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Instituting impairment: Extended cognition and the construction of Female Sexual Dysfunction
Abstract
I further the argument for a socially extended mind by examining gender and the role it plays in cognition. My first claim is that gender is a social institution that often if not always subtends our cognitive processes, especially those that are maximally embodied. The social institution of gender often serves to inhibit female embodied cognitive processing, as a quick glance at the myriad of oppressive forces at play in gender dynamics illustrates. To combat the potential objection that gender is not a vehicle for extending cognitive processes, but rather plays a shaping role in embodied practice, I propose looking at the history of Female Sexual Dysfunction and its construction by the social institutions of the pharmaceutical companies and media. By doing so, I claim a case can be made that these institutions have actually invaded the minds of many women to the point that cognition pertaining to sex, sexual functioning, and health are wholly dependent upon and constituted by the interplay of these social systems.
... Early discussions of HEC mainly focused on real-time synchronic interactions with cognitive artifacts, such as an individual with Alzheimer's consulting his ever-present, memory-augmenting notebook in order to nd his way to the museum. However, by socializing HEC in this deep cultural-historical sense, recent work [e.g., Cash 2010;Fabry 2018;Hutchins 2011;Kirchhoff 2012;Malafouris 2016;Menary 2013;Merritt 2013] productively broadens debates to highlight the structuring role cognitive extensions play at a diachronic scale. As Cash puts this idea, «Our institutions, our languages, and the very cognitive and normative practices within which we cognize have been shaped by us to make cognition easier, and they have, in turn, shaped the cognitive abilities that language-enabled humans possess» [Cash 2010, 664]. ...
... The notion of «instituting impairment» is taken fromMerritt [2013].Joel KrueGer & mIChelle maIeSe © 2018 Thaumàzein 10.13136/thau.v6i0 meNtal INStItutIoNS ...
We argue that the notion of "mental institutions"-discussed in recent debates about extended cognition-can help better understand the origin and character of social impairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction extend across both internal and external factors (i.e., they do not just reside within an individual's head). After providing some conceptual background, we discuss the connection between mental institutions and embodied habits of mind. We then discuss the significance of our view for understanding autistic habits of mind and consider why these embodied habits are sometimes a poor fit with neurotypical mental institutions. We conclude by considering how these insights highlight the two-way, extended nature of social impairments in autism, and how this extended picture might assist in constructing more inclusive mental institutions and intervention strategies.
... Extended cognition has been applied to psychotherapy (Shennan, 2016) and mental health services for patients with borderline personality disorder (Bray, 2008); attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism (Sneddon, 2002); social anxiety disorder (Carter and Palermos, 2016); dispositional affective states (Colombetti and Roberts, 2015); sexual dysfunction (Merritt, 2013) Fig. 1 Technologies of the extended mind framework. ...
Innovations in information and communication technologies are now available for clinical psychologists interested in communicating (visually and verbally) with patient’s in most parts of the world. Communication is important for therapeutic alliances and progress in communication technologies have significantly affected clinical psychology. Clinical psychologists are demonstrating increased attention to technologies that may aide delivery of services and practice management (Norcross et al., 2002, 2013).
With these technological advances come ethical challenges that may hinder the process, efficacy, and even security of psychotherapy. Of particular concern is the noteworthy rise in online therapy delivery, professional social networking sites for therapists, continuing
education, and therapist search engines. For clinical psychologists this may result in professional and personal overlap with patients. While there are steps that clinical psychologists can take to separate their private lives from their clients, there is potential for nonprofessional online activities do occur in the online space shared with their clients. This shared space can lead to various ethical dilemmas. While professional ethical guidelines have been developed that offer direction for offline client-therapist interactions,
guidelines for online interactions will need to continually develop in line with the rapid growth and proliferation of technologies. Most clinical psychologists received limited training in information technologies and may not be prepared for technologyrelated
ethical challenges (e.g., privacy, electronic security, legal implications). Professional ethical guidelines provided by the American Psychological Association (2013a,b,c) and International Society for Mental Health Online (2009) may need to be updated as
new technologies emerge in new sociocultural contexts. Moreover, continuing education for clinical psychologists is needed because technologies update and change often. Practice guidelines developed for offline (face-to-face therapy) may have limited generalizability to clinical practices online. This chapter considers potential ethical concerns for clinical psychologists and their interactions with clients in the digital era. This will include considerations about whether a client’s disposition and/or situation call for eTherapy. First, legal and ethical issues related to privacy (e.g., confidentiality), electronic security, and boundaries are discussed. Here, the relevance and application of ethical codes and guidelines are emphasized. Next, ethical challenges related to technologies that may extend cognitive, affective, and social processes will be considered (Parsons, 2019a,b).
