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African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 319
Capitalizing on Nigeria’s demographic dividend: reaping the
benefits and diminishing the burdens
Holly E. Reed
1
Queens College, City University of New York (CUNY) and
CUNY Institute for Demographic Research (CIDR), New York, NY, USA
Blessing U. Mberu
African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC), Nairobi, Kenya
Abstract
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country in the world, yet there is
a dearth of published research about its demography. As Nigeria enters a period of potentially rapid economic
growth due to the increase in the working-age population, it is critical to understand the demographic trends
in the country. This paper examines the age and sex composition of Nigeria as it relates to various population
characteristics using the two most recent Demographic and Health Surveys for Nigeria (2003 and 2008), as
well as some data from the 2006 Census. It also highlights Nigeria’s demographic composition and trends
using United Nations population projection data, and its implications for the country reaping the demo-
graphic dividend. Finally, it draws some conclusions and makes some policy recommendations based on the
findings.
Key words: Nigeria; demographic dividend; population growth; population policy
Résumé
Le Nigeria est le pays le plus peuplé d'Afrique et le huitième pays le plus peuplé du monde, mais il y a une
pénurie de recherche publiée sur sa démographie. Comme le Nigeria entre dans une période de croissance
économique potentiellement rapide en raison de l'augmentation de la population en âge de travailler, il est
essentiel de comprendre les tendances démographiques dans le pays. Cet article examine la structure par
âge et sexe de la population du Nigeria et sa relation avec d’autres diverses caractéristiques de la population
à l'aide des deux plus récentes enquêtes démographiques et de santé (2003 et 2008), ainsi que certaines
données du recensement de 2006. Il met également en évidence la structure démographique et l’évolution
de la population du Nigeria à partir des données de projection de la population des Nations Unies, et ses
implications quant à la possibilité pour le pays de bénéficier d’un dividende démographique. Enfin, il tire des
conclusions et fait des recommandations pour les politiques à partir des résultats présentés.
Mots-clés : Nigeria, dividende démographique, croissance démographique, politique de population
Introduction
Nigeria’s population and resources are vast, but its
challenges loom equally large. The country is on the
verge of experiencing a potential demographic divi-
dend, or the economic growth due to the increase in
the share of a country’s population in the working
ages (and the corresponding decline of those in the
non-working ages). If Nigeria adopts the most
appropriate and effective policies, it can capitalize on
its natural advantages to address current challenges
while promoting future economic growth and social
development and becoming not only an African, but
a global leader. Investments must be made in this
growing labor force, as well as future generations, to
ensure that the Nigeria’s course of development
proceeds in a positive direction.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa
and the eighth most populous country in the world,
with approximately 162 million people. Despite
declining fertility, Nigeria’s population is expected to
continue to grow to 239 million by 2025 and 440
million by 2050 due to population momentum, mak-
ing it then the 4
th
most populous country in the
world (United Nations 2012). Most of this growth
will be people in the working ages, between age 15
and 64. Thus, the dependency ratio, or the number of
children and elderly (under age 15 and over age 65)
divided by the number of working age adults
(between ages 15-64), will fall over this period from
88 dependents per 100 workers in 2010 to only 69
1. Correspondence address: Holly E. Reed, Department of Sociology, Queens College, Powdermaker Hall 252, 65-30
Kissena Boulevard, Queens, NY 11357, USA; Telephone: +1-718-997-2828; Fax: +1-718-997-2820; E-mail:
Holly.Reed@QC.CUNY.EDU
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 320
dependents per 100 workers by 2050. The median
age of the total population is likewise anticipated to
increase from 17.9 to 21.4 years over the 40-year
period from 2010 to 2050 (United Nations 2012).
These trends are of particular importance because
Nigeria is expected to make up three percent of the
total world population and 14 percent of Africa’s
population by 2050 (United Nations 2008). Thus,
Nigeria will be poised to be a major player in the glo-
bal system, and particularly important in the African
region. In addition to its valuable human capital,
Nigeria’s oil and gas resources represent a potential
development boost. Nigeria contains 37 billion bar-
rels of proven oil reserves (CIA 2009) and 5 trillion
cubic meters of natural gas reserves (Ross 2003). It is
already ranked among the top 13 oil producers glo-
bally (Akpan 2006) and produced 34 billion cubic
meters of gas in 2007, exporting 21 billion (CIA
2009). Yet despite these tremendous resource
advantages, Nigeria continues to lag behind on many
development indicators. Why? Primarily Nigeria has
not properly invested in its current and future labor
force, nor has it developed its oil and gas industries
to produce long-term growth in both jobs and GDP,
nor has it diversified its economy (World Bank/DFID
2005).
