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Moral reasoning and climate change mitigation: The deontological reaction toward the market-based approach

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... Such moral convictions tend to reflect a deontological approach to the protection and conservation of natural resources, motivating strong issue resistance, and providing little space for a consideration of personal (and other) economic gain [6,7,8]. It is for this reason that these two motivationsmoral conviction vs. economic gain-are readily seen as diametrically opposed in driving attitudes toward resource use ( [9,10], although see [11]) and are often cited as underlying conflicts between various stakeholder groups [12,2]. On one hand, moral convictions are formed around a strong desire to protect natural resources, while on the other, economic incentives motivate a tendency to take account of the resources needs of self and other. ...
... To date little research has examined how these two motivations may interact in shaping peoples' attitudes toward resource use. Where the relative influence of both moral and financial considerations has been the focus of previous research, it has investigated how economic gain or moral motives predict attitudes towards energy conservation when both are aligned towards a similar cause [9,11]. The ways in which these orientations may pull individuals in different directions, such as when financial incentives motivate a focus on personal and others' resource needs while moral convictions motivate a deontological approach to resource protection, to our knowledge, has not received prior research attention. ...
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When people are morally convicted regarding a specific issue, these convictions exert a powerful influence on their attitudes and behavior. In the current research we examined whether there are boundary conditions to the influence of this effect. Specifically, whether in the context of salient economic rewards, moral convictions may become weaker predictors of attitudes regarding resource use. Focusing on the issue of mining we gathered large-scale samples across three different continents (Australia, Chile, and China). We found that moral convictions against mining were related to a reduced acceptance of mining in each country, while perceived economic rewards from mining increased acceptance. These two motivations interacted, however, such that when perceived economic benefit from mining was high, the influence of moral conviction was weaker. The results highlight the importance of understanding the roles of both moral conviction and financial gain in motivating attitudes towards resource use.
... Additionally, the warmth dimension also conflates two different aspects: sociability and morality (Rodríguez-Pérez et al., 2021). Sociability is related to the construction of effective relationships, while morality is related to constructing honest and fair relationships (Sacchi et al., 2014) Furthermore, the SCM hypothesis posits that many social stereotypes are ambivalent, i.e., that groups perceived high in competence are, in turn, perceived as low in sociability and vice versa. This result is highly robust and was also verified in a macro-study by Durante et al. (2013). ...
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Research on social perception has shown that people tend to construct a mental picture of national groups. Much research has been directed at exploring the influence of relevant contextual variables, such as economic inequality, on these representations. The purpose of this study is to investigate how economic inequality affects two key elements of social perception: the stereotypical dimensions of competence, sociability, and morality and the humanity attributed to the inhabitants of nations with high and low economic inequality. Countries with high and low objective inequality were selected and participants were asked to indicate to what extent they considered the inhabitants to be competent, sociable, and moral. We also asked to what extent they attributed humanity and capacity to experience primary and secondary emotions to the inhabitants of these countries. The study was carried out with a Spanish sample (N = 245). The results showed the existence of an ambivalent pattern in which more competence and less sociability were attributed to nations with low inequality and the opposite (less competence and more sociability) to nations with high inequality; and a significant tendency was found to attribute more morality to nations with low inequality than to those with high inequality. Parallel mediation analysis showed that only morality significantly connected economic inequality with the attribution of humanity. Significant differences were found in the attribution of humanity but not in the attribution of capacity to experience secondary emotions. The results are discussed in light of the Stereotype Content Model and system justification.
... Over and above trust, there are a number of other psychological variables implicated in people's attitudes toward mining. Particularly relevant to this paper, there is evidence that people's attitudes toward mining sometimes assume a deontological moral quality, informed more by values and worldviews than by value-free appraisals of costs and benefits [28]; see [34][35][36] for related discussions of the impact of morality on climate change beliefs. Three of these worldviews are examined in this paper: the new ecological paradigm (NEP), political conservatism, and moral foundations. ...