... Discussions of the extended cognition paradigm can be found in psychotherapy [100], dementia [99,101,102], psychopathology [103], and depression [104]. Furthermore, specific applications have been discussed for treatment of borderline personality disorder [105], neurodevelopmental disorders (attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism) [103] social anxiety disorder [106], dispositional affective states [107], sexual dysfunction [108], and sex offenders [109,110]. ...
Clinicians are increasingly interested in the potential of virtual environments for research and praxes. Virtual environments include both immersive and non-immersive simulations of everyday activities. Moreover, algorithmic devices and adaptive virtual environments allow clinicians a medium for personalizing technologies to their patients. There is also increasing recognition of social virtual environments that connect virtual environments to social networks. Although there has been a great deal of deliberation on these novel technologies for assessment and treatment, less discourse has occurred around the ethical challenges that may ensue when these technologies are applied clinically. In this paper, some of the ethical issues involved in the clinical use of novel technologies are discussed.
... A historically popular response is inside their head, in their brain. But following recent trends in the philosophical study of the mind, an increasingly large literature has suggested that the health and illness of the mind, too, may be more widely constituted (e.g., [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]). Take the case of schizophrenia. ...
In addiction, apparently causally significant phenomena occur at a huge number of levels; addiction is affected by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, and politico-legal factors, among many others. In such a complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the many layers of explanation will prove amenable to any simple or straightforward, reductive analysis; if we are to unify the many different sciences of addiction while respecting their causal autonomy, then, what we are likely to need is an integrative framework. In this paper, we propose the theory of "Externalist" or "4E"-for extended, embodied, embedded, and enactive-cognition, which focuses on the empirical and conceptual centrality of the wider extra-neural environment to cognitive and mental processes, as a candidate for such a framework,. We begin in Section 2 by outlining how such a perspective might apply to psychiatry more generally, before turning to some of the ways it can illuminate addiction in particular: Section 3 points to a way of dissolving the classic dichotomy between the "choice model" and "disease model" in the addiction literature; Section 4 shows how 4E concepts can clarify the interplay between the addict's brain and her environment; and Section 5 considers how these insights help to explain the success of some recovery strategies, and may help to inform the development of new ones.
... For gender to exist, environmental networks (the foodome, microbiome, culturome, exposome, memome, etc.) must be stable and designed (e.g., by cultural evolution) to push internal nodes towards a genderedend of the variability, which suggests that they form a modularized community (an environmental 'omic' modular community designed to maintain individual's connectomes in the male-and female-end of the variation). If we call such culturally designed and stabilized modular communities "institutions", we may follow Merritt (2013) in arguing that gender is a social institution that regulates the embodied cognitive processes of human males and females. We would perhaps go further than Merritt in suggesting that the institution of gender also serves as well to regulate the bodies of human males and females (the musculoskeletal system (Fausto-Sterling 2005), the cardiovascular system, the immune system, and of course the reproductive system), and through them, regulate embodied cognition. ...
How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model (ICM) has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds (to use Griffiths’ apt phrase), that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds.
... The question of whether this family of analyses can be applied fruitfully to the psychiatric domain has received comparatively little attention in the literature (but see, e.g., Cooper, 2017;Davies, 2016;De Haan, forthcoming;Drayson, 2009;Glackin, 2017;Hoffman, 2016;Krueger, 2018;Krueger & Colombetti, forthcoming;Merritt, 2013;Sneddon, 2002;Sprevak, 2011), and it is our intention in this article to lay the foundations on which such a project might be constructed, and to explore how externalist ways of thinking about mental illness and disorder 1 might reconfigure some of the existing debates in the philosophy of psychiatry. Mental illnesses, too, belong to living, embodied persons who are embedded within an environment that is replete with informational resources and technologies, complicated interpersonal dynamics, and sociocultural practices. ...
Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual's psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we apply a strongly externalist approach to the case of Autistic Spectrum Disorder, and argue that this condition can be illuminated by appeal to the hypothesis of extended cognition. We conclude by briefly considering the significance this strongly externalist approach may have for psychiatric practice and pedagogy.
