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Theorizing States' Emotions

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Abstract

This article starts from the assumption that emotions are inherently part of life in the international system, but that this is not as well reflected in the discipline of International Relations. The study of emotions can be incorporated more systematically into the discipline through more rigorous theorizing about how states—as main actors in world politics— experience and act on emotions. To do so, I draw on intergroup emotions theory, an emerging area of research in social psychology. This approach points out the process by which groups come to have emotional reactions, and from there how emotions generate intergroup perceptions and intergroup behavior—or foreign policies in the case of states. Understanding states-as-groups addresses many of the criticisms mainstream IR scholars direct toward the study of emotions, including how individual-level factors such as emotions matter for intergroup relationships.

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... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Chapter
Chapter 4 of The Psychology of Foreign Policy ponders whether beliefs matter. Conventional wisdom holds that decision-making depends more on people’s beliefs about the reality than on the external reality as such. The chapter scrutinizes the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, how it affects decision-making, and the methodologies related to how these issues can be studied and used as explanatory causal factors in the study of foreign policy decision-making. The chapter looks at such research fields as belief systems, studies of ideologies, images, cognitive maps, and operational codes. A number of prominent foreign policy applications are reviewed, and the respective theoretical and methodological challenges discussed. These include the notion that while information about beliefs can be relatively easily gathered from public sources such as speeches and other discourse, unlike in most psychological approaches, foreign policy decision-makers may hide their real motives and thoughts regarding an action and use popular ideologies as a smokescreen for both domestic and foreign audiences.
... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Chapter
Chapter 5 of The Psychology of Foreign Policy addresses heuristics and cognitive biases that have often been regarded as being at the core of psychological approaches to foreign policy. This field does not constitute a unified theory as such but concerns a variety of cognitive mechanisms that affect decision-making. We start by briefly outlining the main theoretical approaches concerning these phenomena before taking a closer look at some of the most foreign policy relevant biases. In order to illustrate the diversity of the factors we look at confirmation bias, overconfidence, attribution error, cognitive dissonance, misleading historical analogies, groupthink and polythink. After that, representative examples of their applications in the empirical analysis of foreign policy decisions are presented. In the discussion part, conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges are identified, such as the difficulties involved in verifying those circumstances where biases have or have not materialized.
... This article proceeds as follows. First, building on the literature on emotions in international relations (Sasley 2011) and previous works on politically motivated DoS attacks (e.g., Deibert, Rohozinski, and Crete-Nishihata 2012;Asal et al. 2016;Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness 2018;Kostyuk and Zhukov 2019), I discuss why the frequency of DoS attacks should increase against countries when they threaten or impose sanctions. Afterward, I introduce the data on DoS attacks and sanctions. ...
... Following studies from social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) and their application to international relations (e.g., Sasley 2011; Larson and Shevchenko 2014), aggressive foreign policy events can influence the political behavior and emotions of states, various groups within the country, and society at large. Foreign policies such as sanctions may be perceived as humiliating, trigger anger, and increase hostility against the foreign aggressor (see Sasley 2011). The Internet has provided new disruptive ways for states and individuals to show this anger and displeasure. ...
Article
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Conventional wisdom expects to see a rise in cyber activities around aggressive foreign policy events. In this article, I test this claim by investigating whether sanctions lead to an increase in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks using new data on DoS attacks measured from Internet traffic. Exploring the development of DoS attacks around sanctions imposed against Russia in 2014 indeed shows an increase of DoS attacks against several sanction sender states. Extending this case study to a systematic analysis, including all sanction threats and impositions made by the United States and the European Union between 2008 and 2016, shows no apparent patterns. When I exclusively consider sanctions against technologically advanced countries, however, the frequency of attacks rises systematically against the United States. It thus appears that states do not always have to expect a digital retaliation after aggressive foreign policies. Nevertheless, sanctioning countries may have to anticipate an increase in DoS attacks when their governments impose sanctions against technologically advanced countries.
... Sin embargo, en las últimas dos décadas, cada vez más autores se han centrado en el papel de las emociones dentro de esta disciplinas, tratando de de-construir la dicotomía razón-emoción y arrojando luz sobre la influencia de las emociones en la toma de decisiones, en la política exterior, la construcción de identidades, la consolidación de la paz, la disuasión, el nacionalismo y la movilización de movimientos sociales, entre otros fenómenos (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008;Crawford, 2000;Hall, 2005;Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014;Sasley, 2010Sasley, , 2011. ...
... En este sentido Guerrero Arias lo expresa a través de la necesidad de hablar de sabidurías otras, en lugar de epistemologías, con el fin de captar las formas de entender la vida y la existencia, no solo desde el conocimiento, sino desde el corazón:Pero si lo que se trata es de abrir espacios para que los conocimientos y saberes otros, del sur y fronterizos, puedan visibilizarse y expresarse, hay que hacerlo desde sus propios territorios del vivir, del nombrar y del decir, desde sus propias categorías, y desde ellas, más que llamar epistemologías, al horizonte de conocimientos, experiencias, sentires, saberes, prácticas, con los que orientan su existencia, los pueblos subalternados, la denominan sabiduría; por ello, preferimos hablar no de epistemologías otras, sino de sabidurías insurgentes o sabidurías del corazón y la existencia, porque su potencial insurgente radica, en que frente al sentido fragmentador y totalitario de la razón, de la epistemología y de la ciencia, que solo nos ofrece teorías, información y datos, las sabidurías insurgentes, nos aportan referentes de sentido para el vivir, nos permiten una visión integral de la vida, pues tienen la capacidad de integrar la afectividad, la espiritualidad, el corazón, la razón y la acción, pues no se queda en la teorización de la realidad, sino que impulsa la lucha por su transformación; por eso no son epistemologías, pues no se quedan solo en la dimensión cognitiva del conocimiento, no implica que la sabiduría no tiene epistemología, sino que está más allá de está, las sabidurías del corazón aportan no solo referentes epistémicos, sino cosmos de sentido para sembrar sentidos éticos políticos, estéticos y eróticos 'otros', distintos de la existencia.(Guerrero Arias, 2012, p. 203).Las paces como prácticas y sabidurías sentipensantesDentro de las Relaciones Internacionales, el papel de las emociones en la guerra y la paz ha sido descuidado y subestimado durante mucho tiempo(Hall, 2005;Sasley, 2010Sasley, , 2011Sasley, , 2013. Si bien las diferentes corrientes teóricas dentro de la disciplina han hecho referencia a las emociones, en general han subestimado su papel, no lo han reconocido, o más comúnmente les han asignado un rol SENTIPENSAR LA PAZ: NOTAS PARA LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE PAZ EN COLOMBIA ...
... Moreover, beyond the topic of European integration, this article aims to advance research on emotions in IR. While the literature remained rather theoretical or focused on single emotions to account for decision-making failures (Sasley, 2011; see also Bleiker & Hutchinson, 2008), the methodology of studying emotions in (the history) of IR gained more attention recently (see Clément & Sangar, 2018). Building upon Koschut (2018b), I develop an emotion discourse analysis, distinguishing between two types of emotion (enmity and amity), enriched by combining this with Koselleck's (2005) notions of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation". ...
