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Degrowth is the literal translation of 'décroissance', a French word meaning reduction. Launched by activists in 2001 as a challenge to growth, it became a missile word that sparks a contentious debate on the diagnosis and prognosis of our society. 'Degrowth' became an interpretative frame for a new (and old) social movement where numerous streams of critical ideas and political actions converge. It is an attempt to re-politicise debates about desired socio-environmental futures and an example of an activist-led science now consolidating into a concept in academic literature. This article discusses the definition, origins, evolution, practices and construction of degrowth. The main objective is to explain degrowth's multiple sources and strategies in order to improve its basic definition and avoid reductionist criticisms and misconceptions. To this end, the article presents degrowth's main intellectual sources as well as its diverse strategies (oppositional activism, building of alternatives and political proposals) and actors (practitioners, activists and scientists). Finally, the article argues that the movement's diversity does not detract from the existence of a common path.
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Environmental Values 22 (2013): 191–215
© 2013 The White Horse Press. doi: 10.3197/096327113X13581561725194
Submitted 3 August 2012, accepted 29 November 2012
What is Degrowth?
From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement
Research & Degrowth (R&D) and Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia
Ambientals (ICTA)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Edici C Campus de la UAB
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Barcelona, Spain
* Corresponding author.;
Degrowth is the literal translation of ‘décroissance’, a French word meaning
reduction. Launched by activists in 2001 as a challenge to growth, it became a
missile word that sparks a contentious debate on the diagnosis and prognosis of
our society. ‘Degrowth’ became an interpretative frame for a new (and old) so-
cial movement where numerous streams of critical ideas and political actions
converge. It is an attempt to re-politicise debates about desired socio-environ-
mental futures and an example of an activist-led science now consolidating
into a concept in academic literature. This article discusses the denition, ori-
gins, evolution, practices and construction of degrowth. The main objective
is to explain degrowth’s multiple sources and strategies in order to improve
its basic denition and avoid reductionist criticisms and misconceptions. To
this end, the article presents degrowth’s main intellectual sources as well as its
diverse strategies (oppositional activism, building of alternatives and political
proposals) and actors (practitioners, activists and scientists). Finally, the article
argues that the movement’s diversity does not detract from the existence of a
common path.
Degrowth, social movements, activist-led science, political strategies, limits to
growth, post-growth
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Degrowth (‘décroissance in French) was launched in the beginning of the
21st century as a project of voluntary societal shrinking of production and
consumption aimed at social and ecological sustainability. It quickly became
a slogan against economic growth (Bernard et al., 2003) and developed into
a social movement. The term in English has also entered academic journals
(Fournier, 2008; Martinez-Alier et al., 2010; Victor, 2010; Schneider et al.,
2011) and at least ve Special Issues or Special Sections have been dedicated
to the topic over the last four years (Kallis et al. 2010; Cattaneo et al 2012;
Saed 2012; Sekulova et al 2013; Kallis et al. 2012). Degrowth has also been
quoted and analysed by French and Italian politicians and many renowned
newspapers,1 including Le Monde,2 Le Monde Diplomatique,3 El Pais, the
Wall Street Journal4 and Financial Times.5 During its short life, degrowth has
been subjected to diverging and often reductionist interpretations. This arti-
cle aims to improve the basic denition of degrowth while clarifying possible
misconceptions regarding the term. To this end, we provide a short history of
degrowth and a comprehensive description of its sources and strategies, mean-
while stressing its relevance as a social movement.
Unlike sustainable development, which is a concept based on false con-
sensus (Hornborg 2009), degrowth does not aspire to be adopted as a common
goal by the United Nations, the OECD or the European Commission. The
idea of ‘socially sustainable degrowth’ (Schneider et al. 2010), or simply de-
growth, was born as a proposal for radical change. The contemporary context
of neo-liberal capitalism appears as a post-political condition, meaning a po-
litical formation that forecloses the political and prevents the politicisation
of particular demands (Swyngedouw 2007). Within this context, degrowth
is an attempt to re-politicise the debate on the much needed socio-ecological
transformation, afrming dissidence with the current world representations
and searching for alternative ones. Along these lines, degrowth is a critique
of the current development hegemony (Rist 2008). The rst critiques of the
Western notion of development (universal uniform development) began with
writers such as Arturo Escobar and Wolfgang Sachs, amongst a few others,
1. On a brief count, Le Monde published 18, El Pais 5 and La Repubblica 7 articles on the
Degrowth movement in 2011.
2. Yves Cochet, a French politician and former minister, openly defends economic degrowth;
meanwhile Sarkozy spoke publicly ‘pour le nucléaire et contre la décroissance’ (in favour of
nuclear energy and against degrowth) in April 2011 (Le Monde, 07/04/11).
3. Dupin, Eric (20/08/2009). La décroissance, une idée qui chemine sous la récession. Le
Monde Diplomatique, pp 20-21.
4. Assadourian, Erik. (12/06/2012). How to Shrink the French Economy. The Wall Street
5. Caldwell, Christopher. (15/10/2011). Décroissance: how the French counter capitalism.
Financial Times.
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in the 1980s. Degrowth also challenges the ideas of ‘green growth’ or ‘green
economy’ and the associated belief in economic growth as a desirable path in
political agendas.
Degrowth confronts dominant paradigms in social sciences, such as neo-
classical economics and also Keynesian economics, but is not a paradigm in
the sense of ‘universally recognized scientic achievements that, for a time,
provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers’ (Kuhn
1962: x). In economics, a new ecological macroeconomics without growth is
emerging (Victor 2008; Jackson 2011), building on Herman Daly’s ‘steady
state economy’ (Kerschner 2010), which could evolve into a new paradigm in
economics. However, there is still a long way to go.
Some people refer to degrowth as an ideology, meaning a ‘system of ideas
and values’. This position remains too simplistic, or at least premature, to
explain its heterogeneity of sources and strategies. Degrowth is not just an eco-
nomic concept. We shall show that it is a frame constituted by a large array of
concerns, goals, strategies and actions. As a result degrowth has now become a
conuence point where streams of critical ideas and political action converge.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section II addresses the
relevance of social movement theory for degrowth; Section III briey presents
its history; Sections IV, V and VI present and discuss the different ‘schools of
thought’ and strategies associated with degrowth; and Section VII concludes
with an attempt to provide a comprehensive denition of what is meant by
Primary information for this article was collected via ‘participant observa-
tion’, ‘observing participation’ (Cattaneo 2006; D’Alisa et al. 2010)6 or by
‘observant participators’ (Brown 2007). The authors, in particular Francois
Schneider, have been involved with the degrowth movement since its early
days. In 2004, Schneider started a tour of France with a donkey for more than
one year, spreading the proposal of degrowth. Many of the ideas presented in
this article come from that tour and following public talks, which could be seen
as an original way of doing eld work and dissemination at the same time.
More in general the involvement of authors ensures an insider point of view
and access to a vast amount of informal knowledge and documents collected
since 2000 and not always published in scientic journals.7
6. This method stresses the participative role of the observer and the fact that the resulting ob-
servations emerge from the reective ability of the participant. In this vein, the motivation of
the participant is activism and the academic outcome is a by-product of this activism.
7. The authors are presently members of the ‘Research & Degrowth’ which is an association
dedicated to research, training, awareness raising and events organisation. Most notably
R&D promotes the International Conferences on Degrowth (Paris 2008, Barcelona 2010,
Montreal and Venice 2012).
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Degrowth has evolved into an interpretative frame for a social movement, un-
derstood as the mechanism through which actors engage in a collective action
(Della Porta and Diani 2006). For instance, anti-car and anti-advertising activ-
ists, cyclist and pedestrian rights campaigners, partisans of organic agriculture,
critics of urban sprawl, and promoters of solar energy and local currencies
have started seeing degrowth as an appropriate common representative frame
for their world view.
Goffman (1974) studies social movements using the concept of frames.
These enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label events they ex-
perience (Snow et al. 1986). Interpretative frames generalise a given problem
or life experience and produce new denitions, demonstrating its links and
relevance with wider processes, events and conditions of other social groups.
The framing process is in fact one of politicisation, composed by two main
dimensions: diagnostic and prognostic (Della Porta and Diani 2006).
The diagnosis mobilises multiple sources (or streams of thought) across
space and time, and the prognosis engages multiple strategies and actors.
