Article

A World of States of Affairs

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

This is a position paper or trailer for a larger work in progress and having the same title. My hypothesis is that the world is a world of states of affairs. I think that I am saying the same thing as those who have held that the world is a world of facts not things. So it may be in order to begin by saying why I use the phrase ‘state of affairs’ rather than the word ‘fact’. This is all the more in order because it is customary among those who patronize facts to use ‘state of affairs’ to mean no more than possible fact. My states of affairs, however, are all existents.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

... One is only focused on keeping the number of fundamental entities (kinds or notions) in one's ontology small, rather than that of any entity (kind or notion), irrespective of its ontological status. 19 Two important reasons for favouring the usage of the Laser, rather than that of the Razor-in a metaphysical context-are that, first, it enables one to gain a better understanding of actual methodological practice in the field of metaphysics and, second, its helps to make sense of the notion of the 'ontological innocence' of certain entities. For the first reason, that of methodological practice within metaphysics fitting well with the employment of the Laser rather than the Razor, this can be illustrated through the following imaginary scenario where the former principle, instead of the latter, is shown to correctly account for which specific theory is better than another: 20 Imagine that a metaphysician, Rachel, posits a fundamental theory with 100 kinds of fundamental entities. ...
... For a further unpacking of the nature of fundamentality, see ( [17]). 19 At times, I will interchange between the term entity(ies), in reference to any class of existing things (e.g., objects, properties, relations, kinds, notions etc.) and the narrower phrase of entity(ies) that will refer to objects, properties, relations, etc., and be distinct from kinds and notions. 20 This example is a variation of that of Schaffer's ( [9], pp. ...
... 55 For a trope's role as a universal see, ( [46][47][48]). 56 These remarks also apply to other categorial systems: such as that of Bueno et al.'s ( [49]) no-category ontology, L.A. Paul's ( [50]) one-category ontology, David Armstrong's ( [19]) and John Heil's ( [46]) two-category ontology, Barry Smith's ( [51]) three-category ontology, Ingvar Johansson's ( [52]) nine-category ontology, and Aristotle's ten-category ontology. 57 In previous work, I took God to be of one kind: trope. ...
Article
Full-text available
In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which a ‘trope-theoretic’ version of Theism is a better theory than that of a theory of Atheism, as posited by Graham Oppy. This end will be achieved by utilising the systemisation of the theoretical virtues proposed by Michael Keas (as further modified by an application of the work of Jonathan Schaffer), the notion of a trope, introduced by D.C. Williams, and an aspect, proposed by Donald L.M. Baxter, which will establish the basis of the trope-theoretic account of Theism that will be at the centre of our analysis. This assessment will ultimately show that Theism, rather than that of Atheism (Naturalism), can successfully achieve the trade-off between minimising theoretical commitments and maximising explanatory power. And thus, given this, the best theory of Theism—namely, that of ‘trope-theoretic Theism’—is to be privileged over that of the best theory of Atheism—namely, that of ‘Oppyian Naturalism’—and is able to provide grounds for a decisive reassessment of the cogency of Agnosticism.
... Recently, a principle of this nature has been defined as the truthmaker principle (cf. Armstrong 1997) 1 . This is the principle that if ɸ is true, then there is an X such that: necessarily, if X exists, then ɸ is true. 2 This formulation of the principle makes it clear that the truth of ɸ requires an X and that this X, when it exists, requires that ɸ be true. ...
... Rea 2003: 21). 4 The above argument is, in fact, an attempt to defeat presentism via a reductio ad absurdum since it is difficult to deny the existence of at least some truths about the past or future. The following three claims seem to be incompatible with each other: the truthmaker principle, presentism and the idea that there are truths about the past and future. ...
... Some examples of logical truths about the future include 'Either the actual president of the United States dies next year, or he does not die' and 'No one will be and will not be in Denmark on January 31, 2024'. Some examples of truths necessitated by the laws of nature include 'Every man is mortal' and 'There will be a visible solar eclipse in southern Spain in 4 The grounding problem in many versions has received attention from many authors. Among those who recognize the difficulty for the presentist are authors such as Sider 2026'. ...
Article
Full-text available
The presentist — if she wants her thesis to be consistent with venerable logical–semantic principles, namely, bivalence and excluded middle — must provide a convincing answer to the grounding problem. Given the idea — already present in classical antiquity — that truth supervenes on being, the grounding problem is used by the eternalist to accuse the presentist of not being in a position to offer an adequate ground for truths that concern the past or future. To address this problem, many thinkers evoke metaphysical doctrines regarding abstract object — a truth about Socrates does not include Socrates himself but only his essence or haecceity. Others seek present grounds for future or past truths — nomic presentism — while still others deny the semantic traditions in question or deny that truth supervenes on being. In this article, I present a new grounding problem to the presentist. Under the assumption that time is infinite, I claim that the presentist does not have at her disposal the foundations for truths that concern infinitely distant objects in the future. Moreover, I present a similar argument to refute 'temporalism', the thesis that at least some truths are temporally indexed. To conclude the argumentative phase, I evaluate the traditional presentist perspective that was advanced in some of the above responses to the typical versions of the problem. The objective is to show that the usual answers cannot address the new grounding problem. Accordingly, I conclude that eternalism is better positioned to provide a ground for some truths if time is infinite.
... According to David Armstrong (1989Armstrong ( , 1997, possible worlds are conjunctions of states of affairs that consist entirely of elements found in the actual world. 1 Because these elements in their various combinations exhaust all the possibilities there are, Armstrong dubbed his view Combinatorialism. The core idea behind Combinatorialism is one that many authors have found appealing. ...