... Research on emotions in IR consists of both macrotheoretical approaches that develop generalizable propositions about political emotions, and microapproaches that examine specific emotions in specific contexts, often decision-making failures (Hutchison & Bleiker 2014; see also Sasley, 2011). The "emotional turn" in IR encompasses a wide variety of approaches and concepts, ranging from a focus on individual subjective experiences (emotions) and bodily expressions (affection) to more collective systems of feeling (emotional communities, Rosenwein, 2010;Koschut, 2018a), emotional cultures (Moïsi, 2009), institutionalized emotional norms (emotional regimes, Reddy, 2001; see also Crawford, 2000) and conceptual/abstract expressions (emotional beliefs, Mercer, 2010). ...
Article
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The notion of European integration has been contested from its very start. In the interwar period many ideas were floating around on how to shape European unity. These interwar Blueprints for Europe have to be understood in the context of conflicting and contradictory emotions of enmity and amity. This article looks at the emotive vocabulary of the canonical text of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa. It applies an emotion discourse analysis, using Koselleck’s notion of “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation”. As such it shows the connection between the understanding and use of time and emotions in discourse—thereby demonstrating the necessity of “reading” the blueprints of European integration as highly normative and moral claims on the design of this European order.
... The how approach represents a second wave of writing characterised by a wide range of theoretical issues. Among them are scholarly products that focus on the role of specific emotions or affective phenomena in international politics (see, for example, Löwenheim and Heimann 2008;Fattah and Fierke 2009;Hutchison 2010;Head 2016b;Hall 2011Hall , 2015Koschut 2017b), on how we should engage with the more general emotional phenomenon (see, for example , Sasley 2011;Ross 2013;Hall and Ross 2015;Mercer 2014), and on the absence/existence of emotions and affects in the already existing IR theories or readings of the political (see, for example, Solomon 2014;van Rythoven 2016;Ross 2006). The where approach emphasises a variety of methodological concerns while aiming at developing or testing ways to understand emotional phenomena (see, for example, Bleiker and Hutchison 2008;Koschut 2017a;McDermott 2014;Mercer 2014). ...
... State actors and the general public in the state equally constitute the in-group; and thus, they create core social identities together. Emotions, Schadenfreude among them, have an important role in forming in-group social identities, as they help the members understand their place, as part of a group, in the world (Sasley 2011;Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, p. 506). Popular emotional responses to political cues in the intergroup context always represent the self-perception of the in-group vis-àvis the out-group. ...
Article
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Schadenfreude, the arousal of positive emotions in view of negative experiences of another, is considered one of the most inappropriate emotions in social life. Its international manifestation is puzzling, as it arouses the question of why people in one state enjoy seeing the residents of a friendly country suffer. To address this, the article offers a conceptualisation of international Schadenfreude and treats it as an emotion with purifying and cleansing qualities. I argue that Schadenfreude assists in self-justifying our policies, behaviours, and beliefs within political interactions. I suggest four interrelated conditions that are responsible for the emergence of Schadenfreude. The likeliness of the emotion is thus high when one side (1) perceives an imbalance vis-à-vis the other as unjust; (2) views the other’s misfortune as relevant to the perceived imbalance of the relations; (3) already carries negative sentiments towards the other; and (4) considers the trouble of the other as a minor one. The significance of international Schadenfreude is illustrated here through the Israeli responses to the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. Aiming to link official and popular emotional expressions, the research is based on both discourse analysis and elite interviews.
... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Chapter
Chapter 9 of The Psychology of Foreign Policy provides a systematic and structured comparison of the psychological approaches discussed in the book. It concludes by summarising their ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions, and discusses the methodological solutions as applied to foreign policy decision-making. In an encompassing manner, it elaborates on the issues of the reliability and validity of psychological theories in the context of foreign policy decision-making studies. The chapter discusses the (im)possibility of creating a single research programme around the psychological theories when studying foreign policy decision-making, noting that this would be a challenge without any clear common core of basic assumptions. Nevertheless, the chapter identifies those areas where research shows the most promise in producing new theoretical innovations and empirical explanations within the field of foreign policy analysis. It also outlines practical takeaways for foreign policy decision-makers and practitioners.
... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Book
This book focuses on foreign policy decision-making from the viewpoint of psychology. Psychology is always present in human decision-making, constituted by its structural determinants but also playing its own agency-level constitutive and causal roles, and therefore it should be taken into account in any analysis of foreign policy decisions. The book analyses a wide variety of prominent psychological approaches, such as bounded rationality, prospect theory, belief systems, cognitive biases, emotions, personality theories and trust to the study of foreign policy, identifying their achievements and added value as well as their limitations from a comparative perspective. Understanding how leaders in world politics act requires us to consider recent advances in neuroscience, psychology and behavioral economics. As a whole, the book aims at better integrating various psychological theories into the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis, as partial explanations themselves but also as facets of more comprehensive theories. It also discusses practical lessons that the psychological approaches offer since ignoring psychology can be costly: decision-makers need to be able reflect on their own decision-making process as well as the perspectives of the others. Paying attention to the psychological factors in international relations is necessary for better understanding the microfoundations upon which such agency is based. Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Security at the Arctic University of Norway (UiT) in Tromsø, Norway. Tuomas Forsberg is Director of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies at the University of Helsinki and Professor of International Relations at Tampere University, Finland.
... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Chapter
Chapter 3 of The Psychology of Foreign Policy concerns prospect theory, which originates from behavioural economics but has been increasingly applied to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. It is one of the most influential cognitive psychological decision-making theories. The theory arose to challenge the straightforward expected utility-based rational choice theory. Prospect theory claims that people hardly ever make choices on the basis of the mathematical utility value of the available options, as the expected utility theory models the decision-making situation. Focusing on risky decision-making, the theory argues that the way in which a decision is framed, that is, whether it is understood to be in the realms of loss or gain, defines whether the decision-maker is a risk-taker or risk-averse. After carefully considering the generic theory, the chapter presents its applications to foreign policy decision-making. In addition to methodological challenges, the critical discussion deals with the issue of whether a theory based on average behaviour and tested by small monetary values in controlled circumstances can be applied to foreign policy decision-making.
... Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggests that the more individuals feel they belong to a group, the more likely they will interpret events in terms of their implications for that in-group, rather than for the individual personally, resulting in group-based appraisals and emotions (Mackie et al., 2016). In short, shared identity provides the basis for shared emotions and allows us to use the language of emotions at the state level, even though a state or any collective institution would not possess a body that would actually feel the emotions (Sasley, 2011). Yet, individuals who occupy an institutional role or who associate themselves with the larger collective may feel emotions, the emotions themselves are not individualistic: even if the individuals did not personally feel anything, they can feel obliged to demonstrate emotions because of their position. ...
... Obviously in FPA, at least both the individual and group levels seem relevant, whereas understanding emotions as collective attributes is a bigger challenge to operationalize for a traditional foreign policy decision-making study. Although institutions would appear to be without emotions, we can conceive emotions at the state level both in terms of collective belief systems as well as emotions felt on behalf of an extended self (Sasley, 2011). ...
