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Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic Capitalist Nations
Abstract
I explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis, namely, that capitalists' ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems. Utilizing time-series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984, I find that, indeed, low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis. Moreover, low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress. However, I also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices. The responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may, under some governments, be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies.
... 33 Culpepper (2015), 396. 34 See Quinn and Shapiro (1991); Swank (1992); Przeworksi and Wallerstein (1988). 35 For example, see Culpepper (2015) and Bell andHindmoor (2015, 2017). ...
... 40 Marsh and Lewis (2014), 628. 41 Lindblom (1982, 325; see also Hall (1986); Quinn and Shapiro (1991); Swank (1992); Andrews (1994); Przeworksi and Wallerstein (1988); Strange (1998). dealer-banks-loose monetary policy appears to have disempowered the banks. ...
Despite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.
... 16 Others find support for the implication that a greater number of governing units yield more effective and efficient delivery of public goods and services (Ostrom et al. 1961(Ostrom et al. , 1988(Ostrom et al. : chapter 7, 1993. Lindblom's hypothesis that governments are constrained from making policies contrary to the profit-making interests of private enterprise also has significant support, especially in terms of corporate tax policy (Quinn 1988, Swank 1992, Williams and Collins 1997. In short, jurisdictional markets clearly have some capacity to constrain the extraction of revenue from the economy and also improve the delivery of public services, but only if alternative jurisdictions prove to be viable rivals in the market for economic governance. ...
... Lindblom's (1977) structural dependence hypothesis is built upon the proposition that the free flow of capital so weakens democratic responsiveness that structural changes in the economy are necessary to reclaim political efficacy. Yet, Swank (1992) examines the impact of partisan coalitions on revenue extracted from the economy and finds support for both the structural dependence hypothesis and the hypothesis that partisan control of parliaments affects how much revenue a government will extract. In contrast, Anderson and Tollison (1988) summarily dismiss the importance of an exit option and focus only on legislative organization as the primary explanation of wealth redistribution. ...
... Frenkel, Razin ve Sadka (1991), yapmış oldukları çalışmada, finansal açıklığın sağlayacağı ekonomik faydaların yanı sıra politik riskler de taşıyabileceğine dikkat çekiyorlar. Finansal açıklığın varlığı ve açıklık derecesinin artış göstermesi, ekonomik birimlerinin vergilendirme (servet ve sermaye gibi) politikalarını göz ardı etmelerine neden olabilir.Freeman (1992),Przeworski ve Wallerstein (1988) veSwank (1992), firmaların yatırım alanları seçerken daha düşük vergi oranlarının olduğu ülkelere yöneleceğini, yüksek vergi uygulayan ülkelerin yatırım alamayacaklarını söylemektedirler. Sermaye hesabını tamamen serbestleştirip finansal açıklığı sağlayan ülkeler, makroekonomik politika üzerindeki bazı kontrol yöntemlerinden vazgeçmek zorunda kalacaklardır.Helleiner (1993) ise finansal açıklık sonucunda bir ülkenin yaşamakta olduğu finansal şokların, ticaret üzerinde kısıtlama taleplerine yol açabileceğini söylemektedir.Son yıllarda yapılan çalışmalar, finansal açıklığın ülke ekonomilerine sağlamış olduğu faydaya ve bunun ön koşullarına odaklanmaktadır. ...
... The findings make two main contributions to political economy scholarship on business power (Lindblom 1977;Swank 1992). First, mapping the scale and scope of hitherto hidden forms of coordination reveals more subtle forms of financial industry influence which is arguably not adequately captured by traditional categories of 'structural power' (i.e. the dependency of the state on business for growth and investment) and 'instrumental power' (i.e. ...
Regulatory initiatives are frequently shaped by the ability of the financial industry to build alliances across the wider business community. Yet comparative and international political economy scholarship remains divided over how to explain the resulting networks of financial lobbying. Using quantitative text analysis of 1300 responses to EU financial regulatory consultations between 2010 and 2018, we map patterns of lobbying coordination based on co-signing and text re-use in consultation responses for the first time. This unique dataset is used to analyse hitherto hidden patterns of domestic and cross-border coordination by financial organizations within and between European countries. We find that while distinctive national lobbying networks persist at the country level, the internationalization of financial actors is statistically associated with the formation of coordination ties with foreign financial actors. This suggests that European financial integration has facilitated the emergence of new cross-border alliances which complement-rather than substitute for-existing domestic financial interest coalitions. We argue that the text-as-data approach employed here makes an important new contribution to scholarship on business power and the political economy of Europe. Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments.
... This observed rise of bank lending towards households in the form of mortgage credit has largely occurred as real estate serves as both collateral, mitigating bank lending risks, as well as a financial asset, which, in turn, encourages The specific growth model that emerges in advanced economies can be linked to a series of political, institutional and ideational factors. The political balance between capital and labour, as well as producer-group politics, which strongly favours certain corporate interests, influences the specific growth regime a state may adopt (Alvarez et al. 1991;Swank 1992;Cusack et al. 2010;Hall 2019). ...
Prevailing Comparative Political Economy accounts conceptualise the macroeconomic role of the financial sector in advanced economies either through the Varieties of Capitalism's (VoC) emphasis on corporate finance or on the growth model perspective's focus on household debt to support consumption. As neither framework accounts for the important macroeconomic influence of house prices and mortgage credit, we suggest the prevailing Comparative Political Economy accounts of the financial sector remain underdeveloped. Through an econometric evaluation of 18 advanced economies from 1980 to 2017, we demonstrate that household debt has larger and more statistically significant effects on GDP growth than business debt, and household debt volumes are largely determined by house price inflation. These results are consistent across the varieties of capitalism and advanced banking systems, suggesting the VoC's focus on corporate finance is misplaced and the macroeconomic effects of household debt and house prices are underappreciated, especially in non-Anglo-American advanced economies.