... One might want to bring the null conjunction back into the picture by turning it into an ultra-thin object, one that is perhaps more virtual than real, yet real enough to figure in a (real) state of affairs. For example, given Armstrong's (1989Armstrong's ( , 1997 idea that conjunctions of states of affairs are mereological wholes, one might propose to think of the null conjunction of states of affairs as 'the null fusion' or its equivalent, 'the null individual'. 12 Reified in this way, the null conjunction could become a constituent of a second-order state of affairs like the one that Efird and Stoneham include in the empty world. ...
Article
Full-text available
If possible worlds are conjunctions of states of affairs, as in David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory, then is the empty world to be thought of as the null conjunction of states of affairs? The proposal seems plausible, and has received support from David Efird, Tom Stoneham, and Armstrong himself. However, in this paper, it is argued that the proposal faces a trilemma: either it leads to the absurd conclusion that the actual world is empty; or it reduces to a familiar representation of the empty world in which the concept of a null conjunction plays no role; or it needs to make room for the null individual of certain non-classical mereologies.
... If a given theoretical state can represent the (possible) beliefs of some observer about the physical state of a system, it is called an epistemic state. 1 Notice that these definitions do not exclude the idea that the same theoretical state can be both ontic and epistemic: it is conceivable that the same theoretical state can represent a physical state of the system and the observer's knowledge about this state (cf. Sect. ...
... Then, I argue (Sect. 3.3) that if a theoretical state represents someone's knowledge about the system (and, as such, it is epistemic), it is thereby also ontic-that is, it also represents 1 Strictly speaking, the term "doxastic" would be more adequate than "epistemic" because we can also consider false beliefs. However, I will use the term "epistemic" to remain closer to the original terminology of the debate. ...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper, I challenge the distinction between “epistemic” and “ontic” states propounded by Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125–157, 2010) by pointing out that because knowledge is factive, any state that represents someone’s knowledge about a physical system thereby also represents something about the physical system itself, so there is no such thing as “mere knowledge”. This criticism leads to the reformulation of the main question of the debate: instead of asking whether a given state is ontic or epistemic, we should instead ask whether a given change of a state is ontic or epistemic. In particular, in the context of quantum mechanics, one can ask whether the collapse of the quantum state could be understood as an epistemically successful change of the observer’s beliefs about the complete state of the system that is not associated with any change in the physical reality. I argue that the answer to this question should be in the negative because it is possible that, in a series of measurements, the collapse rule tells us to update a certain state to a different one and then back to the same state; if both of these updates are merely changes of our beliefs, then they could not both be epistemically successful.
... For a discussion of the trope framework, see e.g.,Williams (1953),Campbell (1990) andHeil (2021). For a discussion of the universals framework, see e.g.,Russell (1912),Armstrong (1993), and for a hybrid framework seeLowe (2005). ...
Article
Full-text available
Perceptual learning is characterized by long-term changes in perception as a result of practice or experience. In this paper, I argue that through perceptual learning we can become newly sensitive to basic perceptual features. First, I provide a novel account of basic perceptual features. Then, I argue that evidence from experience-based plasticity suggests that basic perceptual features can be learned. Lastly, I discuss the common scientific and philosophical view that perceptual learning comes in at least four varieties: differentiation, unitization, attentional weighting and stimulus imprinting. Becoming newly sensitive to basic perceptual features, I argue, does not fit into any of these categories. This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I present a novel view of basic perceptual features which can be used in subsequent theorizing. Second, I show that learning basic perceptual features, since it does not fit into this standardized taxonomy, constitutes an underappreciated form of perceptual learning. This result has important implications for recent discussions in the philosophy of perception and epistemology.
... Categoricalists can agree that properties do make objects disposed to behave in particular ways in particular circumstances (Bird, 2016). But (according to the categoricalist) they can only do this with the help of laws of nature (Armstrong, 1983(Armstrong, , 1997, or because of the truth of certain counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973(Lewis, , 2001. ...
Article
Full-text available
In debates about the metaphysics of properties, many have claimed that properties are powers. According to the powers view, a property's nature disposes objects to behave in certain ways in response to certain stimuli. For example, the property of fragility disposes objects to smash when a force is applied to them. But how should we understand powers? There has recently been a surge of interest in the powerful qualities view of properties. Other views in the field either claim that properties are pure powers, or that they are qualities. The powerful qualities view rejects this dichotomy, saying that properties are both powers and qualities. In this paper, I distinguish some versions of the powerful qualities view, and some of the reasons to hold it. I also outline one of the most exciting elements of the view, which is its relation to the philosophy of mind.
... The fact that the relation at issue here is numerical identity needs emphasis. This is because various authors-past and present-assume that, next to numerical identity, there is such a thing as loose identity, and that this latter kind of identity is the relation that obtains between an object at one time and the same object at another time (see e.g.Armstrong 1997, or Chisholm 1976. These authors use to talk about persistence conditions as conditions of identity-thereby meaning loose identity. ...
Article
Full-text available
It is common among metaphysicians to talk about objects having persistence conditions or, equivalently, about the persistence conditions of objects. However, as frequent as these statements are, as rare are the attempts to clarify their meaning in a systematic manner. In the present paper, I try to provide such an explanation by considering in detail the question of what it is for an object to have persistence conditions. The central results are the following. First: that an object has (in contrast to merely fulfil) certain conditions of Fness means that it lies in the essence of this object that these conditions hold—that is, that it is part of this object’s essence that it is F, if it is F, in virtue of the fulfilment of these very conditions. Second: persistence is the staying in existence of an already existing object, which is why an object’s persistence conditions are just that: conditions of the staying in existence of this very object. On the emerging view, the persistence conditions of objects exhibit an interesting parallel to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states or entities. As the latter, they are imposed upon the world by entities existing in the world, viz. objects.
