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Nonviolence as Contentious Interaction
... Whether the goals are to make political claims, defend standpoints, or raise citizens' voices against repression, nonviolent action can be conceptualized as another form of taking part in the contentious political struggle. McAdam and Tarrow (2000) describe such contentious politics as a form of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their political abilities (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Although nonviolent action can indeed be successfully performed by single persons (e.g. during a hunger strike), on most occasions nonviolent tactics are facilitated by a collective effort. ...
... Whether the goals are to make political claims, defend standpoints, or raise citizens' voices against repression, nonviolent action can be conceptualized as another form of taking part in the contentious political struggle. McAdam and Tarrow (2000) describe such contentious politics as a form of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their political abilities (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Although nonviolent action can indeed be successfully performed by single persons (e.g. during a hunger strike), on most occasions nonviolent tactics are facilitated by a collective effort. ...
... The number of participants can range from a couple of activists to a massive crowd of hundreds of thousands of people. Peaceful movements using nonviolent action as tactics, as well as violent armed revolutions, first emerge as the products of dynamic interactions among various parties of a political struggle, whose orientation to each other defines a socially constructed field of contention (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). This field of contention is a set of relationships that is embedded in a legal, institutional, or normative system which constrains the strategic options available to all political contenders (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001). ...
... Numerous people from different walks of life, including workers, farmers, communities, dwellers, and homeworkers, have resorted to this mode of action to protect and pursue their interests. While many studies have focused on the dynamics of the resistance of these disgruntled groups, little has been paid attention to what determines the responses of the targets (government or private actors) (Sokphea, 2016;Cress and Snow, 2000;Soule, 2009;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000). A group of scholars suggests that the responses of the government or State rely on the tactics or strategies of resistance. ...
... To influence a government or state, scholars suggest several tactics and strategiesfor example, institutional versus non-institutional actions, legal versus illegal action, violence versus non-violence (Marx and McAdam, 1994;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000), and nondisruptive versus disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990). These tactics can be condensed as non-institutional and institutional tactics or non-violent and violent tactics in other words (Sokphea, 2016). ...
... Recently, not only do CSOs adopt the tactics/concepts of TANs, but they are also shaped by the tactics of social movements. In social movements, scholars suggest two important tactics: (i) institutional actions (peaceful protest, petition, filing complaint, etc.); and (ii) noninstitutional actions (violent protest and any other harmful activities) (Sokphea, 2016;Cress & Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990;Giugni, 1998;McAdam, 1983;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000). These tactics are more likely employed to target the State or the Government, rather than the private sector. ...
... These tactics are more likely employed to target the State or the Government, rather than the private sector. To address this issue, McAdam and Tarrow (2000) postulate extra-institutional tactics, including boycotting, campaigning and defamation. These are used to target corporations that possess no institutional power that the Government does (King, 2008;King & Soule, 2007). ...
As a contribution to the growing literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in the global production networks, this article examines how civil society organizations (CSOs), which have adopted the TAN approach, influence the sugar industry in Cambodia. Due to ineffective domestic influencing strategies, the CSOs adopted the TAN approach and escalated to an international supply chain movement approach (ISCMA) aiming to influence international stakeholders at each stage of the sugar supply chain in order to leverage boomerang pressure on the sugar producing companies and the Government of Cambodia. Despite its resourceful networking strategies, the ISCMA failed to leverage significant influence on the sugar companies and the government to achieve its demands. The failure was not due to weak networks, but was in part due to the political nexus between the government and the sugar companies. This article suggests that to ensure the effectiveness of CSOs’ actions within the TAN framework in the global production networks, one should take into account the power of the government in relation to local politico-commercial elites.
... Numerous people from different walks of life, including workers, farmers, community dwellers, and homeworkers, have resorted to this mode of action to protect and pursue their interests. While many studies have focused on the dynamics of the resistance of disgruntled groups, little attention has been paid to what determines the responses of the targets of resistance -in this case, government or private actors (Sokphea, 2016;Cress and Snow, 2000;Soule, 2009;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000). Some scholars suggest that the responses by the government or the State rely on the tactics or strategies of resistance. ...
... Scholars suggest that to influence a government or state, several resistance tactics and strategies might be used -for example, institutional versus non-institutional actions, legal versus illegal action, violence versus non-violence (Marx and McAdam, 1994;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000), and non-disruptive versus disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990). These categories can be condensed as non-institutional and institutional tactics or nonviolent and violent tactics (Sokphea, 2016). ...
Agrarian resistance often occurs as a result of expropriation and dispossession of poor farmers’ land and other properties. This paper examines how cost-benefit rational choice determined the government of Cambodia's response to poor farmers’ resistance to large-scale land acquisition for an agro-industrial investment. Theoretically, whatever mechanism a government chooses to respond to resistance, the aim is to retain more benefits, especially political legitimacy. In this study, the government, in collaboration with private companies, opted for a combination of strong repression and partial concession in response to the resistance by the communities. The study argues that this response is basically determined by cost-benefit calculations. However, the purpose is not to retain political legitimacy as theoretically argued, but to protect the economic interests of the client-patron networks that had developed between foreign companies and the powerful local politico-commercial personages associated with the regime.
