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The trouble with radicalization
Abstract
Though widely used by academics and policy-makers in the context of the 'war on terror', the concept of radicalization lacks clarity. This article shows that while radicalization is not a myth, its meaning is ambiguous and the major controversies and debates that have sprung from it are linked to the same inherent ambiguity. The principal conceptual fault-line is between notions of radicalization that emphasize extremist beliefs ('cognitive radicalization') and those that focus on extremist behavior ('behavioural radicalization'). This ambiguity explains the differences between definitions of radicalization; it has driven the scholarly debate, which has revolved around the relationship between cognition and behavior; and it provides the backdrop for strikingly different policy approaches—loosely labeled 'European' and 'Anglo-Saxon'—which the article delineates and discusses in depth. Rather than denying its validity, the article calls on scholars and policy-makers to work harder to understand and embrace a concept which, though ambiguous, is likely to dominate research and policy agendas for years to come.
... However, there is much disagreement over the intricacies and use of this term. While it is widely agreed that radicalisation is a process, it is not agreed upon whether the end result of this process is purely cognitive, being the adoption of radical ideas, or if radical behaviours resulting from these ideas must be exhibited (Neumann, 2013). Additionally, Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2009: 109) observe "there is no generalizable set of characteristics, single demographic profile, or typical pathway to violent extremism", adding to the ambiguity of the term and creating challenges for application to policy and practitioners. ...
... Various ambiguities of the definition of radicalisation have been previously outlined, including difficulties in agreeing upon the end result of radicalisation, as well as which communities are involved (Crone, 2016;Neumann, 2013). It is important to now discuss the impact of these ambiguities. ...
... However, it is difficult to assess trends of radicalisation, which makes establishing a causal relationship with right-wing populism challenging, as direct correlations cannot be observed. Trends in radicalisation are hard to measure due to the ambiguities of the definition (Neumann, 2013). If the end result of radicalisation is terrorism, it can be measured through frequency of terrorist attacks alone. ...
This paper examines the nature of the relationship between right-wing populism and radicalisation to Islamic extremism in the UK. Through the critical analysis of themes and commonalities within existing literature on both individual fields, it is shown that there exists a relationship between the two phenomena, though this relationship has many intricacies. This paper argues that right-wing populism, along with counter-terrorism policy and the media, construct an anti-Muslim narrative, which fosters discrimination and, ultimately, leads to the social exclusion of Muslim suspect communities, a known cause of radicalisation. This research further reveals that this relationship, while significant, is not causal, using cumulative extremism to explain its multidirectional nature. Drawing attention to the relationship between right-wing populism and radicalisation opens up a new approach to understanding the impact current UK politics and the media have on the issue of “homegrown” terrorism. This paper aims to promote engagement with the question of how, as a society, we can implement more effective and less discriminative counter-terrorism policy, as well as become more aware of the impact of the media.
... Ross (1993) suggested a general causation model for oppositional political terrorism that tried to capture, through various propositions, the intricacies and intertwines of all relevant structural factors (permissive and precipitant causes) (Figure 2, below). Contemporary debate has abandoned the notion of the roots of terrorism -seen as a somehow justificatory -taking instead the concept of radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). Being radicalisation different from radical political thought, violent extremism and ultimately terrorism (Dzhekova et al, 2016), the fact that this concept, broader and narrower at the same time, has drawn and framed the discussion on the root causes of terrorism seems to say 'more about the speakers and their governments' ideologies than about the terrorists' intentions and motivations' (Schmid, 2013:2). ...
... Root causes models, as said, usually differentiate several levels: a subjacent ground, where external (pull) and internal (push) factors interplay, leading to radicalisation when a triggering event arises. Pathway and stage models opt for looking radicalisation as a progressive process over a period of time where different factors or dynamics occur (Neumann, 2013). ...
Proyecto TAKEDOWN (Understand the Dimensions of Organised Crime and Terrorist Networks for Developing Effective and Efficient Security Solutions for First-line Practitioners and Professionals)
... Las medidas antiterroristas se centraron en los procesos de radicalización, entendidos como un fenómeno que se puede abortar a través de la neutralización de las ideas que conducen a la radicalización (Schmid, 2013(Schmid, y 2014Neumann, 2013). Los principales programas antiterroristas internacionales, regionales y locales priorizaron el pilar de la prevención de la radicalización y del extremismo (Martini et al., 2020). ...
... Según Berger, la pregunta clave que se debería plantear y responder antes de aplicar cualquier programa para prevenir y combatir el extremismo violento (P/ CEV) es si este busca «luchar contra la V, las acciones violentas, mediante la desvinculación, o contra la E, la adopción del extremismo, mediante la desradicalización o la lucha contra la radicalización» (Berger, 2016: 3). Existe cierto consenso en el mundo académico sobre la necesidad de diferenciar la desradicalización -que se centra en las creencias e ideas extremistas-de la desvinculación -que pone el foco solo en el cambio de comportamiento- Borum, 2011;Neumann, 2013). También hay que tener en cuenta que no todos los extremistas violentos muestran férreas creencias extremistas y que no todas las ideas extremistas acarrean un comportamiento violento (Hellmuth, 2015;Mucha, 2017). ...
Durante las dos últimas décadas, Europa se ha enfrentado a tres desafíos de seguridad: el incremento del terrorismo autóctono (home-grown terrorism), el fenómeno de los combatientes extranjeros y el aumento de la extrema derecha violenta. Ante este escenario, varios países europeos han desarrollado diversas políticas públicas y estrategias cuyo objetivo es la prevención del extremismo violento (PEV). El número 128 de Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals pretende analizar este fenómeno y formular unas primeras respuestas a la pregunta general de investigación: ¿Es la PEV un pilar de las políticas antiterroristas o constituye un nuevo paradigma de acción contra el extremismo violento?
... Their preventive work in countering violent extremism is related to direct client work with youth and adults who may support or participate in both right wing extremist or Islamist extremist organisations (Lid et al., 2016). The concept of radicalization is debated, linked to the war on terror (McKendrick and Finch, 2016), and associated with unclarity (Neumann, 2013). While still debated in academic literature, the term is used to describe a cognitive and behavioural development towards an ideology leading to the use of violence to reach its goals (Koehler, 2017). ...
