perception, rules of the understanding bind our imagination, whereas in
aesthetic perception the imagination is free. For Kant, the exercise of
imagination occurs in every act of perception; it is with this ‘general
theory’ Scruton takes issue. Either for some agents this is the case,
or we exercise imagination only in particular circumstances, exemplified
in forms of perception, imagery and thought; the latter being Scruton’s
‘special theory’.
However, consider the suggestion that imagination is of the essence
of architectural experience. Is there any intimation of imagination
being the single fundamental faculty with which we engage with and
perceive architecture at every encounter? Scruton suggests that only
the ‘special theory’ is possible, as problems with the general theory
deny it cogency. However, we might suggest the qualification that a
pervasive imagination is possible for some, to such a degree that
certain agents can maintain a consistently ‘imaginative outlook’. This
47
like thoughts, ideas, etc. as an oversimplification.
27
assertion turns on an equivocation in which the sense of the word
‘imagination’ is systematically ambiguous. It admits of two distinct
senses, the more technical of which Scruton employs, the more colloquial
of which his opponents seem to accuse him of using. It is not that
imagination is active in every instance of our seeing, remembering and
imagining. The mental content in imaginative experience is not ‘given’
like that of a belief, but is ‘posited’. I might imagine that car
crashing, where I posit the mental image of a car crashing without
believing it. In this way, I am able to ‘transcend the immediate’ and
make an ‘imaginative leap’ similar to seeing two heads in the vase.
Furthermore, as our experience relies on thought for its individuation,
considering the two inseparable denies the possibility of an additional
faculty (of imagination) to unite them. There is no process in which we
combine perceptions with concepts; a perception is only describable with
the help of a concept of that which is perceived. These points will
become clearer in the discussion of the unity of imaginative experience
and the clarification of the senses of imagination that follows.
48
With these distinctions, Scruton believes that he has placed the
foundation for an exposition of architectural experience being of an
imaginative type. We are able to hear movement in music and choose how
to hear it, for instance as beginning here, or here. In so doing, we
exercise a mental freedom representative of imaginative perception. We
might experience architecture similarly, for both seem to exhibit a
similar ‘imaginative structure’. In studying this structure, we shall
see not only how it may be possible in imaginative perception to
‘knowingly misapply a concept’ but also, and more importantly, what is
48
Scruton makes use of an extended discussion of an example of phenomenology, animals and music
to prove that it is imaginative perception that most explicitly describes the capacity that
distinguishes many perceptual differences and idiosyncrasies. Ferrets are able to have
perceptual experiences but unable to imagine due to an inability to reflect on their own
experiences. My ferret is able to see me moving towards its food dish and believe that it is
going to be fed. Rational beings on the other hand are able to posit an additional faculty
between experience and belief; I can imagine my mother placing Christmas dinner in my dish even
though its not Christmas nor am I about to be fed. Thus, the imaginative capacity is present
only in rational beings and not in merely thinking animals.
28
the ‘structure of attention’ that makes this a possibility in a world of
seemingly veridical perceptions.
Imaginative Perception in Architecture
Presenting an account of imaginative perception in architecture is
particularly difficult in the light of the plethora of ambiguities that
arise when considering our experience, particularly in the face of its
complexity and plurality. In recognising this obstacle, Scruton holds we
must look to an analysis, not of introspective psychology or other
empirical themes, but of a concept that is both publicly accessible and
dependent on publicly observable distinctions in experience. The
criterion of success in identifying the essence of a kind of experience
is providing a concept that enables experiential distinctions to be
drawn. In examining Scruton’s distinction between literal and
imaginative perception in experience, we shall find the crux of his
argument. In this way, the most important distinguishing
characteristics of imaginative experience will be brought to light, at
which point we shall discover the source and explanation for the
equivocation.
‘Literal perception’, Scruton claims, has as its goal a belief.
Corresponding to this perception is a concept and a belief, where I see
some stuff, a headstone, attach the concept ‘headstone’ to the stuff,
and believe I am sitting on a grave. This should be unproblematic, for
we have shown that percept and concept are inextricably linked.
Imaginative perception, on the other hand, is a ‘special mode of
attention’ in which we apply to the percept a concept that we know does
not actually apply. I may see the casket and know it is one, yet think
of it as a bench.
49
I still believe it is a casket, but attribute to it
49
As a more obvious example, consider the two heads forming a vase.
