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Discusiones Filosócas. Año 12 Nº 19, julio – diciembre, 2011. pp. 99 - 111
resumen
En un excelente artículo que describe la
estructura lógica de la Guía de perplejos de
Maimónides, y sus argumentos confusos sobre
la existencia de Dios, William Lane Craig
(1988 122-147) concluye que la mayor parte del
impacto de la Guía, se basa precisamente en su
riguroso método de deducción. Tal vez, y bajo el
punto de vista de Craig, esta es una de las cosas
que hacen a Maimónides, un modelo para otros
intentos de conciliación entre la teología y la
losofía. Sin embargo, a pesar de su cuidadoso
análisis, hay una idea que Craig menciona y deja
sin un desarrollo profundo, a saber, que una
cierta noción de eternidad del tiempo subyace
en el esquema argumentativo de Maimónides.
Tratando de ir más allá de los ejemplos
ofrecidos por Craig en su artículo, mi método
para encontrar una solución definitiva a la
cuestión se divide en tres pasos. El primero
es una reconstrucción de las declaraciones de
Craig, y su interpretación como material de
apoyo para su conclusión. A continuación, se
presentan tres puntos de vista alternativos sobre
las creencias de Maimónides de la creación del
mundo, un tema estrechamente vinculado a su
idea de tiempo. Finalmente, utilizaré el material
de las dos secciones anteriores para desarrollar
una respuesta a mi pregunta.
palabras claVe
Craig, tiempo eterno, Dios, Guía de perplejos,
Maimónides, tiempo.
abstract
In an excellent article that traces the logical
structure of Maimonides’ Guide of the perplexed
and his arguments on the existence of God,
William Lane Craig (1988 122-147), concludes
that most of the Guide’s impact rests precisely
on its rigorous method of deduction. Perhaps, in
Craig’s view, this is one of the things that makes
Maimonides a model for further conciliating
attempts between theology and philosophy.
However, despite his careful analysis, there
is one idea that Craig mentions and leaves
undeveloped, namely, that a certain notion
of eternity of time underlies Maimonides’
argumentative scheme.
Trying to go beyond the examples Craig offered
in his article, my method toward a nal solution
to the question is divided in three steps. The rst
one is a reconstruction of Craig’s statements and
its interpretation as supporting material for his
conclusion. Then, I present three alternative
views about Maimonides’ beliefs on the creation
of the world, an issue strongly attached to his
idea of time. Finally, I use the material of the
two former sections to support an answer to
my question.
Key worDs
Craig, eternal time, God, Guide of the perplexed,
Maimonides, time.
eternal time, eternal secret: the thesis oF the
eternity oF time in maimoniDes’
guide of the perplexed
tiempo eterno, eterno seCreto: la tesis de la eternidad del tiempo
en la guía De perplejos de maimónides
EDGAR ESLAVA
Universidad del Bosque, Colombia. disculo@ucaldas.edu.co
RECIbIDO EL 22 DE AGOSTO DE 2011 y APRObADO EL 28 DE NOVIEmbRE DE 2011
Edgar Eslava
100 Discusiones Filosócas. Año 12 Nº 19, julio – diciembre, 2011. pp. 99 - 111
Introduction
In an excellent article that traces the logical structure of Maimonides’
Guide of the perplexed arguments on the existence of God, William Lane
Craig (1988 122-147), concludes that most of the Guide’s impact rests
precisely on its rigorous method of deduction. Perhaps, in Craig’s
view, this is one of the things that make Maimonides a model for
further conciliating attempts between theology and philosophy. In the
meantime, Craig studies in detail each one of the premises and the way
they are organized to form a solid deductive system. However, despite
his careful analysis, there is one idea Craig mentions and leaves it
without deep development, namely, that a certain notion of eternity of
time underlies Maimonides’ argumentative scheme. Indeed, that notion
is supposed to hold some of Maimonides’ major premises on some of
his proofs of God’s existence.
Craig has dropped the bait and I have bit it. In fact, the aim of this paper
is to answer the question: Is Craig’s conclusion necessary, i.e., does it
follows from the analysis of the Guide that Maimonides was holding
the eternity of time as an undoubtedly truth? Trying to go beyond the
examples Craig offered in his article, my method toward a nal solution
to the question is divided in three steps. The rst one is a reconstruction
of Craig’s statements and its interpretation as supporting material for his
conclusion. Then, I present three alternative views about Maimonides’
beliefs on the creation of the world; an issue strongly attached to his
idea of time. Finally, I use the material of the two former sections to
establish an answer to my question.