... While this topic is scarcely described in the scholarly literature, there is evidence that working with violent or traumatised clients has a negative emotional impact on social workers (Adams et al., 2006;Bride, 2007). One explanation of the uncertainties when working within PVE, is the unclarity of the concept of radicalisation itself (Neumann, 2013). Another may be the dilemma that when trying to prevent radicalisation; individuals may feel singled out and stigmatized (Gurski, 2018). ...
To prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, many European countries have adopted a multiagency approach, consisting of both police, teachers and social workers. Such strategies have caused concern for a securitization of social policy and stigmatization of vulnerable groups. This study aims at gaining insight into how Norwegian social workers involved in prevention work against violent extremism experience and manage role conflicts and emotions during interaction with their clients. This article presents findings from 17 individual and two focus group interviews which indicate that social workers experience emotional strain caused by role conflicts and emotional dissonance within a securitized field of social work. To handle these challenges, social workers apply a dynamic combination of surface and deep acting strategies, at both the reactive and proactive level, such as ‘Keeping a brave face’, ‘Character acting’ and ‘Adopting the client’s perspective’. Our findings contribute to expanding both the empirical and conceptual understanding of emotion management at work, and provides a novel insight into how prevention work against violent extremism is perceived by social workers. Also, in a field influenced by security rhetoric, our study gives encouraging new knowledge about how social workers can resist falling into oppressive and controlling practices by seeking to engage with and understand their clients’ human side, and relate this to their own lives.
... There is no definitive answer as to why people radicalize, but it is possible to look for common patterns with a special regard to individual life trajectories and individual cognitive responses to these (Cassam in Sardoč, 2020). While radicalization Threshold of Adversity 207 is a complex and non-straightforward process by which people develop extremist ideologies and beliefs (Borum, 2014;Neumann, 2013;Berger, 2018) typically within extremism-enabling environments (Bouhana, 2019), the common factors behind the individual processes of radicalization habitually point to various life situations in which the individual's psychological needs have been compromised, which have then activated a quest to restore this lost significance (Kruglanski, Bélanger & Gunaratna, 2019). Building on such research findings, Kruglanski, Bélanger and Gunaratna have conceptualized the '3Ns of radicalization' to explain the typical psychological processes behind radicalization. ...
... As demonstrated by these examples, the notion of extremism can be viewed as an ideological stance, which means taking a position at the extreme ends of an ideological continuum, such as conservative or liberal political orientation (Cassam, 2020). Extremism may also be tackled as an issue of methods, where being an extremist is a matter of willingness to use or accept the use of extreme methods that are against the norms or the law, such as sabotage or ethnic agitation (Neumann, 2013;Cassam, 2020). Violence is typically associated with extremism and often seen as the key characteristics of an extremist (Sedgwick, 2010). ...
This article introduces the concept of ‘threshold of adversity’ as an, at present, tentative means of understanding the turning points to radicalization and extremism within educational systems. The conceptual frame is, we argue, of pedagogical and policy relevance across and beyond Nordic countries. Across Nordic countries, the main objective for the prevention of radicalization and extremism through education (PVE-E) is to strengthen the students’ resilience against ideological influences. Given the specialist complexities of the interdisciplinary research literature on terrorism, from which much PVE-E derives, for teachers and policy-makers, understanding the theoretical contexts, which underlie such policy innovations and their pedagogical implementation, are, understandably, problematic. To discuss extremism and the possibilities of its prevention especially in the education sector, an understanding of what exactly is being prevented or fought against is needed. Our conceptual ‘threshold of adversity’ model offers at least a starting point for a more practicable pedagogical implementation.
... Hate speech is defned as the "attack or use of discriminatory language with reference to a person or group" [27]. At the same time, extremism can be referred to as "ideas that are opposed to society's core values which can be of various forms racial or religious supremacy or ideologies that deny basic human rights or democratic principles" [28]. Tere are multiple defnitions of hate speech [29,30] and similarly multiple defnitions of 2 Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience extremism [31,32]. ...
Social media platforms play a key role in fostering the outreach of extremism by influencing the views, opinions, and perceptions of people. These platforms are increasingly exploited by extremist elements for spreading propaganda, radicalizing, and recruiting youth. Hence, research on extremism detection on social media platforms is essential to curb its influence and ill effects. A study of existing literature on extremism detection reveals that it is restricted to a specific ideology, binary classification with limited insights on extremism text, and manual data validation methods to check data quality. In existing research studies, researchers have used datasets limited to a single ideology. As a result, they face serious issues such as class imbalance, limited insights with class labels, and a lack of automated data validation methods. A major contribution of this work is a balanced extremism text dataset, versatile with multiple ideologies verified by robust data validation methods for classifying extremism text into popular extremism types such as propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. The presented extremism text dataset is a generalization of multiple ideologies such as the standard ISIS dataset, GAB White Supremacist dataset, and recent Twitter tweets on ISIS and white supremacist ideology. The dataset is analyzed to extract features for the three focused classes in extremism with TF-IDF unigram, bigrams, and trigrams features. Additionally, pretrained word2vec features are used for semantic analysis. The extracted features in the proposed dataset are evaluated using machine learning classification algorithms such as multinomial Naïve Bayes, support vector machine, random forest, and XGBoost algorithms. The best results were achieved by support vector machine using the TF-IDF unigram model confirming 0.67 F1 score. The proposed multi-ideology and multiclass dataset shows comparable performance to the existing datasets limited to single ideology and binary labels.
... Cognitively, radicalization refers to the support or justification of, or a sense of personal moral obligation toward, the use of violence in the name of an ideology or cause. Although in any population there may be a sizeable portion of individuals who fall into this broad category, an exceptionally small percentage (less than 1%) will ever go on to engage in such radical behaviors (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2010;Borum, 2014;Hafez & Mullins, 2015;Khalil, 2017;McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017;Moskalenko & McCauley, 2020;Neumann, 2013). Like risk and protective factors for other criminal and criminal-analogous outcomes, risk factors for radicalization can generally be split into categories of static and dynamic factors (Lösel et al., 2018;Wolfowicz et al., 2020). ...
... 25. See Neumann, 2003;Malthaner, 2017;Matesan, 2020. 26. ...