29
a concept in addition to or replacing that which veridical perception
suggests to me.
Let us make this account clearer by considering a few
technicalities. Concepts posited by imaginative perception supervene
upon those of literal perception, and it seems Scruton fails to make the
distinction very clearly. Consider an example. That we perceive rhythm
in the columns of our pavilion seems unproblematic. What we see, the
rhythm, is not a physical characteristic of the columns; it is not the
object that is seen, for what we see are the columns. Rather it is the
way of seeing them, or ‘the appearance’, which is rhythmical. We
require imagination to perceive rhythm in the object. We apply the
concept ‘rhythm’ to what we see in the columns;
“For although I am compelled, when I attend to the colonnade of S. Spirito, to
perceive a regular rhythm established and passed on from part to part, it is no
part of my seeing the material object before me – the disposition of masonry – that
I should see this rhythm. It is my own imaginative attention that enables me to
see it …”
50
It is to ‘the appearance’ of stuff, columns, or rhythm that we attach
concepts, and it is our way of seeing that determines to what ‘level’ of
perception we attach our concepts. In this manner, raw or animal
perception gives rise to the appearance of ‘stuff’, literal perception
gives rise to the concept ‘columns’, whereas imaginative perception
‘transcends’ or ‘supervenes upon’ these, giving rise to the concept
‘rhythm’. Seeing the object imaginatively is seeing it as ‘imbued with
implications’ or ‘pregnant’ with visual meaning that suggests something
like harmony, movement or rhythm.
51
50
Scruton, P. 95
51
An additional distinction that may help clarify these notions consists in employing an analogy in
metaphysics consisting in the notions of sense and reference. The Reference of the concept
‘rhythm’ is the columns themselves, the actual physical object in the world, and is objectively
available for our perception. The sense of the concept is the notion of rhythm and can be shared
between us. We both are able to see the object to which we refer as having rhythm, which is to
employ the imaginative faculty. Alternatively, you may see the object simply under the concept
of ‘columns’. This is to apply a different, more basic sense to what we see, which in this case
comes under the remit of literal perception. Rational animals, on the other hand, are only able
to see ‘stuff’, for they are incapable of reflecting on their own experience to which any
concepts may be applied. Thus, we are able to distinguish that imaginative experience supervenes
upon, or transcends, literal experience, which in turn supervenes upon animal perception.
30
Scruton applies the following distinctions that make obvious the
preceding thoughts. Musical movement, or visual rhythm in this case,
are not part of the strictly physical world and therefore are not the
object of literal perception. No scientific description of the columns
need take note of columnar rhythm “as an independent fact of the
matter”
52
. Furthermore, no explanatory function can be filled by the
concept of rhythm that could not be filled by the more basic concept of
visual sequence.
53
Thus, perceiving rhythm is not of the level of raw
or literal experience (available to animals) but is of the level of
imaginative experience.
Imaginative Experience of Architecture
We should turn now to show how architecture is an object of
imaginative experience, for with the preceding examples in hand
Scruton’s arguments may seem plausible. His main claim revolves around
the contention that architecture, being a proper object of imaginative
experience, may only be perceived and understood in imaginative terms
and requires the kind of attention that ‘transcends’ literal
perception.
54
Discerning in what the experience of architecture
consists requires us to abstract from all interpretation and look at
‘the basic forms of architectural experience’. What remains exhibits
the kind of freedom Kant associated with the imaginative perception.
Unfortunately, in proving this, Scruton manages to obscure the issue.
In consistently focusing on examples of ambiguity in architectural
interpretation, he obfuscates the above distinction between literal and
imaginative perception; we need to distinguish more clearly in what
sense ‘imagination’ is used. In fact, he fails to make a critical
distinction in the senses he intends, thereby giving rise to criticisms
52
P. 83
53
p. 83. Scruton goes into length illustrating how animals are not able to hear movement in
music, this lending support to my analogy, although the details are of such a length that it is
31
of essentially sound doctrine. We must attempt to make these criticisms
clearer.
The main argument for the essence of architectural experience being
imaginative rests on nothing more than what we have already discussed.