The thesis of eternal time
As said before, Craig examines in detail each one of Maimonides’ four
proofs of the existence of God, showing in every case the deductive
pattern. Among then, the rst and third ones are especially interesting
for us, given that they are from which the necessity of time to be eternal
is obtained1. Craig synthesizes the rst proof in 12 consecutive steps as
follows:
1 It would be necessary to remind that the in stating the proofs Maimonides uses the twenty-ve
propositions he considers the philosophers have proven as true. A nal one the twenty-sixth that
refers to the eternity of the world is not accepted as proven by Maimonides. That disagreement is
the base for some of the interpretations we will see in the next section.
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1. There must be a cause for the motion or change of transient things
in the sublunary world.
2. There must be a cause of the motion of the cause.
3. This causal series of motion cannot be innite and will cease at the
rst heavenly sphere, which is the source of the sublunary motion.
4. There must be a cause for the motion of this sphere.
5. This cause may reside without the sphere or within it.
6. If it resides without the sphere it may be corporeal or incorporeal.
7. If it resides within the sphere, it may be extended throughout the
sphere and be divisible, or it may be an indivisible force.
8. Therefore, the cause for the motion of this sphere must be a corporeal
object without the sphere, an incorporeal object separated from
the sphere, a divisible force extended throughout the sphere, or an
indivisible force within the sphere.
9. It cannot be a corporeal object without the sphere.
10. It cannot be a divisible force extended through the sphere.
11. It cannot be an indivisible force within the sphere.
12. Therefore, the cause for the motion of the sphere must be an
incorporeal object separated from the sphere, or God2. (124-125)
According to Craig, this proof requires the notion of the eternity of the
universe, although he offers no argument supporting this statement. As
far as I see, Craig’s idea develops from the analysis of Maimonides’ sixth
step, the one that states the impossibility for a divisible force extended
through the sphere to be the cause of its motion. Here there are the
middle stages that hold the premise:
a. The sphere must be nite. (For no actual innite can exist).
b. Therefore, the force it contains must be nite.
c. And a nite force cannot cause eternal motion.
d. But motion is eternal, according to the hypothesis.
e. Therefore, a divisible force extended throughout the sphere cannot
be the ultimate cause of the motion of the sphere. (130)
It is easy to see that stage d. appeals to the twenty-sixth proposition of
the philosophers, the one Maimonides does not accept as proven. Then,
he is using the hypothesis conveniently and leaving aside the problem
of its truth, admitting it just for the sake of argument. Craig’s point here
2 I have omitted some intermediate deductions that support some of the steps. Not being the
exhaustive analysis of Craig's outlines my principal interest I will only use those deductions if
they are necessary to understand the thesis of eternity of time.
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102 Discusiones Filosócas. Año 12 Nº 19, julio – diciembre, 2011. pp. 99 - 111
could be that the hypothesis about the eternity of motion implies the
one about the innity of time, once realized that motion is dened as
change through time. If both Craig’s argument and my interpretation
are right, it would follow that Maimonides is simply holding Aristotle’s
notion of eternity of the world, something that, as we will see, would
not be as simple as it seems at a rst glance, and that is far from having
been proven.
The conclusion obtained from the third proof is clearer. The proof’s
outline is this:
1. Many things exist.
2. There are three alternatives concerning the existence of these things:
all things are eternal, no things are eternal, or some things are eternal.
3. It is impossible that all things are eternal.
4. It is impossible that no things are eternal.
5. Therefore, some things are eternal.
6. This thing is eternal on its own account or on account of an external
cause.
7. If this thing is eternal on account of some external cause, then this
thing is contingent in itself, though eternal on account of its cause.
8. The eternal cause is therefore the absolutely necessary being. (137-
138)
The interesting premise here is number four, in which the impossibility
of any eternal thing is denied. These are the intermediate stages that
lead to that conclusion:
a. If nothing were eternal, then it is possible that all things could cease
to exist.
b. What is said to be possible of a whole class of things must eventually
actually happen, given sufcient time.
c. Therefore, everything would cease to exist.
i. Given innite past time, all possibilities would have to be actualized.
ii. The existence of nothing is a possibility.
iii. Therefore, the possibility of existence of nothing would have to have
been actualized.
d. But nothing would exist now.
e. And this is absurd. (137-138)
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In this case it is completely clear that the whole premise rest on the idea
of eternal time. Without such a time the condition for all the possibilities
having been actualized (c.i.) would not be fullled and, then, the
necessity for everything to cease to exist would not follow, making the
nal conclusion lacking support. Again, this is nothing more than the
argument Aristotle presents in his Metaphysics, which holds that every
potentiality will realize its actuality.
