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Will get fooled again: Emotionally intelligent people are easily duped by high-stakes deceivers
Legal and Criminological Psychology
Abstract
Purpose. There is major disagreement about the existence of individual differences in deception detection or naturally gifted detection ‘wizards’ (see O'Sullivan & Ekman, 2004 vs. Bond & Uysal, 2007 ). This study aimed to elucidate the role of a specific, and seemingly relevant individual difference – emotional intelligence (EI) and its subcomponents – in detecting high‐stakes, emotional deception.
Methods. Participants ( N = 116) viewed a sample of 20 international videos of individuals emotionally pleading for the safe return of their missing family member, half of whom were responsible for the missing person's disappearance/murder. Participants judged whether the pleas were honest or deceptive, provided confidence ratings, reported the cues they utilized, and rated their emotional response to each plea.
Results. EI was associated with overconfidence in assessing the sincerity of the pleas and greater self‐reported sympathetic feelings to deceptive targets (enhanced gullibility). Although total EI was not associated with discrimination of truths and lies, the ability to perceive and express emotion (a component of EI), specifically, was negatively related to detecting deceptive targets (lower sensitivity [ d′ ]). Combined, these patterns contributed negatively to the ability to spot emotional lies.
Conclusions. These findings collectively suggest that features of EI, and subsequent decision‐making processes, paradoxically may impair one's ability to detect deceit.
... On the another hand, some researchers have proposed the existence of lie detection 'wizards' who are exceptionally accurate and the reasons why (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 2004;O'Sullivan, 2005). Furthermore, some recent evidence suggested that psychophysiological measures or personality traits related to emotional sensitivity are related to lie detection performances (Baker et al., 2013;Duran, Tapiero & Michael, 2018;Lyons et al., 2013;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). But some of these studies can be criticized because of methodological and statistical issues or because of inconsistent and isolated results (Baker et al., 2013;Bond & Uysal, 2007;Duran, Tapiero et al., 2018;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). ...
... Furthermore, some recent evidence suggested that psychophysiological measures or personality traits related to emotional sensitivity are related to lie detection performances (Baker et al., 2013;Duran, Tapiero & Michael, 2018;Lyons et al., 2013;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). But some of these studies can be criticized because of methodological and statistical issues or because of inconsistent and isolated results (Baker et al., 2013;Bond & Uysal, 2007;Duran, Tapiero et al., 2018;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). Such inconsistent results unfortunately tend to be interpreted in terms of no-existent e ects, and this is abusively generalized to all other possible factors that have been rarely or not investigated (such as cognitive functions) and, unfortunately, it calls for ceasing all research on individual characteristics. ...
... In uenced by theories and ndings suggesting that telling lies also produces emotional responses, some studies have suggested that emotional sensitivity is the mechanism that underpins lie detection accuracy (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 2004;Etco et al., 2000;Malcolm & Keenan, 2003). However, some studies support the idea that emotions and emotional sensitivity rather interfere with lie detection (Baker et al., 2013;Lyons et al., 2013;Peace & Sinclair, 2012;Duran, et al., 2018;Peace et al., 2011). Indeed, when emotions are more salient, for example, in the contents of the declarations, detectors appear less accurate and are more incline to present a stronger truth bias (Baker et al., 2013;Peace et al., 2011;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). ...
The individual differences determining the ability to detect lies are poorly understood. This study investigated the predictive power of self-monitoring, lexical access, lexico-semantic processes, emotional prosody perception, discourse comprehension, mental imagery and attention on the ability to discriminate lies from truth and on response tendencies in a lie detection task. One hundred and four participants (50% female) were asked to listen to audio-recordings of people describing a relative (50% deceptive) and to judge whether each of them was lying or telling the truth. Participants were also asked to perform several auditory tasks assessing above-mentioned processes and also completed the Self-Monitoring Scale. Multiple regression analyses showed that emotional prosody perception predicted truth bias and that performance in the mental imagery task tended to predict the ability to distinguish truth from lies. These results suggest that competence in emotion recognition leads to label statements as being truthful.
... In our work, we introduce new directions for both theory development and empirical research to investigate the important relationships between emotional intelligence and deception. In contrast to prior research that has focused on emotional intelligence and deception detection (e.g., Baker et al. 2013;O'Sullivan 2005;Wojciechowski et al. 2014), our model links emotional intelligence to the use of deception (in particular, the decision to use deception and the effectiveness of deception), the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception (in particular, the restoration of trust and retaliation). Our model also considers moderators of the relationships between emotional intelligence and deception. ...
... In contrast toO'Sullivan (2005) andWojciechowski et al. (2014),Baker et al. (2013) found that though EI does not influence the use of deception in "high stakes" situations, people high on the perception dimension of EI are (actually) less likely to detect deception. However,Baker et al. (2013) studied deception in an extreme context (i.e., emotionally pleads from individuals for the safe return of their missing family member-of whom half were responsible for the disappearance and perhaps murder of the family member). ...
... In contrast toO'Sullivan (2005) andWojciechowski et al. (2014),Baker et al. (2013) found that though EI does not influence the use of deception in "high stakes" situations, people high on the perception dimension of EI are (actually) less likely to detect deception. However,Baker et al. (2013) studied deception in an extreme context (i.e., emotionally pleads from individuals for the safe return of their missing family member-of whom half were responsible for the disappearance and perhaps murder of the family member). We concur withWojciechowski et al. (2014) that the results ofBaker et al. (2013) are unlikely to generalize to the types of lies in that people tell in everyday situations (e.g., ordinary social interactions, negotiations, organizations).Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. ...
Deception is pervasive in negotiations and organizations, and emotions are critical to using, detecting, and responding to deception. In this article, we introduce a theoretical model to explore the interplay between emotional intelligence (the ability to perceive and express, understand, regulate, and use emotions) and deception in negotiations. In our model, we propose that emotional intelligence influences the decision to use deception, the effectiveness of deception, the ability to detect deception, and the consequences of deception (specifically, trust repair and retaliation). We consider the emotional intelligence of both deceivers and targets, and we consider characteristics of negotiators, their interaction, and the negotiation context that moderate these relationships. Our model offers a theoretical foundation for research on emotions, emotional intelligence, and deception and identifies a potential disadvantage of negotiating with an emotionally intelligent counterpart. Though prior work has focused on the advantages of being and interacting with people high in emotional intelligence, we assert that those most likely to deceive us may also be those highest in emotional intelligence.
... Furthermore, the detrimental effect of emotions is further emphasized by studies of people who are particularly sensitive to emotional stimuli. Thus, higher levels of emotional intelligence and empathy seem to be related to lower lie detection accuracy (Baker et al., 2013;Duran et al., 2019). This seems due to emotional contagion or the inability to suppress processes focused on emotions that lead observers to process cues that are irrelevant (Baker et al., 2013;Duran et al., 2019). ...
... Thus, higher levels of emotional intelligence and empathy seem to be related to lower lie detection accuracy (Baker et al., 2013;Duran et al., 2019). This seems due to emotional contagion or the inability to suppress processes focused on emotions that lead observers to process cues that are irrelevant (Baker et al., 2013;Duran et al., 2019). In addition, emotional sensitivity seems related to modification of levels of arousal that may affect attentional process and at least lie detection performance (Duran et al., 2018;Semmler & Brewer, 2002). ...
... However, the truth bias was observed only in judgments of statements of opinions and actions. The expected emotional truth bias (Baker et al., 2013;Peace & Sinclair, 2012) was not found. In addition, supplementary analyses revealed that the 3 types of contents were dissociated, meaning that, when confronted with these different types of statement, participants either use different cues and information to reach their veracity judgments, or they reach them through the use of different cognitive processes, or probably both. ...
People principally deceive others about opinions, actions and emotions. In two Experiments, this study examined the ability to detect these three types of lies. In Experiment 1, participants had to judge whether actors (50% females and 50% males) were telling the truth (50%) or lying (50%), whereas in Experiment 2, another sample of participants was asked to evaluate how convincing the statements were using a rating scale. One third of the statements were about activities and locations, 1/3 were opinions related to a topic of debate, and 1/3 described emotions experienced during an emotionally charged event. Results of both experiments showed that lies about opinions and emotions were detected better than lies about actions and that they were detected above chance level, unlike lies about actions. Furthermore, the truth bias was observed only in judgments about opinions and actions. Accordingly, Experiment 2 showed that lies about actions were rated as being more convincing than lies about opinions and emotions. Experiment 2 also showed that the difference between opinions, actions and emotions in lie detection was mostly due to participants’ level of empathy, while empathy and subclinical psychopathy seemed to explain the differences in truth bias. The possible reasons why the three types of content are dissociated are discussed.
... Sometimes lies can have serious consequences for society in terms of their human and financial costs (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Unfortunately, most observers, including law enforcement officers, perform suggest the involvement of empathic processes in lie detection (Baker, Brinke, & Porter, 2013;Lyons, Healy, & Bruno, 2013;O'Sullivan, 2005;Peace, Porter, & Almon, 2011;Peace & Sinclair, 2012). ...
... However, contrary to expectations, Baker et al. (2013) showed that emotional intelligence is associated with impairment of lie detection accuracy. The authors suggested that emotionally intelligent individuals may be less analytical due to their difficulties in suppressing processing focused on emotions. ...
... This puts them at risk of mistakenly empathizing with false emotions that disingenuous senders want to share (Ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). Baker et al. (2013) also suggested that emotional intelligence was associated with poor lie detection accuracy because individuals empathize with the emotional experience displayed by liars. Indeed, in addition to emotions they want to share, liars also display leakage cues about emotions they want to conceal (Ekman & Friesen, 1969;Ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). ...
Lies are notoriously difficult to detect. But it appears that some people are better at accomplishing this task than others even though the factors contributing to deception detection accuracy are not well understood. This study explored the influence of empathy on the detection of deception as a function of the detectors’ gender while dark personality traits were statistically controlled. Eighty men and 80 women were requested to judge whether individuals viewed in videos were giving their true opinion or not on current debatable issues (50% truthful and 50% deceptive narratives). Judges were divided into four groups according to their gender and their degree of empathy, as assessed using the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy. It was found that women with lower levels of empathy distinguished false from true opinions better than women with higher empathy, whereas no such difference was found in men. These results suggest that the degree of empathy in women influences their ability to detect deception and supports recent studies showing that emotional skills negatively affect deception detection ability. We suggest that less empathic women are less affected by emotional contagion and thus may be more able to focus on non-emotional cues that might reveal deception.
... They also concluded that greater EI may enable the integration of perceived affective/nonverbal and cognitive/verbal cues and the identification of inconsistencies between these cues, which is notable because inconsistent cues can signal deception. However, Baker, ten Brinke, and Porter (2013), using a trait measure of EI, found that global EI was not related to discriminating between high-stakes emotional truths and lies. Instead, a negative relationship existed between the emotionality factor of EI (perceiving and expressing emotion) and detecting liars. ...
... We used a highstakes truth and deception detection accuracy task following the methods of Wright Whelan et al. (2015a) but with materials expressly compiled for the present study. This paradigm has been used in several previous studies, with different populations, resulting in overall accuracy rates ranging from 49% to 72% (e.g., Baker et al., 2013;Canter, Ioannou, Youngs, & Chungh, 2016;Wright Whelan et al., 2015a). Participants viewed 20 video clips of individuals making pleas for help with missing or murdered relatives in real-life criminal investigations. ...
... This may inform the reasoning process about the liar's deceptive intentions, which may include the integration of (inconsistent) affective and cognitive input derived from the liar's verbal and nonverbal behavior (Wojciechowski et al., 2014). Our results extend the findings of Baker et al. (2013), whose analyses demonstrated that highly emotionally intelligent participants developed considerable sympathy for liars, which negatively affected their ability to accurately categorize liars. Baker et al. concluded that individuals high in EI may not engage in detached reasoning because of a tendency to focus on emotions. ...
Despite evidence that variation exists between individuals in high-stakes truth and deception detection accuracy rates, little work has investigated what differences in individuals’ cognitive and emotional abilities contribute to this variation. Our study addressed this question by examining the role played by cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM), emotional intelligence (EI), and various aspects of attention (alerting, orienting, executive control) in explaining variation in accuracy rates among 115 individuals [87 women; mean age = 27.04 years (SD = 11.32)] who responded to video clips of truth-tellers and liars in real-world, high-stakes contexts. Faster attentional alerting supported truth detection, and better cognitive ToM and perception of emotion (an aspect of EI) supported deception detection. This evidence indicates that truth and deception detection are distinct constructs supported by different abilities. Future research may address whether interventions targeting these cognitive and emotional traits can also contribute to improving detection skill.
... It also contradicts the extensive literature showing that non-verbal Emotional Intelligence and Detection Deception 5 behaviors are generally invalid cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). In addition, recent findings suggest that EI can even be detrimental to deception detection because high-EI individuals tend to be overconfident in their ability to assess the sincerity of genuine versus lying pleaders, are more gullible, and ultimately do not outperform low-EI people at detection (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). However, one study alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that EI might actually not help detection. ...
... However, direct evidence for the relationship between EI and deception detection is almost non-existent. The only study directly examining this relationship even suggests that EI could be detrimental to detection (Baker et al., 2013). Baker et al. had participants watch videos of individuals pleading for the safe return of missing family members and then asked them to judge whether the pleas were honest or deceptive (i.e., cases where the pleader was actually responsible for the missing person's disappearance or murder). ...
