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Human rights, cultural practices, and
state policies: Implications for global
social work practice and policy
Katiuzhinsky A, Okech D. Human rights, cultural practices
and state policies: Implications for global social work practice
and policy
Effective practice in a global world requires knowledge and
understanding of diverse cultures. Most social workers around
the world are committed to values and policies that enhance
the well-being of especially vulnerable populations and that
protect their human rights. However, not all cultural practices
or policies place the same value on human rights and the
protection of vulnerable populations, a situation that may
result in conflicts for social workers, who have an ethical
obligation to advocate for human rights as well as to be sen-
sitive to their clients’ cultural contexts. Based on multidis-
ciplinary research and contemporary examples of gender
discrimination, forced marriages, child labor, and female
genital mutilation, this article proposes resolutions to this
conflict. It concludes by suggesting practices and policies
that might help social workers to strike an effective balance
between cultural diversity and the promotion of human rights.
Key Practitioner Message: • Social workers are best placed to
understand individuals and communities within their various
cultural contexts; • Social work practice and policy should
be sensitive to cultural practices that may undermine human
rights and the well-being of vulnerable populations; • Guided
by professional values and ethics, social workers can assume
the roles of educator and advocate in enhancing the rights
of individuals.
Anna Katiuzhinsky, David Okech
University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
Key words: culture, human rights, relativism, states,
universalism, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
David Okech, University of Georgia, School of Social Work,
Athens, GA, 30602, USA
E-mail: dokech@uga.edu
Accepted for publication October 1, 2012
Social work’s values on human rights and
cultural diversity
The thorny issue of human rights and how it applies
in different cultural contexts has long been debated
throughout history. Wars have been fought in the name
of freedoms and rights, further increasing international
attention to the notion of human rights. Some contem-
porary cultural practices or State policies are still per-
ceived as violating several fundamental human rights
due to the varying values they place on human rights.
This conflict between cultural values and human rights
continues to be unresolved in scholarly circles, interna-
tional social work, and even global political relation-
ships. Rights theorists disagree on the appropriate
approaches to human rights. As Healy (2008a) noted,
some argue that human rights standards should be
universal – the same for all countries and cultures –
while others argue that no one has the right to dictate to
another culture how to operationalize and apply human
rights and that each culture should have the right to
devise its own human rights standards.
The Code of Ethics of the US-based National Asso-
ciation of Social Workers (NASW) as well as that of the
International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW)
affirm the profession’s responsibility to pursue social
change and human rights, particularly on behalf of
vulnerable and oppressed people, and the liberation
of all people (see IFSW, 2004; NASW, 2008). Indeed,
Reichert (2001) even proposed a bold move for social
work from a social justice orientation to a more com-
prehensive human rights framework. Similarly, the
NASW and IFSW expect professionals to understand
and promote cultural diversity through practice compe-
tence (see IFSW, 2004; NASW, 2008). As Ife (2001)
and Healy (2008a) noted, social workers face these
issues in their own countries when they work with
people of different cultures, or internationally when
they interact with other cultures and work in contexts
that are totally different from their own. Healy (2007)
DOI: 10.1111/ijsw.12002
Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 80–88
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL WELFARE
ISSN 1369-6866
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80
attributed the increased contact between social workers
and diverse cultures to globalization. Not all cultural
practices or policies, however, place the same value on
human rights and the protection of vulnerable popula-
tions, a situation that may result in conflicts for social
workers, who have an ethical obligation to advocate for
human rights as well as to be sensitive to their clients’
cultural contexts.
The goal of this article is to examine human
rights within various cultural contexts and to propose
implications for social work practice and policy. The
article is divided into five main sections. Section one
describes some specific human rights violations across
the world. Section two looks at the United Nation’s
(UN) role in creating an international human rights
framework. Section three discusses the “classical
conflict” between the “universalist” and “relativist”
approaches to human rights. Section four assesses
some possible resolutions to the “classical conflict,”
and section five recommends implications for social
work practice and policy.
Human rights violations within specific
cultural situations
Enhancing human rights within diverse cultures may
pose challenges for social work practice or policy.