... As Matthew Watson et al. [18] points out, with regard to the thesis of structural dependence presented in the terms of the two above-mentioned authors, the state is capital-dependent because the owners of the capital make decisions related to employment, inflation and the income of voters. Thus, politicians-who want to be re-elected-are capital-dependent because their voters are, and this will automatically lead to government measures that provide favorable conditions for investment and capital accumulation [19]. In addition, at a time when capital mobility is significant, Matthew Watson et al. [18] argues, political parties that promote economic intervention and state strengthening will be "under considerable constraints". ...
This paper’s aim is to analyze the challenges that may arise to the harmonious and inclusive economic development of EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe in the larger context of the European Common Market and the free movement of capital. The theoretical framework on which this paper is based is represented by the thesis of “structural dependence on international capital” and “race to the bottom” competition to attract foreign investment and increase the convergence speed in the catching-up process. We have also tackled the consequences arising from the social cohesion perspective, pointing out that a country cannot have at the same time (1) a high degree of social equity; (2) free movement of capital, amid structural consequences that manifest themselves as a result of this freedom; and, (3) a robust position of foreign companies as a share of value added.
... https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/business/deutsche-bankcommerzbank-merger.html. 11 Block (1980); Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988); Swank (1992); Culpepper (2015); Lindblom (1977); . carry weight in policymaking processes differs from the explanations offered by the traditional comparative capitalism literature. ...
This article examines how two dynamics, one global and one domestic, have interacted to shape the politics of banking in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, European governments were subject to renewed structural incentive to promote TBTF banks: in financialized economies, the growth of these banks is perceived as an essential element of a national economy's global competitiveness. Yet, this incentive was subject to enhanced political contention at home. Factions—often led by actors from within the state itself—have opposed governments’ impetus to promote TBTF banks. The specific identity, preferences and resources of these factions are determined by distinctive political institutions and vary across countries. Through the comparative analysis of banking structural reform and banking competition policies in the UK, France and Germany, I argue that varieties of regulatory outcomes are explained by the differentiated institutional capacity of “anti-TBTF” factions to carry weight in policymaking processes across jurisdictions.
... It is about giving power to the citizen to have a transparent relationship with the state wherein the citizen gets to participate in service delivery and policy processes. An actual outcome of political empowerment would inculcate organizationallevel change where there is a structural shift of the power that the citizen holds [3,4,5,11,38]. ...
Information and communication technology is said to provide paths to empowerment, yet the current ICT4D literature weakly conceptualises how this occurs. This article questions the conceptual alignment between the empowerment concept and the actual empowerment outcome attained through technology. We use Alsop and Heinsohn’s measuring empowerment framework and Zimmerman’s individual empowerment framework to analyse the missing links between empowerment and technology within current ICT4D research. We argue that research on empowerment in ICT4D needs to (1) be more specific about what type of empowerment takes place; (2) take into account both agency level changes and socio-institutional structures, (3) consider the dual effect of both empowerment and disempowerment.
... 2. This notion of influence is analogous to Robert Dahl's (1957) concept of power, according to which "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." 3. While the classic accounts of business' structural power are found mostly in the context of tax and welfare politics (Quinn & Shapiro, 1991;Swank, 1992), analogous constraints apply to regulatory policy fields (see, for example, Dryzek, 1995). 4. In some policy areas (e.g., competition policy), the Commission has important non-legislative competences. ...
Many citizens, politicians, and political activists voice concern about the political influence of business in the European Union. But do business interests really pull the strings in Brussels? Contrary to expectations, this book shows that business interests are no more influential than other interests in shaping contemporary EU policies. Andreas Dür, David Marshall, and Patrick Bernhagen present an original argument that stresses the role of public actors in facilitating or impeding interest groups’ lobbying success. Novel data on a large number of legislative proposals on the EU’s agenda and three case studies present strong support for this argument. The Political Influence of Business in the European Union offers new insights into how lobbying success depends on the demand and supply of information, as well as new ideas on how to measure lobbying success. The book advances a fresh perspective on the question of business power and shows why business interests often lose in the policy struggle.
... The first, instrumental power, is concerned with observable qualities of power relations, such as lobbying and campaign contributions. The second, structural power, recognizes that governments are dependent on their investment decisions to sustain economic growth and fund public services (Lindblom 1977;Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988;Swank 1992). In anticipation of negative inducement effects, and the wider electoral and fiscal consequences, policy-makers avoid policies that threaten to undermine business confidence. ...
This article seeks to provide a better understanding of why business power varies over time and between firms. It assumes that business influence derives from firms’ ability to send credible information signals about policy costs, causing policy-makers to amend proposals. This ‘structural-informational’ power is mediated by two factors. First, the structure of the policy process enables policy-makers to assess the credibility of industry claims through institutional screening mechanisms, which vary over time. Second, the influence of individual firms is dependent on anticipated policy costs and past reputational damage, leading them to pursue different signalling strategies to maximize credibility. These claims are illustrated using the case study of United Kingdom banking reform between 2010 and 2013. Structural-informational power helps to explain why bank ‘ring-fencing’ reforms were agreed in the face of powerful industry opposition, but also why specific banks were subsequently able to extract important policy concessions.
... They found that the extent of electoral financing by business did correlate with tax cuts, but variables intended to measure structural power, such as declines in investment, did not. Swank (1992) analyzed the responsiveness of corporate tax policies to changes in investment using time-series data for 16 affluent democracies and found that low rates of investment spur corporate tax cuts. The magnitude of the effect found is small, but stronger during periods of economic crisis. ...