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There is currently a surge in interest from both private and government sectors in developing technology for mining asteroids and the moon (“space mining”). One of the key benefits highlighted by advocates of space mining is that it minimizes the usual problems associated with mining on earth in terms of pollution, environmental degradation, and encroachment on human habitats. Two studies—one conducted on a 27-nation sample (N = 4819), the other conducted in the U.S. (N = 607)—provide the first test of the assumed (but never studied) notion that space mining is more palatable to the public than terrestrial mining. Both studies indicate broad support for asteroid mining: levels of support were reliably above the mid-point, and much greater than for other forms of frontier mining such as mining the ocean floor, mining Antarctica, mining the Alaskan tundra, and lunar mining. Unlike terrestrial mining, community attitudes toward mining asteroids were largely non-ideological; support was not correlated with perceptions of ecological fragility, political ideology, or individualistic/hierarchical worldviews. In summary, the current studies suggest that mining companies have a “social license to operate” for mining asteroids, but less so for lunar mining.
... The scales were moderately positively correlated (r = 0.44, p < .001), similar to what has been found in previous research (e.g., Sacchi et al., 2014). ...
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Adopting plant-based, or vegan, diets can have a number of benefits, including mitigating climate change, promoting animal welfare, or improving public health. In the current research, we use social psychological theory to better understand what motivates vegans to engage in collective action on behalf of this social group - that is, what motivates individuals to promote, or encourage others to adopt, a vegan lifestyle. We develop and test a Social Identity Model of Vegan Activism, which highlights the roles of individuals' social identities, sense of efficacy, emotions and moral convictions in fostering collective action. In two pre-registered studies, the first with self-identified vegans from Australia and the UK (N = 351), and the second with self-identified vegans recruited via Prolific (N = 340), we found that individuals more frequently engaged in vegan activism (i.e., actions to promote vegan lifestyles) when they had stronger moral convictions (i.e., deontological or consequentialist), greater collective efficacy (i.e., beliefs that vegans can make a positive difference), anger (i.e., when thinking about the reasons why they are vegan), and identification (both with vegans, and with animals). Deontological and consequentialist moral convictions had significant indirect effects on vegan activism via different mediators. We conclude by discussing the implications and importance of studying dietary behavior from a social identity perspective, including its ability to help explain how and why individuals become motivated to not only adopt a certain (e.g., vegan) lifestyle themselves, but to also ‘act collectively’ on behalf of that shared group membership (e.g., promote vegan-friendly behaviors). We also highlight some key insights for policy makers and campaigners aiming to promote plant-based diets.
... Indeed, warmth conflates aspects of sociability such as friendliness with aspects of morality such as honesty (for a discussion, Brambilla & Leach, 2014;Brambilla et al., 2021). Sociability refers to the ability to build effective relationships, while morality refers to building honest and fair relationships (Sacchi et al., 2014). In light of this distinction, early work by Leach et al. (2007) shows that people consider morality to be the most important quality for feeling good about one's ingroup. ...
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Across two studies, we tested the relationship between the stereotype dimensions of sociability, morality, and competence and the two dimensions of humanness (human nature and human uniqueness). Study 1 considered real groups and revealed that sociability had greater power than morality in predicting human nature. For some groups, sociability also trumped competence in predicting human nature. By contrast, the attribution of human uniqueness was predicted by competence and morality. In Study 2, participants read a scenario depicting an unfamiliar group in stereotypical terms. Results showed that competence and sociability were the strongest predictors of human uniqueness and human nature, respectively. Although with nuances, both studies revealed that sociability, morality, and competence relate differently to the two dimensions of humanness.
... The logic of protected values is equally prevalent among conservation scientists who see such interventions as a slippery slope, as dangerously transgressing historical baselines, or involving outcomes that are poorly understood (Hagerman & Satterfield, 2013). Trading protected values off for economic or other outcomes is thus considered non-negotiable (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008;Sacchi et al., 2014;Visschers & Siegrist, 2014), even where arguments for multiple benefits can be identified (Baron & Spranca, 1997;Daw et al., 2015). Thus, the already strong value positions associated with biodiversity or avoidance of manipulating nature closes the door on many difficult but necessary conversations. ...