Institutionalizing Violence offers a detailed focus on the two most influential Egyptian jihadi groups—al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. From the killing of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 to their partial association with al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the two groups illustrate the range of choices that jihadis make overtime including creating political parties. Jerome Drevon argues that these groups’ comparative trajectories show that jihadis embracing the same ideology can make very different strategic decisions in similar environments. Drevon’s analysis of these groups’ histories over the past four decades illustrates the evolution of jihadism in Egypt and beyond. Institutionalizing Violence develops an institutional approach to radicalization to compare the two Egyptian groups’ trajectories based on ethnographic field research and hundreds of interviews with jihadi leaders and militants in Egypt. Drevon provides a unique perspective on how jihadi groups make and implement new strategic decisions in changing environments, as well as the evolution of their approaches to violence and non-violence.
... Two of the informants, Fazl and Awad, have left the Salafi-jihadist environment and have not been to Syria. Finally, two of the informants, Mazen and Hamdi, have returned from ISIS controlled territories and are no longer behaviorally radicalized 48 with a willingness to travel to some other conflict zone. However, they still have contacts with active members and are in a position to observe general trends in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment's ability to sustain support from its members and other radicals. ...
After the fall of the Islamic State’s self-declared Caliphate in Syria and
Iraq, understanding how the Salafi-jihadist environments in the West
mobilize in new ways has become urgent. This study is based on
unique hard-to-reach data from qualitative interviews with returned
Swedish ISIS fighters, previous members of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist
environment, friends and acquaintances of persons engaged in the
Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment, and a former Swedish jihadist
recruiter. It explores post-Caliphate mobilization in terms of recruiting
new members, keeping old members, and sustaining support from
other radicals who are not active members of the Salafi-jihadist environment. Five distinct themes emerged from the interviews that
reflect changing “push” and “pull” factors, which in different ways
make mobilization in the post-Caliphate period challenging: competition from criminal gangs, increasing fuzziness of the environment, limited ability of external events to mobilize both new and old members, variation in the ease of leaving the Salafi-jihadist environment, and lack of new heroic mobilization narratives. The study concludes that, despite continuing problems in so-called radicalization hubs in Sweden, IS and other jihadist groups now have difficulty mobilizing both old and new members. In particular, changes in pull factors suggest that the current mobilization dynamics point to an environment that is facing challenges.
... According to Neumann, a group or individual might hold "extremist" beliefs without necessarily engaging in "extremist" behavior. As a result, "connecting religious extremism with religious militancy is a serious error" (Neumann, 2013). Iannaccone and Berman (2016) point out that 'Extremism is divided into three types by Wintrobe: groups or persons with extreme goals who use powerful techniques; organizations or individuals with extreme goals who do not employ extreme methods; and individuals or groups who have conventional goals but use extreme tactics to accomplish them. ...
The present anthropological study attempts to document and inform about Extremism, its types, nature, and resistance against it to understand the phenomenon of Extremism in universities' youth. It includes studying extremist behaviors in universities' youth such as radical, religious, linguistic,ethnic-based, and other forms of Extremism. Descriptive qualitative research methodology is used to conduct this research. The primary data is collected over six months from 37 in-depth interviews achieved through the snowball sampling method. Observations as a participant, life histories, and case studies have been used to describe the contextual dynamics of Extremism. Findings show that religious Extremism is most common in university students. The resistance of this religious Extremism is also extremist, which results in conflicts and extremist construction of students' identities in the university.Further, this study will also be helpful for resilience against Extremism and developing peacemaking culture, which is the main agenda of SDGs goals.
... From this perspective, the distinction between CVE and PVE is not evident. Like CVE, PVE seeks to deal with phenomena whose definitions are debatable and debated (Neumann, 2011;Borum, 2011). Lack of consensus over definitions of the key concepts of PVE, for example those of radicalisation and violent extremism, makes it difficult to identify the phenomena it is supposed to be preventing (van de Weert and Eijkman, 2020; Heath-Kelly, 2013). ...
This article analyses strategies for preventing and combatting violent extremism in Spain since the Madrid attacks in 2004. Initially concerned with anticipating the terrorist threat by means of police, military, and legal measures, these strategies have gradually incorporated approaches and measures that address the phenomenon of radicalisation. It is argued that the emergence of the concepts of "countering violent extremism" (CVE) and "preventing violent extremism" (PVE) represents a step forward in the approach to terrorism since its target is not terrorism as such but the factors and conditions that can lead to it. In the case of Spain, CVE and PVE policies come together in the present strategy against violent radicalisation.
... Overall, radicalization is an ambiguous concept (Neumann 2003), extending well beyond either engagement with Islamist terrorism or the use of violence. The stylized view linking radicalization to violence is open to a broader critique that challenges the assumption that attitudes necessarily predict-or even faithfully reflect-actions. ...
... It can stand for "various forms of racial or religious supremacy, or ideologies that deny basic human rights or democratic principles". 23 Here we put emphasis on mobilization based on an ingroup, and the identity-marker of such mobilization can be framed in terms of race, religion, or nationality, etc., and is commonly defined against an outgroup. 24 It can take the form of defending the own group, or advancing the group's interests over others. ...
Trans-national jihadist groups have established themselves across many contexts. However, we have limited knowledge about the larger picture of how such groups tap into various inter-religious, sectarian, or ethnic divisions. To address this research gap, we explore: How do trans-national jihadist groups mobilize on the basis of different forms of identity cleavages? Our empirical analysis focuses on all trans-national jihadist groups who have challenged governments in civil wars. We find that mobilization along ethnic divisions is the most common cleavage, and is increasing most over time. We also find that sectarian mobilization is rare, but associated with significant escalation of violence.
... 22 According to the theory, successful macro-securitization depends not just on (who holds) power, but more on the existence of shared fundamental values/principles, shared threat perceptions, and "on the construction of higher-level referent objects capable of appealing to, and mobilizing, the identity politics of a range of actors within the system." 23 Hence, an analysis of the processes of macro-securitization requires the combination of looking into the mobilization of an audience on a micro-analytical scale, which the radicalization literature has typically done, 24 and the meta-level narratives and speech acts that transform an issue from being a local-level concern to becoming a global/ trans-national concern, attracting new/broader audiences. ...
