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EDITORIAL
The Europäische Akademie organises –
partly in co-operation with other insti-
tutes – expert meetings which serve to ex-
plore further research topics or to deepen
the discussion on overlapping interdisci-
plinary topic fields. These meetings, held
by small circles of experts, complement
the conferences run by the academy, cov-
ering three main areas, namely ethics of
medicine, environment, and engineering
technology and address scientists, political
authorities as well as the public, potential-
ly affected by the consequences of science
and technology.
One of those expert meetings was held re-
cently at the beginning of December in the
Europäische Akademie in cooperation
with the FernUniversität in Hagen and the
Ruhr-Universität-Bochum, focusing the
topic of medically assisted suicide from
ethical, social, and legal points of view. As
far as ethics of medicine is concerned, the
discussion on the subject of euthanasia
and different legislation in Europe in this
context is widely controversial.
While reviewing the problem as scientific
issue, results of the discussion are thought
of being integrated simultaneously in the
professional university studies of a newly
created Post Graduate Master Study Pro-
gramme of Medical Ethics, hosted by the
FernUniversität in Hagen, and destined to
provide further education for profession-
als engaged in the public health system
(www.medizinethik.eu). TE/UH
Further information: www.ea-aw.de
NEWSLETTER
AKADEMIE-BRIEF ●NO. 68 JANUARY 2007
FOCUS
Moral Responsibility, Criminal Law and the Neurosciences
Felix Thiele
Recent developments in the neurosciences challenge the view that a person should be pun-
ished for illegal actions, because he or she is morally responsible for them. Many authors
claim that a reasonable concept of responsibility would depend on the existence of free
will and that, since the neurosciences have proven that there is no free will, it can be con-
cluded that there can be no such thing as moral and legal responsibility for one’s actions.
It is obvious that this would necessitate fundamental changes in our understanding of the
criminal law. In contrast to this, it will be argued here that an anti-deterministic concept
of responsibility can be developed that is not dependent on the existence of free will and
that likely serves the social task of criminal law better than a deterministic approach to
human action.
Free will, moral responsibility and
empirical findings
It is frequently assumed that without
free will there cannot be such thing as
moral responsibility or guilt. Now, the em-
pirical findings of the neurosciences sug-
gest that a free will is not to be found in the
brain: each brain-state (and the resulting
actions) is to the best of our knowledge al-
ways determined by the immediately pre-
ceding brain-state. Bypassing an extensive
debate on whether the existing neuroscien-
tific data actually warrant such far reach-
ing claims, I will assume for the sake of ar-
gument that there indeed exists no free will
kicking off our actions – neither in the
brain nor elsewhere in the body.
With that the justification of punishment
based on the idea of free will has failed: if
there is no free will, there can be – so the ar-
gument goes – no moral responsibility. As a
consequence, one would either have to
abandon criminal law in its existing form –
an option rarely favoured – or one would
have to provide a new justification for
sanctioning certain actions: punishment
would no longer be a means of retaliation
and revenge. Punishment would instead
become a means of influencing behaviour,
i.e. the prevention of future undesired ac-
tions. In a deterministic interpretation of
criminal law human beings are trained for
obedient behaviour no less than a dog is
trained to retrieve the stick.
Responsibility without free will
Waiving the talk of free will does not,
however, necessitate us to give up the con-
cepts of moral responsibility and guilt. Fol-
lowing the use of the term responsibility in
ordinary language one can develop a con-
cept of moral responsibility without falling
back on free will.