Human rights are not universally upheld, and many
international examples depict practices or policies that
essentially violate them. For instance, providing serv-
ices in support of women’s rights may create conflict in
some patriarchal cultures. As Healy (2007, p. 14) noted,
“perhaps no issue has been more contentious than the
[issue of the] rights of women.”
Pakistan is an example of a society in which women
are often deprived of the right to control their own lives
(Critelli, 2010). According to Amnesty International
(2002), in tribal settings of Pakistan, women are
degraded to the status of property to be exchanged
through marriages among families for social status
and resources, or to resolve disputes. It is also estimated
that 80 percent of Pakistani women experience some
form of domestic violence (Hassan, 2000; Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2010; Perveen, 2009).
Despite Pakistan’s constitutional acceptance of women
as equal citizens and the adoption of international laws,
women still have lower social status and there exist
disparities in their basic human development (Jamal,
2006). Jahangir (2000) attributed Pakistani women’s
issues to a distorted interpretation of religion.
Agencies who assist women in Pakistan must
contend with this embedded patriarchal view. Most
women’s shelters tend to view their female clients as
being in need of “custodial restraint” and unworthy of
care (Bari, 1998; Critelli, 2010). This view is reflected
in the quality of the services they provide. Shirkat Gah
(2007) noted that most of these facilities tend to deny
women their fundamental rights to social, legal, eco-
nomic, and emotional support, which is vital to their
efforts to rebuild their lives. The cultural belief that
marriage is the only way to sustain women emphasizes
the practices in these facilities to consider “rehabilita-
tion” as successful only when the women reunite with
their husbands or remarry (Bari, 1998; Critelli, 2010).
Therefore, such shelters may neglect services that
promote women’s self-sufficiency and independence.
Certainly, examples of rights violations against women
are found in many countries the world over.
Another example of an ancient cultural practice
that violates specific human rights is female genital
mutilation (FGM). As Kool (2010) noted, FGM has
been practiced for over 2,500 years. There are different
forms of FGM; the most common are Type I and Type
II (Sharmon, 2010; UNICEF, 2005a). In Type I, part or
the entire clitoris is removed, whereas in Type II, part or
the entire clitoris and labia are removed. Type III is
considered to be the most debilitating as it surgically
closes the vagina, leaving just a small opening for uri-
nation and menstruation, to be reopened after marriage,
sometimes by a husband through cutting or forceful
penetration (Sharmon, 2010; UNICEF, 2005a).
According to UNICEF (2005a), FGM occurs mainly
in countries along an area from Senegal in West Africa
to Somalia in East Africa and to Yemen in the Middle
East. It is also practiced in some parts of Southeast Asia.
Reports from Europe, North America, and Australia
indicate that it is practiced among some immigrant
communities as well. The World Health Organization
(WHO, 2012) estimated that between 100 million and
140 million girls and women alive today have experi-
enced some form of the practice. It is further estimated
that up to 3 million girls in sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt,
and Sudan are at risk of genital mutilation annually
(Sipsma et al., 2012; Weir, 2000). Sharmon (2010)
and Weir (2000) concurred with UNICEF (2005a) that
FGM is performed in order to control women’s attitudes
toward sex and sexuality and to ensure virginity for
marriage, as the practice is expected to take away all
sexual desire.
FGM victims often experience pain, trauma, hemor-
rhaging, difficulty urinating, painful menstruation,
painful sexual intercourse, sexual dysfunctions, infec-
tions resulting from unsterilized instruments, unin-
tended labia fusion, proliferation of scar tissue at the
site, and infertility (Nnamuchi, 2012). Opponents of
FGM maintain that the practice can damage marital
relationships and lead to estrangement due to the lack
of enjoyment of sexual relations and difficulty with
penetration (Sure, Nnamuchi, 2012). Therefore, FGM
is perceived as violating girls’ and women’s right to
health, life, liberty, sexual autonomy, and security as
protected by international human rights laws. The UN
Human rights and culture
Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 80–88
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officially declared it a harmful discriminatory practice
and leads the fight to eliminate it (UN News Center,
2012). In Article 1 of The Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
the UN defines discrimination as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.