... Cognitively, radicalization refers to the support or justification of, or a sense of personal moral obligation toward, the use of violence in the name of an ideology or cause. Although in any population there may be a sizeable portion of individuals who fall into this broad category, an exceptionally small percentage (less than 1%) will ever go on to engage in such radical behaviors (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2010;Borum, 2014;Hafez & Mullins, 2015;Khalil, 2017;McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017;Moskalenko & McCauley, 2020;Neumann, 2013). Like risk and protective factors for other criminal and criminal-analogous outcomes, risk factors for radicalization can generally be split into categories of static and dynamic factors (Lösel et al., 2018;Wolfowicz et al., 2020). ...
Research Summary
This study uses agent-based models (ABMs) to compare the impacts of three different types of interventions targeting recruitment to terrorism—community workers at community centers; community-oriented policing; and an employment program for high-risk agents. The first two programs are social interventions that focus on de-radicalization and changing the dispositions of agents in the model, whereas the employment program focuses on “deflection” and represents a situational/opportunity reducing approach to prevention. The results show significant impacts of the community worker and community policing interventions on radicalization but no significant impact on recruitment. In contrast, the employment intervention had a strong and significant impact on recruitment, but little impact on radicalization.
Policy Implications
Our ABM simulations challenge the reliance of existing programs to reduce recruitment to terrorism on counter and de-radicalization approaches. Instead they suggest that policy makers should focus more attention on deflection and opportunity reduction. At the same time, our ABMs point to the salience of social interventions focusing on risk and protective factors for reducing radicalization in society.
... For instance, many models of terrorism participation rely on the assumption that ideological motivation (a.k.a., cognitive radicalization or radicalization of opinion) is a prerequisite for involvement in terrorism (for review and discussion, see Borum, 2011;Neumann, 2003;Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013;Richards, 2015). Other theories focus on socialization as the prime culprit in why people participate in terrorism. ...
Terrorism is a diverse form of violence, and terrorists are also diverse in terms of their characteristics, motivations for participating, and the roles they take within terrorism. Though terrorism studies have mostly focused on developing broad theories of why people participate in terrorism in general, some scholars have advocated for research that tests specific, contextually bound hypotheses and a disaggregation of terrorism by its roles. This study explores which variables most strongly predict violent (i.e. active planning/commission of terrorist violence) versus non-violent (i.e. passive support) involvement in Islamist terrorism among US Muslim converts (N = 131). After rigorously coding open-source data, a dominance analysis indicated that three variables (out of hundreds) were the dominant predictors of whether a subject took on a violent versus non-violent role (V/N-V), accounting for 25% of variance in V/N-V. Subjects who had owned and/or trained with a weapon, were domestic (versus international) terrorists, and had publicly declared their extremist beliefs were significantly more likely to plan or perpetrate terrorist violence, whereas variables related to radicalization, socialization, and socio-demographics had no impact on V/N-V. These results reinforce that terrorism is not monolithic and that understanding antecedent and operational behaviors may hold the most utility for preventing terrorist violence.
... Radicalization is a process that involves a growing acceptance of the use of violence to achieve political or ideological goals. 11 The literature distinguishes between extremist beliefs (cognitive radicalization) and extremist behavior (behavioral radicalization), 12 as well as between violent and nonviolent radicalization. 13 Most research focuses on physical and violent expressions of radicalization. ...
This study examines early intervention against individual radicalization. The data originate from interviews with young Muslims in Norway who had experienced interventions related to their own radicalization, or engaged in or witnessed interventions directed at a radicalized peer or relative. We find that informal interventions by family and friends were most prevalent in the data and played the most decisive role in interrupting radicalization, while police interventions were less common and had mixed results. Interventions by family or peers often came early in the radicalization process, were employed by trusted “insiders”, and took place as part of everyday life, thus having less detrimental consequences for radicalized individuals. We finally discuss the challenges of combining interventions by family members and friends with involvements from the police and security service.
... Fifth, Neumann (2013) suggested that radicalization in the basic level is interpreted as the process of change in someone which eventually leads him/her to be an extremist. On this view, radicalization meant is still in the way of thinking and believing the truth of an understanding. ...
... 52 At the heart of this debate is whether radicalisation is a process which ends with the adoption of extreme beliefs or extreme behaviour. 53 Several scholars have suggested that this ambiguity should make us reconsider the use of this word. 54 However, given that this research seeks to better understand "online radicalisation," a working definition is in order. ...
Online radicalisation to terrorism has become a pervasive policy concern over the last decade. However, as a concept it lacks clarity and empirical support. In this article, we add an empirical and theoretical lens to this problem by analysing the trajectories of 231 Islamic State terrorists. We use cluster analyses to create typologies of individuals’ different online and offline antecedent behaviours, including the ways in which they engaged in networks with co-ideologues and how they prepared for their events. The findings suggest four types of pathway within our dataset: 1) The “Integrated” pathway which has high network engagement both online and offline, mostly made up of individuals that plotted as part of a group; 2) The “Encouraged” pathway contains individuals that acted more in the online domain at the expense of offline; 3) Terrorists in the “Isolated” pathway are defined by a lack of interaction across either domain; 4) The “Enclosed” pathway encompassed actors that displayed greater offline network activity, but still utilised the Internet for planning their activity. These typologies help to move beyond the dichotomy of online or offline radicalisation; there remain few individuals that either exclusively use the Internet or do not use it at all. Rather, we can conceptualise Internet usage on a spectrum in which these four typologies all sit.
... En estos términos, se abre el interrogante de si únicamente deben ser etiquetados como "radicalizados" aquellos individuos que finalmente participan en la planificación y ejecución de actos violentos o si, en una dimensión más amplia, también deben serlo los que legitiman o justifican el uso de la violencia como medio para la obtención de ciertos objetivos políticos (Richards, 2011: 144). Sobre esta cuestión, la literatura especializada ha tendido a realizar -aunque en numerosas ocasiones de forma confusa y ambigua-una distinción entre la "radicalización cognitiva" y la "radicalización violenta" (Neumann, 2013;McCauley y Moskalenko, 2014;Hafez y Mullins, 2015). Mientras que, por su parte, la primera estaría referida a una disposición creciente a apoyar y perseguir cambios de gran alcance en la sociedad que entran en conflicto con el orden social existente o suponen una amenaza directa para él, la segunda tendría lugar cuando esta pretensión es acompañada del uso o la justificación de medios violentos (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 798). ...