Chapter
Chapter 7 of The Psychology of Foreign Policy discusses personality. The personalization of politics seems to be a pervasive trend in world politics, judging by the daily news as well as political and diplomatic discussions. This is in stark contrast to current mainstream International Relations theorizing, which concentrates on the structures and has either neglected the personality factors or placed them artificially outside the scope of the discipline. The chapter takes an in-depth look at the theoretical and methodological opportunities for integrating personality into the study of foreign policy decision-making. The issue at stake is whether personality matters, or whether systemic drivers suppress personal qualities and characteristics. The chapter starts by reviewing the generic personality theories, such as psychohistorical and psychoanalytical approaches, theories on personality types, and those based on personality traits and their sub-categories in different combinations. We then move to applications of these theories in the field of International Relations by looking at key research literature on personalities of foreign policy leaders and leadership traits. In a more detailed fashion, short illustrative psychological profiles of two great-power leaders are delineated. Finally, the challenges of the above approaches are discussed critically but constructively, pointing out the obvious data and methodological problems, but also issues such as whether personalities are subject to change, and what that would entail.
... For a pertinent example, see the literature in IR on how individuals come to experience collective (state) emotions (e.g. Hutchison and Bleiker 2014;Mercer 2014;Sasley 2011). 86 Keys (2020, 21). ...
Article
When leaders meet in person, they perform a wide range of interaction rituals. They dress for the occasion, greet each other and shake hands, exchange pleasantries and gifts, arrive at the meeting venue and have themselves seated according to protocol, and so on. What do they make of the performance of such rituals? In this paper, I argue that leaders often take advantage of or outright flout what the sociologist Erving Goffman calls the prevailing ‘ceremonial idiom’ of an interaction – that is the intersubjective understanding they share on what rituals to perform and how to perform them – to realize a number of political and personal objectives, with larger international consequences. The ‘ceremonial idiom’ is deliberately transgressed and a counterpart's ‘face’ threatened – overtly but more often subtly – to achieve what are commonly known as ‘one-upmanship’ and ‘putdowns’ in interpersonal contact. Empirically, I demonstrate my argument with over two dozen episodes of face-to-face diplomacy across six categories of interaction rituals: the identity of leaders, gestural, spatial–physical, task-embedded, linguistic, and communication rules. I also outline several directions for future research.
... Yet, this conclusion is problematic due to the extent to which 9/11-inspired qualia were so deeply conditioned by the state system. Indeed, the idea that emotionsdefined both functionally and by their associated qualiaare conditioned by salient socio-political groupings has become a consensus in psychology 8 and has even shaped much recent IR literature on state-level emotions (Sasley 2011;Crawford 2014;Mercer 2014). Literature on the emotional impact of the 9/11 attacks similarly found in individuals across the country increased incidences of post-traumatic stress (Silver 2002), increased prejudice (Morgan, Wisneski, and Skitka 2011), and feelings of insecurity associated with a shift in policy preferences (Huddy and Feldman 2011). ...
Article
Questions of consciousness pervade the social sciences. Yet, despite persistent tendencies to anthropomorphize states, most International Relations scholarship implicitly adopts the position that humans are conscious and states are not. Recognizing that scholarly disagreement over fundamental issues prevents answering definitively whether states are truly conscious, I instead demonstrate how scholars of multiple dispositions can incorporate a pragmatic notion of state consciousness into their theorizing. Drawing on recent work from Eric Schwitzgebel and original supplementary arguments, I demonstrate that states are not only complex informationally integrated systems with emergent properties, but they also exhibit seemingly genuine responses to qualia that are irreducible to individuals within them. Though knowing whether states possess an emergent ‘stream’ of consciousness indiscernible to their inhabitants may not yet be possible, I argue that a pragmatic notion of state consciousness can contribute to a more complete understanding of state personhood, as well as a revised model of the international system useful to multiple important theoretical debates. In the article's final section, I apply this model to debate over the levels of analysis at which scholarship applies ontological security theory. I suggest the possibility of emergent state-level ontological insecurity that need not be understood via problematic reduction to individuals.
... Whereas conventional IR theories have taken emotion much for granted in their underlying assumptions -such as fear in realist theories, or amity and trust in liberal ones -in the past two decades scholars have directed more attention to theorizing how emotions matter in decision-making processes and interstate relations (Crawford, 2000). They argue that shared emotional experiences are central to the formation of collective identities, and propel collective political action (Sasley, 2011;Hutchison, 2016). Since emotion may help explain why one identity construct becomes more salient than others (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014;Hall and Ross, 2015), the nascent focus on emotion in the literature on Japan's identity is a step in the right direction (e.g. ...
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What explains Japan’s security policy change in recent decades? Heeding the ‘emotional turn’ in International Relations, this article applies a resentment-based framework, which defines resentment as a long-lasting form of anger and the product of status dissatisfaction. Leveraging interviews with 18 conservative Japanese lawmakers and senior officials, the article discusses the role, function, and prevalence of resentment in the remaking of Japan’s security policy, premised on constitutional revision. The analysis reveals that conservative elites are acutely status-conscious; and that those who blame a perceived inferior status on Japan’s alleged pacifism are more likely to see revision of Article 9 as an end in itself. For a subset of conservatives, however, the goal is rather to stretch the Constitution to enhance Japan’s means of deterrence vis-à-vis objects of fear or in solidarity with allies. Overall, the article demonstrates that resentment provides a fruitful lens for analyzing status dissatisfaction in international politics.
... 10 Research in Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET) indicates that strong group identity leads to intense group emotions, and 'a group's emotions determine the group's action tendencies (inclinations toward a specific behaviour) and thus, actual behaviour'. 11 Though society functions on established rules, and is composed of communities reluctant to face the unknown consequences of changing those rules, the motivation to do so comes about when the indignity (shame) of continuing within the status quo is understood by the group as being too great, and/or the fear becomes critical that the basic survival of the community is at risk. 12 The relationship between pride/shame and the ability to convince a given population through discourse to dispense with existing rules and support extraordinary measures will be explored in the second section. ...
... In general, the need of the integration of social psychological accounts with respect to a variety of IR subfields has been acknowledged by multiple scholars (e.g. Larson 1988, Rathbun 2009, Kelman 2012) and, in recent years, it has been a growing trend among constructivist scholars to apply social psychological accounts to IR issues (Larson 1988, Rathbun 2009, Sasley 2011. Falling into this trend, my study confirms the possibility and usefulness of such application, its ability to provide us with new insights into the problematic issues of our field. ...