Another controversial cultural practice considered
to violate human rights is forced marriages. Forced
marriages are differentiated from arranged marriages
that are facilitated by the families and both parties give
their full and free consent to the marriage (Uddin &
Ahmed, 2000). In forced marriages, one or both parties
are coerced into a marriage against their will (Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, 2006). Forced marriages
occur both in peace and war times; however, during
war times, this practice is usually much more prevalent
and brutal.
Forced marriages in Sierra Leone, during their
11-year-long civil war, were prime examples of the
extent of the brutality of such practice during war time
(Palmer, 2009). During this period, approximately 41
percent of women and girls were forcibly taken and
3 percent were forcibly married to members of the
rebel group (Gong-Gershowitz, 2009; Palmer, 2009).
Although with their “husbands,” these women suffered
forced labor, physical violence, repeated rape and other
forms of sexual violence including forced pregnancy
(Gong-Gershowitz, 2009). Due to the brutality of their
experiences, Gong-Gershowitz (2009) suggested that
conflict-related forms of forced marriages should be
categorized as sexual slavery and a gross violation of
human rights.
The practice gained public attention because of three
high-profile cases in England in the late 1990s involv-
ing three young women struggling to escape forced
marriages, one of whom was murdered by her family
(see Anitha & Gill, 2009; Hall, 1999; Watt, 1999).
Obtaining reliable data on forced marriages is a chal-
lenge because of its unofficial and undocumented
nature. However, when age was used as an indicator, it
was estimated that, in 2003, approximately 51 million
girls were married before turning 18 (Thomas, 2009).
Anitha and Gill (2009) argued that many forced mar-
riages are misclassified as arranged marriages because
women’s sociohistorical, political, and cultural con-
texts and their location at the intersection of several
vectors of inequality are not considered when determin-
ing if there was consent or coercion.
The widespread use of child labor is another instance
of human rights violations, although the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most widely
ratified treaty. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) approximated that 215 million of the world’s
2 billion children are engaged in child labor (ILO,
2008). Working children are found all over the world.
Child labor is different from child work, which is
defined as child employment that is beneficial to a child
(Jha, 2009). Work around the home, assisting with the
family business, or earning pocket money outside the
home can be beneficial if it provides youth with skills
and experience and prepares them to become productive
members of the society (ILO, 2012). Conversely, child
labor is exploitative and unhealthy, deprives children of
their childhood, keeps them from attending school, uses
children to undermine labor standards, and harms their
development (ILO, 2012).
Child labor exists due to the economic necessities
and the cultural expectations that children are to help
with the family business or bring home a substantial
portion of the family income (Renteln, 1988).
Omokhodion and Uchendu’s (2010) study in south-
western Nigeria found that 39 percent of the parents
surveyed believed that their school-aged children
should work, with 50 percent reporting that their
school-aged children were working. For countries with
large poor populations and with no strong safety nets,
such as India, when the survival of the family is at
stake, every member, including children, is expected to
contribute some labor (Jha, 2009). Although this may
be beneficial to the family in the short run, it imperils
the future development of the child laborers as well as
that of the families and societies at large.
The involvement of the UN in human rights issues
The human rights violations discussed here still
occur despite the fact that the affected countries may
be members of the UN. To become a member, the
UN requires a Country/State to be able and willing
to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter
(UN, 2012). As stated in Chapter IV, Article 13 of the
Charter, the members of the UN General Assembly
(representatives from all member states) are responsi-
ble for assisting in the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all (UN, 2012). On Decem-
ber 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The
UDHR lists specific rights and freedoms that humans
are entitled to without regard for race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth, or other status (UN,
2012). The UDHR became the foundation for interna-
tional human rights law and has inspired more than 80
international human rights treaties and declarations,
Katiuzhinsky & Okech
82 Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 80–88
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many regional human rights conventions, domestic
human rights bills, and constitutional provisions to
promote human rights (UN, 2012).
Particularly relevant to this discussion are the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW), the CRC as well as
the UDHR itself. CEDAW was adopted by the UN in
1979 and is considered a bill of rights for women. It
defines what constitutes discrimination against women
and sets up an agenda for national action to end such
practices (Healy, 2008b). The CRC adopted by the UN
in 1989 is the first legally binding international instru-
ment to incorporate the full range of human rights –
civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights.
The CRC spells out the basic human rights that children
everywhere have: the right to survival; to develop to the
fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse,
and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cul-
tural, and social life (UNICEF, 2005b).