... High-EI participants were more emotional, demonstrated more sympathy towards deceptive pleaders, and were ultimately less accurate in their judgments. Baker et al. (2013) suggested that high-EI individuals may be lacking in skepticism, which makes them gullible and compromises their ability to detect deception. Similarly, a Emotional Intelligence and Detection Deception 11 number of researchers have highlighted the relevance of skepticism to deception detection (e.g., Forgas & East, 2008), but empirical examination of this relationship is scarce. ...
Being able to identify if someone is telling the truth or lying is essential in many social situations, for instance in police interrogations or employment interviews. Unfortunately, people are generally poor at lie detection. Some researchers have argued that a small category of individuals are detection wizards who can achieve substantially higher detection accuracy because they have high levels of emotional intelligence (EI) and are better able to identify non-verbal cues to deceit. These propositions have been popularized in the media and are appealing to some practitioners, but are based on very limited empirical evidence. We conducted three experimental studies to test these propositions, relying on different samples and using both trait and ability measures of EI. We measured deception detection using different approaches (in-person and video-based) and contexts (social interaction and job interview). One study measured skepticism, and another used eye-tracking technology to capture participants' reliance on non-verbal information. Results showed that high-EI individuals indeed rely more on non-verbal information. However, EI, skepticism, and the use of non-verbal cues are unrelated to deception detection. We thus argue that detection wizards are likely a myth, and it would be more productive to focus on evidence-based methods to improve deception detection.
... Research has suggested that there are at least two individual differences relevant in detecting lies. First, high emotional intelligence could hinder lie detection (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013), possibly via increased emotive truth bias. Second, there is a positive link between lie production and detection, indicating that those who lie more are better at detecting when others are deceitful (Wright, Berry, & Bird, 2012). ...
... e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / p a i d intelligence has been found to be a negative predictor of lie detection (Baker et al., 2013), we predict that those high in narcissism perform poorer when detecting high-stakes lies. ...
... Further, relationship between empathy and the Dark Triad depend on the sex of the individual, where empathy deficits are localised to primary psychopathy in men, and narcissism in women . As empathy and emotional intelligence could have an impact on lie detection (Baker et al., 2013), it is important to investigate the sex differences between accuracy and Dark Triad as well. However, there is not enough previous literature to make specific predictions for each sex, and therefore, the analyses on sex differences in this study are exploratory in nature. ...
Although overall people are poor at lie detection, the accuracy depends on the situation (e.g., high versus low-stakes), as well as the characteristics of the person detecting the lie. In an on-line experiment (N = 347), we explored the relationship between the Dark Triad (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy), and accuracy in detecting lies in high-stakes, emotional TV appeals. The participants filled in a 27-item Dark Triad measure, and watched 20 video-clips of people appealing to find a missing person, half of whom had murdered the person they were appealing to find. In both cross-correlational and regression analyses, Machiavellianism had a significant positive relationship with accuracy in women, and narcissism had a significant negative relationship with accuracy in men. Our results suggest that the Dark Triad is a relevant individual difference affecting lie detection, but it has different correlates for men and women.
... For example, Bond and DePaulo (2008) conducted a metaanalysis on several studies, and found that people showed little variation in deception detection accuracy, casting doubt on the existence of lie detection wizards (O'Sullivan and Ekman, 2004). Nevertheless, there may be yet undiscovered individual characteristics that enhance deception detection (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). In this respect, an especially relevant domain of individual differences across people is the ability to make decisions and judgments based on the identification and recognition of emotions in others (O'Sullivan, 2005). ...
... For example, Sylwester, Lyons, Buchanan, Nettle, and Roberts (2012) found that higher scores on a Theory of Mind measure had an association with enhanced accuracy of detecting co-operators in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. However, social intelligence may also relate to more compassionate reactions to emotional lies, thus hindering the ability to detect emotional deception (Baker et al., 2013). Rather than improving lie detection, perhaps the ability to perceive emotions in others is related to higher gullibility, or the tendency to rate liars as being truthful. ...
... The enhanced lie detection ability of women in our sample is intriguing, and contradicts the study of Baker et al. (2013), who found that emotional intelligence (typically higher in women, see Schutte et al., 1998) relates to higher gullibility when identifying liars. Women may rely more on intuition when processing subliminal emotional cues (Donges, Kersting, & Suslow, 2012), which could be an asset in deception detection tasks (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009). ...
We investigated primary and secondary psychopathy and the ability to detect high-stakes, real-life emotional lies in an on-line experiment (N = 150). Using signal detection analysis, we found that lie detection ability was overall above chance level, there was a tendency towards responding liberally to the test stimuli, and women were more accurate than men. Further, sex moderated the relationship between psy-chopathy and lie detection ability; in men, primary psychopathy had a significant positive correlation with the ability to detect lies, whereas in women there was a significant negative correlation with deception detection. The results are discussed with reference to evolutionary theory and sex differences in processing socio-emotional information.
... As for more complex social judgments involving decoding of emotions, the findings have been less positive. In a study using realistic multimedia stimuli, the self-reported ability to express and perceive emotion was associated with poorer performance in discriminating sincere and insincere emotional displays (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2012). Trait EI also failed to predict the ability to learn a facial emotion as a cue for discriminating a person's intent (Fellner et al., 2012). ...
... Emotions may be expressed as short-lived microexpressions (Ekman, 2007), especially when the person is attempting to conceal emotions or intent (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). Although it remains controversial whether TEI is associated with superior detection of deceptive emotion (Baker et al., 2012), TEI should relate to more accurate perception of emotion microexpressions. ...
... There is some psychometric evidence that both general and emotion-specific recognition competencies contribute to emotion recognition (Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2012). Also, TEI may relate not so much to basic encoding and attentional processes but to higher order processes for assimilating contextual information into emotion perception (although, see Baker et al., 2012;Fellner et al., 2012). Newer multimedia assessment approaches might be investigated as predictors of context-dependent perception (Fallon et al., 2014). ...
This study tested whether trait emotional intelligence (TEI) measures of narrow bandwidth predict perception of facial emotion, using two tasks: identification of microexpressions of emotion and controlled visual search for target emotions. A total of 129 undergraduates completed multiple scales for TEI, as well as cognitive ability, personality, and stress measures. TEI was associated with a reduced stress response, but failed to predict performance on either task, contrary to the initial hypothesis. However, performance related significantly to higher cognitive intelligence, subjective task engagement, and use of task-focused coping. Individual differences in attentional resources may support processing of both emotive and non-emotive stimuli. Conceptual models of emotional intelligence (EI) identify emotion perception as central to this construct (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). In research, emotion identification has often been operationalized using facial perception tasks, reflecting the importance of facial emotion in social interaction (Ekman, 2007; Roberts et al., 2006). Thus, a valid assessment of EI should predict facial emotion perception. However, several key issues remain unresolved. As further discussed below, associations between EI and emotion perception are inconsistent across studies,
... Real lies are defined as lies that are simply not true, and involve malicious motives, are self-serving, and are deemed not acceptable (Bryant, 2008). White lies, or those where the "falsehood [is] not meant to injure anyone, and [is] of little moral input" (Bok, 1978, p. 58), are often regarded as acceptable because the deception is viewed as harmless or trivial, and often serves prosocial purposes (Baker et al., 2013). Many of the lies we tell everyday, such as expressing to someone that their haircut looks amazing when you actually think it is not, are considered white lies and may facilitate relationship building. ...
... Deception detection is also inaccurate because we have a truth-bias, where we judge more truths as truths than lies as lies (Baker et al., 2013;Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This leads to what has been coined as the "veracity effect"that is, truth accuracy is greater than chance, but accurate detection of lies often falls below chance levels (as described above) (Levine et al., 1999). ...
Contrary to popular belief, research indicates that individuals in the general population are poor at detecting truthfulness or deception using facial cues (Stel & van Dijk. Social Influence, 13(3):137–149, 2018). We also tend to have a truth-bias, where we judge more truths as truths than lies as lies (Baker et al. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 18(2):300–313, 2013; Bond & DePaulo. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3):214–234, 2006). Successful deception detection is often based on multiple sources of information, and it may take days, weeks, or months to draw conclusions about others’ truthfulness (Park et al. Communication Monographs, 69(2):144–157, 2002). Educators encounter numerous types of deception, and the accuracy of lie detection could be quite useful when investigating allegations of academic misconduct. Findings from deception research suggest that discovery interviews used in academic misconduct cases may not be worthwhile unless educators and administrators are specifically trained to detect deception (Driskell. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18(8):713–731, 2012) and examine multiple sources of evidence before coming to conclusions (Ellis et al. Technology, policy and research: Establishing evidentiary standards for contract cheating cases. In T. Bretag (Ed.), A research agenda for academic integrity (pp. 138–151). Edward Elgar, 2020). This chapter summarizes the peer-reviewed research literature on detecting deception and outlines the implications for investigations of academic cheating.
... Yet, not everybody lies to the same extent with more recent studies showing that a few prolific liars are telling the majority of lies might facilitate lie detection [35,36]. Actual studies, however, showed that higher emotional intelligence, particularly emotionality, yielded impaired lie detection abilities [37]. For cultural differences, the need for lie detection might differ as a function of where you live on the globe, because levels of trust, deception, and corruption vary cross-culturally [4,9,38]. ...
... When designing the studies, we selected individual difference measures that have been mentioned in the lying literature before [20,22,23,25,33,34,37,39]. Most obvious was the Dark Triad, because of what it stands for, malevolent behavioral tendencies such as self-promotion, manipulation (including lying), and lack of empathy [21][22][23][24][25]. ...
Previous literature on lie detection abilities bears an interesting paradox. On the group level, people detect others’ lies at guessing level. However, when asked to evaluate their own abilities, people report being able to detect lies (i.e., self-reported lie detection). Understanding this paradox is important because decisions which rely on credibility assessment and deception detection can have serious implications (e.g., trust in others, legal issues). In two online studies, we tested whether individual differences account for variance in self-reported lie detection abilities. We assessed personality traits (Big-Six personality traits, Dark Triad), empathy, emotional intelligence, cultural values, trust level, social desirability, and belief in one’s own lie detection abilities. In both studies, mean self-reported lie detection abilities were above chance level. Then, lower out-group trust and higher social desirability levels predicted higher self-reported lie detection abilities. These results suggest that social trust and norms shape our beliefs about our own lie detection abilities.
... Research of the kind just mentioned reports detrimental effects of EI at the intrapersonal level, in contrast to work that addresses detrimental effects at the interpersonal level (Schlegel 2020). With reference to the latter, Baker et al. (2013) found that greater trait EI is associated with more sympathetic responses to deceptive as opposed to truthful individuals. These authors suggested that high EI individuals might have given more weight to emotional cues, which are generally more pronounced in deceptive individuals, which then triggered stronger sympathetic responses and led high EI individuals to believe that deceivers were in fact sincere. ...
... Our results supporting the idea that high EI individuals are hypersensitive to emotions and emotion information are consistent with emerging findings regarding undesirable side effects of EI (Davis and Nichols 2016). In particular, hypersensitivity effects compatible with those we have reported here have been observed in studies related to stress management and responsivity discussed earlier (Baker et al. 2013;Bechtoldt and Schneider 2016;Matthews et al. 2006;Mikolajczak et al. 2009), suggesting that the hyper-awareness of high EI individuals may under certain circumstances contribute to ill health (Ciarrochi et al. 2002). ...
In this article, we provide preliminary evidence for the ‘hypersensitivity hypothesis’, according to which Emotional Intelligence (EI) functions as a magnifier of emotional experience, enhancing the effect of emotion and emotion information on thinking and social perception. Measuring ability EI, and in particular Emotion Understanding, we describe an experiment designed to determine whether, relative to those low in EI, individuals high in EI were more affected by the valence of a scenario describing a target when making an affective social judgment. Employing a sample of individuals from the general population, high EI participants were found to provide more extreme (positive or negative) impressions of the target as a function of the scenario valence: positive information about the target increased high EI participants’ positive impressions more than it increased low EI participants’ impressions, and negative information increased their negative impressions more. In addition, EI affected the amount of recalled information and this led high EI individuals to intensify their affective ratings of the target. These initial results show that individuals high on EI may be particularly sensitive to emotions and emotion information, and they suggest that this hypersensitivity might account for both the beneficial and detrimental effects of EI documented in the literature. Implications are discussed.
... Research on the relationship between empathy and deception detection is scarce. Being more empathic relates to better emotional cue classification (Svetieva & Frank, 2016) but also poorer veracity judgements (Baker et al., 2013;Israel et al., 2014). While this seems at odds with the EBA's claims, it can be understood if one conceptualises empathy as being related to emotion classification and not affective authenticity discrimination. ...
... Such a result would be unexplainable using the accuracy-based approach, yet it is congruent and fully interpretable in terms of veracity judgements. As such, the negative correlation between accuracy and empathy suggests that high empathy may hinder decoding, potentially due to the misinterpretation of deceptive emotions as being genuine (e.g., Baker et al., 2013;DesJardins & Hodges, 2015;Israel et al., 2014). Alternatively, less empathic individuals may have an advantage in judging veracity as they potentially utilise cues, weigh information, and/or judge statements differently, leading to better accuracy (e.g., relying more on content). ...