Thesis
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This thesis problematises the bases of soft power, that is, causal mechanisms connecting the agent (A) and the subject (B) of a power relationship. As the literature review reveals, their underspecification by neoliberal IR scholars, the leading proponents of the soft power concept, has caused a great deal of scholarly confusion over such questions as how to clearly differentiate between hard and soft power, how attraction (soft power’s primary mechanism) works and what roles structural and relational forces play in hard/soft power. In an effort to ascertain the bases, I address this issue not from the viewpoint of A’s policies or resources, like do IR neoliberal scholars, but in terms of B’s psychological perception of A. Employing social psychological accounts, I argue that attraction can be produced in three distinct ways, namely 1) through B’s identification with A (“emotional” attraction), 2) via B’s appreciation of A’s competence/knowledge in a particular field (“rational” attraction) and 3) by means of the activation of B’s internalised values which contextually prescribe B to act in A’s favour (“social” attraction). Importantly, depending upon the way attraction is produced, it is peculiar in a number of characteristics, the main of which are power scope, weight and durability. Insights from social psychology also show that unlike soft power, hard power requires not only B’s relevant perception of the A-B relationship (as coercive or rewarding), but also A’s capability to actualise a threat of punishment and/or a promise of reward. I argue this difference can be fairly treated as definitional rather than empirical, which implies that coercion and reward necessarily have both relational and structural dimensions, whereas for attraction, a structural one alone suffices, while a relational one may or may not be present. Having explicated the soft power bases, I illustrate each of them using three “most likely” case studies, namely Serbia’s policies towards Russia (emotional attraction), Kazakhstan’s approach to relations with the EU (rational attraction) and Germany’s policies vis-à-vis Israel (social attraction).
... political science to "theorize more rigorously about how groups in international relations can be said to experience emotions and then take action according to these emotional reactions." 70 Sasley leverages a "specific theoretical framework in social psychology" known as IET (intergroup emotions theory) to undergird his work. The emotionality implicit in any human 71 endeavor requires stakeholders involved in a decision making process to think clearly and act rationally. ...
Thesis
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Using natural language processing (NLP) we subject North Korean propaganda to sentiment analysis and emotion detection in order to derive a set of statistical values from 1997 to the present. Those values are mapped against a timeline of missile launch events in an attempt to identify correlations which could serve as indicators in predicting future launch events. Upon examination of the study’s results, no correlation was found between sentiment values and missile launch events.
... Visual and audio-visual analyses lend themselves to IR research on how emotions contribute to meaning construction and the potential for incorporating intergroup emotions (Sasley 2011), visuality of pain (Crilley 2017), cosmopolitan empathy (Robertson 2010), or the empathic self (Weber 2014; see also Lisle 2016). Ross (2010) cites the circulation of certain images and responses on YouTube as incidental in contributing to negative views of Muslims in Western media and academia, uncovering common Western representations of Muslims as angry and acting through rage. ...
Article
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Each year the prevalence of digitized information becomes more entrenched, not least with the amount of activity on social media. Yet, new media studies pose a number of challenges to international relations scholarship, which are only beginning to be addressed. With some exceptions IR scholars who conduct this research tend to rely on traditional qualitative methods and have been hesitant to embrace interdisciplinary collaboration—especially with those disciplines outside of the social sciences—as well as methodological pluralism across interpretive and quantitative approaches within the social sciences. This tendency shows a general lack of understanding of what new/social media might mean, not only as a source of and tool for generating information but also as a structural factor in how we conduct IR research and practice international relations. In this way, social media can provoke IR scholars to ask questions about their own discipline. This article aims to address these challenges and to provide suggestions on how to bring structural aspects of new media into IR research. In particular, it incorporates ideas centered on the shifting media ecology as fundamental to examining these structural challenges in terms of practicing international relations and in the visual turn in IR.
... Theoretically, my argument rests on the studies on identity and emotions in foreign policy which draw on the social identity and self-categorisation theories from social psychology. Defining identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (quoted in Sasley 2011, p. 457), 1 those papers argue that an actor's self-identification with a certain group (or an individual actor) can alone determine his/her behaviour, in which case his/her cognitive function is accompanied by significant affective incentives (Chafetz et al. 1998;Mercer 2005Mercer , 2010Sasley 2011). When this happens, the actor perceives the group as part of him/herself and looks at the world from the group's perspective, considering it as diverse from and better than other groups, a tendency that springs from the human basic psychological need to evaluate themselves positively (Mercer 2005, p. 96;Sasley 2011, p. 458). ...
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The paper argues that while the Serbian society and political elite are known for treating their country’s accession to the EU in terms of pragmatic utility maximisation, they generally conceive of Serbian relations with Russia, contrariwise, as an identity-laden issue. To prove it, the author analyses Serbia’s behaviour toward Russia along the features of emotion-driven cooperation, found in the literature on identity and emotions in foreign policy. In particular, the paper focuses on Serbians’ especially strong friendliness vis-à-vis Russia, the parallel existence of the Other (the West) in their identity and the particularly strong intensity of their attraction to Russia during Serbia-West conflicts, the reinforcement of their affection to Russia by national traumas, the endurance of the affection’s strength despite conflicting rational interests and negative experiences in bilateral interaction, the frequent occurrence of references to Russia in Serbia’s domestic discourse and decisional justifications and a large use of historical analogies concerning Russia. Finally, the author ponders over the implications of the existent configuration of emotional and pragmatic forces in Serbian politics for the country’s current and future conduct toward Russia and the EU.
... There is no reason to suspect that these motives do not play a role when corporate actors interact (Wolf 2012). To be sure, organizations such as states do not experience emotions, only individuals and their groups do (Sasley 2011;Mercer 2014). However, states definitely can have their own identities which their representatives try to uphold (Ringmar 1996;Wendt 1999;Murray 2010;Lebow 2016). ...
Conference Paper
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Recent IR research on status normally treats status as reputation for excellence. In this perspective, an actor’s status ultimately depends on a society’s beliefs as to how that actor ranks in various ratings of valued attributes (e.g., wealth, intelligence, or coercive capabilities). This paper argues that asymmetrical reciprocal roles (leaders vs. followers, patrons vs. clients, teachers vs. students etc.) create even more fundamental stratifications that can provoke far more acrimonious status conflicts. Role-based hierarchies remain stable as long as the subordinate actor treats its superior with deference. Disputes over asymmetrical roles arise when subaltern actors begin to question a dominant actors’ right to lead or when co-equal actors fear that current partners are trying to establish their dominance through a series of faits accomplis. Under such circumstances, defiance is the status strategy of choice, as it directly undercuts displeasing patterns of deference. The paper provides a first sketch of a theory that lays out the causes and forms of defiant behavior in international status disputes.
... (Mercer, 2014:516,525). The "emotional turn" in IR has already produced stimulating results (see Mercer 2014;Sasley 2011). Hence, in light of legitimacy's vast psychological dimension, it is also desirable to analyze the framing devices intended to resonate with specific audience's feelings. ...
Article
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The topic of international legitimacy has returned to centre stage during the Arab Spring, in which the Arab League has apparently assumed a prominent legitimation role. Although some scholarship has studied how international organizations are decisive in legitimizing actors and their actions during conflicts, relatively scant attention has been focused at constructing a comprehensive analytical framework for this kind of assessment that could be also applied to regional organizations (ROs). This paper proposes that when actors are involved in battles over international legitimation, analysing their access to the socially identified brokers of three legitimation functions (appropriateness, consensus, and empathy) is key to assess their success. Particularly, we argue that relevant identity-based ROs may have a crucial legitimizing role by operating as brokers of regional consensus. For this purpose, two case studies – Bahrain and Libya – illustrate how the Arab League’s brokerage influenced the legitimation of the actors involved and their outcomes. The findings suggest novel implications about the decisive legitimizing impact of regionalism on conflict resolution.