RESUMEN: Los autores de este articulo examinan la validez de la radicalización para constituirse como uno de los elementos vertebradores de la lucha contra el terrorismo de inspiración yihadista en la actualidad. En este sentido, se argumenta que no solo se trata de un concepto problemático y vacío de contenido sino que, además, su naturaleza inespecífica dificulta enormemente la implementación de políticas públicas eficientes para prevenir la participación del individuo en el fenómeno terrorista. Por todo ello, ya en el apartado de conclusiones, se postula la necesidad de someter a este concepto a una profunda revisión que, por su parte, implique una reformulación de las estrategias antiterroristas contemporáneas.
... Bajo esta perspectiva, no resulta evidente distinguir entre CEV y PEV. Al igual que la CEV, la PEV trata de abordar fenómenos cuyas definiciones son discutibles y discutidas (Neumann, 2011;Borum, 2011). La falta de consenso sobre las definiciones de conceptos centrales en la PEV, como la radicalización y el extremismo violento, dificulta la identificación de los fenómenos que se trata de prevenir (van de Weert y Eijkman, 2020; Heath-Kelly, 2013). ...
Este artículo analiza las estrategias para prevenir y combatir el extremismo violento en España desde los ataques de Madrid en 2004. Inicialmente centradas en la anticipación de la amenaza terrorista a través de medidas policiales, militares y legales, estas estrategias incorporaron gradualmente aproximaciones y medidas que contemplan el fenómeno del proceso de radicalización. Se argumenta que la emergencia de la lucha para «combatir el extremismo violento» (CEV) y la «prevención del extremismo violento» (PEV) representa una evolución en la aproximación al terrorismo, puesto que su objeto no es el terrorismo como tal, sino los factores y las condiciones que pueden conducir a este. En el caso de España, las políticas CEV y PEV se mezclan en la actual estrategia contra la radicalización violenta.
... Las medidas antiterroristas se centraron en los procesos de radicalización, entendidos como un fenómeno que se puede abortar a través de la neutralización de las ideas que conducen a la radicalización (Schmid, 2013(Schmid, y 2014Neumann, 2013). Los principales programas antiterroristas internacionales, regionales y locales priorizaron el pilar de la prevención de la radicalización y del extremismo (Martini et al., 2020). ...
Este artículo analiza la evolución del paradigma de la estrategia antiterrorista y su manifestación más reciente en Europa: las políticas de prevención del extremismo violento (PEV). A través de una amplia revisión de la literatura que evalúa la PEV a nivel europeo, este artículo se centra en las principales consecuencias políticas y sociales de estas políticas, tal y como están siendo descritas en la literatura académica. La PEV, al centrarse en elementos abstractos e ideológicos –el extremismo– y poner el foco en las ideologías relacionadas con este, da como resultado una política de prevención que penetra y securitiza esferas sociales, domésticas y privadas, al tiempo que incorpora nuevos actores relacionados con la seguridad. Como se mostrará, esta lógica resulta problemática y, en algunos casos, contraproducente.
... Según Berger, la pregunta clave que se debería plantear y responder antes de aplicar cualquier programa para prevenir y combatir el extremismo violento (P/ CEV) es si este busca «luchar contra la V, las acciones violentas, mediante la desvinculación, o contra la E, la adopción del extremismo, mediante la desradicalización o la lucha contra la radicalización» (Berger, 2016: 3). Existe cierto consenso en el mundo académico sobre la necesidad de diferenciar la desradicalización -que se centra en las creencias e ideas extremistas-de la desvinculación -que pone el foco solo en el cambio de comportamiento- (Horgan, 2009;Borum, 2011;Neumann, 2013). También hay que tener en cuenta que no todos los extremistas violentos muestran férreas creencias extremistas y que no todas las ideas extremistas acarrean un comportamiento violento (Hellmuth, 2015;Mucha, 2017). ...
Antes de los asesinatos perpetrados por Mohamed Merah en 2012, las autoridades francesas trataban el terrorismo únicamente como una cuestión de orden público. De ahí que el país llegara tarde en la elaboración de medidas para prevenir la radicalización y el extremismo violento. A partir del análisis de cómo Francia pasó de un enfoque utópico de desradicalización para abordar la radicalización, más concretamente la islamista, a uno más pragmático, basado en la desvinculación y poniendo el foco en la prevención primaria, este artículo presenta los éxitos y los fracasos de los diferentes planes implementados por Francia desde 2014. Con el tiempo, estas estrategias, revisadas y mejoradas (apoyándose en la interpretación del concepto de radicalización) culminaron con la estrategia nacional de 2018 «Prevenir para proteger». Entre otros aspectos, se movilizan el laicismo, los valores republicanos y los sistemas educativo y judicial.
... According to Neumann (2013;p. 874), »virtually all academic models of radicalization (...) conceptualize radicalization as a progression which plays out over a period of time and involves different factors and dynamics. ...
Do radicalized Muslim prisoners differ from non-radicalized Muslim prisoners with regard to Kruglanski’s (2004) quest for significance (QFS), need for (cognitive) closure (NFC), and their frame alignment regarding ideological and religious issues? To answer this research question N = 26 male inmates from Bavarian prisons were interviewed. The radicalized prisoners or extremists ( n = 13) had been identified as Salafi or Jihadi adherents by the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bayerischer Verfassungsschutz) and therefore had a security note. The comparison group were non-radicalized Muslim inmates ( n = 13); the vast majority had a migration background. The audio files of the interviews were transcribed and Mayring’s (2010) qualitative content analysis was applied. The obtained interview material was analyzed twice (each time with a different focus) for psychological differences and characteristics between the two groups of Muslim prisoners. In the first analysis, the interviews were investigated with regard to conspiracy theories, dualistic conception of the world, political sensitivity, collective and individual victimization and religious rigidity. Extremists exhibited a stronger frame alignment with respect to general conspiracy theories, dualistic conception of the world, collective victimization, and political sensitivity. Results also substantiate the idea that extremists exhibit more rigid religious behaviors than non-extremist Muslim prisoners. Contrary to our expectations, the two groups did not differ in various biographical features, for example whether they grew up in a family that actively practiced their religion. In the second analysis, we found that although the overall pattern regarding QFS turned out as expected, the radicalized inmates did not achieve higher values than their non-radicalized counterparts. However, we obtained substantial differences for subcategories of QFS. The extremist prisoners reported more norm violations as a trigger for QFS and more opportunities for gaining significance than non-extremists. This was also true for non-legitimate as well as non-criminal opportunities to gain significance. There was a substantial difference between extremists and non-extremists regarding the overall NFC characteristics. Radicalized prisoners tend to avoid ambiguous situations or uncertainty, they prefer clear, structured processes and firm beliefs. The results suggest that it is possible to differentiate non-radicalized from radicalized Muslims as they showed less quest for significance, less need for closure, less political sensitivity and a less rigorous view on religion.
