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History o the Present: A Journal o Critical History, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2012.
Copyright © 2012 University o Illinois Press
Femonationalism and the “Regular” Army
o Labor Called Migrant Women
Sara R. Farris
The First World takes on a role like that o the old-fashioned male in
the family—pampered, entitled, unable to cook, clean, or find his
socks. Poor countries take on a role like that o the traditional
woman within the family—patient, nurturing and self-denying.
A division o labor feminists critiqued when it was “local” has
now, metaphorically speaking, gone global.
—Barbara Ehrenreich and Russell Arlie Hochschild, Global Woman:
Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in The New Economy (2003)
This depiction o the relation between the First World and the Global South
in terms o the sexual division o labor within the household should not
be understood as merely a metaphor for the power relations and uneven
development engendered by neoliberal globalization. Rather, it should be
taken quite literally: poor countries increasingly provide the nannies and
maids who work in rich countries. The current percentage o women “in the
world’s international migrants population” as Andrew R. Morrison, Mau-
rice Schif, and Mirja Sjöblom, authors o the first World Bank report on
women’s international migrations argue, “is close to half.” The dramatic rise
o these feminized migration flows is to a great extent due to the increasing
demand for workers in the care and domestic industry, with Europe con-
stituting no exception. Nonetheless, the image o the immigrant as male
Gastarbeiter (guest worker) that was difused in the 1950s and 1960s, when
Europe received the first significant flows o foreigners from all over the
world, has not been replaced by the figure o the migrant as female maid.
Rather, when women migrants are mentioned at all, they are portrayed as
veiled and oppressed Orientalist objects. The public debate on the role o
migrations and contemporary Europe’s status as a multicultural laboratory
has indeed been dominated by an insidious discursive strateg that tends
to obscure the importance o those women as care and domestic workers
and instead represents them as victims o their own culture.
o the
This article uses a political-economic theoretical framework to intervene
in the complex discursive strategies o “femonationalism,” or the contem-
porary mobilization o feminist ideas by nationalist parties and neoliberal
governments under the banner o the war against the perceived patriarchy o
Islam in particular, and o migrants from the Global South in general. Recent
discourses about multiculturalism and migrants’ integration, particularly in
the case o Muslims, have been strongly marked by demands for migrants to
adapt to Western culture and values. We should note that one o the essential
items in such a list o values is gender equality. The mobilization, or rather
instrumentalization, o the notion o women’s equality both by nationalist
and xenophobic parties and by neoliberal governments constitutes one o
the most important characteristics o the current political conjuncture, par-
ticularly in Europe. From Marine Le Pen’s recent pronouncements in defense
o “white” French people, women, and homosexuals from the perils they
encounter in the banlieues, to the Italian Northern League’s and the British
National Party’s recurrent attacks against immigrants, to widespread claims
that the entrance o a supposedly Muslim Turkey in Europe constitutes a
threat for European women, to Geert Wilders’s disturbing filmic portrayal o
Islam as an evil and misognist religion and culture, the proclaimed defense
o women constitutes a common denominator o the so-called new radical
Right in Europe, as well as an insidious argument increasingly deployed by
neoliberal governments and the mass media across the continent.
This mobilization has divided feminist intellectuals and activists. On
the one hand, some feminists, among them Alice Schwarzer in Germany,
Elisabeth Badinter in France, and Cisca Dresselhuys in the Netherlands,
have endorsed the idea that Islam is fundamentally misognist. Since it is
considered a religion that asserts the subordinated role o women in so-
ciety and that exerts a strict control over their sexuality, Islam is argued
to be against women’s emancipation tout court. Its male representatives,
as well as its cultural and religious practices, therefore need to be repri-
manded. On the other hand, other feminists—and here one might think o
Christine Delphy in France, Annamaria Rivera in Italy, and Anja Meulenbelt
in the Netherlands—have criticized such a characterization o Islam as an
overgeneralization, warning against its potentially racist implications. In
particular, they emphasize the need to support Muslim women’s own initia-
tive for self-determination against what they see as patronizing attempts at
protection from the outside; they criticize nationalist-xenophobic parties’
and neoliberal governments’ claims o concern for women’s rights as hypo-
critical and destined to exacerbate an Islamophobic climate. I should admit
at the outset that my position is close to that o the latter group. The current
contraposition between male and female Muslims, with the latter playing
the role o the passive victims o non-Western male “congenital violence”
who require protection, can be regarded as constituting the contemporary
form o a well-known Western mytholog, or an “old ploy” as Leila Ahmed
calls it, namely, that o the “white men [claiming to be] saving brown women
from brown men,” to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s apposite phrase.