... In social movement literature, the use of repertoires or influencing strategies (the specific actions staged by CSOs to interact with government and business) varies considerably. Scholars suggest different strategies and tactics that can be classified as institutional and non-institutional tactics (Marx & McAdam, 1994;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000;Alimi, 2015;Cress & Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990;Giugni, 1998). Defined as actions such as peaceful protests, petitions, filing of complaints, rallies and other forms of non-violent action that are recognised by authority, institutional tactics tend to be perceived as legal by the targets (Cress & Snow, 2000); conversely, non-institutional tactics, such as violent protests, sit-ins and any harmful activities are not accepted by the target, as they are deemed illegal. ...
... Defined as actions such as peaceful protests, petitions, filing of complaints, rallies and other forms of non-violent action that are recognised by authority, institutional tactics tend to be perceived as legal by the targets (Cress & Snow, 2000); conversely, non-institutional tactics, such as violent protests, sit-ins and any harmful activities are not accepted by the target, as they are deemed illegal. As these latter tactics appear to be generally employed to target the state or government, rather than multi-national firms or companies within a country, extra-institutional tactics are proposed (Marx & McAdam, 1994;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000). Extra-institutional tactics, which consist of boycotts, campaigns, defamation etc., are employed to target private companies that, unlike governments, have no institutional means or power to address the grievances of a movement (King & Soule, 2007;Micheletti & Stolle, 2015). ...
In the social movement literature, scholars have proposed that the success or failure of social movements is shaped by several factors, including: social movement strategies and organisational arrangements; cost-benefit calculations informing government responses to social movement demands; the openness of political opportunity structures; and capacity of social movements to mobilise resources and access transnational networks to support their demands. Influenced predominantly by the experiences of social movements in the global North, the propositions of these scholars fail to adequately account for the performance of social movements operating within certain political regime types prevalent in the global South. As a contribution to bridging this gap, this thesis explains why some movements of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Cambodia fail while others succeed, within a context of struggle for political survival by the neo-patrimonial patron of the regime. The thesis focuses on CSO movements engaged in contesting economic land concessions granted to foreign companies in Cambodia and, in so doing, substantiates new empirical and theoretical links between social movements and the political survival of varying regime types.
The study employed a qualitative process-tracing method to examine two cases of CSO movements targeting subordinate government institutions (e.g. provincial offices and ministries) and foreign companies investing in agro-industrial land. The CSOs in the two cases demanded remedy for similar adverse social, economic and environmental impacts caused by large-scale land acquisition for agro-industries. However, they achieved substantially different degrees of success and failure. The thesis argues that a primary factor explaining this variation is the choice of ‘balancing strategies’ employed by the regime’s patron to secure its own political survival by manoeuvring between concessive and repressive responses. To survive politically, the patron tends, on the one hand, to employ repressive measures to deal with opposition, including CSOs that challenge the members of the winning coalitions (influential supporters of the regime’s patron); on the other, it deploys concessive measures to co-opt and circumvent opposition. These strategies illuminate the patron’s calculation of risks and rewards, embodied as the maintenance of political support from the winning coalitions’ members and the placating of aggrieved communities through the relative use of concessive or repressive responses. The way in which the patron calculates risks and rewards is contingent upon their perception of whether or not the movements put the regime and its winning coalitions at risk. The main reference point in making such calculations of risk is the regime’s survival. These strategies to cope with different CSO movements are adopted not only by the central patron, but also by its subordinate institutions.
In one case involving a land concession held by a senator who is also known as a sugar baron, although the CSO movements employed strong strategies, such as: an escalation from domestic to international strategies; the creation of a formal organisational arrangement; external networking; and the adoption of a stance aligned with some political elites, they failed to achieve most of their demands. They were relatively unsuccessful because the subordinate institutions, especially the provincial office, chose to repress the CSO movements due to influence from the sugar baron, a member of the winning coalitions. In contrast, CSO movements targeting a European company employed relatively weak strategies (i.e. weak networking, an informal organisational set-up and the seeking of support from institutions within the government), but they achieved most of their demands. They were relatively successful because the subordinate institutions conceded to regulate the European company to address most of the CSOs’ demands. Due to the European company’s lack of connection to the patron of the regime, the subordinate institutions held strong autonomy and thus could concede to the CSOs.
The interactions explained in these case studies suggest that the relative success or failure of CSO movements is not contingent primarily upon their strategies, but rather upon the concessive or repressive measures of the central patron. These measures, adopted as they are for the political survival of the regime’s patron, shape the responses of the subordinate institutions. In essence, CSO movements are more likely to fail when they pose a high risk to the survival of the regime’s patron. The thesis concludes that, while the strategies orchestrated by the CSO movements are important in explaining the dynamics of their movements and outcomes, these strategies are not primary factors in determining the degrees of success or failure. Thus, scholars in this field should take into account the survival strategies adopted by political leaders in the particular regime type within which a social movement operates.
... Data presented in this paper were collected as part of the author's doctoral research, which was supported by Faculty of Arts of the University of Melbourne. The author would like to thank Kate Macdonald and Andrew Walter, and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also the Centre of Khmer Studies which funded travel to present this paper at the APISA 2014 in Chiang Mai. to what determines the responses of the targets of resistance-in this case, government or private actors (Cress & Snow, 2000;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000;Sokphea, 2016;Soule, 2009). Some scholars suggest that the responses by the government or the State rely on the tactics or strategies of resistance. ...