These processes are described in detail below. The diagnosis consists of iden-
tifying the causes of a social problem. Degrowth as an interpretative frame
diagnoses that disparate social phenomena such as the social and environmen-
tal crises are related to economic growth. Degrowth actors are thus ‘signifying
agents’ engaged in the production of alternative and contentious meanings
which differ from the ones defended by the mainstream (i.e. mass media, most
politicians, economics professors and nancial experts and industry CEOs).
Pro-growth actors, for example, see economic growth as the best path to deal-
ing with the current economic crisis and paying back debts, while degrowth
actors nd the economic system based on growth (fuelled by debt) as the core
problem. Sources from which degrowth builds its diagnosis are presented in
Section IV. It is the complementarity between different concerns that actually
motivate degrowth.
The prognosis, usually characterised by a strong utopian dimension, seeks
solutions and hypothesises new social patterns. Beyond practical goals, this
process opens new spaces and prospects for action. Strategies associated with
the prognosis tend to be multiple. In terms of approaches, these can be alterna-
tives building, opposition and research,8 and in relation to capitalism, they can
be ‘anti-capitalist’, ‘post-capitalist’ and ‘despite capitalism’ (Chatterton and
Pickerell 2010). We argue that these can be combined, as explained in Section
8. Anheier et al. 2001 refers to the existing approaches as rejectionist, alternative and reformist.
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Some of the ideas behind degrowth have been part of philosophical debates
for centuries. The word ‘Décroissance (French for degrowth) appeared pos-
sibly for the rst time in 197210 as a description of a societal path, and was
mentioned several times (Amar 1973; Gorz 1977; Georgescu-Roegen 1979)
in the follow-up of the Meadows report to the Club of Rome, ‘The limits to
growth’. In 1982, a conference was organised in Montreal with the title Les en-
jeux de la décroissance (the challenges of degrowth), but the word was used as
a synonym of economic recession (ACSALF, 1983). Décroissance became an
activist slogan in France in 2001, Italy in 2004 (as ‘Decrescita’) and Catalonia
and Spain in 2006 (as ‘Decreixement and ‘Decrecimiento’).
Décroissance, as a social movement, only started in Lyon (France) in the
wake of protests for car-free cities, meals in the streets, food cooperatives and
anti-advertising (journal Casseurs de pub). This was followed, at the beginning
of 2002, by a special issue of Silence magazine, edited by Vincent Cheynet and
Bruno Clémentin. That same year the conference Défaire le développement,
refaire le monde (Unmake development, remake the world) took place in Paris
at UNESCO with 800 participants. In 2004, degrowth entered a larger public
debate with the monthly degrowth magazine La Décroissance, le journal de la
joie de vivre, selling today around 30,000 copies.
The English term ‘degrowth’ was ‘ofcially’ introduced at the rst
Degrowth conference in Paris in 2008, which also marked the birth of de-
growth as an international research area.
Following the Paris, Barcelona, Montreal and Venice degrowth confer-
ences between 2008 and 2012, the movement has further spread to groups
and activities in Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Poland, Greece, Germany,
Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Czech Republic, Mexico, Brazil, Puerto Rico,
Canada and elsewhere.11
Degrowth is rich in its meanings and does not embrace one single philosophical
current. Its practitioners do not admire a single book or an author. Its the-
matic backbone derives from some streams of ecological and social thought.
9. A more general history of degrowth as a social movement can be found at http://degrowth.
10. ‘The global equilibrium, for which no-growth – or even degrowth - of material production
is a necessary condition, is it compatible with the survival of the (capitalist) system?’ M.
Bosquet (André Gorz), Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 397, 19th June 1972, p. IV. Proceedings
from a public debate organized in Paris by the Club du Nouvel Observateur.
11. More than fty groups from many countries organised a Pic-Nic for Degrowth in 2010 and
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The identication of degrowth streams was rst developed by Flipo (2007).
Following him we refer to the streams as degrowth ‘sources’. Degrowth is
placed at the junction of several such sources or streams of thought which
cross each other without being in competition (Bayon et al. 2010). The sources
bring methodologies and values together and constitute tracks for interpreting
degrowth. Below we identify six sources (adding ‘justice’ to the ve proposed
by Fabrice Flipo). The attribution of authors to a specic source is somewhat
articial, as no author is related to only one. A more in-depth description of
the rst ve degrowth sources can be found in Flipo (2007) and Bayon et al.
Firstly, this source implies perceiving ecosystems as having value in them-
selves, and not only as providers of useful environmental resources or services.
Secondly, it stresses the competition between ecosystems and the industrial
production and consumption systems. An absolute decoupling between indus-
trial expansion and ecological destruction has not been observed yet and it
is very unlikely to take place. Degrowth is therefore a possible path to pre-
serve ecosystems by the reduction of human pressure over ecosystems and
nature, and a challenge to the idea that decoupling of ecological impacts from
economic growth is possible. Degrowth leads to the res communis approach
(Bayon et al. 2010) suggesting that environmental goods are commonly cared
for and shared so that appropriation by a single individual is avoided (as op-
posed to a res nullius approach where resources belong to no one and can be
freely destroyed and stolen). Strategy-wise, res communis implies an integra-
tion of humans in nature, while ‘rights of nature’ could be a rearguard strategy
to preserve what remains, creating areas for ecosystems regeneration.
Critiques of development and praise for anti-utilitarianism
This degrowth source derives from anthropology. Authors within this current
perceive degrowth as a ‘missile word’, which strikes down the hegemonic
imaginary of both development and utilitarianism. Latouche has been an im-
portant author in this stream of thought. Critics of development from the 1970s
and 1980s include Arturo Escobar, Gilbert Rist, Helena Norberg-Hodge, Majid
Rahnema, Wolfgang Sachs, Ashish Nandy, Shiv Visvanathan, Gustavo Esteva
(Sachs 1992), François Partant, Bernard Charbonneau and Ivan Illich. The es-
sence of this source is the critique of the uniformisation of cultures due to the
widespread adoption of particular technologies and consumption and produc-
tion models experienced in the global North. As Latouche (2009) puts it, the
western development model is a mental construct adopted by the rest of the
world. Degrowth considers ‘sustainable development’ an oxymoron and calls
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for disentangling from the social imaginary that it entails, and beyond this, it
criticises the notion of ‘development’ itself.
The other face of this current in the degrowth movement is the critique of
homo economicus, against utility-maximisation as the ultimate driving force
of human behaviour. This critique was inspired by Marcel Mauss in the 1920s
(Mauss 2007[1924]), and Serge Latouche, Alain Caillé and other members of
the MAUSS (Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences Sociales) (Caillé
1989). Other authors often quoted are social and economic historian Karl
Polanyi (1944) and anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1972).
The conception of human beings as economic agents driven by self-interest
and utility maximisation is one representation of the world, or one historic
social construct which has been meticulously nested in the minds of many gen-
erations of economics students. Degrowth in that sense calls for more ample
visions giving importance to economic relations based on sharing, gifts and
reciprocity, where social relations and conviviality are central. The focus here
is on the change in the structure of values and the change in value-articulating
institutions. Degrowth is thus a way to bring forward a new imaginary which
implies a change of culture and a rediscovery of human identity which is dis-
entangled from economic representations (Bayon et al. 2010).
Meaning of life and well-being
The essence of this source is the emerging need for more meaning in life (and
of life) in modern societies. It is a critique of life-styles based on the mantras
of working more, earning more, selling more and buying more.
The ‘meaning of life’ source of degrowth also draws on ndings in the liter-
ature on the economics of happiness. The disconnect between income increase
and life satisfaction over time, a phenomenon known as the Easterlin Paradox
(Easterlin 1974), as well as the association between the importance of material
gains and emotional disorders (Kasser 2002), are two important references.
The movement for voluntary simplicity, reducing individual consumption
while seeing simple life as liberating and profound rather than restraining and
limiting is an important vision within this source. Reference works here are
Walden or Life in the Woods from Henry David Thoreau, Happy Sobriety by
Pierre Rabhi, Voluntary Simplicity by Mongeau, Schumacher’s apology for
enoughness and Kumarappa’s Economy of Permanence.12
Ecological economics and industrial ecology are also degrowth sources.
