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In-And-Outers and Moonlighters: An Evaluation of the Impact of Policy-making Exposure on IR Scholarship

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Abstract

Some international relations (IR) scholars lament the divide that exists between the academic community and the policy community. Others celebrate it. In this article, we test a core proposition advanced by advocates of bridging the policy-academy divide: that direct engagement in the policy-making process will make international relations scholars more adept at designing, undertaking, and communicating research in ways that are useful and relevant to policymakers. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we evaluate whether and to what extent direct exposure to the policy-making process influences how IR scholars select publication outlets. We define and evaluate policy-making exposure in two ways: periods of public service in which faculty members temporarily vacate their university positions to work for governments or intergovernmental organizations; and instances in which faculty members undertake substantial consulting assignments for government agencies and intergovernmental organizations. Our findings suggest that “in-and-outers”—faculty members who temporarily leave the ivory tower to accept policy positions—return to the academy with new perspectives and publication priorities. By contrast, we find no policy-making exposure effect among “moonlighters.” Our results suggest that IR scholars are no more likely to publish in policy journals after doing part-time consulting work for governments and IOs.

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... The "gap bridgers" (Parks and Stern 2014) hold that a lot of IR grant, both standard and basic, is politically insignificant -to a large degree because it focuses on conceptual and meta-theoretical topics of minor concern and makes use of on-screen political characters. ...
... We believe that the large sample size compensates for the primary disadvantage-that is, the survey instrument was not designed specifically for our research question. The data have been used extensively to analyze the policy relevance of academics' research (Hundley, Kenzer, and Peterson 2013); the influence of policy-making exposure on their research (Parks and Stern 2013); how political ideology affects adherence to different theoretical perspectives (Rathbun 2012); and the overall tendencies in IR in theory, method, and epistemology (Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, and Tierney 2011). As of yet, however, the dataset has not been used to explore the teaching of IR scholars. ...
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International Security 26.4 (2002) 169-183 So, a Washington foreign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are supposed to be the scholars and students of international affairs—Why did it happen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance—too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it. The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap." The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conversations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'être. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum." Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the academic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self-servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the questions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered. What causes terrorism? What are the underlying political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics? On these kinds of questions, largely causal-explanatory and geared to gaining greater understanding of driving forces across various levels of analysis (individual, group, societal, state, regional, and international), the academic literature does have significant contributions to make. This is the role of international relations scholarship and social science more generally in seeking, as Robert Keohane puts it, "to elucidate underlying structures of social reality, which generate incentives for action." International relations, comparative politics, and other areas of the discipline have long, solid traditions of work (including much of recent vintage) on subjects such as the relationship between economic inequality and political radicalization; social movements; the dynamics of globalization; the building of civil society; stable democratization; culture and identity; and ideology and beliefs. There is much here that even if not explicitly intended to be policy relevant can help ground, frame, and inform policy analysis and formulation. But on more focused questions that address terrorism as a particular sociopolitical phenomenon and security threat—Who are...
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This paper explores disjunctures between ontology and methodology in the American school to better understand both the limits of this approach and ways we can counter its blind spots. Tierney and Maliniak's TRIP data point to a strong elective affinity between, on the one hand, rationalist/liberal ontological assumptions and quantitative methodologies, and on the other, constructivist assumptions and qualitative methodologies. This affinity is neither natural nor obvious, as is discussed. It also raises deeper issues for the field about the nature of causation. As a variety of philosophers of science have insisted, we need to do much better in thinking about the relationship between our underlying notions of causation and the methodological tools that we employ. By so doing, we will not only be able to better build social-scientific knowledge, but also better help bridge the empirical-normative gap that Cohen identifies. More broadly, the paper suggests that by combining a more thoughtful approach to causation with a broadly pragmatist approach to the philosophy of science we can both remedy some of the defects of the American school of international political economy, and provide some pointers to the British school, too.