... Scholars suggest that to influence a government or State, several resistance tactics and strategies might be used-for example, institutional versus noninstitutional actions, legal versus illegal action, violence versus nonviolence (Marx & McAdam, 1994;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000), and nondisruptive versus disruptive tactics (Cress & Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990). These categories can be condensed as noninstitutional and institutional tactics or nonviolent and violent tactics (Sokphea, 2016). ...
From agrarian perspective, the resistance occurs as a result of expropriation and dispossession of the poor farmers' land and other properties. This paper examines how cost-benefit rational choice determines the government of Cambodia's response to the resistance of a large-scale land acquisition for an agro-industrial investment. Theoretically, whatever mechanism of response is chosen by the government, the aim is to retain more benefits, especially retaining political legitimacy. In this study, the government, in collaboration with the companies, opted for a combination of strong repression and partial concession in response to the resistance by the communities. The study argues that this response is basically determined by cost-benefit rationales. However, the purpose is not to retain political legitimacy as theoretically argued, but to protect the economic interests of the client-patron networks instilled between the foreign companies and the local powerful politico-commercial persons of the regime.
... Generally, anger is expressed through 'bluster, impassioned gestures which are characteristic of standoffs' (Collins 2020, p. 11) rather than culminating in physical violence. While these emotions can motivate collective action and engagement, they also raise ethical challenges regarding the use and acceptability of violence as a form of political action (Barbalet 2020;McAdam & Tarrow 2000;Tilly 2003). ...
This paper examines the interplay between hope and ecoanxiety among young climate activists aged 18–35, moving beyond the conventional focus on ecoanxiety management. While existing scholarship emphasises the predominance of ecoanxiety, critics argue it individualises collective responsibilities. Using personal interviews and visual methodologies (autophotography and photo elicitation), this Australian study explores the experiences of ten young activists, including their feelings of being overwhelmed, rage, and grief. Contrary to a concentrated focus framing ecoanxiety as debilitating, the findings underscore the critical role of hope in motivating and sustaining engagement. Diverse and creative forms of activism render manifest young activists’ deployment of hope and anticipate a better future. A critical understanding of the complementary relationship between hope and ecoanxiety enhances activism efficacy, empowerment, and subsequent well-being. This research contributes to shifting the discourse from exclusively managing ecoanxiety to fostering hope, emphasising meaningful climate action and enhanced well-being among young activists.
... The perceived morality of forgiveness also varies situationally. Forgiveness is viewed as virtuous in some contexts, such as nonviolent civil rights movements (McAdam and Tarrow 2000), but is morally unacceptable in others (Exline et al. 2003). Our work finds that in everyday contexts, intergroup revenge is viewed as less status worthy than forgiveness (Benard et al. 2021). ...
... Resistance tactics are also discussed in social movement theories. Mainstream theorists assert that movements against social injustices can be non-violent (or institutional) and violent (or non-institutional) (Cress & Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990;Marx & McAdam, 1994;McAdam & Tarrow, 2000;Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Non-violent tactics are lawful and non-harmful such as peaceful protests, petitions, and advocacy, while violent tactics may comprise confrontational protests, sit-ins, road blockages and vandalism. ...
This thesis examines the interactions of land exclusions with livelihood transitions, and subsequent gendered responses in both material and emotional forms. It uses a theoretical framework that includes powers of exclusion, livelihood transitions, adaptation and resistance and emotional political ecology to argue that there are many ways to understand the relationships between power and practice in the escalating process of land grabbing. Rather than relying on a universal narrative, this research identifies different configurations of power. The empirical material was generated from the author's long-standing research relationship with the Bunong people in Srae Preah commune, Mondulkiri Province, Cambodia. The study employs a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative household surveys over time, as well as qualitative methods comprising in-depth interviews, life stories, wealth-ranking exercises, and participant observations. Findings show that land exclusions induced by conservation and economic land concessions were evident and enabled by the powers of informality, regulation, the market and force, which limited villagers' customary resource rights. Also, the communal land titling program, which was intended to be inclusive and equitable, resulted in an "intimate exclusion" by community elites. This inequality was exacerbated by capitalist relations that transformed indigenous people's livelihoods into resource commodification leading to market dependency. These transitions resulted in reduced livelihood choices and a greater reliance on the commodity market for household income, although there was still a desire to protect traditional livelihoods. This meant prosperity and impoverishment co-existed, as depicted in the rise in overall income but also in income inequality. Further, gender disparities in access to resources and gendered divisions of labor were evident. Community responses over time included adaptation but also a range of resistance strategies (institutional and non-institutional, direct and indirect, and overt and covert), depending on the reactions of the encroaching actors, their exclusionary powers, local leadership and historical experience. The resistance movements, albeit externally supported and unfederated, yielded some results, although the future of the resources at stake remained uncertain. A variety of both institutional and non-institutional approaches that engaged both men and women were more successful. Importantly, the affective emotions, particularly related to trauma and iii sensationalism, of the local leadership influenced and united villagers in their collective struggles. However, gender differentiation in the application of emotions was not as evident as expected. This study concludes that to understand land exclusions and associated livelihood changes, one needs to understand the nature of "power" over multiple commodifying and territorializing instruments that interact with the practices and discourses of exclusions and their material and non-material impacts. Further, more thorough attention is needed to understand how resources are in a constant state of revalorization; and how different gendered social relations induce both materialist and emotional responses. iv
... Therefore, we have to use empirical case studies in order to detect patterns, mechanisms, and processes that are recurrent in various contexts. With such an empirical research base, we will be able to formulate theories on the dynamics of the "contentious politics" of civil resistance (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Only after that will we be able to give practical guidelines for nonviolent action and become relevant for organizers and strategists of nonviolent social change. ...