... The Centre for the Study of Democracy (2016) stated that recruitment is "one of the ways of bringing a radical into the orbit of organized terrorist activities" (p. 24), while Neumann (2013) noted that recruitment is "the process whereby people become extremists" (p. 874). ...
This paper is an examination of the membership recruitment strategies of two violent extremist organizations (VEOs), namely al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. The majority of the literature on VEOs concentrates on the conceptualization of terrorism, motivations for terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, as well as a focus on the frequency of VEO attacks, number of fatalities and funding sources. The literature tends to portray poverty as the main driver of recruitment. The focus on recruitment strategies has been relatively recent. There is therefore still a lack of in-depth analyses on the processes of recruitment of specific extremist groups, and this impacts on the development of effective counter-insurgency policies and practices. We conclude that there is a need for more nuanced studies of recruitment practices, including radicalization strategies, of specific VEOs in Africa. This understanding of recruitment practices, particularly by VEOs such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, will enable more context specific counter-insurgency programmes that target the ability of these organizations to recruit and expand. There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with the challenge of violent extremism in Africa.
... Understandings about how risk and protective factors affect criminal attitudes and behaviors, and the relationship between these distinct but interrelated outcomes, have important implications for understanding the distinctiveness between the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of radicalization, but also the nature of their relationship (Hafez & Mullins, 2015;Khalil, 2014;Neumann, 2013;Carpenter et al., 2009). The literature indicates that there are significant overlaps between criminals and terrorists, who also tend to come from similar segments of the population (Clarke & Newman, 2006). ...
Background
Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1) why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter-radicalization take a risk-protective factor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important.
Objectives
This review has two primary objectives.
1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radicalization outcomes are, without any predeterminations.
2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors.
The review's secondary objectives are to:
1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalization outcomes.
2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between (a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies.
Search Methods
Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary searches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies.
Selection Criteria
The review included observational studies assessing the outcomes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual-level risk and protective factors.
Data Collection and Analysis
One-hundred and twenty-seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta-analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta-regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differences across studies.
Results
Studies were primarily cross-sectional, with samples representing 20 countries OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right-wing, and left-wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes. With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors.
Authors' Conclusions
While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest estimates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significant reductions in risk through targeting by interventions. Conversely, traditional criminogenic factors, as well as psychological factors tend to display the largest estimates. These findings suggest the need to broaden the scope of factors considered in both risk assessment and intervention, and this review provides much needed evidence for guiding the selection of factors.
This article employs cultural repertoire theory to investigate how 84 Muslim men in Norway make meaning of adopting or rejecting political violence. Previous studies have addressed political violence among Muslims, but little attention has been paid to how its adoption and rejection involve self-ascription and ascriptions by others. The participants made meaning by drawing on stories about their past, exclusion and belonging, in addition to religious worldviews and political knowledge, including boundaries of class, crime, violence, race, religion and gender. Muslims are informed by mainstream ascriptions of them as extreme others and inherently radicalized in their meaning-making. This finding has important implications for how Muslim radicalization should be understood and countered.
The research in this paper builds upon the existing NAPs across 35 countries and the
European Union and is based on the experience of Hedayah, which has been working with governments to develop and implement national strategies and action plans for P/CVE since 2014. In combination with national legislation on counter-terrorism, NAPs and national strategies often set out the country’s definition and approaches to terrorism, violent extremism, extremism, and radicalization both online and offline. Hedayah’s work on this subject has granted it privileged access to the conversations, discussions, and disagreements on how this work is to be defined in a variety of contexts such as Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Balkans.
After the Second World War, to secure peace in Europe and prevent further conflicts, North Atlantic Alliance Organization (NATO) was established. The Alliance’s founding treaty was first signed in Washington in 1949 by a dozen European and North American countries. It dedicates the Allies more peaceful, libertarian and non-conflict environment. NATO was largely dormant until Korean War especially in its military structure. During this war in 1952, Türkiye also became one of the new allies of NATO. Türkiye, which has been a member of NATO for 70 years, is the eighth largest contributor to the common fund, and has the second largest army in NATO. As a strong partner of NATO, Türkiye has always been on the front lines of struggle for defence against terrorism. Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which was inaugurated in 2005, is one of the main contributors to this endeavour. From the moment of its foundation, COE-DAT, as an Education & Training (E&T) Facility, think-tank, and Department Head (DH) of Counter-Terrorism (CT) in NATO’s Global Programming, has published 28 activity reports, 21 newsletters, 16 journals, 28 books, and 14 research reports. COE-DAT has conducted 35 Mobile Education in different 21 countries, and executed 133 courses until now. COE-DAT is additionally appointed as the DH for Alliance CT E&T by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and is tasked to coordinate, synchronize and de-conflict the growing quantity of NATO CT E&T in order to provide training that is “efficient, effective and affordable” on behalf of Alliance members. COE-DAT is still ongoing to present recommendations and suggestions for key decision makers in strategic level.
One of the main arguments in the terrorism studies literature
is about the validity of the lone actors. While some studies defend that
the definition of lone actor to be an oxymoron because it contradicts the
generally accepted definition of terrorism, others argue that lone actors
are very real. In this article, it is argued that lone actors have some distinct
characteristics and that is why they are a real threat to European security.