People hold strong beliefs about the role of emotional cues in detecting deception. While research on the diagnostic value of such cues has been mixed, their influence on human veracity judgments is yet to be fully explored. Here, we address the relationship between emotional information and veracity judgments. In Study 1, the role of emotion recognition in the process of detecting naturalistic lies was investigated. Decoders’ veracity judgments were compared based on differences in trait empathy and their ability to recognize micro-expressions and subtle expressions. Accuracy was found to be unrelated to facial cue recognition and negatively related to empathy. In Study 2, we manipulated decoders’ emotion recognition ability and the type of lies they saw: experiential or affective (emotional and unemotional). Decoders either received emotion recognition training, bogus training, or no training. In all scenarios, training did not affect veracity judgments. Experiential lies were easier to detect than affective lies; however, affective unemotional lies were overall the hardest to judge. The findings illustrate the complex relationship between emotion recognition and veracity judgments, with abilities for facial cue detection being high yet unrelated to deception accuracy.
... Research comparing EI with lie production ability has produced disparate results, most likely due to the variation in study designs and measures used (Levine, 2018;. Although a statistically significant negative relationship has been found between lie production ability and EI (Baker et al., 2013), others have found no relationship at all (Wright et al., 2012), suggesting further exploration is required. Interestingly, although both greater DT traits and greater EI were theorized to relate to effective lie production ability, research shows that both psychopathy and Machiavellianism are negatively correlated with EI (Austin et al., 2007;Lyons et al., 2013). ...
... Although no research to date has compared HEX-ACO results with lie production ability , research focusing on the personality traits of people who are more successful storytellers -comprising truth or lies -reveals that people high in expressiveness and social tact are more successful at lying than people who display social anxiety (Riggio et al., 1987). Tests which could select certain personality traits and exclude others would be valuable when selecting lie producers, such as effective law enforcement officers (Baker et al., 2013). ...
Effectiveness as an undercover operative or human source (informant) handler relies on the believability of police in fictious roles, yet the use of deception by law enforcement in covert fields of policing and criminal interviews remains relatively underexplored in the literature. Moreover, selection processes for these critical police roles do not currently include a test of deception ability. This study investigates the lie production and truth production ability of 50 Australian police officers-in-training by comparing their results on a game of deception with their personality traits as tested by the HEXACO-PI-R-100 item version, the Short-D3 and the MSCEIT. Results indicate that sex, age, dark triad traits and emotional intelligence have no relationship with either truth or lie production. HEXACO results indicate low social self-esteem was related to high lie production ability. Further research is needed to explore extraversion, social skills, and confidence as they relate to the credibility of a ‘storyteller’.
... Research on the relationship between empathy and deception detection is scarce. Being more empathic relates to better emotional cue classification (Svetieva & Frank, 2016) but also poorer veracity judgements (Baker et al., 2013;Israel et al., 2014). While this seems at odds with the EBA's claims, it can be understood if one conceptualises empathy as being related to emotion classification and not affective authenticity discrimination. ...
... Such a result would be unexplainable using the accuracy-based approach, yet it is congruent and fully interpretable in terms of veracity judgements. As such, the negative correlation between accuracy and empathy suggests that high empathy may hinder decoding, potentially due to the misinterpretation of deceptive emotions as being genuine (e.g., Baker et al., 2013;DesJardins & Hodges, 2015;Israel et al., 2014). Alternatively, less empathic individuals may have an advantage in judging veracity as they potentially utilise cues, weigh information, and/or judge statements differently, leading to better accuracy (e.g., relying more on content). ...
People hold strong beliefs regarding the role of emotional cues in detecting deception. While research on the diagnostic value of such cues has been mixed, their influence on human veracity judgments should not be ignored. Here, we address the relationship between emotional information and veracity judgments. In Study 1, the role of emotion recognition in the process of detecting naturalistic lies was investigated. Decoders’ accuracy was compared based on differences in trait empathy and their ability to recognize microexpressions and subtle expressions. Accuracy was found to be unrelated to facial cue recognition but negatively related to empathy. In Study 2, we manipulated decoders’ emotion recognition ability and the type of lies they saw: experiential or affective. Decoders either received emotion recognition training, bogus training, or no training. In all scenarios, training was not found to impact on accuracy. Experiential lies were easier to detect than affective lies, but, affective emotional lies were easier to detect than affective unemotional lies. The findings suggest that emotion recognition has a complex relationship with veracity judgments.
... The absence of an ethical component or the application of moral relevance meant leaders could use the learned tactics of emotionally intelligence to achieve unscrupulous goals. Baker, Brinke, and Porter (2013) presented a stunning assertion regarding leaders that received emotional intelligence training and their confidence. Often these leaders became overconfident, allowing a dishonest individual to deceive them or lure them into corruption. ...
... For example, "Akerjordet and Severinsson argued that emotional intelligence does not necessarily make one an ethical person as these attributes can be used for anti-social as well as social reasons" (as cited in Carragher & Gormley, 2016, p. 88-89). Ethics and morality aside, Baker, Brinke, and Porter (2013) wrote about the gullibility of emotional intelligence people falling prey to amoral individuals. The hubris of people with high emotional intelligence only compounded my fear that amoral leaders can twist a positive rudimentary system of development into a negative. ...
A majority of current leadership programs are failing to deliver a comprehensive approach to leadership development by not providing middle and frontline managers the skills to enhance their potential to develop others. In failing to generate a comprehensive system, animosity towards all types of leadership has been festering for over 40 years as first identified by Greenleaf in 1977. The purpose of the study was to establish a link between the theoretical paradigms of servant leadership and self-leadership using the lens of emotional intelligence to generate an integral leadership development framework. The conceptual framework used Goleman et al.’s version of emotional intelligence, Spears’s model of servant leadership, and Manz’s concepts of self-leadership. The research question examined the interrelationship between the three theoretical paradigms and used the analysis to create a theoretical framework. A paradigm and systematic word search phrase yielded an initial sample of 1356 research articles. Using text scrutinization to achieve saturation, I used 342 articles to evaluate the gap between the three theoretical paradigms. The analysis of the secondary data used Edwards’s approach to metatheory-building. The results yielded the beginnings of a new theory of self-perpetuating leadership style called sustainable leadership. Also noted based on the literature a serious absence of ethics, morality, or spirituality in leadership development. This study is important because it uses a holistic framework based on development techniques found in three theoretical leadership paradigms to help aspiring leaders to develop others. The positive social change that may result is an improvement in leadership skills, over time, through a comprehensive approach to leadership development for aspiring leaders.
... However, the two constructs are not synonymous, and it is not possible to predict whether EI training would improve individuals' ability to detect cues of untrustworthiness. For example, Baker et al. (2013) found that in a courtroom context, judges with high EI tended to let their empathy and compassion override their objectivity when hearing evidence from emotionally deceptive criminals. Intriguingly, high EI judges missed emotion-related cues such as a defendant's 'crocodile tears', and they suffered impairments to their decision-making. ...
... As explained in the introduction, nonverbal cues seem not connected to a better classification accuracy [26,27]. In line, while [38] found that emotional intelligence leads to a higher use of nonverbal cues, deception detection was not heightened; emotional intelligence rather seems to lead to an overestimation of the own lie detection ability [39]. [40] concluded that the aspect "perception of emotion" of emotional intelligence supported the deception detection. ...
Based on recent popular money priming research results, which conclude that money 4 makes self-sufficient (e.g. less interest in other people), we assumed that people are less interested 5 in finding out whether others are lying or telling the truth. In a laboratory experiment, 163 students 6 (85 women, 78 men, MAge = 23.08, ranging from 18 to 36 years) were primed by actively handling 7 money (versus paper sheets). Afterwards, they classified 24 video statements as true or deceptive 8 (senders describing their most/least favorite movie), rated their classification confidence for each 9 decision and then answered control questions. Results revealed no influence of priming condition 10 on judgmental bias, classification accuracy, and classification confidence. Also the level of self-re-11 ported motivation to find out who lied or told the truth did not differ between conditions. Higher 12 motivation was correlated to higher classification confidence. Additionally, and in line with Rein-13 hard (2010) and Reinhard et al. (2011), higher classification accuracy correlated to a higher use of 14 verbal content cues for classification decisions. So, while we were able to replicate these findings, 15 our results contradict the assumption of a money prime influence on lie detection ability. Conclud-16 ing, our results make self-sufficiency in this context questionable and offer next steps for research.
... As explained in the introduction, nonverbal cues do not seem to be connected to a better classification accuracy [28,29]. In line, while [47] found that emotional intelligence leads to a higher use of nonverbal cues, deception detection was not heightened; emotional intelligence rather seems to lead to an overestimation of the own lie detection ability [48]. [49] concluded that the aspect "perception of emotions" of emotional intelligence supported the deception detection. ...
Based on recent popular money priming research results, which conclude that money makes self-sufficient (e.g. less interest in other people), we assumed that people are less interested in finding out whether others are lying or telling the truth. In a laboratory experiment, 163 students (85 women, 78 men, MAge = 23.08, ranging from 18 to 36 years) were primed by actively handling money (versus paper sheets). Afterwards, they classified 24 video statements as true or deceptive (senders describing their most/least favorite movie), rated their classification confidence for each decision and then answered control questions. Results revealed no influence of priming condition on judgmental bias, classification accuracy, and classification confidence. Also the level of self-reported motivation to find out who lied or told the truth did not differ between conditions. Higher motivation was correlated to higher classification confidence. Additionally, and in line with Reinhard (2010) and Reinhard et al. (2011), higher classification accuracy correlated to a higher use of verbal content cues for classification decisions. Thus, while we were able to replicate these findings, our results contradict the assumption of a money prime influence on lie detection ability. Concluding, our results make self-sufficiency in this context questionable and offer next steps for research.
... indicating that the general population perceives these alternative materials with an accuracy similar to chance. These results align with the requirements set by previous studies on deception detection using video-type materials (Baker et al., 2013;Canter et al., 2016;Stewart et al., 2019;Vrij, 2008). Consequently, we consider the selected videos to be valid for use in the formal experiment. ...
In evolution, romantic relationships serve as the foundation for breeding and producing offspring. The ability to detect deception in these relationships can safeguard the investment and cultivation of descendants, leading to greater chances of survival and reproduction. However, barely any research has been carried out within this domain. The current study investigated the preliminary relationship between romantic relationships, mentaliz-ing ability, and deception detection ability through an empirical experiment. Participants were primed by their romantic experiences and neutral experiences, and then went through a Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RTM) task and the deception detecting task for real person crime-type videos. Results showed that romantic relationships can improve participants' emotion recognition ability toward negative emotions, and females performed better in the deception detection task than males did. Most importantly, romantic relationships can improve participants' deception detection ability through the mediator of mentalizing ability. Though gender difference was not statistically significant in the RTM task, the results lay a solid foundation for further investigation into females' menta-lizing ability and disclose the evolutionary meaning of romantic relationships.
... Исследователи криминального манипулирования при мошенничестве констатируют, что в его основе находятся обман и злоупотребление доверием (Онищенко, 2005). Было показано, что способность различать ложь положительно коррелирует с открытостью в опытe и нейротизмом, отрицательно -c экстраверсией и эмоциональным интеллектом (Mayer et al., 2008); ; (Baker et al., 2013), а также зависит от пола (Знаков, 2001); (Егоров, 2018). Майер и др. ...
Th e article presents the results of an empirical study of the relationship of psychological characteristics (traits of the Big Five, values, cognitive styles) with behavior when contacting telephone scammers pretending to be bank employees. Th e relevance of the study is associated with an increase in the number of victims of telephone fraud, especially among the elderly, and the need to clarify psychological characteristics that allow to resist manipulative infl uence. Th e aim of the work was to identify the psychological characteristics of people at risk of telephone fraud and prone to manipulative infl uences. Th e research is based on the hypothesis that such characteristics are revealed as “Cooperation” and “Conscientiousness” on the “Big Five”, as well as the style of thinking “naive optimism” and security values. Th e study involved respondents aged 50+ (N = 70,26 of them were men, the average age was 61 years). The following questionnaires were used: an abbreviated version of the “NEO-FFI” questionnaire “NEO PI-R” by P. Costa and R. McRae; “Portrait value Questionnaire by Sh. Schwartz — Revised PVQ-R”; CTI Constructive Th inking Inventory, by Epstein. In order to fi nd out whether the respondents had encountered fraudsters, what feelings it had caused and what actions would be taken when contacting “imaginary” bank employees by phone, the authors developed a questionnaire. According to the results obtained, respondents who constitute a risk group exposed to the manipulative infl uence of fraudsters were identifi ed. People aged 50+ with pronounced security values, naive optimistic way of thinking, high selfcontrol, who put the interests of the group above their own, inclined to cooperate, make up a group at risk of being manipulated by telephone scammers. It is concluded that 1. Th e key characteristics of a victim of telephone fraud are not the desire to get rich, but the fear of losing what is available. 2. At the level of attitudes, it is possible to form the ability to resist telephone fraud in people aged 70+. 3. Th e characteristics of resistance to manipulative infl uence may be a combination of low self-control and cooperation with other people, the lack of signifi cance of security values and the lack of naive optimism.