... Apart from analyzing the role that various emotions play in relations between states and the decision-making processes of political actors (see, e.g., Steele 2008;Sasley 2011;Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014;Mercer 2014), scholars in the field of IR have also paid attention to the concept and practice of empathy. This scholarship has focused on the theorization of empathy in the realm of local and global politics (see, e.g., Morrell 2010;Pedwell 2014;Head 2016), the institutionalization of empathy within and between states (see, e.g., Crawford 2000;Marlier and Crawford 2013), its significance as a strategy for peace between (former) adversaries in (post-) conflict situations (cf. ...
Article
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Difference, a central concern to the study of international relations (IR), has not had its ontological foundations adequately disrupted. This forum explores how existential assumptions rooted in relational logics provide a significantly distinct set of tools that drive us to re-orient how we perceive, interpret, and engage both similarity and difference. Taking their cues from cosmological commitments originating in the Andes, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East, the six contributions explore how our existential assumptions affect the ways in which we deal with difference as theorists, researchers, and teachers. This initial conversation pinpoints key content and foci of future relational work in IR.
... In this second phase of othering process, as Proposition 2 states, when framing the certain targets as threats to group security, power, and status, the securitizing actors draw from the hostile symbolic predispositions of their constituencies informed by the hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism. These symbolic predispositions can be viewed as "stable affective responses to particular symbols" that are "associated with different principled beliefs and different causal beliefs" (Kaufman 2019, 4;see Mercer 2010;Sasley 2011). For instance, the hostile biases (e.g., prejudices and ideologies) being held by the in-group amplify the othering of the out-group as sources of identity crisis and homeland instability. ...
Article
How does a once familiar and benign ethnoreligious community become a stranger and a threat? This article examines the underlying causal mechanisms driving rival ethnoreligious factions within pluralistic polities to frame each other as threats to their relative security, power, and status. Drawing on complementary theories from critical security, religious, and nationalism studies, I develop a framework that captures and explains the processes and dynamics through which threatening conceptions and narratives about the ethnoreligious others are constructed, socialized, and legitimized over time. To theoretically probe and empirically demonstrate the utility of this framework, I examine how the collective imagined insecurities among Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia have crystallized into tangible security threats using the interpretive process tracing method. Evidences produced from my theoretical and empirical analyses using the novel qualitative data I gathered from my field research reveal that this chauvinistic, zero-sum phenomenon proceeds via a three-phase othering causal mechanism comprised of cultivation of hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism, securitization of othered ethnoreligious groups using hostile symbolic predispositions, and sacralization of hostile perceptions of indivisible ethnoreligious identities and homelands.
... For example, Rathbun argues a vision of uncertainty as stemming from fear is quintessentially realist, neglecting how fear, like all emotions, is subject to interpretation, and thus equally vital to the subjectivity emphasized by cognitivist, constructivist and critical accounts (see Bleiker and Hutchison 2008;Bar-Tal 2001;Crawford 2014). Similarly, his division between individually-oriented cognitivist approaches and constructivist approaches that focus on a reified intersubjective realm neglects significant constructivist work into the interpersonal microfoundations of ambiguity and uncertainty (see, for example, Crawford 2000;Ross 2006), as well as work dissecting how individual emotions spread, forming macro-level group properties (Sasley 2011;Mercer 2014). Though different paradigms may frequently employ different terminology, incompatibilities oftentimes allude to underlying PoS assumptions rather than empirical focus. ...
Article
On the campaign trail, then-candidate Donald Trump expressed a desire to pioneer an unpredictable US foreign policy that would both deceive opponents and disrupt the status quo. Academic and media commentators readily labelled this Trump’s ‘Unpredictability Doctrine’ and have since debated its merits and demerits. Beyond inevitable partisan divides, however, these responses also revealed enormous disagreement over conceptualizations of unpredictability and its impacts, raising fundamental questions for the IR discipline and the foreign policy analysis it informs. What are the ontological and epistemological roots of unpredictability in international politics? How can scholars simultaneously grapple with the conundrums posed by erratic actors and the larger, ever-changing systems they shape? This article unravels the philosophy of science (PoS) issues inherent in theorizing unpredictability, offering a novel, synthesized typology. Recognizing that PoS assumptions both frame accounts of unpredictability and represent a source of uncertainty, this article instead advocates epistemological humility, offering a new typology that transcends assumptions and facilitates dialogue between camps. This typology includes three ‘buckets’ of unpredictability – risk, uncertainty and complexity – that can be interpreted according to varying philosophy of science traditions. When applied empirically, this terminology helps contextualize analysis and expose oftentimes overlooked contours of US foreign policymaking.
... 17 To analyse how emotions 'operate at the state level', Brent Sasley has argued that we should conceive of emotions as motivators for political behaviour. 18 He proposes that there are three ways to discuss emotions as informing state behaviour: viewing the state as a single actor (a person); focusing on individual state leaders as representing the state; and understanding the state as a group and following the internal process by which group members' cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise and reflect those of the group (the state) and so determine how the state will act. 19 He uses intergroup emotions theory to demonstrate how an in-group identity can be activated, and how individuals within the group can feel emotions as in-group members. ...
Article
This article assesses the role that emotions play in European Union foreign policy-making. EU decision-making has often been depicted as technocratic and ‘de-dramatized’, yet there are still situations in which emotions can affect the process and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making. Using examples of the EU's responses to crises in Ukraine and Myanmar, the article illustrates that emotions can motivate the taking of particular decisions at particular times. Further, the EU expresses emotions in its foreign policy communications, although its use of emotional diplomacy may not be accompanied by substantive action appropriate to the emotions expressed, thus revealing the existence of an emotions–action gap. The ‘emotional turn’ in foreign policy analysis can open up new directions for research in EU foreign policy, and the conclusion considers other promising avenues for researching emotions and EU foreign policy.
... In the 2000 th , in the world political science the audit of the past was under consideration, directly related to the high-profile events that have led to some significant changes in the system of the international relations. Two World Wars and the Holocaust (Zehfuss, 2007), the Vietnam War, the armed conflict in Chechnya (Williams, 2000), the September 11, the 2001 attacks (Edkins & Jenny, 2003), the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the follow-up Balkan conflicts (Ray, 2006), the apartheid regime in South Africa led to the emergence of reconciliation groups aimed at "healing by turning to the past" (Meskell, 2006), and reintegrated historical memory into the political practice (Sasley, 2011). ...
... The Global War on Terrorism created a favorable environment for the cultural change of the international system purposefully exploited by revisionist powers. The post-9/11 world order has been less cooperative and is rapidly shifting towards a neo-Hobbesian arrangement to be characterized by changing polarities, enhanced power competition and status conflicts (see also e.g., Renshon 2017; Murray 2019; Shevcenko 2019, 2010;Lebow 2008Lebow , 2010Lebow , 2018Bleiker and Hutchinson 2008;Lindemann and Ringmar 2012;Mercer 2006;Renshon and Lerner 2012;Ringmar 1996Ringmar , 2016Ross 2006;Sasley 2011). ...