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Novel management interventions intended to mitigate the impacts of climate change on biodiversity are increasingly being considered by scientists and practitioners. However, resistance to more transformative interventions remains common across both specialist and lay communities and is generally assumed to be strongly entrenched. We used a decision‐pathways survey of the public in Canada and the United States (n = 1490) to test two propositions relating to climate‐motivated interventions for conservation: most public groups are uncomfortable with interventionist options for conserving biodiversity and given the strong values basis for preferences regarding biodiversity and natural systems more broadly, people are unlikely to change their minds. Our pathways design tested and retested levels of comfort with interventions for forest ecosystems at three different points in the survey. Comfort was reexamined given different nudges (including new information from trusted experts) and in reference to a particular species (bristlecone pine [Pinus longaeva]). In contrast with expectations of public unease, baseline levels of public comfort with climate interventions in forests was moderately high (46% comfortable) and increased further when respondents were given new information and the opportunity to change their choice after consideration of a particular species. People who were initially comfortable with interventions tended to remain so (79%), whereas 42% of those who were initially uncomfortable and 40% of those who were uncertain shifted to comfortable by the end of the survey. In short and across questions, comfort levels with interventions were high, and where discomfort or uncertainty existed, such positions did not appear to be strongly held. We argue that a new decision logic, one based on anthropogenic responsibility, is beginning to replace a default reluctance to intervene with nature.
... For instance, academics have begun linking pro-environmental behaviour to that of moral domain, because moral domain is concerned with what is an acceptable or unacceptable societal norm and serves as an indicator of what is a good or bad, a right or wrong action to take [17][18][19]. Although it has been argued that pro-environmental behaviours often fail to generate strong moral intuitions because climate change is non-linear (its consequences and their timing are difficult to predict), unintentional (no one planned or wanted it to happen), and is not caused by some clearly identifiable individuals (it's impossible to target the guilty ones who cause the most harm [20]), some studies have found strong support for the influence of a moral dimension [21][22][23]. ...
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Many studies have demonstrated that moral philosophies, such as idealism and relativism, could be used as robust predictors of judgements and behaviours related to common moral issues, such as business ethics, unethical beliefs, workplace deviance, marketing practices, gambling, etc. However, little consideration has been given to using moral philosophies to predict environmentally (un)friendly attitudes and behaviours, which could also be classified as moral. In this study, we have assessed the impact of idealism and relativism using the Ethics Position Theory. We have tested its capacity to predict moral identity, moral judgement of social vs. environmental issues, and self-reported pro-environmental behaviours. The results from an online MTurk study of 432 US participants revealed that idealism had a significant impact on all the tested variables, but the case was different with relativism. Consistently with the findings of previous studies, we found relativism to be a strong predictor of moral identity and moral judgement of social issues. In contrast, relativism only weakly interacted with making moral judgements of environmental issues, and had no effects in predicting pro-environmental behaviours. These findings suggest that Ethics Position Theory could have a strong potential for defining moral differences between environmental attitudes and behaviours, capturing the moral drivers of an attitude-behaviour gap, which continuously stands as a barrier in motivating people to become more pro-environmental.
... Ecological messages promote environmental protection based on its direct benefits to nature. In many cases, protecting nature is clearly the primary and most important reason for environmental management, while attempting to reframe arguments for economic co-benefits can make protecting nature appear less important [47]. Moreover, for environmental issues like invasive species management in which there are neither dominant frames nor obvious partisans on each side of the debate to react to those frames, identifying economic co-benefits of environmental management is likely to be less important. ...
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Environmental managers face major challenges related to project implementation and communicating the significance of those projects to the public. Effective communication can mitigate public opposition or increase support for specific projects and increase public and political support for environmental management more generally. In this study, we evaluate which types of benefits or losses environmental managers should communicate and how to frame those attributes to achieve greater public support. To do so, we field a survey experiment that presents the benefits of an invasive species management project, utilizing a two (economic, ecological) by two (gain, loss) factorial design as well as a control message. Ecological messages lead to significantly more support for invasive species management than economic messages, and loss frames are more effective than gain frames. We also find that treatment responses differ across several covariates including political ideology and environmentalism. These results indicate that the public is more concerned with managing invasive species for intrinsic environmental worth than economic benefit and that preventing further environmental degradation is more motivating than promoting additional environmental gains.
... Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions attracts attention of both policy makers and researchers. In past decades, market-based approaches have been considered as the most efficient approaches for gas emissions reduction (Burtraw et al., 2014;Sacchi et al., 2014). Among them, tradable emission permit (TEP), pollution tax, emission trading system (ETS), and cap and trade are worthwhile to mention. ...
Article
Cap-and-trade is regarded as the most effective approach to control and reduce greenhouse gas emission. How to perform the reallocation in a fair way is very critical to control total amount of emissions and improve trade mechanism. It has been proved that data envelopment analysis (DEA) is an effective way for reallocation. The objective of the present paper is to develop a centralized DEA model to reallocate emission permits in the cap and trade system based on countries efficiencies. Presented model considers all decision making units (DMUs) together and improves whole efficiency of them by reducing total emission permit as undesirable outputs. Also, this model determines amount of emitted gases that can be reduced without reducing other outputs. To demonstrate the applicability of model, a case study is presented. Sensitivity analysis is carried out to investigate the impact of the some parameters on the results.
... In addition to these variables, a key dimension that could predict utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas relates to the individual differences on deontology. People with a strong deontological orientation endorse the existence of moral obligations requiring or prohibiting certain actions regardless of their consequences (Baron & Spranca, 1997;Sacchi, Riva, Brambilla, & Grasso, 2014). Standing with categorical imperatives (Kant, 1785(Kant, /1959 should imply lower support for utilitarian-consistent solutions. ...
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Multiple cortical networks intervene in moral judgment, among which the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the medial prefrontal structures (medial PFC) emerged as two major territories, which have been traditionally attributed, respectively, to cognitive control and affective reactions. However, some recent theoretical and empirical accounts disputed this dualistic approach to moral evaluation. In the present study, to further assess the functional contribution of the medial PFC in moral judgment, we modulated its cortical excitability by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and tracked the change in response to different types of moral dilemmas, including switch-like and footbridge-like moral dilemmas, with and without personal involvement. One hundred participants (50 males) completed a questionnaire to assess the baseline levels of deontology. Next, participants were randomly assigned to receive anodal, sham, or cathodal tDCS over the medial prefrontal structures and then were asked to address a series of dilemmas. The results showed that participants who received anodal stimulation over the medial PFC provided more utilitarian responses to switch-like (but not footbridge-like) dilemmas than those who received cathodal tDCS. We also found that neurostimulation modulated the influence that deontology has on moral choices. Specifically, in the anodal tDCS group, participants’ decisions were less likely to be influenced by their baseline levels of deontology compared with the sham or cathodal groups. Overall, our results seem to refute a functional role of the medial prefrontal structures purely restricted to affective reactions for moral dilemmas, providing new insights on the functional contribution of the medial PFC in moral judgment.
... When Dickinson, McLeod, Bloomfield, and Allred (2016) used moral foundations theory as a framework for examining the relevance of moral judgments to willingness to take personal action on climate change, they found that the value of fairness was a significant predictor. Relatedly, Sacchi, Riva, Brambilla and Grasso (2014) found that moral framework toward the environment affected respondents' attitudes toward a cap-and-trade policy. ...
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Effectively addressing environmental challenges such as climate change will require adopting policy measures that have some impact on collective human behavior. The present research examined attitudes toward different environmental policies, specifically focusing on the role of perceived justice. Justice was measured in two ways: as an assessment of the fairness of a particular policy and as a general tendency to endorse statements related to environmental justice. Because justice judgments can be context specific, policies were presented in four conditions, in a 2 × 2 design manipulating the type of impact described, ecological or societal, and the level of focus, individual or collective. The roles of political ideology and environmentalism were also investigated. Results from an online sample of 162 US residents showed that non-coercive policies, overall, were rated as more acceptable. Environmental justice statements were strongly endorsed, and justice in both its specific and general forms was a determinant of policy acceptance. In particular, ratings of the fairness of specific policies were a stronger determinant of acceptability than perceived effectiveness of the policy. Type of impact had little effect, but policies tended to be rated as more acceptable when they were framed in terms of the collective rather than the individual. Although a liberal ideology was associated with acceptance of environmental policies in general and with endorsement of environmental justice, controlling for endorsement of environmental justice eliminated the effect of political ideology in most, but not all, cases. Implications for policy support are discussed.