Hathaway (2007) noted that states sometimes ratify
treaties when they do not intend to, or lack the domestic
institutions strong enough to enforce them, much to the
chagrin of human rights advocates and the general citi-
zenry. Zvobgo (1979) argued that during the UDHR’s
creation, many of the current member states were not
yet UN members and did not have an opportunity to
contribute to its inception. He also contended that if
the UDHR was to be debated again in the General
Assembly, the final draft would be different from what
it is today (Zvobgo, 1979). However, other scholars,
including Eberl, Kinney and Williams (2011), White
(2011), and Schlesinger (2004), noted that in order to
prevent future world wars, 51 nations collaboratively
signed the Charter to form the UN. This established
the Commission on Human Rights in 1946 with
members representing Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, and
Western philosophical, political, and religious perspec-
tives (Eberl et al., 2011).
Subsequently, the Commission on Human Rights
formed a committee to study philosophical thought and
religious tradition in order to identify foundational prin-
ciples that would justify human rights (Eberl et al.,
2011; Hobbins, 2002). In 1947, the committee sent
out a questionnaire requesting some of the world’s
leading thinkers, including Mohandas Gandhi and
Aldous Huxley, to present their views and ideas
(Hobbins, 2002). Respondents to the questionnaire,
many of whom were non-Westerners, identified sources
for human rights in their traditions (Hobbins, 2002).
Based on this feedback, the committee, under the chair-
manship of Eleanor Roosevelt, developed a framework
for human rights and affirmed that certain rights are
implicit in human nature due to the fundamental right to
life (Hobbins, 2002). In other words, civil, political, and
social rights were necessary in order to preserve the
dignity of human beings.
Human rights and culture: a classical conflict
It is not surprising that the notion of human nature and
universal human rights is contested. In fact, at the 1948
UN General Assembly where the UDHR was adopted,
48 states were in favor, whereas eight states abstained
because of reservations in the areas of social rights
(Human Rights Watch, 2011). Not surprisingly, there
are currently two main competing schools of thought
in the current views on human rights: the deontological
and the teleological views. The conflict between these
two opposing schools of thought is also known as the
“classical” conflict (Preis, 1996). The deontologi-
cal school views human rights as “universal” (Healy,
2008b) and believes in fixed moral rules that actions are
inherently right or wrong (Dolgoff, Loewenberg, &
Harrington, 2005) regardless of time, place, or context.
Universalists conceptualize human rights as a universal
moral right, something that all people, everywhere, at
all times, ought to have, something of which no one
may be deprived without a grave affront to justice,
something which is owing to all human beings simply
because they are human (Cranston, 1973; Renteln,
1988). The UDHR expresses the “universalist” view in
its Article 1 by stating that “all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights” (Human Rights
Watch, 2011 [UDHR, 1948]).
The contrasting view is the teleological school
that views human rights as “culturally relative” (Healy,
2008b). Relativists believe that ethical decision making
should be based on context and consequences (Dolgoff
et al., 2005). As the world consists of immensely
diverse cultural contexts, the American Anthropologi-
cal Association questioned whether universal rights are
truly possible (Etinski, 2009). Relativists believe that
each society should formulate their own human rights
standards in their contexts. Pollis and Schwab (1979)
criticized the UDHR for its “Western” construct of
human rights that focuses on individual dignity, worth,
and autonomy and perceive it as cultural and ideologi-
cal ethnocentrism. Those concerned with the influence
of Western individualism argue that human rights are
socially constructed – products of a particular society at
a particular time – and should not be imposed on others
(Sani, 2010).
Universalism has its roots in natural law (Etinski,
2009). In Western society, natural law plays a dominant
role in political theory and was considered a standard
against which all other laws were judged and unjust
laws contested (Renteln, 1988). According to Davies
(2008), both the American Declaration of Independ-
ence and the Bill of Rights claimed universal human
nature and natural law. Natural rights are seen as
modern manifestations of the natural law. Earlier
natural law and rights theorists including Thomas
Aquinas asserted that these rights are self-evident
Human rights and culture
Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 80–88
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because they are immediately knowable by humans. It
is therefore claimed that through human reason, it is
readily understood by all that “good” is to be done and
encouraged, and “evil” should be avoided and discour-
aged (Eberl et al., 2011).