... In NSM scholars suggest several kinds of influential tactics; for instance, institutional versus non-institutional action, legal versus illegal action, and violence versus non-violence (Marx and McAdam, 1994;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000); as well as non-disruptive and disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990;Giugni, 1998). These tactics are similar and known as institutional and non-institutional tactics. ...
This study examines the dynamics and outcomes of movements by indigenous communities that targeted an agro-industrial investment demanding remedy to adverse impacts on their socio-economic conditions. Since the employment of initial institutional tactics, such as peaceful protests and petitions, yielded no significant outcomes, the indigenous communities escalated their tactics to non-institutional tactics: Violent protests. To respond, the government chose a combination of partial repression and moderate concession. To address the government responses, as well as the demands of indigenous communities, the company mitigated most of the adverse socio-economic impacts. As a result, the indigenous communities were able to achieve most of their demands. This paper, therefore, concludes by arguing that tactical escalation of indigenous community movements from institutional to non-institutional tactics influences the government and company to address the demands of indigenous communities, and also shapes the behaviour of the company operating in a host country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement.
... Or it can be pragmatic. Further, we need to understand the external factors and structural conditions that shape a nonviolent movement in order to understand the social and political changes and peaceful conditions that emerge as outcomes of a nonviolent movement (McAdam & Tarrow 2000;Roberts & Ash 2009;Schock 2005). Regardless of scholarly traditions and ideological orientations, scholars of nonviolent movements explicitly and implicitly recognise conflict resolution and peace as outcomes of civil resistance campaigns (Chenoweth & Cunningham 2013;Dudouet 2008;Pearlman 2011). ...
A plethora of literature explains how armed conflicts terminate in nonviolent political settlements. However, little is known about how and why nonviolence functions as a mechanism of conflict transformation. Using the case study of the 2006 April Uprising (Jana Andolan II) in Nepal, this paper shows how the nonviolent struggle was a vehicle for the termination of the armed conflict that ravaged the country for a decade (1996–2006). The collaboration between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPNM), erstwhile enemies, led to nonviolent collective action, driven by the convergence of interests of these two key actors towards fighting a common enemy: the royal Palace. The paper argues that the nonviolent struggle also transformed strategies, attitudes and behaviour of key actors, including the CPNM, which ultimately transformed conflict issues into peace issues and induced structural changes in the long run. Thus the processes of actor transformation, issue transformation and structural transformation catalysed by the April Uprising explain why and how the nonviolent struggle functioned as a catalyst for the termination of the armed conflict.
... This article takes the importance of such precipitating factors as a starting point for a more dynamic comparative approach, aiming to explore how two comparable external 'shocks' can lead to very different forms of collective action even though their structural context (Kano in 2004 and has not changed significantly. To explain such variation, the paper borrows from political science and social movements literature on collective action, with discursive framing as its central concept: the discursive act of collectively making sense of new and unexpected information, such as triggering events, through the filters of existing mental models, identity cleavages, fields of contention, or other heuristic devices (Gentner and Stevens 1983;McAdam and Tarrow 2000;Snow 2004;Kendhammer 2016). ...
This article analyses the role of religious leaders in collective violence in Kano, the major urban centre in northern Nigeria. It compares two episodes of collective action in the city—the violent ‘Plateau riots’ in 2004 and the non-violent ‘cartoon protests’ in 2006—to explore the role of religious leaders in the variation in violence between the two events. The core argument is that the ways in which Islamic and Christian preachers framed the triggering events for these cases facilitated different forms of mobilisation and enemy identification in response. In 2004, the interpretation of violence in Plateau State through the ‘Christians-versus-Muslims’ frame allowed for mobilisation within Kano’s Christian and Muslim communities as well as for the identification of local Christians as enemies. In 2006, in contrast, the infamous Danish cartoons were actively framed as part of the global struggle between faithful Nigerians and nonreligious Westerners, facilitating non-violent mobilisation across Christian-Muslim boundaries. Thus, the divergent discursive strategies employed by religious leaders are likely to have contributed to violent escalation in 2004 and to peaceful mobilisation in 2006. At the same time, however, the article emphasises the interaction of discursive framing with other factors, such as the role of security forces and the inextricable connections between religious and political authorities in Kano. The article is based on mixed-methods data collected in Kano between 2006 and 2012, including perceptions survey data, semi-structured interviews, and newspaper articles.
... Recently, not only do CSOs adopt the tactics/concepts of TANs, but they are also shaped by the tactics of social movements. In social movements, scholars suggest two important tactics: (i) institutional actions (peaceful protest, petition, filing complaint, etc.); and (ii) noninstitutional actions (violent protest and any other harmful activities) (Sokphea, 2016; Cress & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 1983; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000). These tactics are more likely employed to target the State or the Government, rather than the private sector. ...