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Emily O. Goldman, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Davis, is a specialist in U.S. foreign and national security policy, and military affairs. She has authored books and articles on U.S. strategic, military, and arms control policy; strategic adaptation in peacetime; military innovation; organizational change; and defense resource allocation. Her current research focuses on the strategic and foreign policy implications of revolutionary military change, and the impact of the information revolution on national security. She conducted a study for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense on the international consequences of military revolutions from the year 1500 to the present. She can be reached at <eogoldman@ucdavis.edu>. 1. Tenure systems were still present in the majority of private comprehensive (58%), private liberal arts (66%), and public two-year institutions (61%). See Andrea Berger, Rita Kirshstein, and Elizabeth Rowe, "Institutional Policies and Practices: Results from the 1999 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty, Institution Survey," Department of Education (NCES 2001-201), 2001 http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001201.pdf; and Rita Kirshstein, Nancy Matheson, and Zhongren Jing, "1993 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF:93): Institutional Policies and Practices Regarding Faculty in Higher Education," Department of Education (NCES 97-080), 1993 http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/97080.pdf. 2. For an overview of the scientific mission of the John Hopkins University, see John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New York: Viking Adult, 2004). 3. R. Eugene Rice, "Making a Place for the New American Scholar," American Association for Higher Education, Working Paper, no. 1, May 1996. 4. Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 68. 5. Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 12. 6. Lepgold and Nincic make the persuasive case that much of this research is in fact relevant. Be that as it may, because most practitioners do not perceive this to be the case, such research does little to bridge the gap. 7. Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 68. 8. Henry Hale, "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," World Politics 56, no. 2 (January 2004): 165-93. 9. Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 175. 10. Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8 (June 2005): 29-30. 11. Ibid., 33. 12. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: The Stationery Office), July 14, 2004 http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), July 7, 2004; and Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005 http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf. 13. Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming. 14. Walt, "Theory and Policy in International Relations," 42; and Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In," International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 182. 15. Particularly to students, who are our future policymakers. 16. Steven L. Lamy, "Bridging the Gap: Teaching Analytical and Policy Lessons with Foreign Policy Case Studies" (paper prepared for the 2002 ISA Annual Convention, March 23-27, 2002, New Orleans). 17. For the full text of Secretary Rice's remarks, see http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/54176.htm. 18. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, no. 113 (June 2002) http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html; and Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). 19. Kagan, "Power and Weakness." 20. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). 21. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996...
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Ezra F. Vogel, Henry Ford II Research Professor in the Social Sciences at Harvard University, has over forty years of teaching and research experience in academia. His research has focused primarily on Chinese and Japanese society, industrial development, and, more recently, Asian international relations. He has served as director of Harvard's U.S.-Japan Program, Fairbank Center, and Asia Center. During 1993-95 he served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in Washington, D.C. Author of many books and studies on Japan, China, and East Asia, in 1996 he directed the American Assembly on China and in 2000 co-headed the Asia Foundation task force on Asia Policy.
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The association of states known as the Commonwealth of Nations has received little attention from students of international politics. Outside the Commonwealth the association has, on the whole, been ignored; alongside other institutions and alliances, its significance is not great; and the foreign policies of the ten states that now belong to it can to a large extent be accounted for, except in the case of Britain, without reference to the fact of their membership. Within the Commonwealth there has been study of it, but the impulse behind this has been provided less by intellectual curiosity than by the desire to see it prosper: British students have been themselves in the grip of the myth of the Commonwealth, which has become in Britain, along with much else, a totem which it is scarcely good form to examine with an innocent eye.