However, these “self-evident” rights may not be
obvious to others. For example, Locke’s and Aquinas’
assertion of natural rights to property may not be
considered “self-evident” in a socialist or communal
society (Eberl et al., 2011; Renteln, 1988). Brunstetter
(2010) argued that the definition of “good” is ulti-
mately understood in the Western constellation of
values and warned that this tendency can have dire
consequences on those cultures that do not have
the same definition of “good.” What happened to
American Indians in history is a good example of this
hypothesis. They had their own values, different from
Western notions of good and evil. They did not recog-
nize the Western “good” from “evil,” which afforded
them an “inferior” label, and this was used to justify
their inhumane treatment and exclusion (Brunstetter,
2010). The same could be said of how colonization
was executed.
Other scholars (see Davies, 2008; Eberl et al.,
2011; Renteln, 1988) attempted to anchor the basis for
human rights in moral law, human needs and dignity,
and human nature and rationality. However, these
approaches are victims of existing cultural diversities
and the variations in the interpretations of each concept.
An example is the understanding of the American Bill
of Rights over time. During its creation, the American
Bill of Rights was interpreted to be only for white male
property owners (Davies, 2008). However, today, it is
interpreted to include women, nonowners of property,
and other races/ethnicities. As Renteln (1988) con-
tended, “[t]here is no way to prove the validity of any
particular interpretation because no procedure is estab-
lished by which the legitimacy of particular human
rights can be judged” (p. 349). Consequently, Renteln
(1988) contended that there is no basis for universality
of human rights in the UDHR.
In response, Addo (2010) argued that there have
been many opportunities – including The World Con-
ferences of Human Rights in Tehran in 1968 and Vienna
in 1993 – for member states to participate by affirming
or rejecting the standards and ideals set forth in the
UDHR. Therefore, each state that ratified human
rights treaties agreed to be legally bound and to be held
accountable for gross violations of the rights of its
citizens. Thus, through their collective decision to
affirm international standards – regardless of their cul-
tural traditions – universal human rights standards have
been established (Addo, 2010). As such, the universal-
ity of human rights becomes a prospective and an
evolving process, rather than a representation of any
one particular cultural tradition.
Still, even though state representatives officially
consented to specific human right treaties, it does not
automatically mean that the citizens of that state under-
stand or accept that decision and are willing to uphold
it. To create a truly universal and effective human rights
scenario, the participation of the people is required;
otherwise, this obligation may be seen as a “top-down”
imposition (Harris-Short, 2003). Because of current
cultural diversities, it would be difficult to create uni-
versal human rights standards; it may be necessary to
probably create separate human rights standards for
each different cultural group, a task that is by no means
a simple one.
Universalists warn against the “anything goes” atti-
tude and the risks of valuing the group or community
over the individual. Cultural rights could justify ques-
tionable cultural activities, such as those that discrimi-
nate against women, harm people, or constrain their
development (Donders, 2010; Healy, 2008b). Renteln
(1988) stated that because one of the main goals of
rights is to limit the arbitrary exercise of governmental
power, utilitarian goals masquerading as group rights
would perhaps seriously undermine the power of rights
as trumps. Additionally, Donders (2010) advocated for
establishing restrictions that prevent claims of cultural
rights from being used to endanger the rights of others
or of society as a whole.
Resolutions to the classical conflict
Evidently, both sides of the “classical conflict” have
valid points. In order to prevent and to address discrimi-
nation and oppression, clearly identified, enumerated,
and agreed upon rights are imperative. However,
individuals do not exist in a vacuum; they live among
groups and communities, some of which have very
deep cultural traditions. The question is then asked:
How do we balance culturally responsive practices and
policies while protecting the rights of vulnerable indi-
viduals and communities?
Brems (1997) suggested a “rights limitation”
approach, which views one interest as a right and the
other as an acceptable ground for a limitation of that
right. This approach is applied in the UDHR that states
that “in the exercise of his/her rights and freedoms, every
person shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law, solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of moral-
ity, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society” (UDHR, Article 29[2]). However, by using this
approach, lawmakers would have to struggle with the
question of “which right is more important?” Xanthaki
(2010) suggested that the UDHR in its Article 4 prefers
individual over cultural rights, as can be understood
from its contention that “no one may invoke cultural
Katiuzhinsky & Okech
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diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by
international law, nor to limit their scope.”