... Nowadays, these are pressing questions. Moral psychologists have recently begun to study people's moral reasoning about ecological issues in adults (e.g., Clayton, 1998;Kaiser, Ranney, Hartig, & Bowler, 1999;Karpiak & Baril, 2008;Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001;Sacchi, Riva, Brambilla, & Grasso, 2014;Schultz & Zelezny, 1999;Thompson & Barton, 1994) as well as in children (e.g., Corraliza, Collado, & Bethelmy, 2013;Howe, Kahn, & Friedman, 1996;Hussar & Horvath, 2011;Kahn, 1997;Kahn & Friedman, 1995;Kahn & Lourenco, 2002;Kahn, Severson, & Ruckert, 2009;Kellert, 1985; see also Collado, Evans, Corraliza, & Sorrel, 2015). Overall, the studies revealed that even 6-year-olds value the relationship with the natural environment and consider environmental harm a moral violation. ...
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For the first time, we assessed 5-year-old children's choices between two different ways of extending ethics to natural entities: the anthropocentric and the biocentric views. For the former, nature has to be preserved because it helps humans' interests, for the latter it has to be preserved because of its intrinsic value. Children evaluated the moral rightness or wrongness of a decision taken by an agent acting with either a biocentric or an anthropocentric intention. Children were also asked whether the agent deserved a reward or a punishment for having caused, as a side-effect of his actions, a damage or an improvement of the environment. Preschoolers judged the agent who caused accidentally an ecological benefit more worthy of a reward when he had a biocentric intention than when he had an anthropocentric intention. This suggests an early emerging sensitivity to the biocentric view.
... The results echo findings related to a common moral dilemma used in moral psychology that asks whether a participant would pull a lever to avert a train and save multiple people but kill one person (e.g., Sacchi et al. 2014). In this scenario, people are usually utilitarian, optimizing the number of lives saved. ...
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Despite increasing support for conservation efforts, humans exert strong negative forces on nature and disagree over management of these effects. Conflicts over conservation policy may reflect evolving opinions about how people ought to conserve species and whether to intervene in various processes. To understand public preferences for conservation in the United States, we measured support for various strategies in five case studies, where we pit one species against another in simplified but realistic scenarios. Among our online convenience sample of 1,040 participants, we find the majority of participants favor habitat protection in all but one case and little acceptance of lethal control across all cases. Results reveal habitat protection preferences positively relate to considerations of moral principles and ecosystems and negatively to economic and practical considerations. Older, conservative, and male participants were less likely to support habitat protection and more likely to support no action. Results suggest broad support for holistic nature conservation that benefits both people and nature and highlight areas where current wildlife management may not align with public preferences. Controversy may continue until wildlife management policies are consistent with societal values and address moral and ecosystem considerations at multiple levels.
... By operating within a restrictively consequentialist ethical framework, new conservation has become detached from common moral reasoning and decision-making, to the extent that it may risk alienating those it seeks to attract. An increasing body of work demonstrates that, at least in certain scenarios, humans actually appeal to consequentialist, deontological, and even other ethical frameworks when they form moral judgments (Lombrozo 2009;Tanner 2009;Gore et al. 2011;Sacchi et al. 2014). Here we focus only on deontology and consequentialism because we believe ongoing tensions in the conservation community have resulted, at least in part, from the interplay between these two particular ethical frameworks (we will return to this discussion below). ...
