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How Rhetorical Strategies Reproduce Compromise Agreements: The Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Abstract
How do actors, once they have reached agreement on a compromise, make this compromise persist? Being rooted in mutual concessions, it can never be taken for granted that compromises, once agreed upon, stay in place. Contestation about compliance is something that is very much to be expected and does not inevitably destabilize a compromise. Whether such a destabilization occurs or not depends on how actors communicate with one another. I contend that whether compromise persists or not has a great deal to do with the interplay of offensive and defensive rhetorical strategies that actors employ. I identify six offensive strategies (recourse, elaboration, entrapment, accusation, ostracism, abandonment) and six defensive ones (accommodation, placation, denial, deflection, inattentiveness, rejection), and chart the degrees to which offensive–defensive exchanges of strategies are conducive to reproducing compromises. Recourse–accommodation interplays on the one hand (most conducive) and abandonment–rejection interplays on the other (least conducive) form the poles of the spectrum of exchanges. I probe my theoretical framework by inquiring into the stability of the grand compromise that underpins the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The findings support my framework. The parties have tended to stay away from heavy rhetorical artillery and stuck to less robust rhetorical strategies. Elaboration and placation strategies have played a particularly important role for making the grand compromise persist.
... How do actors exploit what opportunities to launch a new advocacy? What strategies and counter-strategies (Kornprobst, 2012) do they employ to make their case and with what repercussions for the advocacy and the background? Working towards answering these questions will require more eclectic theorising and empirical analysis. ...
Develops a rhetorical field theory that conceptualises the relationship between background ideas and foreground communication Distinguishes between two layers of background ideas ( nomos and topoi) that underpin communicative encounters in a field Conceptualises communicative opportunities and moves through which actors change the nomos of a field Illustrates the added value of a rhetorical field theory by inquiring into nomic change in the nuclear-weapons field
A burgeoning literature in International Relations draws on Bourdieu’s theory of social fields to address the question of how actors make and unmake order in world politics. Inquiring into deeply seated background ideas constituting order, this literature often neglects how communication reproduces and (de)contests background ideas. Our article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by outlining a rhetorical field theory. This theory puts background ideas and foreground communication on an equal footing and conceptualises their relationship in detail. We distinguish between two layers of background ideas ( nomos and topoi) and address the crucial question of how nomic change becomes possible. We introduce a typology of nomic change (destabilisation, adaption, disorientation, shift) and conceptualise the interplay of rhetorical opportunities and rhetorical moves that bring about particular types of nomic change. We probe this theoretical framework by analysing the recent nomic change in the nuclear-weapons field. This empirical analysis provides evidence for our theoretical framework.
States routinely justify their policies in interstate forums, and this reason-giving seems to serve a legitimating function. But how could this be? For Habermas and other global public sphere theorists, the exchange of reasons oriented toward understanding—communicative action—is central to public sphere governance, where political power is held accountable to those affected. But most global public sphere theory considers communicative action only among nonstate actors. Indeed, anarchy is a hard case for public spheres. The normative potential of communicative action rests on its instability: only where consensus can be undone by better reasons, through argument, can we say speakers are holding one another accountable to reason. But argument means disagreement, and especially in anarchy disagreement can mean violence. Domestically, the state backstops argument to prevent violence. Internationally, I propose that international society and publicity function similarly. Public talk can mitigate the security dilemma and enable interstate communicative action. Viewing multilateral diplomacy as a legitimation process makes sense of the intuition that interstate talk matters, while tempering a potentially aggressive cosmopolitanism.
Counterterrorist state forces and terrorist insurgents compete to control not only territory and populations but language. The success of counterterrorism, therefore, hinges crucially on representational practices. Defeating terrorism in the long run requires both undermining the legitimacy of political violence and its purveyors and opening space for the pursuit of a less violent but still legitimate politics, and these are fundamentally rhetorical projects. Yet the literature has not shed much light on either the range of conceivable counterterrorist representational strategies or on states' particular representational choices. This article presents and illustrates a typology of counterterrorist representational strategies. It argues that state leaders should ideally delegitimize the extremists' means while politicizing some of their aspirations. Leaders often do not pursue this rhetorical path, however, due to the constraints imposed by existing understandings of terrorist organizations and especially by foundational discourses. These arguments are explored empirically through studies of the Indian, Spanish, and Turkish counterterrorist campaigns. The article concludes by extending the framework to clarify why the militarized rhetoric of the so-called 'War on Terror' is counterproductive.
I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof. Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Starting from a characterization of proliferation as the result of a large number of prisoner's dilemmas played out between states engaged in local dyadic rivalries, I demonstrate that it is possible for the superpowers to design an optimal mix of threats and bribes in which states with low compliance costs join the regime on the terms of the multilateral treaty alone; states with intermediate compliance costs need additional customized incentives, delivered through bilateral agreements; and states with high compliance costs are not only left out of the regime but also punished for nonparticipation. I draw a few comparative statics that I systematically test on Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) membership data. I discuss the applicability of the model to the currency, trade, and aid regimes.