... В то же время, как показывают результаты исследования, не могут распознать ложь в сценариях те респонденты, кто набирал высокие баллы по общительности и доверию [18]. Высокий эмоциональный интеллект (ЭИ) отрицательно влияет на способность распознавать эмоциональную ложь других [19], а молодые женщины с высоко развитой чертой ЭИ склонны к преувеличению чужой честности [20]. J. Mayer и др. ...
Fraud is widespread and every day it is more and more creative. Machiavellianism is of great interest for the symptom complex of fraud victims and resistance to manipulative behavior. The authors studied the psychological profile of the low and high machiavellians. The first hypothesis was that low machiavellians have different level of hostility, development of such traits as Consent and Conscientiousness, moral identity, anti-social creativity, and thinking styles, than high machiavellians. The second hypothesis said that machiavellians of different levels have different values. According to the hypothesis, low machiavellians value social focus, while high machiavellians value personal focus. The sample consisted of 150 students (the average age was 18.8 ±1.50). We used the fol-lowing adapted questionnaires: aggression (A. Bass, M.Perry), "NEO-FFI" of the question-naire "NEO PI-R" (P. Costa, R. MacRae), "Mac-IV", behavioral features of malevolent crea-tivity (N. Hao et al.), PVQ-R (Sh. Schwartz), CTI (Epstein). The questionnaire By K. Aquina and A. Reed II (2002) was used to diagnose the moral identity. Low machiavellians have significantly higher (according to the Mann-Whitney criterion) Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, moral identity, higher values of Social focus, General Scale of Constructive Thinking, Naive optimism and significantly lower anti-social creativity, higher values of Personal focus, Categorical thinking, hostility. Naive optimism significantly positively correlated with the values of Achievement, Security – personal, Security – Public, interpersonal Conformity, Universalism concern for nature, Benevolence as the sense of duty". According to regression analysis, the predictors of Naive optimism were the values Security – personal and Security – public. We have compiled a psychological profile of young people with low values of Machiavel-lianism. It includes such features as the importance of moral identity, low hostility, control of one's own impulses, cooperation with other people, consideration of the interests of others, overcoming personal interests for the sake of the interests of others, self-restraint and order. They will not use their own creativity to harm other people; they are able to adapt their way of thinking to the requirements of the situation. The peculiarity of low machiavellians is a high naive optimism, that is situational, and combined with the significance of the values of per-sonal and public security. Naive optimism can manifest itself in situations where somebody can offer something that is meaningful to a person with a naive optimism mindset. In such situations, it is possible to use unconstructive strategies, and be unable to recognize the threat. The listed set of characteristics creates a risk of being manipulated by fraudsters. The results show that thinking styles, values, and levels of self-control are important for the study of manipulative behavior victims and the study of resistance to such behavior in people of different age.
... Studies of lie detection based on videotaped police interviews with persons suspected of serious crimes, later confirmed guilty (e.g., Mann et al., 2008), do not indicate any differences in the suspect's demeanor between when he is telling a straight lie and when he (later) is telling the truth, and the overall hit rate is not much above chance level. Likewise, studies of TV interviews of mourning relatives of victims of serious crimes begging the perpetrator to come forward, some of whom later turned out to have committed the crime (Vrij and Mann, 2001;Baker et al., 2013), show that truthfulness judgments were close to chance level (for a single exception, see Wright Whelan et al., 2014). A study of routine police controls of cars, some of which had a minor crime to conceal, showed no above-chance level detection of the true crimes (Carlucci et al., 2013). ...
... This effect may be particularly marked in the case of individuals who have superior emotion perception abilities. For example, the ability to perceive and express emotion in others is associated with lower deception detection, mostly due to an increased sympathetic response to deceivers (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). ...
... It is important to carry out this study because, although the acquisition of technical and theoretical knowledge is fundamental and necessary in higher education, in our current social reality, it is no longer sufficient (Baker et al., 2013;Rivers and Willans, 2013;Murphy, 2014;Di Fabio and Bucci, 2016). Students must also develop values and attitudes that guide the transfer and applicability of pure knowledge to real challenges and scenarios of personal, social, academic, and professional progress (Griffin and Reason, 2010;Zepke et al., 2014;Theron and Bitzer, 2016). ...
Since the introduction of the Bologna Process, the goal of education has been not only to acquire technical skills but also to master other skills, such as teamwork, effective communication skills, time optimization, and the ability to manage one's emotions. The present work describes a program to develop emotional intelligence in higher education, the “Emotional Intelligence Training Program,” with a multimethodological approach that offers the opportunity for university students to develop their emotional intelligence. A total of 192 higher education students participated in this educational experience. Of the participants, 66% were women, and 34% were men; the average age of the sample was 18.83 years with a standard deviation of 2.73. The results indicate that our program can help improve emotional intelligence through three proposed methodologies: online, in the classroom, and coaching. It has been demonstrated that the program is effective in the three methodological modalities presented, offering a range of possibilities to future users because it is possible to select the most appropriate modality based on the resources and possibilities available in each situation. Finally, Future research should focus on the application of this program to assess the acquisition of emotional competences at the postgraduate level.
... Subjective glasses for judgements People may differ from each other in the way in which they perceive and interpret the deceptive cues, and consequently make different judgements in the very same case (Nahari, Glicksohn, and Nachson, 2010). For example, Nahari (2012) demonstrated that the same statement was assessed by professional lie detectors (such as police officers) as being poor in detail and by laypersons (students) as being rich in detail, while Baker, ten Brinke, and Porter (2013) showed that emotionally intelligent people are easily fooled by deceivers. Judgements, therefore, can be biased by the personal characteristics of the observer, such as experience, personality, or attitudes. ...
This chapter presents the challenges of, and advances made
in, assessing the veracity of accounts in the forensic context.
Initially, the difficulties in discriminating truths from lies,
without tools, are discussed. Subsequently, primary examples
of lie detection methods are reviewed, and their accuracy
rates and limitations discussed. Their applicability to specific
situations and interviewees is assessed, as well as their
vulnerability to countermeasures and judgmental biases.
Finally, several steps are proposed that an investigator might
take to improve his or her ability to detect lies.
... Цілком логічне у цій ситуації припущення про вірогідний зв'язок емоційного інтелекту (ЕІ), який включає вміння розпізнавати невербальну поведінку та емоції, з розпізнаванням лжі. Проте у своєму дослідженні А. Бекер (Baker, 2012) доводить протилежне. Дослідник зазначає, що високий рівень розвитку емоційного інтелекту негативно впливає на розпізнавання лжі і водночас позитивно -на рівень розпізнавання правди, оскільки, на думку автора, одним із критеріїв розрізнення повідомлень є їх емоційність. ...
Розглянуто вплив різних груп особистісних факторів на успішність розпізнавання ситуацій введення в оману: 1) установки на правду, яка відображає рівень сформованості позитивних цінностей і відповідних їм рис характеру; упередженості, рівень якої пов’язаний зі ступенем притаманності людині рис «темної тріади»: макіавеллізму, нарцисизму, психопатії; 2) інтелектуальних здібностей (уваги та деяких когнітивних стилів обробки інформації); 3) емоційної компетентності (вміння адекватно інтерпретувати особливості невербальної поведінки, ознаки емоційного стану людини; усвідомленої присутності як особливого виду рефлексії; мотиваційного аспекту, зокрема впевненості у власній ефективності).
... (emotionality) is associated with a propensity for gullibility and overestimation of 257 others' honesty (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). ...
Emotional intelligence (EI) was once touted as the panacea for a satisfying and successful life. Consequently, there has been much emphasis on developing interventions to promote this personal resource in applied settings. Despite this, a growing body of research has begun to identify particular contexts when EI does not appear helpful and may even be deleterious to a person, or those they have contact with, suggesting a “dark” side to the construct. This paper provides a review of emergent literature to examine when, why and how trait and ability EI may contribute to negative intrapersonal (psychological ill-health; stress reactivity) and interpersonal outcomes (emotional manipulation; antisocial behavior). Negative effects were found to operate across multiple contexts (health, academic, occupational) however these were often indirect, suggesting that outcomes depend on pre-existing qualities of the person. Literature also points to the possibility of “optimal” levels of EI—both within and across EI constructs. Uneven profiles of self-perceptions (trait facets) or actual emotional skills contribute to poorer outcomes, particularly emotional awareness, and management. Moreover, individuals who possess high levels of skill but have lower self-perceptions of their abilities fare worse that those with more balanced profiles. Future research must now improve methodological and statistical practices to better capture EI in context and the negative corollary associated with high levels.
... The present study aims to investigate the role of ability EI in predicting an individual's adoption of criminal behavior over and above the predictors traditionally considered in the literature, including psychopathy. To the authors' knowledge, very few studies have focused on the relationships between criminal behavior and ability EI on samples of adult inmates, and the results from these studies are controversial (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013;Ermer et al., 2012). The model in this paper also controls for factors such as coping styles and aggressiveness traits, which are traditionally associated with criminal behavior in the literature (Downey, Johnston, Hansen, Birney, & Stough, 2010;Ermer et al., 2012;Ireland, Brown, & Ballarini, 2006;Suris et al., 2004;Vaughn & Howard, 2005). ...
This study aims to investigate the role of ability emotional intelligence (EI) in predicting criminal behavior from a life-span perspective, over and above psychopathy. Psychopathic individuals are characterized by a deviant lifestyle and an inability to regulate emotion. A sample of 29 male inmates was administered the Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (CISS), the Buss�Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ), the Psychopathy Checklist � Revised (PCL-R), the Mayer�Salovey�Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), and five dichotomous items that are converged into the Criminal Behavior Index (CBI). Correlation analysis showed a complex pattern of relationships among the variables. The MSCEIT Experiential area of EI together with CISS Emotion-oriented Coping and PCL-R Social Deviance are found to significantly predict the CBI. The results offer promising findings for the assessment of the relationship between personality traits, emotional abilities and criminal behavior across the life span. Furthermore, the results suggest that EI is an important feature for implementing prevention programs of criminal behavior and recidivism.
... I další výzkumy potvrzují důleţitost zahrnování jiných neţ laických skupin respondentů a vyuţití reálných testových situací ve výzkumu detekce lţi. K jiným výsledkům neţ popsané metaanalýzy studií prováděných mezi laiky (Bond, DePaulo, 2006 dospěla také Maureen O´Sullivan (2008) vyjadřovat emoce (Baker, ten Brinke, Porter, 2013) nebo úroveň well-being a vnímaného pocitu štěstí (Mynaříková, 2013(Mynaříková, , 2014a negativně korelují s přesností rozlišování pravdy a lţi. Současné výzkumy tedy naznačují, ţe některé složky emoční inteligence mohou paradoxně snižovat přesnost rozlišování pravdivých a lživých výpovědí. ...
Lze najít obecnou a šířeji akceptovatelnou definici lži? Můžeme obelhat sami sebe? Jak lžou děti a jak lžou dospělí? Jaké jsou verbální a neverbální projevy lhaní? Jaké jsou limity a úskalí detekce lži? Na tyto a další otázky hledá odborně podložené odpovědi ojedinělá a komplexní monografie věnovaná fenoménu lži.
Publikace nahlíží problematiku lhaní v sociálním, filozofickém, ekonomickém a neuropsychologickém kontextu. Především však zpracovává lhaní jako sociální fenomén vystupující v situacích vyžadujících odborné psychologické působení - například v psychoterapii, forenzní a školněpsychologické praxi.
Autorka seznamuje čtenáře s jevem lži z hlediska typologie, motivů, frekvence lhaní, ale i z hlediska vývojových, genderových i kulturních souvislostí. Ukazuje, jak se komplexní povaha lhaní projevuje v řeči, v chování i v prožívání. Závěrečná kapitola je věnována pozoruhodným situacím, ve kterých jsou lži ve skutečnosti důsledkem sugestibility, falešných vzpomínek či poruch osobnosti.
Monografie jistě zaujme odborníky z vědních oblastí, jako je psychologie, pedagogika, sociologie, právo, ale přínosná bude také pro učitele, rodiče, speciální pedagogy a forenzní psychology.
... These ideas have been supported from research into the dark triad (Paulhus and Williams, 2002;Furnham et al., 2013) of personalities (Machiavellians, narcissists and psychopaths). This dark triad research has found that psychopaths dress to impress and that (among other factors) people are easily fooled by the attractive appearance of such people (Baker et al., 2013;Holtzman and Strube, 2013). ...
Purpose
– This current paper reviews the theoretical speculations concerning psychopaths in the workplace that were originally presented in a paper published in this journal in 2006. The 2006 paper was called: “The Dark Side of Management Decisions: Organisational Psychopaths”.
Design/methodology/approach
– This is a review of the literature on workplace psychopaths since 2006.
Findings
– This current paper determines that while many of these prior speculations about workplace psychopaths have since been supported by evidence, several others remain unexplored. This finding suggests that several important avenues for further research remain in this important area. In particular, links between corporate psychopaths, bullying and lowered corporate social responsibility have been established. On the other hand, links between corporate psychopaths, career advancement, fraud, and corporate failure as exemplified in the 2007 global financial crisis, have been under-explored.