Cultural rights should not be rejected solely on
the basis that they conflict with other human rights.
However, they also should not be enjoyed without
limits. Brems (1997) suggested that in situations where
different rights conflict, limitations should be provided
by law and that they pass a proportionality test where
the controlling body aims at striking a fair balance
between the demands of the general public interest and
the requirements of the protections of the individual’s
fundamental rights. This approach is often used in
courts. When a criminal is imprisoned, his or her
individual right to freedom is limited by the public’s
right to safety and security. Similarly, one person’s
rights might be limited by another person’s rights. For
example, Eberl et al. (2011) argued that one’s right
to life may be limited by the right of others to protect
themselves. Still, the justifications for limiting any par-
ticular right would have to depend on the actual circum-
stances (Donders, 2010), which ultimately yields to
situational relativity. Ife and Finke (2006) stated that it
is clear that rights make sense only if there are parallel
responsibilities on others to protect, secure, or realize
those rights, and similarly, responsibilities make no
sense unless they are linked to rights.
Brems (1997) described an “opt out” approach as
another possible solution. Here, the contextualized
individual in the environment is the focus. The “opt
out” approach is cognizant of the fact that culture
develops and changes over time. Individual members of
a community have the right to participate in their
decision-making processes that determine and develop
the community’s cultural life; they also have the right
to leave the community (Donders, 2010) if they believe
their individual rights are threatened by communal
culture and rights. By abandoning the group viewpoint,
this approach attempts to reduce essentialism and
oppression and allows for internal differences and evo-
lution within the group (Brems, 1997). It allows for
an individual’s actual communal ties, instead of those
that dominant forces in the community would like to
attribute to them.
Therefore, through this approach, individuals would
have the right to practice some or all of their culture,
or reject some or all of it. States therefore, should
have individual “opt out” rights available by law to all
its residents, so that individuals retain the right to take
advantage of these rights or opt out. The role of the
international human rights systems under this approach
would be to protect the individual’s right to “opt out.”
Articles 3 and 4 of the UDHR imply the sanctity and
dignity of individual rights within various cultural con-
texts, especially for minority cultures living within
dominant cultural settings, thus lending support to the
“opt-out” as well as the “rights limitation” approaches.
Both the “rights limitation” and the “opt out”
approach may be necessary to negotiate human rights
within diverse cultures. Because cultural and religious
practices are diverse, it is impossible to make general
statements about their acceptability. Therefore, each
practice should be examined and evaluated separately.
Culture is an important aspect of human life and helps
people to feel connected to other individuals. There-
fore, individuals in a community should have the right
to participate in their respective cultures.
However, culture is fluid and changes over time,
as do people; local laws should protect both individual
and communal freedom to change. Local governing
bodies should have rights available to all individuals
and allow individuals to voluntarily access those rights.
For example, if a woman’s parents arranged a marriage
to which she does not agree, she should have a legal
option to prevent the marriage from happening. This
way, the individual has a choice to follow the culture
and accept the arranged marriage or to “opt out” and
use the legal system to assert her right to choose
another mate.
The “opt out” approach, however, should apply only
to adults because children do not have the power to
exercise their options. Furthermore, some vulnerable
populations, such as those with disabilities, might be
unable to exercise their autonomy to choose and might
need additional protection. Here, the “rights limitation”
approach would have to be used to protect children’s
and other vulnerable individuals’ rights and prevent any
harmful, irreversible, cultural, or religious practices
from being applied. FGM practices on children, for
example, should be banned by law. Similarly, a legal
process would be needed to ensure that children are not
made to labor or forced into marriages. As Article 3
of CEDAW requires, states should take all appropriate
measures to the full advancement and development
of women, guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoy-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
(see CEDAW).