Will Nigeria’s current and future population
composition be a benefit or a burden? How might
Nigeria’s relative share of working age persons (15-
64) and dependents (under 15 and 65 and over) con-
tribute to long term economic growth and develop-
ment? The economic growth potential posed by the
demographic transition is created by a decline in
mortality that precedes a large decline in fertility.
This period of lower mortality and higher fertility,
often known as a baby boom, will ultimately lead to
a working age bulge or a potential demographic divi-
dend when this large cohort of children grows up.
However, whether the working age bulge consti-
tutes a dividend or not also depends on the availabil-
ity of employment. A country ’s dividend cannot be
realized if there is widespread unemployment
among its working age population. This is because
those outside the labor force consume part of what
is produced by the currently employed, and this
influences the amount of surplus that is available for
investment after consumption. A larger surplus can
lead to increased investment and increased eco-
nomic growth, therefore, assuming that jobs are
available, a lower dependency ratio is an advantage.
This paper aims to examine the age and sex
composition of Nigeria as it relates to various popu-
lation characteristics, including level of urbanization,
educational attainment, household structure, wealth,
religion, ethnicity and language, and employment
and occupation. Based on this analysis, some key
findings and policy recommendations related to pop-
ulation policy – as well as broader social and eco-
nomic development – are presented.
Following the introduction, we present findings
from the 2008 DHS, along with comparisons to the
2003 DHS, to examine the current status and trends
of Nigeria’s population age and sex composition,
particularly as it relates to the socioeconomic status,
household composition, religion and ethnicity/lan-
guage and employment and occupation, and family
planning needs.
Nigeria’s demographic composition and trends
based on United Nations population projection data
and its implications for its demographic dividend are
presented next. Finally, the last section of the paper,
summarizes key findings, draws conclusions and
presents policy recommendations.
Nigeria’s population structure and the
demographic dividend
In this section of the paper, we use the 2008 DHS
data with some comparisons to the 2003 DHS data
(and occasionally the 2006 Census data and some
UN data) to describe the basic current demographic
profile of Nigeria and to compare how education
and employment vary by region, rural or urban resi-
dence, religion, language and ethnicity, human capital
attainment and wealth. Univariate and bivariate
tables are presented and analyzed here; values are
weighted for sampling probabilities. The DHS data
are presented by topic (i.e., employment, education)
in tables for men, women and the full sample (2003
and 2008). Although it is not possible to fully discuss
every statistic in these tables, major gender differ-
ences are summarized. Note that the DHS collects
data from women aged 15-49 and eligible men in the
same households aged 15-59; only data for those
aged 15-49 are displayed for comparability across
the sexes. All data are weighted to represent the
population.
Population distribution and characteristics
The 2006 National Census estimated the total
national population at 140,431,790. The states of
Kano (in the north) and Lagos (in the south) were by
far the largest in terms of population, with 9.4 mil-
lion and 9.1 million people, respectively. Other large
population centers (over 5 million) in Nigeria
included: Kaduna with 6.1 million residents, Katsina
with 5.8 million, Oyo with 5.6 million, and Rivers
with 5.2 million. Looking at larger regions of the
country, the estimates from the 2008 DHS are that
the largest percentage of the population lives in the
North West (24 percent), followed by the South
South (with about 21 percent) and South West (17
percent). The North East region has declined since
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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2003 from 18 percent to only 12.5 percent. The
general trend is that population is declining in the
northern areas and increasing in the south (National
Population Commission 2006).
According to our tabulations of the 2008 DHS,
approximately 64 percent of the population lives in
rural areas, and only 36 percent in urban areas
(National Population Commission [Nigeria] and ICF
Macro 2009). The UN estimate for 2010 was 49.8
percent urban, which is significantly higher than the
DHS figures (UN 2009). As shown in Figure 1, it is
also projected to increase quite rapidly, with over
the half the population living in urban areas by 2015
and over three-quarters of the population living in
urban areas by 2050 (UN 2009). These vast discrep-
ancies between the two sources of data remain a
key challenge to research in the country and invest-
ments in estimation and projection techniques to
generate credible data on population dynamics and
outcomes may be an important effort in understand-
ing the demographic process and associated poten-
tial dividends in Nigeria.
In terms of growth, as shown in Figure 1, the
UN estimates that the urban population in Nigeria is
growing currently at a rate of about 3.75 percent,
and it will continue to grow at a rate of at least 3.26
percent annually through 2025 to 2030 and 2.60
percent between 2045 and 2050 (UN, 2012). Mean-
while, the growth rate for the rural population is
already at 1.2 percent and expected to continue to
decline, reaching less than 1.0 percent growth by
2025 and 0.24 percent by 2045-through 2050 (UN,
2012). While this seems quite low, considering the
high rural fertility rates, it suggests that mortality
may be much higher in some rural areas than in
urban areas. Note that rural residents probably gen-
erally have poorer health and lower life expectancies
than urban residents (with the exception of some
slum populations) (Montgomery et al. 2003),
although no research from Nigeria is available that
supports this possibility.