As a contribution to the growing literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in the global production networks, this paper examines how Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), which have adopted the framework of TANs, influence the sugar industry in Cambodia. Due to ineffective domestic influencing strategies, the CSOs adopted the TANs framework and escalated to the international supply chain movement approach (ISCMA) aiming to influence international stakeholders at each stage of the sugar supply chains in order to leverage boomerang pressure on the sugar producing companies, and the Government of Cambodia. Despite its resourceful networking strategies, ISCMA failed to leverage significant influence on the sugar companies and the Government to achieve their demands. The failure was not due to weak networks, but was in part due to the political nexus between the Government and the sugar companies. This paper suggests that to ensure the effectiveness of CSOs' actions within the TANs framework in the global production networks, one should take into account the power of the Government in relation to local politico-commercial elites.
... In (new) social movements, scholars suggest several kinds of influential tactics; for instance, institutional versus non-institutional action, legal versus illegal action, and violence versus non-violence (Marx and McAdam, 1994;McAdam and Tarrow, 2000); as well as nondisruptive and disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000;Gamson, 1990;Giugni, 1998). ...
... Therefore, we have to use empirical case studies in order to detect patterns, mechanisms, and processes that are recurrent in various contexts. With such an empirical research base, we will be able to formulate theories on the dynamics of the "contentious politics" of civil resistance (McAdam and Tarrow 2000). Only after that will we be able to give practical guidelines for nonviolent action and become relevant for organizers and strategists of nonviolent social change. ...
... In some cases, participants may actually intend to put themselves at risk of arrest as a means of calling attention to social problems or political oppression (McAdam & Tarrow, 2000). In addition to arrest, participants in social action campaigns may also risk losing their jobs, harassment, or physical harm by opponents or the police. ...
Social work curriculum on social action-oriented organizing methods is often devoid of content on the day-to-day role of the organizer in recruiting diverse participants, facilitating group decision-making, and planning and implementing campaigns. Little attention is paid to how tactical decisions are made and how the ethical implications of these decisions are weighed. In this study, professional organizers were interviewed about how they viewed their work, their relationships with their constituents, and the values and ethical principles used to make tactical decisions.
... In (new) social movement, scholars suggest several kinds of influential tactics; for instance, institutional versus non-institutional action, legal versus illegal action, and violence and nonviolence (Marx and McAdam, 1994; McAdam and Tarrow, 2000); and non-disruptive and disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 1998). These tactics are similar and known as institutional and non-institutional tactics. ...
This study examines the dynamics and outcomes of movements by indigenous communities which targeted an agro-industrial investment demanding remedy to adverse impacts on their socioeconomic conditions. Since the employment of initial institutional tactics, such as peaceful protests and petitions, yielded no significant outcomes, the indigenous communities escalated their tactics to non-institutional tactics: violent protests. To respond, the government chose a combination of partial repression and moderate concession. To address the government responses as well as the demands of indigenous communities, the company mitigated most of the adverse socioeconomic impacts. As a result, the indigenous communities were able to achieve most of their demands. This paper, therefore, concludes by arguing that tactical escalation of indigenous community movements from institutional to non-institutional tactics influences the government and company to address the demands of indigenous communities, and also shapes the behavior of the company operating in a host country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement.
... It does not differentiate between the opponent and the self and recognizes each party's interpretation of reality and truth (Easwaran, 1997). A nonviolent person claims moral superiority over the opponent (McAdam & Tarrow, 2000). Nonviolence does not attribute intentions to the oppressor. ...
The purpose of this study was to develop a theoretically grounded instrument to measure the construct nonviolence at workplace. The academic discourse on psychological mechanism underpinning nonviolence is meager. Relying on extant literature in psychology, sociology, and political science in the field of violence and nonviolence, we have identified four dimensions to capture the measurable features of nonviolence. Next, we developed items to measure these dimensions. Professionals from private organizations in India answered the 32-item scale. The scale was tested for its factor structure, reliability, and validity. The instrument can be used by behavioral scientists and industry practitioners to assess the level of nonviolence among professionals as pre-screening and for academicians to further test and develop theoretical insights of this construct. The unique contribution of this study is that it challenges the basic assumption that nonviolence is absence of violence. The results indicate that nonviolent personalities are active agents in breaking the cycle of violence.
... The role of external factors affecting the outcome of nonviolent campaigns has recently been reasserted by scholars who integrate social movements theory into the study of NVR (McAdam/ Tarrow 2000;Schock 2005), as well as by the organisers of the Oxford conference on "civil resistance and power politics" in March 2007 (Roberts 2007). Such variables include the means of control and repression by the regime, the level of active support from outside powers, the degree of media coverage of the campaign, the social distance between the adversary parties, the degree of loyalty within the state bureaucracy and security forces, or the broader geopolitical context. ...
When does the accommodation of subordinate ethnic groups generate a backlash from the politically dominant group? I argue that power-sharing, regional autonomy, and multiculturalism lend themselves to the articulation of grievances and fears among members of dominant groups, especially if they explicitly recognize subordinate groups’ collective identities. In turn, nationalist parties can exploit such sentiment to organize protests, incite violence, and increase their electoral prospects. To test these arguments, I combine new monthly data on ethnic accommodation in 125 multi-ethnic electoral regimes between 1990 and 2018 with information on dominant group mobilization in anti-government protests and communal violence. I find systematic increases in dominant group mobilization around times when group-based accommodation is first introduced or expanded. These results enhance our understanding of mass mobilization by dominant ethnic groups. Moreover, they point to concrete proposals to reap the benefits of ethnic accommodation while avoiding a potentially destabilizing backlash against it.