... I will assume here the usual constituent conception of facts, according to which a fact is a non-mereological complex constituted by objects and properties and relations as proposed paradigmatically by Armstrong (1989Armstrong ( , 1997. 5 Strictly speaking a fact is never 'about' objects or properties and relations, it is 'constituted' by objects, properties and relations. As mentioned above, I will represent facts with [square brackets]: '[Socrates exists]' stands for the fact that Socrates exists. ...
Article
Full-text available
Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a constituent? I call this the problem of extrinsic grounding. Prima facie, it seems that there are such cases. In this paper I provide a negative answer to this question. Firstly, I show why this is an important problem. Secondly, I will argue that all apparent cases of extrinsic grounding are merely apparent. My solution is based on the notion of the ‘impure object’. In my view, to each apparent case of extrinsic grounding there is an underlying perspicuous intrinsic grounding link, in which the object of the grounded fact is constituted by an impure object. In the last section, I argue that my solution also works in the ‘hard case’ of grounding the existence of ordinary objects.
... 16 Typically, such laws are taken to be metaphysically contingent. See Armstrong (1997) for a canonical version of categoricalism along these lines and Baysan (2017) for further discussion. ...
Article
Full-text available
In the contemporary literature on panpsychism, one often finds the claim that a Russellian-monist version of panpsychism, i.e., Russellian panpsychism, is a superior view compared to alternative non-physicalist theories. The argument for this claim is that while Russellian panpsychism can integrate consciousness in the causal order and explain mental causation, alternative theories fail to do so. If this is correct, panpsychism deserves its place as a main contender in solving the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Russellian panpsychism’s superiority in explaining mental causation over competing accounts is illusory. On one reading, the proposed explanation is not an explanation of the phenomenon that is at stake in the mental causation debate. On an alternative reading, it is an explanation of the right phenomenon, but analogous explanations are available to competing accounts with less counterintuitive commitments. While there may be other considerations supporting panpsychism, explaining mental causation is not one.
... 11 Numbers and propositions are fair candidates for this third office. Finally, concrete universals, whose representatives include Armstrongian immanent universals (Armstrong 1978(Armstrong , 1989a(Armstrong , 1997 and spatially wholly multiply located extended simple material objects (MacBride 1998;Markosian 1998;McDaniel 2007), must be located in physical space, typically by being wholly multiply located there. ...
... The above principle of negative causation is actually directly encoded in Pearl's structural approach to causality (when applied to Boolean endogenous variables). It is also compatible, however, with philosophical approaches to causality according to which positive causation (or causation between real events) is the only "genuine" causation, whereas negative causation is, at best, a derivative notion (see, e.g., (Armstrong, 1997) and (Dowe, 2000)). ...
Article
Full-text available
A formal theory of causal reasoning is presented that encompasses both Pearl’s approach to causality and several key formalisms of nonmonotonic reasoning in Artificial Intelligence. This theory will be derived from a single rationality principle of causal acceptance for propositions. However, this principle will also set the theory of causal reasoning apart from common representational approaches to reasoning formalisms.
... Concerning the first odd or end, one might be tempted to point out, in reply to the second of the two examples I laid out in the previous two sections (which is the one that avoided the concern about the potential cheapness of logical truths), that it is relatively common in certain subliteratures, such as those on truthmakers and truthmaker semantics, to eschew disjunctive facts (see, for example, Russell 1919: 39, Wittgenstein 1922, Mulligan et al. 1984, Armstrong 1997, and Fine 2017. One might, on this basis, argue that we should simply do away with disjunctively defined relations and/or completions of them. ...
Article
Full-text available
There are two ways to characterize symmetric relations. One is intensional: necessarily, Rxy iff Ryx. In some discussions of relations, however, what is important is whether or not a relation gives rise to the same completion of a given type (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) for each of its possible applications to some fixed relata. Kit Fine calls relations that do ‘strictly symmetric’. Is there is a difference between the notions of necessary and strict symmetry that would prevent them from being used interchangeably in such discussions? I show that there is. While the notions coincide assuming an intensional account of relations and their completions, according to which relations/completions are identical if they are necessarily coinstantiated/equivalent, they come apart assuming a hyperintensional account, which individuates relations and completions more finely on the basis of relations’ real definitions. I establish this by identifying two definable relations, each of which is necessarily symmetric but nonetheless results in distinct facts when it applies to the same objects in opposite orders. In each case, I argue that these facts are distinct because they have different grounds.
... Thus, according to this definition, the hidden state determines all the facts about the (properties of the) system. This is why we use the term "factualism", which bears a similar meaning in philosophy (Textor, 2021;Armstrong, 1993). The terms "ontic" and "epistemic" in items (b) and (c) are motivated by Spekkens' approach to ontological models (Spekkens, 2005(Spekkens, , 2007Leifer, 2014), but all we mean by them is what was stated in Definition 2. ...
Article
Full-text available
In recent years, much research has been devoted to exploring contextuality in systems that are not strictly quantum, like classical light, and many theory-independent frameworks for contextuality analysis have been developed. It has raised the debate on the meaning of contextuality outside the quantum realm, and also on whether—and, if so, when—it can be regarded as a signature of non-classicality. In this paper, we try to contribute to this debate by showing a very simple “thought experiment” or “toy mechanism” where a classical object (i.e., an object obeying the laws of classical physics) is used to generate experimental data violating the KCBS inequality. As with most thought experiments, the idea is to simplify the discussion and to shed light on issues that in real experiments, or from a purely theoretical perspective, may be cumbersome. We give special attention to the distinction between classical realism and classicality, and to the contrast between contextuality within and beyond quantum theory.