In general, natural increase (fertility minus mor-
tality) represents a greater share of urban growth in
sub-Saharan Africa than it does in other regions
(Chen et al. 1998), so these urban growth rates in
Nigeria likely capture relatively high (although now
declining urban fertility rates). Although urban
growth was higher in Africa than in the rest of the
world, the continent still experienced an overall
decline in urban growth during the 1990s and 2000s
(Potts 2006; Bocquier 2005; Bocquier 2003; Potts
2000; Potts 1995), which corresponds with the UN
estimates. Recently researchers have suggested that
the UN urban projections for both Nigeria and sub-
Saharan Africa overall are much too high (Potts
2012; Bocquier and Mukandila 2011).
Nevertheless, even if these projected rates are not
exactly right, one can anticipate that the percentage
of Nigeria’s urban dwellers will increase while the
percentage of rural dwellers will decrease over time.
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percentage
Figure 1 Percentage urban and rural in Nigeria,
United Nations data (2009 revision)
Percentage urban
Percentage rural
0
10
20
30
40
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2009
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Percentage
Year
Figure 1 Percentage urban and rural in Nigeria, United Nations data (2009 revision)
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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Addressing the needs of these increasing numbers of
urban residents, including their access to food, hous-
ing, education, employment and services will be a
major challenge for Nigeria’s government in the
coming decades and will be critical in harnessing the
benefits of her demographic dividend. Some of these
new urban residents will be migrants from rural
areas (Mberu 2005), so there will likely be additional
challenges in integrating them into the cities, but
many will be the children of current urbanites, as
natural increase (fertility) is also contributing to
urbanization. The characteristics of urban popula-
tions will be examined in turn in each of the follow-
ing sections.
Age and sex structure
Table 1 shows the age and sex structure of the
national population according to the 2006 census
data. It is clear at first glance that the majority of the
population is younger than 30 years old. In fact,
about 70 percent of the population is under age 30
and about 41 percent of the population is younger
than age 15. This is a very large cohort of young peo-
ple, and particularly of young children, who will be
entering the educational system and then the labor
force (under an ideal scenario).
The sex ratio (ratio of males to females) is generally
greater than one for children, but it reverses in the
20s, when there are somewhat more females than
males, and then reverses again in the 40s, when
there are more men than women up through the
oldest ages. This suggests some potential son bias, as
well as a potential older age bias. Male mortality
among young adults may be quite high as well, espe-
cially in light of high maternal mortality rates for
young adult females. However, the data are some-
what suspect and further analysis is required to truly
understand the sources of these sex ratio differ-
ences. It is not possible to compare these numbers
directly with the DHS data, because about three
times as many women as men were interviewed in
that survey. Nevertheless, the DHS, although it
includes only ages 15-59 (focusing on women of
reproductive age, 15-49), does show a very young
age structure as well; about 54 percent are under
age 30 in 2008.
Other socio-demographic characteristics
Nigeria is primarily a Muslim and Christian country;
in 2008, about 45 percent reported Islam as their
religion, 11.5 percent were Catholic, and about 42
percent were Other Christian (either Protestant or
another Christian denomination). The percentage of
Catholics and other Christians declined somewhat
Table 1 Distribution of population by age groups and sex, Nigeria 2006
Age groups Both sexes Males Females
0-4 22,594,967 11,569,218 11,025,749
5-9 20,005,380 10,388,611 9,616,769
10-14 16,135,950 8,504,319 7,631,631
15-19 14,899,419 7,536,532 7,362,887
20-24 13,435,079 6,237,549 7,197,530
25-29 12,211,426 5,534,458 6,676,968
30-34 9,467,538 4,505,186 4,962,352
35-39 7,331,755 3,661,133 3,670,622
40-44 6,456,470 3,395,489 3,060,981
45-49 4,591,293 2,561,526 2,029,767
50-54 4,249,219 2,363,937 1,885,282
55-59 2,066,247 1,189,770 876,477
60-64 2,450,286 1,363,219 1,087,067
65-69 1,151,048 628,436 522,612
70-74 1,330,597 765,988 564,609
75-79 579,838 327,416 252,422
80-84 760,053 408,680 351,373
85+ 715,226 404,021 311,204
Total 140,431,790 71,345,488 69,086,302
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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between 2003 and 2008, while the percentage of
Muslims increased from 37.4 to 44.7% (NPC and
ICF Macro 2009). Some regions of the country,
including the North East and North West are almost
entirely Muslim, while the South East has a predomi-
nance of Catholics, and the South South has a major-
ity of other Christians.
