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Communication Security for Smart Grid
Distribution Networks
Elias Bou-Harb, Claude Fachkha, Makan Pourzandi, Mourad Debbabi, Chadi Assi
Abstract—The operation and control of the next generation
electrical grids will depend on complex network of computers,
software, and communication technologies. Their compromise by
a malicious adversary will cause significant damage, including
extended power outages and destruction of electrical equipment.
Moreover, the implementation of the smart grid will include
the deployment of many new enabling technologies such as
advanced sensors and metering and the integration of distributed
generation resources. Such technologies and various others will
require the addition and utilization of multiple communication
mechanisms and infrastructures that may suffer from serious
cyber vulnerabilities. These need to be addressed in order to
increase the security and thus the utmost adoption and success
of the smart grid.
In this paper, we focus on the communication security aspect
which deals with the distribution component of the smart grid.
Consequently, we target the network security of the advanced
metering infrastructure coupled with the data communication
towards the transmission infrastructure. We discuss the security
and the feasibility aspects of possible communication mechanisms
that could be adopted on that subpart of the grid. By accomplish-
ing this, the correlated vulnerabilities in these systems could be
remediated and associated risks may be mitigated for the purpose
of enhancing the cyber security of the future electric grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current electrical grid is perhaps the greatest
engineering achievement of the 20th century. However, it is
increasingly outdated and overburdened, leading to costly
blackouts and burnouts. For this and various other reasons,
transformation efforts are underway to make the current
electrical grid smarter.
The smart grid could be referred to as the modernization
of the current electric grid for the purpose of enabling bi-
directional flows of information and electricity in order to
achieve numerous goals; it will provide consumers with di-
verse choices on how, when, and how much electricity they
use. It is self-healing in case of disturbances, such as physical
and cyber attacks and natural disasters. Moreover, smart grid’s
infrastructure will be able to link and utilize a wide array
of energy sources including renewable energy producers and
mobile energy storages. Additionally, this infrastructure aims
at providing better power quality and more efficient delivery of
electricity. Indeed, all these goals could not be achieved and
realized without a communication technology infrastructure
that will gather, assemble and synthesize data provided by
smart meters, electrical vehicles, sensors, and computer and
information technology systems.
A. Cyber Security Motivation
History has proven that industrial control systems were in
fact vulnerable and victims of cyber attacks. In March 2007,
Idaho National Laboratory conducted an experiment in which
physical damage was caused to a diesel generator through
the exploitation of a security flaw in its control system.
Additionally, during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, cyber
attacks widely believed to have originated in Russia, brought
down the Georgian electric grid during the Russian army’s
advance through the country. Besides that, in April 2009, the
Wall Street Journal reported that cyber spies had penetrated
the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software programs
that could be used to disrupt the system. Lastly but very
significantly, in 2010, Stuxnet, a large complex piece of
malware with many different components and functionalities,
targeted Siemens industrial control systems and exploited
four zero-day vulnerabilities running Windows operating
systems. As a result, 60% of Iranian nuclear infrastructure
was targeted and hence triggering a genuine fear over the
commence of a cyber warfare.
It is therefore of utmost importance to address the cyber
security aspect of the smart grid, specifically the area
concerned with the communication mechanisms which deal
with the distribution subpart.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
pinpoints some related work in our concerned area while
Section III illustrates and describes the smart grid architecture.
Section IV thoroughly elaborates on the feasible communica-
tion mechanisms in the distribution part of the smart grid,
by revealing their security objectives, security threats, and
their practically applicable implementation on the future grid.
Section V presents a discussion of the security framework that
is needed to enable those communication techniques. Finally,
Section VI summarizes and concludes this paper.
II. RE LATE D WOR K
In this section, we briefly highlight some of the work done
in the communications and security area in the context of
smart grid distribution.
Metke et al. [1] discussed key security technologies for a
smart grid system including public key infrastructures (PKI)
and trusted computing for various smart grid communication
networks. They thoroughly presented the security requirements
that are essential for the proper operation of the future grid.