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After several years of intense debate surrounding so-called new conservation, there has been a general trend toward reconciliation among previously dissenting voices in the conservation community, a “more is more” mentality premised upon the belief that a greater diversity of conservation approaches will yield greater conservation benefits. However, there seems good reason to remain uneasy about the new conservation platform. We seek to clarify the reasons behind this lingering unease, which we suspect is shared by others in the conservation community, by re-examining new conservation through an ethical lens. The debates around new conservation have focused predominantly on the outcomes it promises to produce, reasoning by way of a consequentialist ethical framework. We introduce an alternative ethical framework, deontology, suggesting it provides novel insights that an exclusively consequentialist perspective fails to appreciate. A deontological ethic is concerned not with effects and outcomes, but with intentions, and whether those intentions align with moral principles and duties. From a deontological perspective, a strategy such as new conservation, which is exclusively focused on outcomes, appears highly suspect, especially when it endorses what is arguably an indefensible ethical orientation, anthropocentrism. We therefore suggest lingering concerns over new conservation are well-founded, and that, at least from a deontological perspective, the conservation community has a moral obligation to act on the express principle that non-human species possess intrinsic value, which should be protected.
... Assessing morals and analyzing their relationship with conservation-relevant behaviors may help predict reactions to policy alternatives (de Groot et al. 2011;de Groot 2014). Better understanding and methodologically robust measurements of how morals affect behavior are needed to benefit HWC management and provide decision makers with additional tools for navigating tradeoffs in decision making (Vucetich & Nelson 2013;Sacchi et al. 2014). Human-wolf conflicts are one of the most ubiquitous and globally distributed HWC. ...
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Despite increasing support for conservation globally, controversy over specific conservation policies persists among diverse stakeholders. Investigating the links between morals in relation to conservation can help increase understanding about why humans support or oppose policy, especially related to human-wildlife conflict or human conflict over wildlife. Assessing the intrinsic value of a living entity beyond its use to humans provides one way for measuring morality of human-nature interactions. Cognitions and emotions can underlay intrinsic value, which may in turn influence behaviors and policy-making that impacts wildlife. Moral dimensions of human-wildlife conflict has mostly gone unconsidered and unmeasured by conservation social scientists; thus policy and programmatic efforts to reduce controversy may be missing a key part of the equation. We conducted a web-based survey (n = 1239) of Michigan wolf stakeholders to investigate cognitive and emotional influences on the value-behavior relationship. Analyses revealed intrinsic value for wolves was linked to wolf-related human behavior vis a vis emotions favoring wolves and cognitions that hunting and trapping wolves is unacceptable. Most respondents attributed intrinsic value to wolves, all life and engaged in behaviors to benefit wolf populations and ecosystems regardless of stakeholder group (e.g., environmentalist, farmer). Despite similarities in intrinsic values, groups differed in emotions and cognitions about wolf hunting, providing useful ways to predict stakeholder behavior. Our findings may inform interventions aimed at increasing policy support and positive interactions among stakeholders and wildlife. Leveraging agreement over intrinsic value may foster cooperation among stakeholders and garner support for controversial conservation policy. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... Finally, it should be noted that perceived environmental effectiveness is not always associated with policy support. People's ethical concerns, here in particular a deontological orientation, can cause public resistance to certain policies such as a cap-and-trade programme, despite its perceived benefits (Sacchi, Riva, Brambilla, & Grasso, 2014). ...
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The lack of broad public support prevents the implementation of effective climate policies. This article aims to examine why citizens support or reject climate policies. For this purpose, we provide a cross-disciplinary overview of empirical and experimental research on public attitudes and preferences that has emerged in the last few years. The various factors influencing policy support are divided into three general categories: (1) social-psychological factors and climate change perception, such as the positive influences of left-wing political orientation, egalitarian worldviews, environmental and self-transcendent values, climate change knowledge, risk perception, or emotions like interest and hope; (2) the perception of climate policy and its design, which includes, among others, the preference of pull over push measures, the positive role of perceived policy effectiveness, the level of policy costs, as well as the positive effect of perceived policy fairness and the recycling of potential policy revenues; (3) contextual factors, such as the positive influence of social trust, norms and participation, wider economic, political and geographical aspects, or the different effects of specific media events and communications. Finally, we discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research. Policy relevance Public opinion is a significant determinant of policy change in democratic countries. Policy makers may be reluctant to implement climate policies if they expect public opposition. This article seeks to provide a better understanding of the various factors influencing public responses to climate policy proposals. Most of the studied factors include perceptions about climate change, policy and its attributes, all of which are amenable to intervention. The acquired insights can thus assist in improving policy design and communication with the overarching objective to garner more public support for effective climate policy.