Conflict between groups plays a powerful role in shaping social interaction within groups. Within groups, social status—respect, prestige, and deference—organizes, motivates, and stratifies social interaction. Yet, studies exploring how conflict between groups shapes social status within groups are relatively rare. We argue that intergroup conflict creates opportunities for individuals to gain or lose status by demonstrating group commitment. We examine two contrasting intergroup behaviors—revenge and forgiveness—and evaluate the idea that these behaviors will be viewed as status-worthy to the extent that they are perceived to signal group motivation. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis that avengers and forgivers gain status by offering group-motivated accounts of their behavior. Pairing an original national probability sample with an experimental survey design, we examine how avengers and forgivers are viewed in everyday conflicts across three widely held identities: national identity, political partisanship, and sports team fandom. We find that Americans perceive intergroup forgiveness as more status-worthy, and a stronger indicator of group motivation, than intergroup revenge. In open-ended survey questions, forgiving ingroup members were described as more status-worthy, competent, and warm, and less dominant than their vengeful counterparts. However, we find little evidence that individuals can directly gain status by claiming that their actions are motivated by concern for the group. Our work speaks to theories of conflict, identity, and social status. More broadly, understanding how Americans value intergroup revenge and forgiveness offers insight into the frequency and intensity of identity-based conflict in contemporary American society.
In the past two decades, democratically elected executives across the world have used their popularity to push for legislation that, over time, destroys systems of checks and balances, hinders free and fair elections, and undermines political rights and civil liberties. Using and abusing institutions and institutional reform, some executives have transformed their countries' democracies into competitive authoritarian regimes. Others, however, have failed to erode democracy. What explains these different outcomes? Resisting Backsliding answers this question. With a focus on the cases of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, the book shows that the strategies and goals of the opposition are key to understanding why some executives successfully erode democracy and others do not. By highlighting the role of the opposition, this book emphasizes the importance of agency for understanding democratic backsliding and shows that even weak oppositions can defeat strong potential autocrats.
What determines which identity cleavage, ethnicity or religion, is mobilized in political contestation, be it peaceful or violent? In contrast to common predictions that the greatest contention occurs where identities are fully segmented, most identity conflicts in the world are between ethnic groups that share religion. Alternatives in Mobilization builds on the literature about political demography to address this seeming contradiction. The book proposes that variation in relative group size and intersection of cleavages help explain conundrums in the mobilization of identity, across transgressive and contained political settings. This theory is tested cross-nationally on identity mobilization in civil war and across violent conflict in Pakistan, Uganda, Nepal and Turkey, and peaceful electoral politics in Indonesia. This book helps illustrate a more accurate and improved picture of the ethnic and religious tapestry of the world and addresses an increasing need for a better understanding of how religion contributes to conflict.
Nonviolent action is a powerful tool for peacebuilding, through which ordinary people can shift power to advance peace with justice. “External Support for Nonviolent Action” examines how international actors can most impactfully assist locally led nonviolent-action campaigns, with the aim of respecting local autonomy and following a do-no-harm approach.
La erosión democrática se ha vuelto un fenómeno endémico. Enfrentados con crisis económicas y de seguridad, presidentes elegidos democráticamente en nuevas y viejas democracias han utilizado su popularidad para introducir reformas constitucionales que buscan destruir el sistema de pesos y contrapesos, impedir elecciones libres y justas y cesar derechos políticos y libertades civiles. En Venezuela, Hugo Chávez erosionó la democracia. Utilizando reformas institucionales, lentamente, transformó el régimen democrático en un régimen autoritario competitivo. En Colombia, Álvaro Uribe trató de hacer lo mismo, pero falló. Pese a sus esfuerzos para minar la independencia de cortes y Congreso y desequilibrar las elecciones, el orden constitucional colombiano se mantuvo relativamente fuerte. ¿Por qué, a pesar de circunstancias similares, algunos presidentes consiguen erosionar exitosamente la democracia y otros no?
Resistance can take many forms. In Palestine, to exist is to resist. For the last fifty-four years Palestinians have found many inventive and innovative ways to resist the Israeli occupation, and one of those ways, but certainly not the only, is art. Palestinian art and the Israeli occupation walk hand in hand insomuch that and the historical and political encounters of the conflict have influenced the Palestinian cultural scene and vice versa. This article aims to explore how art, in its various forms, is part of the arsenal of everyday resistance techniques employed by the Palestinian. It addresses not only how art has challenged the outcomes of the conflict, but also how the conflict has impacted the Palestinian artistic scene. To this end, it explores the case of contemporary Palestinian graffiti as a relevant tool of resistance that provides an insight into the nature of Palestinian resistance but also into the evolution of the conflict itself.
Nonviolent methods of action have been a powerful tool since the early 20th century for social protest and revolutionary social and political change, and there is diffuse awareness that nonviolence is an efficient spontaneous choice of movements, individuals, and whole nations. Yet from a conceptual standpoint, nonviolence struggles to engage with key contemporary political issues: the role of religion in a post-secular world; the crisis of democracy; and the use of supposedly ‘nonviolent techniques’ for violent aims.