Form Craig’s presentation is seems obvious that Maimonides’ arguments
rest on Aristotelian ground, and, it could be concluded, the compromise
with the philosopher implies adherence to his method and results. Then,
the answer to the question of the adherence to the thesis of time’s eternity
seems to be quite trivial. But as we are going to see soon, the equation of
Maimonides with Aristotle will show to be highly problematic if taken
too far, making the all structure of Maimonides’ argument tremble. On
the other hand, if there is a different basis for the conclusions of the
Guide, how does the idea of eternal time t into it? Looking for answers
we are going to move to the arguments on the creation of the world,
a good place for the discussion of Maimonides’ commitment with the
philosophers.
Maimonides’ beliefs on creation
If there is something that the study of the Guide has shown it is that
there is no consensus on what could be Maimonides’ ‘real beliefs’
about the creation of the word. The problem of such beliefs arises
with Maimonides’ introduction to the Guide. There, he states that the
knowledge of the secrets of the scriptures is only possible for special
people, those that can actually grasp the meaning of the Law being
able to read the truth between the lines. If such a demanding reading
is necessary to understand the scriptures, it has been said, it is possible
that the same kind of task must be performed in order to understand
what Maimonides says in the Guide.
In the opinion of a large group of medieval scholars, that is the only way
by which Maimonides’ personal opinions on the topics the Guide deals
with could be understood. Such group of exegetes paid close attention
to the structure of the arguments and the contradictions among them to
unveil Maimonides’ beliefs. One of the more sound voices among the
proponents of such a reading of the Guide is undoubtedly Leo Strauss.
According to him, contradictions are the guide to trace Maimonides’
real beliefs trough the Guide.
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Maimonides teaches the truth not plainly, but secretly; i.e.,
he reveals the truth to those taught men who are able to
understand by themselves and at the same time he hides it
from the vulgar. There probably is not better way of hiding
the truth than contradict it. Consequently, Maimonides
makes contradictory statements about all important
subjects; he reveals the truth by stating it, and hides it by
contradicting it. (Strauss 1988)
Among the important subjects involving contradictions there is one
particularly signicant, his discussion about the creation of the world.
After having followed Aristotle’s method for demonstrating God’s
being, his incorporeal nature and his unity, and concluding that the
demonstrations are in accordance with the Law, Maimonides recognizes
that there is something problematic in the basis of the system. The whole
argument build by Aristotle is based on the premise of the eternity of the
world and the innity of time. Aristotle had pointed out the existence
of two different kinds of bodies, on one side there are sublunary bodies
characterized for being generable and corruptible, while on the other
side there are the heavenly ones, not suffering at all from generation
and corruption. However, despite of its generability and corruptibility,
sublunary world share with the heavens one important feature, eternity.
Nevertheless, while the eternity of the latter consists of its unchanging
nature, the eternity of the former rest on the continuity of the change,
of the process of generation and corruption.
Nobody in the world originates in time, nor does a body
perish; it is only the forms and accidents that originate in
time. Bodies are either the heavens, or they are eternal,
or they are the four elements, which are the stuff of the
sublunar part of the world; but, as for these four elements,
their bodies and matters are also eternal, and it is only the
forms that are continuously changed upon them as a result
of mixtures and alterations… The series of the causes of all
this things which originate in time terminate in the circular
notion, which circular motion is eternal. (Al-Ghazali 154)
The problem that Maimonides is facing here is that this notion of an
eternal world in time is an open contradiction with the idea of God’s
creation of the world, the standpoint of the Law. Then, Maimonides
is trapped in the middle of a big dilemma. On one hand, Maimonides
can reject Aristotle’s arguments and say that what opposes the Law
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105
is simply a mistake, but then he would have to show how is that the
philosopher’s conclusions about sublunary world physics went right,
if their foundations were wrong. On the other hand, he would have
to admit that the demonstrations are right, but then he would have
to conciliate their results with the scriptures, that cannot be wrong.