... 72 And neither of these options are favorable for an adequate account of property instantiation. Arguably, the conceptualization of "a instantiates F" is doomed because any adequate analysis of Russell (1903); Board (1933); Strawson (1959); Bergmann (1960); Armstrong (1997); and Lowe (2006). 76 See e.g., Bergmann (1960); and Vallicella (2002). ...
Thesis
Full-text available
My dissertation puts forward a critique of the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT). According to standard accounts of PIT, all genuine intentionality is either identical to or partly grounded in phenomenal consciousness. I argue that it is a conceptually significant mistake to construe conscious experiences in terms of token mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties. This mistake is predicated on ignoring an important difference in the temporal character—what I call the “temporal shape”—between states and properties as opposed to conscious experiences. States and properties lack a temporal shape, but conscious experience has a temporal shape. Thus, in order to adequately capture our phenomenology of temporality we need a mental ontology that adequately reflects this distinction. A second aim of this dissertation is to defend a mereological account of phenomenal intentionality, which says that phenomenality and intentionality are related by being proper parts of a first-personal, subjective, mental event. On this approach, the conditions of satisfaction for a subject’s first-personal, subjective, mental event just are the conditions of satisfaction for phenomenal intentionality. I explore the theoretical grounds for a mereological account of phenomenal intentionality and conclude that it does a better job of explaining difficult cases like the problem of unconscious thought (e.g., your belief that “grass is green”). Thus, we have prima facie support for a mereological account of phenomenal intentionality exactly where competing accounts fail.
... Pour rendre compte d'une perception à distance il faut disposer d'une ontologie qui donne toute sa place au possible. Ce n'est pas le lieu ici de reprendre cette question dans toutes ses difficultés (Armstrong, 1997 ;Hintikka, 1979). Nous proposerons seulement l'esquisse d'une telle ontologie du possible et nous nous limiterons aux environnements très simples des études expérimentales que nous avons proposées. ...
Article
Full-text available
Cet article, en hommage à John Stewart, vise à proposer une approche nouvelle de la perception de la position d'un objet à distance, qui implique de donner un statut ontologique aux positions possibles dans l'espace distal. Après avoir rappelé la difficulté d'une explication de la perception de l'extériorité dans le cadre des approches énactives, nous procéderons en deux étapes. Dans la première, nous présenterons les tentatives d'explication de la perception distale en termes d'invariants sensorimoteurs individuels. Ceci nous semble bien poser le problème mais échoue à le résoudre. Puis dans une seconde étape nous proposerons une voie nouvelle pour rendre compte de la perception spatiale, voie qui ne renie pas les intuitions de départ des approches énactives autopoïétiques, mais qui change radicalement la conception de la cognition en considérant, dès le stade perceptif, la nécessité de la prise en compte d'interactions interindividuelles. Le protocole d'une étude expérimentale originale permettra de caractériser cette nouvelle approche pour rendre compte, sans sortir du domaine de couplage, de l'expérience perceptive d'objets à distance, en extériorité dans un espace de possibles. Pour cela nous aurons à analyser les limites du croisement perceptif, c'est-à-dire le moment où la réciprocité perceptive entre différents sujets commence à disparaître. ABSTRACT. Enacting the Distance and the Possibilities. A Tribute to John Stewart. This article, in homage to John Stewart, aims at proposing a new approach to the perception of the position of an object at a distance, which implies giving an ontological status to the possible positions in the distal space. After having recalled the difficulty of explaining the perception of exteriority within the framework of enactive approaches, we will proceed in two steps. In the first stage, we will present the attempts to explain distal perception in terms of individual sensorimotor invariants. This seems to us to pose the problem well but fails to solve it. Then, in a second step, we will propose a new way to account for spatial perception, a way that does not deny the initial intuitions of the enactive autopoietic approaches, but that radically changes the conception of cognition by considering, as early as the perceptual stage, the necessity of taking into account interindividual interactions. The protocol of an original experimental study will allow us to characterize this new approach to account, without leaving the domain of coupling, for the perceptual experience of objects at a distance, in exteriority in a space of possibilities. For this we will have to analyze the limits of the perceptual crossing, that is to say the moment when the perceptual reciprocity between different subjects starts to disappear.
Article
The nature of pre‐reflective self‐consciousness—namely, the putative non‐inferential self‐consciousness involved in unreflective experiences—has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first‐personally given to their subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre‐reflective self‐consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre‐reflective self‐consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This “egological view” is opposed to the “non‐egological view,” according to which the subject is just aware of their own occurrent mental state in being pre‐reflectively self‐conscious. In this article, I argue in favor of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured “fact‐like” entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one's own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. I conclude by dismissing a potential objection to my argument.
Article
En este trabajo abordamos dos preguntas centrales en la metafísica de los universales y las propiedades, tal como este tema queda delineado en el trabajo de D. Armstrong y D. Lewis, y en desarrollos recientes de sus ideas por parte de otros autores. En particular, nos centraremos en la cuestión de qué tan escasos son los universales, y en la de qué es la naturalidad perfecta que se atribuye a ciertas propiedades. Argumentamos que la posición más estable sobre estas cuestiones consiste en postular universales sólo para propiedades perfectamente naturales, y tomar a la naturalidad perfecta como un primitivo sólo parcialmente caracterizado por sus conexiones con la idea de similitud objetiva y con la de base mínima de sobreveniencia.