Most ecological economists are followers of Georgescu-Roegen (1971) who
12. In India, the notion of aparigraha, sufciency, self-restraint in consumption, is very much
alive in some circles despite the economic boom.
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introduced the term ‘bioeconomics’ and wrote in favour of décroissance.13 This
school of thought stresses the importance of resources and sinks availability
(Bonaiuti, 2011; Odum, 2001) and a factor X reduction of natural resources
consumption (Schmidt-Bleek and Klüting, 1993). A classical reference here is
the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972; 2004).
For Georgescu, human activity transforms energy and materials of low en-
tropy or good quality into waste and pollution which are unusable and have
high entropy. Even the inow of low-entropy solar energy is limited in the
sense that it falls in a dispersed fashion on the earth. Degrowth can thus slow
down the process of material degradation. A steady-state economy (as pro-
posed by Herman Daly) is not enough for rich countries.
The bioeconomic arguments for degrowth, including the decreasing energy
return on investment and the imminent peak oil,14 are often cited in academic
and political debate. Ecological economists have long appealed to the 1920s
economic writings of Frederick Soddy (Soddy 1926; Daly 1980, Martinez-
Alier 1987). The nancial crisis of 2008 and the idea of ‘debtocracy’ have
revived interest in this author, who stressed that the nancial system confuses
expansion of credit with the creation of real wealth, while the real economy of
energy and materials cannot grow at the interest rate necessary to pay off debts.
As Georgescu and Odum explain, the available natural resources are actually
decreasing. The increase of private or public debts is thus a perfect recipe for
economic and scal crises.
Degrowth is a criticism of the belief in ecological modernisation which
claims that new technologies and efciency improvements are key solutions to
the ecological crisis. While technological innovation is a source of debate in
degrowth, all degrowth actors question the capacity of technological innova-
tion to overcome biophysical limits and sustain innite economic growth. The
Jevons paradox provides an explanation: eco-efciency may lead to increased
consumption or production because technologies suppress limits (to produc-
tion and consumption) (Polimeni et al. 2008, Schneider 2008). For example,
savings in energy and materials may be reinvested in new material and energy
acquisitions, offsetting the gains in reduction of material and energy use as-
sociated with efciency measures. Degrowth dwells on many ‘non-technical’
proposals for reducing material and energy ows outside the modernisation ap-
proach which tends to discard the option of setting some limits to technologies.
13. In a fax to Paul Samuelson of 14 December 1992 where he complained about the silence
about his work Georgescu-Roegen wrote ironically: ‘I welcomed the opportunity to reveal
how much of a doomsayer I was in the small volume with an outrageous title, Demain la
décroissance (Paris, Pierre-Marcel Favre, 1979)’. See also Levallois, 2010.
14. Hubbert’s theory of peak oil states that there is a maximum level of oil resource extraction
after which production begins to fall, and both energy costs and prices increase.
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The next source for the degrowth movement springs from the calls for deeper
democracy (Deriu, 2008; Cattaneo et al. 2012; Asara et al., 2013). In particular,
degrowth is a response to the lack of democratic debates on economic develop-
ment, growth, technological innovation and advancement. Within this source
we nd conicting positions between those who defend present democratic
institutions considering the risks of losing what we have achieved (a more
reformist strand), and those who demand completely new institutions based on
direct and participatory democracy (more alternative, or post-capitalist vision).
Some of the key writers within this source for degrowth are Ivan Illich, Jacques
Ellul and Cornelius Castoriadis. As Illich (1973) stated, past a given thresh-
old, technology can no longer be controlled by people. For Illich, only when
keeping the technological system below a given multidimensional threshold
can we make democracy feasible. Ellul (1977), on the other hand, conducted
profound studies on technology in which he described technology as a system
that expands without democratic feedback and follows an independent path.
In order to challenge techniques which Ellul perceived as autonomous and
self-augmenting, we need democratic feedback that is external to the technical
system. Castoriadis is another key author for degrowth. He defended the ideas
of ‘self-institutionalising society’ and of autonomy, meant as an entity that
governs itself with its own laws. He defended that democracy can only exist by
(and with) self-limitation (Castoriadis 1988; Asara et al. 2013).
The last source we wish to mention is justice. For Paul Ariès (2005), the rst
type of degrowth is the degrowth of inequality. In line with Dobson (2003)
degrowth does not take ‘just sustainability’ for granted. Instead it intentionally
pursues and explores ways to make justice and sustainability compatible.
One common assumption among economists is that only economic growth
can improve the living conditions of poor people on the planet. Given the per-
ceived impossibility of voluntary income reduction and redistribution, the only
strategy for dealing with poverty is having economic growth which will make
sure that little drops of wealth eventually trickle down to the poor.
Facing the trickle down hypothesis (Snowdon 2006), degrowth opts for
less competition, large scale redistribution, sharing and reduction of excessive
incomes and wealth. If poverty is perceived in terms of relative consumption, it
can never be ‘eradicated’ by economic growth as it only changes the scale but
not the proportions of wealth which individuals possess. Needs, however, can
be served by different satisers (Max-Neef and Kumar 1991). The degrowth
popular literature, for example, has a large number of stories about ‘down-
shifters’, or people who opt for frugality fullling their needs with satisers
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which differ from those used by people with high incomes (Conill et al., 2012;
Carlsson 2008).
As described by Ikeme (2003) we can identify two groups of philosophical
trends here, one related to the consequentialist approach which focuses on the
ultimate results over the means, and the deontological one which favours the
means over the results. As an illustration, focusing only on well-being or in-
equality indicators, is a consequence of applying only the rst approach while
giving priority to a behaviour such as non-violence, is related to the second
one. Hereafter we go through different visions within the justice source of de-
growth, while exploring the consequentialist-deontological duality.
The rst vision is related to social comparison and envy. According to Le
Monde journalist Herve Kempf, inuenced by Veblen (1899), social com-
parison based on the existence and promotion of rich-people lifestyles, has
been responsible for social and environmental crises (Kempf, 2007). From
a consequentialist point of view degrowth can make social comparison less
problematic by reducing the reasons for envy and competition ‘à la Darwin’.
Setting a maximum income, or maximum wealth, to weaken envy as a motor of
consumerism, and opening borders (“no-border”) to reduce means to keep ine-
quality between rich and poor countries, were some of the proposals discussed
at the Second International Conference on degrowth. From a deontological
perspective degrowth implies a change of culture making us insensitive to the
attractions of high-consumption lifestyles, as suggested by the anti-utilitarian
school. Justice requires a degrowth of the living standards of the rich classes of
the North and South. This point is often misunderstood by those who see popu-
lation growth as the central issue. They seem to ignore the difference between
the lifestyle of an artisan sher in India and a banker in New York or Mumbai.
The second vision implies repairing past injustice. A good illustration is the
concept of ecological debt, or the demand that the Global North pays for past
and present colonial exploitation in the Global South. The struggles for climate
justice (such as the informal coalition of groups and organisations Climate
Justice Now!) could easily become allies of degrowth, together with many
other movements for environmental justice in the South (Martinez-Alier et
al 2010, 2012), including post-extractivism and Buen Vivir in Latin America
(Martinez-Alier 2010, 2012; Acosta and Martinez 2009; Gudynas 2011).
Thirdly, the equality approach to justice in the context of degrowth im-
plies resource and wealth redistribution both within and between North and
South economies. Justice here is understood as a concern for a fair distribution
of economic, social and environmental goods and bads at all time-lines (i.e.
intra-generational and inter-generational). It is opposed to Garrett Hardin’s
‘lifeboat ethics’, in which environmental and population concerns lead easily
to racism. Degrowth of resource exploitation to secure basic access to ecosys-
tem services in the Global South and poorer fringes everywhere is consensual
among authors. Having said this, we should mention that equality is often
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misunderstood as universalism or as a call for uniformisation of Western life-
styles (See Section VI).
Finally, some understand justice as preventing misery by establishing mini-
mum standards and a basic income for all (in the form of natural resources,
public services and/or money). Others challenge the basic income approach
and underline the importance of merit and contribution to society (Garcia,
2012). Feminism,15 caste and class division16 and non-violence17 are other key
topics to discuss within the justice source of degrowth that would require ex-
tensive elaboration.
