Debating Belarus: An Economy in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

A U.S.-based geographer and Belarusian political scientist assess the current economic crisis in Belarus. Although the country's financial situation is serious in the short term, they argue that analysis of basic social and economic indicators provides some evidence of underlying strength and stability, recently bolstered by a number of trade agreements concluded with Russia in late 2011. The authors argue that the most natural and meaningful basis for ascertaining the health of the country's economy is to compare it with those of its two Slavic neighbors, Russia and Ukraine. That comparison reveals that although Belarus ranks lower on most indices of economic reform, it has outperformed them during the post-Soviet period in several important categories (GDP growth, income equality, agricultural productivity, expenditures on education and health care, life expectancy, and per capita agricultural output) and occupied an intermediate position (below Russia but above Ukraine) in others (e.g., GDP per capita, wages and pensions, and labor productivity). The paper's final section discusses the nature of the relationship between Belarus and Russia (dependence vs. complementarity) and that between the Lukashenka regime and the Belarusian people.

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Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2011, 52, No. 6, pp. 750–779. http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.6.750
Copyright © 2011 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.
Debating Belarus: An Economy in Comparative
Perspective
Grigory Ioffe and Viachaslau Yarashevich1
Abstract: A U.S.-based geographer and Belarusian political scientist assess the current
economiccrisis inBelarus.Although thecountry’snancialsituationisseriousintheshort
term, they argue that analysis of basic social and economic indicators provides some evidence
of underlying strength and stability, recently bolstered by a number of trade agreements con-
cluded with Russia in late 2011. The authors argue that the most natural and meaningful basis
for ascertaining the health of the country’s economy is to compare it with those of its two
Slavic neighbors, Russia and Ukraine. That comparison reveals that although Belarus ranks
lower on most indices of economic reform, it has outperformed them during the post-Soviet
period in several important categories (GDP growth, income equality, agricultural productiv-
ity, expenditures on education and health care, life expectancy, and per capita agricultural
output) and occupied an intermediate position (below Russia but above Ukraine) in others
(e.g.,GDPpercapita,wagesandpensions,andlaborproductivity).Thepaper’snalsection
discusses the nature of the relationship between Belarus and Russia (dependence vs. com-
plementarity) and that between the Lukashenka regime and the Belarusian people. Journal
of Economic Literature,ClassicationNumbers: E600,G010, H500,P200, P300.5 gures,
8 tables, 101 references. Key words: Belarus, Lukashenka, ruble devaluation, IMF, Russia,
energy imports, well-being, food security, privatization, subsidies, income distribution, educa-
tion, health care.
INTRODUCTION
During the course of the past 15 years, Belarus has earned the distinction of being the
world’s leader in the sheer number of dire predictions about its imminent economic col-
lapse. And yet since 1996, the country has demonstrated steady, impressive and, in the words
of a 2005 World Bank report, “broad-based” economic growth (Ioffe, 2011b). The many
doomsayers, however, may now seem vindicated as Belarus’s current economic predicament
can hardly be trivialized, irrespective of one’s political leanings. In May 2011, the country’s
national bank devalued the Belarusian ruble by 56 percent, with one U.S. dollar exchanging
for 3155 rubles on May 23 and 4930 rubles on May 24 (Belarus Just, 2011). The broadly
denedreasonfortheruble’sdevaluationatsuchhighscalehasbeenthenationaltreasury’s
inability to sustain future outlays, most of which in an open economy exporting 60 percent
ofitsGDP, rely on stable inowofhardcurrency.One suchoutlaycomprisedwagesand
salaries paid by state-run companies. In 2005 and again 2010, the IMF criticized Belarusian
authorities for boosting wages to unsustainable levels (Mezhdunarodny, 2005; IMF Criticizes,
1Professor, Department of Geospatial Science, Radford University, Radford, VA 24142 (gioffe@radford.edu) and
Associate Professor, School of International Relations, Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus (Yarashevich_v@
mail.ru), respectively.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 751
2010).2 In January–February 2011, the wage component of Belarus’s GDP amounted to 51.4
percent, or 11.9 percent above the share of the previous year.3 Not only wages but also the
overall level of social spending has arguably been beyond Belarus’s means. For example, the
IMF suggested in its March 2011 report that “the scale of the government housing program
needs to be brought down to a sustainable level” (IMF Country Report, 2011a). The IMF team
also noted that “Belarus spends about 14 percent of GDP in publicly provided subsidies.”4
Ontopofunsustainablewagesandsocialspending,thereweretwosetsofcircumstances
whoseconuenceprecipitatedthecountry’scurrenteconomiccrisis.Therst(longer-term)
was the substantial price hike on Russian oil and gas. From 2006 to 2011, the overall cost of
both for Belarus increased 4.5 times, which aggravated the country’s negative international
trade balance. A particularly painful change occurred in 2009 when Russia re-imposed an
export tariff on oil exported to Belarus. From 2005 to 2010, the excess of imports over exports
hadgrownfrom $729 million to $9600 million despite signicant expansion of Belarus’s
exports(Osnovnyye,2011).Arguably,thisimbalancehasbeenthelargestsinglereasonfor
Belarus’s ongoing crisis.
The second set of circumstances involved a pre-announced quadrupling (in February
2011) of Belarus’s import tariff on used cars, intended to become effective on July 1,
2011 (Tamozhennaya, 2011; Mozheyko and Yerokhina, 2011)—an increase resulting from
Belarus’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan which prompted the
hike in order to match Russia’s; in essence the measure aimed to protect Russia’s car industry
from foreign competition. Anticipating losses, thousands of Belarusian shuttle traders rushed
to Germany to buy more than 250,000 mostly used cars from February to May 2011, or more
than the total of 175,000 they purchased during the entire year of 2010. By some accounts,
the total spent on used foreign cars from late February to July 1, 2011, was close to $3 billion
(Lukashenko, 2011a).
As money needed for such purchases came from the currency exchange outlets of
Belarusian banks, the latter soon reported a shortage of hard currency. In late March 2011,
hard currency altogether disappeared from the country’s exchange outlets,5 whereupon the
end of unobstructed access to hard currency provoked a consumer panic,6 with Belarusians
promptly stocking up on such necessities as sugar, salt, and vinegar. In June and July 2011,
grocery stores in Minsk and other places in Belarus still looked well supplied, but prices
2Incidentally, in both cases the criticisms were issued on the eve of presidential elections (and called pre-election
giveaways).
3The analyst reporting that outlay opined that no economy could withstand such a level of “social generosity.”
For comparison, the wage component in early 2011 was 39.5 percent in Russia, 37.5 percent in Norway, and 30.9
percent in Italy (Nikolyuk, 2011).
4The report went on to note that “Subsidies take the form of direct transfers to households (for families with chil-
dren, special groups, and for scholarships) or indirect transfers, where the cost of certain goods and services is main-
tainedatadesiredlowlevelusing budgetresources.Examplesofthelatterinclude subsidizedutilitiesandpublic
transportation, subsidized loans for housing purchases and construction, reduced VAT on food, and tax exemptions
onutilitiesandhousingconstruction.Indirectsubsidiesincludealsosupportgrantedtospeciceconomicsectors,in
particular construction and agriculture. Belarus provides a higher level of subsidies compared to peers (Russia, CIS,
andEastCentralEurope)”(ibid.).
5From late March until September 2011, only individuals proving a need to go abroad for study, medical treat-
ment, or burial of family members were allowed to purchase hard currency at four banking institutions.
6In an interview by Grigory Ioffe on July 26, 2011, then–acting chairman of the Belarus National Bank Yuriy
AlymovstatedthattheMarch2011publication(inRussianandEnglish)bytheIMFoftheaddendatoitsreporton
Belarus (despite the BNB request to cancel that publication) also contributed to panic because the published material
revealedthatBNB’shardcurrencyreserveshaddeclinedto$3.4billionata timewhenthecurrentaccountdecit
amounted to $8 billion (Dudko, 2011).