... Norm shifts can occur via intuitive pathways; simply observing that others do not always flush may result in behavior change toward new habits that favor water conservation over consumption (Gregory & Di Leo, 2003). Research on moral reasoning suggests additional ways in which social norms might be changed over time (Paxton & Greene, 2010;Sacchi, Riva, Brambilla, & Grasso, 2014). A discussion with a respected friend can cause an individual to reason through the moral implications of their actions and encourage pro-social and pro-environmental behaviors (Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & Solaimani, 2001;Stern, 2000;Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). ...
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Establishing a framework for carbon management in the European Union and aligning this with climate policy relies on collaboration between diverse actors and coordination between diverse goals. The European Industrial Carbon Management Strategy, a policy that sets ambitions for carbon capture, carbon utilization, carbon storage and carbon removals, was published in February 2024. The strategy underwent a public consultation during the summer of 2023. The consultation offered valuable insights on how the key stakeholders view the governance challenges. This study analyses the consultation submissions and how the stakeholders perceive carbon management challenges and solutions. All submissions (n = 205) to the call for evidence were synthesized using qualitative system dynamics modelling. The analysis resulted in the identification of two dominant approaches to carbon management, a market-driven and a society-driven approach, debated by the stakeholders. These two approaches have an inherent tension between them. The market-driven approach favours minimal regulation and relies on competition and economic incentives as key drivers for carbon management. In contrast, the society-driven approach advocates for strict regulation and active government intervention to ensure technology aligns with broader climate mitigation goals. The European industrial carbon management faces strong advocacy for a market-driven approach. However, due to the interconnections between decarbonization goals, inherent contradictions, and the collaborative nature of the challenge, a solely market-driven approach may not result in the desired acceleration.
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With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics – mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too – moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even ab- surd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. Examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. In all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and pol- icy. One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, in- cluding those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.
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Converging evidence from the behavioural and brain sciences suggests that the human moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify climate change — a complex, large-scale and unintentionally caused phenomenon — as an important moral imperative. As climate change fails to generate strong moral intuitions, it does not motivate an urgent need for action in the way that other moral imperatives do. We review six reasons why climate change poses significant challenges to our moral judgement system and describe six strategies that communicators might use to confront these challenges. Enhancing moral intuitions about climate change may motivate greater support for ameliorative actions and policies.
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This study explored whether personal identity concerns relate in important ways to how people decide whether an event is fair or unfair. Because moral mandates are selective expressions of values that are central to people’s sense of personal identity, people should be highly motivated to protect these positions from possible threat. Consistent with predictions based on a value protection model of justice, whether people had a moral mandate on abortion, civil rights, or immigration was completely independent of the perceived procedural fairness of political institutions when those institutions posed no salient threat to these policy concerns. However, strength of moral mandate, and not prethreat judgments of procedural fairness of the Supreme Court or a state referendum, predicted perceived procedural fairness, outcome fairness, decision acceptance, and other indices of moral outrage when either the Supreme Court or a state referendum posed a possible threat to perceivers’ moral mandates.
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This article suggests that three widely shared commonsense principles of fairness or equity converge upon the same general answer to the question of how the costs of dealing with a global environmental challenge like climate change could be distributed internationally. The first of these principles is that when a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others by imposing costs upon them without their consent, those who have been unilaterally put at a disadvantage are entitled to demand that in the future the offending party shoulder burdens that are unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously taken, in order to restore equality. The second is that, among a number of parties, all of whom are bound to contribute to some common endeavour, the parties who have the most resources normally should contribute the most to the endeavour. The third commonsense principle is that, when a) some people have less than enough for a decent human life, b) other people have more than enough, and c) the total resources available are so great that everyone could have at least enough without preventing some people from still retaining considerably more than others have, it is unfair not to guarantee everyone at least an adequate minimum.