As discussed earlier, even if activists did not coin the term ‘degrowth’, they
were the ones who promoted it as a slogan for voluntary and democratic so-
cietal change. Each source of degrowth can inspire a different range of action
strategies at the local, global and inter-levels, relating to everyday life, but
also to the abstract work of intellectuals. Action strategies vary from opposi-
tion, building alternatives (creation of new institutions) and reformism (actions
within existing institutions to create conditions for societal transformation) –
from local to global levels (for a similar analysis see Dobson 2007). Among
the rst promoters of degrowth we nd grass-root activists engaged in opposi-
tion, and practitioners developing alternatives. Some actors call for a complete
overhaul of the existing institutions, while others call for their transformation
or partial conservation at both local and higher levels (involving political en-
gagement and academic research). The combination of different actors under
the degrowth umbrella has not gone without conicts, nor without comple-
mentarity. We analyse some of these below.
Oppositional activism
Degrowth actors are often engaged in oppositional activism such as campaign-
ers working to stop the expansion of highways, airports, high speed trains
and other infrastructures. Opposition takes different forms: demonstrations,
boycotts, civil disobedience, direct action and protest songs. A good example
of degrowth opposition in the nancial sector is the action taken by Catalan
degrowth activist Enric Duran; in September 2008, Duran publicly announced
15. Degrowth through less technology e.g. in households would require more egalitarian division
of labour between men and women. The competition ‘for having more’ has been criticised by
16. Class division is discussed in two ways within the degrowth literature: as a criticism to the
level of labour division (Bayon et al. 2010) and as a proposal for max-min income ratio.
17. Reducing the conicts generated by resources limitations could be prevented by degrowth.
Also voluntary simplicity is related to non-violence.
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that he had ‘robbed’ nearly a half-million Euro by legally receiving relatively
small loans from several banks, which he had no intention of returning (as he
had spent them on worthy causes). This was a political action to denounce
what he termed the ‘predatory capitalist system’. One purpose of his act was
to denounce the unsustainability of the banking system. Referring to the crea-
tion of money as debt, Duran declared that if the banks can create money from
nothing, ‘I’ll make them disappear into nothingness’. From 2006 to 2008, he
nanced various anti-capitalist movements, including magazines printed in
hundred-thousand copies focusing on the energy crisis (i.e. peak oil), on cri-
tiques of the debt-based economy, and on presenting concrete alternatives for
a sustainable economy of solidarity.18
Building alternatives
Practitioners on the other hand promote local, decentralised, small scale and
participatory alternatives such as cycling, reuse, vegetarianism or veganism,
co-housing, agro-ecology, eco-villages, solidarity economy, consumer cooper-
atives, alternative (so called ethical) banks or credit cooperatives, decentralised
renewable energy cooperatives. This is an illustration of the ‘nowtopia’ of
Chris Carlsson (2008), or developing alternatives outside present institutions,
now. The eco-villages and Transition Towns movement are important experi-
ences within this strategy and often intersect with degrowth.19 Some actors
working on the development of alternatives argue that the change of individual
values and behaviour should be the main target of degrowth. This is manifest
in the lifestyles of people who practice voluntary simplicity, living better with
less, downshifting and slowing down life’s pace. Much attention is given to
how conscious critical consumption can promote transformation at both the
individual and the social level. The major idea being if less time is spent on
formal work and consumption, more time can be dedicated to other activities
which are fundamental to one’s well-being, such as social relations, political
participation, physical exercise, spirituality and contemplation. Such a shift
will potentially be less environmentally harmful.
Italy’s Reti di Economia Solidale (Solidarity Economy Networks) is a use-
ful example. Born in 2002, they are an experiment to articulate and consolidate
existing experiences through the creation of economic circuits, where the dif-
ferent projects sustain each other, exchanging and creating market spaces while
18. Publications available in different languages at
19. It is argued (perhaps wrongly) that the Transition Town (TT) movement is an example of the
post-political condition (Trapese Collective, 2008). TT mainly focuses on only one ‘source’
or stream of thought (peak oil and climate change) while avoiding the strategy of direct
opposition. Therefore, it ends up proposing solutions without a previous analysis of what the
problems are – their structural causes and responsibilities. This does not deny the impressive
success of TT to mobilise communities, but it is brought here to stress the importance of the
political dimension.
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Environmental Values 22.2
aiming at well-being and sustainability. There are already more than twenty
Distretti di Economia Solidale (Solidarity Economy Districts) with hundreds
of small enterprises working as business clusters under strong socio-ecological
principles. In Spain, Enric Duran, Didac Costa and associates have developed
the Catalan Integral Cooperative (CIC). The CIC20 is based on economic and
political self-management with egalitarian participation of its members and
attempts to include ways of satisfying all basic human needs, including the
creation of a local currency (the ‘ECOS’).
Reformism: preserving and acting within some existing institutions
In the words of Latouche (2009) we are living not only in a growth economy,
but in a growth society. Therefore degrowth implies a societal transformation.
While many actors oppose or challenge some institutions, they often propose to
act within existing ones. For example, while challenging capitalism via some
actions, many radical organic farmers still organise their lives around cars and
computers, which can be considered ‘reformist’. In general, we can argue that
some institutions need to be defended (like some form of social security and
public health, public kindergarten and schools, or some other elements of the
welfare state). The feminist literature, for example, highlights how ‘green no-
tions of self-reliance, sustainable communities and “doing one’s bit” at home
and in the public domain threaten to intensify women’s already unsustain-
able burden of responsibility for care’ (MacGregor 2004: 77–78). Reducing
dependency on technology in households, for example, is another reason for
having a more egalitarian division of labour between men and women.
Another recurring debate is on the type of democratic system. On the one
hand we might have to defend the democratic institutions put at risk with the
economic crisis, and at the same time support the development of more par-
ticipative ones. Similarly, while some take a traditional anarchist perspective
in favour of abandoning the state, others believe the state should be kept and
In many cases, however, revolutionary positions could live together with
reformist ones (or even reinforce each other). For example, proposals to set-
up new institutions in a context of direct democracy which replace the current
ones are compatible with the defence and reform of some of the existing ones.
Establishing a basic citizens’ income, the elimination of debt-based money
(money not 100 per cent backed by deposits or real materials), and the protec-
tion and strengthening of the commons, can all be thought of as reform of the
current institutions which go beyond the reforms that consolidate the current
20. One CIC activity already underway is Calafou (a new eco-industrial cooperative in a derelict
industrial textile mill on the Anoia river), featured in the Degrowth conference in Montréal in
May 2012 in the section tellingly called ‘experiences’.
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All previous approaches require right understanding of the links between lev-
els and sources, here academic and non-academic research have roles to play.
For Martinez-Alier et al. (2011) degrowth is actually an example of ac-
tivist-led science. Activist knowledge refers to all kinds of experience-based
notions originating from community groups, civil society, women’s groups,
trade unions, grassroots associations and so on. In sustainability studies, as in
other disciplines, the knowledge gained from grassroots experience and activ-
ism has led to the creation of new concepts, like the ecological debt, climate
debt, biopiracy, environmental justice, popular epidemiology or corporate
accountability (Martinez Alier 2002; Simms 2005). These concepts are some-
times taken up, rened and redened by academics. The reverse also happens,
where academic concepts are taken up by civil society activism (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2011).
Degrowth, launched by activists, entered the international English-
speaking academic agenda around 2008. The literature is growing, with articles
and special issues in various journals. As explained above, the International
Conferences on Economic Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social
Equity21 in Paris (2008), Barcelona (2010), Montreal and Venice (2012),
have attracted hundreds of researchers from a wide range of countries. The
Barcelona conference, for example, aimed at creating cooperative research
by bringing together scientists, practitioners and activists. The event deviated
from the standard model of academic conference organisation and used practi-
cal direct democracy techniques to discuss and develop policy proposals and
research priorities in different areas.
The debate and research has just started. We need not only agreements
within the movement on what it advocates, but also on how to implement the
proposals. Much more research on what type of degrowth, and how much of it,
is needed. Doubt is cast on whether the nal outcome will still be a capitalist
economy and society or not (Gorz 1972; Jackson 2011). Tim Jackson advises
readers not to ght over words. Capitalist or not, we cannot afford (ecologi-
cally and socially) more economic growth in rich countries. This pragmatic
approach, however, is not highly popular among degrowth partisans who see
themselves as anti-capitalists.