Here, says Strauss is where the contradiction appears. Maimonides
religious commitments force him to reject Aristotle’s notion of eternity
of the world, and then to search for an alternative in accordance with
the Law. The solution Maimonides found is to appeal to the platonic
notion of eternity, one that, among other things, requires the existence
of a God as a causal agent with free will, the perfect explanation for the
miracles described by the scriptures and the notion of a world created
in time. However, Maimonides keeps on holding Aristotle’s physical
explanations of the world. Consequently, the result is that the two
systems of beliefs had been made compatible, or at least complementary
to each other, only by their possible and particular accordance to the
scriptures.
Strauss’ uses this result to make a point about the way in which the
Guide has to be interpreted. In his view, the only way to understand
this abrupt change from one system of explanation to the other is by
recognizing that Maimonides’ public statements about the creation
of the world were different from his genuine beliefs. Indeed, those
presumably genuine beliefs are Aristotelian, even if this means that
the highly conictive notion of the eternity of the world is part of them.
Then the nal conclusions of the Guide, the entire Guide itself, offered as
a “Jewish correction” of the philosophers’ points of view (Strauss 1977),
just show what was supposed to be showed, that the scriptures are right
with respect to God’s existence and the nature of his creation. At the end,
contradictions are both the clues for understanding the Guide and some
sort of smoke curtain to veil the true beliefs to the undesired readers.
Keeping the same interpretative track, but going one step beyond
Strauss, E. Fackenheim has shown that Maimonides’ true belief is
that the world, instead of being eternally existent as Strauss claims,
was created ex nihilo. On Fackenheim’s perspective, being committed
with a systematic analysis of the text from the scriptures, Maimonides
decided to adopt the method of the philosophers, using demonstrative
deductions in order to get true conclusions. This method is helpful
with two different tasks. First, it helps Maimonides to nd mistakes,
misunderstandings and misinterpretations in the scriptures, things that
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106 Discusiones Filosócas. Año 12 Nº 19, julio – diciembre, 2011. pp. 99 - 111
have confused readers in the past. Second, it provides Maimonides
with an excellent tool for criticizing philosopher’s approaches to the
scriptures. After having unveiled successfully the most notorious
problems with the way scriptures has been understood, Maimonides
goes to the arguments of the philosophers about the existence of God
and the creation of the world.
Fackenheim’s conclusions go in the same direction as Strauss’ ones do,
although between them there are big differences. As Strauss, Fackenheim
found that Maimonides view of the philosopher method is very
supportive for their method and results in the realm of the sublunary
world, but nding both methods and results mistaken when applied
to the heavens. Indeed, there are two major mistakes in philosopher’s
approach to the supra-lunar world, one of them implicating their
method, and the other the context of application of their results. With
respect to the method, Maimonides declares that philosopher’s statement
of the necessary character of the world’s being and world’s nature must
be disregarded because when proving the absolute character of the
physical laws of the world they presuppose its point instead of proving
it. They try to “derive from the nature of things which actually exist
what is absolutely possible, impossible and necessary” (1977 303-334),
something that “presupposes the absolute metaphysical validity of the
laws by which these things are governed” (Ibid.).
What Maimonides rejects when doing so with the method of the
philosophers are the (Neoplatonic) notions of eternal and necessary
existence of the prime matter from which the world was created, and
the (Aristotelian) impossibility of an absolute origin of the world at a
particular point of time. And here he is in the eld of the second of the
mistakes, the philosopher’s attempt to use what they had proved about
the actual world to the world in the moment of its creation. Even if the
laws that the philosophers found for the actual world are right, and this
has been proved to be true, is does not imply that those laws have any
absolute or necessary character. Indeed, Fackenheim concludes that
Maimonides does what neither the Falasifah nor the
Mutakallimun had been able to do: he distinguishes sharply
between the modifications of actual existence and the
absolute origin of existence… [He] arrives at a real possibility
possessed by the universe as a whole without denying, or
conicting with, the philosophical views concerning natural
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law… There is natural necessity in the universe: sublunary
beings follow as a necessary consequence if their causes are
fully given; immaterial beings exist with natural necessity,
lacking the natural potency for change or destruction. But
the universe as a whole is in a profounder sense possible, a
possibility shared by all crated beings alike. (338)
This notion of the world been possible “as a whole” has a major role
in the debate about the innite character of time in the Guide, once
Maimonides’ use of the term ‘possibility’ implies temporal disposition.
In his own words,
A thing can be possible only with reference to the future,
before one of the alternatives is realized; when such a
realization takes place, the possibility is removed. (331)
Then, we can conclude from Fackenheim’s perspective that the very
possibility for the existence of the world, for the world be created, rests
on the prior assumption that there was a moment, a concrete instant in
time, in which God decided to create it. Before that moment nothing
existed at all, and after that moment the world ‘as a whole’ began to
exist. This ex nihilo creation was then, Fackenheim would say, the ‘real’
belief under Maimonides words.
There is still a third perspective to take into account. Like the former
two, it makes use of the contradictions as a ashlight to illuminate
Maimonides’ real beliefs. Indeed, according to Herbert Davidson
(1979), the logic of contradictions could be seen as the way Maimonides
selected to show his own thought, but the method is only accessible to
those who can decode the clues given by Maimonides all trough the
Guide3. Particularly important, says Davidson, are the theses on creation
and prophecy: after having proved the existence of God, Maimonides
declares there are three possible positions on the question of the
creation of the world, positions Davidson names Scriptural, Platonic
and Aristotelian. The Scriptural perspective states that, in accordance
with the texts of the Law, the world was created from the absolute
nothingness; it was an ex nihilo miracle only possible because of God’s
will. On the other hand, the perspective that holds, following Plato, the
world to be at a time both created and eternal, i.e. given form out of an
3 Despite the fact he uses them as a tool for his interpretation of the Guide, Davidson declares
himself not being ‘completely sure’ that they are the keys to grasp Maimonides’ genuine views.
See Davidson, H. “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation” op. cit. 21.
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108 Discusiones Filosócas. Año 12 Nº 19, julio – diciembre, 2011. pp. 99 - 111
eternal matter. Finally, there is the claim of Aristotle and his followers
that nothing material can be created out of something immaterial, and
then, that the world must be eternal, being the causal relation between
the world and its rst cause both eternal and necessary. Among these
three alternatives, it is obvious that Maimonides defended openly the
ex nihilo ‘scriptural’ position. In fact, Davidson states in the very same
way Strauss did, the main sense of the Guide is to make clear the truth
that stands, although sometimes hidden, in the sacred texts. But, again in
the same line that Strauss draws, there is a contradiction in Maimonides’
defense of his arguments towards the demonstration of the world been
created ex nihilo. Davidson points out that, while at the beginning of
his discussion about the creation of the world Maimonides treated
Aristotle’s and Plato’s positions on creation as equivalent, at the end
he concludes that from a theological perspective Plato’s view is closer
to the scriptures than Aristotle’s. With this result in his hand, Davidson
proceeded both to criticize conclusions like Strauss’ one, and formulate
his own conclusion.
The logic of the contradictions in the Guide requires that in
each pair of contradictory propositions, one proposition be
deemed correct and the other, incorrect. Since the eternity
of the world is nowise involved in the contradiction under
consideration, the conclusion to be drawn cannot be that
Maimonides secretly embraced the eternity of the world.
The contradiction concerns the doctrine of creation from a
preexistent matter, one proposition branding the doctrine
as theologically unacceptable, the other acknowledging
its acceptability. Maimonides would have no motive for
hiding the former proposition. Therefore the contradiction,
if deliberated, could only indicate that Maimonides secretly
subscribed to, or secretly countenanced, creation from
a preexistent matter; and in order not to shock sensitive
readers, he publicly embraced the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo. (22)
Additional support for this thesis is found in the interpretation
that Davidson makes of Maimonides’ classication of the positions
on prophecy. After nding that Maimonides also divides in three
positions on prophecy, namely, the one of the ignoramuses, the one
of the philosophers, and the position of the Law, Davidson traces a
correspondence between them and the former positions on creation.
Ignoramuses’ assertion that prophecy is a gift offered by God to whom
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109
he pleases, without any special preparation required for the receiver,
is compared with Scriptures’ claim of creation ex nihilo. Philosopher’s
notion of prophecy as a natural and necessarily result of a life devoted
to special preparation is equated with Aristotle’s creation for natural
necessity. Finally the position of the Law, stating that prophecy is the
result of God’s will action on prepared people is identied with Plato’s
view of creation as the action of a free will on preexistent eternal matter.
Again Guided by the logic of contradiction, Davidson identies a new
contradiction here. This time the problem is, while Philosopher’s position
and Aristotle’s views match perfectly, it seems to be an inadequacy with
the other pair of perspectives. Indeed, Davidson shows that the matching
is inverted, what Maimonides says ignoramuses said is precisely what
the scriptures afrm, and vice versa. The only reason for Maimonides
misplacing of the relations must be, afrms Davidson, an attempt to
distract the reader and making him believe that the thesis to be defended
was the scriptural while Maimonides’ esoteric belief would have to be
the doctrine of creation from a preexistent matter. A conclusion that is
nothing more than a replica of the previous one.