There are a great number of ethnic-linguistic
groups in Nigeria, although the main languages are
Hausa (primarily spoken in the northern regions),
Yoruba (primarily spoken in the South West), Igbo
(primarily spoken in the South East), and English. Yet
many other languages have large contingents; over
half of Nigeria’s population claims a native language
other than one of these four (NPC and ICF Macro
2009).
Table 2 shows some summary characteristics of
the 2003 and 2008 DHS samples: mean age and
years of education, employment, urban residence,
and household characteristics. Educational attain-
ment in Nigeria remains low, and according to the
Census, about 47 percent of the population is illiter-
ate (NPC 2006). The 2003 DHS found that about 36
percent of the population had no formal schooling.
However, there is some evidence that this situation
is improving; both the 2006 Census and the 2008
DHS found that only about 31 percent of the popu-
lation had no formal schooling, a decline of five per-
centage points from 2003. In 2003, only 19 percent
of the population completed secondary school or
higher education, but by 2008, this figure increased
substantially to about 30 percent.
On average, women are much less educated than
men, although there seems to be some improve-
ment for both sexes. According to the 2008 DHS,
about 36 percent of women have no formal school-
ing (down from about 42 percent in 2003), 20 per-
cent have only primary education (21% in 2003), 36
percent have secondary education (up from 31% in
2003), and about 9 percent have higher than second-
ary education (up from 6% in 2003). Men in the
DHS show a similar pattern, but with less dramatic
changes over time: only 21 percent have no formal
schooling (22% in 2003), 21 percent have primary
schooling (down from 26% in 2003), 43 percent
have secondary education (up from 41% in 2003),
and 14 percent have higher education (up from 12%
in 2003). The mean years of education appear to
have decreased between the two DHS surveys,
which may indicate poor educational policy and
implementation of programs or poor data quality.
According to both DHS surveys, the majority of
both men and women worked last year, but more
men than women worked in both survey years.
Employment seems to be down slightly for both
men and women between 2003 and 2008, but is
over 65 percent total. Nearly 40 percent of Nigeri-
ans live in urban areas.
Table 2 Summary characteristics of the sample by sex
Nigerian DHS 2003 and 2008 (weighted)
2003 DHS 2008 DHS
% or Mean % or Mean
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Mean age 33.2 28.6 29.8 31.8 28.7 29.7
Mean total years of education 8.6 6.4 7.0 8.0 6.2 6.8
Worked last year 78.8 63.8 67.8 83.7 61.1 68.7
Urban residence 39.3 39.3 39.3 37.3 35.8 36.2
Mean number of household members 5.7 6.5 6.3 5.5 6.3 6.0
Male household head 91.4 80.9 83.7 93.1 81.8 85.4
Mean age of household head 43.1 44.4 44.1 42.9 44.7 44.1
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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Table 3 Key characteristics by highest educational level and sex
Nigeria DHS 2008 (weighted)
None Primary Secondary Higher
Males Females Total Pop. Males Females Total
Pop.
Males Females Total
Pop.
Males Females Total
Pop.
Ethnicity
Hausa 46.3 77.1 67.1 21.8 12.4 15.4 23.3 8.9 13.6 8.6 1.6 3.9
Yoruba 5.3 10.0 8.5 17.1 21.5 20.1 55.1 51.6 52.7 22.4 17.0 18.8
Igbo 2.1 5.4 4.4 29.3 20.8 23.3 52.6 58.7 56.8 16.0 15.2 15.4
Fulani 75.0 89.3 85.1 14.8 6.7 9.1 23.3 3.6 4.8 2.6 0.4 1.1
Ijaw/Izon 2.3 10.3 7.3 14.9 23.8 20.5 66.5 58.1 61.2 16.3 7.8 11.0
Ibibio 3.6 4.0 3.9 28.2 27.8 27.9 51.0 53.2 52.5 17.3 15.0 15.8
Tiv 5.9 32.3 23.8 27.2 34.0 31.8 57.2 29.2 38.2 9.7 4.5 6.1
Others 14.1 28.6 24.1 21.2 24.5 23.4 49.4 38.5 41.9 15.3 8.4 10.6
Religion
Catholic 3.0 11.1 8.5 27.6 23.9 25.1 55.0 51.6 52.7 14.4 13.4 13.8
Other Christian 4.1 9.5 7.9 20.4 23.6 22.6 55.8 52.7 53.7 19.6 14.2 15.9
Islam 41.1 66.0 58.1 19.9 14.8 16.4 29.6 16.3 20.6 9.3 2.9 5.0
Traditionalist 33.7 63.7 54.1 40.5 25.7 30.5 22.8 9.4 13.7 3.0 1.3 1.8
Other 8.9 26.7 17.0 17.9 28.8 22.8 42.1 36.9 39.7 31.2 7.6 20.5
Place of Residence
Urban 8.8 16.5 14.0 16.1 16.8 16.6 51.7 49.2 50.0 23.4 17.5 19.4
Rural 28.8 46.5 40.9 24.4 21.3 22.2 38.3 28.1 31.3 8.7 4.1 5.6
Wealth Quintile
Poorest 59.1 75.9 70.9 22.7 15.7 17.8 17.0 8.3 10.9 1.2 0.1 0.4
Poorer 36.2 59.5 52.6 27.9 23.1 24.5 32.7 16.7 21.5 3.2 0.7 1.4
Middle 18.0 34.8 29.5 27.1 26.3 26.5 46.4 36.4 39.5 8.5 2.6 4.4
Richer 5.4 14.4 11.4 21.6 23.1 22.6 57.5 52.9 54.5 15.4 9.6 11.6
Richest 1.6 4.2 3.3 10.9 11.6 11.4 53.4 56.9 55.8 34.1 27.3 29.6
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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Approximately 85 percent of households in the DHS
are male-headed in 2008 (compared to about 84
percent in 2003), and the mean age of the household
head was approximately 44 years in both years.