What is the impact of business interest groups on the formulation of public social policies? This paper reviews the literature in political science, history, and sociology on this question. It identifies two strands: one analyzes the political power and influence of business, the other the preferences and interests of business. Since the 1990s, researchers have shifted their attention from questions of power to questions of preferences. While this shift has produced important insights into the sources of the policy preferences of business, it came with a neglect of issues of power. This paper takes a first step towards re-integrating a power-analytical perspective into the study of the role of business in welfare state politics. It shows how a focus on variation in business power can help to explain both why business interest groups accepted social protection during some periods in the past and why they have become increasingly assertive and averse to social policies since the 1970s.
Mark Crowley reviews this paper on the NEP-HIS blog:
https://nephist.wordpress.com/
Studies of lobbying typically look at the extent to which interest groups realize political goals on issues they actively lobby for. Little is known, however, about the extent to which interest groups attain their political goals without making an active lobbying effort. In this paper, we analyze potential biases in perceived preference attainment at different levels of lobbying activity, including analyses among organizations which do not, or hardly, lobby. Empirically, we rely on a cross‐national survey conducted among interest group leaders in 8 polities in Europe during the Covid‐19 pandemic. Our dataset includes information about issue mobilization and perceived preference attainment on Covid‐19 policies and non‐Covid‐related policies. We find that larger organizations enjoy higher levels of perceived preference attainment, even when they lobby little. In the Covid‐19 case, we also see biases in favor of business groups and economically more important sectors. These results document a form of structural power, where decision‐making automatically favors some economically important interests.
Tech media giants are no strangers to controversy in relation to the payment of corporate tax, such as the cases of Apple and Facebook (Meta) in Ireland, Alphabet (Google) in the UK and Amazon in Luxembourg. While the tech media giants are not the only global corporations that take advantage of international tax avoidance opportunities, this paper argues that their hypermobility and unprecedented cash assets place them especially well to take advantage of these practices. Moreover, the nature of some of the commodities, such as information, software or intellectual property that can be moved at the touch of a button; or even a simple re-conception of where the property resides can mean a state gaining or losing billions of dollars. This paper will explore how tech media giants are redefining property and commodity forms and how this allows for creative tax policies. Moreover, the conception of where immaterial commodities, such as pure information, is located (or not located) challenges tax collection strategies for the state. To explore these conceptions, this paper discusses the ideology surrounding the tech media industry, a particular brand of liberalism coined the ‘Californian Ideology’: An ideology that can sometimes be described as transgressive, but also one that may legitimise tax avoidance. The ideology gives a somewhat nebulous definition of what property is (and isn’t) and its location or non-location, thereby negating justification for taxation.
In Chap. 5, an elite theoretic perspective on contemporary US politics is presented as an alternative to the prevailing pluralist theoretic perspectives. The first half of the chapter provides some context and background about elite, class, and pluralist theories, including a brief review of the post-World War II “community power debate” between political scientists and sociologists. The ongoing centrality of pluralist theory to political science, mainstream intellectual analysis, and political culture is also emphasized. In the second half of the chapter, I outline an elite cooptation model of US politics depicting a strategic bargaining interaction between political elites and the masses in an unequal democracy.
The transformation of the Labour Party by 1997 is among the most consequential political developments in modern British history. Futures of Socialism overhauls the story of Labour's modernisation and provides an innovative new history. Diving into the tumultuous world of the British left after 1973, rocked by crushing defeats, bitter schisms, and ideological disorientation, Colm Murphy uncovers competing intellectual agendas for modern socialism. Responding to deindustrialisation, neoliberalism, and constitutional agitation, these visions of 'modernisation' ranged across domestic and European policy and the politics of class, gender, race, and democracy. By reconstructing the sites and networks of political debate, the book explains their changing influence inside Labour. It also throws new light on New Labour, highlighting its roots in this social-democratic intellectual maelstrom. Futures of Socialism provides an essential analysis of social democracy in an era of market liberalism, and of the ideas behind a historic political reconstruction that remains deeply controversial today.
Highly accommodative monetary policy during nine years of Abenomics allowed fiscal expansion to become the center of the Japanese government’s COVID-19 stimulus and the further economic measures were the primary issue facing the 2021 Lower House Election. Under monetary constraints, the economic policy choice among Japan’s conventional growth strategy, distribution, and fiscal discipline creates trilemma, where the government can pursue only two of these three goals. In this election, the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition managed to straddle between distribution and growth strategy, while exploiting policy space for the opposition parties. Although the coalition maintained the electoral majority, the inroad made by Ishin, Reiwa, and the Democratic Party for the People whose campaigns neglected fiscal discipline in favor of both growth and distribution foreshadows the challenge against the Japanese government’s future fiscal health.
Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.
Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.
This paper argues that a high degree of conflict and a low degree of salience on a policy issue drives corporations to lobby alone rather than via a business association. Previous research has addressed drivers at organizational, sector and structural level. This paper adds an issue perspective. These arguments are important as democracies thrive when business employs its power in a responsible manner. When corporations lobby alone, it can be a challenge to do so as they tend to overlook long‐term interests of the broader business community and society. The arguments are tested for the first time in a corporatist context through an original survey experiment among corporate lobbyists in Germany and the Netherlands. The study finds support for the expectation on conflict, which is striking as it indicates that corporations prefer to lobby alone due to conflict even in contexts in which they are not incentivized to do so.