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This paper will study the potential applicability of the strategic imagination method to international security analysis, which has been previously used to improve prognostic quality in business studies. The method should allow security experts to think about the future by considering “what if” situations, and creatively assess the probability of different threats, even those that appear as improbable to others. The components of the method include strategic fit (the actor’s competence between its abilities and the needs of market), structure (the degree of concentration and maturity), competitive advantages (the extent to which the resources denied to the competition can be gathered, for example, access to novel technology), and strategic focus (i.e., on cost advantages, a differentiated product or exploitation of a market niche), in which a strategic advantage can be obtained by changing rules or deliberately creating turbulence. Strategic imagination can promote an academic discussion on changing nature of global processes like the emergence of global security market and provide nonorthodox methods for advancing a qualitative security analysis. Educated forecasting by connecting today’s developments with strategic imagination offers an important component in building successful security strategies and supportive public policies, especially in what concerns psychological warfare. For example, in the current COVID-19 crisis, main efforts have been made to defend against its national consequences (e.g., various restrictions introduced by individual countries), and less attention has been paid to cooperative strategies that can significantly reduce the global spread of the virus.
... Studies of the individual level examine the role of emotions (Crawford 2000;Bleiker and Hutchison 2008;Hall 2015), presuming that statespersons' thoughts and feelings vis-à-vis their peers, under certain circumstances, "are enormously influential" (van Hoef and Prior 2018, 48; see also : Byman and Pollack 2001;Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012;van Hoef 2018). Whereas many studies discuss collective emotions and how individuals can feel in the name of their nations (Sasley 2011), others analyze the role played by leaders' emotions in various contexts, including foreign policy and peace negotiations. Thus, for example, Keys and Yorke (2019) demonstrate how personal emotions affect diplomats' definitions of the national interest. ...
Article
While most international relations (IR) scholars tend to minimize the effect of relations between statespersons on foreign policy, this article argues that interpersonal relationships have more weight than the literature suggests. On the basis of twenty-one interviews conducted with senior Israeli statespersons, we propose a two-level model-linking positive interaction between statespersons and actual consequences at the state level. At the personal level, positive interactions can create receptiveness, build trust, facilitate accessibility and availability, and advance personal commitment. Translating these outcomes into consequences at the state level is mediated either by persuasion or by commitment. If persuasion is effective or there exists a high level of personal commitment, statespersons are more likely to succeed in mobilizing international support, removing obstacles to agreements, gathering sensitive information, and diffusing interstate tension. We conclude by discussing the limitations and advantages of good personal relations between statespersons and their implications for IR practice and theory.
... Nations are storied not just with wants and desires, but also emotions felt, imposed, and denied. Leaving aside IR debates over collective emotions (Sasley 2011;Mercer 2014;Hall and Ross 2019), nations are frequently narrated as communities of emotional experienceboth positive, such as pride and joy, and negative, such as humiliation and mourning. Belonging to the nation is intricately linked to feeling the nation. ...
Article
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A large literature within the field of international relations has now explored both how emotions can shape political perceptions and behavior and how international actors may seek to manipulate, harness, or deploy emotions and emotional displays for political ends. Less attention, however, has been paid to how political struggles can also center upon issues of who can or should feel what emotion and whose feelings matter. Precisely, we theorize a distributive politics of emotion that can manifest in three general forms, all of which have their own properties and logics of contestation. The first centers on emotional obligations, understood as an actor's duties to feel and express specific emotions. The second concerns emotional entitlements, or the rights an actor enjoys to either feel or not feel certain emotions. And the third involves hierarchies of emotional deference, that is, the varying degrees of priority accorded to different actors’ feelings. We illustrate how the politics of emotions can unfold on the international stage by looking at developments in the so-called history problem within Sino-Japanese relations.
... This communal nature of emotions means that they play a role both in politics and in international relations. Brent Sasley 52 proposes to study emotions in international relations, assuming that states are social groups in which the actions and decisions of leaders or decision makers are a reflection of the group's knowledge and emotions as such and affect the state's behavior on the international stage. ...
Article
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Social, cultural, ideological and political background of different states define their behavior and international relations. According to logos, these actions should be rational and pragmatic. However, emotions – metaphorically symbolized by pathos – contribute to states’ international activities. Authors attempt to analyze emotional driving forces in international relations and estimate their impact. Second purpose of the paper is to explore the instances of the use of emotions in offensive actions in international relations with the crisis-torn European Union as a case study. English School theory and elements of constructivism will provide a theoretical and methodological lens for the study.
... For example, he argues that a vision of uncertainty as stemming from fear is quintessentially realist, neglecting how fear, like all emotions, stems from interpretations of given situations as frightening, such that fear-based uncertainty is grounded in the subjectivity emphasized by cognitivist, constructivist, and critical accounts (see Bleiker and Hutchison 2008;Bar-Tal 2001;Crawford 2014). Similarly, his division between individually oriented cognitivist approaches and constructivist approaches that focus on a reified intersubjective realm neglects significant constructivist work on the interpersonal micro-foundations of ambiguity and uncertainty (e.g., Crawford 2000;Ross 2006), as well as work dissecting how individual emotions spread, forming macro-level group properties (Sasley 2011;Mercer 2014). ...
Article
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What are the ontological and epistemological roots of unpredictability in politics? How can scholars simultaneously grapple with the conundrums posed by unpredictable actors and the larger, ever-changing systems they shape? To answer these questions, unpredictability can be divided into three buckets-risk, uncertainty and complexity-that can be interpreted according to varying traditions in the philosophy of science. When applied empirically, this typology helps to contextualize analysis and expose often-overlooked contours of U.S. foreign policy-making.
... With a Forum in International Politics, Bleiker and Hutchison (2014;see also 2008) further developed the research agenda for studying emotions in international relations. Several key issues were addressed, such as the collective dimension of emotions (Mercer, 2014; see also Hall & Ross, 2015;Sasley, 2011), both their institutionalization (Crawford, 2014) and their changed meaning (Linklater, 2014), and the relationship between emotions and intentionality (Fierke, 2014; see also Ross, 2006). Most of this research takes a sociological approach towards emotions which emphasizes the intersubjective and collective nature of emotions, rather than a focus on affects (bodily expressions) and feelings (personal experiences) (Clement & Sangar, 2018, p. 5). ...
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This Special Issue examines the nexus between emotions and norms in EUropean foreign policy. Theoretically, building on the existing IR-literature on emotions, the Special Issue distinguishes between “emotion norms” (which refer to the appropriate emotional expressions) and “emotional norms” (which refer to the norms that trigger emotional responses). Empirically, the Issue illustrates the different ways in which emotion(al) norms are used at different levels of EUropean foreign policy, i.e. EU, state and subnational levels. The collection of articles aspires to study the ways in which emotions shape the EU’s external relations focusing on the actors (who mobilize emotions, who are constrained or contested by emotion(al) norms), processes (through which various feelings are produced internally or transmitted externally) and the content of norms linked to emotions. Methodologically, this Special Issue illustrates how emotion(al) norms can be studied through the use of different discourse methods.
