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Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543
Policy & practice
139
Protecting policy space for public health nutrition in an era of
international investment agreements
Anne Marie Thowa & Benn McGradyb
Introduction
In 2010, the tobacco multinational Philip Morris brought a
claim against Uruguay under an international investment
agreement (IIA) between that country and Switzerland. e
following year, the company brought a claim against Australia
under an IIA between that country and Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region in China. ese claims challenge tobacco
packaging and labelling policies on several grounds, among
them that large graphic health warnings and so-called “plain
packaging” are arbitrary and unreasonable measures, expropri-
ate trademarks and undermine good will indirectly.1,2 Chal-
lenges to public health policies are relatively rare under IIAs.
However, Philip Morris’ claims illustrate how the autonomy of
states to engage in product regulation to protect and promote
public health – outside the sphere of tobacco control – can
be challenged in the context of an IIA. is paper addresses
important questions about domestic regulatory autonomy
and explores the implications of investment law for public
health nutrition policies designed to prevent diet-related
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and curb their enormous
social and economic costs.3 It highlights the neglected role of
public health policy-makers in national decisions pertaining
to investment and investor protection and examines ways to
protect policy space for public health nutrition.
Foreign direct investment and nutrition regulation
As the global epidemic of diet-related NCDs has escalated, it
has become increasingly clear that healthy eating initiatives
based on public education need to be supported by policies
to improve the food environment.3,4 e current “obesogenic”
environment, in which unhealthful foods are heavily marketed,
easily available and oen the cheapest options, makes it dif-
cult for consumers to make healthy choices in response to
information and education. A growing global consensus is
forming around the need for governments to implement pub-
lic health nutrition regulation in the form of food taxes and
subsidies, informative product labelling, marketing restric-
tions and urban planning initiatives targeting processed and
pre-prepared (e.g. “fast”) foods high in salt, sugar, saturated
fats and trans fats.3–7
e above-mentioned interventions apply to the end
products of complex food supply chains, any stage of which
is usually open to investment by international companies
(Fig. 1). Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the entire food
supply chain has increased rapidly during the past 20 years.
Between 1990 and 2009, FDI in the food, beverage and tobacco
sectors of developed countries increased 11-fold; investment
in these sectors in developing economies increased fourfold8
and is projected to continue to rise.9
FDI in the food sector has occurred primarily in the
processed food and beverage industries and in retail outlets,
such as supermarkets and convenience food stores, selling
products associated with the nutrition transition – i.e. products
low in cereal and bre and high in sugars, salt and saturated
and trans fats.10,11 ese foods are the main targets of global
recommendations to reduce consumption. Seven of the top 100
transnational corporations – with combined foreign sales in
excess of 400 billion United States dollars (US$) in 2010 – are
involved in the production and retail sale of processed foods.12
e beverage sector accounts for most of the food-related
FDI originating in the United States of America13 and the
processed food industry is one of the top 10 sectors attracting
FDI in India.14 Of the world’s top 15 franchises, seven have
strong interests in highly processed and “fast” foods.12 In 2011
the combined sales of the top global food service outlets was
Abstract Philip Morris has recently brought claims against Australia (2011) and Uruguay (2010) under international investment agreements
(IIAs). The claims allege that Philip Morris is entitled to compensation following the introduction of innovative tobacco packaging regulations
to reduce smoking and prevent noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). Since tobacco control measures are often viewed as a model for
public health nutrition measures, the claims raise the question of how investment law governs the latter. This paper begins to answer
this question and to explain how governments can proactively protect policy space for public health nutrition in an era of expanding
IIAs. The authors first consider the main interventions proposed to reduce diet-related NCDs and their intersection with investment in the
food supply chain. They then review the nature of investment regimes and relevant case law and examine ways to maximize policy space
for public health nutrition intervention within this legal context. As foreign investment increases across the food-chain and more global
recommendations discouraging the consumption of unhealthful products are issued, investment law will increase in importance as part
of the legal architecture governing the food supply. The implications of investment law for public health nutrition measures depend on
various factors: the measures themselves, the terms of the applicable agreements, the conditions surrounding the foreign investment and
the policies governing agricultural support. This analysis suggests that governments should adopt proactive measures – e.g. the clarification
of terms and reliance on exceptions – to manage investment and protect their regulatory autonomy with respect to public health nutrition.
a Menzies Centre for Health Policy, Victor Coppleson Building, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
b O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, United States of America.