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This article seeks to answer why North—South climate negotiations have gone on for decades without producing any substantial results. To address this question, we revisit and seek to integrate insights from several disparate theories, including structuralism (new and old), world systems theory, rational choice institutionalism, and social constructivism. We argue that the lack of convergence on climate grew almost inevitably from our starkly unequal world, which has created and perpetuated highly divergent ways of thinking (worldviews and causal beliefs) and promoted particularistic notions of fairness (principled beliefs). We attempt to integrate structural insights about global inequality with the micro-motives of rational choice institutionalism. The structuralist insight that ‘unchecked inequality undermines cooperation’ suggests climate negotiations must be broadened to include a range of seemingly unrelated development issues such as trade, investment, debt, and intellectual property rights agreements. We conclude by reviewing the work of some ‘norm entrepreneurs’ bringing justice issues into climate negotiations and explore how these insights might influence ‘burden sharing’ discussions in the post-Kyoto world, where development is constrained by climate change.
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Research on environmental-decision making is usually based on utilitarian models, which imply that people's decisions are only influenced by the outcomes. This research provides evidence for values and moral positions that reflect nonconsequentialist rather than consequentialist views. In doing this, this article refers to “sacred values,” which are values that are seen as not-substitutable and nontradable. Two studies were designed to examine evidence for sacred values and their role on act versus omission choices within the environmental domain. The studies revealed that sacred values were closely associated with preferences for actions, trade-off reluctance, deontological focus, and position of moral universalism. The results suggest that it is important to account for sacred values and nonconsequentialist views in environmental decision-making research.
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There has been a recent upsurge of research on moral judgment and decision making. One important issue with this body of work concerns the relative advantages of calculating costs and benefits versus adherence to moral rules. The general tenor of recent research suggests that adherence to moral rules is associated with systematic biases and that systematic cost-benefit analysis is a normatively superior decision strategy. This article queries both the merits of cost-benefit analyses and the shortcomings of moral rules. We argue that outside the very narrow domain in which consequences can be unambiguously anticipated, it is not at all clear that calculation processes optimize outcomes. In addition, there are good reasons to believe that following moral rules can lead to superior consequences in certain contexts. More generally, different modes of decision making can be seen as adaptations to particular environments. © The Author(s) 2010.
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The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
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Is morally motivated decision making different from other kinds of decision making? There is evidence that when people have sacred or protected values (PVs), they reject trade-offs for secular values (e.g., "You can't put a price on a human life") and tend to employ deontological rather than consequentialist decision principles. People motivated by PVs appear to show quantity insensitivity. That is, in trade-off situations, they are less sensitive to the consequences of their choices than are people without PVs. The current study examined the relation between PVs and quantity insensitivity using two methods of preference assessment: In one design, previous results were replicated; in a second, PVs were related to increased quantity sensitivity. These and other findings call into question important presumed properties of PVs, suggesting that how PVs affect willingness to make trade-offs depends on where attention is focused, a factor that varies substantially across contexts.
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Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.
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Protected values are those that resist trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values. We propose that such values arise from deontological rules concerning action. People are concerned about their participation in transactions rather than just with the consequences that result. This proposal implies that protected values, defined as those that display trade-off resistance, will also tend to display quantity insensitivity, agent relativity, and moral obligation. People will also tend to experience anger at the thought of making trade-offs, and to engage in denial of the need for trade-offs through wishful thinking. These five properties were correlated with tradeoff resistance (across different values, within subjects) in five studies in which subjects answered several questions about each of several values, or in which they indicated their willingness to pay to prevent some harmful action. These correlations were found even when the subjects could not tell the experimenters which values they were responding to, so they cannot be ascribed entirely to subjects' desire to express commitment. We discuss implications for value measurement and public policy.
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