Article
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit dem Einfluss von Emotionen beim Vorgang des Interpretierens. Emotionen sind zu einem wichtigen Forschungsgegenstand in den Internationalen Beziehungen geworden. Daher ist es von Bedeutung, dass wir uns mit dem Zugang zu Emotionen auseinandersetzen. Hierbei spielt auch die eigene Emotionalität eine Rolle, denn die Art, wie wir etwas verstehen, ist auch emotional geprägt. Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass Emotionen und Rationalität miteinander verbunden sind. Als Forschende sollten wir daher unsere Emotionalität als Teil der wissenschaftlichen Praxis reflektieren. Zudem versteht der Beitrag Emotionen auf verschiedenen, miteinander verbundenen Ebenen: Emotionen als Forschungsgegenstand, der empirische Zugang zu Emotionen, wie auch die Reflektion der Emotionalität beim Interpretieren. Als Illustration dient eine Fallstudie zur Interpretation von politischen Cartoons, der Schwerpunkt wird auf Selbst- und Fremdbilder und die Konstruktionen des (bedrohlichen) Anderen gelegt. Abschließend setzt sich der Beitrag mit der Reflektion der eigenen Emotionalität auseinander.
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El presente trabajo tiene como finalidad contribuir a la reflexión acerca de la función de la CPI. El análisis toma como punto de partida los aportes del economista Amartya Sen acerca de la justicia; en particular su concepción de la justicia global, fundamentada en la defensa de los derechos humanos. Una de las contribuciones más importantes de Sen a la reflexión sobre la justicia ha sido su reivindicación de la inclusión de los derechos económicos entre los derechos humanos fundamentales. La interpretación del concepto de “derechos fundamentales” sirve aquí para incluir los derechos económicos entre aquellos que deben estar protegidos por la legislación internacional, porque las libertades protegidas mediante estos derechos son tan relevantes para desarrollar una vida digna como las libertades asociadas a los derechos civiles y políticos, por lo cual no existe ninguna razón para condenar a los violadores de los derechos fundamentales en un caso y no hacerlo en el otro caso. En este capítulo se estudia la repercusión de esta inclusión sobre el DIP y la función de la CPI, haciendo énfasis en la necesidad de una mayor consideración de las violaciones de los derechos humanos económicos.
Book
El manuscrito que se presenta en este prólogo tiene como título La función de la Corte Penal Internacional: visiones plurales desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar. A ello se une el subtítulo Volumen Especial por el X Aniversario del Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya para la Paz, los Derechos Humanos y la Jusiticia Internacional. En consecuencia, dos son los aspectos principales que se abordan en las siguientes líneas. Por un lado, una breve introducción al trabajo de investigación coordinado por los profesores Olasolo, Urueña-Sánchez y Sánchez Sarmiento, a través del análisis de sus objetivos principales. Por otro lado, la presentación del Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya para la Paz, los Derechos Humanos y la Justicia Internacional (IIH o Instituto) y de sus principales actividades en los diez años transcurridos desde su fundación el 1 de junio de 2011. Con respecto a la primera cuestión, se puede identificar tres objetivos principales a los que se dirige el manuscrito objeto de la presente publicación. En primer lugar, busca proporcionar una visión interdisciplinaria más amplia sobre la función de la CPI a través del diálogo entre las aproximaciones filosóficas y teológicas por una parte, y los enfoques desde el DI y las RI por otra. En este sentido, conviene tener en cuenta que, si bien hasta el momento la doctrina se ha limitado en gran medida a estudiar la CPI desde perspectivas de análisis tradicionales basadas en el positivismo jurídico, no es menos cierto que una comprensión holística de las condiciones que han favorecido la constitución y la consolidación de la CPI como institución requiere ir más allá del análisis del ECPI y de los instrumentos internacionales que lo complementan, para promover el diálogo con aquellas otras disciplinas que explican ciertas variables de su funcionamiento. De esta manera, tanto la filosofía como la teología tienen mucho que aportar en relación al tratamiento de las atrocidades masivas en las sociedades humanas y en la sociedad internacional, y por lo tanto son ciertamente relevantes a la hora de interpretar la función del único tribunal internacional penal permanente (la CPI) que ha sido establecido hasta el momento para investigar y enjuiciar a sus máximos responsables.
Article
Early in 2015, the new Greek government, led by the left-wing SYRIZA party, refused to complete the second bailout program and insisted on further debt relief. This defiant stance entails a puzzle for rational-choice explanations that focus on expected economic utility: when SYRIZA came to power, the Greek economy had resumed modest growth, while its foreign creditors had extended debt maturities and hinted at the possibility of more debt restructuring in the future. Hence, there seemed no immediate need to force the issue. Furthermore, it appeared very likely that the incoming administration's demands would be rejected by some of the creditors, each of whom wielded effective veto power. In fact, weeks before the final showdown, George Tsebelis, a leading expert in the field of EU governance, had correctly predicted that Athens was set for a dramatic climb-down. This article argues that the Greek government's bargaining tactics were neither a rational answer to the country's economic predicament nor a necessary response to domestic constraints. Instead, moral emotions and status sentiments played a decisive role. The administration's overconfident defiance was strongly influenced by anger at Greece's alleged humiliation at the hand of its creditors. link to online first: https://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2018.1490331
Article
Leaders who wish to resolve their disputes through face-to-face negotiations often find themselves in various relational problems. An invitation to talk might be sincere, but it can also be a scheme to exploit one’s counterpart; a claim of value and threat to walk out unless certain demands are met might be serious, but it can also be a bluff; a claim that no further concessions is possible might be heartfelt, but it can also be an attempt to exaggerate one’s “Reservation Price”; and an urge to commit to an agreement might be genuine, but it can also be a ploy to trick a counterpart into a deal one does not intend to honor. What, then, are the interpersonal mechanisms that enable leaders to credibly communicate their intentions? In this article, I identify the diverse repertoire of emotions that leaders exchange when they interact up close, explain the different relational problems they overcome, and, as such, shed light on how their expressions enable leaders with otherwise conflicting interests to proceed through the different stages of a negotiation. Empirically, I present a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy from recent history. I also discuss a number of promising topics for future research.
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Shame is an emotion that is the cornerstone of International Relations (IR) human rights scholarship but remains undertheorized from an explicitly emotional perspective. Given the dubious and unsettled efficacy of human rights “naming and shaming” campaigns, in this article, we outline the theoretical and methodological contours of a research agenda designed (1) to uncover the emotional content of naming and shaming and (2) to pay greater attention to how nonstate actors, especially human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), evoke and experience shame, thus engaging in “emotional diplomacy.” Drawing on theories of emotions in IR and political psychology, we present a thicker account of shame by highlighting the individual and social origins of shame, discussing different varieties of shame, and by distinguishing between emotions that are often conflated with shame. We end with a discussion of the methodological tools suitable for pursuing this agenda, using examples of prominent human rights NGOs.