Correspondence to Anne Marie Thow (e-mail: annemarie.thow@sydney.edu.au).
(Submitted: 6 March 2013 – Revised version received: 13 August 2013 – Accepted: 27 August 2013 – Published online: 4 October 2013 )
Policy & practice
Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543
140
Policy & practice
Policy space for public health nutrition Anne Marie Thow & Benn McGrady
around US$ 230 billion dollars.15 us,
the key targets of public health nutrition
interventions are the objects of extensive
– and growing – investment activity.
Concerns have also been raised
that the substantial recent growth in
FDI in agriculture, with direct foreign
ownership of agricultural land be-
ing a common feature,16 could limit
government inuence over the modes
of production of healthful foods.17,18
Investment in agricultural land is now
high. In 2011, the High Level Panel of
Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
reported that international investors had
leased or purchased an estimated 50 to
80 million hectares of land in middle-
and low-income countries, about two
thirds of them in sub-Saharan Africa.16
Global inward FDI in the agriculture
and hunting sectors totalled US$ 3425.9
million in 2010, a drop from a high of
US$ 6379.4 million in 2008 – during the
global food crisis and before the global
economic crisis.19
In some cases a single company in-
vests at multiple points in the food sup-
ply chain. In Brazil, for example, Coca-
Cola has invested in the renement of
cane sugar, the production of beverage
concentrates, the bottling of sugar-
sweetened beverages and refrigeration.
In Ecuador, the company has invested
in the bottling of sugar-sweetened bev-
erages and in advertising companies.19
is type of vertical investment in the
food supply creates eciencies from an
economic point of view but it also gives
a company greater power within a coun-
try’s food supply. It thus increases both
the cumulative eect of policy interven-
tions on a given investor’s interests and
the investor’s motivation and capacity to
contest regulation.
Investor protection and public
health nutrition policy
Governments actively encourage and
compete for FDI, mainly for economic
and political reasons. FDI can create
employment and thus contribute to
human capital development in the host
country. It can also facilitate technology
transfer, promote competition in the
domestic input market and contribute
to the host country’s corporate tax rev-
enues.20–22 Governments oer a range of
incentives to attract FDI, including tax
holidays, land grants and other forms of
subsidies, and legal protections beyond
those oered to domestic investors.
e opening of the market in Myan-
mar provides a contemporary example
of benets oered to foreign investors
that are likely to have direct eects on
consumption patterns and may reduce
public health policy space. In 2012, a
new foreign investment law came into
force. It set out several types of tax
incentives available to foreign inves-
tors: (i) ve-year income tax holidays;
(ii) accelerated depreciation for capital
assets; (iii) exemptions from duty on
machinery and production inputs;
and (iv) income tax exemptions for
prots reinvested in Myanmar.23 ese
incentives lower production costs for
investors such as Coca-Cola, which
recently announced its plans to invest
directly in Myanmar and begin bottling
in the country to target the domestic
market.24 If the lower costs of produc-
tion are passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices, the demand for
Coca-Cola products in Myanmar will
probably increase under the law of sup-
ply and demand.
Governments encourage invest-
ment in the food sector not just in
competing for FDI, but also to improve
food security, since FDI is perceived as
conducive to improved food production
and processing technologies and more ef-
cient and reliable food supply chains.17
Governments promote investment in
agricultural production through various
types of subsidies. As is true of other
incentives to attract FDI, such subsidies
and other measures to promote food
security can lower the cost of producing
the products that are of greatest concern
in a public health nutrition context. e
subsidization of corn production in the
United States provides a classic example.
Production subsidies were originally
justied partly on food security grounds,
but today a substantial proportion of this
subsidized corn production goes into
making high fructose corn syrup25 and
other caloric sweeteners, which makes
calories cheaper for a population that
already consumes them in excess.
Proposed public health nutrition
measures are intended to reduce the
consumption of end products that are
high in fat, salt and sugar. Insofar as
they reduce product sales and limit
retail expansion, they can be perceived
as potentially undermining the value
of investments at any point in the food
supply chain. e result is an implicit
tension between government action to
promote food security and economic
growth by encouraging investment,
and government action to reduce the
consumption of highly processed foods
to prevent diet-related NCDs. Although
these tensions are not new, they are
likely to increase in light of the World
Health Assembly’s recent endorsement
of the global action plan for the preven-
tion and control of NCDs 2013–2020,
which species the need to use policy
measures, including scal policies, to
“discourage the consumption of less
healthful options”. ese tensions will
be compounded by growing FDI in the
processed and “fast” food industry. e
recent claims brought by Philip Mor-
ris against Australia and Uruguay also
highlight the legal risks associated with
public health regulation. Investments
such as the ones made by Coca-Cola in
Myanmar also highlight the need for the
public health community to play a more
active role in policy-making regarding
investment.