The statement “Harry lied to Sally” is not
or at least not only a description of Harry’s
action but also a way of ascribing Harry
the moral responsibility for Sally’s decep-
tion. Now, to determine whether making
Harry responsible is justified, one might
ask whether Harry acted on purpose, i.e.
intentionally. Unfortunately, intentions are
frequently equated to mental processes lo-
cated in the brain (and likely caused by an
act of free will). The interpretation of in-
tentions as mental acts is, however, deeply
problematic, since nobody has ever been
able to observe a mental act. Insofar the
judge has always been confronted with
what the neurosciences underpin empiri-
cally: mental acts and free will escape any
attempt to make them visible. Instead of
grounding intentions in un-observable
mental acts, one should base the conjec-
ture that an action was done intentionally
on the observable circumstances of this ac-
tion: If I have expressed the intention to
visit my aunt in Cologne tomorrow after-
noon, then I will not board the aeroplane
to Beijing tonight. If I nonetheless did, one
would have to assume that I either changed
my intentions, that I do not understand
what the situation demands, or that I was
forced to board the aircraft. Supposing
that a person did an action intentionally
and thereby is responsible for this action is
therefore dependent on the situation in
which the action is done, further utter-
ances of the person, her earlier actions etc.
Establishing that an action was done inten-
tionally and responsibly in this way is ob-
viously only hypothetical and preliminary,
never irrevocable and final. It is based on
analogies and normally reliable assump-
tions that can always turn out to be erro-
neous. Postulating a free will is, however,
not necessary for this conception of moral
responsibility.
The ascription of legal responsibility in
criminal law is organised in parallel to the
ascription of moral responsibility in ordi-
nary language. Assume that Smith is ac-
cused of having killed Jones. The (Ger-
man) penal code does not define positively
under what conditions one can correctly
argue that Smith has the legal responsibili-
ty for killing Jones. Instead the criminal
code defines certain observable conditions
– e.g. coercion, misunderstanding, and
psychiatric diseases – that, if verified, al-
low Smith to reject the claim that he is re-
sponsible for killing Jones. As in the case
of moral responsibility the ascription of le-
gal responsibility is not dependent on pos-
tulating or proving the existence of free
will. Though the debate on the founda-
tions of responsibility and guilt is far from
being ended, one can still conclude that (i)
anyone judging in practice whether a claim
of the form “x is responsible for having
done the action h” is valid must do so
without the concept of free will and that
(ii) also in moral and legal theory there are
concepts of responsibility that do not de-
pend on there being a free will.
Responsibility as functional element
for organising a society
The “ordinary language approach” to
responsibility sketched above is anti-deter-
ministic in contrast to the “neuroscientific
approach”. A deterministic concept of hu-
man action views actions only as effects of
(neurobiological) causes. In contrast, the
position proposed here assumes that ac-
tions themselves can be causes too. In
philosophical terminology one would say
that the former position proposes a causal-
istic model of human action and the latter a
finalistic model of human action. So far I
have only shown that even if we accept the
findings of the neurosciences and conse-
quently give up the concept of free will we
are not forced to rebuild our legal system
by using a deterministic concept of human
action and responsibility. We should do so,
however, when there are good reasons for
assuming that the neuroscientific (causal)
model of explaining human action is supe-
rior to the finalistic model.
A prominent way of arguing for the priori-
ty of causal explanations of human action
is to claim that only causal explanations
qualify as scientific explanations – where
‘scientific’ means success in terms of repro-
ducibility and predictability. (Disciplines
like ethics and law do not satisfy such crite-
ria, which is why in the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion these disciplines are called sciences
only reluctantly.) However, it would be too
restrictive to claim that only causal expla-
nations could be valid scientific explana-
tions. In contrast to an empiricist concep-
tion of science focusing on causal
explanations – which is, by the way, domi-
nant only since the late 19
th
century – ‘sci-
entific’ might be better understood as ‘well-
founded’ or ‘well-argued’. From this
perspective it is by no means a settled issue
that causal explanations of human action
are better founded as such and thereby
more scientific than finalistic explanations
that ask for the reasons (intentions) some-
body had for doing what he or she did.
That the natural sciences, which are the
main source of causal explanations, are
nonetheless favoured as epitome of science
is to a large extent due to the immense con-
tribution of these disciplines to the benefit
and use of mankind: revealing a causal
chain frequently offers the possibility to
purposely intervene and influence this
causal chain. The great (but so far largely
unfulfilled) hopes pinned on the therapeu-
tic potential of the neurosciences are
grounded in this potential. It is true that it
cannot be proved ex ante that the neuro-
sciences will be successful in revealing
causal chains underlying human action, but
it is equally not possible to prove ex ante
that this endeavour cannot be successful.