Social implications
– Corporate psychopaths are worthy of further research because of their impact on society, for example on corporate social responsibility and their willingness to dump toxic waste material illegally.
Originality/value
– The paper provides an extensive review of research into corporate psychopaths to date and highlights areas where further investigation would be potentially rewarding.
... This suggestion remains however unverified and, in a recent study, it has instead been shown that a high EI is associated with impairment in evaluating sincerity. In fact, it seems that subjects with high EI are sensitive to all the emotional facial expressions and to their frequency and given that deceptive pleaders showed a somewhat greater range of emotional expressions than truth-tellers, they generated more sympathy from high EI individuals [2]. ...
La question du mensonge se pose en neuropsychologie surtout lorsque les examens sont conduits dans un cadre médicolégal. Lorsqu’un sujet présente intentionnellement des déficits inexistants ou lorsqu’il exagère leur gravité dans le but d’obtenir une compensation financière ou matérielle, on parle de simulation (malingering). Dans cet article, la simulation est discutée dans le cadre plus général des travaux en psychologie sur le mensonge. Les différentes procédures utilisées par les neuropsychologues pour établir une absence de collaboration sont brièvement présentées et discutées. Enfin, lorsqu’un manque de collaboration est établi, une attention particulière a été apportée à la question de savoir si cela résulte d’une décision volontaire et consciente du patient.
... Both these studies investigated deception skills. The other relevant study [56], tested whether high EI was a major characteristic of 'detection wizards'. Paradoxically, although total EI score was not related to discrimination of truths and lies, the perception branch score proved negatively related to detecting deceptive targets. ...
Processing facial emotion, especially mismatches between facial and verbal messages, is believed to be important in the detection of deception. For example, emotional leakage may accompany lying. Individuals with superior emotion perception abilities may then be more adept in detecting deception by identifying mismatch between facial and verbal messages. Two personal factors that may predict such abilities are female gender and high emotional intelligence (EI). However, evidence on the role of gender and EI in detection of deception is mixed. A key issue is that the facial processing skills required to detect deception may not be the same as those required to identify facial emotion. To test this possibility, we developed a novel facial processing task, the FDT (Face Decoding Test) that requires detection of inconsistencies between facial and verbal cues to emotion. We hypothesized that gender and ability EI would be related to performance when cues were inconsistent. We also hypothesized that gender effects would be mediated by EI, because women tend to score as more emotionally intelligent on ability tests. Data were collected from 210 participants. Analyses of the FDT suggested that EI was correlated with superior face decoding in all conditions. We also confirmed the expected gender difference, the superiority of high EI individuals, and the mediation hypothesis. Also, EI was more strongly associated with facial decoding performance in women than in men, implying there may be gender differences in strategies for processing affective cues. It is concluded that integration of emotional and cognitive cues may be a core attribute of EI that contributes to the detection of deception.
... These proposed links certainly warrant further investigations in future studies. The enhanced lie detection ability of women in our sample is intriguing, and contradicts the study of Baker et al. (2013), who found that emotional intelligence (typically higher in women, see Schutte et al., 1998) relates to higher gullibility when identifying liars. Women may rely more on intuition when processing subliminal emotional cues (Donges, Kersting, & Suslow, 2012), which could be an asset in deception detection tasks (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009 ). ...
We investigated primary and secondary psychopathy and the ability to detect high-stakes, real-life emotional lies in an on-line experiment (N = 150). Using signal detection analysis, we found that lie detection ability was overall above chance level, there was a tendency towards responding liberally to the test stimuli, and women were more accurate than men. Further, sex moderated the relationship between psychopathy and lie detection ability; in men, primary psychopathy had a significant positive correlation with the ability to detect lies, whereas in women there was a significant negative correlation with deception detection. The results are discussed with reference to evolutionary theory and sex differences in processing socio-emotional information.
This essay reviews a concept that is too rarely dealt with, if at all, in the literature on human intelligence, namely, dark intelligence. I argue that dark intelligence is the possession and, as relevant, deployment of creative, analytical, and practical abilities and attitudes that, in particular tasks confronted in particular situations, can be, and are used for negative, harmful, and, sometimes, malign purposes. Dark intelligence is extremely common, and the world is the worse for it. Yet intelligence research continues to focus largely on solving test-like problems that do not speak to how intelligence is deployed on particular tasks in particular situations, either for good or for evil purposes. The world is facing severe crises, such as climate change, weapons of mass destruction, violence, and enormous income disparities. Creativity researchers, recognizing these problems, have developed a thriving field of “dark creativity.” Intelligence researchers have been largely absent, however, largely ignoring the dark side of intelligence. Yet dark intelligence can be and is being used to cause harm. The world is at increasing peril from its intended and unintended consequences; understanding dark intelligence may help to mitigate some of that peril.
Research into individual differences in deception detection and judgment brought into question the existence of a good liar-catcher. The current study aimed to investigate the role of trait empathy and emotional intelligence (EI) ability in detecting unemotional lies. One hundred and fifty volunteers were given the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, then they watched a sequence of 14 interviews concerning truthful vs. deceptive holidays. For each videotaped interview, detection accuracy, detection confidence, and detection criteria were assessed. Results confirmed the chance-like ability to detect deception. The empathic trait of perspective-taking and the EI ability to perceive emotions predicted detection accuracy, albeit with a modest effect. Receivers’ judgment accuracy was principally determined by the sender to be evaluated, confirming that detection accuracy is mainly explained by the sender, rather than the receiver's characteristics. Confidence appeared unrelated to detection accuracy.
Investment fraud/scam is defined as the intentional misinterpretation, concealment, or omission of facts regarding promised goods, services, or other expectations by putting funds into investments that are not real, unnecessary, never intended to be fulfilled, or intentionally distorted for the purpose of monetary gain. We present in this paper, an analysis of individuals' features/characteristics of those who are highly susceptible to retail investment scamming using machine learning (ML) methods. Purposive sampling is applied in data collection, asking only those who've at least experienced being scammed in a retail investment. Participants' demographic profile, emotional intelligence scores, personality traits scores and financial literacy levels are collected as parameters for the analysis. The data (N = 177) is first submitted to a Boruta algorithm for feature selection and out of nineteen (19) input features, only seven (7) features are confirmed to be important in determining low or high likelihood of susceptibility in retail investment scamming. Afterwards, a 2 - cluster solution is revealed using the k - means clustering. Cluster 1 is composed of individuals having higher number of times being scammed - characterized by higher social class, higher income, higher emotional intelligence scores, higher levels of agreeableness, openness and extraversion, and lower financial knowledge. Cluster 2 is composed of individuals having lesser number of times being scammed - characterized by lower social class, lower income, lower emotional intelligence scores, lower levels of agreeableness, openness and extraversion and higher financial knowledge. Findings of this study may serve as basis for prevention, protection and enforcement against retail investment frauds.
One aspect of social intelligence is the ability to identify when others are being deceptive. It would seem that individuals who were bestowed with such an ability to recognize honest signals of emotion, particularly when attempts to suppress them are made, would have a reproductive advantage over others without it. Yet the research literature suggests that on average people are good at detecting only overt manifestations of these signals. We argue instead that our evolution as a social species living in groups permitted discovery of deceptive incidents due to the factual evidence of the deception transmitted verbally through social connections. Thus the same principles that pressed for our evolution as a cooperative social species enabled us to develop the equivalent of an intelligence network that would pass along information and evidence, thus rendering a press for an individual lie detector moot.
Social interaction involves exchanging of feelings, and the human face emitting facial signals is essential in this process. Our skill sets to identify truth from falsehood in facial appearance allow us to intelligently interact and function adapting to our constantly changing social environment. The question that this chapter raises relates to the versatility of social intelligence in deceitfulness and control of body language inclusive of facial features. On the other hand, do people have the ability and social skills to make accurate interpretation of observed expressions in deciphering truthfulness from falsehood? Interaction is dynamic, and as socially intelligent humans, we are often in the role of both the deceiver and the truth seeker.
Emotional intelligence (EI) can buffer potentially harmful effects of situational and chronic stressors to safeguard psychological wellbeing (e.g., Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans, & Luminet, 2009), yet understanding how and when EI operates to promote adaptation remains a research priority. We explored whether EI (both trait and ability) modulated early attentional processing of threat-related emotion under conditions of stress. Using a dot probe paradigm, eye movement (fixation to emotive facial stimuli, relative to neutral) and manual reaction time data were collected from 161 adults aged 18–57 years (mean age = 25.24; SD = 8.81) exposed to either a stressful (failure task) or non-stressful (control) situation. Whilst emotion management ability and trait wellbeing corresponded to avoidance of negative emotion (angry and sad respectively), high trait sociability and emotionality related to a bias for negative emotions. With most effects not restricted to stressful conditions, it is unclear whether EI underscores ‘adaptive’ processing, which carries implications for school-based social and emotional learning programmes.
Several psychologists have paid attention to individual differences in deception detection, but only a few studies have found significant results. The present study aimed to explore the relationship between attachment anxiety and deception judgment when there are no obvious cues to distinguish lies from truth, and to examine the moderating effect of motives. Participants were instructed to judge each of 10 audios on whether they were true or false. Subsequently, the attachment anxiety of participants was assessed using the Experiences in Close Relationships questionnaire. Results revealed that, compared with people who had low attachment anxiety, those with high attachment anxiety tend to have higher truth biases in the low-motive condition and lower accuracy in the high-motive condition.
During a forensic interview, high-stakes deception is very prevalent notwithstanding the heavy consequences that may result. Studies have shown that most untrained people cannot perform well in discerning liars and truth-tellers.
Some psychological studies have stated that certain facial actions are more difficult to inhibit if the associated facial expressions are genuine. Similarly, these facial expressions are equally difficult to fake. This has cast light on the possibility that deception could be detected by analyzing these facial actions. However, to the best knowledge of the authors, there is no computer vision research that has attempted to discriminate high-stakes deception from truth using facial expressions. Therefore, this paper aims to test the validity of facial clues to deception detection in high-stakes situations using computer vision approaches.
We also note that only a limited number of the existing databases have been collected specifically for deception detection studies and none of them were obtained from real-world situations. In this paper we present a video database of actual high-stakes situations, which we have created using YouTube.
We have adopted 2D appearance-based methods as the methodology to characterize the 3D facial features. Instead of building a 3D head model as is the current trend, we have extracted invariant 2D features that are related to the 3D characteristic from nine separate facial regions by using dynamic facial analysis: eye blink, eyebrow motion, wrinkle occurrence and mouth motion. Then these cues are integrated to form a facial behavior pattern vector. A Random Forest was trained using the collected database and applied to classify the facial patterns into deceptive and truthful categories.
Despite the many uncontrolled factors (illumination, head pose and facial occlusion) contained in the videos in our database, we have achieved an accuracy of 76.92% when discriminating liars from truth-tellers using methods based on both micro-expressions and “normal” facial expressions. The results have shown that using facial clues for automated lie detection is very promising from the point of view of practice.
Prescription opioids are an important tool for physicians in treating pain but also carry significant risks of harm when prescribed inappropriately or misused by patients or others. Recent increases in opioid-related morbidity and mortality has reignited scrutiny of prescribing practices by law enforcement, regulatory agencies, and state medical boards. At the same time, the predominant 4D model of misprescribers is outdated and insufficient; it groups physician misprescribers as dated, duped, disabled, or dishonest. The weaknesses and inaccuracies of the 4D model are explored, along with the serious consequences of its application. This Article calls for development of an evidence base in this area and suggests an alternate model of misprescribers, the 3C model, which more accurately characterizes misprescribers as careless, corrupt, or compromised by impairment.
During a forensic interview, high-stakes deception is very prevalent notwithstanding the heavy consequences that might result. This paper proposes an automated computer vision solution for detecting high-stakes deception based on facial clues. Four deceptive cues (eye-blink, eyebrow motion, wrinkle occurrence and mouth motion) were identified and integrated into a single facial behavior pattern vector for discerning deception and honesty. A Random Forest classifier was trained using an unconstrained video database and applied to classify facial patterns into either deceptive or truthful categories. The labeled database we created was based on open sources such as YouTube. The interview videos used for training and testing the classifier were selected on the basis of high-stakes criminal situations, such as murder or kidnapping, which were later verified by criminal trials. Despite the many uncontrolled factors (illumination, head pose and facial occlusion) in the videos, we have achieved an accuracy of 76.92% when discriminating liars from truth-tellers. This compares well with 80.9% [1], the best extant accurary obtained by experienced interrogators.
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die empirische Basis für eine Kompetenzklärung zwischen Richtern und psychologischen Sachverständigen zu stärken. Zu diesem Zweck wurde der Einfluss von Training, Persönlichkeit und Empathie auf die Fähigkeit Kinderaussagen zu sexuellem Missbrauch bezüglich ihrer Glaubhaftigkeit zu beurteilen untersucht. Zur Abbildung des aussagepsychologischen Sachverstandes wurden Psychologiestudierende in der Anwendung der Glaubhaftigkeitsbegutachtung trainiert. Um den juristischen Sachverstand darzustellen bildeten Jurastudierende die Kontrollgruppe. Es zeigt sich, dass die trainierten Personen in allen Genauigkeitsraten bessere Ergebnisse erzielen. Ein Einfluss von Persönlichkeit und Empathie kann in keiner Gruppe belegt werden. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen zum einen die Notwendigkeit, die Beauftragung eines Sachverständigen als zwingend zu konzipieren. Zum anderen belegen sie die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Glaubhaftigkeitsbegutachtung.