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The recent ‘emotion turn’ in international theory is widely viewed as a cutting-edge development which pushes the field in fundamentally new directions. Challenging this narrative, this essay returns to the historical works of Walter Lippmann to show how thinking about emotions has been central to international theory for far longer than currently appreciated. Deeply troubled by his experience with propaganda during the First World War, Lippmann spent the next several decades thinking about the relationship between emotion, mass politics, and the challenges of foreign policy in the modern world. The result was a sophisticated account of the role of emotional stereotypes and symbols in mobilizing democratic publics to international action. I argue that a return to Lippmann's ideas offers two advantages. First, it shows his thinking on emotion and mass politics formed an important influence for key disciplinary figures like Angell, Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and Waltz. Second, it shows why the relationship between emotion and democracy should be understood as a vital concern for international theory. Vacillating between scepticism and hope, Lippmann's view of democracy highlights a series of challenges in modern mass politics – disinformation, the unintended consequences of emotional symbols, and responsibility for the public's emotional excesses – which bear directly on democracies' ability to engage the world.
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Theories of decision-making grounded in political psychology have experienced a dramatic rise in the study of International Relations. There is widespread recognition of the benefits of incorporating insights from the behavioural sciences into analyses of political behaviour. However, some scholars have argued that the theoretical and empirical scope of these perspectives remains hampered by an unresolved issue: aggregation. While the fundamental unit of interest in psychology is the individual, most International Relations models concern patterns of collective decision-making in aggregate units such as states, bureaucracies, armed groups, transnational networks and institutions. This article contributes to the aggregation debate by providing a more optimistic portrait of its implications for interdisciplinary work. I argue that aggregation may be an overstated problem in International Relations and that a disciplinary preoccupation with it may hinder rather than pave the way for interdisciplinary theorizing.
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This article investigates the historical processes contributing towards the specific development of Turkey after the 1920s that in turn established the main contours of Turkey's conflict with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). It first argues that the traumatic conflict memories of the Turkish leadership (1918–35) influenced its individual‐level patterns of actions. These memories were used by the leadership to consolidate its imagined national agency in Turkey. The leadership perceived the traditional‐conservative groups as ontological insecurity sources, jeopardizing this agency. It second claims that Turkey's military apparatus is designed to silence these ontological insecurity sources. Finally, it claims these developments informed the ways in which the PKK's narratives of rebellion were constructed. Empirically, it problematizes the impact of the Ottoman Empire's collapse on the Turkish elites. Then, through a discourse analysis of elites' speeches and legal documents, it traces their anxieties to the Ottoman Empire's traumatic end. This article contributes to the trauma literature on ontological security and the emotions literature in International Relations in two ways. It first explores the particular national context in which traumatic memories are shaped and in turn articulated through emotional performances. Secondly, it shows the interplay between sociopsychological processes of security and agency making.
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Social media is becoming a key medium through which we communicate with each other: it is at the center of the very structures of our daily interactions. Yet this infiltration is not unique to interpersonal relations. Political leaders, governments, and states operate within this social media environment, wherein they continually address crises and institute damage control through platforms such as Twitter. A question arises here as to what the turn to Twitter means for conventional structures of power and different levels of communication. This article analyses the emotional dynamics of Twitter, illustrating how emotion is implicated in the power of this social media platform. I argue that Twitter can both represent emotions and provoke emotions, which can play an important role in the escalation or de-escalation of conflict. The emotional conditions Twitter facilitates are implicated in how shifts in temporality and functionality of communication have shaped political discourse so significantly.
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This paper provides an assessment of the ability of different international relations theories to grasp modern uses of international digital disinformation. More specifically, the paper argues that E. H. Carr’s notion of propaganda, John J. Mearsheimer’s typology of lies and Joseph Nye’s conceptualisation of public diplomacy all offer useful theoretical lenses through which we can advance our understanding of international digital disinformation. Their added value is demonstrated by applying these three theoretical perspectives to three ‘prototype cases’ of modern international digital disinformation. The paper concludes that the three theoretical perspectives make new aspects of international digital disinformation intelligible, including the underlying motives for using digital disinformation. However, there still remains a space for a more detailed theoretical account of digital disinformation and its use in modern international relations.
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The first part of this chapter proposes a composite (micro/textual-macro/contextual) framework to analyze psycho-social transformation of emotional-discursive practices and affective-contextual structures in international politics of neighborhood. The modal research template is replicable for relational analyses of emotional-affective configurations in trans-governmental neighborhood interactions. The trans-governmental interactions between neighboring states are managed by mutual “feeling rules” and collective “emotional exchange.” International politics of neighborhood habituates through affective-normative practices and interactive structures. The local nature of neighborhood norms indicates official, diplomatic, informal and non-legal making of relational rules in dyadic and regional interactions. International norms of neighborhood do not always fit in universal conception of customary codes and legal laws.
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Si bien el instituto del daño moral, tal como fue concebido en el Derecho Privado, se sustenta en la reparación de lesiones emocionales de indivi- duos, cabe preguntarse si también los Estados pueden ser susceptibles de sufrir tales agravios. Ello, en virtud de que, si bien en el plano de lo jurídico configuran entes ideales, esconden desde lo sociológico, como toda persona jurídica, una realidad social. Esta realidad social viva es reconocida como un sujeto de dere- cho, pero aquello no es más que una herramienta desarrollada por juristas para facilitar el desarrollo de relaciones jurídicas. Si bien la subjetividad es una cons- trucción jurídica ideal, no debe ignorarse el hecho de que detrás de cada Estado hay una población, con una identidad colectiva, vinculada por lazos emocionales fuertes pero sensibles. Podría considerarse que esta experiencia intersubjetiva que conecta los individuos integrantes de un grupo (en este caso, los nacionales de un Estado), permite que un agravio “moral” —o sencillamente inmaterial— al grupo en su conjunto (en el caso, al Estado como personificación jurídica del grupo) repercuta como daño emocional a los integrantes del grupo. La teoría de las emociones moderna entiende que las sociedades pueden desarrollar “emocio- nes colectivas”, que se definen como la acumulación de emociones individuales que distintas personas experimentan como resultado de sentirse identificadas con un grupo determinado. Para que una sociedad pueda desarrollar su propia orientación emocional, debe tener experiencias comunes y normas compartidas por sus miembros, atributos paradigmáticos de los Estados. Así, los Estados son moldes propensos para la formación de colectividades que sienten una intensa identificación con su nacionalidad como grupo de pertenencia. Ello conlleva el riesgo de que un agravio de orden moral infligido al grupo se traslade a cada uno de sus miembros, quienes sentirán en su persona el impacto de la afronta emo- cional debido a su íntima identificación con el colectivo agraviado.
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We suggest that the concept of discourse offers promising opportunities to both understand and study the politics of emotions. We argue and show that this is the case because emotions are socially embedded and constituted—at least in part—through discourse. Discourses are the frames through which we all come to comprehend and make sense of the world around us. We then illustrate how power is central to understanding the links between emotions and discourse in international politics. Emotions can support and mask prevailing power structures and the discourses associated with them. Emotions are sociocultural phenomena that transcend individuals and powerfully support and conceal the particular values that underpin political orders.
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