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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (2009) The Predictioneer’s Game:
Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest To See and Shape the
Future. New York: Random House. xxii þ250 pp. ISBN
9781400067879.
Prediction should be part of any discipline that wants to influ-
ence policy decisions. Fortunately, international relations
scholars have started to live up to the task of anticipating rare
events such as the onset of war. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is
undoubtedly the pioneer in the usage of expected utility and,
in recent years, in applying game theoretic models to forecast
world affairs. His new model promises to take the dynamics of
the strategic interaction between contending political forces
fully into account. Empirically, these models rely on the input
of experts; they assess ex ante where the interests are located
within a conflict space. Bueno de Mesquita has over the years
documented, in scholarly outlets, how accurate such predic-
tions can be. In this monograph, he now spreads the gospel
that rational choice models can provide accurate forecasts to
a wider, not necessarily academic readership. The populariza-
tion of important research findings is a laudable undertaking
from which many conflict researchers unnecessarily shy away.
Bueno de Mesquita presents entertaining anecdotes and shows
through case studies where his forecasts have been successful
512 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 47(4)
Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS)
URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-3jtwyhk71crb6
Erschienen in: Journal of Peace Research ; 47 (2010), 4. - S. 512-513
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00223433100470041106
and where not. The parallel employment of the author as a
university professor and as a political consultant explains why
he stresses the accurate predictions. The applications of the
book range from medieval history, over current political affairs
(North Korea and Iran for instance) to business conflicts. This
embarrassment of riches might frustrate some readers who
would like to see a more in-depth treatment of specific cases
or a detailed presentation of the game-theoretic model. How-
ever, the smorgasbord approach also indicates that model-
based forecasts can be useful in many different settings.
Gerald Schneider
Book Notes 513
