Notwithstanding the general principle that a valid trust requires a beneficiary (cestui que trust), "somebody, in whose favour the Court can decree performance",' a principal use of the trust today is to make provision, particularly by will, for causes or non-human objects. Where no person, capable of enforcing the obligations of the trust, is pointed out as its object, there must be someone,
... [Show full abstract] though not the object of the trust, to whom the law gives the same right of suit under the trust as if he were its object. Only the Crown, as parens patriae, enjoys such a right and only in respect of such trusts as are, in a legal sense, charitable. Inherent in their charitable status is the notion that it is in the public interest that they should be enforced. It is in view of their public character that the Attorney-General may act to ensure their execution. A trust which seeks merely to benefit purposes, but which lacks this element of public benefit, will fail, for there is then no reason why the State should lend its aid to seeing that that purpose is carried out. While acknowledging the existence of certain "anomalous and e~ceptional"~ cases, a trust which makes provision for a cause or non-human object will be valid only if it is, in a legal sense, charitable. Animal welfare, "representing perhaps the most extreme instance of charity's drift towards matters peripheral to social elfa are",^ is one such object. It is clear that, with the primary concerns of welfare falling increasingly into the hands of the State, philanthropists have felt justified in turning their attention to such an object; millions of dollars are now annually devoted to animal ~harities.~ These funds have not only been devoted towards the prevention *B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) (Qld.), Senior Tutor in Law, University of Queensland.