In another research work, Yu et al. [2] identified the
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fundamental challenges in data communications for the smart
grid and introduced the ongoing standardization effort in the
industry. Moreover, the authors depicted the communication
infrastructures, namely, home area networks (HANs) and
neighborhood area networks (NANs), and very briefly listed
the mechanisms utilized to achieve their architectures. In
another paper entitled ‘Secure Communications in the Smart
Grid’ [3], the authors focused on HANs by elaborating on
its AMI infrastructure, its security issues and requirements.
The authors expressed their model in terms of secure
communication mechanism on that subpart of the grid.
To the best of our knowledge, the work being presented
in this paper is unique by providing significant, relevant,
and practical information on the communication mechanisms
in both HANs and NANs, by focusing on their security,
including their objectives and threats, in additional to their
practical feasibility, requirements, and security issues when
implemented on the smart grid.
III. SMA RT GRID ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide a high level overview of the
architecture of the smart grid as depicted in Figure 1. The
future electric grid has a tiered architecture to supply energy
to consumers. Energy starts from power generation and flows
through transmission systems to distribution and eventually to
consumers. The smart grid is striving to utilize and coordinate
various generation and production mechanisms. Moreover,
generation plants can be mobile or fixed depending on specific
architectures. On the transmission side, a large number of
substations and network operating centers manage this task.
A large number of mixed voltage power lines transmit the
generated electricity from various sources to the distribution
architecture. Finally, a set of complex distribution topologies
delivers the electricity to regions, neighbors and premises for
utilization and consumption.
In this paper, our interest lies in the distribution part of
the smart grid. More specifically, we are concerned with
the communication networks of that subpart of the grid,
namely the Home Area Network (HAN) and the Neighborhood
Area Network (NAN). These networks are critical for data
communications between the utility and end-users. HANs
are composed of three components. First, the smart in-house
devices that provide demand-side management such as energy
efficiency management and demand response. Second, the
smart meter that collects data from smart devices and invokes
certain actions depending on the information it retrieves from
the grid and thirdly the HAN Gateway which refers to the
function that links the HAN with the NAN. This gateway can
as well represent the physical device dedicated to performing
this functionality. On the other hand, a NAN connects multiple
HANs to local access points where transmission lines carry out
the data towards the utility.
IV. COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS
In this section, we focus on the communication security
aspect that deals with the distribution and the consumption
components of the smart grid. In the remainder of this
section, we follow the subsequent methodology. First, we
pinpoint the most applicable and utilized communication
mechanisms that could be adopted on that subpart of the grid
by introducing their technology and use. Second, we discuss
their security objectives including confidentiality, integrity,
authentication and authorization. Third, we elaborate on
their threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, we discuss their
feasibility in context of their implementation and security on
smart grid HANs and NANs.
A. HAN Communication Mechanisms
AMI is the key element in smart grid HANs [4]. It is dubbed
as the convergence of the power grid, the communication
infrastructure and the supporting information architecture.
It refers to the systems that measure, collect, and analyze
energy usage from advanced smart devices, including, in-
home devices as well as electric vehicles charging, through
various communication media, for the purpose of forwarding
the data to the grid. Thus, this critical communication
infrastructure ought to be discussed and investigated.
1) Wireless LAN: The 802.11 is a set of standards
developed for wireless local area networks (WLAN). It
specifies an interface between a wireless device and a
base station (access point) or between two wireless devices
(peer-to-peer).
The 802.11 provides confidentiality by implementing
the advanced encryption standard (AES). Integrity is
achieved through the AES-CBC-MAC algorithm [5] while
authentication is implemented using the standards Wi-Fi
Protected Access. IEEE 802.11 by default, does not offer
authorization mechanisms.
The protocol suffers from significant security threats. It
is vulnerable to traffic analysis, a technique which allows
the attacker to determine the load on the communication
medium by monitoring and analyzing the number and size of
packets being transmitted. It is as well susceptible to passive
and active eavesdropping where an attacker can listen to the
wireless connection as well as actively injecting messages into
the communication medium. Moreover, 802.11 is vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle, session hijacking and replay attacks.