752 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
were growing rapidly.7FromJanuarytoJuly2011,Belarusregisteredahigherlevelofina-
tion (41 percent) than any other CIS country (S Nachala, 2011), so that by the end of 2011
inationmaylikelyrisetoabout100percent.Theensuingmeatshortagesingrocerystores
acrossBelaruswererstreportedinlateAugust2011,andblamedonRussianshoppingtours
(Pravitel’stvo, 2011). Indeed, after the devaluation of the Belarusian ruble, the attractiveness
of the country’s retail outlets to customers from nearby Russian provinces (e.g., Smolensk)
increased dramatically.
In sum, the situation looks quite bleak, as Belarus is in need of substantial funds to be
borrowedforimprovingitscurrentaccountdecitandmaintainingthenewexchangerateof
the Belarusian ruble.8Onepossiblesource ofliquidityto temporarilypatchthehole inthe
current account could be another loan from the IMF (in addition to the ones received in 2009
and2010),forwhichBelarusappliedonMay31,2011.However,onSeptember12,2011,the
IMFannounceditsdecisiontotheeffectthat“nancialsupportfromtheFundwouldrequire
strong and demonstrated commitments by the authorities” (IMF Country Report, 2011b). In
other words, current commitments have not been deemed adequate, although the IMF kept the
dooropenbydispatchinganewmissiontoMinsk(October5–17,2011)toreviewthecoun-
try’sscalandmonetary affairs(IMFSays, 2011).The IMF’sresponse appearstosuggest
that it may have caved in to political pressure9—a possibility not lost on Belarus’s President
Lukashenka, who accused the institution sworn to political impartiality of setting political
preconditions (Lukashenko, 2011b).
Anotherpossibleinowof readily available cash maycomefromsellingsomemajor
state-owned enterprises to foreign corporate groups. Russian oligarchs seem poised to buy
any of them without much hesitation, but Belarus is enticing other potential buyers, if only
to boost competition and consequently also the selling prices. From May to September 2011,
the media have reported many “nal” deals, with most only found misleading soon after
publication.10 Rather clearly, such deals involving the possible sale of the “family silver” as
well as Russian and/or IMF loans, would only constitute temporary solutions, for in order
tomakeends meetinthelong runBelaruswouldneed tosignicantlyexpandits exports,
cut numerous subsidies, and unleash local entrepreneurial initiative.11 Belarus made some
progress by easing registration of new businesses, but this apparently has not as yet paid off,
7For example, one of the authors saw retail prices for lean uncooked ham grow from 50,000 to 82,000 rubles per
kilo from late June to late July 2011. At the same time, since price hikes in Belarusian rubles have not been nearly
assignicant astheruble’sdevaluation, foodandrestaurants actuallyhave becomemoreaffordabletoall witha
steadyinowofhard currency (actually largely tomembersofthe Belarusian opposition who enjoy substantial
Western aid). For example, in July 2011 one could buy a three-course chicken dinner at a Minsk cafeteria for a price
equivalent of $3.20.
8Already in late August, a dollar was bought for as much as 9,000 rubles on the black market, almost 4000 rubles
abovetheofcialrateof5,037rubles. Inmid-September,theBelarusianNational Bankeventuallyallowedafree
oatoftheruble,whichfellto8,600rublestothedollar,butthenregainedsomeground:OnOctober31,2011,$1
was worth 8,450 rubles (Kurs dollara, 2011).
9OnAugust1,2011,sixU.S.Senators(Cardin,Durbin,Kirk,Lieberman,McCain,andShaheen)sentaletterto
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner urging him not to support the possible IMF loan to Belarus (http://docs
.rferl.org/ en-US/2011/08/03/b776d644-95e0-498e-a41e-685c3794e6d4.pdf).
10Forexample,Belaruskali(amajor potashfactorycontrollingabout13percentoftheworldmarket)wasrst
reportedtobeboughtbySuleimanKerimov(aRussianoligarch).Thenajointofferwaspublicized,involvinga$2
billion collateralized loan by Russia’s Sberbank and Deutsche Bank based on 35 percent of Belaruskali’s assets,
whereupontheofferwasrepudiatedbyBelaruskali’sCEO.Subsequentlynewscameofanoffertoobtain25percent
of Belaruskali by the government of India, and eventually a $1 billion non-collateralized loan by Russia’s Sberbank
was proclaimed a “done deal” by Belarus’s Deputy Prime Minister, Sergey Rumas (Sberbank Rossii, 2011).
11UntilrecentlysuchinitiativesweremostlyconnedtobuyingconsumergoodsatwholesalemarketsinRussia,
Poland, and Turkey for resale in Belarus.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 753
although in May and July 2011 the country did register a positive balance of its international
trade(EksportPereprygnul,2011).
ButevendespitethefairlyseriousnatureofBelarus’seconomicpredicament,itisdifcult
to shrug off the impression that the amount of hard currency borrowing required by Belarus to
normalizeitsnancialdysfunctionisdwarfedbythefundschanneledbytheEuropeanUnion
and IMF to salvage Greece, whose population is roughly similar in size as that of Belarus;
whereas Greece is to receive $110 billion in aid, the amount required for Belarus is from
$3 billion to $6 billion, according to the recent assessment by Moody’s (Karney, 2011).12 It
is of note that Belarus has been commended by the World Bank and IMF for its “satisfac-
tory degree of transparency in formulation and implementation of its monetary policy” (IMF
Country Report, 2006) and for the “complete and comprehensive set of information” made
availableby thecountry’spublic nancesystem(WorldBank,2009).Severalotherfactors
alsoleadustobelievethatBelarus’seconomicdifculties,nomatterhowseriousatthistime,
may be overcome due to Russia’s decision to: (a) scrap export tariffs for oil sold to Belarus
(December 2010); (b) more recently (November 25, 2011), reduce natural gas prices sched-
uled to be sold to Belarus in 2012;13 (c) purchase the remaining 50 percent of the shares of
Beltransgaz (a Belarusian transit pipeline system, half of which had been owned by Gazprom
since 2007) for $2.5 billion;14 and (d) issue a $1 billion loan from Sberbank to Belaruskali.
Moreover, the still untapped potential of privatization, as well as one of the reliable estimates
that Belarus’s exporters have about $5 billion on their foreign accounts (Prezident, 2011),
appear to bode well for a favorable outcome.15
We can also visualize that even some elements of Belarus’s economic development model
(so much at odds with the neoliberal paradigm promoted for all post-communist countries)
may be salvaged as well.16Inthemidstoftheongoingnancialdistress,salariesofpublicsec-
tor employees (teachers, medical professionals, and government employees) were raised 55.1
percenttocompensatethemforthe50percentinationrecordedfromJanuary1toSeptember
1, 2011 (Denezhnyye dokhody, 2011).17
Regardless of the survival prospects for the above-mentioned economic model, it is
instructive to review here the distinctive features of Belarus’s pre-crisis economic develop-
ment.Toaccomplish thisobjective,wewilluseacomparativeperspective,settingBelarus
against Russia and Ukraine, the two countries (unlike Belarus) which the U.S. Commerce
Department has long conferred the status of market economies.
12Belarus and Greece have in common the unsustainable social burden carried by both state budgets. Greece’s
burden, however, is much heavier, and such ingredients of the Greek crisis as massive tax evasion (Surowiecki, 2011)
do not seem to apply to Belarus,
13The commitment is to lower the 2011 level of $280 per thousand cubic meters to $165, amounting to a savings
of $3.0 billion annually (Klaskovsky, 2011).
14OnGazprom’sefforts to gain control ofthemainnaturalgas pipelines through the transit states (Ukraine,
Belarus,andMoldova),seeEricson(2009,p.51).
15EvenbeforereceivingsubstantialnancialconcessionsfromRussia(infactmoresignicantthanmostobserv-
ers expected), knowledgeable observers such as Daniel Krutzinna (a German investment banker stationed in Minsk)
reportedataOctober26,2011briengattheCarnegieCenterforInternationalPeaceinWashington,D.C.thatMinsk
had already achieved macroeconomic stabilization (Twenty Years, 2011).
16Foranexaminationoftheroleplayedby theneoliberalparadigmintheglobalnancialcrisis inCentraland
EasternEuropeandtheformerUSSR,seeSmithandSwain(2010).TheusualassumptionthattheBelarusianmodel
can only be sustained by continuing discounts on Russian hydrocarbons will be discussed in the last section of this
paper.
17Also, college students in Minsk will now be able to take advantage of public transportation free of charge
(Besplatnyy Proyezd, 2011).

754 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
To us, the most obvious reason to compare Belarus with these two countries is that
Belarusians themselves most frequently compare developments at home with those in Russia
andUkraine.AccordingtoaSeptember2009nationalsurveybytheIISEPS(anopposition-
mindedpollingrm)80percentofBelarusiansdonotevenconsiderRussiatobeaforeign
country (Klaskovskiy, 2010). And our own observations indicate that Belarusians view Ukraine
similarly. Yet from 2001 to 2011, the number of Belarusians willing to pursue the creation of
a union state with Russia declined from 80 percent to 40 percent (Kosarev, 2011). It therefore
appears that Belarusians view their own country as a better place to live. Indeed, in 2008, the
number of Belarusians who said life in Belarus is better than in Russia exceeded the number
ofthosewiththe oppositeopinionbyafactorofve(Ioffe,2008,p.114).Theimportance
of these data is underscored by the fact that as a matter of principle Belarusians may not be
averse to exchanging state sovereignty for a better life (e.g., see Silitski, 2010). We consider
this a unique vulnerability of Belarusians as a community, much underestimated by Western
analysts, who view Belarus’s dependency on Russia in purely economic and political terms.
Needlesstosay,consideringnumerousfamilyconnectionsamongthecitizensofallthreeEast
Slavic countries, and above all, the spread, if not dominance, of the Russian language in those
countries,18 Belarusians are better informed about developments in Russia and Ukraine than
anywhere else. Much of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were part of the same polity (the Soviet
UnionandtheRussianEmpire)formorethan200years.AsVictorMartinovich,anopposi-
tion-mindedjournalist,mentionedinaRadioLibertytalkshow,Russia,Belarus,andUkraine
aretheonlycountriesofEuropeinwhichmostpeopledidnotconsiderthecommunistperiod
in their history to be a result of foreign domination (Drakakhrust, 2011).
Last but not least, at the end of the Soviet Union’s life span, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine
had the highest per capita GDP levels of any of the USSR’s non-Baltic republics. Belarus,
which historically lagged behind both Russia and Ukraine in terms of industrialization, expe-
rienced a surge during the last three decades of the Soviet Union’s existence (Ioffe, 2004).
Roughly a dozen super-large industrial enterprises and scores of their technological subsid-
iaries, established in Belarus during the 1970s and 1980s, were entirely dependent on Russia
forrawmaterialsand/orsemi-nished products.All werecommissionedto meetall-Union
(notBelarusian)demand,andtoexporttoEurope.Considerablelevelingoflivingstandards
withintheSovietUnionoccurredasaresult ofnancialtransfersfromthedonorrepublics
(particularly Russia).19 It appears that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine had similar starting condi-
tions on the eve of systemic transformations in their economies.
In what follows in this paper, we provide comparisons of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine
across privatization strategies and such indicators as reform rankings, GDP growth, wages
and pensions, income distribution, labor productivity, social spending and health, composite
indices of well-being, and agricultural productivity. A concluding section offers an unortho-
dox interpretation of this comparison.
THREE EAST SLAVIC STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Reforms in all three states were initiated in a political setting heavily inuenced by
thecommunistpast.BorisYel’tsin,therst president oftheRussianFederation,hadbeen
18EspeciallyamongurbanpopulationseverywhereexceptwesternmostUkraine.
19For example, if Russia’s per capita GDP level in 1990 is set at 100, the corresponding index for Belarus would be
97 and for Ukraine 79 (Medvedev, 2005). By contrast, the corresponding index for Turkmenistan was 46, Uzbekistan
38,andTajikistan31.Theidenticalcalculation forpersonalconsumptionyieldsthefollowingresults: Belarus93,
Ukraine86,Turkmenistan59,Uzbekistan54,andTajikistan49(ibid.).