... An important recent development in 4E circles has been an investigation of how moods and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009;Greenwood, 2013;Merritt, 2013;Colombetti, 2014;Krueger, 2014a,b;Slaby, 2014;Stephan et al., 2014;Colombetti and Krueger, 2015;Colombetti and Roberts, 2015;Roberts, 2015;Carter et al., 2016;Krueger and Szanto, 2016). These works examine the many ways we regulate, organize, and maintain our affective life by manipulating everyday artifacts and spaces. ...
... An important recent development in 4E circles has been an investigation of how moods and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009;Greenwood, 2013;Merritt, 2013;Colombetti, 2014;Krueger, 2014a,b;Slaby, 2014;Stephan et al., 2014;Colombetti and Krueger, 2015;Colombetti and Roberts, 2015;Roberts, 2015;Carter et al., 2016;Krueger and Szanto, 2016). These works examine the many ways we regulate, organize, and maintain our affective life by manipulating everyday artifacts and spaces. ...
Cambridge Core - Social Psychology - Ethical Challenges in Digital Psychology and Cyberpsychology - by Thomas D. Parsons
As neuroscience has gained an increased ability to enchant the general public, it has become more and more common to appeal to it as an authority on a wide variety of questions about how humans do and should act. This is especially apparent with the question of gender roles. The term ‘neurosexism’ has been coined to describe the phenomenon of using neuroscientific practices and results to promote sexist conclusions; its feminist response is called ‘neurofeminism’. Here, our aim is to survey the phenomena of neurosexism and neurofeminism using a largely philosophical approach, incorporating concepts from the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, ethics, and feminist philosophy. First, we delineate how neuroscientific studies purporting to show sex brain differences may be prone to bias at a number of methodological levels – including the choice of categories to be studied, and the choice of tools for data gathering, analysis, and presentation. Then, we show how interpretations of such studies may wrongly assume the notion of ‘hard-wiring’. Furthermore, lack of attention to distinctions within philosophy of mind may result in a mistaken supposition that brain differences lead to mental and/or psychological and/or behavioral ones. It is not difficult to see how these forms of neurosexism, leading to claims of ‘hard-wired’ gender differences that map onto traditional and harmful gender stereotypes, raise ethical questions. We conclude by briefly considering one: are the harms caused by neurosexist studies and their interpretations outweighed by their potential benefits?. © 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass
The thesis that mental states extend beyond the skull, otherwise known as the extended mind thesis (ExM), has attracted considerable philosophical attention and support. It has also been accused of lacking practical import. At the same time, the field of psychiatry has remained largely unacquainted with ExM, tending to rely instead upon what ExM proponents would consider to be outdated models of the mind. ExM and psychiatry, therefore, have much to offer one another, but the connection between the two has remained largely unexplored. Here, I consider what implications ExM may have for psychiatry and, in so doing, reveal how psychiatry may lend practical import to ExM. First, I detail the possibility of the extension of one mental state relevant to psychiatry. I augment this example by surveying other possibilities for extension in the context of psychiatric diagnoses. I then consider ways in which such extensions might alter psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Overall, I argue that recognition of the truth of ExM could alter the diagnostic status of certain individuals by correcting both false positives and false negatives, re-conceptualize certain aspects of treatment, help us re-envision psychiatric research, and potentially increase empathy towards those individuals considered to be mentally disordered or mentally different.
This chapter examines the phenomenon of “nonsensical gender” — that is, cases of breakdown within the domain of gender identity. First, it is argued that gender is a multifaceted system that shapes and subtends cognitive processing. Next, the chapter examines cases of gender break- down and compares those phenomena with other forms of cognitive breakdown. It is then contended that, while there are some striking similarities among all these failures to “make sense,” a crucial distinc- tion needs to be made: gender interactions, unlike human-tool interac- tions, are marked by complex intersubjective modes of meaning-making. Thus, in order to “make sense” of gender misidentification, the chapter argues for a more nuanced account of breakdown, one that pays more heed to the interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions of social sensemaking.