This volume brings together leading political scientists to explore the distinctive features of the American political economy. The introductory chapter provides a comparatively informed framework for analyzing the interplay of markets and politics in the United States, focusing on three key factors: uniquely fragmented and decentralized political institutions; an interest group landscape characterized by weak labor organizations and powerful, parochial business groups; and an entrenched legacy of ethno-racial divisions embedded in both government and markets. Subsequent chapters look at the fundamental dynamics that result, including the place of the courts in multi-venue politics, the political economy of labor, sectional conflict within and across cities and regions, the consolidation of financial markets and corporate monopoly and monopsony power, and the ongoing rise of the knowledge economy. Together, the chapters provide a revealing new map of the politics of democratic capitalism in the United States.
Can political parties, social movements and governments influence market outcomes and shape the functioning of a capitalist economy? Is it possible for social democratic parties, and the labour movement in general, to promote a significant redistribution of income in favour of labour? According to proponents of the structural dependence thesis, the answer to both questions is negative, because the structural dependence of labour upon capital severely constrains feasible income distributions. This article provides a long-run analysis of the UK, which casts doubts on the structural dependence thesis. There is some evidence of a short-run profit-squeeze mechanism, but income shares are much more variable in the long-run than the structural dependence argument suggests, and the power resources available to social classes are among the key determinants of distributive outcomes.
Cambridge Core - Political Economy - Merging Interests - by Sarah Bauerle Danzman
Based on the background of Chinese oil politics under Xi Jinping, this article studies the “structural power of business” to test the concept within the economic system of state capitalism. Many elements of structural power discourse are valid, such as the political influence of business, the role of information‐expertise, the role of business competitiveness and fluidity, and the effect of external factors. However, the dominance and mechanism of the structural power of Chinese national oil companies presents differently because of the unique state‐business relations in the Chinese oil sector.
Is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies? We answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner. When voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending, the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted. Greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings. With endogenous targeting, support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases, whereas support for aggregate spending is a V-shaped function of inequality. Statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model.
After World War II, collectively bargained private pensions were installed as an alternative to Social Security expansions. But these plans began to go into decline in the 1980s, when defined-contribution retirement accounts, such as 401(k)s, came to replace them. This article makes three arguments about this rise and fall to contribute toward a theory of structural contingency. First, in both episodes, state intervention into labor-management relations triggered policy changes in the private pension system. Second, policy makers were motivated to intervene because of a structural condition—namely, to manage perceived crises in capitalism. And third, the particular way they intervened and how their policy choices spurred pension marketization were driven by contingent historical circumstances. This article argues that structural constraints that inhere in capitalist democracies established a range of possible policy options available to policy makers, yet contingent and historical factors channeled policy selection within that range.
Wie beeinflussen politische Institutionen Sozialpolitik? Ausgehend von dieser Frage haben sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten unterschiedliche institutionelle Erklärungsansätze entwickelt, deren Bedeutung für die Sozialpolitikforschung in diesem Beitrag dargestellt wird. Hierzu werden drei wesentliche Ansätze vorgestellt, die sich im Hinblick auf ihr Verständnis von Institutionen als (1) Barriere für sozialpolitisches Handeln, (2) als Quelle pfadabhängiger Prozesse und (3) als Rahmen für politische Diskurse unterscheiden. Die theoretischen Argumente der jeweiligen Perspektive werden dabei anhand empirischer Beispiele aus der Sozialpolitikforschung diskutiert, womit auch die Stärke institutioneller Ansätze deutlich wird – ihre Offenheit für Kombinationen mit anderen Theorieansätzen.
Why do societies today distribute political power more equally than before? Most scholars believe that this transition is explained by the rise of capitalism but have long disagreed about why it mattered. The author argues that dominant models fail to capture why capitalist development helps key actors win what they seek. Drawing on comparative and historical work, the author introduces a model of the democratic transition that centers on the concept of disruptive capacity. He collects data on employment structures for much of the modern period to study democratization over the same period. In cross-national regressions, the author finds evidence that the disruptive capacity of nonelites drives democratic gains, and the finding that landlord capacity stymies it is reproduced. Counterfactual exercises show that slightly more than half of the democracy gap between the developing and developed world can be explained by the fact that late development bolstered landlords while handicapping nonelites.
The repeal of the federal wealth tax in Germany in the late 1990s remains puzzling. Despite several changes in government composition, growing budget constraints, austerity measures, and widening economic inequality the tax has not been reintroduced. Other narratives are dominating the public debate. Political science analyses of wealth inequity are even more difficult due to lacking data. This thesis takes up the apparent contradiction by reconstructing the policy debate on the German wealth tax. The involvement of actors and their political preferences are untangled via discourse network analysis. This method allows for identifying a varying but dominant disapproving coalition structure between 1995 and 2015. It will be shown that the reinstallment of the wealth tax is hindered by the idea of global tax competition. The analysis ties on research on political networks.
Since its formation in 1900 the British Labour party has been firmly rooted in the social democratic tradition. The majority of its leading members, political commentators and labour historians have taken Labour to be a social democratic party. Yet there is no agreement as to what the social democratic tradition precisely amounts and therefore no agreed ‘yardstick’ with which to analyse Labour’s strategy and achievements. Likewise, there is no agreement about the nature of Labour itself and the distribution of power inside it. Instead academics and others have differed in their interpretation of how the party’s constitution operates.
Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross-national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross-national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990. We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, ‘fiscal illusion’, elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958–1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct-tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We find no support for ‘fiscal illusion’ and ideological theories of revenue growth.