To interpret it in any other way, as Skillen seems to have, is to
misconstrue what is actually a relatively straightforward notion. The
crux of Scruton’s argument resides in the observation that none of the
concepts we apply in experiencing architecture as architecture applies
to the strictly basic physical world of literal perception. On this
basis, we may postulate that the concepts used in architectural
experience, if not applicable to specifically literal perceptions, must
apply not to the object seen, but to our way of seeing it, or its
appearance. That appearance is in fact determined by imaginative
perception in just the ways explained. It is not that imaginative
perception is one ‘way of seeing’ architecture, as if to say imagination
is the single correct ‘aesthetic attitude’ we take towards aesthetic
objects. Scruton’s claim is that imaginative perception is the only way
to see architecture any other way than literally. Should there ever be
any uncertainty that this is the case, it will only arise in the
difficulty of distinguishing between what is a literal perception and
what is not. Again, a literal perception consists in applying the
concept ‘columns’; an imaginative perception consists in applying the
concept ‘rhythm’. In this experience, Skillen misconstrues the point in
assuming that there is some special ‘activism’ in play in which we
employ any additional mental faculty or aesthetic attitude.
55
To say
that the rhythm of columns is ‘literally there’ is to misunderstand the
distinction and misconceive the basic form of experience, which Scruton
correctly identifies. The rhythm is there in the columns for us to
prohibitive to raise them here.
54
p. 87
55
Skillen, p. 259
32
perceive imaginatively, for we cannot perceive either without the
existence of the object to which we apply the concept ‘rhythm’. Scruton
refers to the ‘imaginative structure’ of experience, intending to
delineate just that the structure of experiencing architecture mirrors
the way our imaginative perception works (being first literal, then
imaginative), not that the imagination is a kind of activism or
aesthetic attitude.
Features of Imaginative Experience
Let us discuss some further details and distinctions concerning
imaginative perception. Literal perception consists in an act of
attention that is also ‘a desire to find out’.
56
In imaginative
perception, this desire is also present, and may be a necessary
precondition, but is not part of our aim. In this way, we can say ‘Wow!
What is this place?’ and actively engage the imaginative mode of
perception. We have a desire to find out if it is the pavilion we
imaginatively perceive it to be, or just a humble garden shed.
We have already seen that perception in architecture is ‘imbued
with the thought of something absent’,
57
namely an imaginative concept.
Similarly, it is ‘free’ in the way that we are not compelled to see the
rhythm in the columns, or a mausoleum as a garden pavilion. In this
way, an inherent ambiguity in the way of seeing either object may
present itself to our perceptions. Thus, when we have realised that our
pavilion is not what it seemed, we may ‘alternate’ between seeing it as
a pleasant pavilion, or as a fearful funerary finding. Our seeing it in
either way consists in choosing which way of seeing or interpretation
pleases us best. The ambiguity in what we see persists until we offer
an interpretation, or choose an experience. Unlike literal perception,
this choice of perceptions is really a choice of experience, and as
33
Scruton indicates, is one of the most remarkable features of imaginative
experience.
Now in postulating the notion of alternating experiences, we can
see the possibility of a ‘precise duration and date’ by which we
pinpoint an exact location in time when our ‘aspect’ changed from
pavilion to mausoleum, and vice versa. The perception is not merely a
“‘thought’ or ‘concept’ available to anyone who can think in terms of
order and relation”,
58
for it is linked with the way we see the object,
and changes when our ‘aspect’ or ‘perspective’ does. The experience
will have intensity whereby a particular aspect may be more obvious than
another, as in a grouping of columns looking more like four pairs than
three openings. The choice we make suggests that the experience is
subject to the will, sharing with imaginative thought ‘the property of
voluntariness’. Our thinking affects the experience; so when compared
with traditional mausoleums, ours becomes a humble pavilion indeed.
Thus, we find ourselves able to give reason for choosing our
‘interpretation’. For the baroque or rococo edifices in the Cimetiere
Pere-Lachaise manifest a grandeur of scale and detail, craftsmanship and
cost, incomparable to the flat timber roof and simple woodcarvings that
adorn what we have now chosen to interpret as a mere funerary hut. In
other words, we offer this experience as a reason for our choice, or we
can accept a reason through an experience.
59
As a final element in his elucidation of experience-features,
Scruton proposes that we may find in our choice of the ‘most satisfying’
perception the intimation of a correct experience. Somehow, such
experience is one which gives rise to ‘an understanding and appreciation
of the building’.
60
This correctness takes support from the fact that
there are persuasive arguments in favour of seeing our pavilion as a
56
p. 87
57
p. 84
58
p. 90
59
p. 90
34
pavilion (and not literally the mausoleum it is) by pointing to an
experience of its French counterparts and comparing the relative value
of the two experiences. Furthermore, learning to see the difference
between the two interpretations provides final support to the fact that
seeing the correctness of the former “is to open the possibility of a
richness of meaning that would otherwise be missed”.
