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Неформални институции, идеологии и транзакционни разходи (Informal Institutions, Ideologies, and Transaction Costs)
Abstract
Статията проследява взаимовръзките в институционалната теория на Дъглас Норт между концепциите за неформални институции и идеологии, от една страна, и транзакционни разходи, от друга. В рамките на подхода не само институциите, но и идеологиите могат да бъдат разглеждани като средство за спестяване на транзакцонни разходи на обществено и индивидуално равнище. Подобна теоретична схема позволява икономическо обяснение на възникването и развитието на институциите, включително на институционалните процеси, протичащи при прехода към пазарно стопанство. Посочени са и аргументи против „икономизирането” на функциите на институциите (свеждането им до механизъм за намаляване на разходите за размяна), които идват по линия на т.нар. стар институционализъм и икономическата социология.
The article examines the interrelations between the concepts of informal institutions and transaction costs in D. North’s economic theory. Within his institutional framework not only institutions, but also ideologies can be seen as means for economizing transaction costs both on the individual and social level. This theoretic approach makes an economic explanation of the existence and development of institutions possible, including the institutional processes during the transition to a market economy. In the second part of the paper it is argued against the market interpretation of the functions of institutions. Opposing views to downgrading social norms to a mechanism for minimizing costs of exchange come from the so called old institutionalism and the economic sociology.
Систематизирани са основни отличаващи характеристики на взаимодействията между стопанските агенти в индивидуалистични и колективистични култури. Предложено е кратко обобщение на дебата в литературата относно връзката между култура и икономическо развитие и е обоснована продуктивността за икономическия анализ на доброто познаване на особеностите на националните култури. Обзорът по необходимост включва свидетелства и аргументи за съществуването на механизми, през които дълбоките аспекти на културата влияят чрез формирането на вярванията и предпочитанията върху икономическите резултати – това е демонстрирано нагледно през ефектите на социалния капитал. Някои от привидните противоречия в представените хипотези могат да бъдат разрешени, като се вземе предвид обхватът на групата, спрямо която се простират колективната идентичност и възприеманите споделени отговорности. Така се достига до основния извод от анализа, че видът колективизъм, който възпрепятства икономическото развитие, обикновено се заключава в лоялност към прекалено малка група от хора || Abstract: This article summarizes the main distinguishing characteristics
of the interactions between economic agents in individualistic and collectivist cultures. A brief systematisation of the debate in the literature on
the relationship between culture and economic development is proposed
and the productivity for the economic analysis of a good knowledge of the
peculiarities of national cultures is substantiated. The review necessarily
includes evidence and arguments for the existence of mechanisms
through which deep aspects of culture influence economic performance,
e.g., through the formation of beliefs and preferences – as demonstrated
by the effects of social capital. Some of the apparent contradictions in the
hypotheses presented can be resolved by considering the scope of the
group to which the collective identity and perceived shared responsibilities extend. This leads to the main conclusion of the analysis that the kind
of collectivism that hinders economic development usually consists in
loyalty to a narrow social group.
In this landmark work, a Nobel Prize-winning economist develops a new way of understanding the process by which economies change. Douglass North inspired a revolution in economic history a generation ago by demonstrating that economic performance is determined largely by the kind and quality of institutions that support markets. As he showed in two now classic books that inspired the New Institutional Economics (today a subfield of economics), property rights and transaction costs are fundamental determinants. Here, North explains how different societies arrive at the institutional infrastructure that greatly determines their economic trajectories. North argues that economic change depends largely on "adaptive efficiency," a society's effectiveness in creating institutions that are productive, stable, fair, and broadly accepted--and, importantly, flexible enough to be changed or replaced in response to political and economic feedback. While adhering to his earlier definition of institutions as the formal and informal rules that constrain human economic behavior, he extends his analysis to explore the deeper determinants of how these rules evolve and how economies change. Drawing on recent work by psychologists, he identifies intentionality as the crucial variable and proceeds to demonstrate how intentionality emerges as the product of social learning and how it then shapes the economy's institutional foundations and thus its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Understanding the Process of Economic Changeaccounts not only for past institutional change but also for the diverse performance of present-day economies. This major work is therefore also an essential guide to improving the performance of developing countries.