Legal instruments governing
investment
Various legal instruments provide
protection for foreign investors. ey
include domestic laws governing FDI
or property rights more generally; con-
tracts and other legally binding agree-
ments between a foreign investor and
a government; and IIAs. Importantly,
how a government incentivizes invest-
ment can have legal implications for
subsequent regulation. In other words,
a government runs the risk of tying its
own hands with respect to public health
nutrition regulation in the process of
seeking to attract investment. is risk is
Fig. 1. A simplified food supply
chain, showing key points for
investment
Inputs into production
(e.g. fertilizer)
Primary production
(e.g. agriculture)
Primary processing
(e.g. milling and preservation)
Secondary processing
(e.g. manufacture of highly processed foods)
Food retailing and food service
(e.g. supermarkets or fast food chains)
Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543 141
Policy & practice
Policy space for public health nutrition
Anne Marie Thow & Benn McGrady
most evident in the context of contracts
and IIAs.
Contracts between a government
and a foreign investor are oen seen in
cases in which an investor purchases
state-owned assets or in which a govern-
ment has oered inducements to invest-
ment. Contracts are also commonly
used to limit the regulatory changes that
can aect an investment through what
is known as a stabilization clause. For
example, when the Laotian Government
sold its national tobacco monopoly to a
foreign investor, the government agreed
to x the excise tax on tobacco products
for a period of 25 years.26 Large sporting
events provide another example of how
state contracts can limit governments’
regulatory power. Companies such as
Coca-Cola and McDonalds sponsor
the International Olympic Commit-
tee (IOC), so when the Committee
contracts with Olympic host cities, it
makes certain that the companies in
question are allowed to advertise dur-
ing the games.27 Similar contracts have
been problematic in the context of For-
mula One racing; the tobacco industry
sponsors the sporting body, which
then contracts with governments that
are either contemplating restrictions
on tobacco advertising or already have
them in place.
Like contracts, IIAs grant foreign
investors, including large multination-
als, legal rights above and beyond those
of domestic investors. IIAs are usually
bilateral agreements that protect the as-
sets of nationals of one contracting party
while such assets are invested in the
territory of the other contracting party.
e bilateral investment treaty between
Australia and Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region (China) constitutes
an agreement of this type. Philip Morris
(Asia) alleges that, under such a treaty,
its ownership of the Australian subsid-
iary Philip Morris Limited provides
the legal basis for a claim in response
to Australian tobacco packaging laws.
Foreign investors are able to bring claims
directly under the dispute settlement
mechanisms of IIAs, which means that
disputes are resolved at the international
level rather than in domestic courts or in
accordance with domestic law.
Typically, IIAs protect investors
from expropriation. ese agreements
oblige the contracting parties to pay
compensation for expropriation of an
investment (e.g. direct taking of title or
seizure) or for other measures having
an equivalent eect (e.g. destroying the
economic value of an investment or
keeping the owner from being able to
manage, use or control the property in
a meaningful way).28 Usually IIAs also
provide a guarantee of fair and equitable
treatment and of protection against dis-
crimination based on the origin of the
investor or investment.
Relatively few claims in connec-
tion with the food-chain have been
led under IIAs. Disputes involving
the food industry have had to do with
import restrictions on beef to prevent
the spread of bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (“mad cow disease”);29
prohibitions against the use of certain
pesticides to protect human health;30 the
redistribution of private farm lands;31,32
modications to agricultural subsidy
regimes;33 and a discriminatory tax on
high fructose corn syrup – but not on
other sweeteners – imposed to protect
Mexico’s cane sugar industry from un-
fair competition.34 A search of Invest-
ment Claims35 – Oxford University’s
suite of investment arbitration disputes
– using the keywords food, nutrition and
agriculture revealed no publicly reported
challenges to public health nutrition
measures under IIAs. is should not
be taken to mean, however, that IIAs are
irrelevant when it comes to public health
nutrition. A more likely explanation for
the absence of claims is that regulation
in the interest of public health nutrition
is a relatively new area of activity.
IIAs protect the legitimate ex-
pectations of investors when these
expectations were induced by the host
state and served as the basis for the
investment. Investors have no right to
expect the regulatory environment to
remain unchanged, but if a host state
induces investment, such an action
may later aect the application of provi-
sions governing expropriation and fair
and equitable treatment. For example,
legitimate expectations may come into
play when a host state has provided
incentives for upstream investment in
the food-chain but also downstream
measures to regulate the products of
that investment. Another example is
that of a host state that has negotiated a
form of self-regulation with an investor
but that has subsequently shied to a
stricter regulatory approach. e great-
est legal risk occurs in cases in which
states assure investors that they will be
exempted from certain types of regula-
tions or taxes.
ese examples are not intended
to suggest that public health nutrition
measures ordinarily violate IIAs. ey
show, instead, that although IIAs are
usually interpreted in a manner that
favours state autonomy in implementing
measures to protect health, some actions
to induce investment can tie the hands
of regulators by exposing a country to
the risk of legal liability. In essence, the
legal implications of regulation must be
judged on a case-by-case basis.
Preserving policy space
Growing FDI in the food and bever-
age sectors, an increased recognition
of the need for public health nutrition
regulation and more frequent recourse
to litigation by foreign investors make it
essential that the public health commu-
nity be engaged in matters concerning
investment policy. It is important for
policy-makers, particularly in countries
in the early stages of the nutrition transi-
tion, to ensure that FDI is managed in a
way that minimizes the health risks po-
tentially arising from lowered produc-
tion costs. Risk management should take
place within the framework of existing
IIAs and governments must avoid enter-
ing into future investment agreements
that overly constrain their regulatory
autonomy with respect to public health
nutrition. e goal should be to strike
a balance between allowing host states
sucient autonomy to engage in public
health nutrition regulation and incen-
tivizing investment in the food-chain.
In addition, transparency and predict-
ability – both in terms of the regulatory
environment and of the rules governing
public health nutrition measures – are
valuable and should be pursued.
Managing foreign investment
In the case of new investments, policy-
makers need to evaluate whether grant-
ing incentives that may lower produc-
tion costs, will jeopardize public health
by making unhealthful products more
aordable. ey also need to ensure
that investment contracts that facilitate
incoming investment do not tie the
hands of regulators in ways likely to un-
dermine health, as in the example of the
tobacco monopoly in the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic.
An important aspect of managing
risk under existing and future IIAs is
the importance of clarifying and man-
aging the “legitimate expectations” held
by a foreign investor. One overarching
Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543
142
Policy & practice
Policy space for public health nutrition Anne Marie Thow & Benn McGrady
2010 2011
IIAs
–
–
摘要
国际投资协定时代保护公共卫生营养政策的空间
菲利普莫里斯公司最近已根据国际投资协定（IIA）向
澳大利亚（2011 年）和乌拉圭（2010 年）提出索赔。
索赔宣称，菲利普莫里斯公司有权在引入旨在减少
吸烟和预防非传染性疾病（NCD）的创新烟草包装
法规以后获得补偿。因为烟草控制措施通常被视为公
共卫生营养措施的典范，该索赔引起投资法律如何控
制后者的问题。本文试图回答这个问题，并解释政府
在IIA 扩张时代如何积极主动保护公共卫生营养的政
策空间。作者首先考虑所提出的旨在减少饮食相关非
传染性疾病的主要干预措施，及其与食品供应链投资
approach is to develop national policy
statements on public health nutrition
measures clarifying in advance that a
foreign investor cannot legitimately
expect the host country to not issue
public health nutrition measures. To
complement this approach, host states
could clarify the legitimate expectations
of an investor at specic points – for
example, when entering into invest-
ment contracts (e.g. for the farming of
land), when creating or implementing
schemes incentivizing investment in
the food-chain, and when engaging in
partnerships with investors, such as in
the context of self-regulation.
Protecting regulatory autonomy
It is important that policy-makers
protect their policy space in future
IIAs. In contemporary treaty practice,
states have adopted several approaches
to address the scope of their powers to
regulate in the public interest. ese
approaches include: general exceptions;
language clarifying the meaning of
indirect expropriation and of fair and
equitable treatment; clauses carving out
specic areas of investment; and clauses
permitting contracting parties to refuse
to establish investments on specied
grounds.36 Some states have also taken
more assertive steps. For example, the
Gillard government in Australia de-
clared that it would not seek agreements
having investor–state dispute settlement
provisions.37
e use of clarifying terms and
general exceptions is as relevant to
public health nutrition measures as it
is to other measures to protect public
health. Contrary to what happens in
the tobacco sector, however, clauses that
simply “carve out” investment in the
food-chain (a form of exclusion) from
IIAs might not strike a proper balance
– depending on the other incentives and
protections in place – between the need
to incentivize investment and the need
to ensure policy space. is highlights
the complexity of the policy environ-
ment and suggests the need for a more
detailed examination of the role of IIAs
in the public health nutrition context.
Conclusion
Tension exists between an investment
regime that promotes investment in
the food-chain and the goals of public
health nutrition measures. Incentives to
investment can lower production costs
and make unhealthful products more
aordable; investment contracts can tie
the hands of health regulators; and IIAs
can limit a host government’s regula-
tory autonomy, particularly when it has
induced a foreign investor to invest. In a
context of growing government concern
over NCDs, increasing foreign invest-
ment in the food and beverage sector,
and greater reliance on investment law
to protect the interests of investors,
health policy-makers should play a more
active role in shaping investment policy.
Our analysis highlights the need
for additional research on the intersec-
tion of investment and public health
nutrition policy, especially descriptive
studies on how states are balancing the
interests discussed in this paper and
how dierent policies aect investment
and public health nutrition regulation.
ere is also a need for legal studies on
the implications of dierent legal instru-
ments and the most appropriate legal
approaches to implementing dierent
policy options. ■
Competing interests: None declared.
Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543 143
Policy & practice
Policy space for public health nutrition
Anne Marie Thow & Benn McGrady
的交集。然后审查投资制度的本质及相关案例法，并
调查在这种法律环境中最大化公共卫生营养干预的政
策空间的各种方法。随着整条食品生产链上外资的增
加以及人们提出更多不鼓励不健康产品消费的全球建
议，作为控制食品供应的法律体系的组成部分，投资
法律在这方面的重要性也将提高。投资法律对于公共
卫生营养措施的含义取决于多种因素 ：措施本身、适
用协定的条款、外资所处的环境以及主导农业扶持的
政策。这一分析表明，政府应该采取积极的措施（例
如澄清条款和依靠例外）以管理投资并保护其在公共
健康营养方面的法规自主权。
Résumé
Protéger l’espace politique en matière de nutrition en santé publique dans l’ère des accords internationaux d’investissement
Philip Morris a récemment intenté une action en justice contre
l’Australie (2011) et l’Uruguay (2010) en vertu des accords internationaux
d’investissement (AII). Les plaintes allèguent que Philip Morris a droit
à une indemnisation suite à l’introduction de la réglementation
innovante sur les emballages de tabac pour réduire le tabagisme et
prévenir les maladies non transmissibles (MNT). Comme les mesures
de lutte contre le tabac sont souvent considérées comme un modèle
pour les mesures de nutrition en santé publique, ces revendications
soulèvent la question de savoir comment le droit sur les investissements
régit ces dernières. Cet article tente de répondre à cette question
et d’expliquer comment les gouvernements peuvent protéger de
manière proactive l’espace politique en matière de nutrition en santé
publique à l’ère de l’expansion des AII. Les auteurs considèrent d’abord
les principales interventions proposées pour réduire les MNT liées à
l’alimentation et leur intersection avec les investissements dans la chaîne
d’approvisionnement des aliments. Ils passent ensuite en revue la nature
des régimes d’investissement et de la jurisprudence pertinente, et ils
examinent les moyens de maximiser l’espace politique pour intervenir
en matière de nutrition en santé publique dans ce contexte juridique.
Avec l’augmentation des investissements étrangers dans l’ensemble
de la chaîne alimentaire et le nombre croissant de recommandations
mondiales qui sont publiées et qui découragent la consommation de
produits nocifs pour la santé, le droit sur les investissements va gagner en
importance au sein de la structure juridique qui régit l’approvisionnement
des aliments. Les implications du droit sur les investissements pour les
mesures de nutrition en santé publique dépendent de divers facteurs: les
mesures elles-mêmes, les termes des accords en vigueur, les conditions
concernant les investissements étrangers et les politiques de soutien à
l’agriculture. Cette analyse suggère que les gouvernements devraient
adopter des mesures proactives – c.-à-d. la clarification des termes et
le recours aux exceptions – pour gérer les investissements et protéger
leur autonomie réglementaire dans le domaine de la nutrition en santé
publique.
