Philip Zelikow is Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Formerly a foreign service officer with the Department of State, from 1989 to 1991 he was director for European security affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.
The author acknowledges gratefully the insights he has derived from discussions with Robert Art, Robert Blackwill, Ashton Carter, Ernest May, Mark H. Moore, Richard Neustadt, Condoleezza Rice, Alfred P. Rubin, Richard Zeckhauser, and the students in his fall 1993 class on Political and Organizational Analysis. None of these people are, of course, responsible for the misuse of their ideas.
1. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 108. From the time he worked for the RAND Corporation during the 1950s, George has spent most of his intellectual life on the frontiers between political analysis and the use of history in focused case studies, psychology, and practical advice for policymakers, usually about the efficacy of using or threatening to use force. He long directed a research program at Stanford devoted to "Theory and Practice in International Relations"; see Alexander L. George, "Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice," in James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 114-119. Some of the leading examples of George's scholarship are Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971; 2d ed. forthcoming); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Alexander L. George, Ole Holsti, and R.M. Siverson, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Alexander L. George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
2. Henry J. Aaron, Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978), p. 165. This intuitive impression is reinforced by the writings of many perceptive practitioners who, after having significant foreign policymaking experiences in government, joined or rejoined the world of scholarship, including George Kennan, Raymond Garthoff, Henry Kissinger, William Hyland, Leslie Gelb, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Blackwill, William Quandt, Robert Pastor, and Gregory Treverton. Careful narrative history is the dominant analytical discipline.
3. James Q. Wilson, "Social Science and Public Policy: A Personal Note," in Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., ed., Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 82-83.
4. Paul H. Nitze, Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p. 3.
5. Roy Harrod describing a lunch on July 27, 1922, quoted in Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 114-115 (emphasis in original).
6. It is important, however, that Iraq was not actually perceived as an "outlaw state" by the moderate Arab states or Western Europe until the spring or summer of 1990, at the very earliest. Iraq, viewed as the paladin of the Arab world in early 1989 and the host for foundation of the Arab Cooperation Council, was actually much closer to the Arab "establishment" than Syria. Iraq retained this status at least until the mask began to drop at the May 1990 ACC summit. Second, George misunderstands the nature of the incentives being offered, though his description...