There is therefore no reason for a neuro-
scientist not to search for causal chains.
Rather the general track record of the natu-
ral sciences motivates for the opposite. One
should note, however, that the search for
causal chains is not, so to speak, forced
upon us by nature, but is indebted to cer-
tain aims the researcher has – e.g. the aim
to intervene into certain causal chains.
If there are good reasons to search for
causal explanations of human actions, it
cannot be excluded offhand that there are
also good reasons to search for finalistic ex-
planations of human actions. Such a reason
might be to organise our life with each oth-
er without conflicts as far as possible. It
might turn out that by using (finalistic) ex-
planations and evaluations of actions – ask-
ing for the reasons for an action – we will
be more successful in organising our socie-
ty than by using (causalistic) explanations
that ask for the causes that prompt persons
to act as they do. In addition it might turn
out that for organising a society it is more
suitable to postulate that humans can be as-
cribed moral responsibility for their actions
than to reduce ‘being responsible for an ac-
tion’ to ‘being the cause of this action’. The
concept of responsibility resulting from this
approach is a functional one: what respon-
sibility means is dependent on the task soci-
ety allocates to this concept. It is needless to
say that a functional interpretation of re-
sponsibility and guilt is highly controversial
in philosophy and jurisprudence – not at
least since many hold that certain actions
are morally reprehensible as such and not
only relative to certain societal aims.
Independent of what model of human ac-
tion one prefers and what concept or re-
sponsibility one favours, it should have be-
come quite clear that this is not a question
that can be solved empirically. The issue is
not a matter of the correct interpretation of
human action by using an established scien-
tific method, but first of all a matter of
what counts as the adequate (scientific) ba-
sis for explaining human action.
Finally, the above considerations are not
meant to show that the neurosciences are of
no importance for the moral and legal or-
ganisation of a society: in the same way as
e.g. the determination of blood alcohol
(and the explanation of the causal influence
alcohol has on human action) has become
an accepted part of establishing the respon-
sibility of a suspect car driver, in this same
way neuroscientific methods might help ex-
plaining the causal influence brain-states
have on human action and furthermore
modify our moral evaluation of these ac-
tions. However, so far there is no convinc-
ing evidence that the findings of the neuro-
sciences give us good reason to change our
concepts of responsibility and in effect our
criminal law fundamentally.
Dr. med. Felix Thiele, M.Sc., is deputy director of the
Europäische Akademie GmbH. Currently he is also
head of the BMBF-Junior Research Group “Phar-
ming. Genetically Modified Plants and Animals as
Future Production Site of Pharmaceuticals?”.
Europäische Akademie Bad Neuenahr-AhrweilerNewsletter No.682
cation for sustainability in particular. Ger-
man education schedules are criticised for
being focused too much on the matters of
teaching and, thus, on the inputs instead of
the competencies of pupils as the outputs
of schooling. Accordingly, the concept of
competencies and the canon of necessary
competencies for a sustainable develop-
ment are to be specified.
●
The strategies for the implementation of
education for sustainability in schooling.
●
The strategies on how to develop the
recommendations, the study will give
(rather bottom-up or top-down?).
Some helpful suggestions will now be closer
examined by the project group members, e.g.
be restricted that the study should not, as
was originally planned, on the senior years
of secondary school (Sekundarstufe II) only,
that an expansion of the chapters dealing
with the concept of justice would be helpful,
or that the agenda should be supplemented
by an extensive examination of and reflexion
on lifestyles. Since, however, the further
agenda was approved by all commentators
in its essence, the working group will now
start to work out more detailed its hitherto
provisional plans.
Contact:
Dr. phil. Georg Kamp, M.A.