61
To assume there
is only one way to experience a building in its entirety is to
misunderstand the nature of imaginative perception.
Although this experience has been described primarily in terms of
its visual aspects, this in no way construes it as being only visual.
For it should be obvious that sequences of experience consequent on
movement, as well as the effects of our other perceptive faculties, will
in fact contribute to and qualify our impressions and experience. As
Scruton illustrates, “it is doubtful that a purely visual experience
could reveal to us the full power [of a building]”.
62
In observing
‘anticipatory’ qualities of certain materials and features, such as the
friendliness of wood or the warmth of terracotta tiles, we should note
that we can refer to objects with concepts that signify non-visual
properties. This, we will find is due to the imaginative structure of
experience, which signals Scruton’s penultimate notion that the aim of
imaginative perception is “not confined to any literal understanding,
but ranges freely over every imaginative conception”.
63
The Unification of Experience
Have we yet achieved our goal of locating the essence of
architectural experience? What remains is to provide a full account
of the reality of the object of our experience by showing how all the
above-mentioned features form part of a unified totality. This
60
p. 92
61
p. 93
62
p. 96
35
exposition in turn needs to be informed by an understanding of why we
should pinpoint a single kind of experience, as described by our
theory of imaginative perception and experience. Objects of
imaginative experience, as Scruton indicates, are also those
decorative arts in which we perceive similar visual patterns and
figures. He uses the example of statuary to distinguish between mere
decoration, similar to placing garlands on a building, and wholly
integral features, as in Gothic tracery. This obtains equally in the
distinction between ‘building’ and ‘ornament’, as well as
‘architectural statuary’ and ‘autonomous sculpture’.
Through these illustrations, we are meant to see that the
distinction between integral and ornamental signals two ‘ways of seeing’
or modes of perception, signifying the search for centrality in
architectural experience and unity in its object. Lending assistance to
the investigation is the notion of what is essential versus inessential
or accidental in our perceptions and experience. It should be
unproblematic that there seems to be more than one way of seeing and
interpreting our visual field. This gives rise to the fact that any
particular way of seeing sculpture, pavilions or columns can ‘enter
into’ our understanding of what we see. An understanding of the
pavilion (a whole) will depend on an understanding of its columns
(parts). Whether these are seen as ‘serene’ or ‘unsteady’,
understanding our pavilion depends on an understanding of the columns as
rhythmical or disjointed, respectively. In this way, experience ‘feeds’
our understanding; the capacities of experience and understanding are
inter-sustained. Combining columnar rhythm and material simplicity for
instance, we might come to understand the pavilion as being ‘serene’.
The unity of what we see in our experience informs the understanding of
what we see, which will respect that unity. This act is what Scruton
63
p. 96
36
calls ‘bringing the experience under a single conception’,
64
definitive
of the unity he asserts. Our thus unified understanding signals the
single conception of ‘serene’. The unity of our experience in
architecture is expressed in this understanding; it is therefore the
understanding that is the source of unity. Hence, in attending to the
pavilion ‘under the unified conception’ of ‘serene’, our experience
which expresses that conception will maintain its unity.
65
The unity of
our experience of the columns and their material (thus the unified
conception of ‘serene’), combined with an experience of the headstone
and coffin, producing the conception of ‘eerie spirituality’, might
issue in the further unified conception of ‘eerie but spiritual
serenity’. In this way, whilst walking through the pavilion we are
struck by certain aspects of it; our experience retains a certain
character posited by the perceptions of material, structure, furniture
and decoration, and suitably ‘hangs together’. “Because my experience
is not constrained by the needs of literal perception, it ranges freely
over its object, and imposes whatever unity it will bear.”
66
64
p. 102
65
After Scruton, p. 101-2
66
p. 102-3
37
IIIiii – Complex Experience
Imagination as The Aesthetic Attitude
An issue of primary concern is Scruton’s use of the phrases
‘special mode of attention’, or ‘act of imaginative attention’. For
what he suggests is not that the imagination is the single appropriate
aesthetic attitude with which to approach architecture. The problem
with considering imagination as the aesthetic attitude is in the fact
that this would result in claiming that anything we engage with
imaginatively, we engage with aesthetically. This assertion would
amount to saying that visualising or imagining ice cream would be to
engage with it aesthetically. Skillen represents the argument slightly
differently by saying that such visualisation “does not dignify my
desire with the insignia of an aesthetic outlook”.