Acting on different scales: local, national, global
The degrowth movement is also concerned with the appropriate scale of ac-
tion. There is awareness that action must be taken on all levels. Most activities
take place at the local scale, and are often articulated through informal and
formal networks. Transition towns (UK), Rete del Nuovo Municipio (Italy)
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Environmental Values 22.2
and Comuni Virtuosi22 (Italy) are good examples of urban-focus approaches.
Degrowth networks and actions, however, also exist nationally and region-
ally.23 An informal network is also consolidating at the international level
around events like the Degrowth Conferences. The most consolidated net-
works are issue specic (i.e. agroecology), but being a frame, degrowth offers
the potential to create a network of networks including activists, practitioners,
researchers, politicians and scientists (i.e. Redes en Red24). There is an open
debate over various possible ways of organising such a network.
Even though networking is at the centre of degrowth, the movement is
still far from being able to coordinate actions to reduce absolute consumption
of energy and materials at the national and global scale. What would happen
to a nation that independently undertakes degrowth policies? Can degrowth
alternatives be built in a social context of economic growth and ‘debt-fuelled’
capitalism? What should be done with the debts in a context of ‘debtocracy’?
Here the open questions also have to do with the appropriate political con-
ditions that might support the implementation of certain policies. It remains
unclear how the socio-ecological transformation might actually take place at
macro scales and which institutions should be involved. For example, those
proposing direct democracy based on assemblies or the project of Inclusive
Democracy (Fotopoulos, 1997) never convincingly articulate how to go be-
yond the municipal level of organisation. Perhaps, following Murray Bookchin
(1980), a confederation of municipal entities could take up the administrative
roles of a state no longer focusing on economic growth. This is a view congen-
ial to many in the degrowth movement.
Degrowth sources
The previous review of degrowth sources has shown the diversity of arguments
which can be employed to defend degrowth. Several points are discussed
here. First, the classication of sources presented in this article for analytical
purposes should not be seen as implying hermetic compartments. Instead, it
highlights the different foci of attention embraced by different writers or ac-
tors, depending on their social, cultural or political backgrounds.
Second, the overview of streams of thought feeding into the river of the de-
growth movement is not exhaustive. Feminism, political ecology, non-violence
(including the critique of militarism), radical bottom up neo-Malthusianism
23. Some examples are: in Italy Rete per la Decrescita; in France Réseau des Objecteurs de
Croissance pour l’Après-Développement; in Switzerland Réseau Objection de Croissance;
in Brazil Rede pelo Decrescimento Sustentável.
24. Network of networks:
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Environmental Values 22.2
(Ronsin 1980; Martinez-Alier and Masjuan 2005), class divisions and open
borders positions should be further elaborated. Particularly, further elabo-
ration is needed on the gender dimensions of degrowth, as was done at the
Venice conference of 2012. The rst and strongest critiques of GDP accounting
came from feminist economics, allied to ecological economics (Waring 1988).
Feminist environmentalism (Agarwal 1992), for example, emphasised the gen-
dered practical and cultural values of nature outside the market.
Third, some followers of Marx have argued that degrowth does not ex-
plicitly or sufciently position itself against capitalism.25 Yet, some orthodox
Marxists embrace the idea that consumer goods (which are products of cap-
italism itself) should be widely and easily accessible remaining thus linked
to productivism, where the objective is maximising production and growth
(Altvater, 1993). Other interpretations of Marx on the contrary criticise unilin-
ear progress, as did Walter Benjamin from the Frankfurt school (Postone, 2009;
Jappe, 2003); also neo-marxists like David Harvey or eco-socialists like Joel
Kovel and Michael Lowy, are more in line with degrowth. Other Marxists have
also recently started to adopt the ideas of degrowth in their writings (Badiale
and Bontempelli, 2010; Altvater, 2011). While eco-marxist J. B. Foster openly
mocked degrowth (Foster, 2011), the journal Capitalism, Nature, Socialism
has edited a special issue on degrowth in 2012.
Finally, the complexity and multi-dimensionality of degrowth can some-
times be difcult to communicate, and overwhelming to people looking for
a single guide to practical action. Yet, overlooking one of these sources can
be problematic. Jean-Claude Decourt, author of several documentaries on de-
growth, says that growth would be problematic even if innite natural resources
were available.26 Degrowth only makes sense when its sources are taken into
account, meaning not just ecology and bioeconomics, but also meaning of life
and well-being, anti-utilitarianism, justice and democracy. Taken indepen-
dently they can lead to incomplete and reductionist projects fundamentally
incompatible with the ideas of the degrowth movement. Being concerned with
resource scarcity, or with ecosystem destruction, but not with world justice can
lead to top-down anti-population proposals and anti-immigration discourse.
Justice without democracy can lead to authoritarian solutions, as suggested
perhaps by Wolfgang Harich’s Kommunismus ohne Wachstum (Communism
25. Elmar Altvater recently declared in an interview: ‘there is no way out of the dilemma be-
tween the capitalist imperative to accumulate and the limits that nature sets. In the long
term, a reduction of growth is inevitable and, therefore, an economy of degrowth. However,
I tend to doubt that such a thing could occur within the capitalist mode of production, since
it also means de-accumulate. That is not clear in many of the representatives of the theory of
degrowth.’ Ferrero, Àngel (26/09/2012). ‘Socialism of the XXI Century can only be plural’,
an interview with Elmar Altvater. La Directa 287 (translated from Catalan by the authors).
26. ‘Quand bien même la Terre serait illimitée, nous serions contre la croissance, parce qu’elle
détruit l’humain en nous, parce qu’elle détruit la beauté.’ (Even when the earth will be un-
limited, we will be against growth, because it destroys the human in ourselves, because it
destroys beauty).
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Environmental Values 22.2
without growth) of the mid-1980s which carried the subtitle ‘Babeuf and
the Club of Rome’. Improving democracy or justice without worrying about
meaning of life could lead us to techno-centred solutions. In this line, Carter
(2004) shows the importance of combining concerns in order to create the
right conditions for a radical green society. While not all actors may be able to
get involved or work on the whole set of concerns without risking a burn out,
understanding each other’s concerns is feasible.
Degrowth strategies
The debates and controversies over strategies employed within each source of
the degrowth movement have been most intense. Strategies of opposition can
be perceived as conicting with the practitioners promoting alternatives, or
with the researchers bringing only a diagnosis (and sometimes a vague prog-
nosis). In the world of politics, the strategy of opposition is the revolutionary
stance which opposes the reformist position.
What we tried to illustrate previously, however, is the potential for compat-
ibility among the strategies used by the movement as more and more actors
realise the importance of combining strategies at the local and/or global level
(Chatterton and Pickerell, 2010). The challenges faced by our societies are so
wide that diversity is an indispensable source of richness – so long as partici-
pants are conscious of the limitations of their activities and humble enough to
remain open to constructive criticism and improvements. Actually, these ten-
sions among the strategies can be one of the forces by which to keep creativity
and diversity alive, assuming communication channels remain open.
There is not only possible compatibility between the strategies, but com-
bining the right strategies can also enable the right process of transformation.
This can best be analysed and understood in a short-term versus long-term
timescale perspective. The movement has an urgent pending task: to elabo-
rate a transition (better called a transformation) path in rich societies from the
actual crisis of economic growth to socially accepted degrowth. Under this
perspective, strategies can be combined along a dened timescale to shape
scenarios. People employing the opposition strategy challenge ‘development’
on the ground – stopping ‘harmful’ projects and generating fundamental public
debates. Scientists and intellectuals who dedicate most of their efforts to the
struggle of ideas, can open up new imaginaries and create links between levels
and approaches. Practitioners experiment with new possibilities in everyday
life at both individual and collective level. Degrowth activists, intellectuals
and policy makers engaged at the larger scale can help to facilitate societal
adjustment to the actions of local practitioners and activists (Schneider, 2010).
The act of opposition will not be successful if conditions for societal change
are not adequate. This is where some so-called ‘reformists’ have a role to
play. We might have to call them revolutionary reformists. All actors together
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Environmental Values 22.2
challenge the hegemony, with barricades or words, while imaging and building
alternative socio-environmental futures. For Latouche (2009) degrowth is not
a concrete and universal alternative to growth, but a matrix of multiple alter-
natives that will reopen the space for human creativity, after removal of the
plaster of economic totalitarianism. The eventual success story of degrowth in
the media, academia and society could actually be related to the good variety
of strategies within degrowth.