Drawing on classic thinkers and contemporary authors, in particular the Italian philosopher Aldo Capitini, this book shows that nonviolence is inherently a non-systematic and flexible system with no pure, immaculate thought at its core. Instead, at the core of nonviolence there is praxis, which is impure because while it aims at freedom and plurality it is made of less than perfect actions performed in an imperfect environment by flawed individuals.
Offering a more progressive, transformative and at the same time pluralistic concept of nonviolence, this book is an original conceptual analysis of political theory which will appeal to students of international relations, global politics, security studies, peace studies, and democratic theory.
This article argues that the goals and strategies the opposition uses against presidents with hegemonic aspirations are critical to understand why some leaders successfully erode democracy, while others fail. Using interviews and archival research, I trace the dynamics of erosion in Alvaro Uribe’s (Colombia) and Hugo Chávez’s (Venezuela) administrations. I show that during the first years of these governments, the opposition in both countries had some institutional leverage. The Colombian opposition used that leverage. It resorted to institutional and moderate extra-institutional strategies, which protected its institutional resources and allowed it to eventually stop Uribe’s second reelection reform. The Venezuelan opposition forsook that leverage and chose radical extra-institutional strategies instead. The latter cost it the institutional resources it had, and helped Chávez advance more radical reforms.
Why do nation-states, which have long been standardizing and unifying their lands and languages, allow the formation of ethnically distinct territorial autonomies? Few existing theoretical studies that entertain this question heavily rely on hard power explanations of territorial autonomy formation, such as groups' economic and military capabilities. Employing the arguments advanced in the nonviolence literature and tracing the process of territorial autonomy formation in the case of Tatars in the Russian Federation, this study revises the conventional claim. It concludes that groups which rely on peaceful tactics such as verbal or written communication of discontent as well as nonviolent protests have a significant potential to achieve territorial autonomy.
What determines why some self-determination disputes develop into mass nonviolent campaigns, others turn into civil wars, and still others remain entirely in the realm of conventional politics? A great deal of work has addressed the factors that lead to violent mobilization, but less attention has been paid to understanding why disputes become violent or nonviolent, comparing these two as strategic choices relative to conventional politics. This article examines the determinants of strategy choice in self-determination disputes by analyzing how a variety of factors affect the costs and benefits of conventional political strategies, mass nonviolent campaign, and civil war. I find that civil war is more likely, as compared to conventional politics, when self-determination groups are larger, have kin in adjoining states, are excluded from political power, face economic discrimination, are internally fragmented, demand independence, and operate in states at lower levels of economic development. I find that nonviolent campaign is more likely, as compared to conventional politics, when groups are smaller, are less geographically concentrated, are excluded from political power, face economic discrimination, make independence demands, and operate in non-democracies. Examining the full set of strategies available to self-determination groups allows us to more accurately understand why these groups engage in mass nonviolent campaign and civil war.
Las Abejas came to be known by the international community as the civil counterpart to the neozapatista movements and as a Christian pacifist movement. This book presents the voices of Las Abejas and of numerous collaborators alongside an innovative theoretical analysis of the dynamics of identity construction. The uniqueness of this study is the analysis of the role of international human rights observers in relation to indigenous communities in resistance. In this fascinating study, Marco Tavanti explains how cultural, religious, political, human rights and nonviolent frameworks combine in a syncretic identity of resistance.
Critical sociologists have long recognized the intersections between love and revolution. For the most part, however, our understanding of love and its relevance for revolution remains vague. My article seeks to remedy this limitation. It starts by sketching the social and personal contexts of alienation, indicating that in today's capitalist world genuine love is revolutionary in itself. It then specifies what love means, what types of love exist, and what revolutionary love implies in theory and practice. The next section introduces the political cultures of loving revolution concept and applies it to the Indian independence movement led by Gandhi. The conclusion discusses how potential revolutionaries might benefit from my interpretation of love and revolution.
In spite of the numerous challenges it faces (including a traumatic split), Sudan has not yet fallen to the domino effect of Arab revolutions. However, Sudan has not just one but two experiences from which to draw lessons about the conduct of successful peaceful popular revolutions against entrenched despots. In both instances the revolutions (in 1964 and 1985) came well ahead of similar waves of revolutionary fervour elsewhere, and they were extremely ‘low-tech’ and rather local affairs, not benefiting from new media, international trends or external pressure. This paper offers a close analysis of Sudan's remarkable revolutionary heritage, and asks what lessons it throws up for the present.
In the context of 1960s contention, the outbreak of the Troubles would suggest the distinctiveness of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland. Yet a comparison with the civil rights struggle in the US Deep South indicates otherwise. I rely upon original archival sources located in the Linen Hall Library in Belfast and on the vast literature on the US Civil Rights Movement to show how the processes of mobilization, counter‐mobilization and repression in the two countries shared striking similarities. Blacks in the US South and Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland shared a similar structural position within their societies, which partially explains the similarities in their mobilizations. Likewise, the reaction of local majority communities to civil rights mobilization was informed by the social mechanism of “attribution of threat,” unleashing similar patterns of counter‐mobilization and police repression. However, while the Civil Rights Movement in the US was devoted to nonviolence, activists in Northern Ireland utilized nonviolence in their rhetoric, but not in their protest activities.