Scruton’s enterprise consists in the explanation of the structure
of architectural experience, whereby either we experience architecture
literally, i.e. see merely columns, roofs, benches, wood, nameplates,
etc., or we see something in addition to these simple building elements.
In seeing anything in addition to these elements, we must employ the
faculty of the imagination. This in no way supposes a ‘distinctively
aesthetic mode of experience’, although what Scruton does intimate is
that the experience of architecture, being inherently imaginative, is
primarily aesthetic. This might indicate that Scruton attaches the
misnomer ‘aesthetic’ to ‘thin’ sense of the imagination, although, if
so, he himself misconstrues the scope of the terminology he employs.
Thus, we might postulate an additional level that supervenes upon the
imaginative perception to avoid the claim that all imagination is
aesthetic. To avoid claiming that imaginative experience is the
aesthetic attitude, we must assume that if anything could be called
aesthetic, we might tentatively propose it must lie beyond the ‘thin’
conception of experiencing architecture with imaginative perception.
38
Complex Experience
In support of complex experience being aesthetic, we may observe
that many of Scruton’s statements about the imaginative structure of
experiencing architecture seem to involve an ambiguous ‘alternating’
terminology, thus contributing a certain ambiguity to his overall
arguments. If his opponents were to allow a more sympathetic and
slightly less literal reading, one might say that the thoughts Scruton
proposes, strung together to form the strongest line of thinking
possible, are highly persuasive. If there have been misunderstandings
(many of which are exemplified by Skillen), they will have arisen due
only to his idiosyncratic way of writing, rather than the content of his
statements. It would seem most analytical aesthetics intends to employ
the everyday or ‘thick’ sense of the term ‘imagination’, but instead
misunderstands or misuses it in the ‘thin’ sense as intended by Scruton.
Perhaps a better way of referring to and distinguishing these phenomena
would be to consider the everyday, ‘thick’ sense as a kind of ‘complex
experience’. In so doing, we may be able to answer many problems that
arise with Scruton’s account and still others that Skillen raises.
Comparing Complex and Imaginative Experience
Although we may have identified an appeal to imagination, the
literal and imaginative distinction is not sufficient for aesthetic
appreciation and experience. We must add that aesthetic appreciation
consists at least in the appropriate exercise of imagination informing
our understanding in an attempt at ‘getting it right’. In this way, we
are aiming for a correct interpretation, or one that is most faithful to
the intentions of the architect and the purpose of the building. This
requires such things as sensitivity, visualisation abilities,
imagination, the aesthetic sense, and reflection. We shall then see the
39
columns as appropriately rhythmical or the pavilion as appropriately
solemn. This is ‘complex experience’ that employs the ‘thick’ sense of
imagination.
Postulating a level of ‘complex’ experience explains our aesthetic
engagement with our environment and the objects within it. Complex
experience pertains to what is colloquially referred to as ‘aesthetic
experience’. Every aesthetic experience employs the thick sense of
imagination and can therefore be complex. However, not every complex
experience is aesthetic, as in the experience of a fighter pilot.
Imagination may not be the single or only faculty employed in engaging
with objects aesthetically, for we may employ our creativity for
instance. It is a type of experience that is possible in any context,
and its existence displays how we might allow for a kind of purposeful
or involuntary imaginative engagement that supervenes upon the basic
structure of our non-literal experience. Complex experience allows that
imagination may be the chief faculty in our aesthetic perception, yet
remains one among others that, entailing or transcending imagination,
are also sufficient for aesthetic engagement, such as creativity. Here,
we acknowledge the availability of complex multi-dimensional experience
that allows for other perceptual or experiential features to supervene
upon the ‘thin’ background elements. The imaginative structure of
experience is just that, it is the ‘background’. A general feature of
aesthetic experience is that is it imaginative. It is a mistake to
believe that the essence of architecture and its experience is
imaginative in the thin sense.
It would be incorrect to consider that everyone is capable of
complex experience. Alternatively, everyone maintains the capacity for
imaginative experience. In fact, imagination admits of degree, being in
its ‘simple’ form available to anyone capable of making ‘novel
40
connections’.