Article
Full-text available
Standard approaches to ontological simplicity focus either on the number of things or types a theory posits or on the number of fundamental things or types a theory posits. In this paper, I suggest a ground-theoretic approach that focuses on the number of something else. After getting clear on what this approach amounts to, I motivate it, defend it, and complete it.
Article
This article aims to provide a philosophical elucidation of the concept of divine atemporality (i.e. divine timelessness and immutability), found within the theological trajectory of Classical Theism, and a philosophical model – termed Aspectival Pluralism – that demonstrates its compatibility with the further notion of Divine Preservation. To achieve this end, an original interpretation of the concept is formulated within the Aspectival Account and the thesis of Theistic Ontological Pluralism, as extended by the temporal ontology of Priority Presentism, introduced by Sam Baron, and the Exdurantist view of persistence, introduced by Theodore Sider, which will ultimately enable the notion to be elucidated in a clear and consistent manner and help to answer an important conceptual question concerning it.
Article
Full-text available
Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism has been repeatedly criticized since its initial defense in the paper Mental Events, which was published in 1970. Despite the widespread rejection, there seems to be no agreement on why anomalous monism fails. This paper systematizes two strong objections to anomalous monism. First, Davidson’s argument for monism requires the problematic assumption that physics can provide strict causal laws for causal relations in general. Second, Davidson’s monism requires an ontology of events for which no satisfactory criterion of identity has been provided. Despite these problems, the paper argues that the theses on the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental remain acceptable, despite the difficulty of reconstructing precisely the arguments Davidson uses to defend them.
Article
Full-text available
En este artículo discutiré algunos problemas lógicos de la omnipotencia que van más allá de las clásicas paradojas ligadas a esta noción. Presentaré una versión refinada de la paradoja de Fitch sobre la omnipotencia que tiene en cuenta la distinción entre acciones básicas y derivadas, así como la distinción entre la capacidad de hacer algo y la mera posibilidad metafísica de hacerlo. También explico cómo esta paradoja puede reformularse para obtener una versión afín a la paradoja del mentiroso que afecta a la consistencia de ciertas nociones de omnipotencia. Por último, evalúo algunas posibles respuestas disponibles para el teísta y un intento de usar la paradoja de Fitch como argumento a favor de la existencia de Dios.
Article
Thomasson’s easy ontology approach (2015) aims at deflating existence questions through a revival of Carnap’s (1950) distinction between internal and external questions. Importantly, her account depends on an analysis of the ordinary meaning of ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order predicate. I do two things in this paper. First, I show that Thomasson’s analysis fails to do justice to the complexity of the English predicate ‘exist(s)’. Against Thomasson, I argue that there are cases in which ‘exist(s)’ functions as a first-order predicate. Because these cases were first noted by P.F. Strawson (1967), I will call them ‘Strawson-cases’. Secondly, I argue that these counterexamples give some support to (i) more substantive theories about existence as well as (ii) accounts that treat ‘exist(s)’ as varying in meaning.
Article
Full-text available
En el presente artículo pretendemos mostrar como uno de los espacios de comprensión de la posición antimetafísica y de su declive la inmanentización de la significatio. Para ello presentaremos algunos apsctos del proyecto antimetafísico, realizaremos una visión panorámica de la metafísica entendida como significatio que tiene su equivalencia escolástica en la teología de la imagen y concluiremos señalando a modo de apunte la ruptura con la mediación como un proceso de inmanetización de la significación metafísica como soporte de la imagen y su consecuencia para le declive de la metafísica. Abstract: In this paper, we intend to show how one of the spaces of understanding the anti-metaphysical position and its decline is the immanentization of the significatio. To do so, we will present some aspects of the anti-metaphysical project, we will make a panoramic view of metaphysics understood as significatio, which has its scholastic equivalence in the theology of the image, and we will conclude by pointing out the break with mediation as a process of immanentization of metaphysical signification as a support of the image and its consequence for the decline of metaphysics.
Article
Full-text available
W niniejszym tekście podejmujemy problematykę uprawdziwiaczy w filozofii Petera Thomasa Geacha. Praca stanowi rekonstrukcję wspomnianej koncepcji, jak również jej krytyczną analizę. Analizuje się związek między reprezentacjami mentalnymi poznawanych przedmiotów a ich odzwierciedleniem językowym oraz rzeczywistością. Prezentujemy omówienie relacji sprawczości Boga w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz porównanie jej cech charakterystycznych z podejściem prezentowanym przez Geacha. Następnie dokonujemy formalnego jej zapisu. Fundamentalną tezą przedstawianej teorii jest utożsamienie Boga z Prawdą, dzięki czemu możliwe staje się określenie relacji uprawdziwiania za pomocą wyrażenia „woluntarystyczny kauzalizm”. Stąd też — korzystając z terminologii zaproponowanej przez Tomasza z Akwinu — Bóg zostaje zaklasyfikowany w obręb bytów nazywanych entia actu intelligibilia. Brak jednak w obrębie koncepcji autorstwa Geacha szczegółowych analiz dotyczących problematyki osoby. Kolejnym problematycznym elementem tej koncepcji jest doprecyzowanie kategorii ontologicznej, uznawanej za podstawę relacji uprawdziwiania. Wykazujemy trudności z dostosowaniem teorii Geacha do współczesnych stanowisk, które ujmują stan rzeczy jako ontologiczną podstawę rozważanej semantyki. Epistemologia używana przez brytyjskiego filozofa opiera się na relacji podmiot-przedmiot, a nie na stanach rzeczy, podobnie jak odniesienie przyczynowe Boga względem rzeczywistości.