Neoliberal reforms in public policies and economic institutions proliferated across the developed democracies and the globe in the latter decades of the twentieth century. National structures of taxation have not been immune to neoliberalism. Beginning in the early 1980s, policymakers throughout the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) significantly altered the content of tax policies. The relative priority accorded equity and growth goals, the use of investment and behavioral incentives, and the level of tax rates were all notably changed: marginal income and corporate profits tax rates were scaled back, the number of brackets were cut and inflation-indexed, and tax-based investment incentives were eliminated or reduced to broaden the tax base. Why have nearly all developed nations enacted this set of market-conforming tax policies? To answer this question, I build on my recent work on the determinants of change in tax policy in the developed democracies and explore the dynamics of diffusion of the neoliberal tax policy paradigm in the area of capital taxation. While I assess general competition, policy learning, and social emulation models of tax policy diffusion, I argue that the highly visible 1986 market-conforming tax reform in the United States should be especially important in promoting diffusion. Specifically, I argue that (asymmetric) competition for mobile assets associated with US reforms significantly influences national policy choices in other polities.
This essay highlights productive ways in which scholars have reanimated the concept of structural power to explain puzzles in international and comparative politics. Past comparative scholarship stressed the dependence of the state on holders of capital, but it struggled to reconcile this supposed dependence with the frequent losses of business in political battles. International relation (IR) scholars were attentive to the power of large states, but mainstream IR neglected the ways in which the structure of global capitalism makes large companies international political players in their own right. To promote a unified conversation between international and comparative political economy, structural power is best conceptualized as a set of mutual dependencies between business and the state. A new generation of structural power research is more attentive to how the structure of capitalism creates opportunities for some companies (but not others) vis-a-vis the state, and the ways in which that structure creates leverage for some states (but not others) to play off companies against each other. Future research is likely to put agents - both states and large firms - in the foreground as political actors, rather than showing how the structure of capitalism advantages all business actors in the same way against non-business actors.
I examine the challenges of conceptualization and measurement of structural power when the differential power of industries or individual firms are in question. While ascertaining structural power’s operation at this level can be very challenging, I point to some issues of conceptualization and measurement that can enhance our analytic leverage at the initial stages of the research process. Specifically I propose a more refined language of “structural prominence” to differentiate between the expected causes of structural power from its hypothesized effects. Using a variety of data I show that researchers have some simple tools at their disposal but must pay careful attention to basic logical inferential limitations when examining structural power arguments. Through an examination of firms’ reactions to policy proposals in US securities regulation I find positive evidence for structural power operating in initial policy proposals. When I examine levels of preference attainment in the policymaking process itself, structural power appears to be playing a weaker and more conditional role. I also find that the preference attainment of firms is greatest when structural and instrumental forces operate in conjunction, a finding supportive of recent research in this area.
Competition among partisan projects is often cited as a constitutive element of all representative democracies. While the Francophone and English-medium research literature have viewed the link between partisan competition and public policy differently, in both cases parties tend to be the “poor cousins” of theories of public action. Drawing from theories of agenda-setting and issue competition, this article argues for taking the partisan variable more seriously, by adopting an approach which is both global and differentiated and which aims to establish in what conditions governing parties influence public policies. Data from the Comparative Agendas Project provide a challenging basis for investigating this issue. Testing several hypotheses concerning French legislative activities between 1981 and 2009 highlights its potentialities.
The 2008 bailout is often taken as evidence of the domination of the US political system by large financial institutions. In fact, the bailout demonstrated the vulnerability of US banks to government pressure. Large banks in the United States could not defy regulators, because their future income depended on the US market. In Britain, by contrast, one bank succeeded in scuttling the preferred governmental solution of an industry-wide recapitalization, because most of its revenue came from outside the United Kingdom. This was an exercise of structural power, but one that most contemporary scholarship on business power ignores or misclassifies, since it limits structural power to the automatic adjustment of policy to the possibility of disinvestment. We show that structural power can be exercised strategically, that it is distinct from instrumental power based on lobbying, and that it explains consequential variations in bailout design in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany.
▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives, many observers expected government control of effective economic policies to induce clear economic-outcome cycles that track the electoral calendar in timing and incumbent partisanship in character. Empirics, however, typically revealed stronger evidence of partisan than of electoral shifts in real economic performance and stronger and more persistent electoral and partisan shifts in certain fiscal, monetary, and other policies than in real outcomes. Later political-economic general-equilibrium approaches incorporated rational expectations into citizens' and policy makers' economic and political behavior to explain much of this empirical pattern, yet critical anomalies and insufficiencies remain. Moreover, until recently, both rational- and adaptive-expectations electoral-and-partisan-cycle work underemphasized crucial variation...
We are increasingly learning more about the contingencies and independent variables that shape the structural power of business and financial interests. This paper contributes to this research by analysing factors that led to weakening in the structural power of financial interests in the City of London in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis. We focus on under-researched mediators of structural power dynamics, especially the context of action and the agency and ideas of state leaders. Prior to the crisis, closed regulatory policy and a prevailing discourse premised upon the notion of market efficiency, helped to reinforce the structural power of the UK banking and financial sector. After the crisis heightened politicisation, more assertive state leadership, and especially ideational revision, has increasingly challenged the power of the City. We illustrate this through an examination of the Independent Commission on Banking's proposals in relation to the ‘ring fencing’ of investment and retail banks.
The recent moves of the Indian economy towards further opening up of the economy with less government control has brought about changes in its policy structure. The objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that greater economic freedom leads to higher levels of economic growth in a federal system like India where business regulations, taxation, and government spending differ widely across states. Pooled linear regression model is applied to categorical data containing economic freedom and its three components as independent variables, and growth rates of income per capita and gross state domestic product as dependent variable, for a panel of twenty states for three time periods, 2004/2005, 2006/2007 and 2009/2010. While examining this relationship, the variables like initial income per capita, initial literacy rate, sectoral composition, and inflation rate are taken as control. The results tend to establish the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth. Three individual dimensions of economic freedom namely size of government, strong rule of law, and flexible regulations governing credit, labour, and product markets are likely to exert beneficial impacts on income growth. Initial income per capita exerts a positive impact, thus proving the prevalence of regional divergence on this front. High human capital, greater share of the services and inflation exert direct impact on growth.
This research examines individual and corporate income tax rates in order to identify the political and economic conditions
that affect the rate of revenue extraction in the modern state. Specifically, it employs multivariate time-series analysis
to study the average effective income tax rates paid by both individuals and corporations in the U.S. from 1916 to 1986. The
results reveal that individual income tax rates and corporate income tax rates are affected by many of the same variables.
Indeed, both state-centered and society-centered variables influence the rate of revenue extraction, but societal-level variables
are generally more important than organizational-level variables. In particular, macroeconomic conditions, state imperatives,
and class organization affect the rate of revenue extraction, but political organization generally does not. Although individual
income tax rates and, to a lesser extent, corporate income tax rates are relatively stable over time, both federal income
taxes were altered dramatically as a result of World War II, indicating a tendency toward “punctuated equilibrium.”
This article reviews the literature on business-government-society relations during the past three decades. It describes the growth of scholarship on business power, business political activity, the changing political agenda, interest group representation, and changing social expectations and explores in detail three approaches to the study of the political and social role of business: a comparative perspective, an emphasis on the contemporary political and social environment of business, and an exploration of the nature of business power. While we have clearly learned much about this important subject, the intellectual fragmentation of this field prevents it from realizing its full scholarly potential.
According to one common theory of business power, politicians face strong electoral incentives to implement policies matching the preferences of business enterprises. The tendency for investors to choose the time and place producing the highest returns supposedly weakens or eliminates the ability of ordinary citizens to provide direction for policymakers. If the theory is accurate, substantive public input into policymaking should suffer the most during economic downturns, when officeholders are most dependent upon additional investment. Building upon recent work examining representation over time, I test the theory's predictions within the United States using time-series regression. The data set includes measures of public opinion, elections, and a broad range of federal legislative decisions important to the business community at large. Contrary to the theory's expectations, the results indicate that representation in the U.S. is not impaired by linkages between the economy and elections. Flaws in the theory's underlying assumptions show why trepidation about the structural power of business is misplaced.
Much contemporary research in political economy has stressed the importance of the political power of the Left and the organization of labor on economic performance among the advanced industrial democracies. This paper argues that the impact of each variable on performance, operationalized as proportionate change in economic growth rates, 1974–1980, is conditional upon the relative presence or absence of the other. Specifically, encompassing labor organization is only positively associated with growth when accompanied by Left control of government, and Left governments only have a positive impact on economic growth when labor is highly and centrally organized. Conversely, when either variable is only weakly present, the impact of the other on economic growth is negative.
By now, a number of aggregate time series studies on economics and elections in Western European countries have appeared. But their results are contradictory. And, virtually no survey research has been done to help resolve these contradictions. Here, we analyze new survey data on economics and the vote, gathered in 1983 Euro-Barometer surveys carried out in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Across these nations, economic voting is clear and consistent. Specifically, retrospective, prospective and affective evaluations of government economic performance exert statistically significant and substantively strong effects on the likelihood of a vote for the incumbent coalition. In contrast, personal economic circumstances, no matter how measured, demonstrate nonexistent to weak effects on vote choice. Overall, economic conditions emerge as a relatively important vote determinant. When a more properly specified, general multi-equation model of the vote is estimated, economics shows itself to be as powerful as traditional factors used to explain the Western European vote. In particular, economic variables exceed the impact of partisan identification in Britain, and roughly equal it in Germany. Moreover, the economic variables exercise more influence than the social cleavages of class and religion everywhere except Italy.
Despite the large number of studies of the determination of government expenditure in the affluent democracies, most students of the subject admit that we know relatively little about the complex dynamics of spending change. Using multiple regression analyses of changes in nonmilitary outlays over the years 1960 to 1973 and 1973 to 1980, this study attempts to remedy some of the problems in the literature by providing new tests of several old hypotheses, by introducing and testing several relatively new hypotheses, and by evaluating such propositions in the context of an integrated theoretical framework and of analyses that span two distinct political-economic eras. Results suggest that the dynamics of domestic expenditure change are partially conditioned by macroeconomic and political environments of particular eras. Overall, the self-interests and ideological preferences of policymakers, the institutional and extrainstitutional political action of policy-relevant groups, and needs for state assistance emerge as principal sources of changes in domestic expenditure
Regressions on data jointly structured in space and time, commonly referred to as the pooling of cross sections of time series, can be formidable both in the strength of their design properties and in the number of special statistical problems encountered with them. This essay deals briefly with the potential applications of pooled design and more extensively with the special statistical problems commonly associated with analysis in space and time together. Four estimators--ordinary least squares, least squares with dummy variables, error components, and an adaptation of Box-Jenkins ARMA models to the pooled estimation problem--are reviewed, with an effort to suggest where each may find application in political science research. The four estimators are then illustrated by analysis of the regional dynamics in party issue polarization over issues of racial desegregation in the U.S. House of Representatives
In their continued considerations of political inequality, urban scholars are especially concerned with less visible influences surrounding community decision making, and have employed such concepts as potential power, nondecision making, and anticipated reactions. However, these concepts leave some patterns of influence unexplained. There is also a dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system confer advantages and disadvantages on groups in ways that predispose public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others. Public officials make their decisions in a context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged. Because this system of stratification leaves public officials situationally dependent on upper-strata interests, it is a factor in all that they do. Consequently, system features lower the opportunity costs of exerting influence for some groups and raise them for others. Thus socioeconomic inequalities put various strata on different political footings.
Based on well-known updating formulae used in Kalman filtering and recursive residual estimation, this study presents simple formulae for determining the effect of including the first observation in regression models with first-order autoregressive disturbances. The formulae describe the changes in coefficient estimates, variance estimate and covariance estimates in terms of similar quantities involving the first observation.
A central claim of both Marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society. This is the theory of “structural dependence of the state on capital.” Using a formal model, the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined. We conclude that in a static sense the theory is false: virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place. Yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense. Policies that, once in place, redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented.
This article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class-linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies. Our multivariate model of this thesis, specified to 1960-1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product, is supported strongly by regression analyses. These indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth. They also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion, while leftist, centrist and Christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion; and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well. In addition, state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests, strike activity, and capital investment/disinvestment — activities outside the boundaries of political arenas typically conceived. In short, institutional and extrainstitutional class-linked politics along with economic growth seem largely to determine welfare payment changes. In contrast with other comparative research on the welfare state, the fit of model to data is strong and findings are robust in the face of statistical controls, small changes in measurement, and small changes in sample.
Much has been written about the relationship between the economic resources of corporations and their ability to control politics in advanced capitalist democracies. The resource that has received the most attention is economic concentration, but there is little agreement about the precise form of concentration that matters. In an attempt to find the most useful image of the state, this study looks at the connection between the aggregate concentration of assets among the leading manufacturing firms as well as the rate of business investment and taxes on business. Time-series regressions computed on U.S. national level data show that theories of the state that emphasize the independet activities of private investors are not supported. Instead, the aggrgate concentration of assets, as measured by the share of assets held by the leading 100 firms, has a strong negative influence on effective corporate tax rates. These results are consistent with the theory that heightened aggregate concentration helps corpor...
In spite of the traditional legitimacy accorded the market mechanism of the private sector in advanced capitalist nations, governments in those nations have become more influential as providers of social services and income supplements, producers of goods, managers of the economy, and investors of capital. And in order to finance these various activities the revenues of public authorities have increased dramatically–to a point where they are now equivalent to one-third to one-half of a nation's economic product.
This growth in governmental activity in advanced capitalist society is examined by considering the causes, and some of the consequences, of the expansion of the public economy–defined, following Schumpeter's discussion of the “tax state,” in terms of the extractive role of government. The primary concern of this article is to discover why some nations have experienced a far greater rate of increase in recent years and, as a result, have a much larger public economy than other nations. Five types of explanation are elaborated to account for the growth of the scope of governmental activity: (1) the level and rate of growth in the economic product; (2) the degree to which the fiscal structure of a nation relies on indirect, or “invisible,” taxes; (3) politics–in particular the partisan composition of government and the frequency of electoral competition; (4) the institutional structure of government; and (5) the degree of exposure of the economy to the international marketplace. The article evaluates the five explanations with data for 18 nations, and concludes by discussing some implications of the analysis.
It is commonly believed that elections in the industrial democracies reflect a democratic class struggle, according to which lower-income voters support parties of the Left while higher-income voters protect their interest by voting for parties of the Right. This interpretation hinges critically on a series of implicit assumptions. First, the class-struggle thesis assumes that most industrial democracies have majoritarian political institutions. Second, it assumes that the typical form of political competition follows the responsible-parties model, which implies, among other things, that parties are fundamentally programmatic, adopting distinctive positions along a left-right continuum. When these assumptions are evaluated in light of the available evidence on the nature of party systems, political competition, and voting behavior, they are judged to be largely implausible. Thus, the democratic-class-struggle thesis constitutes a seriously flawed interpretation of elections.
This book sets forth both a theory and a comparative empirical analysis of stagflation, that peculiar combination of high unemployment, slow growth, and spurts of high inflation bedeviling the advanced industrial nations during the past fifteen years. The authors first construct a small macroeconomic model that takes full account of aggregate demand and supply forces in the determination of output, employment, and the price level, in both a single-economy and a multi-economy setting. They then apply the model to provide an understanding of comparative performance of industrial countries in the areas of unemployment, inflation, productivity, and investment growth. They argue convincingly that the decay of the major economies during this period resulted from the supply shocks of the 1970s, such as the two major OPEC oil-price increases, and from the consequent policy-induced decrease in demand in response to inflationary pressures. Their analysis differs markedly from similar studies in that it takes specific account of institutional differences in the labor markets of the various economies. This helps to explain in particular the divergent adjustment profiles of the United States and Europe. Bruno and Sachs make several key recommendations for the mix of demand management and incomes policies necessary to combat stagflation in individual countries as well as for the coordination of macroeconomic policies among the major industrial nations.
This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
Though the inclusion of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations is often prescribed as a method for assessing interaction in multivariate relationships, the technique has been criticized for yielding results that are hard to interpret, unreliable (as a result of multicollinearity between the multiplicative term and its constituent variables), and even meaningless. An interpretation of a multiple regression equation with a multiplicative term in conditional terms reveals all these criticisms to be unfounded. In fact, it is better analytic strategy to include a multiplicative term than to exclude one. Complicated as quantitative political analysis may seem to the uninitiated, one of the most telling criticisms made against it is that it often oversimplifies an exceedingly complicated political reality. The penchant for simplicity and generality of explanation is, of course, one of the driving forces of science, and unfortunately, it sometimes drives too far. But oversimplification sometimes also occurs because political researchers do not know about or hesitate to use techniques that would allow them to detect more complicated patterns of relationship in data. A prime example of this is the technique considered in the following pages: the inclusion of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations. Perhaps the most common simplification in quantitative analysis is the assumption of additivity-the assumption that the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is always the same, regardless of the level of other variables. The familiar multiple regression equation
Our August 1985 JOP article directly examined a theoretical proposition which had been proposed but not tested in a number of previous studies within the field of the “new political economy.” Scholars had suggested that the effects of labor's political and organizational power on policy outcomes might be interactive and conditional, but had eschewed systematically testing this hypothesis, primarily for methodological reasons. We presented theoretical reasons for believing the conditionality thesis might be correct not just for unemployment and redistributive policies, on which most earlier studies had focused (but see Whiteley, 1983), but also for economic growth. We then employed interaction regression models and conditionality tables based on them to test the derived hypotheses. The small number of cases and presence of “constant structures” posed methodological risks. Nonetheless, the possible importance of the proposed interaction effects seemed worthwhile exploring, especially in light of the central role these variables had assumed not only in specific policy studies but more generally in discussions of whether parties or even politics matter.
This paper is concerned with the influence of the British system of 'party government' on tax policy outputs. It has been argued that parties make little difference (Rose, 1984) and have only a minimal influence on the trends in tax revenues (Karran, 1985). This paper examines the post-war trends in the rates of income tax, corporation tax and consumption taxes in the UK. It is argued that there is a relationship between the trend in tax rates and the party in office. Hence, we conclude that parties do make a difference to the distribution of the tax burden, that this difference has recently been more pronounced, that it can be important to taxpayer/voters and that partisan influences have been detrimental to the development of the UK tax system.
Recent papers by Lange and Garrett and by Jackman have debated whether the political and economic power of the Left has had a sustained impact on the economic growth of relatively affluent capitalist democracies since 1973. This paper indicates that, consistent with theory and research by Lange and Garrett, they have had such an impact. Economic growth between 1974 and 1980–1982 accelerated where both unions were organizationally strong and Left parties were strong participants in governments; and this finding is not an artifact of a 1970s oil boom in Social Democratic Norway. In addition, it is robust in the presence of several key control variables drawn from economic theory. These variables indicate that less affluent and slower growers tended to catch up, and that capital formation tended to accelerate growth while progressive governmental redistribution of income tended to dampen it.
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a steady stream of books and articles on business-government relations describing the ‘privileged position’ occupied by the business corporation in the American political system. Taking issue with the pluralist paradigm that dominated writing and research on American national politics in the two decades after the Second World War, these writers have argued that business is not simply another interest group. Instead, they have suggested that its role in American society is more akin to that of a dominant class, power elite or private government: it thus possesses a degree of influence that invariably exceeds that of any other class or interest group. This appraisal of the political dominance of business in contemporary American society primarily rests on four sets of interrelated observations. These include the ability of business to define the political agenda; the extent to which business gains disproportionate benefits from the political process; the need for elected officials to maintain a high degree of ‘business confidence’; and the superior capacity of business interests to mobilize political resources, work closely with each other and shape the climate of public and elite opinion.
The idea that capital possesses structural power over the state is of growing importance. Yet the theoretical literature on power has argued that this concept is either a contradiction in terms or is conceptually redundant. This paper seeks to show that a coherent distinction can be made between structural power, non-structural power, and structural constraints. These distinctions are based upon a concept of human agency which draws attention to the peculiar pasts of those individuals occupying the same type of structural position. It is argued that these distinctions are both widely applicable and ‘empirically’ relevant.
Hypotheses about determinants of income inequality in advanced capitalist societies are tested with data from the World Bank for 1975–80 across virtually the complete population. The results support most of the propositions of a model that takes into account differences in partisan control of government, the organization strength of labour, and the openness of the economy to international market forces. Hypotheses derived from global models of income distribution are not supported. The major findings are (1) that labour organization has no direct effect on income inequality; (2) that strong socialist parties have a negative effect on the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but no effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; (3) that the governmental strength of conservative parties is unrelated to the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but has a very strong positive effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; and (4) that, regardless of partisan control of government, relatively small trade dependent economies are more egalitarian than relatively large economies which are less dependent on international trade.
Tax Incentives and Economic Growth
- Bosworth
- Barry
Bosworth, Barry P. 1984. Tax Incentives and Economic Growth.
The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective InterventionWhat Is behind the Capital Spending Boom?" Federal Reserve Bank of
- Rueschemeyer
- Peter Dietrich
- Sahling
- M A Leonard
- Akhtar
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Peter Evans. 1985. "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention." In Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sahling, Leonard, and M. A. Akhtar. 1984-85. "What Is behind the Capital Spending Boom?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review (Winter) 9:19-30.
Does Government Cause Inflation? Taxes, Spending, and Deficits
- David R Cameron
Cameron, David R. 1985. "Does Government Cause Inflation? Taxes, Spending, and Deficits." In The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, ed. Leon Lindberg and Charles Maier.
Fluctuating Fortunes
- Vogel
- David
Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes. New York: Basic.
The State and the Economy under CapitalismDemo-cratic Capitalism at the Crossroads
- Przeworski
- Adam
Przeworski, Adam. 1990. The State and the Economy under Capitalism. New York: Harwood Academic. Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. "Demo-cratic Capitalism at the Crossroads." Democracy 2:52-68.
Investment Incentives: A Five-Country Test of the Lindblom Hypothesis
- Quinn
Quinn, Dennis. 1988. "Investment Incentives: A Five-Coun-try Test of the Lindblom Hypothesis." Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 10:87-111.