Some possible approaches to prevent that from
occurring are age limitations and requirements for pre-
marital counseling and/or individual interviews before
receiving a marriage license. In these examples, the
parental, cultural, and religious rights are limited by
law in lieu of the child’s individual right to health and
well-being. Another example of the rights limitation
approach is the policy in the USA that allows adults to
refuse life-saving medical treatment but cannot refuse
it for their children, even if the treatment violates
their religious beliefs. Article 19 of the CRC explicitly
demands that states take all appropriate legislative,
administrative, social, and educational measures to
protect the child from all forms of maltreatment, abuse,
and exploitation while in the care of parents, legal
guardians, or any other person (see the CRC).
Human rights and culture
Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 80–88
© 2012 The Author(s). International Journal of Social Welfare © 2012 Inter national Journal of Social Welfare and John Wiley & Sons Ltd 85
Implications for social work practice and policy
Evidently, social workers have opportunity for specific
engagements within diverse cultures in promoting
human rights. First, the IFSW (1988) has declared that
social work has always been, from its conception, a
human rights profession. Independent from their social
contexts, human beings are worthy in and of them-
selves. Healy (2008a) stated that in its formative years,
social work was extensively involved in human rights
issues. However, in more recent years, social work has
paid more attention to human needs than rights. To be
clear, social and economic needs and civil and political
freedoms are closely related. The rights identified in
Articles 22 and 25 of the UDHR are obviously based on
human needs for survival and development (see the
UDHR). Social worker’s desire to engage in actions to
solve rights violation issues and enhance basic well-
being clearly positions them as front-line human rights
workers (Healy, 2008a).
Second, as “grass roots human rights workers,”
social workers have deeper knowledge of human
needs, rights, conditions, and cultural contexts (Ife &
Finke, 2006). They also understand that rights have
limited uses to a person who does not have access to
adequate basic needs and that even the best cared for
person may suffer without freedom. Staub-Bernasconi
(2007) wondered what permanent achievement is
gained by saving people from torture, only to find that
they die from famine or disease that could have
been prevented in the first place. It is plausible that by
denying families economic rights and driving them
into poverty, their children might, for instance, be
forced to engage in child labor, thereby denying chil-
dren their social rights.
Third, social workers can educate individuals
about their rights and empower them to access those
rights. FGM is better reduced by an educated class
(Nnamuchi, 2012). The basic premise of CEDAW is not
only protection and advancement of women, rather it
seeks to place women on an equal footing with men.
Gender equality in education and training, as a sustain-
able approach and as required in Article 10 of CEDAW,
should be promoted in efforts to reduce FGM. Changes
in the community are more successful and sustainable
if they are not imposed from the outside but allowed to
develop from within (Donders, 2010). Wronka (1994)
expanded the notion of education as key to constitu-
tional reforms, which in turn affects social policy and
promotes the rights of people, and ultimately fulfills
basic human needs.
Fourth, social workers can assume an advocate
role. Davies (2008) stated that rights have to be claimed
before they can be established. Social workers can
advocate legislations that enhance human and com-
munal rights and assist in negotiating their scope and
limitations. They can also advocate on behalf of vulner-
able populations who are deprived of their power to
advocate for themselves or are unable to do so.Although
grossly violating the fundamental human rights of their
people, some state dictators plead sovereignty and label
rights advocates as agents of external forces. Working in
such environments may even be risky but is still worth-
while. Many social workers worldwide are involved in
empowerment programs that strengthen and amplify the
voices of vulnerable communities.
In conclusion, the cultural practices discussed
here may appear senseless or destructive to others.
Social workers understand that such cultural practices
have meaning and fulfill a function for those who
practice them. For instance, FGM is practiced as a rite
of passage among some communities, where girls are
considered adults and ready for family responsibilities
after the initiation. An approach to eliminating FGM
in such communities might be to integrate nonharmful
rites of passage that preserve community identity as
well as protect the rights of girls. As UNICEF (2005a,
p. 1) noted, “culture is not static; it is in constant
flux, adapting and reforming. People will change their
behavior when they understand the hazards and indig-
nity of harmful practices and when they realize that it is
possible to give up harmful practices without giving up
meaningful aspects of their culture.” Social workers
should therefore strive to strike a balance between
securing human rights for individuals or vulnerable
minority communities while being culturally respon-
sive (Sohlberg, 2009), because as James (1994) stated,
even though human rights are universal, they are not
absolute in application.
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