Agreement in the disagreement
What do the theses about Maimonides’ beliefs on creation offer to solve
our original question? Let see it case by case.
According to Strauss, Maimonides holds the eternal existence of the
world, with an open commitment with Aristotle’s physics; although
in the topics beyond this sublunary science Maimonides seem more
inclined for a platonic perspective. Despite the fact that here there is an
explicit contradiction, one that Strauss tries to justify, the result that we
obtain is that this position makes Craig’s thesis hold naturally. Time’s
eternity is necessary and is guaranteed by the teleological system of
actualization of potentialities. Such a thesis implies that in an innite
time all that is potentiality have to be actualized.
For eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things,
and no eternal thing exists potentially. The reason is this.
Every potentiality is at one and the same time a potentiality
for the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of
being present in a subject cannot be present, everything
that is capable of being may be possibly not actual. That,
then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the
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same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being…
Nor can anything which is of necessity be potential; yet
these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing
would exist. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such,
exist potentially; and if there is an eternal mover, it is not
potentially in motion. (Aristotle IX 1050b)
Then, being Maimonides’ statement completely Aristotelian, in this
respect, their thesis on time are also the same, given as a result that the
eternity of time ends being necessary as Craig has stated.
On the other hand, Fackenheim’s statement about Maimonides belief
in creation ex nihilo seems to imply an opposition with the Aristotelian
tradition. However, ex nihilo creation and Aristotle’s physics are not
completely incompatible once one realizes that the expression ex nihilo
is used by Aristotle with the meaning of ‘coming after a thing in time’
(V 1023a), something that implies a temporal order before the world
began to exist. This, of course, would be only possible with a time innite
in the past. Therefore, if we cannot say that it is a clearly guaranteed
conclusion at least it must be recognized that the notion of creation ex
nihilo does not exclude the possibility for the time to be eternal4.
In turn, Davidson states creation from eternal matter to be Maimonides’
‘true’ belief. Such a platonic argument rests on a very different account
from the one of the actualization of potentialities, the central thesis
on Craig’s account of the third proof of God’s existence. To see the
connection between this conception and the thesis of eternity of time it
is necessary to appeal to Maimonides’ description of the platonic point
of view.
They [Plato’s followers] therefore assume that a certain
matter has co-existed with God from eternity in such a
manner that neither God existed without that matter or the
matter without God5. (Wolfson 238)
According to Davidson, Maimonides holds this assumption not to be in
disagreement with the scriptures once realized that by such an eternal
matter they do not mean something of the ‘same order of existence of
4 This idea is used to make a criticism on Davidson's approach by W. Dunphy in his “Maimonides'
Not-So-Secret Position on Creation”. Ormsby, E. Studies in philosophy and the History of philosophy.
Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1989. Print.
5 Maimonides. M. Guide of the Perplexed. The quote is taken from Wolfson, H. “The Platonic,
Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides”.
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God’ but something waiting for being modeled by the Creator. And
under the assumption that it has been waiting forever for becoming
world, then we have the same kind of conclusion that Strauss found
in Maimonides personal combination of Aristotelian physics with
platonic metaphysics. Again, there is no contradiction between the idea
of creation out of eternal matter and the eternity of time.
Then, we arrive at the conclusion that the thesis of eternity of time, if
not necessarily at the very base of the explanatory system of both God’s
existence and the creation of the world, is compatible with all of them.
Besides, we have seen that there is no contradiction between the eternity
of time and any of the current interpretations of Maimonides’ Guide. If
such a conclusion goes against the interpreters or for them, is something
that needs to be explored.
bibliographical reFerences
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Aristotle. Metaphysics. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2008. Online.
Craig, W. L. “Maimonides’ proofs for the existence of God”. J. Bujis.
Maimonides. A collection of critical essays. Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press. 1988. Print.
Davidson, H. “Maimonides’ secret position on creation”. I. Tewrsky
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Fackenheim, E. “The possibility of the universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina,
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Strauss, L. “Farabi’s Plato”. A. Hyman. Essays in medieval Jewish and
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---. “The literary character of the Guide for the perplexed”. J. Bujis.
Maimonides. A collection of critical essays. Indiana: University of Notre
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Wolfson, H. Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion. Cambridge:
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