I contrast somewhat individualist arguments for first-wave “extended cognition” and second-wave “integrationist cognition” with what we can identify as a third wave of arguments for “socially and culturally distributed cognition”, in which individual cognition takes place within, is supported by, and is mutually co-constructed with larger social, institutional, normative, political and technological systems and cultural practices. Such accounts must respond to the objection of “cognitive bloat”. When does a processes count as my cognitive process? This objection is not best rebutted, as Clark often attempts, by limiting extension to processes that play a similar role to internal brain processes. Nor is it best addressed, as Gallagher (2013) does, by appealing to enactive engagement as grounding “ownership” of a process. Rather, the solution is in our shared, evolving, normative and social practices of holding people responsible for their actions. I support this by drawing parallels between socially distributed cognition and feminist relational theory, which has already addressed the issue of individual autonomy within social practices that shape individuals’ selves, values, and capacities. I end by highlighting political and ethical concerns raised by this conception of HEC regarding differential distribution of cognitive resources.
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician. That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing. 1 Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required.
As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only.
An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition. Articulates and defends the &"mark of the cognitive&", a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. Challenges the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature. Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences.
Thinking, or knowledge getting, is far from being the armchair thing it is often supposed to be. The reason it is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the cortex.... Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes within the brain. (John Dewey 1916, 13-14). Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the concept of the extended mind, in part to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is something that happens in a private mental space, "in the head." In this paper I want to pursue a liberal interpretation of this idea, extending the mind to include processes that occur within social and cultural institutions. At the same time I want to address some concerns that have been raised about whether such processes actually constitute cognitive processes, so that we think of the mind as extended, or whether environmental and institutional factors are simply causal supports for cognition, which, essentially, continues to occur only in the head. 1 I start with what Clark and Chalmers have called the parity principle.
We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions
(e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are
often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective
spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are
pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes.
We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior.
KeywordsExtended mind–Objective spirit–Parity principle–Hegel–Social institutions
An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles - contextual, enabling and constitutive - it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are more than a context for social cognition: they can complement and even replace individual mechanisms. This new explanatory power of social interaction can push the field forward by expanding the possibilities of scientific explanation beyond the individual.
Empathic responses, such as sympathy towards others, are a key ingredient in the decision to provide help to those in need. The determinants of empathic responses are usually thought to be the vividness, similarity, and proximity of the victim. However, recent research highlights the role that attention plays in the generation of feelings. We expanded on this idea by investigating whether sympathy depends on cognitive mechanisms such as attention. In two studies we found that sympathy responses were lower and reaction times were longer when targets were presented with distractors. In addition, online sympathy judgments that allow attentional focusing on a target lead to greater affective responses than judgments made from memory. We conclude that attention is an ingredient in the generation of sympathy, and discuss implications for research on prosocial behaviour and the interaction between attention and emotions.
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are ``one of many'' in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity --- a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome. One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience \textit{affect}, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths represent dry statistics, ``human beings with the tears dried off,'' that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological deficiencies described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other forms of mass murder.
These essays describe diverse aspects of women's lived body experience in modern Western societies. They combine theoretical description of experience with normative evaluation of the unjust constraints on freedom and opportunity that continue to burden many women. The lead essay rethinks the purpose of the category of "gender" for feminist theory, after important debates have questioned its usefulness. Other essays include reflection on the meaning of being at home and the need for privacy in old age residencies. Aspects of the experience of women and girls that have received little attention even in feminist theory are analyzed, such as the sexuality of breasts, or menstruation as punctuation in a woman's life story. The phenomenology of moving in a pregnant body and the tactile pleasures of clothing are also considered.
When historian Charles Weiner found pages of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman's notes, he saw it as a "record" of Feynman's work. Feynman himself, however, insisted that the notes were not a record but the work itself. In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that our thinking doesn't happen only in our heads but that "certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world." The pen and paper of Feynman's thought are just such feedback loops, physical machinery that shape the flow of thought and enlarge the boundaries of mind. Drawing upon recent work in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, robotics, human-computer systems, and beyond, Supersizing the Mind offers both a tour of the emerging cognitive landscape and a sustained argument in favor of a conception of mind that is extended rather than "brain- bound." The importance of this new perspective is profound. If our minds themselves can include aspects of our social and physical environments, then the kinds of social and physical environments we create can reconfigure our minds and our capacity for thought and reason.
This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind.
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the intuitive demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We will advocate an externalism about mind, but one that is in no way grounded in the debatable role of external reference in fixing the contents of our mental states. Rather, we advocate an *active externalism*, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.
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