Article
Full-text available
The paper begins by briefly engaging critically—on theological grounds—with Dean Zimmerman’s defense of Peter van Inwagen’s Christian Materialist idea that we are identical with our bodies, and so survive bodily death by not actually undergoing bodily death. Next, I consider the view of the mind-body relation that Dean himself is tempted by, namely Emergent Substance Dualism, arguing that it is best seen as a fig leaf that at most works to avoid offending contemporary anti-theistic “traducian” sensibilities. In displacing Emergent Substance Dualism, I set out a Neo-Aristotelian account of essence and embodiment that allows for—indeed entails—the possibility of our surviving the death of our bodies. Along the way a characterization of ontological reductionism is given, which avoids the incoherent thought that reduction goes by way of identity. The characterization makes evident why mental events and states are not reducible to physical events. Finally, two non-reductive relations between mental and physical events, namely subserving and implementing, are defined, and then used to characterize the relation of embodiment, and explain how certain mental acts can be “difference-makers” in the physical realm. I only aim to show that given the manifest failure of psycho-physical ontological reduction, this new account of survival adds no further mystery to the mind-body problem.
Article
Full-text available
Monists and pluralists disagree concerning how many ordinary objects there are in a single situation. For instance, pluralists argue that a statue and the clay it is made of have different properties, and thereby are different. The standard monist's response is to hold that there is just a single object, and that, under the description "being a statue", this object is, e.g., aesthetically valuable, and that, under the description "being a piece of clay", it is not aesthetically valuable. However, Fine provided an ontological reading of the expression "an object under a descrip-tion": the theory of rigid embodiments. The debate between monists and pluralists reduplicates in the domain of ordinary occurrences, like walks and conferences. Specifically, they disagree whether an occurrence in progress (also called "process") like John's walk that is happening at t n is identical to some completed occurrence (also called "event") like John's walk that happened between, e.g., t 1 and t n. Under the adoption of the pluralist's position, the article aims to provide a novel theory of ordinary occurrences that develops the ontological reading of "under a descrip-tion" to account for occurrences in progress and completed occurrences. As a first result, we formulate a theory according to which both occurrences in progress and completed occurrences are rigid embodiments. As a second result, we argue that the suggested theory is explanatorily powerful to the extent it solves two puzzles that we call "the Puzzle from the Completion of a Process" and "the Metaphysical-cum-Semantical Puzzle".
Article
Full-text available
Recently, metaphysical coherentism has been propounded as an alternative to metaphysical foundationalism and infinitism. The view replaces the picture of reality as a hierarchy of levels with that of a network of objects or facts standing in symmetric or, more generally, cyclic relations of metaphysical dependence. This paper defends the orthodox picture of a well-founded hierarchy against the claimed superiority of coherentism. First, it will be argued that alleged theoretical advantages of coherentism do not hold up to scrutiny. Secondly, examples that are claimed to support coherentism are either misdescribed as involving metaphysical interdependence, or foundationalist treatments fare at least as good and often better than coherentist interpretations. Thirdly, a similar diagnosis applies to a recently proposed coherentist interpretation of quantum entanglement. The more general diagnosis is that claims of metaphysical dependence are convincing only if there is a detailed account of how one item metaphysically explains another. While foundationalists can resort to various specific explanatory relations, coherentism seems to be incapable of providing detailed explanations.
Article
This paper addresses some problems related to the relation of truthmaking, especially those concerning its necessity, adopting an essentialist point of view and focusing on the nature of truthbearers. According to the orthodox view in truthmaker theory, the relation of truthmaking is necessary in some sense. Thus, an important question involves how the relation of truthmaking is made necessary. I adopt a version of Jonathan Lowe’s essentialist approach to this question. However, contra Lowe, I take token acts of predication as the primary truthbearers. This is Peter Hanks’ view in the philosophy of language. I shall argue that some problems with the essentialist approach can be solved by taking the nature of token acts of predication to be the source of necessity in truthmaking. At the end of this paper, I shall also briefly outline two general consequences related to truthmaking that I suppose this move about truthbearers should have.
Article
Full-text available
In this paper, it is argued that, contrary to some suggestions in the philosophical literature, dispositions cannot replace laws in the description of the physical world. If for a certain type of physical situation a well-working law-based account is available, then it is not possible to describe that situation equally well in terms of dispositions. Using an example consisting of four laws (Coulomb’s law, Newton’s law of gravitation, the rule for the composition of forces and Newton’s second law), it is shown that when one attempts to replace a law-based account with a disposition-based account, the latter turns out to be either less informative or inferior with respect to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unification, non-triviality of predictions and explanatory power. Laws are also better suited to deal with interactions and their screening off. Using inference to the best explanation, one can conclude from this comparison that it is laws rather than dispositions that should be included in our ontological picture of nature.
Book
It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences”. Firstly, this book explores this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. Such a view has been defended by authors like Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod. Second, a relevant alternative is provided by those accounts that, instead of acknowledging an intersection among causal lines, claim to track coincidences back to some common cause. Third, starting from Herbert Hart and Anthony Honoré’s view of coincidences (Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959). This book provides a more detailed account of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, which is the intersection between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects, including but not limited to, access to information, expectations, relevance, significance, desires, which in turn are psychological aspects. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. This book aims to introduce and discuss recent work in psychology concerning one’s judgment about coincidences; this data offers further materials and reasons to reflect upon our understanding of coincidences and to refine our hybrid conception. Available at 24% discount (using code CFC54396A1AA on checkout): https://vernonpress.com/book/1848
Preprint
Full-text available
In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser and Vickers 2022) and the textbook account (Egg 2021). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral.