While studying the consequences of violent and non-violent protests, the current literature is mostly mute on the question of why some ethnic collectivities prefer violent political action over non-violence. This question is especially interesting as recent empirical studies reveal functional effectiveness of non-violent tactics vis-à-vis violent strategies in achieving communal goals. Why then do some groups still employ violent tactics? Drawing on the literature that connects educational level with utilization of democratic practices, I argue that ethnic groups that enjoy a higher educational status are less prone to using violent strategies choosing instead peaceful protest. I test this hypothesis using data on 238 ethnic groups in 106 states from 1945 to 2000. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that groups with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to engage in non-violent protest. Conversely, groups that enjoy lower educational status in their respective societies tend to use violent tactics.
Social action-organizing requires the use of confrontation-related skills that are substantially different from collaborative and problem-solving strategies commonly used in community development and social planning. Consequently, field instructors must use training strategies for community organizers that are unique to this type of practice. In this paper, the authors develop a conceptual model that can be used in supervising students in social justice-related field placements that require the use of confrontation tactics. The model includes eight skill areas that will help students develop engagement and communication skills needed to work in partnership with constituents to fight for social justice.
This study examines factors that predict the formation of territorial autonomy arrangements for regionally concentrated ethnic communities. Territorial autonomies are institutional arrangements that allow ethnic groups to express their distinct identities while keeping the borders of host states intact. Although an extensive literature has investigated the capacity of autonomy arrangements to manage interethnic disputes, little research has addressed the precise origins of these institutions. The existing literature considers violent tactics as a primary factor that enables ethnic collectivities to attain territorial autonomy. In this study, the reasoning from the extant literature is juxtaposed with the arguments developed in the research on nonviolent opposition. Nonviolent movements enjoy moral advantage vis-a-vis violent groups. Moreover, peaceful tactics have the advantage of garnering attention for the concerns of ethnic groups without the liability of provoking the animosity or distrust created by violent conflict. Based on the analysis of a dataset representing 168 ethnic groups across 87 states from 1945 to 2000, it is found that the peaceful tactics groups employ when seeking greater self-rule is the single strongest predictor of the formation of autonomy arrangements. In particular, this study concludes that groups that rely on peaceful tactics, such as protests and strikes, and demand territorial autonomy, as opposed to an outright independence, have a greater potential to achieve territorial autonomy in comparison to those groups making extreme demands through the use of violence.
Building and sustaining cultures of peace does not mean eliminating conflict. Rather, conflict is to be expected. Sharp, even profound, disagreements among groups are almost inevitable in any social setting. These disagreements may be or become deeply divisive and threaten to split the community on moral or political grounds. The challenge for building a culture of peace, therefore, becomes how such contention is expressed and managed. This involves building institutions that are authoritative and legitimate and altering behavioral repertoires among community members so that conflicts can be waged short of violence. This chapter argues that nonviolent action, as a method of making contention, makes three important contributions to building and sustaining a culture of peace. First, nonviolent means of struggle promote social norms that eschew violence, even without any kind of overarching commitment to pacifism. Second, nonviolent struggle helps to build trust among individuals and groups, even when they find themselves in contention. Third, the structural requirements for effective nonviolent action diffuse power throughout society—effectively empowering groups who might otherwise be excluded, broadening democratic participation, and valuing inter-group communication.
The repertoire of nonviolent methods for contentious action has important consequences for each of these approaches to building peaceful communities. It does this by virtue of the characteristics of engaging in nonviolent action as well as by the behavioral consequences of its practice. In addition, it promotes institutions that are responsive to community interests and needs, reflect norms of social justice, and are generally effective in their actions. Such institutions will have deeper legitimacy and consequently will be able to act with greater authority. Of vital importance, these institutions will also be perceived as legitimate venues for conflict resolution and for contention.
In this classic work of sociology, Doug McAdam presents a political-process model that explains the rise and decline of the black protest movement in the United States. Moving from theoretical concerns to empirical analysis, he focuses on the crucial role of three institutions that foster protest: black churches, black colleges, and Southern chapters of the NAACP. He concludes that political opportunities, a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the development of these three institutions played a central role in shaping the civil rights movement. In his new introduction, McAdam revisits the civil rights struggle in light of recent scholarship on social movement origins and collective action. "[A] first-rate analytical demonstration that the civil rights movement was the culmination of a long process of building institutions in the black community."--Raymond Wolters, Journal of American History "A fresh, rich, and dynamic model to explain the rise and decline of the black insurgency movement in the United States."--James W. Lamare, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
The advancement of social theory requires an analytical approach that systematically seeks to explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations between events. These essays, written by prominent social scientists, advance criticisms of current trends in social theory and suggest alternative approaches. The mechanism approach calls attention to an intermediary level of analysis in between pure description and story-telling, on the one hand, and grand theorizing and universal social laws, on the other. For social theory to be of use for the working social scientist, it must attain a high level of precision and provide a toolbox from which middle range theories can be constructed.
The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the WorldAt the Margins of the Movement: Grassroots and Cadre in Philippine Protest
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In the Name of Civil Society: Contesting Free Elections in Post-Colonial Phlippines Social Mecha-nisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory
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Church and State in the Philippines: Some Implications for United States Policy
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At the Margins of the Movement: Grassroots and Cadre in Philippine Protest
- Vince Boudreau
In the Name of Civil Society: Contesting Free Flections in Post-Colonial Philippines
- Eva-Lotta Hedman
- Elisabet