Резюме
Защита пространства стратегий развития здорового общественного питания в эпоху международных
инвестиционных соглашений
Некоторое время назад корпорация Philip Morris возбудила
иски против Австралии (2011 г.) и Уругвая (2010 г.) в связи с
международными инвестиционными соглашениями. В исках
заявлялось, что Philip Morris имеет право на компенсацию в связи
с введением новых предписаний по упаковке табачных изделий,
направленных на сокращение курения и предотвращение
неинфекционных заболеваний. Поскольку меры по борьбе с
потреблением табака часто рассматриваются как модель для мер,
направленных на развитие здорового общественного питания,
в исках был затронут вопрос о том, как эти меры регулируются
инвестиционным правом. Данный документ представляет собой
попытку дать ответ на этот вопрос и разъяснить, каким образом
правительства могут превентивно защищать свое пространство
стратегий развития здорового общественного питания в эпоху
роста международных инвестиционных соглашений. Сначала
авторы обсуждают основные мероприятия, которые предлагается
провести для сокращения неинфекционных заболеваний,
связанных с питанием, и то, как эти мероприятия пересекаются
со структурой инвестиций в систему поставок продуктов питания.
Затем они рассматривают природу инвестиционных политик и
соответствующую правоприменительную практику и оценивают
способы максимального расширения пространства стратегий и
мероприятий по развитию здорового общественного питания, с
учетом обозначенного юридического контекста. В связи с ростом
зарубежных инвестиций в систему поставок продуктов питания
и вынесением глобальных постановлений рекомендательного
характера, препятствующих потреблению вредных для здоровья
продуктов, будет возрастать важность инвестиционного права,
как части законодательной системы, регулирующей поставку
проуктов питания. Влияние инвестиционного права на меры,
предпринимаемые для развития здорового общественного
питания, зависит от различных факторов: самих мер, условий
соответствующих соглашений, обстоятельств, определяющих
характер зарубежных инвестиций, а также стратегий поддержки
сельского хозяйства. Этот анализ свидетельствует о том, что
правительствам следует принять превентивные меры, такие как
прояснение условий и определение исключений, для управления
инвестициями и защиты нормативно-правовой независимости в
вопросах, касающихся здорового общественного питания.
Resumen
La protección de un espacio político para la nutrición en la salud pública en la era de los acuerdos internacionales de
inversiones
Recientemente, Philip Morris ha presentado demandas contra Australia
(2011) y Uruguay (2010) en virtud de los acuerdos internacionales de
inversiones (AII), en las que alega tener derecho a una indemnización a
raíz de la introducción de las regulaciones innovadoras del empaquetado
Bull World Health Organ 2014;92:139–145 | doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.120543
144
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Policy space for public health nutrition Anne Marie Thow & Benn McGrady
del tabaco para reducir el tabaquismo y prevenir las enfermedades no
transmisibles (ENT). Dado que las medidas para el control del tabaco
suelen considerarse un modelo para las medidas de nutrición de salud
pública, estas demandas plantean la cuestión sobre cómo la ley de
inversiones controla estas últimas. El presente artículo trata de responder
a esta pregunta y explicar cómo los gobiernos pueden proteger de forma
proactiva el espacio político en materia de nutrición de salud pública en
la era de la expansión de las inversiones internacionales. En primer lugar,
los autores consideran las intervenciones principales propuestas para
reducir las enfermedades no transmisibles relacionadas con la dieta y su
confluencia con la inversión en la cadena de suministro de alimentos. A
continuación, revisan la naturaleza de los regímenes de inversiones y de
la jurisprudencia pertinente, y examinan formas de maximizar el espacio
político para la intervención de la nutrición en la salud pública dentro de
este marco legal. Dado que las inversiones extranjeras aumentan en toda
la cadena alimentaria, junto con las recomendaciones internacionales
que desaconsejan el consumo de productos nocivos para la salud,
también cobrará más importancia la ley de inversiones como parte de la
arquitectura legal que rige el suministro de alimentos. Las consecuencias
que la ley de inversiones tendrá en las medidas de nutrición en la salud
pública dependerán de varios factores: las medidas en sí, los términos
de los convenios aplicables, las condiciones que rodean la inversión
extranjera y las políticas que rigen las ayudas a la agricultura. Este
análisis sugiere que los gobiernos deben adoptar medidas proactivas,
como dilucidar los términos y basarse en excepciones, para gestionar
las inversiones y proteger su autonomía reglamentaria con respecto a
la nutrición y la salud pública.
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