For instance, it could be remembered that while current media and politi-
cal discourses focus on male Muslims as oppressors, the “male immigrant
threat” in the 1990s was depicted as coming from Eastern Europe. The bad
immigrant was then embodied by Eastern European men, usually portrayed
as involved in criminal activities, while women from these countries were
oten depicted as victims o a backward culture. As Helma Lutz noted, “It
is through discourses o ‘racial,’ ethnic and national otherness, rather than
through sexual diference, that the antagonism between the ‘European’ and
the ‘other’ woman is emphasized. In this binary, the European woman serves
as the standard against which to measure women from elsewhere.” The im-
age o the migrant woman from non-Western countries as passive subject o
the violent patriarchy o her culture thus has a long history; one could argue
that, in the present context, Muslim women play the role o a synecdoche for
the European stereotype o the female immigrant “portrayed as a particular
kind o deviation from ‘European’ femininity—perhaps unconsciously func-
tioning as counter-images or alter-egos o European feminine self-images.”
Keeping these historical perspectives in mind, in this intervention I aim
to extend the critique o the current instrumentalization o feminist themes
beyond the largely culturalist terms that have been prominent in recent de-
bates. In particular, I hope to open a discussion about the political-economic
dimensions o these processes, which seem to me to have been either over-
looked or insuficiently analyzed. I will, thus, focus on the various attempts to
employ “gender” in contemporary discussions o migrants’—and especially
Muslims’—integration by means o some o the conceptual tools ofered by
Karl Marx’s discussion in Capital o the “reserve army o labor” in its current
problematization.
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What is Femonationalism?
I propose to employ the concept o “femonationalism” to address the political
economy o the discursive formation that brings together the heterogeneous
anti-Islam and anti-(male) immigrant concerns o nationalist parties, some
feminists, and neoliberal governments under the idea o gender equality.
The term “femonationalism” recalls to a certain extent Jasbir K. Puar’s no-
tion o “homonationalism.” Puar uses this notion to identify the “discursive
tactic that disaggregates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual
others, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and American
nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics o patriotic inclu-
sion and by gay and queer subjects themselves.” The terrain o “collusion”
is seen in the opposition to the (Islamic) terrorist as homophobe and enemy
o American civilization.
In similar ways, femonationalism describes the attempts o European
right-wing parties, among others, to co-opt feminist ideals into anti-immi-
grant and anti-Islam campaigns. However, my use o the term femonational-
ism does not imply collusion or a conscious alliance between feminists and
nationalists, nor does it attribute national patriotic rhetorics to an indistinct
agent like Europe or European governments as a whole. On the one hand,
despite the fact that several well-known European feminist intellectuals
have spoken against Islam and called for the ban o the veil, their reasons are
entirely diferent from those that animate nationalist parties. On the other
hand, despite the rise o diferent forms o patriotism across the political
spectrum, I use the notion o “nationalism” to indicate the explicit ideolog
deployed by right-wing parties in contemporary Europe and selectively, as
well as conveniently, utilized by neoliberal governments: an ideolog com-
posed o chauvinism, the myth o a common ethnic kinship, and xenophobia.
But why is it important to provide an analysis o femonationalism at the
political-economic level? And what would it mean to trace its political-eco-
nomic contours? We can begin with the first question. Despite the fact that
several authors have identified and criticized the usage o a certain feminist
lexicon by contemporary European nationalists, I believe that most critical
attempts have paid little attention to political-economic elements. On the one
hand, several authors have provided useful descriptions and reconstructions
o the process o such an instrumentalization in ways that have had the merit
o uncovering the performative contradiction o nationalist-xenophobic par-
ties’ and governments’ legal proposals. On the other hand, other accounts
have tried to understand the current mobilization o gender as an ideologi-
cal and instrumental cover up for neo-imperialist and even fundamentalist
projects. Thus, several authors have argued that claims to liberate Muslim
women by unveiling them is a classically colonialist/missionary position.
These authors detect strong traces o neocolonialist and assimilationist
projects behind the deception o the new missionary expeditions that are
presented as philanthropic—or rather, as “philognist.” Furthermore, no-
tions such as “enlightened fundamentalism” and “secular humanism” have
suggested that the legacies o secularism and the Enlightenment “as the
foundation o Western European culture” are employed in a fundamentalist
fashion. Thus, these authors emphasize that the goal o “philognist” claims
and Western secular fundamentalism, which is not diferent in this respect
from religious fundamentalisms, is to redefine gender roles.
Nonetheless, despite the crucial importance o these analyses, I would
like to propose that we need to go further and to ask the following questions:
(a) Why is it that “gender equality,” rather than another weapon from the
Western arsenal o universal values, is so widely mobilized against Islam?
and (b) Is there something specific to women, particularly to non-Western
women, and more precisely, something specific to their political-economic
role in the current conjuncture, which could explain why they, as opposed
to non-Western men, have been targeted by femonationalist discourses?
The Gendered Side o Integration
One o the main ways in which Western “enlightened fundamentalism”
tries to impose its idea o gender equality and women’s liberation on non-
Western and Muslim migrant women is by arguing that their adoption o a
Western female lifestyle would facilitate not only their own integration into
Western society, but also the integration o the community to which they
belong. Women are in this perspective regarded as the “vectors o integra-
tion,” in a way that can oten seem close to the supposedly diferent model
o “assimilation.” It is necessary, however, to analyze the specific ways in
which calls for such an integration/assimilation are diferentially addressed
to men and women from migrant communities.
Discourses about immigrants’ integration, not only those pronounced by
nationalist-xenophobic parties, but also those o more mainstream perspec-
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tives and those difused by the mass media, function according to gender.
For these accounts, it is men, and not women, who create trouble for the
process o integration in several ways. First, men are regarded as the real
obstacle to social and cultural integration, and thus represent a cultural
threat to European society. Even when it is the veiled woman who seems
to be targeted as a cultural danger, she is depicted as i she does so not on
the basis o a personal choice—since Muslim women in these accounts are
denied agency—but because she is oppressed by men. Second, and perhaps
most importantly, men and women are perceived and depicted in diferent
and oten opposed ways at the level o economic integration. xenophobic-
nationalist slogans that call for “jobs for the nationals” (which are important
for the electoral afirmation o these parties) should be read, I suggest, as
“jobs for national men.”
A closer look at the diferences between migrant men and women, Muslim
and non-Muslim alike, in the European economic arena will enable us to
shed further light on some o the reasons for the “treacherous sympathy”
claimed by European nationalist movements for feminist demands.
The Peculiarity o Female Migrant Labor
Male migrant workers in Western economies play the role o what Marx
called a “reserve army o labor,” namely, a surplus laboring population o the
unemployed and underemployed whose existence is “a necessary product”
o capitalist accumulation and whose constant reproduction is used by em-
ployers to maintain low wages. Nowadays, particularly in Southern Europe,
migrants are frequently perceived as constituting a reserve o cheap labor
whose presence threatens national workers with job losses or a lowering o
their incomes. Yet, female migrant labor is neither presented nor perceived
in the same way. Why is this the case?
Hal o the current migrant population in the Western world is consti-
tuted by women. In Europe, for instance, the estimates reveal that women
make up slightly more than hal o the migrant stock in the twenty-seven-
member European Union. A large number o migrant women, Muslim and
non-Muslim alike, who actively participate in the Western labor market
are employed in one single branch o the economy: the care and domestic
sector. The increased participation o national women in the productive
economy ater the Second World War, the decline o the birthrate and the
mounting number o elderly people, coupled with the erosion, insuficiency,
or simply non-existence o public or afordable care services, has resulted
in the marketization o so-called reproductive labor, which is done mainly
by migrant women. The demand for labor in this sector has grown so much
over the past ten years that it is now regarded as the main reason for the
feminization o migration.