According to the 2006 Census, the average house-
hold size is large, with over 72 percent of house-
holds having at least five people. Mean household
size in the DHS surveys confirms this. Marriage is
relatively universal in Nigeria and those who are
widowed or divorced at younger ages often remarry.
Education
As Table 3 (above) shows, according to the 2008
DHS there is also a clear religious gradient in educa-
tion. Catholics and Other Christians have fairly high
levels of educational attainment overall (over 65 per-
cent have secondary or higher education). Mean-
while, Muslims and traditionalists have relatively low
levels of educational attainment, although Muslims
have somewhat larger percentages of secondary or
higher level attainment compared to traditionalists.
Over 50 percent of both Muslims and traditionalists
have no formal schooling.
Not surprisingly, urban residents have higher lev-
els of education than their rural counterparts. Sixty-
nine percent of urbanites have secondary or higher
levels of education, while only about 37 percent of
rural dwellers do. Educational access is more difficult
in rural areas, as there are fewer schools and fewer
resources, in addition to the tradition that rural chil-
dren are often kept from attending school to help
with agricultural or home chores (Montgomery et al.
2003; UNESCO 2000; Enaohwo 1983). As the data
in Table 3 also demonstrate, there is a clear positive
relationship between wealth and educational attain-
ment, with the middle and richer quintiles having
higher percentages of people who have attained sec-
ondary or higher levels of education compared to
the poorer quintiles. In sum, women, and those liv-
ing in rural areas, those living in the northern part of
Nigeria, Muslims and traditionalists, and the poor are
worse off in terms of formal educational attainment.
In relation to maximizing the demographic divi-
dends, addressing these educational disadvantages
among these disadvantaged groups will be upper-
most for Nigeria currently and in the years to come.
Employment
Table 4 (below) shows results for employment and
occupation by age, sex, region, type of place of resi-
dence, and educational attainment using the 2008
DHS data. (Note that many of these values do not
sum to 100 percent because of missing values for
occupation.) The first column shows the percentage
not working by various characteristics. Unemploy-
ment rates are quite high among the younger age
groups; 66 percent of teenagers were not working in
2008, possibly because many are in school, but also
undoubtedly due to high youth unemployment. This
percentage has declined substantially since 2003,
when it was 73 percent. Unemployment seems to
have declined over the five-year period from 2003-
2008 among all age groups, which is a good sign. Yet,
it is only after age 30 that unemployment rates drop
below 25 percent. Unemployment was relatively
high in all regions, but lowest in the South South and
highest in the North West. In 2008, 32 percent of
urban residents were unemployed, and about 30
percent of rural residents. The connection between
education and employment is a mixed picture.
Unemployment is, somewhat counter intuitively,
lowest among those with primary education (18 per-
cent) and highest among those with secondary edu-
cation (38 percent). This potentially suggests that
those who either attend but do not complete sec-
ondary school and/or those who complete second-
ary school are at a disadvantage on the job market,
while there are still enough jobs for those with at
least some primary education in Nigeria. Unemploy-
ment is relatively high (at least 17 percent) among all
educational groups, however, there is likely a need
to create jobs at all skill and educational levels.
Looking at occupational distributions, there are
relatively low percentages employed in clerical work
and unskilled manual labor across all age groups and
other socio-demographic categories. Those in the
younger age groups are most likely to be employed
in agriculture or sales. In the older age groups, peo-
ple are also generally employed in agriculture or
sales, but there are larger percentages also in profes-
sional or technical work and skilled manual labor.