These features are theorized within the framework of the organizational
connection variable, and the differences between lone actor and other
organized attacks are examined. According to both statistical and
descriptive analysis of these attacks, it is concluded that lone actor
attacks are used as a conscious strategic choice by al Qaeda and Daesh
leadership because of their unique characteristics
This article explores the question of which factors and dynamics lead also non-religious people to join the so-called “Islamic State”. The analysis starts with the biographical reconstruction of a radicalization process in Switzerland, the results of which are linked with sociological and socio-psychological explanations from the research on radicalization and extremism. The article shows that also in the field of “Islamic extremism” radicalization processes do not necessarily have to be ideologically or religiously underpinned, and that there are therefore doubts as to the comprehensive explanatory power of the religious paradigm.
Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is a concern for most liberal democracies. This is a study of a preventive initiative called the Tolerance Project (TP), which aims to reduce recruitment to extreme nationalist groups across Sweden. The TP is a Holocaust educational programme that is offered to a selected group of 14- and 15-year-olds, aimed at mixing ‘at-risk’ youths and stabile pupils. During 2015 and 2016, the author conducted ethnographic fieldwork in a Swedish region that was implementing the programme in several localities. At the same time, the largest National Socialist organization in the Nordic countries, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) increased its public visibility and launched a parliamentary branch in Sweden. As a timely example of the TP’s ultimate target group the thesis also examines the legitimation strategy of the NRM and how this correspons to the way the TP work to prevent contemporary forms of extremism.
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 in Indonesia is a signifcant stage in recognizing women’s role in the peace process at the national and locallevels. This research is interested in examining how local communities, especially religious groups, perform their agency in peace-building, specifically counter-radicalization. This research questions the perception and strategies of women Quran study groups in Cilacap regency in counterradicalization efforts and later provides an overview of peace-building and counter-radicalization activities by women religious groups in Cilacap. The research shows that these women religious groups’ perceptions on radicalization influence their understanding as an agency in various counter-radicalization activities and contribute to building the foundation of peace in the community by strengthening society’s resilience through social and religious activities.Adopsi UNSCR 1325 di Indonesia menjadi satu tahapan yang signifkan untuk mengakui peran perempuan dalam proses perdamaian, baik di level nasional hingga lokal. Dengan tujuan mempelajari cara komunitas lokal, khususnya kelompok-kelompok pengajian perempuan, berperan sebagai agensi dalam upaya bina damai di ranah kontra-radikalisasi, penelitian ini mempertanyakan persepsi dan strategi kelompok pengajian perempuan sebagai representasi kelompok perempuan dan kelompok agamis di Kabupaten Cilacap dalam upaya-upaya kontra-radikalisasi dan bina damai. Lebih lanjut, artikel ini memberikan gambaran mengenai aktivitas-aktivitas bina damai dan kontra radikalisasi oleh kelompok pengajian perempuan di Cilacap dan menjelaskan bagaimana persepsi mereka tentang radikalisasi memengaruhi pemahaman sebagai agensi dalam rangkaian aktivitas kontraradikalisasi dan berperan dalam upaya mereka membangun fondasi bagi perdamaian positif di komunitas dengan penguatan ketahanan sosial melalui aktivitas-aktivitas sosial keagamaan
Due to the attacks led by the Buddhist monks, hundreds of Muslims (Rohingyas) in the Arakan region of Myammar lost their lives, and an important part of them had to emigrate. The international community has long remained silent, apart from a few weak reactions, to the discrimination and violence that the Rohingya Muslims have suffered. If the violence continues, this situation caused by Buddhist religious radicals is likely to spread to India and Bangladesh and turn into a regional conflict. The USA wants to use the conflicts between India and China to surround China. The growth of these conflicts will create difficult security problems in the region, as in the Middle East. The main problematic of the study; The extent to which religious-based conflicts affect regional security.
The institutional format of educational training courses in universal extremism prevention entails the promise to counter a rise of different kinds of extremism with targeted interventions. I analyse how an NGO, in cooperation with the police, in a game of three hours simulates processes of radicalisation in school classes. In a reflection of the game the NGO explains the mechanisms of radicalisation with the aim to make participants resilient to radicalisation in real life. I ask who the NGO considers as people at risk and how the prevention measure attempts to change different audiences. Theoretically, I suggest that a constructionist-ethnomethodological perspective on institutional (re-)categorisation of people can be fruitfully complemented by an undogmatic realist one. Methods of ethnography and conversation analysis bring into view how the NGO adapts the prevention measure that was designed for pupils raised in Germany when playing it with refugees. NGO staff consider refugees’ experiences and the focus shifts from generating unsettling experiences when participants realise how they got manipulated in the game to activities typical of integration classes. Hence, not only does the course have an impact on its participants but the different audiences also alter the course. A discussion reveals contradictions in expectations that prevention should provide a standardised and soft quick fix to complex and dynamic societal problems.
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For a book review see:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642537.2022.2143067?src=&journalCode=rejp20
Or see:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364652714_Review_of_Institutionality_Studies_of_Discursive_and_Material_Re-ordering_-Edited_by_Yannik_Porsche_Ronny_Scholz_Jaspal_Naveel_Singh
This is the introductory chapter from Ideology and Mass Killing: The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides and Deadly Atrocities. In research on 'mass killings' such as genocides and campaigns of state terror, the role of ideology is hotly debated. For some scholars, ideologies are crucial in providing the extremist goals and hatreds that motivate ideologically committed people to kill. But many other scholars are sceptical: contending that perpetrators of mass killing rarely seem ideologically committed, and that rational self-interest or powerful forms of social pressure are more important drivers of violence than ideology. In Ideology and Mass Killing, I challenge both these prevailing views, advancing an alternative 'neo-ideological' perspective which systematically retheorises the key ideological foundations of large-scale violence against civilians. Integrating cutting-edge research from multiple disciplines, including political science, political psychology, history and sociology, the book demonstrates that ideological justifications vitally shape such violence in ways that go beyond deep ideological commitment. Most disturbingly of all, the key ideological foundations of mass killings are found to lie, not in extraordinary political goals or hatreds, but in radicalized versions of those conventional, widely accepted ideas that underpin the politics of security in ordinary societies across the world. The book then substantiates this account by a detailed examination of four contrasting cases of mass killing - Stalinist Repression in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1938, the Allied Bombing Campaign against Germany and Japan in World War II from 1940 to 1945, mass atrocities in the Guatemalan Civil War between 1978 and 1983, and the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. This represents the first volume to offer a dedicated, comparative theory of ideology's role in mass killing, while also developing a powerful new account of how ideology affects violence and politics more generally.