In order to understand the exception constituted by migrant women in
contemporary Europe as a migrant workforce that seems to be spared from
accusations o economic and social as well as cultural threat—in other words,
in order to decipher one o the justifications to which femonationalism ap-
peals—we therefore need to look more closely at the care and domestic sector.
The Non-Disposable Materiality
o Afective/Reproductive Labor
What distinguishes the care and domestic sector, where female migrants are
mostly employed, from other sectors that employ mostly male migrants?
First, the care and domestic sector is perhaps the most gendered labor mar-
ket insofar as constructions o femininity have been enduringly associated
with it and therefore have been constitutive elements in the formation o its
skills, working culture, and identity formation. As Lutz argues, domestic
and care work is “not just another labour market.” It is not simply work, but a
“core activity o doing gender. . . . Outsourcing household and care work to
another woman is widely accepted because it follows and perpetuates the
logic o gender display in accordance with institutionalized genderisms.”
Furthermore, afectivity is a fundamental—albeit not exclusive—component
o care and domestic or reproductive labor. The intimate nature o the con-
text in which it is performed (the household), the highly emotional character
o the tasks involved (caring for children and/or the elderly, cooking, look-
ing ater the house, i.e., the employer’s nest o intimacy par excellence) and,
therefore, the importance o trust in the work relationship, are all aspects
that make it much more dificult for employers to replace the worker once
a relation o reliance is in place. The highly afective character o care and
domestic labor is also one o the core dificulties encountered by attempts
to mechanize and automate it. As Silvia Federici argues,
Unlike commodi production, the reproduction o human beings is to a great extent
irreducible to mechanization, being the satisfaction o complex needs, in which physical
and afective elements are inextricably combined, requiring a high degree o human
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interaction and a most labor-intensive process. This is most evident in the reproduction
o children and the elderly that even in its most physical component involves provid-
ing a sense o securi, anticipating fears and desires. None o these activities is purely
“material” or “immaterial,” nor can they be broken down in ways making it possible
for them to be mechanized or replaced by the virtual world o online communication.
One o the consequences o this resistance to mechanization is not only
that domestic and care work has been mostly redistributed onto the shoul-
ders o migrant women or partly commercialized, but also that it is one o
those sectors where Marx’s analysis o the reserve army o labor cannot be
easily applied. The discussion o the creation o a surplus-laboring popu-
lation, or reserve army, is strictly related to Marx’s analysis o the organic
composition o capital and the tendency o capitalist accumulation to en-
courage the increase “o its constant, at the expense o its variable constitu-
ent,” namely, the increase o the mass and value o the means o production
at the cost o the mass and value o living labor employed in the production
process. A crucial element for the reduction o variable capital is indeed
technical development and automation, which, alongside other factors, leads
to the expulsion o a number o workers from the productive process and
therefore to the creation o the reserve army. However, the resistance o care
and domestic labor to mechanization means that only a small amount o
labor can be replaced by the technical development o the means o produc-
tion. It mostly has to be performed by living labor, whether commodified
through the recruitment o care and domestic workers in private households
or through the growth o commercial services (fast food, laundry and so
forth), or performed for free by members o the family-household.
As a consequence, the demand for care and domestic work in private
households, particularly in a situation in which reproductive tasks are in-
creasingly outsourced and commodified, is destined to grow dramatically
in the future. It is thus not by chance that a recent International Labour
Organization report on the impact o the global economic crisis on migrant
workers shows that the sectors where migrant women are more concentrated
“have not been afected by the crisis”; indeed these sectors have “even ex-
panded in its context. This is the case o sectors such as health and social
work, the highest employer o women migrant workers, social and personal
services, and education.” As the report further explains, women’s labor
migration may have been less afected than men’s.
Providers o Jobs and Welfare
As I have previously noted, the increasing participation o women in the
labor market in the last twenty years, which was followed neither by a growth
o public care services nor by changes in the sexual division o labor within
the household, has certainly been one o the reasons for the growing demand
for private care workers and domestic workers, and a powerful impetus for
the feminization o contemporary migration flows. Yet, as Fiona Williams
and Anna Gavanas clearly note, “it is not simply the lack o public provision
that shapes the demand for childcare [and elderly care], but the very nature
o state support that is available.” In countries such as Britain, Spain, Finland,
and France, forms o cash provision or tax credit have been introduced in
order to assist in buying help for childcare on the market. Furthermore, in
Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and, Austria, for example, forms o direct
payment have been made available which allow older or disabled people to
buy support and assistance. Both cash provisions and direct payment have
encouraged the development o the commodification o care or domestic
services, which are generally sought privately on the market, where migrant
women provide the lion’s share o supply.
The growing demand for care and domestic workers in Europe, which is
due both to the generalized privatization o care services, thus prompting
families to look for this solution on the market, and to the higher rates o
national women’s participation in the labor market, which oten involves
them being obliged to find gender-acceptable replacements for themselves
in the household, are very important factors that explain why female migrant
labor does not receive the same treatment as its male counterpart. Evidence
for this can be found in the diferent ways in which current campaigns and
policies against illegal migration afect men and women. The Italian and
German cases in this respect are particularly emblematic because they show
how diferent policy cultures and migration histories present similar ap-
proaches towards irregular immigration when care and domestic services are
at stake. In 2009, the Italian government granted an amnesty only for illegal
migrants working as caregivers (badanti) and domestic workers, who are
mostly women, since that was considered the only sector where the demand
for labor could not meet the national supply. In Germany, on the other hand,
Lutz and Palenga-Möellenbeck describe the state’s attitude towards illegal
migrant care workers in terms o “semi-compliance.” For instance, Eastern
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Europeans (who constitute the majority among care and domestic workers
in Germany) “have residency but no working rights, so that the violation o
rights is restricted to labor law and not to residency.” As they put it, “the
German government seems to appreciate this by a de facto relatively liberal
intervention policy.” The paramount example is the behavior o the German
state in 2004, when it introduced a taskforce for dealing with undocumented
migrant work. Oficers prosecuted illegal employment in workplaces in the
public sphere, but not in private households. The problems faced by families
within the household in the management o child and elderly care encoun-
tered the “understanding” o state functionaries who, as a result, did “not
perceive the employment o undocumented care workers as ‘punishable.’”
Rather than job stealers, cultural clashers, and welfare provision para-
sites, migrant women are the maids who help to maintain the well-being
o European families and individuals. They are the providers o jobs and
welfare: they are those who, by helping European women to undo gender by
substituting for them in the household, allow those national women to be-
come laborers in the productive labor market. Furthermore, migrant women
contribute to the education o children and to the survival and emotional life
o the elderly, thus providing the welfare goods from whose provision states
increasingly retreat.
The Regular Army o Labor Called Migrant Women
The female migrant workforce thus seems to amount not to a reserve army,
constantly threatened with unemployment and deportation and used in
order to maintain wage discipline, but to a regular army o extremely cheap
labor. This idea in a certain sense seems to run counter to the so-called
“domestic labor debate” initiated by feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In that debate, the concept o the reserve army o labor was used in order
to account for the structural income biases and precarious working and
contractual conditions o women who were then entering the labor market
as wageworkers in increasing numbers. As Floya Anthias noted, it had
become “an almost unproblematic reference to depict women as an RAL
[reserve army o labor],” particularly in Marxist-feminist discussions.
The opposition between these two approaches, however, is more apparent
than real because the unit o analysis to which the two concepts are applied—
reserve and regular army—are rather diferent. While feminists debating the
concept o the reserve army in the 1970s and 1980s were referring to women
as extra-domestic wage laborers, I propose to employ the notion o regular
army to describe what happens to migrant women engaged in commodified
reproductive labor. The change o focus enables us to see that not only is
the economic sector internally diferentiated, but also that the women to
whom the two concepts refer do not belong to the same homogenous uni-
versal called womanhood. Rather, they inhabit diverse worlds o experience
strongly marked by class, and particularly racial, diferences.
Insofar as the women who are employed in the care and domestic sec-
tor are migrants mainly coming from the Global South and former state-
socialist countries, the most appropriate term for understanding their
working conditions is neither the indeterminate abstraction o wage labor
in general nor o women’s work in particular, but rather, the determinate
abstraction o migrant labor. Migrant labor in contemporary European and
Western societies is configured in specific forms: it is “labor on the move,”
as a result o the uneven development brought about by what David Harvey
calls “accumulation by dispossession,” and it is “disposable labor,” with a
distinctive economic as well as political status. Moreover, in the world o
migrant workers, migrant women’s labor seems to obey its own rules. On the
one hand, it follows the rules o gender and the “sexual contract” within the
household, which establishes that women are still in charge o reproduction
and care. Further, it follows the rules o the “racial contract,” according to
which ethnic minorities and people o color perform the least desirable and
valued tasks in a society. Migrant women are currently a regular army o
reproductive labor, that is, the labor at the foundation o any collectivity.
Reproductive labor is that “species o activity that includes everything we do
to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as
possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment.”
Conclusion
The useful role that female migrant labor plays in the contemporary re-
structuring o welfare regimes and the feminization o key sectors o the
service economy accounts in a significant way for a certain indulgence by
neoliberal governments and for the deceptive compassion o nationalist
parties towards migrant women (and not migrant men). We could further
note that besides being extremely useful reproductive workers, female mi-
grants are also reproductive bodies, whose birth rate is more than double
that o national women. Despite attempts in the last few years by several
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EU countries, to establish “the demographic advantage o a certain nation-
ality,” as Judith Butler put it, calls for assimilation addressed to migrant
women—Muslim and non-Muslim alike—identify a specific role for them
within contemporary European societies, insofar as they are regarded as
prolific bodies o future generations and as mothers who play a crucial role
in the process o transmission o societal values. As a useful replacement
in the reproductive sector for national women, but also as potential wives o
European men, migrant women become the target o a deceivingly benevo-
lent campaign in which they are needed as workers, tolerated as migrants,
and encouraged as women to conform to Western values.
Two further elements should be considered in these concluding remarks,
albeit briefly. The critique o femonationalism must attend to women’s spe-
cific placement within the circuit o the market economy, not only in terms
o the role o women as producers and reproducers, but also when we con-
sider them as consumers and even as commodities. As Hester Eisenstein
argues, “i the goal o globalization is to create investment and marketing
opportunities, and therefore acceptance o Western products along with
Western norms, then in this context an image o a liberated Western woman
becomes part o the sale. . . . Feminism, defined as women’s liberation from
patriarchal constraints, is made the equivalent o participating in the market
as a liberated individual.” Continuous capitalist expansion in the Global
South as well as the full incorporation o all individuals into its logic in the
richer North involves an extension and re-articulation o the ideolog that
C. B. Macpherson famously called “possessive individualism.” As possessive
individuals, migrants integrated into Western societies—particularly female
migrants—should conceive o their freedom in terms o their independence
from communitarian boundaries and their capacity for endless consumption.
Migrant women, however, are also commodities, as the way in which they
are expected to behave in accordance with the values o Western emancipated
women reminds us. Here, by considering contemporary femonationalism as
an ideological construction that needs to be understood also on the basis o
the commodification o non-European women as such, I am arguing that we
need to pursue the line o reasoning proposed by Alain Badiou a few years ago.
Ater the law against the hijab in public schools was approved in France—a
law that has come to epitomize the entire debate about the equation between
Islam and women’s oppression—the French philosopher defined it as a “pure
capitalist law.” For femininity to operate according to its function under capi-
talism, the female body has to be exposed in order to circulate “according to
the market paradigm.” The Muslim girl therefore has to show “what she’s
got to sell.” In other words, she needs to accept and endorse actively her com-
modification. The emphasis on the unveiling o Muslim women in Europe
therefore combines both the Western male’s enduring dream o uncovering
the woman o the enemy, or o the colonized, and the demand to end the
incongruence o hidden female bodies as exceptions to the general law ac-
cording to which they should circulate like “sound currency.”
We can thus argue that the rise o femonationalism needs to be understood
as symptomatic o the distinctive position o Western and non-Western
women in the economic, political, and lato s ensu in the material chain o
production and reproduction. The possibility that nationalist-xenophobic
discourses could appropriate the central feminist ideals o equality and free-
dom emerges from the very specific reconfiguration o the labor markets,
and migration, produced by neoliberal globalization in the last thirty years.
Confronting femonationalism thus requires not only ideological refutation
but also a concrete analysis o its political-economic foundations.
Sara R. Farris lectures at King’s College London and is Marie Curie Fellow in the De-
partment o Sociolog, at the University o Cambridge. Her main areas o research are
international migration, particularly female migration, classical and contemporary
social and political theory, gender studies and intersectionality. She has published
on Max Weber, orientalism and Edward Said, international female migration and
second-generation migrant women in Europe.
Notes
1. Andrew R. Morrison, Maurice Schif, and Mirja Sjöblom, The International Migra-
tion o Women (2007).
2. See for example, Hester Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced: How Global Elites Use Wom-
en’s Labor and Ideas to Exploit the World (2009); Liz Fekete, “Enlightened Fundamental-
ism? Immigration, Feminism and the Right,” Race and Class 48 (2006): 1–22; Sherene
H. Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction o Muslims from Western Law and Politics (2008);
Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics o the Veil (2007); Anna C. Korteweg, “The Murder o
Theo van Gogh: Gender, Religion, and the Struggle over Immigrant Integration in
the Netherlands,” in Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos, ed. Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe
Yurdakul (2006), 147–166.
3. Leila Ahmed, “Feminism, Colonialism, and Islamophobia: Treacherous Sym-
pathy with Muslim Women,” Qantara.de, August 18, 2011, accessed August 24, 2011,
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can The Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpreta-
tion o Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (1988), 271–313.
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4. For an overview o these debates see Eleonore Kofman et al., eds., Gender and
International Migration in Europe: Employment, Welfare and Politics (2000).
5. Helma Lutz, “The Limits o European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress
Europe,” Feminist Review no. 57, Autumn (1997): 96.
6. Ibid.
7. Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), 39.
8. Sherene H. Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction o Muslims from Western Law and Poli-
tics (2008); Birgit Sauer, “Headscar Regimes in Europe: Diversity Policies at the
Intersection o Gender, Culture and Religion,” Comparative European Politics 7 (2009):
75–94.
9. Quoted, respectively, from Fekete, “Enlightened Fundamentalism?,” 8; Saba
Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections
on the Egptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology 16 (2001): 202–236 and Fekete,
“Enlightened Fundamentalism?” 8.
10. For an account o the “intolerant” features o secularism and its relations to
women’s rights, see particularly Scott, Politics o the Veil and Joan Wallach Scott, “Sexu-
larism,” Ursula Hirschmann Annual Lecture on Gender and Europe, presented at the
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San
Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, 2009.
11. Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Europe; Sara R. Farris et al.,
eds., La straniera: Informazioni, sito-bibliografie e ragionamenti su razzismo e sessismo (2009).
12. This diferential treatment o male and female migrants in the European media
has been highlighted in several studies. For instance, for Germany and France see
respectively Paul Scheibelhofer, “Die Lokalisierung des Globalen Patriarchen: Zur
diskursiven Produktion des ‘türkisch-muslimischen Mannes’ in Deutschland,” in
Mann wird man: Geschlechtliche Identitäten im Spannungsfeld von Migration und Islam, ed.
Lydia Potts and Jan Kühnemund (2008), 39–52; Thomas Deltombe and Mathieu
Rigouste, “L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’’Arabe,’”
in La fracture coloniale: La société francaise au prisme de l’héritage coloniale, ed. Pascal
Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire (2005), 191–198.
13. Ahmed, “Feminism, Colonialism, and Islamophobia.”
14. See for example, Jorgen Carling, “Gender Dimension o International Mi-
gration,” Global Migration Perspectives 35 (2005): 1–26; Sara R. Farris, “Interregional
Migration: The Challenge for Gender and Development,” Development 53 (2010):
98–104.
15. Ronald Ayres and Tamsin Barbe, “Statistical Analysis o Female Migration
and Labor Market Integration in the EU,” (working paper, Integration o Female
Immigrants in Labor Market and Society, Policy Assessments and Policy Recom-
mendations, Sixth Framework Program o the European Commission, Oxford Brooks
University, 2006).