Chapter
To which ontological category do quantum systems belong? Although we usually speak of particles, it is well known that these peculiar items defy several traditional metaphysical principles. In the present chapter these challenges will be discussed in the light of certain distinctions usually not taken into account in the debate about the ontological nature of quantum systems. On this basis, it will be argued that an ontology of properties without individuals, framed in the algebraic formalism of quantum mechanics, provides adequate answers to the ontological challenges raised by the theory.What kind of item is a quantum system? In the practice of physics it is common to speak of quantum particles, as if they were items of a similar nature to classical items, but obeying different laws of motion. However, as is well known, quantum systems have such peculiar features that they challenge certain ontological principles and categories as understood in traditional metaphysics. In general, these features are analyzed in the context of the so-called problem of indistinguishability, which is a consequence of the particular statistical behavior of quantum systems. But the fact that certain items are “indistinguishable” is not the only difficulty to be overcome in order to elucidate the ontological category of quantum systems.
Article
Full-text available
Due to internal contradictions involved in analytic metaphysics, I will find that properties of objects cannot exist in a mind-independent reality. I will show that since n-adic properties cannot exist, only bare particulars exist, which leads to a robust philosophical atomism, eluding to the dichotomy between, and inversion of, quantum reality versus the experienced physical reality.
Article
This article’s purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls “Serious Metaphysics” and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis.
Article
Full-text available
Joseph Schmid has proposed an account of existential inertia which says (among other things) that each existentially inert object is not ontologically dependent on anything that is not a part of itself. Using this account, I propose an argument that existential inertia cannot be enjoyed by external relations nor by their relata. I first draw from Arianna Betti’s case for relata-specific relations to argue that external relations cannot have existential inertia. Building on this conclusion, I then propose an argument that the relata of external relations also cannot have existential inertia.
Article
Full-text available
A frequent criticism of Richard Vallee’s “pluri-propositionalism” is that it multiplies propositions beyond necessity. I argue that this criticism, recently voiced by Robert Stanton and Arthur Sullivan, is based in misconceptions about propositions are and how they help us classify utterances and the mental states and events that lead to them, relying for the most part on extended discussions of examples.
Article
Full-text available
Practical knowledge is discussed in close relation to practical expertise. For both anti-intellectualists and intellectualists, the knowledge of how to φ is widely assumed to entail the practical expertise in φ-ing. This paper refutes this assumption. I argue that non-experts can know how to φ via other experts’ knowledge of φ-ing. Know-how can be ‘outsourced’. I defend the outsourceability of know-how, and I refute the objections that reduce outsourced know-how to the knowledge of how to ask for help, of how to get things done, or of external contents. Interestingly, outsourcing differs from social cooperation, collective agency, testimonial transmission, and many other notions in social-epistemological debates. Thus, outsourcing provides not only a hitherto unconsidered form of know-how but also a novel way for knowledge to be social. Furthermore, outsourcing plausibly involves a ‘social’ cognitive extension that does not rest on EMT or HEC. Given the outsourceability of know-how, we must reconsider the nature of know-how and expertise, as well as the relation between non-experts and experts.
Article
There is a widespread consensus within analytic metaphysics that the abstract versus concrete distinction, if valid at all, must be thought of as exhaustive and exclusive. I present four arguments designed to cast doubt on this consensus.
Article
Full-text available
It is a metaphysical orthodoxy that interesting non‐symmetric relations cannot be reduced to symmetric ones. This orthodoxy is wrong. I show this by exploring the expressive power of symmetric theories, i.e. theories which use only symmetric predicates. Such theories are powerful enough to raise the possibility of Pythagrapheanism, i.e. the possibility that the world is just a vast, unlabelled, undirected graph.
Article
Full-text available
Anscombe’s 1971 inaugural lecture at Cambridge, entitled ‘Causality and Determination’, has had a lasting influence on a remarkably broad range of philosophers and philosophical debates, touching on fundamental topics in philosophy of science, action theory, the free will debate, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Especially where anti-reductionist or pluralist strands of philosophical thought are being seriously considered, one should not be surprised to find references to Anscombe’s lecture. Moreover, there appears to be a growing interest in Anscombe’s comprehensive philosophical outlook, as attested by the recent publication of a weighty collection of essays spanning that outlook in its full breadth in the prestigious Routledge Philosophical Minds series. Against this background it is apt that now, 50 years after the original lecture, a Topical Collection sees the light, circling around the most central themes from Anscombe’s lecture, with a particular emphasis on the question how these hang together, how they form part of the larger philosophical project that Anscombe obviously intended the lecture to highlight. This Introduction motivates the Topical Collection, and introduces the various contributions against that background.
Article
Why does anything happen? What is the best account of natural necessity? In this book, William A. Bauer presents and defends a comprehensive account of the internal structure of causal powers that incorporates physical intentionality and information. Bauer explores new lines of thought concerning the theory of pure powers (powerful properties devoid of any qualitative nature), the place of mind in the physical world, and the role of information in explaining fundamental processes. He raises probing questions about physical modality and fundamental properties, and explores the possibility that physical reality and the mind are unified through intentionality. His book will be valuable for researchers and students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind.