Why did the European Union (EU) decide to expand to Central andEastern Europe? More precisely, since it is still uncertain when andunder which conditions Eastern enlargement will actually take place, whydid the EU open the accession process with the ten associated Centraland Eastern European countries in March 1998 and start concreteaccession negotiations with (only) five of them (the Czech Republic,Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia)? My analysis is embedded in thecurrent great debate between rationalist and sociological orconstructivist approaches to the study of international institutions inthe international relations discipline.
Why did Western European states agree to the enlargement of the EU and NATO? Frank Schimmelfennig analyzes the history of the enlargement process and develops a theoretical approach of 'rhetorical action' to explain why it occurred. While rationalist theory explains the willingness of East European states to join the NATO and EU, it does not explain why member states decided to admit them. Using original data, Schimmelfennig shows that expansion to the East can be understood in terms of liberal democratic community building. Drawing on the works of Jon Elster and Erving Goffman, he demonstrates that the decision to expand was the result of rhetorical action. Candidates and their supporters used arguments based on collective identity, norms and values of the Western community to shame opponents into acquiescing to enlargement. This landmark book makes an enormous contribution to theory in international relations and to the study of European politics.
International Relations scholars often treat international order as a byproduct of threats of military violence. Recent scholarship, however, has focused attention on security communities — nonviolent international orders that develop as a by-product of interstate collective identity. Yet it is unclear how these regimes could work during crises when collective identity is disrupted. This article argues that during such periods member states can use representational force, a form of power exercised through language, to stabilize their collective identity. Through an analysis of the Anglo-American security community during the 1956 Suez Crisis I demonstrate how both states relied on nonphysical but forceful expressions of power to `fasten' their identity against the disintegrating effects of their dispute. One effect was to stabilize the security community and preserve nonviolent order. While this illuminates one process by which security communities can weather crises, it also highlights that getting beyond guns does not necessarily mean getting beyond force.
Norms affect political outcomes by shaping the strategies that political actors use to advance their interests. Norms do so by shaping the terms of the debates that underpin political decision making. Unlike existing literature that highlights the importance of persuasion, this article demonstrates that through the mechanism of rhetorical action, norms induce self-interested political actors to adapt their strategy and accept political change that they would normally oppose. The case of the advent of the Convention on the Future of Europe examined here shows that by considering the impact of norms on the behaviour of the opponents of change, ideational analyses can incorporate agency in the explanation of political change.
This article explores the responses of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to Iran's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), focusing on the stance adopted by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). In February 2006, key NAM members voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in a move that stunned Iranian
diplomats, and seemed to signal a collapse in NAM solidarity on fundamental non-proliferation issues. This article assesses
the significance of this event, analysing the extent to which it represents a softening in the ideological divide between
NAM and Western approaches to third-party non-compliance, and a convergence in attitudes towards the nuclear non-proliferation
regime more generally. It draws on the interlinking concepts of international system, international society and global society
to help explain these developments, exploring the hurdles and opportunities associated with any attempt to build on the fragile
consensus emerging among the NNWS over the need to respond more decisively to NPT violations.
On July 5, 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement pledging their governments to actions designed to culminate in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement that would end a three-decade U.S. nuclear embargo against India. Although the formal agreement has not yet received final approval from Congress, concerns about the consequences of the agreement, particularly its possible adverse effect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the worldwide nonproliferation regime, have made the agreement controversial. This article traces the events that led to the Bush-Singh meeting, explicates the current situation, examines the arguments for and against the proposed agreement, and makes some preliminary judgments regarding the agreement's effects on the nonproliferation regime. The failure to prevent India's 1998 nuclear tests with the threat of sanctions (because the Indians calculated that long-term U.S. resolve was not sustainable) set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately end the nuclear embargo. However, the conditions for a better U.S.-India nuclear agreement—from a nonproliferation perspective—will inevitably arise if the current proposed agreement is not adopted.
This paper describes the role of rhetoric in legitimating profound institutional change. In 1997, a Big Five accounting firm purchased a law firm, triggering a jurisdictional struggle within accounting and law over a new organizational form, multidisciplinary partnerships. We analyze the discursive struggle that ensued between proponents and opponents of the new organizational form. We observe that such rhetorical strategies contain two elements. First are institutional vocabularies, or the use of identifying words and referential texts to expose contradictory institutional logics embedded in historical understandings of professionalism, one based on a trustee model and the other based on a model of expertise. A second element of rhetorical strategies is theorizations of change by which actors contest a proposed innovation against broad templates or scenarios of change. We identify five such theorizations of change (teleological, historical, cosmological, ontological, and value-based) and describe their characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Administrative Science Quarterly is the property of Administrative Science Quarterly and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
This paper examines from a
comparative perspective the first
historically documented case of
transitional justice: the restoration
of the Athenian democracy
in 403 BC. It analyzes in particular
the rhetoric of amnesty, justice,
reconciliation and revenge and
the discursive strategies informing
the prosecutions and litigation
which followed the transition.