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 755
the former Communist Party chief of Moscow and a Politburo member. Similarly, Leonid
Kravchuk had been a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Politburo in which he was
responsible for ideology. And while in Belarus the presidency did not appear as an institution
until 1994, the true boss of the country, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, had been deputy
Prime Minister of Soviet Belarus and its Central Planning Commission’s chief; and Stanislav
Shushkevich, Speaker of Belarus’s parliament from 1991 to 1994, had been vice president of
the Belarusian State University and a party member.20
While in Russia and Ukraine former communists quickly transformed themselves into
champions of unfettered capitalism, in Belarus the story was different. From the break-up of
the Soviet Union until 1994, the country was run in Soviet fashion, with most economic and
social institutions intact. In 1994, the post of president was introduced in Belarus, and the
incumbent Prime Minister Kebich lost elections to Alexander Lukashenka. Unlike Yel’tsin
and Kravchuk, Lukashenka did not belong to the Soviet nomenklatura, having worked as a
state farm director before moving to Minsk in 1990 as a member of the parliament. Unlike
his Russian and Ukrainian colleagues, however, Mr. Lukashenka did not show any preference
for market reforms, let alone Western-style governance, and continued running Belarus in
the manner of his predecessor—i.e., using command methods rather than promoting market
mechanisms in the economy and pluralism in politics. Upon coming to power, Lukashenka
stopped voucher privatization, which had barely begun, and retained subsidized transport
and utilities and free health care and education. By that time (1995), most industrial work-
ers worked barely 2–3 days per week (as plants ran out of supplies and could not dispose of
their output), and had to eke out a living from the output of their kitchen gardens. Yet within
roughly a year (by 1996) the industrial giants of Belarus had resumed their full-capacity work
schedules, mostly due to restored ties with Russia. That was what Lukashenka had been voted
in for in 1994, and he made good on his electoral promise (Ioffe, 2004). After 1996, Belarus
experienced a rather long period of steady economic growth, which from 2005 to 2008 was
themostrapidinEurope.
Privatization
Meanwhile, in Russia and Ukraine the early 1990s were a time of fundamental trans-
formation. Mass privatization was arguably the single most important policy that put these
twolargerEastSlaviccountriesonadistinct post-communistpath.InRussia,privatization
became a widely publicized affair, with its own national heroes and anti-heroes.21 The Russian
economy had been largely privatized by 1996, when President Yel’tsin faced elections for his
second term with opinion polls estimating his popularity as low as 2–3 percent. Nevertheless,
he won, thanks (it is believed) mainly to the support of the oligarchs (the byproducts of priva-
tization)andpossiblybystufngballotboxes.InUkraine,privatizationwassimilarlyrapid,
though it initially received less attention from international media.
20Moreover, by some accounts, Shushkevich, now an ardent pro-Western liberal, had been on the KGB payroll
(e.g., see Yakavenka and Patyomkin, 2007). Indeed, to be attached to an American visitor as a tutor of Russian would
havebeenunthinkableinthoseyearswithouttheKGB’sparticipation.TheAmericanin questionwasLeeHarvey
Oswald,wholivedinMinskfrom1959to1962andworkedataradiofactory.
21A prominent example of the former is Lyonya Golubkov, a common Russian fellow wondering how to invest his
voucherandeventuallyndingnobetterchoicethanastockin“Khoper-Invest,”amutualfundthatwentbankrupta
few years after its formation. Anti-heroes include oligarchs such as Boris Berezovskiy, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, and
Roman Abramovich as well as Kremlin privatization proponents such as Anatoliy Chubais and Alfred Koch.

756 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
As a result of privatization, politicians in Russia and Ukraine could no longer manage
resource allocation at their discretion, as they surrendered property rights to the oligarchs. In
these countries, many privatized companies, especially energy and mining giants, turned to
offshoreoperationstominimizetheirscalobligationsandmaximizeprots.Withgovern-
mentsinbothRussiaandUkraineweakandunabletoestablishandmaintainscaldiscipline,
corruptionourished,furtherunderminingsociety’sapprovalofmarketreform.InRussia,the
rstwaveofprivatizationendedwiththeYukosaffair,whenaclashbetweenpresidentPutin
and Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, led to the latter’s imprisonment for tax evasion, and his com-
panymadebankruptandsoldoffinpieces(e.g.,seeHanson,2009).InUkraine,the“Orange
Revolution”concludedtherst privatizationwave,withalandmarkresaleofthecountry’s
steel giant Krivorozhstal to the British tycoon Lakshmi Mittal in 2005 for a sum exceeding
by several times the original price paid by a local oligarch.
In Belarus, largely unreformed property relations enabled authorities to control the
economy at both the macro and micro levels, through a network of ministries, departments,
and state corporations inherited from Soviet Belorussia and kept largely intact. Privatization
in Belarus amounted to incorporating state enterprises, with the stock capital in most cases
held by the state. Fearing speculation and Russian-style property relations, a special law was
enacted in the late 1990s to freeze any transactions involving the securities of privatized com-
panies. This moratorium on privatization was withdrawn only in 2011, but Belarus still does
not have a working stock market.
AccordingtoEBRDestimates,theprivatesectorintheBelaruseconomydoesnotexceed
25 percent of GDP, whereas in Russia and Ukraine it accounts for approximately 65 percent
(EBRD,2011b).However,theseguresshouldnotbeinterpretedtomeanthereisnoserious
private business in Belarus. While large Soviet-era processing factories (with more than 500
workers) are still run by the state, almost 90 percent of retail trade in the country is in private
hands, and so are all mobile telecommunications; public catering and tourism are mostly pri-
vate. There are even private kindergartens and schools, as well as medical centers and other
kinds of social facilities. In July 2011, Georgiy Kouznetsov, Chairman of the Committee
for State Property, caused a commotion in a newspaper interview, in which he proved that
articialobstacles toprivatizationare creatednotby thepresidentialadministration butby
the directorate of state-run enterprises often acting in concert with their workers (Na Vore,
2011).22Despitetheirinuence,however,178state-runenterprisesareonthelisttobetrans-
ferred to private ownership within two years (ibid).
A radical transformation of property relations in Russia and Ukraine has certainly led
to more dynamic economic and social reforms in these countries. Notably, private owners
of privatized and brand new private companies demanded tax cuts, less administrative regu-
lation, free trade regimes, and removal of price controls. Labor laws were relaxed, private
companieswereallowedtobidforpublicprojects,andinRussiaeventhepensionsystemwas
reformed according to Western neoliberal recommendations.
Becausetherewasnolarge-scaleprivatizationinBelarus,therealsowasnosignicant
internal pressure to liberalize the economy. Thus, market reforms in the country were very
slow and often inconsistent, frustrating domestic businesses and foreign observers. Accord-
ingtoeconomicreformrankingsbytheEuropeanBankofReconstructionandDevelopment,
Belarus has consistently ranked as one of the least-reformed states in the post-communist
world (Table 1). By contrast, Russia and Ukraine had some of the best rankings not only in the
22Manydirectorsopposeprivatizationbecausetheyareapprehensivethatnewownerswouldrethem,whereas
Belarusianworkers,seeingwhattranspiredinRussiaandUkraine,opposeitoutoffearoflosingtheirjobs.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 757
formerSovietUnion,butalsoamongallpost-communistcountries.Especiallylowhasbeen
Belarus’ standing for large-scale privatization, while for Russia and Ukraine this particular
indicator has been quite high and in line with post-communist averages.
Economic Growth
Assuming that post-communist reforms have been conducted not for their own sake but
forthepurposeofboostingeconomicefciencyandconsequentlypublicwell-being,itwould
nowbereasonabletocomparethethreeEastSlaviccountries’achievementsintherealmof
economic growth. Because all three experienced similar initial conditions following the dis-
integration of the USSR but took different approaches with respect to reform, data on GDP
provide a reliable starting point for a comparative socio-economic analysis. According to
WorldBankgures,allthreecountriesregisteredsubstantialGDPdecreasesduringtheearly
1990s,withBelarusbeingthersttoresumegrowthin1996,followedbyRussia(in1997),
and Ukraine (in 2000) (Table 2).
Judging by the GDP growth data contained in Table 2, it is obvious that Belarus has out-
performeditslargerEastSlavicneighbors.Itexperiencedthelowestaveragecontractionin
therstveyearsofindependence(–8.1percent),andthereaftergrewalmosttwiceorthree
times as fast as Russia and Ukraine, respectively. In addition, Belarus did not experience
output contraction after a 10.4 percent decline in 1995, while during the same period Russia
experienced setbacks twice–in 1998 and 2009.23Onaverage,bothRussiaandUkrainelagged
considerably behind Belarus, registering 0.6 and –1.6 growth rates for the entire period of
independece, while Belarus registered a rather healthy average growth of 3.4 percent. By
23Ukrainehasexperiencedvesuchcontractionssince1995(WorldBank,2011a).
Table 1.EBRD’sAssessmentofReforminBelarus,Russia,Ukraine,and
Post-communist Countries, 1990–2009
Year Priva-
tization
Restruc-
turing
Price
Liberali-
zation
Trade
Liberali-
zation
Priva-
tization
Restruc-
turing
Price
Liberali-
zation
Trade
Liberali-
zation
Belarus Russia
1990 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1995 1.84 1.67 3.67 2.00 3.50 2.00 3.67 3.00
2000 1.50 1.00 2.33 1.67 3.67 2.00 4.00 2.33
2005 1.67 1.00 2.67 2.33 3.50 2.33 4.00 3.33
2009 2.00 1.67 3.00 2.33 3.50 2.33 4.00 3.33
Ukraine Post-communist Countries
1990 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.30 1.04 1.90 1.41
1995 2.00 2.00 3.67 3.00 2.70 1.93 3.59 3.05
2000 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 3.19 2.09 3.85 3.45
2005 3.50 2.00 4.00 3.67 3.46 2.40 4.00 3.83
2009 3.50 2.33 4.00 4.00 3.52 2.48 4.01 3.92
Source:CompiledandcalculatedbyauthorsfromEBRD,2011a.