This study examines people's first impressions of voices of various ethnic origin and recognizability from identification line-ups. It was hypothesized that voices that were easily recognized would be perceived more negatively than less recognizable ones, fitting the “bad guy” stereotype. Forty English native speakers rated the voices of 12 male speakers for attractiveness, extraversion, dominance, kindness, intelligence, success, goodness, as well as for several voice characteristics (i.e., melody, clarity, nervousness). The recognizability categorization process (low-, medium-, and high-recognizability groups) was determined from accuracy rates collected in a different study. A significant effect for recognizability was found on first impressions. Partially in line with the hypothesis, voices low in recognizability were rated more positively than voices whose recognizability was high. Attributes in which high-recognizability voices differed significantly from the other voices concerned nervousness, morality, and social desirability. Practical recommendations are given for real-life voice identification line-ups.
In this article, we attempt to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables at a number of levels. First, we seek to make theorists and researchers aware of the importance of not using the terms moderator and mediator interchangeably by carefully elaborating, both conceptually and strategically, the many ways in which moderators and mediators differ. We then go beyond this largely pedagogical function and delineate the conceptual and strategic implications of making use of such distinctions with regard to a wide range of phenomena, including control and stress, attitudes, and personality traits. We also provide a specific compendium of analytic procedures appropriate for making the most effective use of the moderator and mediator distinction, both separately and in terms of a broader causal system that includes both moderators and mediators. (46 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The question of whether discernible differences exist between liars and truth tellers has interested professional lie detectors and laypersons for centuries. In this article we discuss whether people can detect lies when observing someone's nonverbal behavior or analyzing someone's speech. An article about detecting lies by observing nonverbal and verbal cues is overdue. Scientific journals regularly publish overviews of research articles regarding nonverbal and verbal cues to deception, but they offer no explicit guidance about what lie detectors should do and should avoid doing to catch liars. We will present such guidance in the present article. The article consists of two parts. The first section focuses on pitfalls to avoid and outlines the major factors that lead to failures in catching liars. Sixteen reasons are clustered into three categories: (a) a lack of motivation to detect lies (because accepting a fabrication might sometimes be more tolerable or pleasant than understanding the truth), (b) difficulties associated with lie detection, and (c) common errors made by lie detectors. We will argue that the absence of nonverbal and verbal cues uniquely related to deceit (akin Pinocchio's growing nose), the existence of typically small differences between truth tellers and liars, and the fact that liars actively try to appear credible contribute to making lie detection a difficult task. Other factors that add to difficulty is that lies are often embedded in truths, that lie detectors often do not receive adequate feedback about their judgments and therefore cannot learn from their mistakes, and that some methods to detect lies violate conversation rules and are therefore difficult to apply in real life. The final factor to be discussed in this category is that some people are just very good liars. The common errors lie detectors make that we have identified are examining the wrong cues (in part, because professionals are taught these wrong cues); placing too great an emphasis on nonverbal cues (in part, because training encourages such emphasis); tending to too-readily interpret certain behaviors, particularly signs of nervousness, as diagnostic of deception; placing too great an emphasis on simplistic rules of thumb; and neglecting inter- and intrapersonal differences. We also discuss two final errors: that many interview strategies advocated by police manuals can impair lie detection, and that professionals tend to overestimate their ability to detect deceit. The second section of this article discusses opportunities for maximizing one's chances of detecting lies and elaborates strategies for improving one's lie-detection skills. Within this section, we first provide five recommendations for avoiding the common errors in detecting lies that we identified earlier in the article. Next, we discuss a relatively recent wave of innovative lie-detection research that goes one step further and introduces novel interview styles aimed at eliciting and enhancing verbal and nonverbal differences between liars and truth tellers by exploiting their different psychological states. In this part of the article, we encourage lie detectors to use an information-gathering approach rather than an accusatory approach and to ask liars questions that they have not anticipated. We also encourage lie detectors to ask temporal questions-questions related to the particular time the interviewee claims to have been at a certain location-when a scripted answer (e.g., "I went to the gym") is expected. For attempts to detect lying about opinions, we introduce the devil's advocate approach, in which investigators first ask interviewees to argue in favor of their personal view and then ask them to argue against their personal view. The technique is based on the principle that it is easier for people to come up with arguments in favor than against their personal view. For situations in which investigators possess potentially incriminating information about a suspect, the "strategic use of evidence" technique is introduced. In this technique, interviewees are encouraged to discuss their activities, including those related to the incriminating information, while being unaware that the interviewer possesses this information. The final technique we discuss is the "imposing cognitive load" approach. Here, the assumption is that lying is often more difficult than truth telling. Investigators could increase the differences in cognitive load that truth tellers and liars experience by introducing mentally taxing interventions that impose additional cognitive demand. If people normally require more cognitive resources to lie than to tell the truth, they will have fewer cognitive resources left over to address these mentally taxing interventions when lying than when truth telling. We discuss two ways to impose cognitive load on interviewees during interviews: asking them to tell their stories in reverse order and asking them to maintain eye contact with the interviewer. We conclude the article by outlining future research directions. We argue that research is needed that examines (a) the differences between truth tellers and liars when they discuss their future activities (intentions) rather than their past activities, (b) lies told by actual suspects in high-stakes situations rather than by university students in laboratory settings, and (c) lies told by a group of suspects (networks) rather than individuals. An additional line of fruitful and important research is to examine the strategies used by truth tellers and liars when they are interviewed. As we will argue in the present article, effective lie-detection interview techniques take advantage of the distinctive psychological processes of truth tellers and liars, and obtaining insight into these processes is thus vital for developing effective lie-detection interview tools.
This paper reports a replication and extension of the McCornack & Parks model of relational deception detection which argued that the association between relational involvement and accuracy in detecting deception is mediated by judgmental confidence and truth-bias; and that relational involvement, confidence, truth-bias and accuracy form a causal chain. Recent research testing some of these links has yielded results which cast doubt upon the validity of the model. Moreover, research examining suspicion has raised questions concerning the generalizability of the model across various levels of aroused suspicion. The present study represents the first rigorous path-analytic test of the model, as well as a test of the model's generalizability. Testing the model in a sample of ninety romantically involved couples, this study found unqualified support for the model as it was originally specified. In addition, the model seems to be generalizable across levels of aroused suspicion. The implications of the model for research on relationships are discussed.
In this paper, we examine whether affect influences higher level cognitive processes. We review research on the effect of emotion on interpretation, judgement, decision making, and reasoning. In all cases, we ask first whether there is evidence that emotion affects each of these processes, and second what mechanisms might underlie these effects. Our review highlights the fact that interpretive biases are primarily linked with anxiety, while more general mood-congruent effects may be seen in judgement. Risk perception is also affected by negative and positive affect. Research shows complex effects of emotion on decision making and reasoning, with emotion sometimes hindering normatively correct thinking and sometimes promoting it. There are also important effects of emotion on reasoning style. We discuss key differences between the effects of incidental affect (feeling states not related to the semantic contents of the cognitive task) and integral affect (where the feeling state is caused by or linked to the contents of the cognitive task). In the conclusion, we suggest that focusing on some of the constituent mechanisms involved in interpretation, judgement, decision making and reasoning provides a way to link some of the diverse findings in the field. We also highlight important areas for future research.
This study is a quasi-experiment focusing on the deception detection ability of prison inmates (n=52) and college students (n=52). Participants made veracity judgments of videotaped statements of witnesses either lying or telling the truth about an event. In line with findings on criminals' beliefs about cues to deception, it was predicted that prison inmates would outperform students in terms of lie detection accuracy. Our hypothesis received partial support since the prison inmates outperformed the students in terms of detecting lies, but not in terms of detecting truths. Moreover, the prison inmates achieved an accuracy level higher than chance, while students did not. Furthermore, prison inmates had a pronounced lie bias. It is possible that the outcome feedback provided in the environment of criminals may explain the differences in accuracy levels between prison inmates and students. It is suggested that relevant outcome feedback may be a beneficial component in training of professional lie-catchers in order to improve their performance.
This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the criterion and incremental validity of trait emotional intelligence (trait EI or trait emotional self-efficacy), which is defined as a constellation of emotion-related self-perceptions and dispositions located at the lower levels of personality hierarchies (Petrides & Furnham, 200155.
Petrides , K. V. and
Furnham , A. 2001. Trait emotional intelligence: Psychometric investigation with reference to established trait taxonomies. European Journal of Personality, 15: 425–448. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [CSA]View all references). In Studies 1 and 2 (N=166 and 354, respectively) trait EI is shown to be related to measures of rumination, life satisfaction, depression, dysfunctional attitudes, and coping. Most relationships remained statistically significant even after controlling for Big Five variance. In Study 3 (N=212) trait EI is shown to be related to depression and nine distinct personality disorders. Most relationships remained significant, even after controlling for positive and negative affectivity (mood). It is concluded that trait EI has a role to play in personality, clinical, and social psychology, often with effects that are incremental over the basic dimensions of personality and mood.
Deception evolved as a fundamental aspect of human social interaction. Numerous studies have examined behavioral cues to deception, but most have involved inconsequential lies and unmotivated liars in a laboratory context. We conducted the most comprehensive study to date of the behavioral consequences of extremely high-stakes, real-life deception-relative to comparable real-life sincere displays-via 3 communication channels: speech, body language, and emotional facial expressions. Televised footage of a large international sample of individuals (N = 78) emotionally pleading to the public for the return of a missing relative was meticulously coded frame-by-frame (30 frames/s for a total of 74,731 frames). About half of the pleaders eventually were convicted of killing the missing person on the basis of overwhelming evidence. Failed attempts to simulate sadness and leakage of happiness revealed deceptive pleaders' covert emotions. Liars used fewer words but more tentative words than truth-tellers, likely relating to increased cognitive load and psychological distancing. Further, each of these cues explained unique variance in predicting pleader sincerity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
Participants completed measures of trait emotional intelligence (trait EI), happiness, personality, and cognitive ability. Neuroticism was negatively related to happiness, whereas Extraversion and Openness to Experience were positively related to it. Cognitive ability was not related either to happiness or to trait EI. A three-step hierarchical regression showed that trait EI explained over 50% of the total variance in happiness. The positive relationship between trait EI and happiness persisted in the presence of the Big Five. In contrast, the Big Five did not account for a significant amount of happiness variance when trait EI was partialled out.
The present experiment examined the ability of fifty-two uniformed police officers to detect deception. The experiment differed from previous experiments into detecting deceit because of its high stake lies scenario. The judges were exposed to videotaped press conferences of people who were asking the general public for help in finding their relatives or the murderers of their relatives. They all lied during these press conferences and they all have been found guilty of killing their own relatives. The judges did not perform better than could be expected by chance. Additional analyses showed that accuracy was unrelated to confidence, age, years of job experience in the police force, or level of experience in interviewing suspects. There was, however, a significant positive correlation between having experience in interviewing suspects and being confident in detecting deception. Finally, men were better at detecting deception than women.
The discrimination of genuine and falsified emotional displays is critical in many contexts, including healthcare, forensic, and airport security settings. Previous research has demonstrated that comprehensive (two-day) empirically based deception detection training can lead to moderate gains in judgment accuracy. However, for many professional groups such extensive training is not feasible due to time and resource limitations. In the present study, we evaluated the effectiveness of brief (three-hour) training. N = 26 (13 females, 13 males) healthcare professionals with experience in evaluating the validity of medical claims participated in the training workshop. Their performance on two deception detection tasks was measured pre- and post-training; the participants attempted to discriminate: (1) videotaped truthful and fabricated stories concerning emotional events and (2) sincere and falsified emotional facial expressions. Results indicated that participants' overall accuracy on both tasks increased modestly from chance (M = 51.2%) to significantly above chance (M = 60.7%), primarily due to an increase in their improved ‘hit’ rate from pre- to post-training.
The present study evaluated how well people are able to identify completely mistaken emotional memories from childhood. Further, possible individual differences, including personality/interpersonal traits and cue utilization strategies, contributing to this ability were examined. 137 participants (aged 17-34 yrs) viewed videos of true and mistaken childhood memory reports and judged whether the target had actually experienced the described event. Results indicate that 60% of judges accurately identified mistaken memories (greater than chance) and 53% accurately identified true memories (performing at chance). Compared to inaccurate judges, accurate judges were interpersonally less unassuming-ingenuous and more arrogant-calculating and aloof-introverted. Accurate judges also reported using more overall cues to formulate their judgments than inaccurate judges. Brief exposure to information about empirically based cues to mistaken memories prior to veracity judgments impaired rather than facilitated judgment ability. Implications for credibility assessment in applied settings and future research are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Purpose. The process of catching liars is challenging, though evidence suggests that deception detection abilities are influenced by the characteristics of the judge. This study examined individual differences in emotional processing and levels of psychopathic traits on the ability to judge the veracity of written narratives varying in emotional valence.