Degrowth actors
Who is the political subject of degrowth? This is an open question, which will
determine the forms of conict and the persistence of the movement over time
(Romano 2012). Degrowth can be perceived as a new social movement where a
new middle class (people with high education, often working in the service sec-
tor) plays an important role (Habermas 1981). New social movements engage
in conicts over the production of knowledge including symbolic production
(Touraine 1981). Although degrowth challenges the social imaginary on issues
like development, democracy and ‘the good life’ – where the individuals, com-
munities or whole societies struggle for an autonomous denition of their self
(Melucci 1996); it is not a mere non-material, or post-materialist movement,
as it also addresses economic and political power dynamics (justice), and natu-
ral resource scarcity (bioeconomics). Degrowth can thus probably be better
described as a combination of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements, engaging in
‘old’ and ‘new’ structural conicts (Della Porta and Diani 2006).
Duverger (2011) describes well the French degrowth movement’s conicts
among actors who adopt and defend a single strategy (although often wrongly
interpreted as a conict on sources). Also the Barcelona conference (2010), for
example, was a meeting among scientists, activists and practitioners, which
resulted in some differences and even frictions, but ultimately dialogue was
established. What may have contributed to the establishment of a healthy di-
alogue among disparate actors is the unique characteristic that many of the
participants were functioning in multiple roles: many activists involved were
simultaneously working as researchers inside or outside academia, whilst
many researchers were also engaged as activists inside or outside institutions.
Furthermore, most people were, and are, practising the ideas of degrowth in
their daily lives or in the institutions in which they are involved. The movement
is struggling with the difculties arising from working with diverse actors co-
hesively and playing the role of ‘bridging actors’ to catalyse collaboration and
learning across levels. Present tensions and confrontations are attributed to the
involvement of multiple actors with multiple identities, though, as Duverger
(2011) pointed out, this can have positive effects as well. Certainly this char-
acteristic of degrowth actors is in line with those who call into question the
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Environmental Values 22.2
binary construction of activists and non-activists (Askins, forthcoming), or the
trends observed in England by Chatterton and Pickerill (2010).27
One main point here is that an explicit call for the combination of con-
cerns goes nevertheless together with the exclusion of groups that develop
reductionist interpretation of the critiques against growth, such as xenophobes,
right-wing environmentalists (i.e. the Nouvelle Droite of Alain De Benoist
in France), groups with a nihilist perspective (i.e. neo-primitivists like John
Zerzan), anti-immigrant and racist organisations (e.g. the Carrying Capacity
Network in the USA) or those who would support mainstream western life-
styles at the cost of a drastic reduction of population. They simply fail to
combine degrowth sources.
The present article represents an attempt to search for a ‘betterdeni-
tion of degrowth. Generally degrowth challenges the hegemony of growth and
calls for a democratically led redistributive downscaling of production and
consumption in industrialised countries as a means to achieve environmental
sustainability, social justice and well-being. Although integrating bioeconom-
ics and ecological macroeconomics (Victor, 2009; Jackson, 2011), degrowth
is a noneconomic concept. On one side, degrowth is the reduction of energy
and material throughput, needed in order to face the existing biophysical con-
straints (in terms of natural resources and ecosystem’s assimilative capacity).
On the other side, degrowth is an attempt to challenge the omnipresence of
market-based relations in society and the growth-based roots of the social
imaginary replacing them by the idea of frugal abundance.28 It is also a call
for deeper democracy, applied to issues which lie outside the mainstream
democratic domain, like technology. Finally, degrowth implies an equitable
redistribution of wealth within and across the Global North and South, as well
as between present and future generations. Degrowth sees itself as an ally of
the global environmental justice movement with strong roots in the South. It
applauds initiatives such as the Yasuni ITT proposal in Ecuador and other simi-
lar attempts to ‘leave oil in the soil, coal in the hole’, South or North.
This article has presented, discussed and analysed the history of degrowth,
showing that it rst appeared as an activist slogan and soon became an inter-
pretative frame of a social movement. We have illustrated the diversity that
27. See also:
28. Frugal abundance is the term used by Latouche (2009). Understanding degrowth as a ‘matrix
of alternatives’ we should also consider other proposals with similar connotations such
as: ‘conviviality’ by Ivan Illich, ‘prosperity without growth’ by Tim Jackson, ‘better with
less’ by Jose Manuel Naredo, ‘buen vivir’ by indigenous communities as recognised in the
Constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador, and also ‘eudaimonia’ by Aristotle, human ourishing,
joie de vivre and others.
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Environmental Values 22.2
can co-exist within a frame, not only for the prognosis (strategies), but also
for the diagnosis (sources), a fact often neglected in social movement theory.
Thus degrowth is neither a mere criticism of economic growth, nor a pro-
posal for a decrease of GDP.29 The attractiveness of degrowth emerges from its
power to draw from and articulate different sources or streams of thought and
to formulate strategies at different levels. It brings together a heterogeneous
group of actors who focus on housing and urban planning, nancial issues and
alternative money systems, agroecology and food systems, international trade,
climate justice, children’s education and domestic work, meaningful employ-
ment and cooperatives, as well as transport and alternative energy systems. We
have argued that degrowth could complement and reinforce these topic areas,
functioning as a connecting thread (i.e. a platform for a network of networks)
Degrowth activists attempt to re-politicise the public debate by identify-
ing and naming different socio-environmental futures (Swyngedouw, 2007).
This happens in two ways. First, they articulate particular concerns, demands
and means to achieve the desired socio-environmental arrangements (‘theory
is politics’). Second, they oppose power in its different forms, starting from
its provocative denomination which challenges the consensus on growth in
parliamentary politics, in business, in the bulk of the labour movement and
in the social imaginary. Rather than accepting a fake consensus (such as the
need to grow in order to pay the debts, or sustainable development, or climate
change discourse à la Al Gore) where everyone is supposedly in the same boat,
degrowth gives visibility to the contradictions and the conicts at different
Finally, degrowth is an example of an activist-led science, where an ac-
tivist slogan is slowly consolidating into a concept that can be analysed and
discussed in the academic arena. The sources from which degrowth draws, and
the strategies and political proposals that degrowth puts forward, are often not
new, but their combination is innovative and, in our view, coherent. We have
argued in favour of their compatibility and complementarity for two reasons.
First, they do not necessarily undermine each other’s robustness but can rather
be combined when taking a longer-term horizon. Second, the diversity main-
tains a sort of tension which stimulates constructive debates and exchanges,
offering an incentive for continuous improvements both at the theoretical and
practical levels. Therefore the differences and conicts within should be rec-
ognised and valued as forces that keep the movement open and alive in its
continuous evolution.
29. Considering the weak and arbitrary nature of GDP as an indicator (Van den Bergh, 2009;
2011), and following Latouche (2009), the irrelevance of GDP increases/decreases can be
expressed with the term ‘a-growth’ in the same sense that one can be an a-theist.
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Environmental Values 22.2
We are grateful to the ‘Research & Degrowth’ group in Barcelona for long and
convivial discussions, and to French colleagues Fabrice Flipo and Denis Bayon.
We also owe much to many activists, practitioners and writers devoted to de-
growth. Niamh Shortt and Sheryle Carlson have kindly revised the English.
We also acknowledge anonymous reviewers. This paper contributes to the
following projects: CSO2011-28990 (Beyond GDP growth: Investigating the
socio-economic conditions for a Socially Sustainable Degrowth), CSO2010-
21979 (Social Metabolism and Environmental Conicts) and the European
FP7 project RESPONDER.
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... Degrowth is an aggressive position arguing for multiscale transformations beyond growth-oriented economics. It is critical of capitalism and its associated aspects of continuous growth and consumptive societies (Demaria, et al., 2013). It calls for concurrent and multiple transformations to enable long-term socio-ecological equality (Asara, et al., 2015), i.e. transformations impacting individuals, societies, institutions, technologies, economies, ecologies, practices, lifestyles, power relations, norms and values (Brown, et al., 2013). ...