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It has always been true that foreign policy debates tend to proceed on a weak evidentiary base, with clever quips or stirring oratory regularly trumping sound analysis. According to Thucydides, for example, the Athenian assembly that endorsed the Sicilian expedition during the second Peloponnesian War had only the haziest conception of the adversaries’ capabilities. 1 Contemporary politics is distinctive not in the sloganeering quality of political discourse, but in the divergence between the quality of information available to society as a whole and the quality of information used in making decisions. For example, it was clear to any open-minded observer by the time of the Congressional vote in 2002 that implications of collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda lacked any basis in reliable evidence. By the time the Bush Administration initiated war in 2003, claims about Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities were also partially debunked and increasingly dubious. Still, the war went forward, and many Americans continued to believe the Bush Administration’s false claims even after the Administration itself had abandoned them. Many political scientists—like many Americans—were deeply dismayed by this situation, and in the fall of 2004 a group of us determined to try to do something about it. We saw two obvious options. One was to address the substantive issue directly, participating in the election campaign as citizens according to the logic that a new presidential administration would at least not repeat the policies of the Bush team. But anybody could do that, and our marginal contribution could only be modest. We decided
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I'm pleased to report that the health of the American Political Science Association (APSA), and of political science as a discipline, is excellent. © 2003, by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
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This article takes the example of global governance in order to reflect on the problematic relationship between theory and practice and on the gap that exists between the academic and policy worlds. That there is a gap between the two worlds is clear. Some insist on the benefits to be gained from trying to bridge the gap, highlighting the contribution that theoretical inquiry can make to the policy world and the responsibility of academics to contribute towards resolving policy challenges. Others argue for the continued importance of a division of labour, stressing that the logic of theoretical enquiry demands analytical and critical distance from power and politics. This article does not examine either of these extreme positions but instead explores the dangers of the middle road. For academics, insufficient awareness of the problematic ways in which theory and practice are inextricably interwoven makes it more likely that they will fall hostage to the politics and parochial prejudices of both time and place. For policymakers and for those who teach public policy, the danger lies in seeking the authority and legitimacy of academic work that purportedly embodies objectivity and detachment but that in fact merely translates the prejudices and preoccupations of the policy world back into a different idiom. An unreflective and uncritical attitude to the relationship between theory and practice can leave the academic study of International Relations in the worst of all possible worlds.
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Two decades ago, Alexander George observed a growing gap between academic theorists and practitioners in the formulation of foreign policy. The significance of the gap has been debated, but trends in the academy, society, and government suggest it is likely to grow.
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The highly personalized nature of the modern American presidency makes the strengths and weaknesses of the White House incumbent of the utmost importance. This article summarizes the conclusions of an interpretative study of the eleven American presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. It discusses the qualities that have served well and poorly in the Oval Office under six headings: communication to the public, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence.
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Policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical liter-ature in IR, and many scholars seem uninterested in doing policy-relevant work. These tendencies are unfortunate because theory is an essential tool of statecraft. Many pol-icy debates ultimately rest on competing theoretical visions, and relying on a false or flawed theory can lead to major foreign policy disasters. Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of different policies. Unfortunately, the norms and incentives that currently dominate academia discourage many scholars from doing useful theoretical work in IR. The gap between theory and policy can be narrowed only if the academic community begins to place greater value on policy-relevant theoretical work.
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An academic field of study may be said to exist when a coherent body of knowledge is constructed to define a subject of inquiry. Recognized standards come to be employed to train and certify specialists; full-time employment opportunities become available in university teaching and research; learned societies are established to promote study and dialogue; and publishing venues become available to help disseminate new ideas and analysis. In short, an institutionalized network of scholars comes into being, a distinct research community with its own boundaries, rewards, and careers. In that sense, the field of International Political Economy (IPE) has ex- isted for less than half a century. IPE, Robert Gilpin once famously sug- gested, may be defined as 'the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in in- ternational relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power' (Gilpin, 1975b: 43). In other words, IPE is about the complex linkages be- tween economic and political activity at the level of international affairs. As a practical matter, such linkages have always existed. As a distinct aca- demic field, however, IPE was born no more than a few decades ago. Prior to the 1970s, in the English-speaking world, economics and political sci- ence were treated as entirely different disciplines, each with its own view of international affairs. Relatively few efforts were made to bridge the gap be- tween the two. Exceptions could be found, often quite creative, but mostly among Marxists or others outside the 'respectable' mainstream of West- ern scholarship. A broad-based movement to build bridges between the separate specialties of international economics and international relations (IR)—in effect, to construct the field we now know as IPE—was really of very recent origin. ∗ Based on a lecture presented to the inaugural meeting of the International Political