758 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
2003, Belarus had recovered its pre-reform GDP level, Russia attained recovery in 2006,
while Ukraine has yet to re-attain its 1991 level of output (CIS STAT, 2011).
It is noteworthy that Belarus’s economy did not register output contraction even in 2009,
theglobal economy’sworstyearduringtheglobalnancialcrisis.In 2009,Belarus’sGDP
grew by 0.2 percent according to CIS STAT and by 1.4 percent according to World Bank data,
while Russia’s economy shrank by 7.9 percent and Ukraine’s by 15.1 percent (on the latter,
seeÅslund,2009).Similarly,Belarusexperiencedamorecondentrecoveryin2010,withits
GDP increasing by 7.6 percent, while in Russia and Ukraine output grew only by 4 and 3.7
percent respectively (CIS STAT, 2011; World Bank, 2011a). Thus, the cumulative economic
resultoftherst20yearsofindependencehasbeenquitedifferentforBelarus,Russia,and
Ukraine, with Belarus nearly doubling its output, Ukraine losing almost one-third, and Russia
being somewhere in the middle with a 12.3 percent gain (Fig. 1).
Table 2 also shows that Russia is the wealthiest of the three republics in per capita terms,
followed by Belarus and Ukraine. It is evident, that despite being resource poor, Belarus has
increased its position relative to Ukraine, but continued to lag behind Russia.
Wages and Pensions
Wages and pensions constitute the basic income indicator at the microeconomic level.
Because of the unstable macroeconomic situation in most post-communist countries during
Table 2. GDP Growth (pct.) and GDP Per Capita (current U.S. dollars) in Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine, 1992–2010
Year Belarus Russia Ukraine
Growth Per capita Growth Per capita Growth Per capita
1992 –9.6 1,666 –14.5 3,095 –9.7 1,418
1994 –11.7 1,460 –12.6 2,663 –22.9 1,012
1996 2.8 1,452 –3.6 2,651 –10.0 873
1998 8.4 1,512 –5.3 1,844 –1.9 835
2000 5.8 1,273 10.0 1,775 5.9 636
2002 5.0 1,471 4.7 2,375 5.2 879
2004 11.4 2,356 7.2 4,109 12.1 1,367
2006 10.5 3,798 8.2 6,947 7.3 2,303
2008 11.3 6,277 5.2 11,743 2.1 3,899
2009 1.4 5,075 –7.9 8,684 –15.1 2,468
2010 7.6 5,765 4.0 10,440 3.7 3,007
Averages
1991–2010a3.4 2340 0.6 4135 –1.6 1459
1991–1995 –8.1 1567 –8.9 2957 –13.5 1223
1996–2010b7.2 2616 3.8 4555 2.4 1544
aAverage for GDP per capita is for 1991–2009.
bAverage for GDP per capita is for 1996–2009.
Sources: Compiled and calculated by authors from World Bank, 2011a and 2011b.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 759
the 1990s, it became commonplace to express their wages and pensions in U.S. dollars. While
it would be useful to analyze wages and pensions in terms of their purchasing power (by com-
paring their nominal amounts with standard national consumer baskets), there are no reliable
comparable data on those indicators.
DataonwagesshowthatRussiahasbeentheleaderamongitsEastSlavicpeers,evenin
the turbulent 1990s. In the wake of the commodity boom of the last decade, Russian wages
shot up in nominal terms, putting the country far ahead of both Belarus and Ukraine. In
fact, the latter should not have been lagging too much considering its reliance on commod-
ityexports.However,itwasBelaruswhichactuallymovedclosertoRussia’snominalwage
levels (Table 3). This move could be partly attributed to centralized wage-setting policies in
Belarus, which were absent in Ukraine. Thus, on average for the period, Russian wages were
1.6 times Belarusian wages and 2.1 times Ukrainian wages; in turn, Belarusian wages were
1.3 times Ukrainian wages.24
In 2008, Belarus had 2.5 million pensioners for 4.6 million workers (a retirement ratio
of 1.88 workers per pensioner); Russia—39 million for 68 million workers (a 1.77 ratio); and
Ukraine—13 million for 20 million (only 1.6). Comparing the data on pensions in U.S. dol-
lars, one can observe some trends similar to those with wages in nominal terms, while quite
different in relative terms. Nominally, Russian pensions have frequently been higher, but by
2009 they became the lowest among the three countries as a percentage of wages (Table 3).
By contrast, although Ukrainian pensions have often been the lowest in nominal terms, at
least in 2009 they were the highest relative to wages.
Income Distribution and Labor Productivity
The comparative analysis of wages and pensions above indicates that in Belarus the
governmentappearstohavedoneabetterjobofchannelingpositivemacro-leveloutputper-
formance to the micro-level, thus ensuring a broad base for economic growth—an assumption
supported by World Bank analysts.25 By contrast, Russia and Ukraine have had their positive
24Author calculations using the averages reported for 1993–2010 and 2001–2010 periods in Table 3.
25“Economicgrowthhasbeenratherbroad-based.IncontrasttosomeotherCIScountries,thepatternsofgrowth
inBelarushavebeenmuchmorebenecialforlabor”(WorldBank,2005,p.2).
Fig. 1. GDP recovery in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2010. Source: Compiled from CIS
STAT (2011).

760 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
GDPgrowthlargelyconcentratedinspecic sectors (e.g., oil) and geographicallocations
(e.g., capitals and resource-rich areas), with only marginal spillovers to the wider economy,
at least as far as individual average incomes are concerned. This assumption is supported by
Table 4, which shows that Belarus has consistently reported the most equitable income distri-
bution, although the shift in Ukraine’s position since the early 2000s cannot be discounted. In
fact, Belarus’s levels of inequality as measured by the Gini Index closely correspond to those
of Scandinavian countries, arguably the most socially equitable in the world (Finland—0.269,
Norway—0.258,Sweden—0.250),whereasRussia’sGinicoefcientsaresimilartothoseof
more inequitably developed economies such as United States (0.408) or United Kingdom
(0.360) (UNDP, 2010b).An additional conrmation of Belarus’s relatively more “equal”
economy can be taken from national wage statistics by sector and region. If one were to
take, for example, the average nominal monthly wage as a benchmark, then in Belarus the
deviation from it has been lowest both in the 1990s and at present. By contrast, in Russia and
Ukraine large differences are evident both between the capital regions and the provinces, and
betweenthewealthierindustrialandnancialsectorsvis-à-visagriculturalandpublic-sector
workers (Table 5).
No internationally recognized reports point to extreme inequality in Belarus; in fact, the
opposite arguement has been made (Istomina, 2007). There are no oligarchs, Russian and
Table 3. Average Monthly Wages and Pensions in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine,
1994–2010 (U.S. dollars),
Year
Belarus Russia Ukraine
Wage Pension
Pension
pct. of
wages
Wage Pension
Pension
pct. of
wages
Wage Pension
Pension
pct. of
wages
1994 27 19 69 100 54 55 45 36 81
1996 70 42 59 154 62 41 69 28 41
1998 35 59 169 108 42 38 63 25 40
2000 89 46 51 79 29 37 43 16 36
2002 107 50 46 139 47 34 71 26 36
2004 162 80 49 234 70 30 111 60 54
2006 271 129 48 391 105 27 206 95 46
2008 404 181 45 697 183 26 341 170 50
2009 350 153 44 588 195 33 244 128 52
2010 409 – – 688 – – 281 – –
Averages
1993–
2010
168 – – 276 – – 132 – –
2001–
2010
245 – – 386 – – 182 – –
Source: Compiled by authors from CIS STAT (2011), with national wage statistics for 2010 obtained
from the websites of the statistical agencies of the respective states (http://www.belstat.gov.by/; http://
www.rosstat.ru/; and http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/).