67
Only capable of seeing the rhythm of the columns
(imaginative perception), my cousin may be incapable of making the
unconventional connection that, if photographed in a certain light from
a particular angle, perhaps the mausoleum could portray joyous but eerie
spirituality (complex, creative perception).
68
Creativity is employed
here as a perceptual extra, exercised at a higher degree, supervening
upon imaginative perception. Creative perception is sufficient for
aesthetic perception, as is imaginative perception, but is not necessary
or essential; imagination in the thin sense is necessary but not
sufficient.
Here, the traditional sense of creativity employs the idea that we
generate new ideas where the ‘genuine’ creative experience is not simply
making novel connections but the combination of ‘unconventional thinking
with appropriateness’.
69
Conceivably, we may have unconventionally
chosen to disregard the presence of what we might normally take to be a
coffin in choosing our experience of the pavilion rather than the
mausoleum. The highest level of abstraction might represent something
like Kant’s notion of genius, considering its rarity as a gift of
nature.
70
This fact of degree suggests that it is possible to develop
or be educated in aesthetic experience, although only to a certain
point.
As with the imagination, non-meritorious complex experience is
possible in the sense that both seem to invite a positive value-
judgement. Such experience is open to positive or negative judgement
based on the ‘quality of the making involved’, as in the ‘success of
integrating complex elements’ to form unconventional and perhaps unified
67
Limiting to anyone in this case allows the possibility that there may be agents that are
incapable
68
In itself, creative experience is extremely difficult to pinpoint, although one way of
characterising it would be to see what the photographer sees in photographing a poignant
moment, a solemn street, or a dramatic action. In addition, perhaps it is wholly unconventional
to assume that a mausoleum is simply a pavilion because it obviously contains a coffin.
69
White p. 88 for the account of novelty and unconventional thinking only.
70
White p. 89 inclusive of the account of genius only.
41
ideas that are exemplary (in Kant’s sense) rather than nonsensical,
71
thus the requirement for appropriateness. The thick conception of
imagination is thus incomparable to simply adopting a detached
contemplative aesthetic attitude; it is more like a kind of ‘mind-set’
that is complex, receptive and open-ended, allowing for chance or
untrained encounters and capable of degree.
The Aesthetic ‘Mind-set’ and Experience-Criterion
It should be obvious that there are more ways to attend to an
object than just imaginatively, such as with inattention, distraction,
creatively, etc. Our aesthetic engagement is an active attention,
inasmuch as the notion of creative imagination signals the capacity
for original, inventive creation. It is a state that allows for
complexity and plurality both of its object and in itself. Such
plurality permits our experiences to exist concurrently and in
contribution to one another, their interrelation being dependent on
the spectator’s motivations and perspective. By studying what
‘perspective’ from within which we attend objects, informed by our
motivations, whether focusing on instrumental, moral, educational or
artistic aspects, we may better discern the characteristics of the
experience we undergo. In this way, we might better determine what is
valued from that perspective. A work of architecture may have
artistic value to the individual interested to undergo an experience
of the building for its own sake alone.
72
Thus, we are able to attach
values to works and their experiences by referring to what aspects of
the work and its experience are being attended to. In order to
ascertain what particular value is under consideration, we must
‘discriminate’ within which perspective spectators make their
evaluations.
71
White p. 89
42
Now, every act of aesthetic attention and every aesthetic
experience is at least an engagement of our imagination. However,
should conceiving experience in the thick sense prove insufficient to
suitably describe this plurality, we might refer to a ‘mind-set’ or
complex of attitudes, perceptions and points-of-view. This mind-set,
although having various motivations and intentions, refers to a kind of
experience that requires categorisation in terms of certain criteria.
These would be descriptive of the range of experiences we consider
‘aesthetic’, here referring strictly to a range satisfying certain
criteria specified independently of ‘the aesthetic’. The problem would
then remain to understand the issues related to characterising and
explaining the appropriate range of creative experiences, and whether
formulating criteria would be appropriate, exhaustive, sufficient and
necessary.
To clarify this notion, the idea of taking, having or allowing
ourselves a mind-set should not be read as a requirement to actually put
ourselves in a certain mental state. This may preclude the required
possibility of chance encounters. It is not that there may be some
ideal, optimal or privileged position from which to have aesthetic
experiences of architecture. We must allow for the idea of having a
certain mind-set that is either learned, acquired or innate and
possessed by some more than others. One can be better or worse than
others at discriminating features of objects, and so aesthetic
experiences are possible to a greater or lesser degree. The examples of
being better or worse suited than others at taking exams, giving
presentations or cycling may illustrate this point, and any of these
activities may be improved by education, training and further experience
and contemplation.
73
Furthermore, moving away from the notion of
72
Budd (1995), Chapter 1
73
It should be obvious that someone can, through thoughtful planning and consideration among
other things, become a more successful cyclist, presentation-giver, or exam-taker, and that any
43
defining the underlying aesthetic attitude allows us to focus on what is
involved in an aesthetic experience, which is more important than merely
specifying a kind of attention that defines aesthetic engagement.
The notion of a mind-set allows for and encompasses not only the
idea of attention (which may be of a certain kind). For a mind-set may
embody a whole host of complex, varied and perhaps even conflicting
concerns, interests, motivations, and may even contain other points of
view, or views of other points of view.
74
More importantly, it
accommodates a range of attitudes, which stem from differing
motivations, that may or may not yield a pleasurable response.
75
In addition, we can explain how judgements and evaluations of both
the experience and of the object are possible by noticing that they can
be made from within a certain mind-set, about other perspectives, and
even about a certain point of view within that perspective.
76
What is
now required of this characterisation is a survey and proposal of the
criteria that would serve to characterise the kinds of experience that
we consider definitive and paradigmatic of the required kind of
‘aesthetic’ experience. Beardsley has offered five such criteria, being
object-directedness, felt freedom, detached effect, active discovery,
and wholeness, although this list may not be exhaustive.
77
Reference to
such criterion consists in denoting something apart from other types of
experience, hallucinations, sleep, exercise, or merely contemplating,
perceiving, imagining, thinking or speaking.
of these things may be a matter of skill, luck, ability, etc. I employ the action-loaded sense
of ‘suited’ here, in the way that being suited for photography refers to being capable and
executing actions in line with those capabilities.
74
Similar to Skillen’s point about Alberti’s commodity, firmness and delight where it may not be
these characteristics themselves that are of interest, but their peripheral or consequential
employment and combinations.
75
A mind-set can encompass and is consistent with notions previously advanced by other theorists
regarding such things as aesthetic awareness being perspicacious consciousness (Findlay), or
aesthetic appreciation where the object serves as a point of focus (Scruton). It allows a
readiness for imagination (Cooper), the loss and regaining of the will (Schopenhauer, Collinson
respectively), the idea of play (Gadamer) and further phenomenological accounts of cognition,
experience (‘artkind’ or otherwise) and perception (Dewey, Beardsley, Osborne).
76
I refer here to the distinction that a point-of-view may be taken from or within a perspective.
77
See Beardsley (1982) p. 285-297, in Collinson (1992) p. 166-170, for a complete outline
description of his experience criterion.
44
These criteria and others specifiable later, refer not to some
theoretical notion or norm that must be conformed with. Rather, the use
of criteria allows us to avoid charges of subjectivism through their
relationship with the external, real world.
78
Our experience,
perceptions, judgements and evaluations regard objects in the world,
whereby "the object controls the experience",
79
or "the object serves as
a focal point on which many different thoughts and feelings are brought
to bear".
80
It is critical to notice that experience-criteria that
describe our engagement with objects actually supervene upon the notion
of mind-set. We must allow both that one can maintain a certain mind-
set and not have aesthetic experiences (say for instance the art critic
attending to any mundane activity in which no aesthetic qualities
obtain), and the reverse that one may have aesthetic experiences yet not
maintain an aesthetic mind-set (untrained or chance encounters).
Treating the situation in this way allows us to focus less on the
need to theorise about a single central feature of aesthetic experience
identifying the aesthetic attitude. We might now be able to look more
towards the idea of having a mind-set as a way of allowing ourselves to
be in a position to be receptive to the offerings of our environment.
This could also take on the notion of the ‘lowering of our prejudices’
as Dickie has proposed.
81
Furthermore, this is akin to adopting a frame
of mind to take an exam, give a presentation, or engage with
architecture. In this way, we focus our mind on a certain sub-set of
mental or physical objects that require a certain kind of attention,
such as exam-attention, cycling-attention, or architecture-attention.