There is an urban-rural divide in occupational distri-
butions as well. The highest percentage of workers
is found in sales occupations in urban areas, and in
agriculture in rural areas. Skilled manual labor,
household and domestic, and professional or techni-
cal jobs also make up large percentages in urban
areas, while sales and skilled manual labor jobs are
also important in rural areas. As seen in the previous
section, educational levels are higher in urban areas,
so this coincides with the distribution of occupations
by educational attainment. According to the 2008
DHS, 33 percent of those with higher education are
in professional and technical jobs (down substantially
from 44 percent in 2003), and 18 percent are in sales
(up from about 10 percent in 2003). This suggests
that fewer university graduates are finding jobs com-
mensurate with their training. Likewise, over a quar-
ter of those with completed secondary educations
are in sales, but relatively large percentages are also
in agriculture, household and domestic, and skilled
manual labor. Most with primary or no education
who work are in sales, agriculture, and, to a lesser
extent, skilled manual labor.
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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Table 4 Unemployment and occupation by key characteristics and by sex
Nigerian DHS 2008 (weighted)
Percentage not
working
Professional/Technical Clerical Sales Agricultural
(self-employed)
Services Skilled
manual labor
Unskilled
manual labor
Age
15-19 66.0 0.6 0.5 9.3 13.0 2.2 6.1 2.1
20-24 43.6 2.6 1.4 17.7 16.0 5.3 11.2 1.7
25-29 26.2 5.0 1.7 25.6 18.9 7.8 13.6 0.8
30-34 17.1 7.5 1.5 32.0 21.6 7.1 12.5 0.3
35-39 13.5 7.9 1.5 33.8 25.3 5.6 11.7 0.1
40-44 13.0 8.5 1.4 32.3 28.6 5.4 10.3 0.2
45-49 12.4 8.5 1.0 33.2 30.0 4.5 9.7 0.1
Total 30.7 5.3 5.3 23.8 21.2 5.6 10.7 0.9
Sex
Male 13.4 7.7 1.4 12.9 34.1 9.6 15.2 2.3
Female 37.3 4.1 1.2 28.9 15.2 3.8 8.7 0.3
Region
North Central 26.8 5.0 1.0 17.8 36.7 3.6 6.6 2.1
North East 29.2 1.9 0.5 21.3 33.2 2.7 9.5 1.1
North West 35.4 2.7 0.5 26.2 18.6 2.8 12.5 1.0
South East 35.2 6.7 1.4 22.5 15.5 7.8 10.1 0.6
South West 30.8 5.9 1.8 21.6 19.0 9.3 10.7 0.6
South South 26.2 9.1 2.4 29.4 11.3 7.9 12.7 0.4
Place of residence
Urban 32.3 8.9 2.5 27.8 5.8 8.3 12.9 1.0
Rural 29.8 3.2 0.6 21.6 30.0 4.1 9.5 0.9
Highest educational
No education 30.1 0.5 0.2 26.4 30.1 2.3 9.8 0.2
Primary 17.9 1.1 0.4 27.2 31.8 7.4 13.5 0.5
Secondary 38.3 3.6 1.8 21.6 13.2 7.9 11.7 1.5
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 327
Although further analysis of the labor market and
economic situation is needed, these descriptive sta-
tistics seem to suggest that there may be a significant
number of Nigerians with secondary or higher levels
of education who are underemployed in sales, agri-
culture, or skilled manual labor. Women’s labor force
participation is far behind men’s, likely because of
high rates of childbearing, particularly at young ages,
when women might first enter the labor market.
These results point to the persistence of female
labor force disadvantages identified in the country in
the last 20 years. The World Bank (1996) identified
the legal, regulatory, and cultural barriers that keep
women disadvantaged relative to men in terms of
access to health, education, financial, and agricultural
extension services. Similarly, apart from facing dis-
crimination in employment, Adeyeye (1996) and
Haddad (1991) had highlighted how women also
face lower chances of independent escape from pov-
erty, in part because women’s large share of domes-
tic commitments prevents them from seizing new
and profitable opportunities as readily as men.
Urban and rural unemployment were similar in
2003, but now urban unemployment is higher than
that in rural areas. As urbanization proceeds at a
rapid pace in Nigeria, there will be even more urban
unemployment if jobs are not created for the mil-
lions of young people—both urban residents and
migrants to urban areas—who will be finishing their
educations and entering the labor market for the
first time.
Unemployment appears to be high across the
entire country, so the development of industries and
employment must have a national focus (albeit with
regionally appropriate components), and not just
focus on one or two potential areas for job creation
in one or two regions. Agricultural employment
seems to be the main force that is reducing unem-
ployment, but this should only be seen as a positive
trend if wages and income for farmers are well
above subsistence level. In addition, increasing
employment in agriculture may lead to other prob-
lems in the long run if agriculture is not developed in
an ecologically sound manner. Several researchers
have noted the negative environmental impacts of
common agricultural practices like slash and burn in
Nigeria (Junge et al. 2008; Onwuka 2005).