Methods. Undergraduate participants ( N = 251) judged the veracity of 12 written narratives (truthful/deceptive) across three emotional categories: positive, negative, and neutral events. Levels of psychopathy were assessed to investigate its relation to accuracy and cue use.
Results. Overall accuracy was close to chance, although participants were more accurate in determining the veracity of truthful relative to deceptive narratives. Accuracy was impaired for emotional (positive and negative) relative to neutral narratives. Psychopathy was not associated with levels of overall accuracy, but related to discriminative ability, and differential use of cues in decision making. Reported cue use also differed across emotional narrative conditions.
Conclusions. We speculated that an emotive truth bias may have detracted judges from attending to valid cues that are indicative of the deceptive nature of stimuli because they were distracted by the emotional content of the report. Implications for deception detection in forensic settings are discussed.
Purpose. Assessing the credibility of reports of sexual victimization – often in the absence of corroboration – presents a significant challenge for legal decision makers. This study examined the accuracy of observers in discriminating genuine and fabricated sexual assault allegations. Further, we examined whether individual differences and cue utilization strategies influenced deception detection accuracy.
Methods. Observers (N= 119) evaluated eight (four truthful and four deceptive) written allegations of sexual assault (counterbalanced), and completed a Credibility Assessment Questionnaire (CAQ) and individual differences measures.
Results. Results indicated that overall accuracy was below chance (M= 45.3%), and a truth bias was evidenced. Examining the Big Five personality traits, we found that openness to experience and neuroticism were positively associated with accuracy, whereas extraversion was negatively related to accuracy. Further, judgement confidence was negatively associated with accuracy.
Conclusions. The present study offers insights into observers’ perceptions of credibility regarding real-life sexual assault allegations. Implications for legal decision making are discussed.
Although most people are not better than chance in detecting deception, some groups of police professionals have demonstrated
significant lie detection accuracy. One reason for this difference may be that the types of lies police are asked to judge
in scientific experiments often do not represent the types of lies they see in their profession. Across 23 studies, involving
31 different police groups in eight countries, police officers tested with lie detection scenarios using high stakes lies
(i.e., the lie was personally involving and/or resulted in substantial rewards or punishments for the liar) were significantly
more accurate than law enforcement officials tested with low stakes lies. Face validity and construct validity of various
lie scenarios are differentiated.
Encoders were video recorded giving either truthful or deceptive descriptions of video footage designed to generate either
emotional or unemotional responses. Decoders were asked to indicate the truthfulness of each item, what cues they used in
making their judgements, and then to complete both the Micro Expression Training Tool (METT) and Subtle Expression Training
Tool (SETT). Although overall performance on the deception detection task was no better than chance, performance for emotional
lie detection was significantly above chance, while that for unemotional lie detection was significantly below chance. Emotional
lie detection accuracy was also significantly positively correlated with reported use of facial expressions and with performance
on the SETT, but not on the METT. The study highlights the importance of taking the type of lie into account when assessing
skill in deception detection.
Darwin (1872) hypothesized that some facial muscle actions associated with emotion cannot be consciously inhibited, particularly when
the to-be concealed emotion is strong. The present study investigated emotional “leakage” in deceptive facial expressions
as a function of emotional intensity. Participants viewed low or high intensity disgusting, sad, frightening, and happy images,
responding to each with a 5s videotaped genuine or deceptive expression. Each 1/30s frame of the 1,711 expressions (256,650
frames in total) was analyzed for the presence and duration of universal expressions. Results strongly supported the inhibition
hypothesis. In general, emotional leakage lasted longer in both the upper and lower face during high-intensity masked, relative
to low-intensity, masked expressions. High intensity emotion was more difficult to conceal than low intensity emotion during
emotional neutralization, leading to a greater likelihood of emotional leakage in the upper face. The greatest and least amount
of emotional leakage occurred during fearful and happiness expressions, respectively. Untrained observers were unable to discriminate
real and false expressions above the level of chance.
KeywordsUniversal emotions–Facial expression–Deception–Emotional intensity
Reports an error in "Police lie detection accuracy: The effect of lie scenario" by Maureen O’Sullivan, Mark G. Frank, Carolyn M. Hurley and Jaspreet Tiwana ( Law and Human Behavior , 2009 [Dec], Vol 33[6], 530-538). In the original article the target designated in Table 1 for reference 20 (Bond, 2008) is incorrect. The targets were paroled felons not students; the "s" in the last column should be "c". The correct Table 1 is given in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-22450-007 ). Although most people are not better than chance in detecting deception, some groups of police professionals have demonstrated significant lie detection accuracy. One reason for this difference may be that the types of lies police are asked to judge in scientific experiments often do not represent the types of lies they see in their profession. Across 23 studies, involving 31 different police groups in eight countries, police officers tested with lie detection scenarios using high stakes lies (i.e., the lie was personally involving and/or resulted in substantial rewards or punishments for the liar) were significantly more accurate than law enforcement officials tested with low stakes lies. Face validity and construct validity of various lie scenarios are differentiated.
In this article, the author provides a framework to guide research in emotional intelligence. Studies conducted up to the present bear on a conception of emotional intelligence as pertaining to the domain of consciousness and investigate the construct with a correlational approach. As an alternative, the author explores processes underlying emotional intelligence, introducing the distinction between conscious and automatic processing as a potential source of variability in emotionally intelligent behavior. Empirical literature is reviewed to support the central hypothesis that individual differences in emotional intelligence may be best understood by considering the way individuals automatically process emotional stimuli. Providing directions for research, the author encourages the integration of experimental investigation of processes underlying emotional intelligence with correlational analysis of individual differences and fosters the exploration of the automaticity component of emotional intelligence.
In this article, we attempt to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables at a number of levels. First, we seek to make theorists and researchers aware of the importance of not using the terms moderator and mediator interchangeably by carefully elaborating, both conceptually and strategically, the many ways in which moderators and mediators differ. We then go beyond this largely pedagogical function and delineate the conceptual and strategic implications of making use of such distinctions with regard to a wide range of phenomena, including control and stress, attitudes, and personality traits. We also provide a specific compendium of analytic procedures appropriate for making the most effective use of the moderator and mediator distinction, both separately and in terms of a broader causal system that includes both moderators and mediators.
In 2 diary studies of lying, 77 college students reported telling 2 lies a day, and 70 community members told 1. Participants told more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies, except in dyads involving only women, in which other-oriented lies were as common as self-centered ones. Participants told relatively more self-centered lies to men and relatively more other-oriented lies to women. Consistent with the view of lying as an everyday social interaction process, participants said that they did not regard their lies as serious and did not plan them much or worry about being caught. Still, social interactions in which lies were told were less pleasant and less intimate than those in which no lies were told.
People are usually no better than chance at detecting lies from a liar's
demeanour, even when clues to deceit are evident from facial expression
and tone of voice. We suspected that people who are unable to understand
words (aphasics) may be better at spotting liars, so we tested their
performance as lie detectors. We found that aphasics were significantly
better at detecting lies about emotion than people with no language
impairment, suggesting that loss of language skills may be associated
with a superior ability to detect the truth.
Detecting deception is an inherently difficult task, but one that plays a critical role for law enforcement investigators in the interrogation room. In general, research has failed to indicate that performance in this domain is improved by training or prior experience. A signal detection framework is applied to the paradigm to better conceptualize the influence of these two factors. We found that although neither factor influenced discrimination accuracy, there was an effect on response bias such that training and prior experience appeared to increase the likelihood of responding "deceit" as opposed to "truth." This "investigator bias" was observed both in a review of the literature and in this study of North American law enforcement investigators who took part in a forensically based deception-detection task. Possible theoretical mechanisms and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Ninety-nine police officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups that are superior in lie detection, attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped police interviews. Accuracy rates were higher than those typically found in deception research and reached levels similar to those obtained by specialized lie detectors in previous research. Accuracy was positively correlated with perceived experience in interviewing suspects and with mentioning cues to detecting deceit that relate to a suspect's story. Accuracy was negatively correlated with popular stereotypical cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting. As in previous research, accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, but the level of confidence was dependent on whether officers judged actual truths or actual lies and on the method by which confidence was measured.
We analyze the accuracy of deception judgments, synthesizing research results from 206 documents and 24,483 judges. In relevant studies, people attempt to discriminate lies from truths in real time with no special aids or training. In these circumstances, people achieve an average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive. Relative to cross-judge differences in accuracy, mean lie-truth discrimination abilities are nontrivial, with a mean accuracy d of roughly .40. This produces an effect that is at roughly the 60th percentile in size, relative to others that have been meta-analyzed by social psychologists. Alternative indexes of lie-truth discrimination accuracy correlate highly with percentage correct, and rates of lie detection vary little from study to study. Our meta-analyses reveal that people are more accurate in judging audible than visible lies, that people appear deceptive when motivated to be believed, and that individuals regard their interaction partners as honest. We propose that people judge others' deceptions more harshly than their own and that this double standard in evaluating deceit can explain much of the accumulated literature.
There is a substantial amount of empirical evidence that psychopathy, as measured by the PCL-R and its derivatives, is a predictor of recidivism and violence in prison, forensic psychiatric, and civil psychiatric populations. The PCL-R is one of the most generalizable of the risk factors identified thus far, and for this reason it is included in various actuarial and structured clinical risk assessment procedures. Although psychopathy is not the only risk factor for recidivism and violence, it is too important to ignore, particularly with respect to violence. Treatment and management are difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, but new initiatives based on current theory and research on psychopathy and the most effective correctional philosophies may help to reduce the harm done by psychopaths.
People are generally poor at detecting deceit when observing someone’s behaviour or listening to their speech. In this chapter I will discuss the major factors (pitfalls) that lead to failures in catching liars: the sixteen reasons I will present are clustered into three categories: (i) a lack of motivation to detect lies; (ii) difficulties associated with lie detection; and (iii) common errors made by lie detectors. Discussing pitfalls provides insight into how lie detectors can improve their performance (for example, by recognising common biases and avoiding common judgment errors). The second section of this chapter discusses 11 ways (opportunities) to improve lie detection skills. Within this section, I first provide five recommendations for avoiding common errors in detecting lies. Next, I discuss recent lie detection research that introduces novel interview styles aimed at eliciting and enhancing verbal and nonverbal differences between liars and truth tellers. The recommendations are relevant in various settings, from the individual level (e.g., “Is my partner really working late?”) to the societal level (e.g., “Can we trust this suspect when he claims that he is not the serial rapist the police are searching for?”).
: Research relevant to psychotherapy regarding facial expression and body movement, has shown that the kind of information which can be gleaned from the patients words - information about affects, attitudes, interpersonal styles, psychodynamics - can also be derived from his concomitant nonverbal behavior. The study explores the interaction situation, and considers how within deception interactions differences in neuroanatomy and cultural influences combine to produce specific types of body movements and facial expressions which escape efforts to deceive and emerge as leakage or deception clues.
For many years we have studied individual differences among people in their ability to detect deception from demeanour. Most people do rather poorly in making such judgements. In experimental situations in which someone is either lying or telling the truth half the time, people do little better than chance (i.e., they get average accuracy scores of 50 per cent). This has been found not only in our studies (Ekman and O'Sullivan, 1991), which examined high-stake lies, but also in a wide range of other studies (Malone and DePaulo, 2001). By doing an idiographic analysis, we have discovered some individuals who are highly accurate across different types of deception. This report describes our beginning research with a small group of such ‘wizards’ of deception detection. In the late 1980s, we started to administer a test of the ability to detect deception, based on our early work with a group of nurses who had lied or been truthful about their feelings as they watched either a gruesome surgical film or a pleasant nature film (Ekman and Friesen, 1974). When we analysed group performance, we found that most groups – police officers, CIA and FBI agents, lawyers, college students, therapists, judges, etc. – did little better than chance. Yet our objective measurements had demonstrated that there were discernible clues that could have been used to distinguish lying from truthfulness accurately (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, and Scherer, 1980; Ekman, Friesen, and O'Sullivan, 1988).
Deception—a fundamental aspect of human communication—often is accompanied by the simulation of unfelt emotions or the concealment of genuine emotions to correspond to the false message. We investigated the consequences of extremely high-stakes emotional deception on the engagement of particular facial muscles, posited by Darwin [Darwin, C. (1872/2005). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. In J. D. Watson (Ed.), Darwin: The indelible stamp (pp. 1066–1257) Philadelphia: Running Press] to reveal the false face. The videotaped facial actions of a sample of individuals (N=52) emotionally pleading to the public for the return of a missing relative—half of whom eventually were convicted of murdering that person—were coded frame by frame (30 frames/s for a total of 23,622 frames). Findings support the view that emotional “leakage,” particularly via those facial muscles under less cortical control, is a byproduct of the overextended cognitive resources available to convey elaborate lies. Specifically, the “grief” muscles (corrugator supercilii, depressor anguli oris) were more often contracted in the faces of genuine than deceptive pleaders. Subtle contraction of the zygomatic major (masking smiles) and full contraction of the frontalis (failed attempts to appear sad) muscles were more commonly identified in the faces of deceptive pleaders. Thus, while interpersonal deception often is highly successful, signs of covert emotional states are communicated clearly to the informed observer.