If we are unable to locate any counter-examples to imaginative
experience in the thick sense (as an appropriate exercise of imagination
78
Collinson, p. 166
79
Beardsley (1982) p. 527, in Collinson (1992) p. 166
80
Scruton (1974), p. 155 in Cooper, p. 26
45
in ‘getting it right’), we might allow for extended, plural, concurrent
and contributive imaginative experiences to form an important part of
the way that we experience architecture and our environment. Should
complex experience or the notion of a mind-set be proven otherwise
incompatible with the imaginative structure of experience, we will have
at least pointed out the ambiguous usage of the term ‘imagination’.
81
Dickie (1964), p. 44
46
Part IV
Conclusion
By way of critical assessment, I began by addressing Scruton’s
main theses, explaining his claims by first clarifying what was at
issue and addressing any arguments, then focusing on any replies and
contributing any rebuttals. By considering in what the aesthetic
experience of architecture consists, I proved that whilst imaginative
perception may be possible and necessary for an experience of
architecture to be ‘aesthetic’, it is not sufficient. According to
Scruton, engaging architecture requires imaginative perception.
However, we must allow for chance or untrained aesthetic experiences,
for if imagination is active in the sense that one must be engaged in
thought about the object, then surely this is unnecessary.
Imaginative perception does explain much of our experience, but it
is perhaps only one aspect of a complex of attitudes that we can take
towards architecture. As Scruton intimates, the structure of our
experience of architecture mirrors that of perception, this structure
containing the levels of literal and imaginative perception. This
explains the how our experience can be imaginative and not aesthetic,
and how it must be imaginative to be aesthetic. Thus, it is certainly
feasible that, as Kant suggested, the paradigm aesthetic experience
will consist in the free interaction of the imagination and
understanding.
From this, we have found a requirement to superimpose upon
imaginative experience an additional level of ‘graded complex
experience’, exemplified in the ‘thick’ conception of the imagination.
Rhythm is actually there to be discovered in the columns of a
mausoleum, and appreciating architecture aesthetically requires more
47
than visual perception. Scruton’s imagination thus becomes the basic
or ‘thin’ conception of experience. All experience of architecture
consists in the exercise of the imaginative capacity, for otherwise we
merely would perceive ‘stuff’ literally. Even in the ‘thick’
conception, it will be impossible to have an aesthetic experience that
is not an engagement of the imagination, owing to the imaginative
structure of experience. Upon this structure resides the level of
‘complex’ experience, which clarifies how we might have aesthetic
experiences. This level explains the range of aesthetic experiences
in which the imaginative capacity is engaged to greater or lesser
degree. Whilst every experience of architecture need only be
imaginative, every aesthetic experience must employ something more
that the imagination.
Consider experiences ranging from the person who simply ‘knows what
they like’, to the reflective contemplation of a lake scene, to the most
profound, intimate, extensive experience, perhaps of a piece with a
‘religious awakening’. It is almost as if we must address such a range,
then demarcate as to what constitutes an aesthetic experience, and what
does not.
82
The purpose here has initially been to determine whether
there is in fact any central or essential feature of architectural
experience, but subsequently we meet the requirement to define the
aesthetic experience itself. Architectural experience consists in the
‘thin’ level of imaginative perception, upon which supervenes ‘thick’
perception as a central feature of aesthetic experience. A mind-set
defines the range of experiences, allowing not only for the complex and
plural experience akin to an awakening, but also chance or untrained
encounters, as well as simple one-dimensional experiences.
An obvious problem with pluralist accounts resides with their
inability to focus on the problem and provide succinct answers to
82
Numerous studies have been undertaken to define this experience, whether it even exists, or if
48
questions regarding the essence of experience, the value and
importance of architecture and the experiences we derive. But the
primary issue here seems not that the competing accounts are
incommensurable, rather they are complementary and interrelated; it’s
not that we can offer no true (i.e., correct) view, or that all of
these views are equally correct. It is more that there is no single
way of stating the unique fundamental truth about our experience in
the way that Scruton proposes by citing the imaginative perception.
83
I have suggested that some of Scruton’s claims following from this
presentation on imagination are purely a manifestation of personal
preferences. It might be seen an attempt to rationalise and objectify
those preferences in the manner so frequently displayed by others with
a manifest bias, as vividly illustrated in his choice of examples,
coming predominantly from classical architecture. Finally, I would
like tentatively to propose that, until we undertake to delineate a
full understanding of the psychology of ‘aesthetic’ perception and
experience, we cannot properly say what it would be to experience
architecture aesthetically.
any experience may be called ‘aesthetic’.
83
After Blackburn, p. 290-91
49
Part V
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