En la actualidad, el “discurso sobre la radicalización” se ha tornado hegemónico a la hora de aproximarse al terrorismo de inspiración yihadista. En este sentido, este marco epistemológico no solo ha sido ampliamente examinado en el campo académico sino que, además, también ha sido utilizado para articular un número significativo de políticas públicas en esta materia. El objetivo principal de este artículo reside en examinar las consecuencias que se derivan de esta hegemonía desde un punto de vista muy concreto que, por su parte, entronca con una tendencia mucho más amplia que puede ser rastreada desde comienzos de los años setenta del siglo pasado: la securitización de las políticas sociales. Para ello, en primer lugar, el “discurso sobre la radicalización” es deconstruido desde una aproximación crítica, evidenciándose que su mera existencia contribuye a criminalizar a categorías enteras de población que nada tienen que ver con este fenómeno. Posteriormente, se analiza cómo la pretensión anticipatoria en la que se basa este discurso ha conducido a que determinados profesionales del ala asistencial del Estado sean involucrados de forma activa en la lucha contra el terrorismo, lo que ha sentado las bases para una securitización de la política social aún mayor. Finalmente, ya en el apartado de conclusiones, se argumenta que el “discurso sobre la radicalización” no ofrece un marco adecuado para prevenir de forma eficiente la participación del individuo en el fenómeno terrorista.
This is the first annual review of the "Monitoringsystem und Transferplattform Radikalisierung" (MOTRA) research network featuring summary reports of current research in the field.
Résumé
Cet article propose une revue de la littérature consacrée aux études empiriques examinant les rapports entre Radicalisation et Justice. Il en ressort que la perception des institutions policières et judiciaires, l’expérience vécue de leur action ou encore la confrontation régulière à leurs représentants affecte(nt) les processus d’engagement.
Mots-clés: radicalisation, procedural justice, crime-terror nexus, mouvements sociaux
Samenvatting
Dit artikel geeft een overzicht van de literatuur over empirische studies waarin het verband tussen radicalisering en justitie onder de loep wordt genomen. Hieruit blijkt dat de perceptie van de politiële en justitiële instellingen, de ervaringen in het kader van hun optreden maar ook de regelmatige confrontatie met hun vertegenwoordigers een impact hebben op de engagementsprocessen.
Trefwoorden: radicalisering, procedural justice, crime-terror nexus, sociale bewegingen
Summary
This article presents a literature review of the empirical studies examining the relation between Radicalization and Justice. It appears that the perception of the police or the judicial authorities, the experience with their actions or also the regular confrontation with their members has an impact of the processes of engagement.
Keywords: radicalization, procedural justice, crime-terror nexus, social movements
We propose to extend the current binary understanding of terrorism (vs. non-terrorism) with a Dynamic Matrix of Extremisms and Terrorism (DMET). DMET considers the whole ecosystem of content and actors that can contribute to a continuum of extremism (e.g., right-wing, left-wing, religious, separatist, single-issue). It organizes levels of extremisms by varying degrees of ideological engagement and the presence of violence (e.g., partisan, fringe, violent extremism, terrorism) identified based on cognitive and behavioral cues and group dynamics. DMET is globally applicable due to its comprehensive conceptualization of the levels of extremisms. It is also dynamic, enabling iterative mapping with the region- and time-specific classifications of extremist actors. Once global actors recognize DMET types and their distinct characteristics, they can comprehensively analyze the profiles of extremist actors (e.g., individuals, groups, movements), track these respective actors and their activities (e.g., social media content) over time, and launch targeted counter activities, whether in the form of deplatforming, content moderation or redirects to targeted CVE narratives.
This systematic review aims to answer the following research questions: (1) What are the family-related risk and protective factors for radicalization? (2) What is the impact of radicalization on families? (3) To what extent are family-based interventions against radicalization effective? The review will answer these research questions by systematically gathering and synthesizing published and unpublished scientific literature on family-related risk and protective factors for radicalization, the impact of radicalization on family, and studies that evaluate the impact of family-based interventions on radicalization. This review will also explore what components of family-based interventions are most effective for countering radicalization. Thus, this systematic review will provide a global vision of scientific literature focused on family and radicalization including quantitative research.
This article conceptualizes political radicalization as a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence. Across individuals, groups, and mass publics, twelve mechanisms of radicalization are distinguished. For ten of these mechanisms, radicalization occurs in a context of group identification and reaction to perceived threat to the ingroup. The variety and strength of reactive mechanisms point to the need to understand radicalization—including the extremes of terrorism—as emerging more from the dynamics of intergroup conflict than from the vicissitudes of individual psychology.
The ubiquity of use of the term “radicalization” suggests a consensus about its meaning, but this article shows through a review of a variety of definitions that no such consensus exists. The article then argues that use of the term is problematic not just for these reasons, but because it is used in three different contexts: the security context, the integration context, and the foreign-policy context. It is argued that each of these contexts has a different agenda, impacted in the case of the integration agenda by the rise of European “neo-nationalism,” and so each uses the term “radical” to mean something different. The use of one term to denote at least three different concepts risks serious confusion. The proposed solution is to abandon the attempt to use “radicalization” as an absolute concept.
The Salafi movement (often referred to as the Wahhabis) includes such diverse fig-ures as Osama bin Laden and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia and reflects a broad array of positions regarding issues related to politics and violence. This article explains the sources of unity that connect violent extremists with nonviolent puritans. Al-though Salafis share a common religious creed, they differ over their assessment of contemporary problems and thus how this creed should be applied. Differences over contextual interpretation have produced three major Salafi factions: purists, politicos, and jihadis.
To foster a more in-depth understanding of the psychological processes leading to terrorism, the author conceptualizes the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase. Although the vast majority of people, even when feeling deprived and unfairly treated, remain on the ground floor, some individuals climb up and are eventually recruited into terrorist organizations. These individuals believe they have no effective voice in society, are encouraged by leaders to displace aggression onto out-groups, and become socialized to see terrorist organizations as legitimate and out-group members as evil. The current policy of focusing on individuals already at the top of the staircase brings only short-term gains. The best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor.