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06
2013
Spatial Planning and High-tech Development | Wei-Ju Huang 黃偉茹
2013
Spatial Planning and
High-tech Development
A comparative study of Eindhoven city-region, the Netherlands
and Hsinchu City-region, Taiwan
Wei-Ju Huang 黃偉茹
Spatial Planning and High-tech
Development
A comparative study of Eindhoven city-region, the Netherlands
and Hsinchu City-region, Taiwan
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. ir. K.C.A.M. Luyben,
voorzitter van het College voor Promoties,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 27 augustus 2013 om 12.30 uur
door Wei-Ju HUANG
Master of Science, Pratt Institute
geboren te Keelung, Taiwan
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Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor:
Prof. V. Nadin
Copromotor:
Dr. A.M. Fernandez Maldonado
Samenstelling promotiecommissie:
Rector Magnificus, Voorzitter
Prof. V. Nadin, Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor
Dr. A.M. Fernandez Maldonado, Technische Universiteit Delft, copromotor
Prof.dr.ir. A. van Timmeren, Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof.dr. W.A.M. Zonneveld, Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof.dr. D.B. Needham, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
Dr. S.F. Kung, National Cheng Kung University Taiwan
Dr. A. Romein, Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof.dr.ir. V.J. Meyer Technische Universiteit Delft, Reservelid
abe.tudelft.nl
Design: Sirene Ontwerpers, Rotterdam
ISBN 978-94-6186-197-9
ISSN 2212-3202
© 2013 Wei-Ju HUANG
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7 Contents (concise)
Contents (concise)
1 Introduction 31
2 Principal Components of High-tech Development 59
3 Institutional Variables of Spatial Planning Systems 87
4 Socio-political Context in the Netherlands and Taiwan 107
5 Spatial Planning Policies and Planning Systems in the Netherlands and
Taiwan 121
6 High-tech Spatial Policies and Development in Eindhoven City-region
and Hsinchu City-region 147
7 High-tech Oriented Spatial Planning and Governance in Eindhoven
City-region and Hsinchu City-region 177
8 Conclusions and Reflections 213
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9 Acknowledgement
Acknowledgement
I always look forward to absorbing knowledge like a sponge, so I did enjoy doing the PhD
research in the past four years. Although there were some bad moments, I was lucky to
have several individuals who in one way or another supported and assisted me in my
doctoral journey.
My first debt of gratitude must go to my promoter Professor Vincent Nadin and daily
supervisor Dr. Ana Maria Fernández-Maldonado. Vincent is so clever and witting that
he could always ask critical questions to inspire my thinking and provide vision for my
research. Ana Maria patiently gave encouragement and advices necessary for me to
proceed through the doctoral program and complete my thesis. They always gave me
great freedom to pursue independent study and encouraged me to attend international
conferences to present my study as well as establish academia networks. This way
of training is especially important for my future career. I am grateful for their careful
thought.
The Delta Electronics Foundation, the Ministry of Education, R.O.C., and the Chiang
Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange deserve my sincerest
thanks. Without their financial support, I could not totally concentrate on my research
and complete my thesis in time.
I owe my deepest gratitude to each of my interviewees in the Netherlands and Taiwan.
Special thanks go to Wei-Jie Chen, Yi-Ju Tsai, Tsaiher Cheng, Jean van Zeeland, Edgar
van Leest, and Marjan van den Hoogenhof. Jean, Edgar and Marjan kindly shared their
experiences and knowledge. I really learned a lot from them. When conducting fieldwork
in Taiwan, I relied on a large network of former colleagues and friends. Without the helps
of Wei-Jie, Yi-Ju and Tsaiher, I could not reach several key persons in relation to my case
studies in Taiwan.
Living abroad was not easy, but I had great time in the Netherlands. My friends in the
Netherlands, Taiwan and other parts of the World were sources of joy and support in
the doctoral journey. Hearty thanks to Suwanna Rongwiriyaphanich, Jinghuan He,
Chen-Kun Chung, Chin-Wen Yang, Guowen Dai, Julie Huang, Peiwen Lu, Jen-Hsiung Ho,
Wei-ShuHua, Juan Jimenez and Szchi Chen.They always stood by me. I appreciate our
friendship. Wei-Shu and Szchi helped me take several crucial pictures. This enriched
the quality of the thesis book design. Suwanna and Jinhuan were my best fellows in my
doctoral journey. We shared most of the worst and best moments. I enjoyed the time
when we fight and argued for what we believed and made fun of each other. This made
my doctoral journey more fruitful and joyful.
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10 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
My heartfelt appreciation goes to my parentsTsung-Shun Huang and Ping-Lu Chu, and
my grandmother Ti-Mei Fu. My father was very sick in the first year of my PhD study,
but he tried to keep it as a secret to avoid distracting me from my study. I am glad that
he has entirely rehabilitated. My mother and grandmother always give me fully support
even they may not always agree with my decisions. I am not good in expressing how
much I love and appreciate them, but I will try my best to do so. De-Jung Chen’s love and
support played a definite role that allowed me to complete the journey. She is so brilliant
and always gives me insightful suggestions. I am so lucky to have her in my life. Finally, I
would like to dedicate this work to my grandfather Wen-Ping Chu, who left us too soon.
I hope this work makes him proud.
Wei-Ju HUANG (Astor), Amsterdam, July 2013
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11 Summary
Summary
High-tech development—which lies at the very heart of the processes of economic
growth—has been recognised by many developed and developing countries as a strategic
instrument to enhance and sustain their competitiveness in the global economic network.
Although the concept of high-tech development differs between countries, many share
the underlying assumption that the core of high-tech development is to create a sound
environment where innovation thrives. This ideology implies a definite spatial dimension.
As a result, various spatial strategies have been formulated and implemented to support
high-tech development. This has had intentional and unintentional effects on the
economy, society and space.
Numerous studies have been devoted to exploring, analysing and theorising this global
phenomenon. However, there has been less attention given to the role spatial planning
may play in the process of high-tech development and to the factors that shape the spatial
planning approaches to high-tech development in a particular place. The major objectives
of this research are to advance the knowledge of the role of spatial planning in the process
of high-tech development, and to establish an analytical framework that helps reveal the
major institutional factors that shape spatial planning mechanisms for dealing with the
spatial issues of high-tech development in different places. This contributes to the field
of high-tech spatial policies transfer and lesson-drawing.
In order to explore the major factors that shape the practices of spatial planning in high-
tech development, a comparative approach is applied in this research. The Eindhoven
city-region in the Netherlands and the Hsinchu city-region in Taiwan are selected as
case study areas. Both city-regions can be recognised as success stories of high-tech
development not only on a national scale but also on a global scale, despite the fact that
they apply different approaches. In the Eindhoven city-region, the governments act as
supporters and governors. High-tech development in the city-region is a result of close
collaboration between different levels of government and other parties. In contrast, in the
Hsinchu city-region the governments act as providers in high-tech development.
By critically reviewing relevant literature, the research begins with the identification of
principal components of high-tech development and their spatial dimensions, and with
the establishment of a set of comparative frameworks, which are built upon the concepts
of institutionalism and previous comparative studies of spatial planning systems. On the
basis of the frameworks, the comparative study is conducted. Four major conclusions are
drawn in this research.
First, R&D capital, relational capital and human capital can be identified as the principal
components of high-tech development, but the conception of the principal components
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12 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
is not static. It may change through time and space, and be influenced by contemporary
technological development and dominant discourses about high-tech development.
Additionally, how governments in a particular place conceptualise the principal
components will influence the content of their strategies for high-tech development.
Second, how governments in a particular place use their spatial planning system and
tools to conduct, facilitate and/or coordinate the development of high-tech spaces is
influenced by the socio-political context (e.g. model of society, administration system
and conceptualisation of rights in land), conceptualisation of the principal components,
dominant style of spatial planning, but also by their historical roots and contemporary
technological capacities. At the city-regional level, the particular culture characteristics
and historical experience of a city-region also have effects on the approach to spatial
governance.
Third, it is common that governments recognise the necessity of collaborating with
knowledge institutes and high-tech firms in the process of high-tech spatial development,
because they have access to a wide range of know-how and crucial resources. The creation
of new institutional arenas to invite institutes and firms to participate in the process of
decision-making is a good strategy for governments, although they must assure that the
decision-making process is transparent and accountable, and meets the principles of
social justice.
Finally, the two cases have shown that a successful high-tech spatial development would
have spatial effects on the surrounding areas, such as traffic congestion, imbalance
between land supply and demand for housing and/or industrial land, and so on. It is
necessary to anticipate and monitor continuously the externalities of the development
from a more comprehensive perspective and to leave room for adjustment to the spatial
planning and governance approaches.
The analytical framework built upon the institutional concepts of Ostrom and Scharpf
worked well in this research, but in the process of conducting the empirical study I
found that the framework of institutional analysis I established for the empirical study
implied a temporarily fixed situation for analysis. Such a framework did create an easier
situation for analysis, but proved difficult to use to investigate and explain the dynamic
interrelationships between the changing institutional contexts and the decision making
of high-tech spatial planning at a specific place and time.
While considering this limitation, I adopted a diachronic approach to complement the
empirical study of part three, in order to understand the influences of prior institutional
developments and specific episodes on later policy/decision making and action taking. In
the future, if other studies consider applying the frameworks of this research, the effect of
historical path dependency has to be taken into consideration.
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13 Samenvatting
Samenvatting
De ontwikkeling van high-tech vormt het hart van processen van economische groei. Die
ontwikkeling wordt erkend als een strategisch instrument voor een sterke internationale
concurrentiepositie in zowel ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden. Hoewel het concept
high-tech ontwikkeling verschillend wordt gedefinieerd, staat het creëren van een
omgeving waarin innovatie tot bloei kan komen in veel landen centraal. Dit concept heeft
ook impliceert een duidelijke ruimtelijke dimensie. Verschillende ruimtelijke strategieën
zijn geformuleerd en in de praktijk gebracht, met zowel bedoelde als onbedoelde effecten
op economie, maatschappij en ruimte.
Een groot aantal studies is gewijd aan het verkennen, analyseren en theoretiseren
van dit wereldwijde verschijnsel. Maar minder aandacht is tot nu toe besteed aan de
rol van ruimtelijke planning in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling, alsmede aan
de institutionele factoren die inhoud en proces van deze planning mede bepalen. De
belangrijkste doelstellingen van dit onderzoek zijn bijdragen aan kennis van de rol van
ruimtelijke planning in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling, en het formuleren van een
analytisch kader van institutionele factoren die de mechanismen van deze ruimtelijke
planning in verschillende plaatsen vorm geven. Dit zal aan het overdracht en het lessen
trekken aan het high-tech ruimtelijk beleid bij te dragen .
Om de belangrijkste factoren die de praktijk van ruimtelijke planning in high-tech
ontwikkeling vorm geven te verkennen, is in dit onderzoek een vergelijkende benadering
toegepast. Daartoe zijn case studies uitgevoerd in de regio’s Eindhoven in Nederland
en Hsinchu in Taiwan. Dit zijn twee stadsregio’s die kunnen worden beschouwd als
succesvolle voorbeelden van high-tech ontwikkeling, niet alleen op nationaal niveau
maar ook op wereldschaal, ondanks verschillen in benadering. In de stadsregio
Eindhoven fungeert de overheid als een ondersteuning en een bestuurder: high-tech
ontwikkeling is daar dus het resultaat van nauwe samenwerking tussen de verschillende
overheidsniveaus en andere partijen. In Hsinchu City heeft de overheid een veel sterkere
rol in high-tech ontwikkeling als aanbieder van vrijwel alle inputs.
Het onderzoek start met het identificeren van de belangrijkste componenten van high-
tech ontwikkeling en hun ruimtelijke dimensies op basis van een kritische evaluatie van
relevante literatuur. Vervolgens is een reeks van vergelijkende kaders opgebouwd conform
de concepten van institutionalisme en aan de hand van eerdere vergelijkende studies
van ruimtelijke planningssystemen. Deze kaders vormen de basis van de vergelijkende
studie. In dit onderzoek worden vier belangrijke conclusies getrokken.
Ten eerste kunnen R&D–, relationeel– en menselijk kapitaal worden geïdentificeerd als de
belangrijkste componenten van high-tech ontwikkeling. Maar de conceptualisering van
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14 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
deze componenten zijn niet statisch: zij kunnen veranderen in tijd en ruimte, en worden
beïnvloed door technologische ontwikkeling en de dominante discoursen over high-tech
ontwikkeling. Daarnaast zal de manier waarop de overheid in een bepaalde plaats die
componenten conceptualiseert invloed hebben op de inhoud van haar strategieën voor
high-tech ontwikkeling.
Ten tweede wordt de wijze waarop de overheid in een bepaalde plaats gebruik maakt van
haar ruimtelijk planningsysteem en de middelen die zij inzet om high-tech ontwikkeling
te realiseren, te vergemakkelijken of te ondersteunen beïnvloed door de sociaal-politieke
context (bv. maatschappijmodel, bestuurlijk systeem en grondgebruiksrechten), door
de conceptualisering van de belangrijkste componenten, door de dominante stijl
van ruimtelijke planning, en niet in de laatste plaats ook door historische wortels en
technologische capaciteit. Op stedelijk-regionaal niveau oefenen ook de specifieke
cultuur en historische ervaringen effecten uit op de aanpak van ruimtelijke governance.
Ten derde is het gebruikelijk dat in het proces van high-tech ontwikkeling de overheid
streeft naar samenwerking met kennisinstituten en high-tech bedrijven omdat die
beschikken over een breed scala aan kennis en cruciale hulpbronnen. De creatie door de
overheid van nieuwe institutionele arena’s waarin die instituten en bedrijven deelnemen
aan het proces van besluitvorming is een goede strategie, maar de besluitvorming moet
transparant en verantwoordelijk zijn en aan de beginselen van sociale rechtvaardigheid
voldoen.
Tenslotte tonen de twee bestudeerde casussen aan dat een succesvolle high-tech
ontwikkeling ruimtelijke effecten heeft op omliggende gebieden, zoals verkeerscongestie,
onevenwichtigheid tussen vraag en aanbod van grond voor woningen en bedrijventerreinen
enz. Het is noodzakelijk om continu te anticiperen op externe effecten van high-tech
ontwikkeling, te controleren vanuit een breed gezichtspunt en genoeg ruimte te laten
voor aanpassing aan ruimtelijke planning en governance.
Het analytische kader dat is gebaseerd op de institutionele concepten van Ostrom en
Scharpf heeft haar waarde bewezen in dit onderzoek. Maar tijdens de uitvoering van het
empirisch onderzoek bleek die een tijdsdoorsnede te impliceren en problemen op te
leveren voor onderzoek en verklaring van de dynamische relaties tussen veranderende
institutionele situaties en besluitvorming van high-tech ruimtelijke planning op een
bepaalde plaats en tijd. Om die beperking ongedaan te maken heb ik een complementaire
diachrone benadering toegepast in het empirisch deel van het onderzoek. Met die
benadering bleek de invloed van voorafgaande institutionele ontwikkelingen en bepaalde
sociaal-economische en politieke episodes op later beleid en latere besluitvorming en
interventies te begrijpen. Het is daarom aan te bevelen om in toekomstige studies waarin
men gebruik wil maken van dezelfde kaders als in dit onderzoek rekening te houden met
de effecten van path dependency.
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17 Cont ents (extensive)
Contents (extensive)
Acknowledgement 9
Summary 11
Samenvatting 13
Samenvatting 15
Acronyms and Abbreviations 25
PART 1 Introduction
1 Introduction 31
1.1 Emergence of High-tech Spatial Development 31
1.2 Problem Statement 33
1.3 Research Aims and Questions 35
1.4 Methodological Approach 35
1.4.1 Values and Challenges of Comparative Research 36
1.4.2 Concepts of Institutionalism 39
1.5 Research Design 46
1.5.1 Case Selection 46
1.5.2 Analytical Approach and Research Methods 51
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 53
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18 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
PART 2 Theoretical Framework
2 Principal Components of High-tech Development 59
2.1 Conceptual Foundations of Regional High-tech Development 59
2.2 The Nature of the Principal Components 64
2.2.1 R&D Capital 64
2.2.2 Relational Capital 67
2.2.3 Human Capital 70
2.2.4 Remark 72
2.3 Spatial Dimension of the Principal Components 75
2.3.1 R&D Capital: Role of Universities and Innovation Centres 75
2.3.2 Relational Capital: Development of High-tech Spaces 78
2.3.3 Human Capital: Planning and Design Strategies 84
2.3.4 Remarks 86
3 Institutional Variables of Spatial Planning Systems 87
3.1 Introduction 87
3.2 Institutional Variables at the Constitutional Level 89
3.2.1 Model of Society 89
3.2.2 Legal System and Constitutional Law 91
3.2.3 Property Relations 92
3.2.4 Administration System 93
3.3 Institutional Variables at the Collective-choice Level 94
3.3.1 Planning Doctrine 95
3.3.2 Spatial Planning System 96
3.4 A Typology of Spatial Planning and Governance 101
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19 Cont ents (extensive)
PART 3 Emperical Study
4 Socio-political Context in the Netherlands and Taiwan 107
4.1 The Netherlands 107
4.1.1 Model of Society 108
4.1.2 Legal System, Constitutional Rights and Property Relations 109
4.1.3 Administration System and Interaction Modes 111
4.2 Taiwan 113
4.2.1 Model of Society 113
4.2.2 Legal System and Property Relations 115
4.2.3 Administration System and Interaction Modes 117
4.3 Comparisons 118
5 Spatial Planning Policies and Planning Systems in the Netherlands and
Taiwan 121
5.1 The Netherlands 122
5.1.1 The Evolution of Spatial Planning Policy 122
5.1.2 Dutch Spatial Planning System 125
5.1.3 Means to Influence Land Use Directly 128
5.1.4 Summary of the Dutch Planning System and Practices 129
5.2 Taiwan 131
5.2.1 The Evolution of Spatial Planning Policy 132
5.2.2 Taiwanese Spatial Planning System 134
5.2.3 Means to Influence Land Use Directly 137
5.2.4 Summary of the Taiwanese Urban Planning System 141
5.3 Comparisons 142
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20 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
6 High-tech Spatial Policies and Development in Eindhoven City-region
and Hsinchu City-region 147
6.1 High-tech Spatial Development Policy in the Netherlands 147
6.1.1 Background of Dutch High-tech Spatial Development Policy 148
6.1.2 An Overview of Dutch Campus Development in 2012 150
6.1.3 Summary 152
6.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Eindhoven Region 153
6.2.1 Socio-economic Context: Towards Brainport Eindhoven 153
6.2.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Eindhoven City-region 155
6.2.3 Summary 157
6.3 High-tech Spatial Development Policy in Taiwan 158
6.3.1 Background of Taiwanese Science Park Policy 158
6.3.2 Evolution of Taiwanese Science Park Policy 160
6.3.3 Summary 163
6.4 High-tech Spatial Developments in Hsinchu Region 163
6.4.1 Socio-economic Context: Large Externalities of the HSP 163
6.4.2 High-tech Spatial Developments in Hsinchu City-region 166
6.4.3 Summary 168
6.5 Comparisons 168
6.5.1 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance R&D Capital 169
6.5.2 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance Relational Capital 170
6.5.3 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance Human Capital 174
6.5.4 Remarks 175
7 High-tech Oriented Spatial Planning and Governance in Eindhoven
City-region and Hsinchu City-region 177
7.1 Brainport Eindhoven 178
7.1.1 Spatial Planning Concepts of Brainport Eindhoven 178
7.1.2 Spatial Planning and Governance Approach of Brainport Eindhoven 183
7.1.3 Spatial Consequences: A Huge Oversupply of Industrial Land 188
7.1.4 Remarks 190
7.2 Hsinchu High-tech City-region 191
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21 Cont ents (extensive)
7.2.1 Spatial Planning in Hsinchu High-tech City-region 192
7.2.2 New Spatial Planning and Governance Approach in Hsinchu City-region 197
7.2.3 Spatial Consequences: Increasing Urban Sprawl in Hsinchu City-region 200
7.2.4 Remarks 201
7.3 Comparisons 202
7.3.1 Dominant Style of Spatial Planning 203
7.3.2 Mechanisms of Spatial Governance 205
7.3.3 Spatial Patterns of Industrial Land Development 207
7.3.4 Remarks 207
PART 4 Conclusions and Reflections
8 Conclusions and Reflections 213
8.1 Main Empirical Findings 213
8.1.1 The Principal Components of High-tech Development 214
8.1.2 Factors that Shape Spatial Planning Arenas 215
8.1.3 Spatial Mechanisms to Enhance High-tech Development 216
8.1.4 Spatial Planning and Governance of High-tech Spatial Development 219
8.2 Conclusions 221
8.2.1 The Provision of the Three Principal Components 221
8.2.2 Close Collaboration among Government, Knowledge Institutes and Firms 222
8.2.3 To Anticipate and Monitor the Externalities of High-tech Development 224
8.3 Methodological Reflections 226
8.3.1 Restating the Value of Comparative Research 226
8.3.2 Reflections on the Analytical Frameworks 227
8.4 Directions for Future Research 228
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25 Acr onyms and Abbreviations
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AMvB Ruimte Netherlands General Regulation on the Management of Spatial Planning
APICA Science Park and Innovation Centre Association
BZW Brabant-Zeeuwse Employers Association
CEPD Taiwan Council for Economic Planning and Development
CPAMI Taiwan Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior
CTSP Central Taiwan Science Park
DPP Democratic Progressive Party, the second largest political party in Taiwan
DAF Van Doorne’s Automobile Factory
DATAR France Inter-ministerial Delegation for Territorial Planning and Regional Attractiveness
EFRO European Regional Development Fund
EL&I Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation
EPZ Export processing zone
EU European Union
HSC Hsinchu Science City
HSP Hsinchu Science Park
HUDB Taiwan Housing and Urban Development Bureau
IC Integrated circuits
ICT Information and communication technology
IOB Dutch Interdepartmental Policy Research
IT Information technology
ITRI Taiwan Industrial Technology Research Institute
KMT Kuomintang, the largest political party in Taiwan
KvK Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
MEZ Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs
MIRT Netherlands Multi-year Plan for Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and Transport
MITI Japan Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NCTU National Chia Tung University in Taiwan
NTHU National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan
NLG Dutch guilder
NSC Taiwan National Science Council
NV REDE An economic development agency for the Eindhoven Region
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
PCC Taiwan Public Construction Commission
R&D Research and development
RDEC Taiwan Research, Development and Evaluation Commission
SMEs Small and medium-sizes enterprises
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26 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
SPA Taiwan Science Park Administration
SRE Eindhoven City Region
STPs Science and technology parks
STSP South Taiwan Science Park
SVIR Netherlands National Policy Strategy for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning
TKFP Taiwan Knowledge-based Flagship Park
TNO Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research
TPG Taiwan provincial government
TSMI Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
TU/e Eindhoven University of Technology
UMC United Microelectronics Corporation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UPC Urban Planning Commission in Taiwan
URBACT A European exchange and learning programme promoting sustainable urban development
VROM Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment Administration
WRO Dutch Spatial Planning Act in 1962
Wro Dutch Spatial Planning Act in 2008
WRR Netherlands National Scientific Council for Government Policy
WTO World Trade Organisation
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31 Introduction
1 Introduction
§ 1.1 Emergence of High-tech Spatial Development
High-tech development has had strategic importance for economic policy for a long
time, because it has been broadly accepted that technological change ‘lies at the very
heart of the processes of economic growth and development’ and innovation is key to
promoting technological change (Dicken 2003, 85). After the Second World War, when
other countries struggled to rebuild their damaged economies, the USA continued its
rise in economic performance by consolidating its science and high-tech industry to
trigger economic growth (Coopey 2004). The economic success of the USA influenced
other countries to consider the promotion of technology as a main strategy to reconstruct
their economy and establish their technology policy according to their own conditions.
Advanced by government intervention and market-driven forces, since the 1970s
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been rapidly evolving and
broadly applied to ‘flexible integrated production and management systems’, which
support an internationally decentralised mode of production both functionally and
spatially (Castells 1989, 12). Following the continuing evolution of ICTs and the dynamic
process of decentralising production modes, an informational and global economy
has emerged. In this new economic system, technological capacity is one of the main
factors that determine the outcome of global competition—a capacity that ‘refers to the
appropriate articulation of science, technology, management, and production’ (Castells
1989, 103).
Under such global conditions, since the 1970s both developed and developing
countries have established technology policies to harness the potential of ICTs and
other new technologies, aiming to enhance and sustain competitiveness in the global
economic network. One commonly used strategy is to initiate and/or promote the
development of high-tech spaces—such as technology parks, science parks, science
cities, and technopolises—where technologically advanced industries and/or research
and development (R&D) firms and institutes gather to trigger economic growth at the
national, regional and/or local level. According to Science Park and Innovation Centre
Association’s (SPICA) Directory, by the end of 2010 there were more than 395 science
and technology parks (STPs) and 1,664 business incubators in 102 countries. While
these figures are provisional and do not claim to be exhaustive, they give an impression
of the extension of this global phenomenon.
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32 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
The concept and scale of high-tech spatial development varies according to time and
place. Differences may result from the particular socio-economic, political and historical
context of a place, but also from the way the initiators of a development understand
and perceive the notion of high-tech development, which may be influenced by
contemporary discourse and technological developments. For example, the French term
‘technopole’ combines two key ideas, technology and city (polis in Greek), so in their well-
known book, Technopoles of the World, Castells and Hall (1994) chose technopole as a
generic name for high-tech spaces. They define technopole as a planned place gathering
technologically advanced, knowledge-intensive industries and R&D activities for the
purpose of promoting technologically innovative, industry-related production. They
further identify four types of technopoles, including new techno-industrial complexes,
technology parks, science cities and the Technopolis programme in Japan.
However, they exclusively select cases from industrialised and newly industrialised
countries, within a period leading up to the beginning of the 1990s. Some of the
case areas arose without significant planning by government (e.g. Silicon Valley and
Boston Highway 128 in the US, Cambridge in the UK, etc.), others were the outcome
of more specific, deliberate political decisions (e.g. Taedok Science Towns in Korea,
Tsukuba Science City in Japan, Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, etc.). Their definition
of technopole does not include current high-tech spatial developments, which have
received an additional impetus since the rise of ICTs and the advent of the Internet in
the mid-1990s, such as the more recently established IT City and IT Corridor in India
(Centre, van Westen, and Prasad 2008).
Moreover, in the past two decades many countries—including the countries where the
cases are located—have been influenced by the doctrine of neoliberalism and/or huge
financial burden, gradually changing the role of the public sector from a provider to an
enabler, facilitator, or supporter. Ways of formulating and implementing technology
policy and approaching high-tech spatial development have also been shifting from
government to governance. For example, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) proposed
a triple helix model of innovation governance. In this model, government focuses on
the development of hybrid organisations and trilateral networks that overlap and
connect government, academia and industry in order to build a tight interrelation and
collaboration among the three sectors and to encourage the creation of an innovative
milieu. The Brainport Eindhoven development is a good example of the triple helix
model, presenting a more collaborative way to conduct high-tech spatial planning and
development.
The experience of developing countries and the changing role of the public sector in
industrialised and newly industrialised countries must be considered, because these
situations might offer alternative perspectives to understand the relationship between
high-tech development and its effects on the organisation of space. On the basis of
the previous studies, there is a pronounced need to reinvestigate high-tech spatial
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33 Introduction
development. In light of this, this research focuses on the changing role of government in
high-tech spatial development. I understand high-tech spaces to be places that gather
technologically advanced industries and/or R&D firms and institutes, that have been
specifically selected by technology policies—in developed or developing countries—and
implemented to enhance high-tech development and trigger economic growth at the
national, and/or regional level. This includes government led initiatives without, or with
different degrees of private sector involvement, private-led initiatives with different
degrees of public sector support, or the result of partnerships between the public and
private sector.
§ 1.2 Problem Statement
A large number of studies have explored relationships between technology policy,
economy, society and space. Many of the studies focus on how to achieve economic
success through technology policy and high-tech spatial development. Although the
main focus differs across the studies, they share the same underlying assumption that
knowledge and technological innovation not only contribute to economic growth, but
also can be stimulated and induced by well-focused policy in combination with certain
spatial mechanisms.
For example, Castells and Hall (1994) explored the development and success of global
high-tech spaces in different parts of the world. Giarratana and Torrisi (2006) focused
on the links between universities and industry in order to generate benefits for the
economy. Carter (1989), Joseph (1989), Keeble (1989) and Annerstedt (2006) found
that the development of technology-oriented complexes (TOC) contributes to growth
of the local economy. Sternberg (1996b) evaluated several economic growth theories
in relation to technology-based regional growth and proposed a theoretical approach to
analyse the factors governing the genesis and development of high-tech regions in order
to clarify the role of technology policy. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) and Lagendijk
and Boekema (2008) explored mechanisms to govern discursive relations among
government, academia, and industry in forming territorial innovation systems.
Two issues have to be addressed in relation to the previous studies: neglect of the role
of spatial planning and a questionable assumption of easy high-tech policy transfer.
First, some studies have recognised that the development of high-tech industries ‘has
very definite spatial dimensions, with far reaching consequences for the future of cities
and regions’ (Castells 1989, 33), and examined how and to what extent high-tech
spaces intentionally or unintentionally impact the surrounding areas. For example,
Massey (2008) highlighted the ‘enclave’ character of certain high-tech spaces, which
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34 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
are significantly problematic and may increase social polarisation and geographic
inequalities. Lin (2000) also showed that if a high-tech spatial development succeeds,
in the long term it might expand into surrounding areas because the agglomeration and
spin-off effects of high-tech industries may raise the rent of industrial land and edge out
traditional industries.
According to the agglomeration theory of new economic geography, if the development
of a high-tech space succeeds, it will create a circle of causation leading to growing
varieties of goods and workers/people and thus form agglomeration forces (Fujita
2008). At the same time, land demands to accommodate the various new activities
will be triggered. This leads to competition over the limited supply of land and public
investment among different sectors. Spatial planning, on the other hand, is argued to be
a means of mediating the tensions and contradictions among sectoral policies (United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2008) and to provide sound space and place
qualities for economic and socio-cultural purposes (Healey 2010). Although the scope
of spatial planning differs, in most countries the key function of contemporary spatial
planning is managing spatial development and organisation in a particular place (Dühr,
Colomb, and Nadin 2010; Healey 2006; Healey et al. 1997; United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe 2008). In other words, spatial planning not only can play a
role in coordinating other sectoral policies to provide sound space and place quality
for high-tech development, but also may need to anticipate and mediate the spatial
consequences and agglomeration effects of the high-tech development, because spatial
planning must take into consideration other socio-cultural and environmental needs.
Second, there is a questionable assumption underlying some of the previous studies,
which aimed to identify the successful elements of high-tech development. They often
assume that ‘there are ways of understanding the problem and finding solutions that
work can be applied in different places and can be broadly expected to have the same
effect.’ (Booth 2011, 14) However, what works in one place may not necessarily work
in another place. Policy transfer is difficult for a number of reasons, including a variety
of local circumstances, a natural resistance to change, a lack of detailed knowledge and
information of the so-called ‘good practices’ for application elsewhere (OECD 2001, 34;
Stead 2012).
Local circumstances are characterised by certain institutional variables, such as
cultural attributes, socio-economic conditions, technology capacity, administration
system, policy style, spatial planning system, and other sectoral policies. This implies
that ‘success factors and good practices may vary between areas’ (OECD 2001, 34). In
order to avoid this questionable assumption, before lesson-drawing it is necessary to
acknowledge the differences of institutional context between places and to recognise
advantages and disadvantages of practices applied in particular circumstances. This
helps to clarify how certain success factors are created in some places but not in others,
and to learn from other cases in a more cautious, effective and comprehensive way.
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35 Introduction
§ 1.3 Research Aims and Questions
On the basis of the problems stated in the previous section, this research has two main
aims. The first is to advance knowledge regarding the role of spatial planning in the
development process of high-tech city-regions. The second is to provide an analytical
framework that helps to reveal the major factors that shape high-tech oriented spatial
planning practices of particular high-tech city-regions. This will contribute to the field of
high-tech spatial policy transfer and lesson-drawing. According to the research aims, I
formulate a set of research questions that guide the research process as follows:
1 What are the principal components of high-tech development? What are the spatial
dimensions of the identified components?
2 What are the factors that shape the form and the means of spatial planning in a particular
place?
3 How do governments conduct, facilitate and/or coordinate the provision of the spatial
elements that can contribute to high-tech development in a particular place?
4 How do governments use the systems and tools of spatial planning and governance to
mobilise resources and actors to deal with the spatial issues generated in the process of
high-tech development?
5 What are the major institutional factors that shape how governments formulate and
employ spatial planning and governance mechanisms to conduct, facilitate, and/
or coordinate high-tech spatial developments in a particular place, and deal with the
spatial issues generated in the development process?
The first two research questions lead to the establishment of the theoretical framework
of this research. The third, fourth and fifth research questions guide the empirical study
of the research.
§ 1.4 Methodological Approach
In the past two decades, there has been a growing concern in the research field of spatial
planning and development about the issues of policy transfer and lesson-drawing from
good practices. According to this thinking, spatial planning is considered to be a social
construction and the characteristics of planning systems and practices are recognised to
vary widely among nations. Even within a country, differences between regions and cities
can be found, because the characteristics are rooted in and restricted to the wider socio-
economic, political and cultural context (Sanyal 2005; Nadin and Stead 2008a; Knieling
and Othengrafen 2009a; Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012).
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36 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
On the basis of this understanding, I employ two complementarily methodological
approaches: comparative research and institutionalism. Comparative research can
reveal implicit assumptions and other institutional factors, which shape the systems
and practices of spatial planning in particular places but are often taken for granted or
overlooked (Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Nadin and Stead 2008a, 2012). On the other
hand, institutionalism provides a sophisticated way of viewing the interrelationships
between structure and decision-making. This helps to explore the institutional factors
that have shaped the practice of planning. I discuss the values and challenges of
comparative research and introduce key concepts of institutionalism in the following
sections.
§ 1.4.1 Values and Challenges of Comparative Research
There is a growing interest in comparative research of spatial planning systems and
cultures. The value of comparative research is manifold. It not only encourages systematic
examination of the transferability of good practices and deepens understanding of
the nature and operation of spatial planning, but also contributes to planning theory-
building and to mutual understanding and learning between nations, regions and
cities. High-tech spatial development is a ‘global’ phenomenon. The underlying logic
and mechanisms of technology policy differ from country to country and high-tech
spaces themselves show place-specific differentiation (Ramachandraiah, Westen, and
Prasad 2008). It is reasonable to employ comparative analysis in this research to explore
the factors that shape the means and practices of spatial planning when carrying out
high-tech spatial development. However, there are three interrelated methodological
challenges, namely the risk of misinterpretation, the validity of comparative research
findings and the issue of cultural sensitivities.
First, the risk of misinterpretation may occur when conducting international comparative
research. This refers to the fact that ‘not all concepts are commonly understood across
different cultures’ (Nadin and Stead 2012, 4) The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning
Systems and Policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997, 23–25) notes
that many terms are used in the EU member states to describe particular activities that
are closely related to the idea of spatial planning, such as ruimtelijke ordening in the
Netherlands or aménagement du territoire in France, but each term represents a specific
meaning in its own national context. It is inappropriate to suggest that the meanings
are the same. ‘Translations are often fraught with unacknowledged cultural associations
and words that are ostensibly direct translations may carry quite different overlays of
meaning.’ (Booth 2011, 25) The EU Compendium proposes two useful ways to reduce the
risk of misinterpretation. The first is to italicise ‘home language terms’ when they have
specific meaning, and to explain the terms when they are first mentioned. The second
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37 Introduction
is to develop common categories for comparison. The terms used in the categories are
supposed to be neutral.
Second, the validity of comparative research findings is another important issue.
Nadin and Stead (2012, 3) remind that ‘comparison requires some common scale of
measurement but various characteristics of planning systems are difficult to compare
directly.’ In other words, it is necessary to study the particular phenomenon in its own
context and setting. There are two useful approaches to learn from previous comparative
studies towards overcoming this methodological issue, including the systematic
classifications of planning systems applied in Davies et al. (1989), Newman and Thornley
(1996) and Janin Rivolin (2008), and the use of ‘ideal types’ in the EU Compendium
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997).
Both approaches are helpful to position and characterise particular planning systems,
but the latter approach may provide more fruitful analytical findings, because it can not
only be used to appraise each planning system individually but also to measure their
trends and directions of change (Nadin and Stead 2012). However, although the four
planning traditions proposed by the EU Compendium claim to be ‘ideal types’, it is not
set out explicitly how the four traditions relate to the seven criteria they select, including
the scope of the system, the extent and type of planning, the locus of power, the relative
roles of public and private sectors, the legal framework, the maturity or completeness
of the system, and the distance between expressed objectives and outcomes. Further,
the typology was developed according to the knowledge of the ‘old’ EU Member States.
Hence, it is not easily employed by other cross-national comparative studies, especially
when the country being studied is not one of the ‘old’ EU member States.
The systems and objectives of spatial planning are not an independent phenomenon.
Spatial Planning is culturally embedded and considers numerous variables, seemingly
too many to explain easily (Booth 2011). It is common that researchers selectively choose
variables to classify systems or create ideal types. Therefore, the main question is how
to construct a methodological approach that can result in meaningful comparisons and
avoid a bias, as Gullestrup (2009, 3 emphasis in original) argues ‘“reality” will always be
perceived and understood through one’s own culture…[and] constructed on the basis
of one’s own cultural background and experience’. The criteria and the principles of
measurement, which are developed to classify planning systems or to create ideal types,
have to not only correspond with the purpose of the research but also be underpinned
by a theoretical stance. Both the research purpose and theoretical stance have to be
explicitly explained in order to allow others to review.
Finally, on the basis of previous comparative studies, many reflections have been
developed, mainly addressing aspects of historical evolution and planning cultures.
They are grounded in the understanding that spatial planning systems and practices are
embedded in a wider socio-economic, political, cultural and historical context. Most of the
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38 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
criticism follows that the previous comparative studies focus too much on the description
of formal institutions at one point in time and cannot characterise how spatial planning
systems and tools actually operate in practice and how the systems and practices constantly
evolve to respond to internal and external challenges (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a;
Booth 2011; Nadin 2012; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012). The issue of planning cultures and
their dynamics are thus being addressed in recent methodological discussions.
However, there is no widely accepted definition of planning culture. For example, while
Sanyal (2005, 3) considers planning culture as ‘the collective ethos and dominant
attitude of professional planners in different nations toward the appropriate roles of
the state, market forces, and civil society in urban, regional, and national development’,
Knieling and Othengrafen (2009b, xxiv) refer to planning cultures as ‘the different
planning systems and traditions, institutional arrangements of spatial development
and the broader cultural context of spatial planning and development. It consists of
more than planning instruments and procedures; it is the aggregate of the social,
environmental, and historical grounding of urban and regional planning’. The former
definition implies the influence of assumptions and values of planners on the systems
and practices of planning in a particular place, but does not explicitly indicate the
influence of the broader cultural context on the assumptions and values of planners.
The latter definition, on the other hand, includes not just the formal systems, real
practices and traditions of spatial planning but also the broader cultural context where
spatial planning is embedded and operates. Following this definition, Knieling and
Othengrafen (2009c, 55–58) further propose a culturised-planning model to expose
culture and its impact on spatial planning and development practices. The model consists
of three analytical dimensions, including ‘planning artifacts’, ‘planning environment’
and ‘societal environment’. Planning artifacts consist of the elements that can be easily
observed and understood, such as visible planning products, structures and processes.
Planning environment refers to the shared assumptions, values and cognitive frames
that are taken for granted by planners. Societal environment describes the underlying
unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, thoughts and feelings that affect planning.
However, the model proposed by Knieling and Othengrafen does not present a dynamic
perspective on planning cultures nor does it offer analytical strategies to uncover the
shared assumptions, values, beliefs, thoughts and feelings hidden in the planning
environment and societal environment, although they do claim that the hidden
assumptions and values ‘have strong impact on the specific occurrence of cultural
manifestations in planning models and practices.’ (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a,
58) In other words, they do provide rich theoretical reflections on the issue of planning
cultures, but the model they propose is too abstract to operate directly. The value of
comparative analysis—in revealing taken-for-granted factors and their impact on spatial
planning practices in a particular territory—is not explicitly addressed in their research.
In light of cultural sensitivity, the most essential methodological questions for this
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39 Introduction
research are: What are the major structural and cultural factors that shape specific
spatial planning practices? How can the use of comparative analysis expose these factors
systematically and result in learning from the comparisons? How can a generic analytical
framework be established that is not tied to specific places? Moreover, many comparative
studies do not make a clear distinction between the institutional variables influencing
the spatial planning system and the spatial planning system itself, and between the
spatial planning system (structure) and planning practices (decisions/actions). Such
studies mix these elements when they conduct empirical research. This may be a
reason why sometimes the analytical frameworks or classification/categorisation of
the systems established in previous comparative studies are difficult to apply in other
comparative research.
The major purpose of comparison in this research is to reveal implicit assumptions
and institutional factors that shape the practices of high-tech spatial planning and
development, and that are often taken for granted in their own context. This will increase
mutual understanding and learning between different cases but also will contribute to
theory-building with regard to high-tech spatial planning and development in different
cultural contexts. Since the focus of this research is the practices of high-tech spatial
planning and development, planning systems become one of the institutional factors
that shape the practices. It is necessary to distinguish a planning system and its
institutional variables from its practices. In order to overcome this issue in the process
of analysis, an institutional approach may help to establish a more comprehensive and
operational framework for comparative research.
§ 1.4.2 Concepts of Institutionalism
Institutionalism concerns the interrelationships between structure and decision-
making/action-taking. It offers a sophisticated way for this research to explore the
interrelationships among spatial planning systems, other institutional factors and high-
tech spatial planning practices, while comparisons help to reveal the major institutional
factors that shape planning practices.
The definition of ‘institution’ varies in different studies. Two meanings have been
distinguished:
One refers to the broader norms and practices which frame the ways in which, for
example, conflicts are dealt with, resources are allocated and, action are taken in the
realm of public affairs. In other words, how things get done! The other refers to specific
configurations of agencies and organisations which operate within the parameter of the
above wider norms. (Sturzaker et al. 2009, 7)
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40 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
In order to map the changing nature of the interrelations between structure and agency,
it is necessary to distinguish institutions, actors and action arenas analytically. Hence,
this research follows the definition proposed by Ostrom (Ostrom 2008, 822 emphasis in
original) that ‘[t]he term “institution” is used to refer to many different types of entities
including organizations as well as the rules, norms, and strategies used to structure
patterns of interaction within and across organizations.’ Specifically, the focus of the
institutional analysis is on the patterns of interactions within and among institutions and
action arenas, and how the decisions are made, but not the decisions per se (Healey 2007).
Another important concept of institutional analysis is that decisions that are made at
one level are constrained by the institutions at that level and deeper levels. ‘Changes
in deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and more costly to accomplish, thus
increasing the stability of mutual expectations among individuals interaction according
to the deeper set of rules.’ (Ostrom 2005, 58) For comparative analysis, this concept of
multiple institutional layers is especially useful for enhancing mutual learning but also
for systematically examining the transferability of good practices between places.
Based on the understanding, I recognise that the two concepts of institutionalism—
the interrelationships between institutions and actors, and the multiple institutional
layers—are very instrumental in establishing analytical frameworks for comparative
research. I further explain the two theoretical concepts in the following sections.
A The interrelationships between institutions and actors
Ostrom (2005; 2008) suggests a general framework that helps to recognise the
universal elements in the institutional analysis and the relations among these elements
(see Figure 1). The first step in using this framework is to identify ‘action arenas’, which
include an ‘action situation’ and the actors in that situation. This identification can help
to analyse and explain the behaviour of the actors. She further addresses the importance
of nested-levels of rules, which consist of physical and material conditions, attributes of
community and rules-in-use. The attributes of physical and material worlds determine
what actions are physically possible. This may also involve the availability of technology.
The attributes of community refer to values that are shared within a community. The
nested-levels of rules deeply influence the action agenda, because ‘the rules of the
game…structure the game itself’ and the rules are embedded in the physical, social and
cultural environment (Ostrom 2008, 831). Rules-in-use refer to ‘shared understandings
by participants about enforced perceptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are
required, prohibited, or permitted’ (Ostrom 2005, 18, emphasis in original). The shared
understandings are learned on the ground and may not exist in any written document
as rules-in-form do.
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41 Introduction
Figure 1
A general framework for institutional analysis (source: Ostrom 2008, 829)
As Timmermans (2001, 317) argues, ‘a finite set of rule types allows institutions to be
compared.’ Ostrom (1986; 2005; 2008) divides the nested-levels of rules into seven
types of interrelated rules. These are, scope rules, access rules, position rules, payoff
rules, competence rules, information rules, and decision rules. Together they shape the
patterns of interactions. As shown in Table 1, I summarise definitions of the seven types
of rule. The classification of rules helps to link the nested-levels of rules to the action
arenas in the analysis process, but the concept of rules-in-use rather than rule-in-form
has to be pointed out at the same time..
Type of rule Definition
Scope rules Scope rules delimit the range of potential externalities created by the decision out-
comes.
Access rules Access rules affect the number of participants and their attributes.
Position rules Position rules define the role an actor is supposed to play.
Payoff rules Payoff rules prescribe the distribution of benefits and costs for actors while actions
and outcomes are made.
Competence rules Competence rules give participants jurisdictions and conditions for using resources
within arenas.
Table 1
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Schar pf 1997, 44)
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42 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Type of rule Definition
Decision rules Decision rules influence the procedures for decision-making and the level of control
for participants when they exercise the decision function at a particular node.
Information rules Information rules authorise channels of communication among participants in
positions.
Table 1
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Schar pf 1997, 44)
Different from the general framework proposed by Ostrom, which focuses more on how
the institutions structure action situations, Scharpf (1997) proposes an alternative
approach to explore how actors with their orientations, capacities, actor constellations
and modes of interaction influence policy-making to cope with particular political
issues, presenting an actor-centred institutionalism (see Figure 2). He recognises policy
is ‘intentional action by actors who are most interested in achieving specific outcomes.’
(36) The term actor is used to describe an individual or an aggregate of individuals. In
other words, in this approach policy-making is considered as an outcome of interactions
among intentional actors—‘Games real actors play’.
Figure 2
Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Schar pf 1997, 44).
In order to link actor’s action orientations to institutionally determined or empirically
observable indicators, Scharpf (1997) disaggregates the notion of actor orientation
into three major components: unit of reference, cognitive orientations and preferences.
The most important unit of reference for empirical research is the role of positions that
are associated with role-specific norms, expectations and identity. He argues that in
most cases the normative expectations of a role are a more useful predictor of role-
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43 Introduction
related action than individual self-interest, because the willingness of individuals to
assume such a role is assured through benefits of membership, position, and career
opportunities that cannot be otherwise obtained. However, this does not mean that the
role self-interest plays in affecting the preference of actors’ choice can be ignored.
Regarding cognitive orientations, Scharpf (1997, 62) ‘start[s] from the working
hypothesis that actors’ perceptions of directly observable facts will be empirically correct
and that their hypotheses about what they cannot observe as well as about causal
linkages will be shaped by theories prevailing at the particular time and in the particular
institutional setting.’ The specific combinations of knowledge, ignorance and theories
tend to be shared among actors in institutionalised interactions. Collective learning
plays an important role in the knowledge sharing process, which implies communication
and public debate. Thus, the cognitive orientations of the specific actors can be obtained
relatively easily for researchers from public documents, interviews, or participant
observation.
Scharpf (1997) divides preferences into four simpler components—basic self-interest,
normative role orientations, identity, and interaction orientations. ‘Basic self-interest’
describes the basic preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth.
In terms of corporate actors, their self-interest can be identified with the conditions of
organisational survival, autonomy and growth, so the specific requirements associated
with the self-interest of collective actors and corporate actors are relatively transparent
to researchers. ‘Normative role orientations’ are shared expectations among
participants based on antecedent conditions of particular actions or the purposes to be
achieved. However, actors have the possibility to emphasise selectively certain aspects
of interest, rules and normative purposes according to the specific ‘identity’ they define
for themselves. If only individual or corporate actors have a clearly defined identity, the
uncertainty of their preference can be reduced for other actors as well as for researchers.
In short, both analytical frameworks, respectively proposed by Ostrom and Scharpf, try
to create a linkage between structure and actors, although their main focuses are very
different. The former focuses more on the analysis of action arenas and on how the nested-
levels of rules shape action situations and influence collective actions. Alternatively,
the latter focuses more on the analysis of the interaction among intentional actors,
which are structured by particular institutional settings. Indeed, these two frameworks
do not conflict, but complement each other. Figure 3 illustrates the linkage between
these two frameworks. Access rules determine the constellations of actors in the action
arenas. Scope rules, competence rules, decision rules and information rules together
structure the capacities of involved actors. Position rules and payoff rules affect action
orientations of involved actors regarding their role of positions and action preference.
Cognitive orientation is shaped by the theories prevailing at the particular time within a
specific problem-field. In this research, the cognitive orientation especially relates to the
theoretical concepts of high-tech development, which are discussed in the next chapter.
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44 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Figure 3
A combinative framework of action arenas.
B Multiple levels of analysis and institutional change
Ostrom’s framework also addresses the concept of multiple levels of action situations
and decisions, which has a twofold meaning. First, policy decisions that are made at a
higher level need to be implemented by lower tier actions. Second, what can be done
at one level is defined by the rules at that level and deeper levels. Ostrom (2008, 842)
distinguishes four levels of rules, including operational, collective-choice, constitutional-
choice, and meta constitutional levels of rules, which ‘cumulatively affect the actions
taken and outcomes obtained in any operational setting’ (see Figure 4). On the other
hand, Ostrom (2005, 58) explains that ‘[f]or most practical applications, three levels are
enough.’ According to her opinion, the point of identifying layers is to ‘hit rock bottom—
the biophysical world’ (58), so there is no theoretical justification regarding how many
levels should be identified in an institutional analysis. Despite a lack of theoretical
justification, this structure does demonstrate the concept of multiple levels and provide
an useful outline for multiple levels of analysis.
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45 Introduction
Figure 4
Levels of analysis and outcomes (Source: Based on Ostrom 2008, 843)
However, the analytical frameworks discussed above all assume a temporary fixed
situation for analysis. This assumption can create an easier situation for analysis, but
cannot help to explain dynamic interrelationships between structure and agency, an
interactive process of social construction that should be emphasised. The dialectic of
‘path dependency’ and ‘path shaping’ may provide a way to explore the process of social
construction. ‘Path dependency implies that the prior development of an institution
shapes current and future trajectories’, while path shaping conveys an idea that ‘social
forces could intervene in current conjunctures and actively rearticulate them, so that new
trajectories become possible.’ (Jessop 2001, 1229) Both situations can be explained in a
relational perspective.
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§ 1.5 Research Design
In the following sub-sections, I explain the criteria of case selection and briefly introduce
the two cases. Then, I explain the analytical approach and methods of this research.
§ 1.5.1 Case Selection
In the first year of this research I established a database, which consists of the
information of 217 high-tech parks in the 25 most technology-advanced European
and Asian countries. The data are mostly from the International Association of Science
Park, World Alliance for Innovation, Science Park and Innovation Centre Association’s
Directory, and the national science park association in each country, such as Korean
Technopark Association, Finnish Science Park Association (TEKEL), Associazione Parchi
Scientifici e Tecnologici Italiani (APSTI), and so on. This database collects information
regarding each high-tech park’s major industries, activities, shareholders, planned area,
year established, and number of employees and tenants. However, the database does
not claim to be exhaustive, but offers a foundation for this research to choose cases for
in-depth case studies.
Considering the research questions, there are four criteria that help in selecting the
two case study areas. Firstly, the case study areas have been specifically selected by
national/regional technology policies to trigger economic growth at the national and/
or regional level. In other words, both cases are the outcome of very specific, deliberate
political decisions. But according to the role of government, two modes of formulating
and implementing the policy of high-tech spatial development can be recognised in the
database. In the first mode, the government dominates the development of the high-
tech space as a provider. In the second mode, the development of the high-tech space
is a result of close collaboration between the government and other parties, such as
universities. In the process, the government acts as a supporter and a governor rather
than a provider. In light of this recognition, the two cases have to present respectively
these two development modes. This helps to explore the relationships between the role
of government in high-tech spatial development and its implications for the practices of
spatial planning and the organisation of space.
Secondly, high-tech industrial clustering has formed in the two case study areas. The
economies of the chosen areas both have to rely mainly on high-tech industries. This
gives an easier approach to explore how government uses spatial planning and tools
to promote and deal with the issues of high-tech development in the particular city-
regions. Thirdly, the scale of the chosen areas in terms of population and physical size
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47 Introduction
has to be comparable. Finally, data accessibility plays a major role in the process of case
selection.
Based on the database and the criteria, the Eindhoven city-region, the Netherlands
and the Hsinchu city-region, Taiwan have been selected as the case study areas in this
research (see Figure 5). The former case is well known since the end of the 2000s for its
triple helix model in high-tech development, while the latter has been widely studied
as one of the most successful examples of state–led high-tech spatial development.
As shown in Table 2, both of them exhibit high levels of performance in the national
high-tech economy and are characterised as the technology and innovation hot spots
in their own country. Their specialised industries are similar and their scale in terms of
population and physical size are comparable as well.
Figure 5
Hsinchu city-region and Eindhoven city-region (Source: Based on google map 2011).
Also of primary importance, I have relatively easy access to data about these two areas.
This research is mainly conducted in the Netherlands and is related to the research
on knowledge-based development carried out by A. M. Fernández-Maldonado in the
Department of Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture, TU Delft. There are some connections
between the university and the Brainport Eindhoven. On the other hand, I am originally
from Taiwan and used to be involved in urban planning practice in the Hsinchu area.
I remain well connected with the local governments and the Hsinchu science park
administration. In the following sections, I briefly introduce the two cases.
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48 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
City region Hsinchu Eindhoven
Area (km2) 578 1,370
Population in 2012 1,054,000 742,000
Output value (Million
Euro) in 2004
27,148
(only within the Hsinchu Science Park;
share in the GNP of Taiwan is 9.3 %)
21,199
(Share in the GNP of the Netherlands
is 4.3%)
Specialised Industries ICT, Electronics, and Life Tech industries ICT, Mechatronics, Life Tech, and
automotive industries
Local Political Entities
The Science Park Administration,
Hsinchu city government and county
government
Noord-Brabant Provincial Government,
SRE, and 21 municipalities
City-region Strategic
Plan
Hsinchu Science City Development Plan
(1993)
Stimulus programme (1995),
Horizon programme (2002),
Brainport Eindhoven (2005)
Table 2
Information about Hsinchu region and Eindhoven region (Source: Based on 2009 HSP Annual Report; National
Statistics of Taiwan (http://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1); Eindhoven Region 2008, Facts & Figures)
Eindhoven city-region
In 2004 the Dutch central government appointed the Eindhoven high-tech city-region
as the national ‘Brainport’, the most innovative region in the Netherlands (Ministry of
Economy Affairs 2004) (see Figure 6). In the city-region, government has a role, together
with the private sector, in strengthening regional innovation. This was triggered by the
crisis in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. At that time, the Eindhoven City Region
(SRE), business, knowledge institutions and public authorities joined forces to recover
from the economic downturn. The SRE is a regional organisation made up of the city
of Eindhoven, the city of Helmond, and another 19 surrounding municipalities, which
created a joint fund to strengthen the economic structure of the region and set up the
Stimulus programme. This cooperation laid the foundation for the Brainport of today
(SRE 2009).
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49 Introduction
Figure 6
Dutch national strategic planning and Eindhoven city-region (Source: based on Ministry of Economic Affairs
2004, 10; Brainport Foundation 2009, 32).
After two decades of efforts, the city-region has shifted from a manufacturing centre to
an important innovation hot spot not only at the national scale but also at the European
scale. According to Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2011 (European Union 2011, 208), in
Europe the Eindhoven city-region ranks highest in terms of patents per population,
more than 2, 000 patents per million inhabitants.
Hsinchu city-region
The Hsinchu high-tech city-region was formed due to the development of Hsinchu
Science Park (HSP), which has been in operation since 1980. In order to acquire the
land and create a sound industrial environment for the HSP, the HSP Special District
was planned and established under the supervision of the National Science Council. The
major aim of the HSP development is to foster the development of high-tech industry in
Taiwan. As shown in Figure 7, the Hsinchu city-region is not an administrative division
but rather a functional city-region, which consists of Hsinchu city, one county-controlled
city and six townships of Hsinchu county and two townships of Miaoli county.
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50 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Figure 7
Taiwan national spatial planning and Hsinchu city-r egion (Source: based on CEPD 2010; SPA and TPC 1993).
The Science Park Administration (SPA) was funded by the central government under
the supervision of the National Science Council as an independent authority to manage
the park. The SPA even has a prevailing position in deciding the masterplan and detail
plans of the HSP Special District, which is supposed to be under supervision of local
governments. This has created huge tensions between the SPA, Hsinchu city government
and Hsinchu county government, because the development of the HSP has serious
environmental impacts on the surrounding area, but the earnings of the HSP go directly
to the central government rather than the local governments (Chou 2007).
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51 Introduction
§ 1.5.2 Analytical Approach and Research Methods
There are two major concerns in this research—the role of spatial planning and the factors
that shape the practice of spatial planning in the development process of a high-tech
city-region. After the general introduction to the research problems and methodological
approaches, I develop a theoretical framework of the research to understand the spatial
dimension of high-tech policy and to recognise the variables at different institutional
levels that may cumulatively affect the practice of spatial planning by reviewing literature
in relation to economic geography, high-tech policy, innovation systems, regional study,
science park development, and spatial planning and governance. This forms a theoretical
base to guide the empirical study of this research (see Figure 8).
Figure 8
Research structure.
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52 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
According to the institutional concept of multiple levels of analysis, I build a scheme to
conduct comparative case study research. As shown in Figure 9, the scheme consists of
four comparative analyses. I first explore and compare certain institutional variables in
the two countries at the constitutional level as grounds for understanding what causes
the significant differences between them regarding their spatial planning systems and
dominant planning styles. Then, I review high-tech spatial policies in the Netherlands
and Taiwan from 1980 to 2012 as a base to investigate and compare the high-tech
spatial developments in 2012 in these two city-regions. In this part, I focus more on the
major similarities and differences between their mechanisms to provide particular high-
tech spatial elements that have been identified in the theoretical framework.
Figure 9
Scheme of comparative case study.
In the first three comparative analyses, I investigate the socio-political context, high-
tech spatial planning policies and development in these two countries mainly through a
desk study based on secondary data and internet searching, including relevant literature,
reports, laws, regulations, official documents and statistics. The findings of the first
three comparative analyses are helpful to explore the major institutional factors that
have shaped the means and practices of spatial planning and governance for developing
a high-tech city-region and led the planning practices of these two city-regions to have
significant differences.
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53 Introduction
In the final part of the empirical study, I address the role of spatial planning and governance
in the development process of the high-tech city-regions. Since the degree of spatial
coherence and the quality of place are expected to be the fundamental concerns of spatial
planning, the emphasis is put on whether and how the governments in the two city-
regions use spatial planning and governance instruments to coordinate other sectoral
policies to provide a sound environment for the purpose of high-tech development, to
mediate the spatial impacts of high-tech development on surrounding areas, and/or to
deal with complex spatial issues generated in the development process. In order to have
better understanding of the spatial planning and governance practices in these two city-
regions, I respectively select three and two high-tech oriented spatial planning projects in
the Eindhoven and Hsinchu city-regions to conduct in-depth case studies to investigate
whether, and how the governments use spatial planning instruments and govern the
complex relationships among various stakeholders to achieve the goal of high-tech
development in practice. Most of the projects I choose are in progress and thus few
studies have been done in relation to the projects, so except reviewing a large number
of official documents, articles in magazine and (on-line) newspapers and relevant
literature, the in-depth case studies also rely on field observation and in-depth personal
interviews with key persons in relation to the formulation and/or implementation of the
selected planning projects (for the interviewee list please see the Appendix).
In order to avoid misinterpretation resulting from cultural differences, I have had
discussions with Dutch peers (planners) during the research process and have asked
interviewees to provide second opinions about my findings in relation to the first draft
of the dissertation.
§ 1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
The thesis has eight chapters. In addition to the introduction, I organise the thesis in
three parts. The second part of the thesis consists of chapter two and three. In chapter
two, I first identify principal components of high-tech development. Together they
underlie the core of high-tech development—innovation capacity. I then explore
the spatial dimension of the identified components in order to make the connection
between high-tech development and spatial planning more explicit. In chapter three,
I recognise several institutional variables of spatial planning systems and practices that
have been discussed in the previous comparative research of spatial planning systems.
These two chapters together form the theoretical framework of the research to guide the
following empirical study.
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54 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
The third part has four chapters. In chapter four and five, I respectively review and
compare the socio-political context and the spatial planning systems and dominant
planning styles in the Netherlands and Taiwan mainly from 1970 to 2012. In chapter
six, I first outline the high-tech spatial policy in the Netherlands and Taiwan and
examine the provision of high-tech spatial elements in these two city-regions. Then,
I investigate the major similarities and differences between the two cases regarding
their means to conduct, facilitate, and coordinate the provision of high-tech spatial
elements. The findings of the three chapters form a foundation for a comparative study
of the spatial planning and governance means of high-tech development in the two city-
regions. In chapter seven, I present the practices of high-tech oriented spatial planning
and governance in these two city-regions. Through comparisons, I recognise their major
similarities and differences. On the basis of the findings in chapter four, five and six, I
examine the major institutional factors that cause the differences.
In the last part, chapter eight, I make a synthesis of the main findings and the conclusions
of the entire research, and also reflect on the methodology and give recommendations
for future research.
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59 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
2 Principal Components of High-tech
Development
In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework by reviewing literature that sheds light on
regional high-tech development, including regional development, economic geography,
high-tech policy, regional innovation systems and governance. Through the review, two
themes are addressed: 1) the principal components of high-tech development, and 2)
the spatial dimension of the identified components. The principal components, which
constitute the core concept of high-tech development, assist in understanding the
distinction between ‘high’ technology and middle/low technology development as well
as the underlying ideas guiding policy-making for high-tech development. On the other
hand, recognition of the spatial dimension of the identified components can help make
the connection between high-tech development and spatial planning more explicit.
The two themes together form a theoretical understanding of the ‘spatial’ in high-tech
development and show the potential for spatial planning instruments to facilitate,
induce and/or support high-tech development in a particular place.
§ 2.1 Conceptual Foundations of Regional High-tech Development
High-tech development has played a central role in regional development policy for
decades. The emphasis on high-tech development is underpinned by understanding
of the complex interrelationship between technological change, innovation, economic
growth and places. As Dicken (2003, 85, 115; emphasis in the original) states
technology is ‘an enabling or facilitating agent…[that] makes possible new structures,
new organizational and geographical arrangements of economic activities, new products
and new processes…Technological change, then, lies at the very heart of the processes of
economic growth and development...Innovation [is] the heart of technological change…
Nevertheless, “conditions of knowledge accumulation are highly localized”. Knowledge
is produced in specific places and often used, and enhanced most intensively, in those
same places.’
Two groups of theories have provided important insights into regional high-tech
development: theories that stress diffusion of growth or innovation and theories that
focus on the analytical concepts of a regional innovation system. Both groups of theories
view space as a type of network, but are developed in isolation from each other. The
first group of theories refers to growth pole/growth centre and hierarchical theories.
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60 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Both address the ‘spatial filtering’ or ‘trickling down’ effects, but the former ‘focuses
on the transmission of growth from center to hinterland within a region’, while the
latter assumes ‘innovations are transmitted from larger to smaller metropolitan areas.’
(Goldstein and Luger 1990, 66) Growth pole/growth centre theory states that ‘the
centers should offer the greatest agglomeration economies…[and] the investment would
be targeted to those sectors (for example, microelectronics, biotechnology, or machine
tools) with the greatest multiplier effects and competitive advantages in their region vis
à vis the rest of the world.’ (p.67) This statement has underpinned the development of
science/technology parks for decades.
Despite the fact that since the 1980s growth pole/growth centre theory has been
severely criticised for its lack of empirical evidence, ignorance of the influences of the
institutional context and path dependence (Dawkins 2003), the discourse has had
significant effects on the practice of regional high-tech development and its spatial
mechanisms. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the French national government
played a leading role in the genesis of technopoles in order to reshape the imbalanced
regional development (Halbert 2008). In the 1980s, the Japanese central government
launched the Technopolis programme as an instrument of regional development and
industrial decentralisation (Castells and Hall 1994). Since the 2000s, the Taiwanese
government has changed their science park development policy from a single technopole
strategy to a technopolis programme (Hsu 2010).
However, this group of theories cannot explain why some regions succeed while others
fail to create growth poles/growth centres in their regions. This leads the field of regional
development to a shift in focus towards the second group of theories, which address
how valuable knowledge is generated by managing relationships between actors within
a particular functional region, including industrial districts, cluster theory, innovative
milieus and new regionalism. They reveal and explain some hidden operating rules and
factors of a regional innovation system. The theory of industrial districts emphasises
the presence of external economies, namely the ‘industrial atmosphere’, in shaping the
development patterns of local production systems (Camagni, 1991). The term industrial
atmosphere refers to ‘factors that reduce transaction costs and stimulate (informal)
networking (e.g. trust) as well as factors pointing to (informal) labour skills such as tacit
knowledge’ (Halbert 2008).
Cluster theory emphasises the importance and advantage of regional clusters in the new
economics of territorial competition because ‘a cluster allows each member to benefit
as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally—without requiring it to
sacrifice its flexibility’ (Porter 1998, 80). In other words, spatial proximity could ‘spread
risks via increased access to other producers’ (Storper 1997, 41) and facilitate mutual
learning through easily making site visits and frequent face-to-face contact (Porter,
1998).
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61 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
From a network perspective, GREMI group developed the concept of innovative milieu.
The concept recognises that ‘spatial proximity matters not really in terms of a reduction
in physical “distance” and in the related transport costs, but rather in terms of easy
information interchange, similarity of culture and psychological attitudes, frequency of
interpersonal contacts and cooperation, and density of factors mobility within the limits
of the local area.’ (Camagni 1991, 2) Storper (1997), one of the leading proponents
of new regionalism, addresses the role of regions as a fundamentally spatial unit of
economic and social life linking to the global network. He uses the relational dynamics
among ‘technology—organisation—territory’ to explain the formation of flexible
specialisation in the global economy.
While theories about industrial districts, clusters and innovation milieus are centred
on how collective actors in a particular place benefit from physical proximity, new
regionalism tries to provide a comprehensive framework regarding economic geography
and territorial development. Although each theory has its own analytical approach based
on its focus, they all indicate that high-tech economic development has a very definite
spatial dimension. However, no theory alone can explain the emergence or dynamics of
a high-tech region because its development is influenced by a large number of partly
interdependent factors (Sternberg 1996a; Komnonis 2002). But taken together, these
theories have revealed several hidden rules and factors of high-tech development.
On the basis of the theories, a number of empirical studies have tried to explore a set of
policy principles that can contribute to the emergence of high-tech regions in order to
offer feasible suggestions to policy makers. For example, Sternberg (1996a) evaluates
seven high-tech regions in France, Great Britain, Japan and the United States (See Table
3). He concludes that while there is no single determinant that constitutes a necessary or
sufficient precondition, national technology policy (such as R&D expenditure) together
with R&D infrastructures (such as science park and research institutes) act as the main
impacting factors in the emergence of the seven high-tech regions.
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62 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Table 3
An assessment of the genesis of seven high-tech regions (Source: Sternberg 1996a, 210).
Learning from the experience of Silicon Valley, Castells (1989) identifies three
preconditions for the development of the innovative milieu that can be facilitated
through technology policy. These are, ‘raw material’ of technology, a sufficiently large
pool of mobile labour, and the accessibility of venture capital. He suggests that the first
factor could be acquired from leading universities, public and private R&D institutes,
and their networks. Later on, he works with Peter Hall to study technopole developments
around the world and concludes that besides the three preconditions, the relationships
between the state and the private sector in promoting R&D activities and the synergy of
socio-economic networks are also the major factors that underpin the innovative milieu
(Castells and Hall 1994).
As shown in Table 4, Komininos (2002) summarises six basic components of the
innovation environment—including research and technological development,
innovation finance, technology transfer, product development services, technology
cooperation networks, and network infrastructures—and proposed 21 key organisations
for a high-tech region. He argues that research results and scientific knowledge feed the
cycle of innovation, but only with the support of the other five components can the ‘raw
material’ be transformed into products. He further asserts that cooperation networks
are the key elements in the construction of the innovation environment.
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63 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
Field Key organisation
In the field of R&D – Universities
– University labs
– Public research centres
– Private R&D centres
– Patent offices
In the field of innovation finance – Venture capital funds
– Business angels
– Regional incentives for technology based companies
In the field of technology transfer – Science or technology parks
– Business innovation centres
– Technology networks
– Industrial/university liaison offices
– Technology brokers
– Best practices clubs/associations
In the field of new product deve-
lopment
– Specialised consulting companies
– Graphic design companies/centres
– Marketing companies
In the field of business networks – Industrial districts
– Knowledge-intensive tertiary clusters
– Suppliers’ associations
– Distribution networks
Table 4
Twenty-one key organisations for an ‘innovating r egion’ (Source: Komninos 2002, 154)
Nijkamp et al. (1994) introduces a pentagon model based on the study of high-tech regions.
They claim that the model could help reproduce favourable conditions for the development
of science parks, which they recognise as ‘potentially powerful policy tools for regional
development’ (23). The model consists of five dimensions: hardware, software, orgware,
finware and ecoware. The hardware includes good transport and communications systems
and availability of land for further development. The software represents accessibility
to skilled labour force, research institutes, and markets of users and supply. The orgware
relates to supporting services and policies that favour entrepreneurship, such as support for
technological spillovers and knowledge flows between enterprises and technology-based
spinoffs and start-ups. The finware refers to the availability of seed capital and venture
capital. The ecoware regards favourable living quality.
In short, all of the studies have a different focus and starting point, but their arguments
are complementary rather than in conflict with one another. On the basis of the studies,
I understand that R&D capital, relational capital and human capital play a vital role in
innovation and recognise them as the principal components of high-tech development.
Specifically, the high-tech development of a particular place refers to the development
of these three components. They are interrelated and must be in place at the same time.
In the following section, I outline theoretical discussions about the nature of the three
types of capital and summarise a set of strategies that are expected to contribute to the
three capitals, through literature review.
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64 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
§ 2.2 The Nature of the Principal Components
§ 2.2.1 R&D Capital
R&D capital refers to the effectiveness of R&D activities in generating valuable knowledge
for the development of new products or services. Castells and Hall (1994) argue that
governments can contribute by encouraging R&D activities that are too large-scale, too
high-risk, or both, to be justified in a normal commercial balance sheet. Mani (2002, 5),
based on OECD statistics about government and business enterprise R&D expenditure,
indicates that ‘the relationship between government and business enterprise R&D is
complementary, implying thereby that a reduction in the former will always be met with
reductions in the latter.’ There is a consensus that public interventions in R&D activities
are necessary, because leaving R&D activities entirely to the private sector will quickly
lead to underinvestment.
In addition to establishing physical infrastructures—such as universities, research
centres, and patent offices—financial measurements are most commonly used in
innovation policy to promote R&D activities. These include: 1) subsidising exchange
of goods and services R&D personnel between the public and private sectors; 2) tax
incentives for R&D; 3) direct funding through grants, soft loans, loan guarantees for
R&D projects; 4) promotion of national R&D projects; 5) joint cooperative R&D projects
between government and the private sector; 6) creation or improvement of specialised
financial market mechanisms (e.g., venture capital); and 7) public procurement
particularly in defence (Mani, 2002). However, a large amount of financial incentive
for R&D activities does not guarantee a high value outcome. There is also a difficulty to
quantify the outcome of R&D activities in advance.
These financial measurements are more or less based on a linear innovation model, which
consists of a chain of successive, interrelated activities that ‘begin with basic scientific
research and pass through applied and more developmental research activities, the
development of new product and process ideas, the evolution and testing of prototypes,
to commercial production and finally to diffusion’ (Massey, Quintas, and Wield 1992,
56). The linear innovation model ignores the role of socio-cultural structures and the
interactions among local firms and institutes in technological development. This
involves a social process of ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’. In the process, tacit
knowledge is produced. In other words, innovation is ‘a complex process involving users,
producers and various intermediary organisations learning from each other regarding
demand and supply capabilities and exchanging both tacit and codified knowledge’
(Cooke 2001, 33).
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65 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
On the basis of this understanding, Chesbrough (2006) describes a desirable shift of
innovation paradigm from a closed to an open model, which addresses the utilisation
of not only internal but also external knowledge to create value and increase the
effectiveness of R&D activities (see Figure 10). The model is labelled as an open
innovation paradigm, because in this model there are many ways for ideas to flow into
the innovation process as well as to flow out into markets through R&D outsourcing,
licensing or spin-offs, so the boundaries between firms and other research organisations
are becoming blurred. Not only does proximity of innovative firms and other research
organisations remain important, but also the management services of internal and
external knowledge flows start to play a key role (Spithoven 2009). The transformation
from Philips High Tech Campus to High Tech Campus Eindhoven in the Netherlands is a
good example of the shifting paradigm, as their brochure1 claims that the shifts are not
only from closed to open, but also ‘from owning everything to focus on core competences,
from just knowledge sharing to developing together’.
Figure 10
Closed (left figure) and open (right figure) innovation models (Source: Chesbrough 2006, 3).
The policy issue regarding R&D activities is no longer limited to combating private
underinvestment in R&D. Instead, the role of the three groups of actors and their
interrelationships has to be addressed in policy: knowledge infrastructures (including
universities and R&D institutes), high-tech firms (including large firms and small and
medium-sized enterprises) and professional associations. First, regarding the role of
knowledge infrastructures, a growing number of universities initiate entrepreneurial
1 http://www.hightechcampus.com/viewfile.php/424 (Accessed in January 2012)
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66 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
programmes as well as technology transfer centres or business parks to help university
graduates and personnel, or people from business to start their own company, and to
arrange meetings between the emerging entrepreneurs and representatives of larger
firms and organisations, such as the University of Twente in the Netherlands (Hosper
and van Tongeren 2008).
Nonetheless, Florida (2005, 146) argues that such initiatives may ‘tend to distract the
university from its core missions of conducting [basic] research and generating talent’
and thus retard advances in basic science that underlie these technology intensive firms’
long term futures; furthermore, ‘[t]he region surrounding the university may not even
benefit if it does not have the required infrastructure and environment to keep these
companies [and talents] in the area’, or if the communities surrounding the university
do not have the capacity to ‘absorb and exploit the science, innovation, and technologies
that the university generates’ (150). This argument implies that it is impossible to rely on
a single policy instrument or organisation to sustain or enhance local R&D capacity and
to transform the R&D results into local economic wealth. To achieve this goal requires
a mixed approach based on a relational perspective, the content of the approach has
to depend on different territorial contexts and to take into account possible long term
effects.
Second, some small countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, rely more on a
limited number of large multinational firms for business R&D. Governments have
recognised the risks associated with these large firms undertaking more of their R&D
overseas, so it is necessary to generate new entrepreneurial opportunities for the
development of local technology-based firms that can provide R&D services and help
to sustain the country’s R&D capacity (OECD 2005). However, this does not mean that
the role of large firms in high-tech development is not important anymore, but rather
their relationships with local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have to be
addressed. In other words, the policy issue regarding the enhancement of R&D capital
has to include the strategies to foster SMEs and new technology-based firms, which
can provide technology/knowledge-based services for large firms, but also to promote
collaboration between the large firms and the SMEs.
Finally, although some governments have launched certain initiatives such as federally
funded Small Business Development Centres in the USA, a more effective way to help
individuals to pursue entrepreneurial ventures may be to foster new technology-based
firms by helping unions and professional associations to provide entrepreneurship
training for their members, and to assist their members to identify new business
opportunities, develop business plans, navigate capital access and intellectual property
concerns (Markusen 2008). This strategy relates to the development of local support
networks, which is discussed in the following section on relational capital.
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67 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
§ 2.2.2 Relational Capital
Relational capital refers to the capacity to identify specific resources, alongside the
know-how to gain access to and mobilise these resources based on not only a monetary
nature but also relations, which are based on ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity’ (Crevoisier 2004).
It has been recognised that networks that are maintained by social relations provide
transmission routes for specialised knowledge and market information exchange within
a cluster (Kenney and Patton 2005). This addresses the issue of coordinating and
networking among actors in the innovation process. Crevoisier (2004, p.7; emphasis
in original) suggests that territorialised economic development ‘is characterized by
competition through innovation, not through production costs; an organization of the
productive system based on networks, not on hierarchical or market mechanisms; and
competition among territories, not among companies.’
Studies from this perspective, such as those regarding innovative milieu, learning
region, and institutional thickness, have endeavoured to explore the constitution
of relational capital and its relation to regional innovation capacity. Based on their
findings, the capacity to mobilise relations has been considered as one of the critical
factors in the innovation process. Therefore determining the preconditions and kinds of
strategies that can be used to build relations and promote collective learning becomes
an essential question for the development of a high-tech economy. Several strategies
have been proposed. I summarise the strategies according to three aspects, including
the development of relations and trust between actors, enhancement of local innovation
networks and construction of external knowledge linkages.
First, Storper (1997) proposes two strategies for the public sector to build relations with
high-tech firms—‘talk’ and ‘confidence’. He recognises talk as the first step to build a
relation, because it refers to communicative interactions that can help to achieve mutual
understanding. Talk is a low-cost method, but gives the possibility to create depth in
the interactions. This may lead to the development of a relation, which involves having
confidence in what other actors will do and showing trust in them. He further argues that
a relation based on special material incentives, which are provided by the public sector
to private actors, is likely to work only as long as the incentives last, so it is necessary
to apply other approaches at the same time, for example, public procurement, joint
projects as well as other small, repeated, experimental interactions. However, he does
not explain in detail how mutual understanding and confidence/trust can be achieved
in practice.
According to the empirical study of collective learning and networking in the Cambridge
area, Keeble et al. (1999) suggest that trust can be developed on the basis of culturally
based rules of behaviour, innovation engagement and collaboration, as well as accepted
but tacit codes of conduct between individuals and firms. Specifically, these preconditions
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68 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
of developing trust are based on the construction of shared knowledge that is not only in
the form of establishing a common technological and organisational language (Keeble
et al. 1999), but also in the form of developing a collective identity, convention, and
cultural asset (Benner 2003). Keeble et al. (1999, 322-323) further assert that local
universities and large R&D consultancies in this respect are key sources of such culturally
based rules of behaviour, because their new knowledge will spill over into and help shape
‘the wider culture of the local research based business community, via university spin-
off, research recruitment and direct research collaboration.’ Such spillovers also relate
to the movement of knowledge workers. In other words, knowledge workers are carriers
of knowledge, norms and socio-economic relations, so their movements actually play a
role in increasing the density of local innovation networks and in shaping the culture of
the local innovation community.
Second, regarding local innovation networks, besides the networks among universities,
research organisations and high-tech firms, appearances of entrepreneurial support
networks, networks between big firms and SMEs and networks between upstream
suppliers and downstream consumers in a value chain and are also considered as
important elements in the innovation system of a high-tech region. For SMEs and start-
ups, business services and technology transfer are even more important than R&D
and direct cooperation with research organisations (Komninos 2002). Actors of the
entrepreneurial support network include law firms, venture capitalists, executive search
firms, investment banks, business consultants, accountants, professional associations
and other local business services, which help the commercialisation of innovations and
facilitate the development of new products and services.
Regarding the networks between big firms and SMEs and between upstream suppliers
and downstream consumers, Tödtling et al. (2011, 1889) argue that innovation
activities benefit from the presence of lead firms in a particular region, because they can
afford to invest in R&D activities and if the lead firms can cooperate with small high-tech
firms through outsourcing or licensing, ‘the strengths of both can be used to exploit open
innovation opportunities.’ Further, ‘interaction with regional suppliers and customers
makes it possible to include knowledge from these partners early in the development
process to speed up the learning curve.’ (1889) They conclude that there is no uniform
model that applies to all types of regions, but certain characteristics of regional culture
do support the appearances and quality of the networks, such as cosmopolitanism,
social tolerance, and openness to global interaction.
Further, it is important for policy makers and planners to recognise the correlation
between clustering of different high-tech industries and emergence of their local support
networks. Some studies suggest that networks have a strong geographical limitation
because social relations maintain these networks, but Kenney and Patton (2005) argue
that the clustering degree of a particular industry and its support networks differs
according to its source of technology transfer and the characteristics of its production
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69 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
system. Furthermore the concentration degree of actors in support networks is
influenced by their service content and attributes of the interactions between high-tech
firms and business services. For example, biotechnology industry reveals considerable
clustering of firms and support networks, but its distribution is comparatively more
dispersed than electronic-based industries, because biotechnology firms depend more
on universities or research institutes rather than on suppliers and each other, which are
more important for electronic-based firms.
Third, many studies claim that external sources of knowledge are essential for continuous
success of a high-tech region, a way to help local organisations from becoming locked
into non-competitive technological trajectories (Camagni 1991; Keeble and Wilkinson
1999; Keeble et al. 1999; Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2004). For example, Bathelt
et al. (2004) propose a buzz-and-pipeline model to explain the structure and dynamics
of local networks and their global linkages in terms of knowledge collaborations and
information exchange, both of which contribute to innovation (see Figure 11). In their
model, the quality of a cluster depends on the amount of related yet complementary and
heterogeneous knowledge, skills and information that resides in the local networks. They
further argue that it is beneficial for firms to have a well developed system of pipelines
to connect the cluster to elsewhere, based on two reasons. First, ‘[n]ew and valuable
knowledge will always be created in other parts of the world and firms who can build
pipelines to such sites of global excellence gain competitive advantage. Second, it seems
reasonable to assume that the information that one cluster firm can acquire through its
pipelines will spill over to other firms in the cluster through local buzz.’ (Bathelt et al.
2004, 46)
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Figure 11
The buzz-and-pipeline model (Source: Bathelt et al. 2004, 46).
However, it requires substantial time, cost and effort for a firm to establish and maintain
a global linkage, because it is more difficult to develop trust between organisations when
they are located in different territories. The difficulties result from not only long distance,
which reduces the chance of face-to-face contact, but also differences in cultural and
institutional contexts, which lead to greater uncertainty and less understanding. Hence,
policy makers and planners may need to consider how to stimulate and assist in the
development of global pipelines through institutional and infrastructure support, such
as promoting international research collaboration, holding international conferences,
developing local identity and reputation, providing a well-established internet network
infrastructure, and so on.
§ 2.2.3 Human Capital
It has been broadly accepted that cities and regions with higher educated residents grow
faster than comparable cities and regions with less human capital, although there is no
consensus on the causes and effects of the correlation between high human capital and
urban/regional growth (Glaeser and Saiz 2003). Two concepts underlie human capital
models of regional development: people follow jobs, and jobs follow people, a complex
chicken-and-egg relationship (Storper 2010). The former concept emphasises building
a business climate that can attract firms to locate in the area and thus create a thick
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labour market that can not only provide many high paying, challenging employment
options (Florida 2005), but also secure a new post following layoff for talented people
(Storper 2010).
The latter concept, on the other hand, focuses on developing a creative environment that
can supply and retain top-notch talent, both ‘home grown’ and imported (Markusen
2008), because the location of labour skills and education is recognised as one of the
essential factors that draw high-tech and knowledge-intensive firms (Anderstig and
Lundgren 1994; Florida 2005). Although their starting points are different, they both
recognise the contribution of the clustering of talented people or human capital to the
productivity of a city or a region, especially in the emerging knowledge economy. This
shows a complex chicken-and-egg relationship between talented people and high-tech
firms.
Regarding the supply of knowledge workers, a group of scholars recognise well-
functioning education and training institutions as an essential element. Florida (2005,
151) considers a university to be a talent magnet ‘that attracts eminent scientists and
engineers, who then attract energetic graduate and undergraduate students, who create
spin-off companies, all of which encourages companies to locate nearby.’ Anderstig and
Lundgren (1994), on the other hand, indicate that the quality of the basic school system
has a significant effect on the transition probability to university education. Markusen
(2008) addresses the role of occupational organisations—including professional
associations, trade unions, industry advisory groups, and other education and training
organisations—in securing and enhancing the pool of regional talent, but policy makers
and planners need to make sure their initiatives are systematically connected to the
demand side of the labour market. This connection can also help to recruit regional
graduates before they leave for a better situation elsewhere as well as to ensure the
graduates remain current. Her consideration implies another important policy issue,
how to attract and retain knowledge workers.
Castells and Hall (1994, 26) argue that ‘quality of life is a highly subjective attribute,
and many areas in the world are of startling beauty without having much chance to
become technological or industrial centers.’ Storper (2010, 2034) also claims that ‘[s]
killed people appear in most cases to precede the creation of amenities’. But both in
theory and practice, there is a growing focus on amenities, entertainment, and lifestyle
considerations in attracting and retaining knowledge intensive firms and people,
for example, Gottliep (1994; 1995), Florida (2002; 2005), Yigitcanlar et al. (2007),
Baum et al. (2007). They argue that since knowledge workers have high mobility and
many job options, to attract and retain them, a high ‘quality of place’—consisting of
infrastructural facilities, amenities, lifestyle, professional networks, urban diversity,
tolerance, and territorial identity—must be in place (Florida 2005). Such an argument
has had influential effects on contemporary high-tech policy making and spatial
planning practices.
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§ 2.2.4 Remark
On the basis of previous discussions, three sectors can be identified as key players in a
territorial innovation system: government, industry and academic institutes. The roles
that governments, lead firms, and academic institutes play ‘are essentially strategic in
that they shape the discursive and material settings for localized forms of economic
development’ (Lagendijk and Boekema 2008, 933). This has profound implications for
the governance activities of spatial planning, since governments may need to mobilise
powerful high-tech players and their resources to induce and/or support high-tech
spatial development and to deal with the spatial issues generated in the high-tech spatial
planning and development processes. This identification can also assist in analysing and
explaining the behaviour of the key players in the process of high-tech spatial policy/
plan/strategy-making.
As shown in Figure 12, the role of industry and academic institutes is twofold. They form
the basis of both R&D capital and human capital in a high-tech region. Universities and
research institutes are knowledge generators as well as talent magnets in a regional
innovation system. Industry consists of large, medium and small high-tech firms
and their support networks that provide services to the high-tech firms and help the
commercialisation of innovation. Their constant interactions and collaboration may
generate new knowledge and facilitate the development of new products and services.
Besides, high paying, challenging occupational opportunities provided by the high-tech
firms also contribute to the enhancement of human capital.
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Figure 12
Interrelationships between the key players.
Regarding relational capital, these two groups of actors can be recognised as knowledge
generators and knowledge exploiters—the interactions of which can be mutually fertile
(OECD 2005; Benneworth and Hospers 2007). The dynamics of local networks between
the two sectors and their external knowledge linkages can help to generate valuable
knowledge and prevent a lock-in situation in the high-tech city-region.
Government, on the other hand, is considered as the key supporter and governor who
can provide and/or strengthen the principal components of high-tech development in a
particular innovation system. In the previous sections, I discussed a set of strategies that
are expected to contribute to the three principal components of high-tech development. I
summarise the strategies in Table 5. Most of the strategies are comprehensive and have to
be implemented through collaboration between the three sectors, because the strategies
need certain resources that may be held by the high-tech firms and/or knowledge
institutes rather than the government, such as generation of valuable knowledge,
information about new trends in technology and the market, access to international
markets, production and knowledge networks and to the talented labour pool.
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Principal components Strategies
R&D Capital – Financial resources (e.g. incentives, funding, venture capital and public procurement)
– Entrepreneurial climate (Knowledge transfer/spillovers, spin-offs from universities,
R&D institutes and lead firms)
– Other
Relational Capital – Collaboration networks among knowledge infrastructures and high-tech firms
– Local support networks (including the networks between big firms and SMEs as well as
upstream suppliers and downstream customers)
– External knowledge linkages
– Professional networks
– Other
Human Capital – A sufficiently large pool of mobile labour and high paying, challenging occupational
opportunities
– Well-functioning education and training systems
– Quality of place (e.g. quality of life, urban diversity, tolerance, and territorial identity)
– Other
Table 5
Strategies to enhance the principal components
For example, external sources of knowledge are essential for a high-tech region to
avoid becoming locked in to a non-competitive technological trajectory. To stimulate
and assist in the development of global pipelines, governments rely on not only a well-
established international transport system and ICT infrastructures in the region, but
also a set of strategies to promote international research collaboration and knowledge
sharing as well as the development of regional identity and reputation, such as holding
international conferences and other events, providing international collaboration
research funding, and so on. However, a large amount of public investment and research
funding does not guarantee a high value outcome. The government is expected to
provide a ‘sound’ environment, both physical and non-physical, that can stimulate
and support the collaboration, but universities, R&D institutes and/or high-tech firms
are the crucial actors—the ones conducting the collaboration. Their capacities and
behaviours decisively affect the quality of the collaboration in terms of building social
relationships and generating, exchanging, sharing and gaining knowledge. Policy makers
and planners should be aware of the role that high-tech firms and academic institutes
can play and should play. The two groups of actors may potentially bring necessary
resources to assist in the high-tech spatial development, but also be powerful actors
determining the effectiveness of a high-tech spatial policy/plan/strategy.
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§ 2.3 Spatial Dimension of the Principal Components
In the last section I discussed the nature of the three principal components—R&D capital,
relational capital and human capital—for high-tech development and summarised a set
of strategies and elements that can provide and/or strengthen the principal components.
Since high-tech development has a definite spatial dimension, some of the strategies do
have implications for spatial planning and development. In this section, I try to make the
implications more explicit by identifying the spatial mechanisms that are considered to
be useful for the development of the three principal components.
§ 2.3.1 R&D Capital: Role of Universities and Innovation Centres
One of the most important components of an innovation system is R&D capital, which
refers to the ‘raw material’ of innovation generation. Universities, R&D institutes,
R&D in large high-tech firms, innovative SMEs and their networks are considered the
essential units of R&D activities. However, for governments there is always the risk
that large-firms with high mobility can undertake more of their R&D overseas (OECD
2005). Namely, ‘rationalising and restructuring large firms may function as resource-
removers’ in a regional innovation system (Benneworth and Hospers 2007, 113).
Therefore, the emphasis of R&D capital accumulation more recently is being placed
on local universities, R&D institutes, and innovative SMEs. Addressing the presence of
universities and R&D institutes and promoting the development of innovative SMEs are
thus considered as stepping-stones to creating an innovative milieu.
A Presence of universities and R&D institutes
Among discourses on innovation there has been consensus for decades that the presence
of universities and R&D institutes are crucial for knowledge generation in innovation
systems, essential for economic growth in the knowledge economy. The locations of
leading universities and R&D institutes often play a strategic role for governments to
conduct high-tech oriented development. Sometimes national governments may
relocate leading universities or R&D institutes to less favoured regions or develop new
universities or R&D institutes in those regions in order to raise the local technology
level, trigger new high-tech industrial clustering, and thus achieve balanced regional
development. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the French government relocated
some higher education institutes and research centres outside of the Paris metropolitan
region to Southern France to balance regional development (Halbert 2008). In its 2004
Pre-Budget Report the UK Finance Ministry announced a promotion of Science Cities for
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the North, starting with Manchester, Newcastle and York. Strategies for the promotion
included physical developments of large research organisations, such as new universities
(Benneworth and Hospers 2007).
However, the presence of universities or R&D institutes is not a panacea for all regional
economic issues, because each region faces different innovation barriers requiring
different combinations of strategies. For example, as shown in Table 6, Benneworth
and Hospers (2007) summarise an OECD report, The Response of Higher Education
Institutions to Regional Needs (1999), stating that when universities try to engage in
regional innovation governance several research barriers may be present that vary
depending on the institutional, regional, and national context. Moreover, the creation
of an innovative milieu, which can effectively turn knowledge into products, relies on
well-functioning coordinated networks among actors—including knowledge producers,
knowledge users and appliers, knowledge regulators, knowledge funders (Cooke
2005)—rather than on local universities or R&D institutes alone.
Background Conditions Research Barriers
On the scale of institution:
University weakly focused on
regional engagement at institu-
tional level
– A lack of strong linkages between the senior management team and
research centres to develop proposals for strategic research activities that
underwrite and drive through greater regional engagement.
– No inclusion of regional engagement as a criterion for promotion,
undermining academic interest.
Regarding regional structure:
Weak regional demand for
universities’ outputs
– Regions lack a strong base of local research users, such as a strong base of
research-intensive multi-national businesses.
– A lack of regional provision of studentships at the graduate level to allow
high-level technology transfer between universities and regional
businesses through ‘knowledge on legs’.
Regarding regional institutions:
Poor regional governance and
partnership systems
– A lack of regional stakeholders to work constructively with universities in
developing new courses.
– A lack of regional science policy able to develop new research capacity and
invest in latent research strengths with potential regional advantages.
– A lack of awareness within the universities of the importance of regional
networks because of an institutional emphasis of developing
international research networks.
National/external barriers and
threats to engagement
– Nationally focused research agendas overlook the distinctive needs of
regions.
– The selective nature of research funding concentrates resources in
regions fulfilling national criteria.
– A lack of sensitivity of research funders and sponsors to research, which
meets regional needs.
– A peer review system, which denigrates and undermines the quality of
proposals, which support greater regional development activity.
Table 6
Research barriers to universities’ regional engagement (based on Benneworth and Hospers 2007, 119-120)
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B Development of innovation centres
As discussed in the previous section, fostering small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and new technology-based firms is one of the major strategies considered to
be useful for the enhancement of R&D capital in a particular place. A broadly adopted
mechanism is to encourage universities or R&D institutes to establish an innovation
centre on their property, on account of two reasons. First, compared to other types of
high-tech industrial facilities, the size of innovation centres is considerably smaller,
because they focus on start-ups, which usually employ less than five people. Therefore,
‘most of the centres are based on a simple idea: an existing building is altered to make
room for between 10 and 30 small businesses’ (Allesch 1986, 59). For a university or
R&D institute, there is a high chance that they have the capacity to accommodate such
initiatives, sharing their technological facilities—such as clean rooms and laboratories—
with the start-ups. Second, it is also a way to promote spin-offs and technology transfer
from the university or R&D institute, and help to construct regional networks between
the research organisation and industry.
Some policy makers recognise SMEs as an innovative motor for the local economy (Allesch
1986), so sometimes the establishment of innovative centres has spatial preference
for less favoured regions in order to achieve a more balanced regional technology
development. For example, from 1991 to 1995 around 43 technology centres in eastern
Germany benefitted from federal funding in order to create new jobs. The German case
shows that the technology centres ‘do not play a particularly significant role’ in economic
development in terms of their contributions to local job creation, however the indirect
effects are unknown (Sternberg 2004, 462).
On the other hand, the Business Technology Centre established by the University of
Twente in the Netherlands is recognised as a successful case to foster university spin-offs
and promote a mutually reinforcing network of regional knowledge-intensive activities,
which not only broadens the scope of the existing regional networks but also increases the
innovation resources available to others (Hospers and van Tonferen 2008). The two cases
indicate that the major function of an innovation centre may not be to create new jobs, but
rather to play a role in promoting technology transfer, spillovers and spin-offs from local
research organisations, and to enhance regional innovation networks. This may not fit the
job creation demand of the less favoured regions, but can be one of the supplementary
policy tools to support regional R&D activities and networking.
C Remarks
The presence of universities and/or R&D institutes and the development of innovation
centres are considered as useful spatial strategies that can enhance regional R&D
capital. However, the performance of these knowledge infrastructures is not always
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as good as expected, because each region faces different innovation issues requiring
different combinations of strategies. Nonetheless, it is also an undeniable fact that
some universities, R&D institutes and innovation centres do play a significant role in
enhancing regional R&D capital and innovation networks by promoting technology
transfer, spillovers and spin-offs.
§ 2.3.2 Relational Capital: Development of High-tech Spaces
Spatial proximity of knowledge generators and users has been recognised as the most
important precondition for the enhancement of relational capital, which relates to
the capacity to build and mobilise relations and promote collective learning in the
innovation process. One of the main spatial mechanisms is to provide a particular space
with sufficient institutional and physical development to encourage the formation of
local university-industry and inter-firm networks, to promote technology transfer and
knowledge spillovers, and to connect local innovation systems with global innovation
networks—the development of high-tech space. The term high-tech space in this study
is defined as a place where technologically advanced industries and/or R&D firms and
institutes gather, which have been specifically selected by national technology policies
to trigger economic growth at the national and/or local level. This includes technology
parks, science parks, science cities, technopolises, high-tech corridors and high-tech
regions.
Many countries have recognised high-tech spaces not only as an important element
of national and regional innovation systems (Link 2009), but also as a nodal point of
science and technology in a region or a country as well as a locally embedded hub in
a global economic network (Anttiroiko 2004; Spithoven 2009). They also consider
that such developments can help develop local identity and image that can be used to
attract external investors and partners, and thus promote the construction of ‘global
pipelines’. The global phenomenon is shown in the Science Park and Innovation Centre
Association’s (SPICA) Directory. According to the directory, by the end of 2010 there were
more than 395 science and technology parks (STPs) located in 102 countries. These
figures are provisional and do not claim to be exhaustive, but they give an impression of
the extension of the phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the planning concept of high-tech spaces varies according to space and
time. Based on previous academic studies, five types of high-tech spatial development
are recognised in this research. On a district scale, research parks, science parks, and
technology parks are identified. On a city-regional and a national scale, high-tech city-
region and technopole planning are categorised respectively.
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A On a district scale: research parks, science parks, and technology parks
As shown in Table 7, in 1994 the Of ficial Journal of the European Commission defined
research parks, science parks, and technology parks (Guy 1996; Komninos 2002). The
research and science parks are deliberately planned either by governments, universities,
high-tech firms, or private sector parties. What distinguishes them from technology
parks is the emphasis on basic and/or applied science research. The research and
science parks address research more than product development. For them, the key is
the link between academic and applied research and thus the production plants are
normally precluded.
Type Key features
Research Parks Normally located very near to one or more universities or similar academic and
research institutions. The emphasis is placed on research rather than
development, and the key is the link between academic and applied research.
Science Parks A real estate initiative in one or more sites that are geographically near to one or
more higher education or R&D institutions, and maintains operative links with
them. The main objectives of science parks are research, development and design,
conceiving new products and developing them to the marketing stage.
Technology Parks A technology park is a group of high-tech companies in close proximity. Their
activities include R&D, production, sales and services, but compared to science
parks they emphasise production more. The presence of academic institutions is
not essential.
Table 7
Definition of research, science and technology parks in the European Union ( based on Guy 1996; Komninos
2002)
The latter emphasise R&D activities, conceiving new products and, and developing
them to the market stage. Firms activities in the science parks often end at the stage
of prototype design, while their production activities are located elsewhere (Guy 1996).
From the main objectives and activities of the research and science parks, we can
recognise that their original planning logic is based on the linear innovation model,
whereby the scientific and applied research activities can be spatially separated from
production and diffusion activities. The philosophy of the planning model is the ‘science-
push’, ‘which sees scientific results as raw material for innovative activities among the
business firms’ (Annerstedt 2006, 287).
However, a group of scholars, such as Massey et al. (1992), Asheim (2000), Cooke (2001;
2005), argue that the linear model not only is weak in connecting the development
of research and/or science parks to local economy, but also ignores many feedbacks
and loops that occur between different stages in the chain of successive, interrelated
innovation activities. On the other hand, they propose an interactive innovation model,
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which is underlined by the logic that innovation is a social process of ‘learning by doing’
and ‘learning by using’ that is based on tacit knowledge. The emphasis is on the role
of socio-cultural structures and the interactions among local firms and institutes in
technological development (Asheim 2000).
The logic of the interactive model implies that the essence of high-tech economic
development is to promote technology transfer and knowledge spillovers, which
are ‘relying on close university-industry cooperation, where large and smaller firms
establish network relationships with other firms, universities, research institutes, and
government agencies’ (Asheim 2000, 472). In other words, knowledge generation is not
limited to the R&D activities within universities and R&D institutes, but also develops
in the interaction process between the knowledge infrastructures and high-tech firms,
between upstream suppliers and downstream customers in a value chain, and between
the firms and their support networks.
A technology park is a specific zone that is designated to accommodate firms that are
engaged in the commercial application of particular high technologies. The firms normally
work in similar or complementary areas. The planning logic of the technology park is
based on the concept of industrial district, so it addresses more the interrelationships
among high-tech firms. The purpose of such initiatives is to trigger particular high-tech
industrial clustering, enforce the ‘industrial atmosphere’, and thus contribute to local
economic growth and job creation. The emphasis is more on production than the link
with academic activities, although academic involvement is also essential (Guy 1996;
Komninos 2002). Governments often initiate the development of technology parks as
part of their industrial cluster policy.
According to the implementation experiences of cluster policy in Asian countries, including
Japan, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand, Kuchki and Tsuji (2005; 2008) proposed a
flowchart to illustrate the development process (see Figure 13). This approach is applied
to the development of technology parks as well. In the beginning, governments devote to
capacity building—such as developing infrastructure, and providing incentives, business
services, human resources and superior living conditions—to attract selected high-tech
industries to a specific zone. Capacity building may successfully trigger the industrial
agglomeration process. In the later phase anchor firms and their related firms start to
play a role in reinforcing local innovative activities. This flowchart approach is based on
the interactive innovation model and argues that new industries and new businesses do
not emerge alone but rather are part of regional economic and innovative activities. This
argument implies that it is important to promote university-industry collaboration, but
for local economic development the key strategy is to harness the power of industrial
clustering, which forms the base of the creation of the regional innovation milieu.
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81 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
Figure 13
A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy (Source: Kuchki and Tsuji 2008, 5)
B On a city-regional scale: science cities and high-tech city regions
On a city-regional scale, developments of a science city and/or a high-tech city-region
are the most common approaches to high-tech development. The starting points of the
two approaches are different. While the former refers to a new town project acting as a
high-tech growth pole for a region, the latter is an urban extension plan of one or more
science/technology parks with an aim to create or enhance favourable conditions for the
development of an innovation milieu on a city-region scale. But both of their underlying
concepts imply that the linkages between R&D activities and industrial activities are so
important that on a city-regional level it is crucial to provide adjacent or well-connected
spaces for these two activities from the outset. Following is an explanation of the origin
and planning concepts of these two approaches.
On the basis of high-tech spatial development experiences from the 1960s to 1980s
in the USA, Europe as well as Asia, Castells and Hall (1994) identify a science city
development approach. According to their case studies, including Akademgorodok
in Russia, Taedok Science Town in Korea, and Tsukuba Science City in Japan from the
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1960s to 1980s, they define science cities as ‘new settlements, generally planned and
built by governments, and aimed at generating scientific excellence and synergistic
research activities, by concentrating a critical mass of research organisations and
scientists within a high-quality urban space’ (p.39). Specifically, a science city is a new
town plan that consists of strictly scientific research complexes and high-quality urban
assets with no direct territorial linkage to industrial activities, a planning concept that is
based on the ‘science push’ model.
However, Castells and Hall find that in such an isolated environment, remote from normal
human society, research communication and networks could hardly be developed, so many
existing science cities alter their development strategies to have closer linkages between
scientific research and industrial activities. The adjustment in planning and development
shows an underlying concept that knowledge exploitation and generation can interact and
cross-fertilise, so it is essential for a regional innovation system to promote the linkage
between knowledge producers and exploiters by providing space for industrial activities
adjacent to the proximity of R&D activities. Thus, the original conception of science cities
is too narrow to encompass current development.
On the other hand, since the 1990s some successful science or technology parks have
gradually evolved towards a city-region scale, such as Kista in Sweden and Hsinchu
in Taiwan. Anttiroiko (2004, 396) points out that this evolution involves ‘the wider
geographic area, new infrastructures and logistical solutions, housing projects, wider
commercial services, and closer relations with the surrounding urban community’,
comprehensive spatial planning and development on a city-region level. In those city-
regions there is a considerable concentration of academic, R&D and industrial activities
with dense interactions among these activities and sufficient supplies of infrastructure,
housing, business and commercial services, entertainment, recreation and amenities.
This concentration is deliberately planned and developed by governments and can be
seen as an urban extension of one or more science or technology parks.
C On a national scale: technopole planning
Technopole planning is a set of larger scale high-tech spatial developments based on
the concept of balanced regional development, a tool of regional policy rather than
technological innovation on the basis of growth pole/growth centre theory (Masser
1991). In other words, it is a national policy aiming to balance geographical development
and to improve local competitiveness by promoting local high-tech industrial
development. The implementation is usually based on a new town model, conducted
by local governments and supported by national governments. It involves cooperation
between different government levels, but the way of cooperating differs from country
to country and shifts from over time depending on the administrative, legal and spatial
planning systems of the country at that time.
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For example, since the 1960s the concept of technopole has appeared in France under
the intervention of the state in the context of the specific French spatial planning
strategies developed by DATAR—the Prime Minister’s National Agency for Spatial
Planning and Regional Action (Halbert 2008). In the 1960s and 1970s, the French
government relocated some higher education institutes, research centres and national
industrial firms outside metropolitan Paris to Southern France, areas such as Toulouse,
Grenoble and Nice. Following the decentralisation of the French government’s powers
between 1982 and 1984, local governments greatly increased their influence on
technopole planning (Benko 2000; Halbert 2008; Simmie 1994). Furthermore, the
planning strategy altered from exogenous to endogenous development and aimed to
accelerate existing growth poles rather than to create new ones.
In 1980, according to the Technopolis Law, the Japan Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) founded the technopolis (technology-intensive city) programme
aiming to promote local technological and industrial development by raising the local
technology level, establishing new high-tech industries, encouraging local research and
development, and creating attractive communities where people could live and work.
The underlying logic was to reduce the geographical imbalanced between Japan’s three
major metropolitans—Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka—and other peripheral areas (Castells
and Hall 1994; Simmie 1994; Suzuki 2004). At that time twenty-six regions were
designated as technopolises, and the role of the Japanese government was to facilitate
local developments rather than directly invest, except for Nishi-harima Technopolis
(Masser 1991; Castels and Hall 1994; Suzuki 2004).
However, the Technopolis Act was terminated in 1998. The programme ended in
failure due to the gap between theory and reality (Suzuki 2004). The technopolis
programme in Japan ‘was a development policy that depended upon the investment of
big companies outside the concerned region’, but there were technical gaps leading to a
weak relationship between the invited industries and the local existing industries (600).
Since 1998 the MITI has changed its technology planning and policy model to promote
venture business and to enhance the links between universities and industries, a shift
from exogenous to endogenous development as well.
Influenced by Japanese, the Korean government also established its own technopolis
programme in 1989 and designated nine sites as technopolises, but only Kwangju was
built. The remaining eight technopolises were re-designated as local high-tech industrial
parks—technoparks. The scale of the technoparks is smaller than the technopolises,
because the national government intended to authorise local governments to conduct
the development with limited national support (Oh 1995). Compared to the French
case, the Japanese and Korean technopolis programmes are more production oriented,
but all of their technology planning and policy models have the tendency to shift from
exogenous to endogenous development and their national governments also changed
to play a more strategic and supportive role rather than to lead the implementation of
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84 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
high-tech space developments. Further, they all recognise the presence of both R&D
and industrial activities as important, but the French and Japanese cases emphasise
more the role of big firms, while the Korean case addresses more the role of locally-based
SMEs and new technology-based small firms in the development process.
D Remarks
The previous studies show that most cases identify the role of science and/or technology
parks as important for high-tech spatial development whether on an urban, regional
or national scale. This is because the cases recognise that the parks can provide
adequate spaces for R&D and high-tech industrial activities while helping them to
develop linkages with each other, facilitate industrial clustering, and promote valuable
knowledge generation and application. In other words, science and/or technology parks
are expected to be the basic spatial elements for high-tech development in a particular
place. Learning from the studies on larger scale high-tech spatial developments,
including science cities, high-tech city-regions and the technopole programme, we can
understand that besides the development of science and/or technology parks, sufficient
supplies of transport and communication infrastructures and spaces for business and
commercial services are recognised as crucial spatial elements for such developments.
§ 2.3.3 Human Capital: Planning and Design Strategies
Human capital is another principal component that is commonly addressed in high-tech
development. Many studies have shown that there is a strong and steady connection
between education levels and urban/regional population, employment, and income
growth (Glaeser 2001; Glaeser and Shapiro 2001; Glaeser and Saiz 2003). The major
issue is how to produce, attract and retain knowledge workers in a particular city/region.
In academic discussions, the two most commonly mentioned and complementary
factors in relation to the issue of reinforcing human capital are ‘quality of education
system’ and ‘quality of place’. These discourses have had fundamental influences on the
content of spatial strategies.
Some scholars recognise the importance of well-functioning education and training
systems, from higher education down to basic school. For example, Florida (2005)
claims that universities can act as a talent magnet to attract eminent scientists and
engineers, while Anderstig and Lundgren (1994) argue that the quality of basic school
system significantly affects the transition probability to university education. Glaeser and
Shapiro (2003) also suggest that knowledge workers may be produced and attracted by
the provision of quality public schools. In the practice of high-tech spatial planning, the
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85 P rincipal Components of High-tech Development
argument has been transformed into the establishment of international (basic) school
in order to create a friendlier environment for international knowledge workers and their
families.
Other scholars claim that the provision of a high ‘quality of place’—consisting of
infrastructural facilities, amenities, lifestyle, professional networks, urban diversity,
tolerance, and territorial identity—is another effective strategy to attract and retain
knowledge workers. For example, Markusen (2008, 59) argues that ‘to build a regional
identity around key occupations that allows it to be known as a “place to be” for that
occupation’ can attract particular group of knowledge workers on regional and urban
levels, such as IT professionals in the Bay Area, media artists in the Los Angeles, software
engineers in Seattle, and so on.
Florida (2005) also conducts a study of talent via focus groups and interviews, and
statistical research in the USA to explore the factors that enable places to mobilise and
attract technology and talent. He concludes that the diversity and tolerance of a place,
in other words openness and low barriers to entry, are the most important factors that
attract and retain talent rather than the supply of high-paying, challenging employment,
which is recognised as a necessary but insufficient condition. However, some scholars
have challenged the validity of the data Florida presents to support his argument, such
as Glaeser (2005) and Rausch and Negrey (2006).
Despite the issue of validity, the discourse of creative capital has inspired planners and
designers to generate spatial strategies for high-tech spatial development. For example,
one-north in Singapore seeks to create an intellectually stimulating and creative physical
environment that can attract, retain and form a critical mass of talents
by providing residential options such as home of fices to create a ‘work-live-play’
environment; by fostering a ‘vibrant’ cultural scene with art galleries, restaurants, pubs,
and cafes...JTC [,the master developer of one-north,] attempted to enhance existing
bohemian spatial qualities so as to attract more creative talents who would in turn further
contribute to the ‘innovative milieu’ at one-north (Wong and Bunnell 2006, 76, 78).
However, the concept of quality of place is very abstract and can be interpreted in different
ways. Spatial demands and preferences of different groups of knowledge workers may
vary according to their life stages, nationalities, professions, and so forth, so for planners
and designers to fit all the potential demands of knowledge workers often becomes a
commonly used strategy. This results in a compact, diverse, mixed-use urban form with
a variety of sufficient facilities and amenities.
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86 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
§ 2.3.4 Remarks
In the previous sections, I discussed a set of spatial strategies that are expected to
make a contribution to the three principal components of high-tech development. The
spatial strategies and their spatial implications are summarised in Table 8. Two types of
spatial implications can be identified, including 1) land supply for accommodating R&D,
knowledge-based production, training and/or education activities, and 2) particular
spatial conditions for inducing knowledge generation and application, for supporting
production activities, or for attracting and retaining human resources. The former is
more visible than the latter.
Principal
Components Spatial Strategies Spatial Implications
R&D Capital – Knowledge infrastructures:
universities, R&D institutes, and
technology centres/incubators
– Lead high-tech firms
– Land supply for
accommodating R&D activities
Relational Capital
– Research/Science/Technology/
Industrial Parks
– Land supply for accommodating R&D
and other knowledge-based production
activities
– Spatial conditions for inducing knowledge
generation and application
– International and internal accessibility
(e.g. Airport, highway,
ICT infrastructure, etc.)
– Spatial conditions for suppor ting
knowledge-based production activities
Human Capital – Education and training institutes
(including international schools)
– Land supply for accommodating
education and training activities
– A variety of sufficient facilities,
amenities, commercial and business
service centres and housing choices;
landmarks
– Spatial conditions for attracting and
retaining human resources
Table 8
Spatial strat egies for enhancing the principal components
However, it is important to highlight that in many studies the spatial elements
are considered as preconditions for a high-tech space, but their presence does not
guarantee the success of the development, because synergy between physical (e.g. the
establishment of knowledge infrastructures and science/technology parks, etc.) and
non-physical developments (e.g. R&D capacity, quality of human resources, etc.) is
key. This implies the importance of linking the governance activities of the territorial
innovation system with the planning activities of high-tech spatial development.
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87 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
3 Institutional Variables of Spatial
Planning Systems
§ 3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I identified the three principal components of high-tech
development and their correlated spatial elements based on the theories of high-tech
development. But few of the theories draw attention to the role of spatial planning and
governance in the high-tech development process. The concept of spatial planning
encompasses more than land use planning and development control. Although the
term ‘spatial planning’ is considered a ‘Euro-English’ concept that has been formidably
advocated by the European Community since the 1990s (Thompson 2000; Harris
and Hooper 2004), there are two reasons why the term particularly fits the domain of
this research. First, spatial planning can be used as a generic term to name different
sorts of ‘governance system[s] for managing spatial development and/or physical land
use in a particular place’ (Dühr et al. 2010, 26). Its generic nature is useful for cross-
country comparison, because the term is not specific to a particular country. Second, the
term spatial planning is often used to describe a specific spatial approach that focuses
on policy coordination and spatial cohesion, so it can be used to address the ‘spatial’
concern of this research on the policy of high-tech development and its implications for
managing the organisation of space.
In this research, I understand the key function of spatial planning to be managing spatial
development and organisation in a particular place in order to provide sound space and
place qualities for a range of economic and socio-cultural purposes. Spatial planning
includes a set of governance practices not only ‘for developing and implementing
[spatial] strategies, plans, policies and projects, and for regulating the location, timing
and form of development.’ (Healey et al. 1997, 4), but also for mediating the tensions
and contradictions among sectoral policies (United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe 2008). Specifically, in the development process of a high-tech economy, spatial
planning needs to play a role either in providing sound space and place qualities for the
purpose of high-tech development, and/or in mediating the tensions and contradictions
between high-tech development and other sectoral policies at different scales. The
question is what are the major factors that lead different countries to adopt different
spatial planning and governance approaches to high-tech spatial development?
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88 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Learning from previous comparative research of spatial planning systems and practices
(e.g. Davies et al. 1989; Newman and Thornley 1996; Commission of the European
Communities 1997; Ng 1999; Sanyal 2005; Farinós Dasí 2007; Nadin and Stead 2008a;
Knieling and Othengrafen 2009a; Booth,2011; Ernste 2012; Getimis 2012), I identify
six groups of variable that may affect the operational situations of spatial planning and
governance practices, including 1) model of society, 2) legal system and constitutional
law, 3) property relations, 4) administration system, 5) planning doctrine, and 6) spatial
planning system (see Figure 14).
Figure 14
Institutional variables of spatial planning and governance.
According to the concept of multiple layers proposed by Ostrom (2005), rules at a deeper
level are more difficult and costly to change, but what can be done and/or changed at
a lower level is defined by the rules at that level and deeper levels. This implies that it is
important to distinguish different levels of institutional variables, whether the purpose
of research is to understand the origin of the rules at one level, or to identify the causes of
policy problems with an intention to solve the problems by changing institutions. Since
in this research I aim to explore the major institutional factors that shape the practices of
spatial planning and governance in the development process of high-tech city-regions,
it is necessary to clarify the relationships between different groups of variables.
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89 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
Hence, I divide six groups of variables into two analytical levels, including the
constitutional level and the collective-choice level, and assume that they will cumulatively
shape the rules-in-use at the operational level: the mechanisms of spatial planning and
governance of high-tech development. Besides, regional cultures (cultural attributes of
community) and spatial organisation (physical world) are recognised as the other two
major elements that will affect the operational arenas and action situations of high-tech
city-regional development according to Ostrom’s framework. In the following sections
I explain the implications of the six groups of variable for spatial planning practices by
reviewing theoretical concepts and typologies corresponding to the variables on the
basis of previous comparative research. In the end of this chapter, I propose a typology
of spatial planning and governance approach as a generic analytical tool to position and
characterise spatial planning practices in particular places and measure their trends and
direction of change.
§ 3.2 Institutional Variables at the Constitutional Level
In this section, I explain the concepts of the four institutional variables, including model
of society, legal system and constitutional law, property relation, and administration
system, at the constitutional level and their implications for spatial planning systems
and practices according to previous comparative research.
§ 3.2.1 Model of Society
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (Commission of the
European Communities 1997) has considered the relative roles of the public and private
sectors in spatial planning and implementation as one of the essential factors of a
national spatial planning system. On the basis of the studies of European social models
and planning systems, Nadin and Stead (2008a, 35, 44) define the notion of model of
society as ‘the diverse values and practices that shape relationships between the state,
the market and citizens in particular places’, and illustrate ‘how the planning model is
embedded in the wider model of society.’ For example, due to the rise of neoliberalism in
the 1980s and 1990s, English spatial planning has changed from serving public interests
to selling a service. This shows that the liberal ideology has become the dominant model
of English society, in which the planning system has evolved and is practiced.
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The typology of welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) forms
a theoretical base for the social models. He considers the quality of social rights, the
effects of social stratification and state-market-family relationships in social provision
as three major criteria to classify three ideal types of welfare state regimes: liberal, social
democratic and conservative regimes. The number of regime types and criteria have
increased over time not only because of more sophisticated analyses of welfare systems
but also because of the need to put more countries into the classification and to present
simultaneously their prominent attributes in policy-making. For example, Holliday
(2000, 707-708) argues that the criteria set by Esping-Andersen only consider the
states that ‘are deeply affected by their social policy that they are best defined as welfare
states’ and exclude the states ‘that do engage in social policy, while also subordinating
it to other policy objectives.’ She further suggests a productivist welfare state regime,
and puts this into Esping-Andersen’s typology to demonstrate the social models of East
Asian countries (see Table 9).
Welfare state
regime Social policy Social r ights Stratification effects State-market-family
relationship
Liberal Neither privileged
nor subordinate
Minimal Equality of poverty
for minority; market
differentiated
welfare for majority
Market provision
encouraged
Conservative Neither privileged
nor subordinate
Quite extensive Existing status
differentials
preserved
Family protected
Social
democratic
Privileged Extensive Universal benefits
graduated according
to accustomed
earnings
Market crowded out;
family socialised
Productivist Subordinate to
economic policy
Minimal; extensions
linked to productive
activity
Reinforcement of
productive elements
Premised on
overriding growth
objectives
Table 9
Four worlds of welfare state r egimes (Source: Holliday 2000, 709; emphasis in original)
The typologies of welfare state regimes provide a way to explore the social model of a
country that underlies its spatial planning system and planning practices, although
most countries present hybrid forms of the regimes and ‘the classification of countries
into regime types is time-dependent’ as well as their planning systems (Nadin and Stead
2008a, 38). For example, the Dutch planning system was recognised as a typical social
democratic model in the 1980s and 1990s, but has since undergone a change towards
a more liberal approach. Additionally, if we consider the model of society as a collection
of values and practices, the discourse of welfare state regimes, which mainly focuses
on social policy and its relation to other policies in general, can only reflect the model
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91 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
of society to a certain degree. Besides the social perspective, the political economic
dimension has to be considered in the model of society as well. Friedman (2005)
argues that political culture is another variable for differentiating societies in ways
that affect planning systems. Political culture is a broad term that includes the degree
of civil participation in public decision-making, the degree of openness in the political
process, the party system of the state, and so on. These elements must be taken into
consideration.
§ 3.2.2 Legal System and Constitutional Law
The legal system has been recognised as one of the crucial factors that determines the
characteristics of spatial planning systems and practices (Davies et al. 1989; Healey and
Williams 1993; Newman and Thornley 1996). National ‘legal style’ and constitutional
rights are considered as the foundation of the legal system, which also have effects on
planning systems. Planning Control in Western Europe (Davies et al. 1989) is the first
example that categorised planning systems according to the effects of law on the legal
certainty and mechanisms of spatial planning systems. It identifies two types of planning
systems: the ‘English system’ based on English common law and the ‘continental system’
based on the Napoleonic and Scandinavian law. The English common law is case-law,
which originates from the court and gradually develops from decision to decision. On
the other hand, the Napoleonic and Scandinavian law is enacted law, which comes from
study and relies on abstract rules and principles in advance.
In practice, following legal thinking, there are no legally binding zoning plans in the
English system, in which a higher degree of discretion is given to politicians and
professionals. The decisions they make do not necessarily have to be to in accordance
with policies and plans if they have good reasons at the time for doing otherwise (Nadin
and Stead 2008b). In the other systems, administrative decisions are made according
to legally binding plans and regulations, a lower degree of administrative discretion that
thus guarantees higher legal certainty (Davies et al. 1989). However, this approach may
create two misleading implications. First, although this way of categorising is simple
and effective, it reduces the other four northern European countries (Denmark, France,
the Netherlands and West Germany) into one category and ignores some important
distinctions between them (Nadin and Stead 2008b; 2012).
Second, this categorisation does not simply imply that the English legal style remains
more flexible, while the other legal style provides more certainty. All systems require
discretion regarding when to apply or how to interpret plans and rules. For example,
in Italy although plans are legally binding, informal political networks play a key role
in the operation of planning regulations, and the distance between a plan and its
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implementation may be considerable (Healey and Williams 1993). This example
shows that in practice, greater flexibility exists in the planning system that is based on
Napoleonic law. Although the fundamental differences between the two legal styles
cannot be removed because new mechanisms can only be generated and operate
within the existing legal system, it is important to avoid oversimplifying the influences
of different legal styles by being aware that all systems incorporate discretionary and
indicative elements, and planning practices often seek innovative mechanisms to
combine the advantages of flexibility and certainty.
In addition to the effects of different legal systems, the constitution of a country, which
defines individual and government duties and rights and the relationships among
different levels of governments, also has an enormous influence on the institutional
arrangement, priorities, competences, and operation of spatial planning (Newman
and Thornley 1996; Commission of the European Communities 1997). For example,
in Germany the protection of property rights are explicitly written into the Constitution
and a particular right is reserved to challenge the decisions of government through
administrative courts. This is interrelated with the ‘principle of legality’, which ‘holds
that the government is only authorised to intervene in and determine limitations on the
freedom and property of its citizens on the basis of statutory power…therefore relates
to the power of public bodies’ in spatial planning practices and control of development
(Hobma 2011, 4; emphasis in original).
§ 3.2.3 Property Relations
Regarding property relations, the conceptualisations of ‘rights in land’ and who owns
the rights in a given location are the two factors that substantially influence the systems
and practices of spatial planning, and affect the laws that underpin the planning system
and practice in a particular country (Booth 2005; 2007; Needham 2005; 2006). First,
‘[a] property right is the right to use some thing in a particular way’ (Needham 2006, 30;
emphasis in original). A right ‘is a social creation…[that] give[s], or should give, clarity,
certainty and stability in the relationships between people with respect to a thing’
(31-32). The ‘thing’ can refer to landed property ‘that is a piece of land and “things”
connected to that land’ (31; emphasis in original). Specifically, the attitude toward
‘rights in land’ and ‘market in rights in land’ will influence the spatial planning systems
and practices in a particular country.
For example, the major reason why the British government in 1947 could nationalise
future development rights without affecting the rights to current enjoyment of land
is due to two deeply ingrained concepts about rights in land, ‘the capacity to envisage
overlapping interests in a single piece of land’, and a separation ‘between current and
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future rights to beneficial enjoyment’ (Booth 2005, 264). In contrast, countries that are
deeply influenced by Roman law—legitimacy of the government to restrict the exercise
of rights in land under public law, ranging from expropriation to land use regulation and
building control—is based on the concept of imperium (Booth 2005, 2007; Needham
2006). According to the concept, ‘the enjoyment and occupation of property must be
within the limits proposed by laws approved by government.’ (Booth 2005, 275) This
gives the government the right to intervene and govern spatial organisation.
Second, ‘who has responsibilities, duties, rights, liabilities, etc. with respect to which
parcels of land’ also affects the practices and the outcomes of spatial planning in a given
area (Needham 2006, 10). This relates to the degree of difficulty to implement a spatial
plan involving a change of land use and/or an acquisition of land for new development,
because the transition costs of bargaining have a direct relationship with the number
of stakeholders and the ‘initial assignment’ of those rights with respect to the parcels
of land in the given planning area. For example, if in an area land ownership remains
concentrated and land holdings are large and contiguous, it will be relatively easier for
someone to assemble plots for a large-scale development.
§ 3.2.4 Administration System
Administrative systems also have fundamental implications for spatial planning
systems. In the comparative planning studies, the emphasis is often on not only
governmental structures, but also the power relations among levels of government and
their planning competences, although the focus of the studies may differ according to
their research aims and underlying assumptions. For example, the the ESPON (2007)
Governance of Territorial and Urban Policies paid particular attention to the distribution
of power in relation to spatial planning among levels of government by analysing state
structures, decentralisation processes and devolution of powers based on a combination
of taxonomies (see Table 10). Eight types of devolution of planning powers, three types
of additional planning features and five types of regionalisation were used to tabulate
120 categories to characterise styles of planning in each country. Through the tabulation
the dynamics of administrative structures and power relations within governments
were described, but the interrelations among the typologies and their effects on spatial
planning systems were not explained.
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Taxonomy Type
Devolution types of
planning powers
Powers to
regions
1. Unitary state—power in central state; 2. Unitary state—
power in regions; 3. Unitary state—centralisation, dominant
state; 4. Federal state—strong central state and regions; 5.
Federal state—weak central state and regions; 6. Federal
state—weak central state, strong regions.
Powers to local
authorities
1. Powerful local – municipal level (with equally strong central
state); 2. Powerful local – municipal level (with relatively weak
central state).
Additional planning
features
1. Regional spatial planning through inter-municipal cooperation; 2. National –
regional interactive, negotiative and / or contractual approaches to spatial
planning; 3. Other
Regionalisation types 1.Administrative Regionalisation; 2.Regional Decentralisation; 3.Regionalisation
through the existing Local Authorities; 4.Regional autonomy (Political
Regionalisation); 5.Regionalisation through the Federate Authorities.
Table 10
Taxonomies used in the ESPON Project 2.3.2, Annex B (based on Farinós Dasí 2007)
On the other hand, Newman and Thornley (1996) and the EU Compendium of Spatial
Planning Systems and Policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997)
emphasise the locus of power and its effect on the systems rather than its dynamic
nature. The former emphasises ‘the role of central government and the extent of its
involvement in planning at the urban level’, because they assume that ‘the locus of power
will have a significant effect on the autonomy and strength of urban planning.’ (Newman
and Thornley 1996, 5, 28) The latter gives a more general view about the locus of power
regarding the extent to which the operation of the planning system is centralised,
regionalised or localised. They further suggest that ‘there is no simple correlation
between the structure of government and the real locus of power and responsibility of
spatial planning in practice.’ (Commission of the European Communities 1997, 41)
Learning from the studies, it is crucial to keep in mind the dynamics of administrative
systems and of governance attributes because previous institutional development will
influence the current and future trajectories of planning systems and practices. However,
the focus should be on their implications for the organisation of spatial planning and on
the way they affect the relationship between a national planning system and planning
practices at each level of government.
§ 3.3 Institutional Variables at the Collective-choice Level
In the previous section, I described why the model of society, legal system and
constitutional law, property relation, and administration system are four essential
variables at the constitutional level that shape spatial planning systems. At the
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95 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
collective-choice level, besides the spatial planning system, which is often the focus
of comparative research, planning doctrine will also shape the mechanisms of spatial
planning and governance in a particular place. Planning doctrine can be used to describe
the attributes of a planning community in decision-making and implementation. I
further explain the two groups of variable in the following sections.
§ 3.3.1 Planning Doctrine
According to the definition of Faludi and van der Valk (1994), planning doctrine is a
set of interrelated and durable notions about the principles of spatial organisation and
planning principles. The principles of spatial organisation refer to a body of thoughts
concerning spatial arrangements within a given area and the development of that area,
such as the planning concepts of Green Heart in the Netherlands and of Green Belt in the
UK. The concept of planning doctrine indicates an arena for discussion and action, which
involves the process of consensus seeking in a particular planning context. But planning
is a long term process. Progressing from the initiative stage to the implementation stage
often takes years or even decades. The planning context is so dynamic that planning
concepts may be replaced in the planning process due to the changes of political
preference, socio-economic conditions and contemporary scientific knowledge over
time (Roodbol-Mekkes, van der Valk, and Korthals Altes 2012).
Planning principles, on the other hand, relate to the way of handling the principles of
spatial organisation, including the preparation, form, uses and implementation of plans.
Adopting the concept of policy style, which was introduced by Richardson et al. (1982,
2), I identify four styles of planning principles based on two criteria, which respectively
refer to 1) the interaction between the government’s approach to spatial problem solving
(proactive vs. reactive) and 2) the relationships between government and other actors in
the spatial planning and implementation process (imposition vs. consensus). As shown
in Figure 15, governments that are located in the first category tend to have a reactive
attitude to problem-solving or goal-achieving and less concern for consensus seeking in
the planning process. This shows a regulative oriented planning style, which relies more
on precise regulatory rules than interpretive and discretionary regulation.
Governments located in the second category act as a provider. They are also less
concerned with consensus seeking in the planning process and prefer an active
approach to problem-solving or goal-achieving. Such an active attitude is triggered
by a set of normative values, such as the duty to provide a reasonable quality of space.
The third category refers to a negotiative style of planning, which stresses consensus,
with a reactive attitude to problem-solving. The fourth category implies a collaborative
character of planning style, which also emphasises consensus in the planning process
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and is inclined to apply an active approach to problem-solving or goal-achieving. This
typology is so simple and generic that it is manageable for cross-national comparisons.
However, it is important to keep in mind that even within one government more than one
planning style may exist according to the planning context. Hence, even if a dominant
planning style can be identified, exceptions will always occur.
Figure 15
A typology of planning principles
§ 3.3.2 Spatial Planning System
According to Healey and Williams (1993, 702), planning systems consist of three
functions:
• a plan-making function, expressing strategies and principles for spatial organisation
and land use/built form arrangement;
• a developmental function, which may range from land assembly and servicing, to
infrastructure provision and construction and development activity; and
• a regulatory function relating to the control of building location and form, and activity
change within existing buildings.
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In other words, spatial planning systems contain two major elements. The first is the
various institutional arrangements for formulating and expressing the objectives,
strategies and principles of spatial organisation (plan-making). The second is the
planning mechanisms that are used to realise the plans. The planning mechanisms
include a collection of planning instruments and their accompanying proactive
(developmental) and/or reactive (regulatory) planning powers. I further explain the two
elements in the following sections.
Institutional arrangements for plan-making
Regarding the institutional arrangements for plan-making, I apply the combinative
framework (as shown in Figure 3) to link the institutional arenas of plan-making to
the institutional variables at the constitutional level through identifying the relations
between the variables and the seven types of rule. As shown in Table 11, the actor
constellations refer to the number and attributes of primary actors who can be involved
in the legal procedure for spatial planning. The primary actors may not include all the
stakeholders who can influence the decisions or who will be affected by the decisions.
The constellation of primary actors in a particular arena has to be identified through
both formal and informal interactions in the decision-making process. The model of
society and administration system may provide directions to understand the variation
between different planning systems.
Action orientations of primary actors are shaped by the position rules and pay-off
rules. Position rules refer to the responsibilities of different levels of government and
how they perceive the relative roles of public and private sectors in spatial planning
and development. The model of society, constitutional law and administration system
may be the major factors of this type of rule. Pay-off rules will influence the interest of
stakeholders, so property relation and land policy mechanisms can be identified as the
most important factors.
The decision rules, information rules, scope rules and competence rules together shape
the capacities of primary actors. The decision rules determine the level of control for
primary actors when they exercise the decision function at a particular moment. The
information rules define the conditions for the actors to communicate with each
other. The scope rules refer to the scope of a spatial planning system. According to the
Commission of the European Communities (1997, 34), the scope of a planning system
‘refers to the range of policy topics over which the planning system has some competence
or influence, and the extent of integration between the spatial planning system and
planning and investment in particular sectors.’ The model of society, constitutional law
and administration system may have influences on the delimitation of the scope.
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98 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Action situations Type of rule In the field of spatial plan
Actor
constellations
Access rules This type of rule refers to the number and attributes of primary actors
who can be involved in the legal procedure for spatial planning. This may
relate to the model of society and administration system.
Action
orientations
Position rules Referring to the responsibilities of different levels of government and
the relative roles of public and private sectors in spatial planning and
development. This may relate to the model of society, constitutional law
and administration system.
Payoff rules Property relation and land policy mechanisms are identified as the most
important factors that will influence the interest of stakeholders.
Actor capacities Decision rules This type of rule refers to the legal and administrative procedures of
plan-making. This may relate to legal framework, constitutional law and
administration system.
Information
rules
Conditions for actors to communicate to each other and gain relevant
information and knowledge. This also relates to the model of society,
especially the level of public participation.
Scope rules Referring to the scope of spatial planning. This may relate to the model of
society, constitutional law and administration structure.
Competence
rules
This type of rule refers to the planning instruments and planning powers.
The legal system, constitutional law and administration system may have
influential effects.
Table 11
Rules used to structure the arenas of plan-making
The competence rules refer to the planning instruments and planning powers. The
forms of planning powers in a planning system reflect the scope of resources that are
empowered to each level of governments and conditions for them to use resources,
such as land use plans and regulations. The land policy mechanisms—such as land
acquisition, expropriation, pre-emption right, etc.—not only relate to the competence
of governments to implement the plan, but also affect the benefits and costs (pay-off
rules) that governments, developers, owners and other relevant stakeholders in relation
to the supply and demand of land property may gain or lose due to planning decisions.
This shows that the types of rules are interrelated.
Planning mechanisms
The framework proposed above also takes the planning mechanisms into account, because
they reflect the pay-off rules and the competence rules that influence the situations of
plan-making. The planning mechanisms consist of the planning instruments and their
accompanying planning powers. The planning instruments include statutory and non-
statutory plans, regulations and guidelines, and the full range of political documents that
are used to express spatial planning policy. The Commission of the European Communities
(1997, 51-53) has recognised four types of planning instruments according to the form
and purpose of the instrument, including national policy and perspectives, strategic
instruments, framework instruments, and regulatory instruments (see Table 12).
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99 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
Type of
instrument Purpose Areas covered Sub-categories
National policy &
Perspectives
To identify the national
government’s spatial
planning policy and strategy.
They include documents
that give general guidance
or performance criteria for
development, and those that
are spatially specific and are
described as national plans.
The whole Member
State, significant parts
or special areas.
– National perspectives
– Spatial policy
guidance
– Sectoral plans/
guidance
Strategic To identify broad spatial
development patterns or
areas below Member State
and above the municipality.
They do not generally iden-
tify specific locations and are
intended to be implemen-
ted by other ‘lower tier’
instruments, which specify
locations.
They are often tied to
the administrative tier
of government that
prepares them (region
or province), but they
can be prepared for a
functional planning
region.
– General strategic
instrument
– Second level strategic
instrument
– Sectoral instrument
– City region plans
Framework (Masterplan) To identify a general spatial
framework and criteria for
the regulation of land use
over an area. They are
locally specific. They may
be binding or non-binding
in respect to regulation but
are generally implemented
through lower tier plans.
Generally the whole of
one municipality, but
where local authorities
are small they may
cover several munici-
palities—a functional
planning area.
Regulatory
(Control may also be
exercised by general
codes, which can apply
over very large areas,
even whole countries)
To regulate the development
and protection of individual
parcels of land. These may
be general regulation zoning
plans, implementation in-
struments, or special instru-
ments to secure particular
types of development.
Ranging from one site,
a neighbourhood of one
municipality, the whole
municipality or more
than one.
– Regulatory zoning
instrument
– Local building control
instrument
– Implementation
instrument
Table 12
Categorisation of planning instruments of EU Member States (Source: Commission of the European Communities
1997, 52)
However, this categorisation of planning instruments is based on the statutory planning
instruments used in EU Member States at the time it was conceived. The categorisation
already masks many subtle differences between instruments, but it is still unmanageable
and may not be sufficient for the purpose of comparisons when the studied nations are
outside the EU. It is necessary to propose a simple and universal way to categorise planning
instruments. Learning from a decision-centred view of planning, which views planning as
a process of decision-making (Needham 1988; Faludi and van der Valk 1994), I categorise
planning instruments into two categories according to the moment of decision-making:
strategic instruments and operational instruments (see Table 13).
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100 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Type of instrument Major characteristics
Strategic instruments The purpose of strategic instrument is to provide a framework to build
planning consensus in a given area and/or to provide a frame of reference for
the formulation of the operational instruments. They may or may not identify
specific locations and include statutory as well as non-statutory instruments.
The object of the strategic instruments is decisions.
Operational instruments Operational instruments are implemented at the lower tier including the prepa-
ration of regulations and/or regulatory zoning plans and the taking of measures
based on them, by which the government can directly intervene in the organisation
of space. The object of the operational instruments is material.
Table 13
Categorisation of planning instruments in this research
The definition of strategic instruments covers the first three categories proposed by
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) and includes cross-border planning
instruments, such as the European Spatial Development Perspective (Commission of the
European Communities 1999). The strategic instruments are intended to be applied
by lower tier strategic instruments and/or implemented through the operational
instruments. The purpose of the strategic instruments is to provide a framework to
build planning consensus in a given area and/or to provide a frame of reference for the
formulation of the operational instruments. Since one of the purposes of this research is
to identify the major factors that shape the practices of spatial planning and governance
when conducting high-tech spatial development, I focus more on the implications of
the strategic instruments for the practices of spatial planning and governance rather
than the form and content of the strategic instruments themselves. Hence, the strategic
instruments that I refer to have a very broad definition. They may or may not identify
specific locations and include statutory as well as non-statutory instruments.
The definition of operational instruments is beyond the last category proposed by the
CEC. They are instruments implemented at the lower tier including the preparation
of regulations and/or regulatory zoning plans and the taking of measures based on
them, by which the government can directly intervene in the organisation of space.
Therefore, they always go alongside certain proactive and/or reactive planning powers.
The mechanisms of proactive planning powers range from different public powers for
acquiring land ownership (such as the right of expropriation, zone expropriation and
urban land consolidation) to diverse market mechanisms based on private law (such as
purchase, ground lease, agreement and various forms of public-private partnership) in
order to effectively realise the plans. On the other hand, the reactive planning powers
mainly refer to the control of land use and building activities as well as the protection
of particular environmental and cultural heritage by issuing different kinds of permit.
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Specifically, the object of the strategic instruments is decisions, while the object of the
operational instruments is material. This categorisation can be used to describe two
forms of planning mechanisms—framework-based planning and project-based planning
(see Table 14). The former mechanism addresses the role of strategic instruments in
guiding operational decisions. It more focuses on the interrelationships between spatial
elements and aims to provide a frame of reference for operational planning decision-
making or to be used as a tool to build planning consensus in a given area. Project-based
planning, in contrast, refers to a form of spatial planning and governance by which the
operational decisions are made without strategic instruments as a frame of reference.
In other words, the decisions are made case-by-case. In some cases, the project may be
so grand that planning can only take place within the context that is set by the project.
However, these two forms of spatial planning mechanisms may be simultaneously
employed by the same level of government according to the planning context, such as
time of preparation. The point is to identify the dominant planning mechanism and its
implications for the practices of spatial planning and governance.
Type of mechanism Major characteristics
Framework-based planning Framework-based planning addresses the role of strategic instruments in
guiding operational decisions and more focuses on the interrelationships
between spatial elements.
Project-based planning When applying project-based planning mechanism, the operational
decisions of spatial planning are made without strategic instruments as a
frame of reference.
Table 14
A typology of planning mechanisms
§ 3.4 A Typology of Spatial Planning and Governance
In a search of a simple, manageable and generic typology of spatial planning and
governance approaches as an analytical tool, I choose the two variables at the level of
collective-choice as the criteria—the style of planning principles (planning doctrine) and
the mechanisms of spatial planning (planning system)—because I consider these two to
have more direct and obvious effects on spatial planning and governance approaches
(see Figure 14). The first criterion refers to the dominant attributes of a planning
community in terms of its governance mode. As shown in Figure 15, I have identified four
ideal types, including the regulative type, the provider type, the negotiative type, and the
collaborative type. The second criterion consists of two types of planning mechanisms,
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102 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
including framework-based planning and project-based planning (see Table 14). As
shown in Table 15, the two criteria together form seven types of spatial planning and
governance approaches.
Mechanism of Spatial Planning
Style of planning principles Framework-based Planning Project-based Planning
Regulative
(Reactive-imposition)
1. A legally binding spatial framework
and criteria for the regulation of land
use over an area
Provider
(Active-imposition)
2. Self-binding strategic plans/frame-
works guide public investments and
infrastructure developments
3. Project plans (initiatives of
government) without frameworks as
reference
Negotiative
(Reactive-consensus)
4. Strategic plans/frameworks guide
project developments (based on
individual bargaining)
5. Project plans (initiatives of private
sector) without frameworks as refe-
rence (based on individual bargaining)
Collaborative
(Active-consensus)
6. There are recursive interactions
between strategic plans/frameworks
and project plans. The function of the
strategic plans/frameworks is to build
consensus between stakeholders and
to guide, facilitate and coordinate
project developments
7.Project plans (initiatives in a form of
public-private cooperation) without
frameworks as reference
Table 15
A typology of spatial planning and governance approa ches
Some types of spatial planning and governance approaches may coexist in a given area
according to the planning context, such as the purpose of the spatial planning and
governance activities, the time of preparation, and which level of government is the
major promoter. Nonetheless, the typology is useful not only for the characterisation
of each single spatial planning case and for the identification of the dominant spatial
planning and governance approach in a given territory, including a nation, a region, a
city-region/metropolis, or a municipality, but also for measurement of their trends and
directions of changes.
However, although the typology of spatial planning and governance approaches can be
used to identify the dominant planning style in a particular place, it cannot explain how
planning decisions are made and how the decision-making relates to the institutional
variables. The typology has to be used alongside the combinative framework (see Table
11), which provides a clear direction to explore the institutional arrangements for plan-
making and their relations to institutional variables. The utilisation of the combinative
frameworks can deepen our understanding of a particular planning system and its
practices. For comparative analysis, the combinative framework can also help us explore
the significant factors that shape planning decision-making in a particular place.
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103 Instit utional Variables of Spatial Planning Syst ems
The value of comparative research is great, especially for revealing the implicit
assumptions and other institutional factors that shape the systems and practices of
spatial planning in particular places but are often taken for granted or overlooked. In the
next two chapters, I respectively investigate and compare the socio-political contexts
and the evolution of planning doctrines and planning systems in the Netherlands and
Taiwan on the basis of the analytical tools I have established in this chapter. This forms a
foundation to explore the major factors that shape the means and practices of high-tech
spatial development in these two case study city-regions.
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107 Socio- political Context in the Netherlands and Taiwan
4 Socio-political Context in the
Netherlands and Taiwan
In the past four decades, it is possible to recognise two correlated wider forces that
are bringing about major changes in policy-making as well as spatial planning: global
competitiveness and neoliberalisation (Manuel Castells 1989; Green-Pedersen,
Kersbergen, and Hemerijck 2001; Hall and Pain 2006; Hsu 2009; Waterhout,
Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). Some scholars have warned that a growing concern with
economic competitiveness in the political agenda leads to the danger to exclude other
possible perspectives, such as social, cultural, and environmental, and to neglect non-
monetised issues and interests, such as social housing, environmental protection and so
on (such as Friedman 2005; Waterhout et al. 2012). However, this does not mean that
every country will follow the same trajectory. In fact, within different national contexts
the manifestations and interpretations of global competitiveness and neoliberalisation
differ (Green-Pedersen, Kersbergen, and Hemerijck 2001; Friedman 2005; Dicken
2003; Waterhout, Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012).
In this chapter I review how the constitutional variables—including the model of society,
legal system and constitutional law, property relations and administration system—
have evolved in the Netherlands and Taiwan from 1970 to 2012 under global forces,
and investigate the significant similarities and differences between the two countries
based on the analytical framework I established in chapter three (see Figure 14). The
framework follows the concept of multi-level analysis proposed by Ostrom (2005; 2008)
and assumes that the variables at the constitutional level and collective-choice level will
cumulatively shape the rules-in-use at the operational level—the means and practices
of spatial planning and governance. The investigation forms a foundation to explore the
relationships between the institutional variables and the practices of spatial planning
and governance in the development process of the high-tech economy in the Eindhoven
city-region and the Hsinchu city-region.
§ 4.1 The Netherlands
Due to the wider forces of globalisation, Europeanisation, and neoliberalisation,
the relationships between the Dutch government, the market and civil society have
changed. The Dutch government has gradually accepted the market in policy measures
since the end of the 1980s. Economic competitiveness now is not just ‘the way it is’
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108 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
but also a goal that takes priority over other policy concerns (Lagendijk and Boekema
2009; Waterhout, Othengrafen, and Sykes 2012). Although the Dutch legal system and
the way Dutch society conceptualises property rights remain intact, the Dutch societal
model and administration system have had certain changes in response to the wider
forces. I investigate the changes in the following sections.
§ 4.1.1 Model of Society
The model of society can be understood as the type of welfare state regime that presents
‘the diverse values and practices that shape relationships between the state, the market
and citizens in particular places’ (Nadin and Stead 2008a, 35). In the tradition of the
three ideal types of welfare state regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990), the
Dutch welfare state is often classified as either a conservative type, social democratic
type, or a hybrid type in-between these two (van Oorschot 2006; Vis et al. 2008). Some
scholars argue that ‘it is neither of them, and its development has not been a movement
from one to another type but a change of its hybrid character.’ (Vis et al. 2008, 43) In the
post war period, the Dutch welfare system expanded rapidly with a strong paternalist
character. The right to social protection was regarded as universal and unconditional (van
Oorschot 2006). The Dutch welfare system was also recognised as a verzorgingsstaat
(caring state), which embodied a concept that ‘“[t]he strong” had to care for “the weak”
and for the sake of social harmony benefits had to be generous’ (Vis et al. 2008, 43;
emphasis in original).
However, since the financial crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Dutch
welfare system has experienced financial problems, gradually leading to the development
of a new concept of social protection. The new concept further emphasises personal
responsibility and has led to various liberalised policy measures, such as privatisation,
decentralisation, and so on. The growing pressure of global competition and effects of
Europeanisation have further enhanced the reorientation process, but some paternalist
features and social democratic elements still remain in the system (van Oorschot 2006;
Vis et al. 2008). In other words, the new Dutch welfare system embraces ‘both an
acceptance of the market as a superior mechanism for arriving at certain outcomes, and
a crucial role for strong state intervention.’ (Green-Pedersen, Kersbergen, and Hemerijck
2001, 320)
The reorientation of the Dutch social model has also altered the relative role of the
public and private sectors in spatial planning and implementation. For example,
Stellingnamebrief Nationaal Ruimtelijk Beleid (the Position Statement of National
Spatial Policy) in 2002 proposed close and early cooperation of governments, civil
society organisations and market participants, for the spatial development of an area,
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109 Socio- political Context in the Netherlands and Taiwan
and jointly formulated quality goals followed by incremental agreements between the
parties (VROM 2002). This proposal shows that the focus of Dutch national spatial
planning policy has shifted from government to governance. Since the middle of the
1990s, market participants have played a larger role in spatial development and market
finance has replaced public funding in many cases (Needham 2007; Roodbol-Mekkes et
al. 2012). This implies that the government tends to share the responsibility of spatial
development with other sectors.
§ 4.1.2 Legal System, Constitutional Rights and Property Relations
According to the classification of Zweigert and Kötz (1998), the Dutch legal system
is located in the Napoleonic legal style. The ideology that underpins the legal style
is to make plans, to regulate things in advance, and to draw up abstract rules and
systematise them. The Dutch Constitution defines a right for all citizens to have a decent
home and requires local authorities to ensure good living conditions, a responsibility
combined with a legitimacy that is given to each level of government to maintain the
quality and quantity of housing through spatial planning (Commission of the European
Communities 1997). The right to a decent home is one of the most substantial concerns
of Dutch planning practices.
The realisation of spatial policy and plans relies on certain planning powers, such as
land use regulations and building permits, to manage the location and forms of spatial
development, which may limit landowners in how they use their property. When
considering the protection of property rights in relation to Dutch planning powers, the
Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code)2 declares that:
Ownership is the most comprehensive property right that a person, the ‘owner’, can
have to (in) a thing. The owner is free to use the thing to the exclusion of everyone else,
provided that he respects the rights and entitlements of others to the thing and observes
the restrictions based on rules of written and unwritten law. The owner of the thing
becomes the owner of its separated fruits and benefits, except when another person is
entitled to them.
2 http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook055.htm [accessed in December 2012]
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In 2005, the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak Raad van Sta te (Department of Administrative
Justice of the Council of State) stated that:
the new land-use plan regulations do not take away the property of the appellants; they
stay entitled to the enjoyment of their possessions within the planning framework.
Insofar as the limitations on the use of the property as set forth in the land use plan can be
interpreted as infringement of the right to unimpeded enjoyment of possessions, art. 1 of
the First Protocol of the Convention for the Prot ection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms leaves intact the application of laws that can be considered to be necessary to
regulate the use of property in keeping with the public interest. (Hobma and Schutte-
Postma 2011, p.21-22)
In other words, although the Dutch law protects the ownership of rights in land, including
the enjoyment and occupation of land, the Dutch state has the power to restrict the
ability to exercise rights in land in keeping with public interests. However, two conditions
have to be addressed under Dutch law. First, the restrictions to exercise rights in land
have to follow the principle of legality, which holds two core values: universal equality
before law and legal certainty. That is to say, ‘the government is only authorised to
intervene in and determine limitations on the freedom and property of its citizens on the
basis of statutory power.’ (Hobma and Schutte-Postma 2011, 11) Second, according to
Dutch spatial planning law the owner of a right in land can claim planning compensation
for loss, when the loss results from governmental restrictions on the owner’s right in
land, such as a change to a land use plan (Needham 2006; Hobma and Schutte-Postma
2011). This follows the principles of Napoleonic law that consider ownership of land to
include the rights to own not only current but also future benefits from the land (Booth
2007; Needham 2007).
The legal principle also means that the owner of the land owns any increase in land
value, even if the increase is caused by public works or planning decisions (Needham
2007, 29, 153–155). Nonetheless, after the enforcement of the new Wet ruimtelijke
ordening (Dutch spatial planning act) in 2008, if a bestemmingsplan (municipal land
use plan) contains an exploitatieplan (land servicing plan), it is possible to impose
financial conditions on the granting of a building permit as a contribution to the costs
of infrastructure and other public works within the plan area as well as to the costs of
planning compensation paid for the loss caused by the development of the plan (162-
163). But the underlying ideology is not so much about skimming off the ‘unearned
increments’, but rather to use a part of the value increment to increase the quality of
what is being developed (29). This does not conflict with the legal principles.
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111 Socio- political Context in the Netherlands and Taiwan
§ 4.1.3 Administration System and Interaction Modes
There are three levels of government in the Dutch administration system, including the
national government, provinces and gemeenten (municipalities). Despite the shifting
role of the public and private sectors, the Dutch public administration system maintains
the feature of a decentralised unitary state (Faludi and van der Valk 1994; Hajer and
Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk and Boekema 2009; Needham 2007). Rather than through
a top-down system of command and control, public policy is enacted through ‘a subtle
mix of inducement and dialogue primarily based on discursive practices, alongside
a sophisticated system of financial support and control.’ (Lagendijk and Boekema
2009, 129) On the one hand, the income of both provinces and municipalities heavily
depend on the national government. They respectively make only 24 per cent and 19 per
cent of their total income themselves and the rest comes as a grant from the national
government (Needham 2007; Rfv 2010). This strengthens the power of the national
government.
On the other hand, the system requires different levels of government to seek consensus
on policy-making (Faludi and van der Valk 1994; Hajer and Zonneveld 2000; Lagendijk
and Boekema 2009). Two forms of coordination mechanisms are established in
the planning practices—the vertical and horizontal coordination and the diagonal
coordination (see Figure 16 and 17). The supervisory powers of the state are used to
facilitate bottom-up coordination, to generate consensus, and to exchange experience.
The underlying logic of the Dutch institutional arrangement rests on a theory—‘unity
cannot be imposed on the state from above’ but rather comes from ‘a plurality of forces
thrashing out their differences within an agreed-upon framework.’ (Faludi and van der
Valk 1994, 33) This contributes to the stability of policy.
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112 Spatial Planning and High-tech Development
Figure 16
Intergovernmental coordination in Dutch planning pra ctices (based on Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 224;
Needham 2007, 148).
Figure 17
Diagonal coordination in Dutch planning practices ( based on Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 224).
The diagonal coordination approach refers to ad hoc working practices for large national
projects (see Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 223-224 ; Needham 2007, 233-236).
Such projects often involve many policy sectors at all levels of government, so the
best coordination approach is considered to be the establishment of ad hoc teams
instead of th