On one hand, it can be declared that the WLAN (802.11)
technology may be a feasible solution in a HAN. As a result,
all smart devices should be equipped with an embedded
WLAN adapter. Those devices would directly communicate
with a WLAN home gateway that could as well be a
WLAN enabled smart meter. The authentication mechanism
is performed according to a one-to-one basis between the
smart device and the gateway. On the other hand, it can be
claimed that the 802.11 may not be a suitable communication
mechanism for a HAN. This statement can be based on the
significant negative consequences that will result if a 802.11-
based HAN network was maliciously attacked. For example,
suppose the WLAN session is hijacked; then, the attacker
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Fig. 1. Smart Grid Architecture
would manipulate the smart devices and corresponding
output data and hence forward falsified information to the
grid. More simply, assume an attacker was able to jam a
WLAN communication by generating random data. Thus, this
will cause a serious issue with the availability of the HAN
network, causing a DoS that affects not only the functionality
of the concerned network, but other dependent smart grid
networks as well, including NANs. Furthermore, presume that
an attacker was capable of performing traffic analysis on the
WLAN traffic in a HAN. Consequently, the confidentiality of
the information would be targeted since the attacker would
infer HAN consumption loads of various smart devices. In
conclusion, we believe that WLAN, with its open standards,
high throughput, strong home market penetration, good
economics and relatively secure communication, is a suitable
choice in a HAN.
2) ZigBee: ZigBee is a specification for a communication
protocol using small, low-power digital radios based on the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. It is more specifically known as
Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN).
Confidentiality of a Zigbee network is established though
utilizing the AES algorithm. Moreover, frame integrity is
achieved by generating integrity codes. ZigBee devices
authenticate by employing pre-defined keys. Additionally,
ZigBee networks provide security counter-measures against
message replays by ensuring freshness of transmitted frames.
The 802.15.4 protocol is vulnerable to jamming. This threat
aims at weakening the availability of system services. Another
threat is characterized by message capturing and tampering,
which are difficult to avoid in LR-WPANs, since the cost of
sufficient physical protection defeats the low cost important
design goal of such networks. A further threat is exhaustion;
a compromised coordinator node can lure a large number of
nodes to associate with it by appearing to be a coordinator
with high link quality. Consequently, it can force all the
devices to stay active for most of the time, resulting in quick
battery depletions at those devices.
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In 2007 a large stakeholder community assembled the
ZigBee Alliance to tackle the AMI and develop what is
known as the ZigBee Smart Energy. Hence, this extensively
advocates the feasibility of adopting the ZigBee technology
as a HAN communication infrastructure. As a result, a
ZigBee gateway device supporting two communication
streams joining the utility AMI central database to smart
devices in the HAN need to be placed and configured. The
gateway can as well act as a trust center and firewall in
the ZigBee network implementation to protect assets from
the grid side. To complete the network topology, in-house
smart devices equipped with ZigBee modules should be
configured and authenticated. However, a core security
threat resides if, for instance, an adversary was able to
compromise a HAN coordinator ZigBee node. As a result,
this node will be able to maliciously control all aspects
of other smart device nodes, tamper with their transmitted
data, falsely redirect their communications or even deplete
their batteries for a complete system failure. Additionally,
suppose an attacker was capable of jamming or flooding
the ZigBee HAN network. Consequently, this will trigger a
drastic availability problem that halts the network which will
propagate, negatively affecting all other segments of the grid’s
communications and functionality. In summary, we believe
that ZigBee, with its extremely low cost (e.g. less than $10),
low power consumption, unlicensed spectrum use and its
already available relatively secure ‘smart energy’ products, is
an extremely effective and efficient communication choice in
a HAN.