Phone +49 (0) 2641 973-308
georg.kamp@ea-aw.de
Fuel Cells
The third meeting of the project group
“Brennstoffzellen und virtuelle Kraftwerke
als Elemente einer nachhaltigen Entwick-
lung. Innovationsbarrieren und Umset-
zungsstrategien” (Fuel Cells and Virtual
Power Plants as Elements for a Sustainable
Development Innovation Barriers and Im-
plementation Strategies) took place in Bad
Neuenahr-Ahrweiler on 7
th
and 8
th
Decem-
ber. The working programme was adopted
and will be discussed with experts from sci-
ence and practice at a workshop on 22
nd
and
23
rd
January. Furthermore, the expert work-
shop was prepared and first written inputs
to basics on technology aspects, innovation
barriers and strategies, market imperfec-
tions, and aspects of law were discussed.
Since January 2007, the project group has
now been completed: Holger Berg, Dipl.-
Ing. (Universität Duisburg-Essen, technolo-
gy of energy supply and energy conversion
plants), Dr.-Ing. Bert Droste-Franke, Dipl.-
Phys. (Europäische Akademie, environmen-
tal science and energy economics), Annette
Kötter, Dipl.-Vw. (Europäische Akademie,
environmental economics), Jörg Krüger, RA
(Universität Bochum, energy law), Dr. rer.
pol. Karsten Mause, Dipl.-Pol. (Europäische
Akademie, political science and institutional
economics), Professor Dr. jur. Joh.-Christian
WORKING GROUPS
PROJECT ACTIVITIES
Project Group “The Research Guiding
Function of Metaphors from the Informa-
tion Sciences and their Relevance to the
Transformation of the Philosophy of Man”:
27./28.11.2006 in Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler
Project Group “Pharming. Genetically
Modified Plants and Animals as Future
Production Site of Pharmaceuticals?”:
5./6.12. 2006 in Weihenstephan
Project Group “Fuel Cells and Virtual
Power Plants as Elements for a Sustain-
able Development. Innovation Barriers and
Implementation Strategies”: 7./8.12.2006
in Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler
Project Group “Responsibility for Future
Generations. Implementation of Sustain-
ability in Schooling”: 15.12.2006 in Bremen
SPOTLIGHTS
Implementation of Sustainability in
Schooling
The project group had its first feedback
meeting on 15th December 2006 at the Uni-
versität Bremen. External experts had been
invited to review on the disposition of the in-
tended study and to discuss the hitherto
established work of the group. For their very
committed and helpful participation the
members of the project group and the Eu-
ropäische Akademie GmbH thank very much
Professor Dr. phil. Andreas Ernst (Universität
Kassel, Center for Environmental Systems
Research, environmental systems analysis,
chairman of the environmental psychology
division of the German Psychological Associ-
ation); Professor Dr. rer. pol. Andreas Fischer
(Universität Lüneburg, didactics of econom-
ics, chairman of the German Gesellschaft für
berufliche Umweltbildung e.V.); Professor Dr.
rer. oec. Ulrich Hampicke (Universität Greifs-
wald, Institut für Botanik und Landschafts-
ökologie, economics of landscapes and
resources); Professor Dr. phil. Monika Keller
(Max Planck Institute for Human Develop-
ment, Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cog-
nition, Berlin) and Professor Dr. phil.
Christoph Lumer (University of Siena, Moral
Philosophy). Mainly their comments fo-
cused on five topics:
●
The concept of critical sustainability the
project group will work with. Critical
sustainability allows restricted substitution
between certain resource classes.
●
The relation between economy and educa-
tion – as it is and as it should be.
●
The finalistic perspective of the project
group on education in general and of edu-
Pielow (Universität Bochum, energy law),
Professor Dr.-Ing. Ingo Romey (Universität
Duisburg-Essen, technology of energy sup-
ply and energy conversion plants) and Pro-
fessor Dr. rer. pol. Thomas Ziesemer (Uni-
versiteit Maastricht, economics).