... It questions inauthentic sustainability regulations, making degrowth different to sustainability models (Asara, et al., 2015) as it demands a paradigm shift aligned to socio-ecological values. It sees societies having smaller metabolisms, i.e. less production and consumption to stay within planetary boundaries (Demaria, et al., 2013;Kallis, et al., 2017) by moving away from flawed notions of economic growth, GDP and consumption (Fournier, 2008;Kallis, et al., 2017). It proposes alternative economic thinking of care and commons, endorsing new forms of living and producing, e.g., eco-communities, cooperatives, work-sharing, basic and maximum incomes, redistributing wealth between the Global North and South and redistributing wealth between current and future generations (Kallis, et al., 2017). ...
... Degrowth sees a different society having different activities, different forms and uses of energy, different relations, different gender roles, different allocations of time between paid and non-paid work and different relations with the non-human world (Kallis, et al., 2017). It offers a collaborative frame (Demaria, et al., 2013) having: (1) criticism of growth, (2) criticism of capitalism as a system requires constant growth, (3) criticism of GDP, and (4) criticism of commodification, the process of converting all things into monetised commodities. Degrowth is embodied by new forms of living and producing, like eco-communities, cooperatives, work-sharing, basic and maximum income, etc. Traditional sustainable development assumes environmental impacts can decline while the economy grows, whilst degrowth requires aggressive decoupling from classic mechanistic consumption (Krahmer, 2020). ...
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The book serves as basic text to an Applied Complexity Science course offered at the University of Cape Town. It provides insights on the systems sciences, how we practice it to a degree, and the reflexivity that compels ongoing improvement
... Degrowth cannot just be understood as an umbrella term for growth critique and as a normative framework, but it can also be described as a "political slogan with theoretical implications" (Latouche, 2010, p. 519); highlighting that degrowth must neither be understood as solely a political movement nor just a scientific frame (Demaria et al., 2013). Nevertheless, independent of how the term degrowth is concretely understood, in its core lies a radical shift from the incumbent economic growth paradigm with a drastic reorganization of social and economic relationships that basis itself on socioecological boundaries D'Alisa et al., 2016;Kallis et al., 2018). ...
... (Latouche, 2010, p. 519). With the former and latter going hand-in-hand, degrowth approaches ought to liberate societies and the subject from the current systematic constraints of unsustainable socioeconomic structures and growth while allowing the articulation of political and real utopias which provide a good life for all thought intra-and intergenerational (Acosta & Brand, 2018;Demaria et al., 2013;Latouche, 2010Latouche, , 2015Schmelzer & Vetter, 2021 Because degrowth is foremost an umbrella term for growth-critical analyzes and alternative propositions, multiple approaches still try to define what constitutes a degrowth society. To understand the degrowth debate better, Eversberg & Schmelzer (2018) find that aside from the consensual critique of economic growth, the notion of a positive transformation is the second central pillar. ...
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Degrowth, as a broad spectrum of proposals and advocacies, is united in the demand that economic activity must undergo a 'right-sizing' to a level that respects socio-ecological boundaries and the minimum social foundations that ensure a dignified and good life for all. From the demand to establishing societies and economies that stay within those boundaries, the question arises of what role the state has and to what extent particular political formats are suited to facilitate that. With the insight that the liberal state is incompatible with degrowth, the search for alternatives references the Kurdish Freedom Movement and the associated political format of Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism is a political format that calls for the abolition of the state and an inclusion of environmental protection and feminism. This thesis aims to determine whether Democratic Confederalism is a viable political format for degrowth societies. To fulfill the goals, a theory synthesis is used as the methodology to combine two different theories to generate knowledge that goes beyond the two theories on their own. The compatibility is determined by utilizing the Gramscian analysis and understanding of the state. This thesis examines whether Democratic Confederalism edits and handles actors and elements within the integral model sufficiently to allow the implementation of degrowth to measure their compatibility. The results of this thesis show that Democratic Confederalism and degrowth are compatible with each other and, thus, that Democratic Confederalism is a suitable political format for degrowth societies. Because Democratic Confederalism aims at dismantling hierarchical and centralized state structures, the material conditions, as well as actors and structures within the civil and political society, are sufficiently addressed to foster the advocacies that degrowth proposes. Those results further expanded the societal boundaries framework and suggested that Democratic Confederalism should continuously aim to manifest counter-hegemonies to facilitate the transformation and advocate consensus-based decision-making processes in their advocated councils.
... Nevertheless, there are lessons learned from Degrowth, since the concept claims that growth is not possible on a finite planet, while at the same time economic growth is not a prerequisite for human well-being (Demaria et al., 2013;Robra and Heikkurinen, 2019). The main aim of Degrowth is to reduce economic activity to a point where it can be considered ecologically sustainable (Demaria et al., 2013). ...
... Nevertheless, there are lessons learned from Degrowth, since the concept claims that growth is not possible on a finite planet, while at the same time economic growth is not a prerequisite for human well-being (Demaria et al., 2013;Robra and Heikkurinen, 2019). The main aim of Degrowth is to reduce economic activity to a point where it can be considered ecologically sustainable (Demaria et al., 2013). Practically, what this ecological sustainability would mean for a society is to "keep [its] wastes within assimilative capacities; harvest within re-generative capacities of renewable resources; deplete non-renewables at the rate at which renewable substitutes are developed" (Goodland andDaly, 1996, p. 1002). ...
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... The hypothesis that a democratically led, redistributive and equitable downsizing of the global economy and change of economic paradigm could not only sustain but also improve human well-being, social justice and environmental sustainability has underpinned much of the academic research on degrowth over the past ten years (Demaria et al. 2013). Understandings of degrowth take various forms, from an umbrella vision for radical change to a multidisciplinary academic paradigm to a movement that advocates a shift from the growth ideology and the coloniality of power and modernity (Abazeri 2022). ...
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This book uses a unique typology of ten core drivers of injustice to explore and question common assumptions around what urban sustainability means, how it can be implemented, and how it is manifested in or driven by urban interventions that hinge on claims of sustainability. Aligned with critical environmental justice studies, the book highlights the contradictions of urban sustainability in relation to justice. It argues that urban neighbourhoods cannot be greener, more sustainable and liveable unless their communities are strengthened by the protection of the right to housing, public space, infrastructure and healthy amenities. Linked to the individual drivers, ten short empirical case studies from across Europe and North America provide a systematic analysis of research, policy and practice conducted under urban sustainability agendas in cities such as Barcelona, Glasgow, Athens, Boston and Montréal, and show how social and environmental justice is, or is not, being taken into account. By doing so, the book uncovers the risks of continuing urban sustainability agendas while ignoring, and therefore perpetuating, systemic drivers of inequity and injustice operating within and outside of the city. Accessibly written for students in urban studies, critical geography and planning, this is a useful and analytical synthesis of issues relating to urban sustainability, environmental and social justice. The Open Access version of this book, available at, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Funded by Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Table of Contents Driver 1: Material and Livelihood Inequalities Driver 2: Racialized or Ethnically Exclusionary Urbanization Driver 3: Uneven Urban and Intensification and Regeneration Driver 4: Uneven Environmental Health and Pollution Patterns Driver 5: Exclusive Access to the Benefits of Urban Sustainability Infrastructure Driver 6: Unfit Institutional Structures Driver 7: Weakened Civil Society Driver 8: Limited Citizen Participation Driver 9: Power-Knowledge Asymmetries Driver 10: The Growth Imperative and Neoliberal Urbanism The book is fully open access here:
... This strategy is advocated from within several civil society currents. Demaria et al. (2013) and Muraca (2013) have suggested that all these currents could be subsumed under the concept of the "degrowth movement". However, it is not only actors within the degrowth movement who advocate the strategy of transformation according to which GDP per capita would decrease (or the strategy of a controlled reduction in GDP). ...
... ation wird, gemäß der Degrowth-Position, Auswirkungen auf die zukünftige Entwicklung des BIP/Kopf in den wohlhabenden Ländern haben. Gemäß manchen Vertreter/innen wird in der Folge der sozial-ökologischen Transformation das BIP/Kopf in den wohlhabenden Ländern sub-Diese Strategie wird innerhalb mehrerer zivilgesellschaftlicher Strömungen vertreten.Demaria et al. (2013) oderMuraca (2013) haben vorgeschlagen, all diese Strömungen unter dem Begriff "Degrowth-Bewegung" zu subsumieren. Gleichwohl vertreten nicht nur die innerhalb der Degrowth-Bewegung zusammengefassten Akteure die Strategie einer Transformation mit der Folge, dass das BIP/Kopf sinkt bzw. die Strategie einer kontrollierten Reduktion des BIP ...