3) Mobile Communications and Femtocells: Femtocells
are cellular network access points that connect in-house
user equipments (UEs) to mobile operators’ core network
infrastructure using residential DSL, cable broadband
connections, or optical fibers. The technologies behind
femtocells are cellular such as UMTS and LTE. One key driver
of femtocells is the demand for higher indoor data rates which
can be achieved through the establishing of high performance
radio frequency links with a femtocell. Additionally, these
devices can significantly provide power savings to indoor
UEs since the path loss and the required transmitting power
to interface with a femtocell is significantly less than to
communicate with an outdoor base station. This fact renders
the applicable feasibility of mobile communications and
femtocells in HANs.
In a femtocell networking environment, confidentiality and
integrity of the transmitted data are guaranteed by using
end-to-end IPsec. Moreover, authentication can be realized by
using either the Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport
Layer Security (EAP-TLS) or the EAP-Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM).
In femtocell networks, there are three main security concerns
or threats. The first is characterized by network and service
availability. Since the link between the femtocell and the
core network is IP based, DoS and other flooding attacks
are viable. The second is depicted by fraud and service
theft where an adversary can connect to a femtocell and
make illegal use of it. The third threat targets privacy and
confidentiality where the femtocell network is subject to the
same security issues of regular IP based networks including
fabrication and modification of data.
The adoption of mobile femtocells as a HAN
communication mechanism could be a practical, reasonable
and a sufficient solution. This is especially true in rural HANs
where other communication infrastructures are unavailable
but a satisfactory Internet link is accessible. Hence, if this
architecture is realizable, then the smart devices including,
at least, the smart meter should be equipped with a cellular
SIM card. The authentication could be achieved using
EAP-SIM [6] between the smart devices and the femtocell.
Alternatively, smart in-house devices can authenticate to the
smart meter and then the latter can relay the communication
to the femtocell. In order to enable access to the femtocell,
two access methods could be utilized, namely, closed access
and open access [7]. Issues in the deployment of the mobile
femtocells technology in HANs could be rendered in three
obstacles. First, there is a concern with the use of femtocells
in homes with regards to their possible associated health
issues [8]. Second, there is the challenge related to the
ability of determining femtocells location. This estimation
is necessary for smart grid operators to determine HAN
locations for network planning and access control reasons
which could be hard to achieve using femtocells. Third, there
is a security concern by grid operators who will question the
transfer of sensitive HAN data through the public Internet
as a transmission medium towards the NAN and eventually
the grid. In conclusion, we believe that cellular femtocells,
with their relatively high price (e.g. >$100), possible indoor
health issues, various implementation and security concerns,
and limited device access, are not a suitable communication
choice in a HAN.
Note that, the distribution part of the smart grid, namely,
HANs and NANs with corresponding possible threats, is
focused on and illustrated in Figure 2.
B. NAN Communication Mechanisms
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) is the HAN
complementary network that completes the distribution
subpart of the smart grid. A NAN is the next immediate
tier and its infrastructure is critical since it interrelates
and connects multiple HANs collectively for the purpose
of accumulating energy consumption information from
households (the HANs) in the neighborhood and delivering
the data to the utility company. Thus, the communication
infrastructure that is responsible for such tasks is as well very
significant to confer.
1) WiMAX: The IEEE 802.16 standard, referred to as
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX),
defines the air interface and medium access control protocol
for a wireless metropolitan area network (WMAN).
WiMAX standards define three steps to provide secure
5
Fig. 2. Smart Grid Distribution and Corresponding Threats
communications, namely, authentication, key establishment,
and data encryption. This is achieved by implementing the
EAP protocol, the Privacy Key Management protocol and the
AES algorithm respectively.
Threats in IEEE 802.16 focus on compromising the radio
links. Hence, the system is vulnerable to radio frequency
(RF) jamming. WiMAX is as well susceptible to scrambling
attacks, where an adversary injects RF interference while
transmitting specific management data. This attack affects the
proper network ranging and bandwidth sharing capabilities.
Additionally, and due to lack of frame freshness, the 802.16
is vulnerable to replay attacks.