Contact:
Dr.-Ing. Bert Droste-Franke, Dipl.-Phys.
Phone +49 (0) 2641 973-324
bert.droste-franke@ea-aw.de
NEWS
Minister Michael Breuer visited
academy
On 14th December 2006 the local work-
ing committee “European Politics” of the
German Party Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) visited the Europäische
Akademie GmbH. During their last visit in
March they had been accompanying Pro-
fessor Dr. phil. Hans-Gert Pöttering. This
time Minister Michael Breuer, responsible
for European and Federal Affairs in
North-Rhine Westphalia, was informed
about the work of the academy.
Professor Dr. phil. Dr. phil. h.c. Carl
Friedrich Gethmann, Director of the Eu-
ropäische Akademie, welcomed the guests
and gave a short survey of the history and
the aims of the academy. Furthermore
project coordinator Dr. phil. Margret En-
gelhard presented the current project
„Pharming. Genetically Modified Plants
and Animals as Future Production Site of
Pharmaceuticals?“. Pharming is a new
branch of biotechnology using transgenic
plants or animals as living “factories” to
produce human or animal pharmaceuti-
cals. Breuer affirmed his wish to deepen
the work of his ministry with the Europäi-
sche Akademie.
Summer School “Neuroscience and
Psychiatric Disease”
From 2
nd
to 9
th
October 2007 the Inter-
national Summer School “The Impact of
Current Developments in the Neuro-
sciences on the Concept of Psychiatric
Disease” will take place at the Universi-
tätsclub Bonn. The latest news and infor-
mation on the summer school (e.g. applica-
tion requirements) can now be found on the
homepage www.neuroscience-psychiatry.de
Managing Commitee/
Partners’ Assembly
On 13
th
November 2006 the budget of
the Europäische Akademie GmbH for
2007 was reviewed and confirmed during
the 20
th
general meeting of the Managing
Committee (GA) and the Partners’ As-
sembly (GV) in Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler.
Europäische Akademie Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler 3Newsletter No.68
PUBLICATIONS
Carl Friedrich Gethmann
„Das Ethos des Heilens und die Effizienz
des Gesundheitswesens“, in: Berlin-Bran-
denburgische Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten (Hg.), Berichte und Abhandlungen, Bd.
11, Berlin 2006, 83–97
“Manned space travel as a cultural mis-
sion”, in: Poiesis & Praxis 4 (2006),
239–252
Gerd Hanekamp/Ruth Klüser/Stephan
Lingner
„Elektrische Energieversorgungsnetze in
interdisziplinärer Perspektive“, Energie-
wirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 56 (2006) 12
LECTURES
Carl Friedrich Gethmann
29.11.06
„Praktische Vernunft in einer techni-
schen Kultur“: Philosophisches Institut der
Technischen Universität Chemnitz
7.12.06
„Naturveränderung und Natur-Heimat-
recht. Normative Fragen der Strukturverän-
derung des ländlichen Raumes“: Akademie-
Vorlesung der Berlin-Brandenburgischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin)
15.12.06
„Gefahrenwahrnehmung und Risiko-
beurteilung. Eine philosophische Skizze“:
Wissenschaftliche Sitzung der Versammlung
der Mitglieder der Berlin-Brandenburgischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin)
18.12.06
„Die Aktualität einer lebensweltlichen
Fundierung des Wissens und Handelns“:
Philosophisches Seminar der Universität zu
Köln in Verbindung mit dem Husserl-Archiv
Felix Thiele
19.12.06
„Die Einwilligung eines Patienten in eine
ärztliche Maßnahme – Funktion, Struktur,
Gültigkeit“: Institut für Geschichte, Theorie
und Ethik der Medizin der Johannes Guten-
berg-Universität Mainz
Homepage of the academy
Having had a successful celebration of the
10th anniversary of the Europäische
Akademie GmbH in September 2006, pho-
tographs of the festivity can now be found
on the homepage of the academy. While the
photographs provide an insight into the cele-
bration of the anniversary, a film on the
homepage informs about project, aims and
mission of the academy. Please go to
www.ea-aw.de and click on “Film and Pho-
tographs about the Europäische Akademie”.
www.ea-aw.de is the new web address of the Euro-
päische Akademie GmbH; www.europaeische-aka-
demie-aw.de, however, is also still accessible.