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 761
Ukrainian style, and no beggars on the streets of Belarusian towns. By contrast, both in Russia
and in Ukraine, extremes of income distribution have become commonplace, with Forbes
magazine claiming 101 billionaires in Russia and 8 in Ukraine in 2011 (The World’s Billion-
aires, 2011), whereas 18 million people in Russia (Paliy, 2011) and 35 percent of Ukraine’s
populationlivein poverty (Ukrainians, 2011).OntheUNDP’smulti-dimensionalpoverty
index calculated for 2000–2008, Belarus (0.000) is well ahead of both Russia (0.005) and
Ukraine (0.008) (UNDP, 2010b).
Inequality also matters as a labor productivity factor. According to various studies,
includingthosecommissionedbytheOECD(Aghionetal.,1999;Lloyds-Ellis,2000;Alam
et al., 2005), substantial increases in inequality tend to coincide with falling labor productiv-
ity as workers lose motivation to work harder in belief that their extra efforts would contribute
only to the rich, but not to national welfare in general. It is, then, important to compare labor
productivity dynamics in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in order to see if the more equitable
income distribution in Belarus has had any impact. Although methodologically such a com-
parison is hampered by the lack of appropriate statistics, one can overcome this by calculating
labor productivity dynamics as a change in GDP per person (see Table 4).26
AccordingtoTable4,Belarus’slowerinequalitylevelhas notresultedin signicantly
higherratesoflaborproductivity.However,therateofBelarusianlaborproductivitygrowth
26Itshouldbenoted,though,thatthisisnottheonlywayofmeasuringlaborproductivity.Forexample,OECD
prefersto doitbytakingGDPand totalhoursworked.Itcan alsobe calculatedagainstthenumberofjobs.And
theuseofUSDtosomeextentallowsonetooffsetinationarydistortions.Thechoiceofmethodinthispaperwas
prompted by data limitations.
Table 4.IncomeInequality(measuredbytheGinicoefcient)andGrowthinLabor
Productivitya in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1992–2009
Year
Belarus Russia Ukraine
Gini
coefcient Labor
productivity
Gini
coefcient Labor
productivity
Gini
coefcient Labor
productivity
1992 – – 0.289 – – –
1994 – – 0.409 – – –
1996 0.244 35.2 0.387 29.8 0.351 20.4
1998 0.253 8.6 0.394 –32.5 0.351 –13.5
2000 0.247 4.4 0.395 31.6 0.363 –1.3
2002 0.246 20.8 0.397 10.1 0.327 12.0
2004 0.248 31.8 0.409 35.4 0.283 28.3
2006 0.279 20.9 0.416 28.4 0.282 24.8
2008 0.272 30.1 0.422 27.7 0.275 24.9
2009 0.272 –19.7 0.421 –24.4 0.275 –31.9
1996–2009
average
– 13.1 – 13.2 – 11.8
aMeasured as GDP per employed worker in U.S. dollars (percentage change from previous year).
Sources: Compiled by authors from UNDP, 2010, pp. 153–154; Wolfram Alfa, 2011; and CIS STAT,
2011.

762 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
for 1996–2009 is almost the same as in resource-rich Russia and noticeably higher than in
Ukraine. It may be the case, then, that robust labor productivity growth in Belarus, despite
the lack of abundant natural resources, has been to some extent facilitated by its lower level
of inequality, which has helped maintain workforce motivation in a largely state-owned econ-
omy with limited competition and opportunities to maximize one’s income.
Belarus’s labor productivity growth is even more impressive if one takes into account
therelativelystableworkforcein the country since themid-1990s,asreectedinsteadily
declining unemployment and rising workforce participation rates. Indeed, higher productivity
growth can to a great extent be determined by a shrinking workforce and rising unemploy-
ment, which might have been the case in Ukraine. By contrast, Belarus managed to register
productivity gains without substantial workforce losses (Table 6).
Well-Being and Social Infrastructure
Solid GDP growth and more equitable income distribution have arguably placed Belarus
aheadofRussiaand Ukraine intermsofwell-being.However,qualityoflife depends not
only on one’s income, but also on maintenance of towns and roads and provision of social
Table 5. Wage Differentials in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2009 (percent)
Wage and sector 1991 1995 2000 2005 2009
Belarus
Average nominal monthly wage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture
Educationandhealth
Finance
Industry
86.5
79.8
158.9
110.2
62.0
81.7
213.5
114.1
62.4
76.5
189.5
120.3
61.7
88.3
157.5
105.8
68.7
76.4
181.0
106.9
Capital city 113.7 133.3 130.4 121.8 128.7
Russia
Average nominal monthly wage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture
Educationandhealth
Finance
Industry
83.8
73.5
179.9
110.6
54.9
69.3
160.0
96.1
44.3
57.9
235.3
106.4
42.6
66.3
262.6
98.4
51.6
75.4
227.4
89.0
Capital citya111.2 123.6 145.2 168.6 176.7
Ukraine
Average nominal monthly wage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture
Educationandhealth
Finance
Industry
85.1
73.2
175.1
120.5
51.8
99.8
237.2
121.6
49.5
64.0
243.2
131.2
47.8
77.0
199.7
110.4
64.0
76.5
211.9
110.1
Capital city – – – 163.0 153.2
aData for Russia’s capital city are provided for 1990 instead of 1991 and for 2008 instead of 2009.
Source: Compiled by authors from CIS STAT (2011), with national wage statistics for 2010 obtained
from the websites of the statistical agencies of the respective states (http://www.belstat.gov.by/;
http://www.rosstat.ru/; and http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/).

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 763
infrastructure. Based on visual observations beyond the connes of the capital cities of
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, we are convinced that Belarus is decidedly ahead of its larger
EastSlavicneighborsonallthesecounts.Whilethispointofviewishardtosubstantiatewith
statistical data, a comparison of public expenditures and key social services and infrastructure
indicators may provide some insights.
The available data demonstrate that Belarus consistently spent much more on education
and health care as a share of GDP than did Russia or Ukraine: on average 5.8 percent of GDP
was spent on education from 1991 to 2009, compared to a mere 3.7 percent in Russia and 5.1
percent in Ukraine. Similarly, over the same period an average 4.8 percent of Belarus’s GDP
wasspentonhealthcare,comparedtoonly3.6percentforbothRussiaandUkraine(UNICEF,
2011).
TheefciencyofBelarus’srelativelyhigherlevelsofpublicspendingoneducationand
healthcare canbeveriedbyexaminingselectedindicatorswidely regardedaspivotalfor
both types of public goods. For education, such indicators typically include enrolment data
and student/teacher ratios. While there is no striking difference in basic and tertiary enrolment
among the three countries, pre-primary and upper-secondary enrolments in Belarus have been
muchhigherthan in bothRussiaandUkraine, a factthatreectsthe former’sconsistency
of funding at all levels in contrast to the latter two countries. Similarly better have been the
pupil/teacher ratios in Belarusian schools at different levels (Table 7).
The Belarusian government has continued to maintain a broad network of specialized
educational facilities for children established during the Soviet period—namely, arts, music,
and sports schools, as well as multi-activity youth centers—not only in the big cities, but also
in most towns and even large villages. Most importantly, due to steady public funding these
facilities have remained widely affordable—a typical one-year course at an arts or music
school costs less than $50 (Detskiye Shkoly, 2011). Similarly affordable have been preschool
facilities—parents would generally pay around $10–$15 per month, or less than 5 percent
of an average monthly wage, for subsidized meals for their children. In Russia and Ukraine,
Table 6. Unemployment and Workforce in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2009
Year
Registered unemployment
(pct. of workforce)
Workforce
(mill. people)
Workforce participation rate
(pct. of population)
Belarus Russia Ukraine Belarus Russia Ukraine Belarus Russia Ukraine
1991 0.0 0.1 0.0 5.02 73.8 25.0 49.3 49.8 48.4
1995 3.0 3.7 0.5 4.41 70.7 24.1 43.3 47.7 47.2
1997 2.9 2.9 2.7 4.37 66.3 23.8 43.2 44.8 47.3
1999 2.1 2.0 5.9 4.44 64.6 19.9 44.3 43.9 40.4
2001 2.3 1.7 5.0 4.42 65.1 20.0 44.3 44.6 41.2
2003 3.1 2.5 4.9 4.34 66.4 20.2 43.9 46.0 42.3
2005 1.6 2.7 4.3 4.35 68.2 20.7 44.5 47.6 44.1
2007 1.0 2.2 3.1 4.48 70.6 20.9 46.1 49.7 45.1
2008 0.8 2.1 4.0 4.59 71.0 21.0 47.5 50.0 45.5
2009 0.9 3.1 2.6 4.63 69.3 20.2 48.8 48.8 44.0
Source: Compiled by authors from data in the CIS STAT database, 2011.

764 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
Table 7.SelectedIndicatorsofEducationinBelarus,Russia,andUkraine,1991–2009
Indicator Country 1991 1995 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Pre-primary enrolment, percent of all children
aged 3–6
Belarus 62.5 62.3 84.8 84.1 83.6 87.2 90.1 94.1
Russia 75.3 64.4 64.1 65.4 67.9 69.6 70.7 72.1
Ukraine 61.5 51.4 49.8 54.0 61.8 68.9 73.0 73.9
Primary enrolment, percent of relevant
population
Belarus – – 100.6 98.4 102.5 99.6 98.0 99.8
Russia – – 95.7 101.6 104.0 97.6 97.3 98.8
Ukraine – – 91.3 97.7 99.0 104.0 101.7 100.1
Basic enrolment, percent of relevant
population
Belarus 94.3 94.6 91.8 92.3 93.6 93.4 98.1 99.6
Russia 89.3 88.4 100.5 102.9 104.3 105.2 107.2 109.7
Ukraine 91.5 90.8 95.7 99.0 100.1 99.4 99.6 103.2
Upper-secondary enrolment, percent of all
children aged 15–18
Belarus 76.6 71.8 75.6 75.5 76.6 64.3 62.3 75.8
Russia 72.2 65.9 52.3 52.7 53.9 53.4 50.1 48.0
Ukraine 63.9 57.4 55.4 55.0 57.0 58.8 57.8 48.5
Tertiary enrolment, students per 100,000
people
Belarus – – 4 318 4 583 5 064 5 502 5 889 6 218
Russia – – 4 835 5 398 6 255 6 730 6 940 6 738
Ukraine – – 3 904 4 302 5 099 5 752 6 056 5 655
Student/teacher ratio in primary education,
students per teacher
Belarus – – 17.7 16.8 15.6 16.2 15.6 15.2
Russia – – 17.3 17.1 17.0 17.1 17.4 18.6
Ukraine – – – 19.5 18.6 17.1 15.8 15.7
Student/teacher ratio in secondary education,
students per teacher
Belarus 11.6 11.0 9.4 9.2 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.2
Russia 13.4 12.5 11.7 11.5 10.3 9.1 8.6 –
Ukraine – – 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.1 8.4 8.7
Source:CompiledbyauthorsfromdatainUNICEF’sTransMONEEdatabase,2011.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 765
theprovisionofout-of-schoolfacilitiesfortheyounghassignicantlydeclinedsinceSoviet
times, most probably due to lesser public funding and worse public administration. While
there are no reliable statistics in this regard, available individual and media reports tend to
support the view that Belarus has again been more advanced with provision and maintenance
of the educational infrastructure.
In health care, relatively better public funding is likely one of the key reasons for the
superior standing of Belarus on indicators traditionally associated with well-developed medi-
cal systems. The key measure in this regard is life expectancy, and in Belarus it has not only
beenhigherthaninRussiaor Ukraine throughout their rst two decadesofindependence
(Table 8), but in 2009 also approached the level of upper-middle-income countries according
totheWorldHealthOrganization’sclassication(WHO,2011).Incontrast,lifeexpectancyin
both Russia and Ukraine has remained at a level typical of lower-middle-income countries.27
Infant mortality, another vital indicator of health care, has also been much lower in Belarus
than in Russia and Ukraine, having approached the levels of advanced countries by 2010. In
contrast, despite substantial declines in infant mortality in both Russia and Ukraine during the
rstdecadeofthe2000s,bothcountriesstillregisteredlevelslastreportedinBelarusinthe
late 1990s. Such a contrasting picture may be the result of a modernization program, launched
in the early 2000s, for all maternity hospitals in Belarus. Reports from medical specialists in
thecountryimpliedthatnewmedicalequipmentallowedfortreatmentofdifcultmaternity
cases, thus saving the lives of children who might otherwise have died.28
Asignicantlylowerincidenceofsuchdeceasesashepatitis,tuberculosis,andHIValso
atteststothe higherqualityofBelarus’smedicalsystem. RegardingHIV,for example,the
frequencyofnewregisteredcasesinBelaruswaslessthanone-fththenumberinRussia,and
one-fourth that in Ukraine (Table 8).
Greaterexpenditureonhealthcareshouldalsobereectedinahealthierworkforceand
better infrastructure provision, which can be compared using the available data. According
totheWorldHealthOrganization,goodmedicalinfrastructureimpliesasufcientnumberof
hospital beds and radiotherapy units, and a decent health care workforce is associated with
highratiosofphysicians,nurses,dentists,andpharmacists.Onallthesecounts(apartfrom
the ratio of pharmacists) Belarus has been far ahead of Russia and Ukraine in the last decade,
as can be seen in Figure 2.
Composite Indicators of Well-Being
According to one of the most reputable composite indicators of overall well-being, the
UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram’sHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Belarusranked
61st in 2010, ahead of all CIS countries, including Russia (65) and Ukraine (69) (UNDP,
2010a). In 2011, Belarus was 65th on the list, but still ahead of other CIS countries (UNDP
2011).29 In the 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index ranking of 110 countries, Belarus was 50th—
ahead of all CIS countries and even one position ahead of Latvia (Legatum Institute, 2011).30
27It is noteworthy in the context of this comparison that in 1986, Belarus received 70 percent of radionuclides
discharged during the Chernobyl’ disaster (Ioffe, 2007).
28Furthermore, a national maternity center was built in Minsk for particularly severe cases, and plans call for the
opening of similar centers in all regional capitals (Davydova, 2007; Struzhinskaya, 2009).
29HDIcombinespercapitaGNIPPPwithlifeexpectancyatbirth,meanyearsofschooling,andexpectedyearsof
schooling (for details, see footnote 8 in Clem, 2011, which follows this paper in this symposium—Ed.).
30The Legatum index is based on eight groups of variables (economy, entrepreneurship, governance, education,
health, safety and security, personal freedom, and social capital).

766 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
A Russian “popular economics” Internet portal Flime.ru devised its own composite indi-
cator to compare Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, utilizing data from the IMF, UN,
and earthtrends.wri.org. Partial indicators included rate of change in GDP from 1990 to 2007
and from 2000 to 2007, dynamics of GDP per capita and population31 for the same periods,
andthe2007GDPpercapita—altogethersevenindicators(Belarus,Rossiya,2009).Having
ranked each country on a scale from 1 to 4 on each indicator and having summed up rankings,
theInternetportal placedKazakhstanrstwith atotalscoreof 23points,Belarusin close
second (22 points), Russia third (16), and Ukraine last (9).
Agriculture
Acomparativeanalysisofthesocio-economicdevelopmentofBelarusanditsEastSlavic
neighbors would be incomplete without a foray into agriculture, which provides employment
31TheinclusionofthisindicatorismotivatedbypopulationdeclineinallthreeEastSlaviccountries,andbythe
factthatitisviewedasamajorprobleminRussia.TheimplicationsofthisformigrationinRussiaareexploredin
Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya (2010).
Table 8.SelectedIndicatorsofHealthCareinBelarus,Russia,andUkraine,1991–2009
Country 1991 1995 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Life expectancy at birth for both sexes, in years
Belarus 70.5 68.6 69.1 68.7 68.7 69.0 70.4 70.6
Russia 68.9 65.0 65.6 65.5 65.2 65.6 67.6 68.7
Ukraine 70.5 67.3 68.0 68.0 68.4 68.1 68.4 69.4
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births
Belarus 12.1 13.3 9.3 9.1 7.7 7.1 5.2 4.7
Russia 17.8 18.1 15.3 14.7 12.4 11.0 9.4 8.1
Ukraine 13.9 14.4 11.9 11.3 9.6 10.0 11.0 9.4
Incidence of hepatitis, new cases per 100,000 people
Belarus 195.8 62.7 94.2 110.4 51.1 12.7 6.5 3.7
Russia 191.5 163.3 163.3 181.4 97.7 93.1 73.2 69.6
Ukraine 312.4 78.3 78.3 107.9 86.1 57.3 26.1 13.8
Incidence of tuberculosis, new cases per 100,000 people
Belarus 30.9 44.3 49.9 47.5 51.7 54.3 50.2 48.3
Russia 34.0 57.3 89.1 87.1 82.0 83.3 83.3 82.6
Ukraine 32.3 41.8 60.4 69.2 77.8 84.4 80.1 72.9
Incidence of HIV, new registered cases per 100,000 people
Belarus 0.1 0.1 5.3 5.8 7.2 7.7 10.2 11.1
Russia 0.1 0.1 59.6 34.6 19.7 20.0 31.1 59.6
Ukraine – 2.9 11.4 12.5 16.9 29.3 38.1 43.2
Source:CompiledbyauthorsfromdatainUNICEF’sTransMONEEdatabase,2011.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 767
to rural residents as well as to many people employed in the food processing and other indus-
tries dependent on inputs from agriculture. Well-developed agriculture not only ensures food
security for the country but also is essential for proper maintenance of the countryside and
helpspreservetheBelarusianculturalheritage.Inaddition,harvestedeldsandpasturesfull
of cattle look more attractive than roadsides overgrown with unmown grass, thus creating a
more positive tourist image for the country. To compare the state of agriculture in Belarus,
Russia, and Ukraine, one can look into such indicators as output, workforce, and investment.
According to the CIS statistical database (CIS STAT, 2011), only Belarus managed to regain
its 1991 level of agricultural output by 2010 (Fig. 3). In 2010, the output produced on all
types of farms in Belarus exceeded the 1991 level by almost 16 percent. By contrast, Russia
and Ukraine fell short of their 1991 levels of agricultural output by a quarter and a fth
respectively (Fig. 3), with land abandonment in Russia a widespread phenomenon (Ioffe et
al., 2004).
Belarus’sstrongerperformanceinagriculturelikelyreectsthestate’sgreaternancial
commitment than in Ukraine and Russia. Since 2003, the State Rural Development Program,
launched by Lukashenka, has focused on the upgrading of machinery, housing construc-
tion, and changes in management practices. The legal status of most collective farms has
been transformed to allow the participation of private investors, and for the sake of experi-
ment, some 120 farms in the Minsk region were assigned by central authorities to selected
entrepreneurs from the capital for the purpose of improving management and increasing
production.In thepastve yearsnearly1,500 largervillagesthroughoutthecountrywere
transformed into modern agricultural settlements (agrogorodki), with 68 thousand new apart-
ments for young working families built in them (Zhizn na Sele, 2010). State-backed loans
havealsobeenprovidedtonancepurchasesofnewtractors,trucks,harvesters,andother
farm machinery.
Finally,government ofcials have pledged to continuereformingagriculturetomake
itmore competitive, in line with WTO requirements. It was announcedthatstate support
wouldbeconcentratedondrainage,soilcalcication,animalbreeding,agriculturalresearch,
Fig. 2. Medical infrastructure and workforce in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 2000–2010. Physi-
cians nurses, and hospital beds are per 10,000 people; dentists and pharmacists are per 100,000 people;
and radiotherapy units are per 1,000,000 people. Source:WHO(2011).

768 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
andtraining(Gosudarstvennaya,2005).Otherthantheseareas,policymeasurestosupport
agriculturewouldbegroupedinaccordancewithWTOmethodology,andwouldbeprovided
onlyforspecicprograms.32
Such continuous state support of agriculture in Belarus is one of the main reasons why
nearly 90 percent of food sold in the country has been of local origin (Kunitsky, 2011),
whereas in Russia close to half of all consumed foodstuffs is now imported (Miloserdov,
2011), with Ukraine being closer to Belarus than to Russia in terms of the share of imports
(about 12 percent of food retail sales) (Panchenko, 2009).33 State support of agriculture in
Russia and Ukraine has plummeted since the Soviet period, and farmers are largely left to
their own devices. The outcome of Belarusian policies in agriculture can be measured using
such indicators as output per capita and grain yields (Figs. 4 and 5). Throughout 11 months
of 2010, Belarus earned $2.9 billion for its food exports, of which $2.4 billion went to Russia
(Prodovol’stvennyy, 2011). From 1995 to 2009, Belarus had the highest per capita agricul-
ture production in all but three years, and the highest grain yield since 2003. This seems
quite remarkable given that the country has relatively poorer soil than Ukraine and Russia’s
south. To summarize, it seems that the laissez-faire attitudes toward agriculture adopted in
RussiaandUkrainehaveturnedouttoberatherlessefcientthanBelarus’scentral-planning
approach, despite its inherent problems and setbacks.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Given the scale of the current economic crisis, it appears rather evident that Belarus
needs to introduce without delay several fundamental changes in its economy. A commitment
to two such changes, namely, the elimination of multiple exchange rates of the Belarusian
ruble and return of hard currency to exchange outlets, was announced in late August 2011
(Belyavskaya,2011b)andimplementedinSeptemberandOctober2011.However,Belarus
32Milk production is a good example of such a program-based approach. Belarusian authorities have set the goal
of producing 10.5 million tons of milk annually by 2016 (Belyavskaya, 2011a), investing the equivalent of hundreds
of millions of dollars into construction and renovation of milk farms across the country, with every rayon planned to
haveatleastvemoderndairyfarmslinkedtomilkprocessingplants.
33Ukraine, however, has incomparably higher natural soil fertility than Belarus.
Fig. 3. Agricultural production (gross value of output) in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (1991 level
of output = 100). Source: Compiled by authors from CIS STAT (2011).

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 769
should also trim its national programs in housing construction and agriculture, privatize most
medium-sizedandsomelargebusinessestablishments,andsignicantlyexpandexports.Con-
sidering past achievements, it seems likely that the country should be able to accomplish these
objectives.Forexample,inMayandJulyofthisyear,Belarus’sinternationaltradebalance
waspositiveforthersttimeinmanyyears.Duringtherstninemonthsof2011,Belarus’s
exports doubled relative to the same period in 2010 (Kozhemyakin, 2011)—to some extent
owing to the devaluation of the ruble.
By some accounts, a program of transferring many medium-sized enterprises into the
hands of local businessmen (as an antidote to selling these assets to Russia) is being vigor-
ously discussed in the corridors of power in Minsk (Romanchuk, 2011). It is also helpful
for Belarus that Russia is agreeing to lower natural gas prices, apparently in an attempt to
signaltoUkrainethelikelybenetsofentering acustomsunionwithRussia(withBelarus
and Kazakhstan). Ukraine’s intransigence in this regard also benets Belarus in another
way. By launching the Nordstream natural gas pipeline to Germany, Russia will be able to
bypassUkraine,whichiscurrentlythemajortransitregionforRussiangas.Butbecausethe
Fig. 4. Agricultural output per capita in U.S. dollars in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2009.
Source: CIS STAT (2011).
Fig. 5. Grain yields in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2009, in hundreds of kilos per hectare.
Source: CIS STAT (2011).

770 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
volumeofgassoldbyRussiatoEuropeexceedsNordstream’scapacity,Belarusianlandtran-
sit has a reasonable chance to be fully utilized at the expense of the Ukrainian transit, which
explains Russia’s interest in obtaining the remaining shares of the Beltransgaz pipeline for
$2.5 billion.
The comparative analysis of post-communist socio-economic developments in Belarus,
Russia, and Ukraine tends to lead to a number of conclusions, among which is the key fact
that Belarus has outperformed Russia and Ukraine on many counts.34 As far as output is con-
cerned, Belarus has registered the smallest contraction and most rapid recovery to the 1991
level, with average growth dynamics far exceeding those in Russia and Ukraine. While it has
lagged Russia in the GDP per capita indicator as well as in absolute wage and pension levels,
Belarus has had the most equitable income distribution, which most likely has contributed to
robust productivity dynamics despite its relative paucity of natural resources. In the social
sphere, the country has also achieved better results, due to higher public spending and most
likelybecauseofthehigherqualityofadministration.Thishasbeenveriedbycomparing
some critical indicators in education (such as enrollments and teacher-student ratios) and
health care (mortality, spread of disease, and infrastructure). Finally, in contrast to Russia and
Ukraine, Belarus in the early 2000s embarked on a large-scale program of modernization in
agriculture to improve the well-being of its rural inhabitants and ensure national food security
and proper land maintenance. As a result, the country’s productivity in agriculture has been
much higher than in Russia or Ukraine, whether measured by output per capita or by yield
data.
The argument most frequently enunciated by the Belarusian political regime’s detractors
is that the country’s socio-economic achievements are only due to lasting discounts on natural
gas and oil sold by Russia. Now that Russia has stopped “subsidizing” Belarus, the latter is
experiencing a deep economic crisis. This turn of events, however, should have been foreseen
all along, and steps should have been taken to lessen dependency on Russia.
There is no reason to doubt that Russia’s lasting commitment to the aforementioned
discountshasbeneted Belarus. Sufce it to say that two Belarusian reneries have long
receivedcheap(i.e.,withoutexporttariffs)Russiancrudeandselltherenedproducttothe
West at world prices. The IMF has estimated that this factor alone accounts for at least 5 per-
centofBelarus’sGDP—morespecically,$5.9billionin2007and$8.2billionin2008(IMF,
2010, p. 17). And prices of Russian natural gas for Belarus were at times only one-fourth of
thepriceatwhichthesameproductwassoldtoEUcountries.35
ButalthoughthescaleofRussia’seconomicaidtoBelarusissignicant,viewingitasan
opportunitycostorasRussia’slostprot(whichiswhatmostRussiancriticsofLukashenka
tend to do) is not without fault. The Russian government, which authorized the aforementioned
discounts in the past and which has reintroduced them starting in 2012, has not acted out of
compassion and kindness, for Belarus is one of its two closest allies.36 Their mutual border is
transparent, there are no customs at that border, and individual travelers may use internal IDs
whencrossingitsconnes.37 There are two Russian military bases in Belarus, including an
early missile detection station in Gantsevichi (near the city of Baranovichi), whose perceived
34For recent assessments of the economic challenges confronting the latter two countries during and after the
globalnancialcrisis,seeÅslund(2009)andGaddyandIckes(2010).
35OneoftheauthorsdevotedmuchofChapter4ofhis2008booktotheanalysisofthissituationanditspositive
effect on Belarus’s economy (Ioffe, 2008).
36The other is Kazakhstan.
37Also Belarusians in Russia and Russians in Belarus do not require authorizations for employment. At the ports
ofentryintoRussiaorBelarus,thecitizensofothercountriesreceiveajointRussia-Belarusmigrationform.

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 771
signicanceincreasedafterthelossofanidenticalmilitaryinstallationatSkrundainLatvia;
another base is a submarine monitoring station in Vileika, northwest of Minsk.38 Scores of
Belarusian military personnel study in Russian schools, and the Belarusian army’s munitions
are all either made in Russia or are a product of Russia-Belarus industrial cooperation. The
Belarusian army may be the most battle-trained in the CIS and as such protects Russia from
theWest.ThefactthatNATOdoesnotthreatenRussia’sterritorialintegrityisnotacceptedas
avalidargumentbyRussia’sinuentialnational-patrioticcamp,andtherearemanynation-
ally recognized political experts in Russia who believe that the aforementioned assets of
Belarus are worth paying for. 39 By some accounts, there is a powerful Belarusian lobby in
Moscow (Suzdal’tsev, 2010), although it was noticeably weakened when Moscow’s Mayor
YuriyLuzhkovwasredbyPresidentMedvedev.
The history of world trade features many special economic relationships. They exist
betweenChinaand Singapore, betweentheU.S.andIsrael, within theEU,andfor a long
timebetweentheU.K.andmany of its former colonies. One mayarguethattherelation-
ship between Russia and Belarus is even more special than the ones mentioned above, as
Belarus has not yet cut the umbilical cord connecting it with its large neighbor. But if the
cord is still intact, taking advantage of these relationships by Belarus can hardly be viewed
as opportunism, particularly given that in 1998 both countries signed a union treaty which
includesaclauseabout creatingalevelplayingeldintheeconomiesofthetwocountries
(Soglasheniye, 1998).40
It is generally known that Russia’s leadership suffers from time to time from bouts of
doubt about these bilateral agreements and more or less frequently re-evaluates them with an
eye toward possible change. Most observers agree that currently Moscow faults Belarus for
its reluctance, even at a time of crisis, to sell its most lucrative assets to Russian oligarchs.
Russia’s expectations of such sales have thus far proven wrong and prompted the country’s
policymakersinlate2009toreconsiderthepriceofitsmaterialsupportofBelarus.However,
in the spring of 2010 Belarus began to receive Venezuelan oil (later replaced by Azeri light),
transportedthroughtheOdessa-Brodypipelineonthebasisofbilateralswapschemes.This
relatively unexpected development prompted Russia in December 2010 to revoke the export
tariffs on all Russian oil sold to Belarus.41
In the West, Belarus is frequently castigated not so much for its “unreformed” economy
as for its poor record in human rights, including mistreatment of the opposition. Although
this paper is not intended to be focused on politics, we take the liberty of hypothesizing that
Belarus’s economic success is not solely based on taking advantage of favorable terms of
tradewithRussiaandpassingonthebenetstomostBelarusiansratherthantotheprivileged
elites. Belarus’s economic success is also rooted in a degree of harmony between much of its
society and the political regime—a degree which is higher than in Russia and Ukraine. “Not
one of his international peers evidences so profound an understanding of his or her people,”
wrote The Washington Post about Vladimir Putin (Peters, 2011). We submit that Lukashenka
has a similar understanding of the inhabitants of Belarus.
38Russia pays no fees for the use of these bases.
39Such experts include but are not limited to Mikhail Delyagin, Alexander Dugin, Sergey Kara-Murza, Sergey
Mikheyev, Alexander Prokhanov, and Konstantin Zatulin.
40The1998agreementstipulatesthatpricesofexportedproductssubjecttoregulationareto replicatedomestic
prices in the exporting country. Alexander Lukashenka and members of his government refer to this agreement each
time they criticize Russia for raising prices on hydrocarbons earmarked for Belarus.
41It should be noted that the swaps with Venezuela showed that Belarus has an opportunity to lessen its depen-
dency on Russia.