The Smart Grid Working Group [9] acts as a major point
for utility interests in WiMAX as a technology for smart grid
networks. Thus, it promotes WiMAX as a core communication
technology for NANs. Furthermore, WiMAX is a broadband
wireless last mile technology that can support smart grid
distribution. As a result, WiMAX can be implemented
between a base station and the home gateway. The smart
meter would collect smart devices data and then forwards
them to the home gateway which has the interoperability
property to comprehend WiMAX communication. The
home gateway is in fact a subscriber station (SS) in the
HAN. The SS would collect the data from the smart meter
and sends it to the NAN through a WiMAX dedicated
connection. To complete the data transfer towards the utility,
a point-to-point, point-to-multipoint or hybrid (multi-hop
relay) [10] WiMAX topologies can be implemented. The
practical feasibility of such a technology could be hindered
by possible security misdemeanors. For example, and since
WiMAX is susceptible to traffic analysis techniques, an
adversary with malicious intentions can retrieve HANs
sensitive data while in transit through WiMAX to identify
neighborhoods trends in consumption loads. Moreover, an
attacker can take advantage of lack of message timeliness
to launch a man-in-the-middle attack by replaying certain
information from the grid or the NAN towards the HANs
using WiMAX. In summary, we believe that WiMAX, with
its high throughput, significant smart grid standardization
and working groups, backhaul media for WiFi or ZigBee
in-premises devices, and its interoperability features, is very
applicable as a NAN communication technology.
2) LTE: Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a wireless
communication standard for a fourth generation mobile
6
network. LTE features an all-IP flat network architecture, an
end-to-end quality of service, peak download rates nearing
300 Mbps and upload rates of 75 Mbps. This renders it very
advantageous to exist as a NAN communication mechanism.
LTE networks provide mutual authentication between the UE
and the core network by implementing the authentication and
key agreement (AKA) protocol. For radio signaling, LTE
provides integrity, replay protection, and encryption between
the UE and the base station (e-NB). Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) coupled with IPsec can protect the backhaul signaling
between the e-NB and the core network [11]. For user-plane
traffic, IKE/IPsec can similarly protect the backhaul from the
e-NB to the core network.
Threats in LTE can be divided into three main sections. The
first is characterized by attacks on the air interface. Such
attacks are mainly passive such as traffic analysis and user
tracking. The second is rendered by attacks on the e-NB. Such
threats include physical tampering with the e-NB, fraudulent
configuration changes, DoS attacks, and cloning of the e-NB
authentication token. The third section is characterized by
attacks against the core network. These may include flooding
and signaling attacks.
In the context of the smart grid, the adoption of LTE as a
NAN technology could be feasible in two ways. The first is the
use of the already implemented mobile network architecture
of established mobile network operators (MNO) to carry
out the data. This method can be referred to as piggyback
where smart devices data from HANs are piggybacked on
the MNO infrastructure as a medium to reach the NAN and
eventually the utility. An advantage of this approach is the
ease of implementation and adoption since from a smart grid
perspective, there is no additional needed configuration, setup
and management. The second way in which LTE could be
adopted is by utilizing a specialized network core architecture
to transfer the data. This methodology itself can be realized
in two ways. The first is by implementing the notion of
Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), which means
that the smart grid utility rents a portion of the traditional
MNO core network for its dedicated functions. The second
way is essentially recognized when the utility implements its
own core architecture, using the same LTE technologies as
the MNO, but totally decoupled from it.
One critical security issue that may thwart LTE as a NAN
communication mechanism is the fact that the e-NB is the
main location where users’ traffic may be compromised [11].
Hence, if various attacks on the e-NB are successful, they
could give attackers full control of the e-NB and its signaling
to various nodes. In this case, HANs and NANs on the grid
and their communications would also be compromised since
in such architecture, they play the role of subscribers to
the e-NB in the LTE/smart grid infrastructure. To conclude,
we believe that LTE, being cost-effective coupled with its
relatively rapid implementation and highly secure, available
and trustful infrastructure, is a suitable NAN communication
mechanism.
Note that, a high level illustration of the discussed
communication mechanisms in smart grid distribution
networks is shown in Figure 3.
3) Broadband over Power Lines: Advanced signal
processing techniques and standardization efforts performed
by the European Committee for Electro-technical
Standardization have made the employment of narrow
band power line communications (PLC) possible. The
evolution of this technology gave birth to broadband over
power lines (BPL) systems. BPL offers high speed data
communications with minimal new infrastructure to deploy
making this technology a viable mechanism for NAN
communications.
In terms of security objectives, no default security protocols
are provided by the PLC MAC standards to achieve access
control.
Power line channels are considered to be shared networking
mediums and hence external and internal attacks are feasible
on such networks. External threats refer to eavesdropping on
exchanged data without having access credentials. On the
other hand, internal threats are performed by benign users on
the network using access credentials with the intent to misuse
services.
PLC is a system that could potentially be used in NANs
on the smart grid. Many standards such as ITU G.Hn and
IEEE P1901 exist. We believe that a harmonized PLC
standard is possible by interoperating these systems for a
better implementation of the BPL for smart grid. However, a
major obstacle for such adoption is rendered by the fact that
electric transformers block the transmission frequency of the
BPL. This limits BPL to small coverage range within the low
voltage grid (neighborhood) and requires other retransmission
mechanisms to allow the full data transfer to the utility.
From a security perspective, an attacker may be able to
launch a man-in-the-middle attack by forging his identity and
standing between a HAN and NAN communication using
BPL. Moreover, an adversary can take advantage of the use
of copper wiring in PLC to sniff the data. In summary, we
consider that the BPL technology will unlikely emerge as a
leading broadband tool for smart grid NANs, but instead will
remain as an option for NAN communication in the future
smart grid.
In the subsequent section, we present a discussion on the
security framework that is needed to enable the above men-
tioned communication techniques to be employed for smart
grid applications.
V. SECURITY FRAMEWORK DISCUSSION
Currently, there is a lack of adequate work in security
schemes and frameworks for AMI, especially in authentication
methods. To the best of our knowledge, there exist very
limited realistic approaches [12] to solving the scalability
problem of smart meter authentications, regardless which
communication technology is utilized.
7
Fig. 3. Distribution Network-Communication Mechanisms
Cryptographic methods such as digital certificates require
a momentous overhead in comparison with data packet
processing. In addition, cryptographic operations contribute
to extensive computational cost. In the context of smart
grid, a smart meter routinely sends a meter reading message
within a period of 500 ms [13]. Nowadays, for PKI-based
schemes, generating a digital signature every 500 ms is not
an issue using a commodity computer. Conversely, for a
legacy power grid that interconnects numerous buildings, the
number of meter reading messages that require verification
by the NAN gateway might be particularly larger than its
capacity. Although digital signing and message verification
can certainly achieve secure communications, however, we
believe that the conventional cryptographic operations make
such security frameworks neither scalable nor affordable.
We assert that the security framework that is required
to enable the discussed communication techniques to be
employed for smart grid applications should be based on the
following design objectives:
1) Device authentication: The identity and legality of the
smart meters and their associated consumers should be
verified receiving the proper utility services.
2) Data confidentiality: The smart meter readings and
management control messages should be confidential to
conceal both consumers’ and utilities’ privacy.
3) Message integrity: The smart grid should be able to
verify that any meter messages should be delivered
unaltered in an AMI.
4) Prevent potential cyber attacks: Smart meters should be
guaranteed to obtain secure communication with the
AMI network, even if an individual smart meter is
compromised.
5) Facilitating communication overhead: The proposed
framework should be efficient in terms of communica-
tion overhead and processing latency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated applicable
communication mechanisms that could be adopted on
smart grid distribution networks. To tackle the cyber security
of such infrastructures, we have pinpointed their security
objectives and threats. We further elaborated on their practical
feasibility in terms of their technical implementation, possible
obstacles, and their core security issues and attacks on smart
grid HANs and NANs.
We believe it is critical to continue discussing, designing,
and implementing solutions for such mechanisms for the
purpose of enhancing the cyber security of the future electric
grid and hence accomplishing consumers’ utmost trust in such
a major gird transformation.
8
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