Comparison of the
Athenian experience with
modern situations of transitional
justice helps to identify key features
which made the Athenian
reconciliation so successful.
How do individual actors figure out what to do? This article advocates a departure from carving up research on this key question about political agency into narrow scholarly categories. Such categories, especially what has to become framed as incompatible logics of action in International Relations Theory, may make for neat and tidy scholarly boxes. But they miss the winding roads through which actors come to embark on a course of action. In order to overcome this shortcoming, I start with uncovering an important clue on which authors adhering to different logics of action converge; political agency has a lot to do with making judgements. I proceed with conceptualizing political judgement broadly in terms of subsuming particulars and universals. I follow-up with outlining a map for empirical research on judgement that helps us follow the actors in how they figure out what to do (the agent's logics of action) rather than superimposing our narrow scholarly categories on their reasoning (a scholarly logic of action). Scrutinizing the usefulness of this map, finally, I analyse McNamara's exercise of political agency during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The findings underline my overall argument: the inclusive conceptualization of political judgement, coupled with the balance of theoretical and empirical inquiry that the research map facilitates, improves on our understandings of how actors figure out what to do.
Despite a large body of research, little is known about the ways in which viewers react to different kinds of statements during televised debates nor about the degree to which these short-term reactions influence postdebate opinions. Taking the second televised debate in the 2002 German national election as an example, we address both of these questions. We identify the most unifying and polarizing statements and connect immediate reactions during the debate to postdebate verdicts on an individual level of analysis. Our results show that commonplaces and acclaims met unanimous support among audience members with different political predispositions. Attacks and statements in which the candidates presented factual evidence or specified their political plans tended to polarize supporters of the respective candidates. Moreover, short-term reactions had an independent impact on postdebate verdicts even when political predispositions and expectations were controlled.
It is well known that during a crisis, unitary rational states have an incentive to misrepresent their true resolve and willingness to go to war. This theoretical result has been taken to imply that diplomacy, interpreted as pre-bargaining communication, can have no effect on the way crises play out. This paper shows an intuitive way that diplomatic cheap talk can matter in a single crisis between countries, especially when the bargaining game has multiple equilibria. In particular, if after “diplomacy” states can choose to either fight a war directly or bargain in hopes of reaching a peaceful settlement, then it is possible to find an equilibrium, where diplomacy influences whether there is war or peace. Importantly, the cheap talk diplomacy does three things the standard model says it cannot: it coordinates actions, it reveals information, and it changes the ex ante probability of war. This result demonstrates an easy way of reconciling the discrepancy between the obvious empirical observation that diplomacy often does influence the path of a crisis with the rationalist model of war.
The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. Both countries’ leaderships regard a recent nuclear cooperation agreement as the most important step yet in their emerging “strategic partnership.” But the deal is also deeply controversial—critics see it as a major departure from decades-standing nonproliferation norms—and its approval by the U.S. Congress in 2006 was far from assured. This paper argues that an increasingly professional and well-funded “India lobby” among Indian-Americans was critical in pressing members of Congress to support the nuclear agreement. Moreover, this episode may portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century—if it can sustain momentum for its ambitious long-term goals, such as securing a permanent seat for India on the UN Security Council, through the uncertain near-term future of the nuclear agreement itself.
Recent works in international relations theory have focused on the value of reciprocity as a means of achieving cooperation in international politics. They argue that even in an anarchic setting in which self-help typifies the behavior of sovereign nation states, the strategy of matching comparable responses to the actions of other nations may educate them over time to cooperate. This article empirically confirms that this assumption is correct. It examines the use of flexible reciprocal bargaining strategies between the United States and its major trading partners in key sectors in which surplus capacity and domestic adjustment difficulties have made commercial conflicts apparent. The outcomes of most of the disputes demonstrate that reciprocity is an effective means of eliciting cooperation from trading partners. Results also illustrate that this cooperation is usually consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) norms of liberal trade and dispute settlement, even when it is inconsistent with the GATT principle of nondiscrimination.
Why are international institutions organized in such different ways?Some, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World HealthOrganization, seek very wide memberships. Others, like the Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development and the Group of Eight, aredeliberately restricted. Some, like the UN, cover an extremely broadrange of issues. Others are narrowly focused, dealing with a singleproduct (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC) or asingle problem (Convention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies). Some, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), perform avariety of centralized tasks and even negotiate sensitive economicpolicies with member states. Others do little more than organizemeetings and collate information, as the Asia-Paci c EconomicCooperation forum does for its members. Most institutions allocate votesequally to all members. But a few of the more important institutionsincluding the IMF, European Union (EU), and UN Security Council givelarge members more votes and effective veto power. Some institutions,like the Outer Space Treaty, are built around rigid promises. Others,like the WTO, allow states to alter their obligations when faced withunusual circumstances.
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There were, of course, also exceptions to this trend. See, for example, Kharrazi, Iran, Statement at the General Debate
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General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2000).
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Rivasseau,
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