16. Helma Lutz, ed., Migration and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global
Theme (2008); Saskia Sassen, “Globalization or Denationalization?,” Review o International
Political Economy 10 (2003): 1–22.
17. See Veronica Beechey, “Rethinking the Definition o Work,” in Feminization o
the Labor Force: Paradoxes and Promises, ed. Jane Jenson, Elizabeth Hagan, and Ceallaigh
Reddy (1988), 45–62.
18. Lutz, Migration and Domestic Work, 1.
19. Ibid., 48.
20. For a discussion on afective labor see in particular, Michael Hardt, “Afective
Labor,” Boundary 2 no. 26 (1999): 89–100; Ariel M. Ducey, Heather Gautney, and
Dominic Wetzel, “Regulating Afective Labor Communication Skills Training in the
Health Care Industry,” in The Sociology o Job Training, ed. David B. Bills (2003), 49–72.
21. Silvia Federici, “ The Reproduction o Labor-Power in the Global Economy,
Marxist Theory and the Unfinished Feminist Revolution,” Globalizations 3 (2006): 13.
22. Karl Marx, Capital, in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works (1996), 35:623.
23. Emanuele Pavolini and Costanzo Ranci, “Restructuring the Welfare State:
Reforms in Long-Term Care in Western European Countries,” Journal o European
Social Policy 18 (2008): 246–259.
24. Ibrahim Awad, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers: Impact and Response
(2009), 43.
25. Fiona Williams and Anna Gavanas, “The Intersection o Child Care Regimes
and Migration Regimes: A Three–Country Study,” in Migration and Domestic Work: A
European Perspective on a Global Theme, ed. Helma Lutz (2008), 14.
26. See for example, Clare Ungerson, “Commodified Care Work in European Labor
Markets,” European Societies 5 (2003): 377–396; Pavolini and Ranci, “Restructuring
the Welfare State.”
27. Sabrina Marchetti, “Che senso ha parlare di badanti?,” Zeroviolenzadonne.it, ac-
cessed June 10, 2011, http://www.zeroviolenzadonne.it/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=12069:che-senso-ha-parlare-di-badanti&catid=34&Itemid=54.
28. Helma Lutz and Ewa Palenga-Möellenbeck, “Care Work Migration in Ger-
many: Semi-Compliance and Complicity,” Social Policy & Socie 9 (2010): 419–430.
29. Ibid., 426.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. For an overview o this debate, see Lise Vogel, “Domestic Labour Debate,”
Historical Materialism 16 (2008): 237–243.
33. Veronica Beechey, “Some Notes on Female Wage Labour,” Capital and Class 3
(1977): 45–66; Floya Anthias, “Women and the Reserve Army o Labour: A Critique
o Veronica Beechey,” Capital and Class 1 (1980): 50–63.
34. Anthias, “Women and the Reserve Army,” 50.
35. For instance see Sandro Mezzadra’s thesis on the “autonomy o migrations,”
Sandro Mezzadra, “Capitalisme, migration et luttes Sociales: Notes préliminaires
pour une théorie de l’autonomie des migrations,” Multitudes 19 (2004): 17–30. For the
concept o “accumulation by dispossession,” see David Harvey, The New Imperialism
(2003).
• Farris
o the
36. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988).
37. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (2007).
38. Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic o Care (1993), 103.
39. Charles Westo and Thomas Frejka, “Religiousness and Fertility among Eu-
ropean Muslims,” Population and Development Review 33 (2007): 785–809.
40. Judith Butler “Feminism Should not Resign in the Face o such Instrumental-
ization,” Iablis, 2006, last accessed June 23, 2012, http://www.iablis.de/iablis_t/2006/
butler06.html.
41. Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced, 195.
42. Alain Badiou, “Derrière la Loi foulardière, la peur,” Le Monde, February 24, 2004;
English translation available at: http://zinelibrary.info/files/badiou-hijab-imposed.
pdf.
43. Franz Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled,” in The New Let Reader, ed. Carl Oglesby (1969),
167.