CONFERENCES
Spring Conference
On 30th and 31st March 2007 the Euro-
päische Akademie organises a conference on
“Digitales Publizieren in den Geisteswis-
senschaften” (Digital Publishing and the Hu-
manities) at the SETA Hotel in Bad Neuenahr-
Ahrweiler. The new options of digital
publishing and the open access movement are
increasingly influencing the culture of publica-
tion in the humanities. This gives new options
as for example the full-text-search in sources
or articles or the hyperlinkage of texts and
data, or the enhanced potentialities for coop-
erative work. But for the same reasons there
will be retroactive and side effects that influ-
ence the epistemic processes in the humanities:
texts are the main objects of these disciplines,
and the spreading of open and online accessi-
ble texts, either as facsimile or as hypertext,
will alter the scope of perception, the focusses
of debate, the conditions of publishing and
archiving and the manners of reception. With
its spring symposion in 2007 the Europäische
Akademie contributes to an active and
purposive shaping of these developments with
an interdisciplinary discussion among schol-
ars, publishers, librarians as well as represen-
tatives and practitioners from scientific insti-
tutions and organisations.
Further information soon at www.ea-aw.de
KATHARINA MADER, M.A., studied English,
Speech Sciences/Phonetics and Psychology at
the universities of Jena, Nottingham (UK)
and Bonn. Before starting her studies, Ma-
der volunteered as a welfare worker both for
disabled and foster children (Germany,
USA). At university her main interests were
German and English linguistics: in Jena she
worked as student assistant in the field of
phonetics (chair of English Linguistics) and
organised audition evenings at the “Institut
für Sprechwissenschaft und Phonetik”; in
Bonn she wrote her final thesis about trans-
lation studies. Besides, she was editorial as-
sistant at the radio stations Deutschlandfunk
(Köln) and Westdeutscher Rundfunk
(Bonn), and journalist co-worker at radio
stations in Jena, Weimar, Nottingham (UK)
and Köln. Furthermore she gained teaching
and supervising experience both in Germany
and the UK.
Since December 2005 Katharina Mader has
been a member of staff at the Europäische
Akademie in Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, being
responsible for public relations and editing.
Her main attention is focused on the edition
of the Newsletter of the academy and the
organisation of the regular spring and
autumn conferences as for example this
year’s spring conference on “
Digital Publish-
ing
and the Humanities” on 30
th
/31
st
March.
Together with her colleague Friederike
Wütscher she edits further publications of
the Europäische Akademie (Research Re-
port, Research Programme, Graue Reihe),
organises events (press meetings, vernissages
etc.) and is responsible for the design of the
corporate identity of the academy. Further-
more Frau Mader assists Frau Wütscher in
editing and presenting the series “Wis-
senschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeur-
teilung” (Springer Verlag).
Katharina Mader, M.A., is member of staff of the
Europäische Akademie. She is responsible for public
relations and scientific editing.
Publisher:
Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen
Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH, Wilhelmstraße 56, D-53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler
E-Mail:
europaeische.akademie@ea-aw.de, Internet: www.ea-aw.de
Director:
Professor Dr. phil. Dr.phil. h.c. Carl Friedrich Gethmann (V.i.S.d.P.)
Editing:
Katharina Mader, M.A., Phone +49 (0) 26 41 973-313, Fax 973-320, katharina.mader@ea-aw.de
Print:
Warlich Druck Ahrweiler GmbH, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler
ISSN 1432-0150, frequency of publication: 6 –10 times per year, 2.700 copies,
reproduction is permitted with reference to the source, please send two voucher copies.
Europäische Akademie Bad Neuenahr-AhrweilerNewsletter No.684
PERSONALITIES