This study examines the extent to which cognitive ability, the Big Five factor personality dimensions, and emotional intelligence are related to training and job performance of U.S. federal criminal investigators. Training performance measures were collected during a 17-week training program. Job performance measures were collected 1 year after the investigators completed the training program. Conscientiousness was modestly related to training performance. Cognitive ability and emotional intelligence were positively correlated with job performance. Neuroticism was negatively correlated with job performance. The relative benefits of using emotional intelligence and the five-factor model to select law enforcement agents are discussed.
This study examined for the first time the relationships between self-monitoring, sincerity, and emotional manipulation, by investigating whether sensitivity to social cues and to appropriate emotional expression would facilitate the use of emotion in malevolent contexts. Participants (N=170 student and community members) completed online measures of self-monitoring, sincerity, and emotional manipulation in a cross-sectional, correlational design. As predicted, high self-monitoring (of self-presentation) and low sincerity were significantly associated with emotional manipulation. Lower levels of conscientiousness and agreeableness also predicted emotional manipulation. Although the current research is exploratory, it is concluded that attention to, and control of, emotional expression, in combination with an insincere approach, are central to emotional manipulation.
In this paper, we provide our view of the current understanding of high-stakes lies often occurring in forensic contexts. We underscore the importance of avoiding widespread pitfalls of deception detection and challenging prevailing assumptions concerning strategies for catching liars. The promise and limitations of each of non-verbal/body language, facial, verbal/linguistic, and physiological channels in detecting deception are discussed. In observing the absence of a single cue or behavioural channel that consistently reveals deception, a holistic approach with concurrent attention to multiple channels of a target's behaviour (ideally videotaped for review) and changes from baseline behaviour is recommended whenever possible. Among the best-validated cues to be considered together include: illustrators, blink and pause rate, speech rate, vague descriptions, repeated details, contextual embedding, reproduction of conversations, and emotional ‘leakage’ in the face. While advocating a reliance on empirical evidence, we observe that few studies of high-stakes deception yet have been conducted. Further, some manifestations of lying are highly idiosyncratic and difficult to address in quantitative research, pointing to the need for keen observation skills, and psychological insight. A recurring theme is the need for the field to devise innovative approaches for studying high-stakes lies to promote ecological validity. Ultimately, such work will provide a strong foundation for the responsible application of deception research in forensic and security settings.
Purpose. Numerous wrongful convictions have brought into question the ability of judges and juries to accurately evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including defendants. Dangerous decisions theory (DDT) offers a theoretical framework to build our understanding of the decision‐making process that can culminate in such injustices.
Arguments. According to DDT, the reading of a defendant's face and emotional expressions play a major role in initiating a series of ‘dangerous’ decisions concerning his/her credibility. Specifically, potent judgments of trustworthiness occur rapidly upon seeing a defendant's face, subjectively experienced as intuition. Originally evolved to reduce the danger to the observer, the initial judgment – which may be unreliable – will be enduring and have a powerful influence on the interpretation and assimilation of incoming evidence concerning the defendant. Ensuing inferences will be irrational, but rationalized by the decision maker through his/her subjective schemas about trustworthiness and heuristics for identifying deceptive behaviour. Facilitated by a high level of motivation, a non‐critical, tunnel vision assimilation of potentially disconfirming or ambiguous target information can culminate in a mistaken evaluation of guilt or innocence.
Conclusions. Empirically based education and responsible expert testimony could serve to reduce such biases and improve legal decision‐making.
The role of on-the-job experience in fostering skill at detecting deception was examined. A deception-detection test was administered to three samples of more than 100 subjects each: a group of undergraduates with no special experiences at detecting deceit; a group of new recruits to a federal law enforcement training program, who had some limited on-the-job experience at detecting deceit; and a group of advanced federal law enforcement officers, with years of experience working at jobs in which the detection of deception is very important. Although the officer samples were more confident about their judgments of deceptiveness than were the students, they were no more accurate than the students. None of the three groups showed a significant improvement in deception-detection success from the first half to the second half of the test; however, the advanced officers felt increasingly confident about their performance as they progressed through the test. Correlational analyses of the relationship between accuracy and confidence provided further evidence that experience does not improve people's awareness oi the accuracy or inaccuracy of their judgments. The findings from this research are compared to the results of research on other kinds of professional decision-makers (e.g., clinical psychologists), and several theoretical perspectives on the role of experience in decision making are discussed.
a b s t r a c t This was the first investigation of individual differences in adopting deceptive universal emotional expressions. We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would lead to a heightened ability to suppress emotional expressions and exhibit less ''leakage'' of inconsistent emotions during deceptive displays. Fur-ther, we predicted that emotional intelligence (EI) would lead to a heightened ability to simulate emo-tional expressions. Participants (N = 100) viewed emotionally arousing (happy, sad, fearful, disgusting) images, responding to each with a genuine or deceptive expression. Each video frame (30/sec) was coded for emotion (in)consistent with the intended expression (365,550 frames coded for 2437 expressions). As predicted, psychopathic traits – specifically, high levels of interpersonal manipulation – were related to shorter durations of unintended emotional ''leakage'' during deceptive expressions. In contrast, the erra-tic lifestyle element of psychopathy predicted greater emotional inconsistency during deceptive displays. Individuals higher in EI – specifically, the ability to perceive and express emotion – feigned emotions more convincingly than others but were not more immune to emotional leakage.
This article provides an overview of current research on emotional intelligence. Although it has been defined in many ways, we focus on the four-branch model by Mayer and Salovey (1997), which characterizes emo-tional intelligence as a set of four related abilities: per-ceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions. The theory provides a useful framework for studying in-dividual differences in abilities related to processing emo-tional information. Despite measurement obstacles, the evidence in favor of emotional intelligence is accumulating. Emotional intelligence predicts success in important do-mains, among them personal and work relationships. KEYWORDS—emotional intelligence; emotions; social inter-action In the past decade, emotional intelligence has generated an enormous amount of interest both within and outside the field of psychology. The concept has received considerable media at-tention, and many readers of this article may have already en-countered one or more definitions of emotional intelligence. The present discussion, however, focuses on the scientific study of emotional intelligence rather than on popularizations of the concept. Mayer and Salovey (1997; see also Salovey & Mayer, 1990) proposed a model of emotional intelligence to address a growing need in psychology for a framework to organize the study of in-dividual differences in abilities related to emotion. This theo-retical model motivated the creation of the first ability-based tests of emotional intelligence. Although findings remain pre-liminary, emotional intelligence has been shown to have an ef-fect on important life outcomes such as forming satisfying personal relationships and achieving success at work. Perhaps most importantly, ability-based tests of emotional intelligence reliably measure skills that are relatively distinct from com-monly assessed aspects of personality.
Purpose. This study used statistical text analysis to examine the features of crime narratives provided by psychopathic homicide offenders. Psychopathic speech was predicted to reflect an instrumental/predatory world view, unique socioemotional needs, and a poverty of affect.
Methods. Two text analysis tools were used to examine the crime narratives of 14 psychopathic and 38 non-psychopathic homicide offenders. Psychopathy was determined using the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). The Wmatrix linguistic analysis tool (Rayson, 2008) was used to examine parts of speech and semantic content while the Dictionary of Affect and Language (DAL) tool (Whissell & Dewson, 1986) was used to examine the emotional characteristics of the narratives.
Results. Psychopaths (relative to their counterparts) included more rational cause-and-effect descriptors (e.g., ‘because’, ‘since’), focused on material needs (food, drink, money), and contained fewer references to social needs (family, religion/spirituality). Psychopaths’ speech contained a higher frequency of disfluencies (‘uh’, ‘um’) indicating that describing such a powerful, ‘emotional’ event to another person was relatively difficult for them. Finally, psychopaths used more past tense and less present tense verbs in their narrative, indicating a greater psychological detachment from the incident, and their language was less emotionally intense and pleasant.
Conclusions. These language differences, presumably beyond conscious control, support the notion that psychopaths operate on a primitive but rational level.
This article investigated the relationships between trait emotional intelligence (“trait EI” or “emotional self-efficacy”) and 4 job-related variables (perceived job control, job stress, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment). Gender-specific data (N=167, 87 females) were analyzed via multigroup structural equation modeling. Perceived job control had a negative effect on stress and a positive effect on satisfaction. Stress had a negative effect on satisfaction, which, in turn, had the strongest positive effect on commitment. There were many gender differences in the model, mainly concerning age, which was negatively related to control and commitment in the female sample only. Trait EI had specific, rather than widespread, effects in the model. Discussion focuses on trait EI's implications in the workplace.
This paper presents two experiments concerning trait emotional intelligence (‘trait EI’). In study 1, ten high and ten low trait EI individuals were selected from a sample of 85 persons to participate in a computerized experiment involving the recognition of morphed emotional expressions. As hypothesized, high trait EI participants were faster at identifying the expressions than their low trait EI counterparts. In study 2, trait EI scores from 102 persons were residualized on the Big Five and subsequently 15 high and 15 low trait EI individuals were selected to participate in a mood induction experiment. As hypothesized, high trait EI participants exhibited greater sensitivity to the mood induction procedure than their low trait EI counterparts. The findings are discussed in terms of the construct validity of trait EI, with particular emphasis on the issue of incremental validity vis-à-vis broad personality traits. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Purpose . Although most people perform around the level of chance in making credibility judgments, some researchers have hypothesized that high motivation and the provision of accurate feedback could lead to a higher accuracy rate. This study examined the influence of these factors on judgment accuracy and whether any improvement following feedback was related to social facilitation, a gradual incorporation of successful assessment strategies, or a re‐evaluation of ‘tunnel vision’ decision‐making.
Methods . Participants ( N = 151) were randomly assigned to conditions according to motivation level (high/low) and feedback (accurate, inaccurate or none). They then judged the credibility of 12 videotaped speakers either lying or telling the truth about a personal experience.
Results . Highly motivated observers performed less accurately ( M = 46.0%), but more confidently, than those in the low‐motivation condition ( M = 60.0%). Although there was no main effect of feedback, the provision of any feedback (accurate or inaccurate) served to diminish the motivational impairment effect. Further, high motivation was associated with a relatively low ‘hit’ rate and high ‘false‐alarm’ rate. This suggested that in the absence of feedback the judgments of highly motivated participants were made through tunnel vision.
Conclusions . The results suggest that it is important for lie‐catchers to monitor their motivation level to ensure that over‐enthusiasm is not clouding their judgments. It may be useful for professionals engaged in deception detection to regularly discuss their judgments with colleagues as a form of feedback in order to re‐evaluate their own decision‐making strategies.
Past research (e.g., DePaulo & Kirkendol, in press) has documented a motivational impairment effect in the communication of deception, whereby people who are more highly motivated to get away with their lies (relative to those who are less highly motivated) are less successful at doing so whenever observers can see or hear any of their nonverbal cues. In the present study, we report a conceptual replication of the effect: Subjects who told ingratiating lies under conditions in which they thought that the ability to convey particular impressions was an important skill (high competence-relevance) were less successful at getting away with those lies when judges could observe their nonverbal behaviors. We also report a conceptual replication of an unpredicted finding from an earlier study (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985b): Under the same conditions (ingratiating lies, high competence relevance), women were more likely to show the motivational impairment effect than were men. We predicted in this study that more attractive speakers would be less susceptible to the motivational impairment effect than less attractive speakers. Consistent with this prediction, under high motivational conditions (ingratiating lies, high competence-relevance), more attractive speakers were less likely to show the impairment than were less attractive speakers. Finally, we report suggestive evidence that the motivational impairment effect may occur when subjects are trying deliberately to control simultaneously all of their verbal and nonverbal behaviors.
Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.
This study compared depressed undergraduate subjects with controls on a syllogistic reasoning task. Each syllogism consisted of two premises, the first relating the subject to a middle term and the second relating the predicate to a middle term. The subject's task was to draw the appropriate conclusion relating the subject to the predicate. The findings revealed a significant difference between the groups in ability to solve the problems correctly, and an examination of the types of errors made showed that the depressed subjects made significantly more errors which involved a failure to integrate information from the two premises to solve the problems. Such errors are thought to be associated with working memory capacity limitations. The findings are discussed in relation to models of depression postulating deficits in effortful processing.
Trait emotional intelligence refers to a constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the lower levels of personality hierarchies. In 2 studies, we sought to examine the psychometric properties of the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short Form (TEIQue-SF; Petrides, 2009) using item response theory (IRT). Study 1 (N= 1,119, 455 men) showed that most items had good discrimination and threshold parameters and high item information values. At the global level, the TEIQue-SF showed very good precision across most of the latent trait range. Study 2 (N= 866, 432 men) used similar IRT techniques in a new sample based on the latest version of the TEIQue-SF (version 1.50). Results replicated Study 1, with the instrument showing good psychometric properties at the item and global level. Overall, the 2 studies suggest the TEIQue-SF can be recommended when a rapid assessment of trait emotional intelligence is required.
The ability to detect lying was evaluated in 509 people including law-enforcement personnel, such as members of the U.S. Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, California police and judges, as well as psychiatrists, college students, and working adults. A videotape showed 10 people who were either lying or telling the truth in describing their feelings. Only the Secret Service performed better than chance, and they were significantly more accurate than all of the other groups. When occupational group was disregarded, it was found that those who were accurate apparently used different behavioral clues and had different skills than those who were inaccurate.