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Are IPE journals becoming boring? The question is a serious one. Over the four decades or so since the modern field of International Political Economy was born, the character of what gets published in leading journals in the United States—IPE standard setters like International Organization, International Studies Quarterly , and World Politics —has changed dramatically. Arguably, the change has not been for the better. To illustrate, consider a simple thought experiment. Think first of some of the memorable work published in the early years of the field—work like Keohane and Nye's special International Organization issue on “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” published as a book in 1972; Peter Katzenstein's 1976 IO essay on “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” which in turn led to his special issue on “Between Power and Plenty,” also published as a book in 1978; or Stephen Krasner's special issue on “International Regimes,” published in book form in 1983. Or think of Krasner's 1976 World Politics study of “State Power and the Structure of International Trade”; Peter Gourevitch's 1978 IO article on the second image reversed; John Ruggie's 1982 IO essay on embedded liberalism; or Jeff Frieden's 1991 IO paper on invested interests. All were seminal, foundational works—influential scholarship that is still widely read and cited. Now compare these with anything that has appeared in mainstream journals over the last 5–10 years. A great deal of quality research has been published, much of it making use of the most rigorous and up-to-date statistical methodologies. The intellectual candlepower is impressive. But how well does this work stack up against the output of earlier years? How much can be regarded as truly path-breaking? How much is likely to be read or cited 5–10 years from now? The answers, I think, are obvious. Our major journals are full of articles …
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Operation Allied Force had a decisive impact on Tony Blair's leadership of UK foreign policy. This article begins with Blair's famous Chicago speech of April 1999; his clearest statement of an apparently underlying moral purpose in international relations. It then contrasts the conventional wisdom that over Kosovo Blair was acting out of a sense of moral obligation (sharpened by recent British failings to act to prevent humanitarian disasters in the Balkans) with a revisionist account centring on the domestic political considerations impelling Blair into this particular foreign policy adventure. Blair drew three lessons from his involvement in Operation Allied Force: that media presentation was a crucial aspect of implementing a successful foreign policy strategy; that he had been too cautious between 1997 and 1999, partly as a result of being chained to the vagaries of public opinion; and that he could generate robust and worthy foreign and defence policies sitting with his close advisers on the sofa of his ‘den’ in Downing Street rather than working through traditional channels. The key argument in conclusion is that there was a Tony Blair before Iraq, one who was genuinely set on building a consensus around humanitarian intervention.
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While some gap between the academic and policy worlds is inherent, it is neither necessary nor beneficial for the “Beltway-Ivory Tower” to be as wide as it is. Three principal factors explain the extent of the gap: academia’s dominant organizational culture, which devalues policy relevance; increased role of think tanks as research transmission belts to the policy world; and limited interest of the policy community in academic research. The case for the value of greater policy relevance for the international relations scholarly community is based on the intellectual pluralism of bringing policy relevance in while not driving theory out, intellectual complementarity in the different relative strengths of scholars and policy professionals, and self-interest both in what individual scholars can learn and in being true to the mission of universities. We make three principal bridging the gap recommendations: increase disciplinary incentives for policy relevant scholarship, more programmatic and project-based connectivity, and more policy world experiential opportunities.
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For the Time-Use survey conducted by Insee in 1999 data was gathered from seven-day diaries in which working people noted their working hours for one week. Different types of working weeks were categorized by applying a two-stage optimal matching method, firstly for working days, then for simplified weeks using day types. The days differ greatly according to socio-professional category, the type of job, sector, but also gender. Pronounced regularities also emerge at a weekly level. Generally speaking, the better ones position in the economic system, the more independent time-management one has and the more working weeks are standard or long. Meanwhile, less skilled workers have working weeks which are shorter on average, but have staggered and fragmented schedules and a very low degree of control over their working time. For couples less independent time-management leads to their work schedules becoming more desynchronized and this creates new inequalities between households.
Should Women get Ph.D.s in International Relations? The New ForeignPolicy.com: Daniel W. Drezner- Global politics, Economics, &amp; Pop Culture
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