Nigeria’s population projections and
implications for demographic
dividend
The UN projections assume that Nigeria is currently
a medium-fertility country; in other words, although
fertility is still well above replacement level, it is
declining and expected to continue to decline. How-
ever, because Nigeria’s TFR is currently still over 5
children per woman, even with the assumption of a
steady decline, it is still not expected to reach
replacement level fertility by the end of the projec-
tion period, 2050. This is under the medium-variant
assumption. Under the high-variant assumption, fer-
tility will remain even higher, by approximately 0.5
children per woman throughout the projection
period. Under a low-variant assumption, the oppo-
site is true; fertility is expected to remain lower, by
approximately 0.5 children per woman through
2050 (UN, 2009). While this range may seem small,
it can have a substantial impact in a country like
Nigeria with currently high fertility; if fertility
declines more rapidly, according to the low-variant
assumption, Nigeria could reach replacement level
fertility by 2050, but if fertility declines slow or stall,
then fertility could still be as high as about 3 children
per woman by 2050.
In terms of mortality assumptions, Nigeria is one
of the high-HIV-prevalence countries (having a prev-
alence among persons aged 15-49 of at least 1.0 per-
cent during the period 1980-2007; Nigeria’s current
estimated prevalence is about 3.1 percent (UNAIDS
2008)). Therefore, mortality for Nigeria is projected
by modeling the course of the AIDS epidemic and
projecting a yearly incidence of HIV infection. How-
ever, the models also assume a 50 percent reduction
in the force of the epidemic and the population at
risk of infection every 20 years, due to assumed
behavioral changes. The models also make country-
specific assumptions regarding the impact of anti-
retroviral therapy treatments, mother-to-child
transmission treatments, and pediatric AIDS thera-
pies (UN 2009). Despite stated government priori-
ties in tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic and
international donors increased funding (DFID,
2004), universal access to HIV prevention, treat-
ment, care, and support remains to be attained in
the country. Nigeria’s current life expectancy is only
49 years, and although it is projected to increase, it
will only rise to about 62.5 years by 2050. Conse-
quently, Nigeria must step up its efforts to attack the
AIDS crisis to prevent an even bleaker picture of
future life expectancy in the next round of UN pro-
jections.
Conclusions and policy
recommendations
With respect to its age structure, at first glance
Nigeria appears to be in a very promising situation
overall, with a large cohort of young people entering
adulthood (and, presumably, the labor force) while
fertility rates are falling. Nevertheless, the popula-
tion of children and youth will still be quite a large
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
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(albeit declining) percentage of Nigeria’s total popu-
lation by 2050 (28 percent). Even though the per-
centage of elderly will be relatively small, the elderly
population is projected to grow and the numbers of
both youth and elderly are staggering, given the
overall population of Nigeria. Policies must address
the needs of these groups, including education, child
immunizations and basic health care, the prevention
of sexually transmitted diseases and reproductive
health services for teens, and old-age support and
pensions and health care for the elderly who are dis-
abled or chronically ill.
The dependency ratio suggests that the working
age population will support these other two portions
of the population, and in fact produce a surplus, but
in order to do that, they must be employed, and the
data presented in this paper make that prospect
seem rather dim. Despite some improvement
between 2003 and 2008, unemployment rates are
very high across nearly every region and every sub-
group in the population. Increased employment
seems to be mainly agricultural, which may not pro-
vide enough income to adequately support Nigerian
families and could have deleterious environmental
consequences if not done properly.
In terms of population trends, Nigeria’s total fertility
rate (TFR) remains quite high compared to the rest
of the less developed countries (over 5 children per
woman) and although it is projected to continue to
decline, there are questions about whether this
decline is inevitable and whether it will continue
apace. There is some evidence of decline from the
2003 and 2008 DHS data, however. Regardless of
how the fertility rate changes, Nigeria’s population
growth will continue through 2050 due to simple
population momentum.
Age at first sex, age at first marriage, and age at
first birth for women still remain low in Nigeria
(17.2, 17.8, and 19.4, respectively, according to the
2008 DHS), although they have increased since
2003. Policies must be implemented that raise these
average ages to reduce fertility overall. Unmet need
remains high and the public health infrastructure –
particularly the family planning and reproductive
health infrastructure – is in great need of reform and
improvement (Blattner et al. 2008). Confronting and
assuaging Nigerian pronatalist attitudes, particularly
among men, is potentially difficult, but also neces-
sary. This requires investment in education for
women and an overall focus on improving the status
of women. But investment in education, particularly
for women, does not make sense without a benefit
in terms of employment and economic mobility.
The labor market currently does not have many
opportunities for women (or men, for that matter)
and underemployment is widespread as well, partic-
ularly for youth (World Bank 2009). What can be
done? This is a question for the development econo-
mists, but it would seem that at this point in time,
with the current technological resources available
and Nigeria’s substantial oil wealth, some creative
forms of education, training, and job creation should
be a focus.