... The convivial conservation perspective draws on a growing body of scholarship that similarly argues for alternative frameworks for conservation policy, programmes, and practices. This scholarship calls for equity and justice in conservation based on recognising cultural diversity (Kothari et al. 2014), building self-reliant regional economies (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012;Büscher and Fletcher 2019), and pursuing redistribution and reduction in both production and consumption (Demaria et al. 2013). The overarching vision for convivial conservation entails moving beyond monetary valuation of nature and redefining value in terms of the social, cultural or affective ways that people live with, and relate to, nature in everyday life . ...
... Furthermore, there is a widespread belief among advocates for sustainable communities that the best visions of a sustainable society that can embed the ideas of localism are ecovillages/urban ecovillages, which are widely regarded as a strategic approach to transitioning to a sustainable society and spatial organization suitable for implementing localism. These discussions on ecovillages/urban ecovillages as a long-term sustainability strategy have far-reaching implications for society's spatial development (Xue, 2014;Demaria et al., 2013;Owen, 2012;Jenkins et al., 2020). As a result, ecovillages that act as experimental community models have the potential to help society achieve sustainability by developing alternative sustainable living possibilities. ...
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Ecovillages are widely considered as a strategic approach to the transition to a sustainable community in the sustainability literature, and the desire for these ecovillages is reflected via each individual's activities and behavioral traits. Consequently, the resident's choices determine whether an ecovillage may be dispersed in other geographical places. The goal of this paper is to determine the most essential aspects of ecovillages based on residents’ preferences in connection to France's geographical regions. The Required data were collected through a web survey conducted from 2021 to 2022, among 186 responses in 35 cities in France. The statistical analysis was performed using the SPSS and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) designed with AMOS software. In addition, the probability level (P: 0.0001) is optimum, and Then the spatial analysis was performed in ArcGIS by spatial autocorrelation (Moran's I) and Hot Spot. The results indicate that the most important dimensions of ecovillages based on the SEM Model respectively are the transportation and access dimensions economic dimensions and Social and agricultural dimensions. Moreover, Due to the spatial autocorrelation, the studied cities in France were randomly correlated in terms of the dimensions of the ecovillage. Finally, this study helps to improve the definition of an ecovillage in different geographical locations and facilitates the practical implementation of sustainable lifestyles, and provides new ways to launch policies related to sustainable lifestyle promotion based on ecovillages.
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Using a qualitative approach, the purpose of this research was to critically analyse the role of indigenous planning on resource conservation in Ghana which was conceptualized as degrowth. Using three traditional areas located in the coastal, forest and savannah zones in Ghana, the study interviewed 15 traditional leaders. The findings showed that taboos that protects the ecosystem from overexploitation for economic pursuit were influenced by the belief that plants, animals and water bodies have some spiritual and cultural significance. Through the lens of indigenous planning, this works adds to the understanding of degrowth within socio-spatial planning.
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Traditional fiat currencies, and the ways they are managed by governments and central banks, have been a defining feature of our capitalist economies. Unfortunately, fiat money and traditional monetary policy have been harmful to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives. In mature democracies, central banks are independent and obligated to pursue defined national interests, in particular stable growth, low inflation, and high employment. Central banks determine interest rates and control the supply of money to achieve these goals. In practice, these tools will frequently promote one goal over another. For example, an increase in the money supply will promote growth but it will come at the cost of higher inflation. Since World War II, central banks in mature democracies have generally pursued expansive policies. In the short term, these policies benefit the parties in power because economic growth and expanding opportunities for investment and consumption have proven popular among consumers and businesses and beneficial at the polling booths. However, in the mid- to long term, these policies are socially regressive because inflation erodes the value of savings and pension funds of average citizens, and cheap money encourages risky behavior by banks and entrepreneurs. In combination with ever more frequent bailouts of financial and other corporate ventures considered “too big to fail”, monetary policy encourages reckless entrepreneurs and exacerbates inequality. The incessant quest for endless growth on a finite planet (Mander) has not only become socially but also environmentally unsustainable. The situation is worse in developing countries and dictatorships where monetary policy is not independent and serves primarily to keep the current leadership in power. Easily convertible fiat currencies moving across international borders in virtually untraceable transactions are also escaping regulatory and tax authorities in ever larger volumes. Various estimates place between US$ 6 and 36 trillion in offshore tax havens (Shaxson) where they would not need to be unless they were stolen or hidden from taxation. Virtual or crypto currencies running on a blockchain could theoretically address these problems of fiat money. Every transaction on a public blockchain is part of an immutable record and verifiable in perpetuity. As long as we know the owners of the crypto wallets or accounts involved, transactions are transparent, and money cannot be hidden. Moreover, monetary policy is implemented by agnostic algorithms insulated from political pressures and ideologies. Unfortunately, existing crypto currencies, in particular Bitcoin and Ethereum, have not only missed the opportunity of offering better alternatives for ESG goals. They have been inflicting considerable harm on the environment and they – once again – favor those with large capital holdings making large transactions over average individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In combination with inconsistently implemented know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) requirements, they have actually expanded the opportunities for illicit money movements and offshore wealth accumulation. Widespread speculation has additionally eroded public trust and destroyed the potential of Bitcoin, in particular, of becoming a preferred and global store of value. Blockchain technology could be used differently, however. A virtual currency created with strong governance systems – partly programmed into the blockchain, partly achieved via not-for-profit governance structures bound to pursue ESG goals – could challenge money and monetary policy as we know it. First, Smart Money for the People could be pegged to a currency basket and the peg could be defended against speculators with a strict rule keeping 90% of the value base in cash and near money. By publicly auditing these reserves, and by making an unlimited buy-back promise, the currency would build trust and secure the peg. Second, Smart Money for the People could be designed to appreciate, rather than depreciate, in value. The peg would not be static but floating, with Smart Money increasing by 1% per month against the basket, a rate that normally exceeds inflation in the basket economies. This would encourage a shift away from ever more and faster consumptive cycles to savings and value preservation. Pension funds and savings accounts would finally create security in retirement. Third, a combination of stringent KYC and AML procedures with fully transparent transactions on the blockchain would reduce opportunities for illicit financial transactions and undermine the premise of offshore tax havens. The problem with the implementation of this form of social currency is not of technical nature. A shift from parochial for-profit central bank monetary policy based on fiat money as we know it, to a global not-for-profit digital currency, would be a power transfer of unprecedented proportions. It is highly unlikely that any government would agree to transfer its monetary sovereignty to the Smart Money Foundation or any similar organization. However, Smart Money for the People could be created – just like the virtual currencies already on the market – as an alternative offer, and leave its success or failure to the market.
Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the association of income and happiness. The basic data consist of statements by individuals on their subjective happiness, as reported in thirty surveys from 1946 through 1970, covering nineteen countries, including eleven in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Within countries, there is a noticeable positive association between income and happiness—in every single survey, those in the highest status group were happier, on the average, than those in the lowest status group. However, whether any such positive association exists among countries at a given time is uncertain. Certainly, the happiness differences between rich and poor countries that one might expect on the basis of the within-country differences by economic status are not borne out by the international data. Similarly, in the one national time series studied, for the United States since 1946, higher income was not systematically accompanied by greater happiness. As for why national comparisons among countries and over time show an association between income and happiness that is so much weaker than, if not inconsistent with, that shown by within-country comparisons, a Duesenberry-type model, involving relative status considerations as an important determinant of happiness, is suggested.
The author begins by defining what is to be understood by the word 'development', and then moves to the colonial period to show that the practices presently claimed as new have in fact a long history. Traces President Truman's concept of underdevelopment leading to the invention of development and the prinicples of cooperation formulated by Third World countries and international organisations. Following the work of Rostow, and the proclamation of the new international economic order, it was thought that all nations would share the promise of abundance and inequalities would be reduced. However, the debt problems and the environmental crisis came to the fore, particularly because they affected the finance and supply systems of the North. Being unable to solve them, every one joined in hoping that 'development' would be durable and humane - such was the justification in both North and South for perpetuating a system which maintains and reinforces exclusion while claiming to eliminate it. Concludes by showing why development has gradually been drained of content so that it is now a residue used to justify the process of globalisation.