Article
Full-text available
This paper is a critical and expository study of the basic ideas in the process thought of Henri Bergson. Process philosophy is one of the oldest traditions in metaphysics, traceable to the doctrine of Heraclitus, an ancient Greek thinker. It is opposed to the idea of the Milesian thinkers like Thales and Anaximenes, who believed that reality consists of an unchanging substance that persists. Overtime, the view that reality is a novelty and, as such creative became a discourse of interest, either implicitly or explicitly, for many philosophers in the different epochs of western philosophy. As a result, different ideas emerged in an attempt to explain processes. However, these ideas have been discovered to point toward two directions – mechanism and finalism. As against this stance which pointed toward an end to the creative and novel posture of reality, Henri Bergson came up with his philosophy of multiple virtualities. However, how successful was his project? In this paper, therefore, we critically assess some strengths and weaknesses of the basic ideas in his thought process. However, though we have noted some inherent problems in his thought, Bergson’s idea of reality as multiple virtualities gives room to reality as continually processual, overcoming the mechanistic or finalistic you of other thinkers.
Thesis
Ce travail se propose de:- Établir et défendre une définition de la causalité - Identifier les caractéristiques d'une causalité - Montrer que la stérilité d'une grande partie des débats contemporains sur la causalité découle de tentatives de réduction d'une causalité à l'autre.Nous distinguerons le renoncement à l'entendement la dernière décimale, l'abandon de la localité, le déterminisme, les nouveaux débats et la causalité subjective vs objectiveUne étude de quelques articles contemporains fournira par la synthèse des remarques qui seront formulées une délimitation des études complémentaires nécessaires. Cela abordera en particuliers les problèmes des relata, les concepts d'états et d'événements.Les définitions de la causalité à l'époque contemporaine (Causalité INUS, causalité MT, etc.) permettront de lister les propriétés de cette causalité, qui ne peut être précisément définie, mais qui rassemble un faisceau de convergences.Nous essaierons de démontrer:- Que les problèmes liés à la nature et au nombre de relations causales, sont un simple résultat de la taille du grain retenu.- Que la causalité ne pose des problèmes de transitivité, de causes conjointes, d'effets simultanés et de contrefactualité que si elle est considérée comme une relation et non comme un processus de transition d'un état de l'univers à un autre- Que l'origine des problèmes contemporains concernant la causalité peut être expliquée par le hiatus entre les deux conceptions objective et subjective. Et comment le second est utilisé pour exprimer soit des jugements pragmatiques, soit des jugements de responsabilité, et comment il utilise pour cela une variation du niveau de grain et la causalité des absences (Grouchy absent, cause de Waterloo).
Article
Full-text available
Filozofowie analityczni zwykle uważają, że dyskutowany przez nich problem uniwersaliów jest tym samym problemem, którym zajmowano się w starożytności i średniowieczu. Historycy filozofii pokazują jednak, że dawny spór o uniwersalia dotyczył wielu różnych kwestii i wcale nie skupiał się na dyskutowanym obecnie problemie wspólnych własności. W swojej książce Tropy i uniwersalia przyjmowałem, że pojęcie powszechników miało zawsze mniej więcej to samo znaczenie i interpretowałem stanowisko św. Tomasza z Akwinu jako rodzaj współczesnego realizmu. Moja interpretacja wywołała interesujące polemiki ze strony historyków filozofii, Tomasza Tiuryna i Michała Głowali. W tym artykule staram się zbadać podobieństwa i różnice między współczesnym a średniowiecznym rozumieniem powszechników i odpowiedzieć na niektóre sformułowane przez nich zarzuty. Wygląda na to, że w średniowieczu istniały co najmniej trzy różne pojęcia uniwersaliów. Po pierwsze, rozumiano je jako byty wspólne, ściśle tożsame w wielu swoich realizacjach. To pojęcie uniwersaliów być może zawdzięczamy patrystycznym dyskusjom o Trójcy Świętej w IV wieku. Po drugie, uniwersalia definiowano jako byty orzekane o wielu, to znaczy ogólne pojęcia istniejące w intelekcie. Po trzecie wreszcie, uważano je, zwłaszcza w późnej scholastyce, za byty dzielące się w swoich realizacjach. Tylko to pierwsze pojęcie zgadza się ze współczesnym rozumieniem uniwersaliów. Wynika z tego, że średniowieczny i współczesny spór o powszechniki częściowo pokrywają się ze sobą. Staram się także pokazać, że proponowane przez Tiuryna i Głowalę interpretacje stanowiska św. Tomasza prowadzą do osobliwego poglądu łączącego teorię tropów i strusi nominalizm Quine’a.
Article
Full-text available
This paper is part of a general programme of developing and investigating particular first-order modal theories. In the paper, a modal theory of propositions is constructed under the assumption that there are genuinely singular propositions, ie. ones that contain individuals as constituents. Various results on decidability, axiomatizability and definability are established.
Article
Foreword by Catherine L. Albanese and Stephen J. SteinPrologue Introduction: Jim Jones, the Peoples Temple, and Jonestown I. Perspectives on an Event II. The Classifications of Persons III. Orientation in Space IV. Orientation in Time V. Salvation and Suicide EpilogueAppendix: Preface to the Original Edition Notes Index
Article
This volume offers an unusual variety of topics presented during the fifth annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Essays topics include: a dispute of the standard deductivist account of scientific testability; two definitions of “nonsense” that are closely related and correlate to science's concern with truth and philosophy's concern with concepts; contesting the causes of voluntary actions purported in Hart and Honoré's Causation and the Law; distinguishing two kinds of metaphysical tasks-—taxonomic and evaluative; and discussions of “what a thing is” in terms of its qualities and particulars and the distinction between numerical and conceptual differences, universals and individuation.
1993: Ontology, causality and mind: essays on the philosophy of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge
  • K Campbell
  • J Bacon
  • L Reinhardt
Things and qualities
  • H Hochberg
Causality and determination”, Cambridge
  • G E M Anscombe