772 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
Although public opinion in Russia and Ukraine has been hostile to privatization or rather
tothewayitwasconducted,privatizationwasnonethelessercelypromotedinbothcoun-
tries, breeding corruption, cynicism, and distrust of the authorities. Russian and Ukrainian
authorities made a commitment to honor civil liberties (e.g., multi-party system, free and fair
elections, and unrestricted public rallies) only to curtail them arbitrarily and at times harshly.
In contrast, the social compact established and maintained between the regime and society in
Belarus was explicitly based on surrendering some personal liberties (which most Belarusians
didnotconsiderworthyofmajorsacricetobeginwith)inexchangeforahighdegreeof
social safety and equity. There are good reasons to believe that Belarusians have thus far en
masse supported this kind of equilibrium. In a 2007 national survey taken (at a time of the
boominconsumption) byareputableopposition-orientedpollingrm,64.1 percentofthe
respondents subscribed to the notion that Lukashenka has been successful in installing order
inthecountry (Ioffe,2008,p. 187).Ourobservationsprompt ustoassertthat “order”isa
compositeand“sacred” condition in the East Slavic world, a condition antithetical to the
free-for-all which subsumes corruption, social inequality, and crime. In a December 2010
post-electionnationalpollbyasimilarlyorientedpollingrm,only17.4percentofrespond-
ing Belarusians approved of protest actions and only 18.9 percent acknowledged that they
opposed the regime (Ioffe, 2011a).
Werealizethatourhypothesisofharmonymayevokeoutrageamongsomereaders.How
can one commend a regime commonly referred to as dictatorial? After all, Western media
routinely portray the people of Belarus as the regime’s victims. Not only that—existing social
research in the context of Belarusian as well as Russian and Ukrainian area studies is, in the
words of Sam Greene (2011) “almost inevitably reduced to a dependent variable” (i.e., social
results), which is the product of politics and the political economy. But the inverse is true as
well (i.e., that society may produce the political economy and the political regime) and maybe
even more so, which is what shrewd Belarus watchers make clear, however inadvertently
at times. In this regard, the pronouncements of Lukashenka’s detractors are more revealing
than those of his supporters. For example, the late Vitali Silitski, the founding director of the
U.S.-funded Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies in Minsk and a leading analyst repre-
senting the opposition, suggested that the Lukashenka regime incorporated “the outlook and
the political culture of the average Belarusian” into its core framework (quoted in Ioffe, 2008,
p.153).KonstantinSkuratovich,aveteranjournalistandalsocriticofLukashenka,recently
stated that “the fault of [his] regime … is in the fact that it is too close to people, however
paradoxical it may seem” (Neklyayev-Skuratovich, 2011).
“Disturbing though it may sound, Lukashenka … proved to have greater national respon-
sibilityandintegritythantheentire Orange elite in Ukraine,” wrote BalaszJarabikofthe
EuropeanthinktankFRIDE(Jarabik,2009).Theve-wordqualieratthebeginningofthat
positive statement (by a professional promoter of democracy) only makes it more compelling.
“The … myth which needs debunking,” Jarabik (2011) also wrote,
… is that Alexander Lukashenka himself is a singular phenomenon. His rule is
commonly perceived as iron-sted. Despite the authoritarian repression of the
opposition, however, he would not have been able to rule for 16 years without public
consent.…[Lukashenka]isthereectionofanupgradedversionoftheSovietmodel
ofpoliticswhichhasbeenwidelyaccepted.Hissocialcontractisbasedon[steady]
economic growth and a more equal distribution of wealth. (Jarabik, 2011b).
These observations are echoed in a reader’s suggestive comment in the Belarus Digest,
an Internet portal set up by a group of Belarusian graduates of leading Western schools. The

IOFFE AND YARASHEVICH 773
comment was in response to Jarabik’s article titled “Belarus after Sanctions: The Lost Dicta-
tor”(Jarabik,2011a).Morespecically,it focusedonasentenceinthearticlestating“Itis
not only about Lukashenka but [also] about a society that approves and supports order and
stability and does not mind a lack of freedom in return.” “So you are saying that the people
of Belarus chose to live in this way, and yet you insist we should come in and change their
ways?” wrote the reader who introduced herself as Anon, “What happened to all that talk of
freedomofchoice?Isitalljust‘bigtalk’,andinrealityyoujustwanttovalidateyourown
viewsbyforcingthemonothers,justlikereligiousorganizationsthroughouthistory?”
Within a month after the forcible dispersal of a post-election rally in Minsk on December
19,2010,theassociatesoftheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeacepublishedthree
items, in which condemnations of the Belarusian regime’s actions were interspersed with
statements like “The losers of Sunday’s events are President Lukashenka himself and the
constructive elements of the opposition” (Shumilo-Tapiola, 2010); and “Lukashenka remains
popularbecauseherepresentsstabilityinuncertaintimes”(RojanskiandCollins,2011).42
So returning to the harmony hypothesis, our point is not to “commend,” which would
tendtobeavaluejudgment,buttounderscorewhatseemstobeareasonableobservationthat
Lukashenkathusfarhasreectedtheaspirationsofmany,ifnotmost,ordinaryBelarusians.
Moreover, the case can be made that out of three (or 3½) national leaders—the Putin- Medvedev
duo, Yanukovich, and Lukashenka—the latter actually is the most “democratic.” Unlike his
EastSlaviccolleagues,Lukashenkasidedwiththecommonfolkand“nippedoligarchyinthe
bud,” whereas Putin-Medvedev and Yanukovich are widely viewed as protégés of the oligar-
chy, and more often than not as covert oligarchs themselves. But because Western propaganda
madeBelarus, notRussiaor Ukraine,“Europe’slastdictatorship,”itisa posterchildeven
in those countries. For example, when Russia’s liberal Westernizers castigate Russia’s politi-
cal regime, they say that the difference between it and Lukashenka’s rule is purely cosmetic
(e.g.,seeGol’ts,2011).Weagree.AsforUkraine,itsOrangeRevolutionisnolongerfondly
remembered inside that country and Western political commentators aver that its spirit has
been “squandered” (Levy, 2009). At times, it seems, Ukraine is dangerously approaching the
status of a failed state (Wilson, 2009).
“Our liberty is bedlam, and our dream is order in that bedlam,” quipped Mikhail
Zhvanetsky(2010),astand-upcomedianbornandraisedinUkraine’sOdessa.Ourinsiders’
insights lead us to believe that Zhvanetsky’s dictum appears to be more meaningful than the
writings of political commentators who see the likes of Lukashenka, Putin, and Yanukovich
as the sources of all evil, and the societies over which they preside as their victims.
Robert Putnam famously showed in his analysis of local communities in Italy that democ-
racy builds upon homegrown traditions of civility and trust. If, however, “laws … are made
to be broken, [and] fearing others’ lawlessness, people demand sterner discipline” (Putnam,
1993, p. 115), then a nourishing environment for autocratic regimes arises. Writing about
Russian political culture, a political scientist with close ties to the Kremlin acknowledged
that “the personication of political institutions and the great role of leaders … make up
for the deciency of mutual trust [emphasis added—G.I.]. That is why Russians lean not to
institutions but to strong personalities” (Nikonov, 2007). Belarusians likewise do, but perhaps
evenmoreso.Indeed,likeRussiansandUkrainians,Belarusiansarepermeatedbyadecit
of trust, loose ethical standards, and a winner-take-all mentality. But on top of that state of
mind, they have not as yet developed a clear-cut identity (Ioffe, 2008; Leshchenko, 2011)
42It had also been stated that the West should not sever ties with the Belarusian regime, as such a move would lead
toone-on-oneconfrontationwithRussia(JarabikandRojansky,2011).

774 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS
and often feel like pawns in a grand geopolitical game between Russia and the West. Under
such circumstances, establishing and maintaining order by authoritarian means may after
all not be a losing proposition, and the statistical data presented in this paper may prove us
right. It is of course an open question whether the current economic distress will destroy the
harmony between regime and society beyond repair. If it does, a time of trouble lies ahead
for Belarus.
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