Key subgroups within the population deserve
special emphasis in population and economic poli-
cies. Ethnic disparities in fertility and child morbidity
and mortality rates have been documented and are
linked to religious, regional, and socioeconomic dis-
parities, as well as some cultural practices (Reed and
Mberu, forthcoming; Olufunke and Obafemi 2011).
The northern regions, Muslim and traditionalist pop-
ulations, and rural areas, in particular, are in need of
increased resources and infrastructure, particularly
in the areas of family planning, education (especially
female education), job creation, and public health.
These programs should not exclude other regions or
parts of the population, particularly as Nigeria is rap-
idly growing and there is also a large and growing
urban population base in the south. Supporting
change in underserved areas and among unders-
erved groups without alienating those who are
somewhat better off will require stronger govern-
mental and civil society institutions (Bloom et al.
2007).
Although we do not discuss them in detail in this
paper, Nigeria’s mortality and health indicators con-
tinue to lag far behind other countries as well. Life
expectancy lags severely, due to the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic as well as other infectious diseases, and poor
health care infrastructure, particularly in rural areas
(Blattner et al. 2008). The facilities in the Nigerian
health system are unevenly distributed across the
country’s regions and most of the facilities are clin-
ics, not hospitals (and most hospitals are privately
owned), with an inadequate supply of trained health
workers (Nwakeze and Kandala 2011). A recent
analysis by Akinyemi et al. (2013) found that child
survival rates improved between 1990 and 2008, but
that this improvement was due primarily to
improvements in sewage disposal and drinking
water, as well as birth spacing and child care. In
order to further decrease child mortality rates, the
authors argue that maternal and child health services
must be expanded and female education increased.
Steps are being made in the right direction, but mas-
sive public health investments, such as the govern-
ment’s ongoing recruitment of midwives for rural
areas, must be made to avoid Nigeria falling even
further behind its neighbors in life expectancy and
health (Akinyemi et al. 2013).
If the UN projections can be believed, continuing
urbanization, at least partially due to internal migra-
African Population Studies Vol 27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 329
tion from rural areas, but also natural increase within
cities, means that urban labor markets will need
more jobs and infrastructure over time. Will this
increasing urbanization lead to a more rapid fertility
decline? Perhaps, as urban fertility norms continue to
decline and rural migrants assimilate to urban norms
(see, for example, White et al. 2008). But it is impor-
tant to recognize that even if urban fertility declines
without many policy changes, Nigeria’s rural popula-
tion will still be large in numbers (even if they are a
declining percentage of the population), rural-rural
migration remains high (Mberu 2005), and rural fer-
tility change may require significantly more interven-
tion.
In terms of international migration, Nigeria has
moved from being primarily a sending country to
also being a migrant receiving country in the West
African region (Adepoju 2011). Meanwhile, the
Nigerian diaspora continues to grow globally, but
although Nigeria is a leader in terms of the volume of
remittances received from the diaspora in Africa,
data on how these funds are used was lacking until
recently; moreover, the country is also losing remit-
tances sent out by non-Nigerian nationals resident in
the country (Afaha 2013). Whether or not the Nige-
rian diaspora is a potential engine for growth at
home or simply a brain drain is an outstanding ques-
tion; however, the organization Nigerians in
Diaspora Organizations has been formed and is in
active dialogue with the Nigerian government
regarding development and remittances (Adepoju
2011).
The demographic dividend as a potential boon
for overall development was first recognized in the
case of the East Asian tigers. There is some debate in
the literature about whether or not Africa can follow
their model and capitalize on this one-time demo-
graphic bonus of a large working age population and
relatively small dependent population (World Bank,
2009; Bloom et al. 2007; Bloom et al. 1998). It is a
tall order, particularly for a country like Nigeria,
given all of its challenges as highlighted in this analy-
sis. Nevertheless, Nigeria’s population, in combina-
tion with its relative wealth, could be a dynamic
engine of growth if harnessed properly. The Nigerian
government, as well as international donors, must
focus on the key challenges of investing in basic pub-
lic infrastructure, including health, family planning,
schools, and basic services; and of reinvesting oil
profits in job creation. These sound like simple pre-
scriptions, but of course they are not. Nevertheless,
time is passing quickly and unless these investments
are made now, the demographic dividend and its
golden opportunity will pass Nigeria by. An impor-
tant part of this process must include investments to
improve quality data collection, access and availabil-
ity, and the promotion of research on Nigeria’s
demographic trends and processes in order to gen-
erate credible evidence to guide policy and program
interventions as well as to monitor and evaluate
progress.
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Catherine S. Andrzejewski, Robert L.
Reed, Gabriel Saldarriaga, and Guillermo Yrizar-Bar-
bosa for their research and editorial assistance. We
also thank David Bloom and two anonymous review-
ers for their helpful comments.
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