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Developing a Framework for Responsible Innovation

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Developing a Framework for Responsible Innovation

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The governance of emerging science and innovation is a major challenge for contemporary democracies. In this paper we present a framework for understanding and supporting efforts aimed at ‘responsible innovation’. The framework was developed in part through work with one of the first major research projects in the controversial area of geoengineering, funded by the UK Research Councils. We describe this case study, and how this became a location to articulate and explore four integrated dimensions of responsible innovation: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness. Although the framework for responsible innovation was designed for use by the UK Research Councils and the scientific communities they support, we argue that it has more general application and relevance.
Content may be subject to copyright.
Research
Policy
42 (2013) 1568–
1580
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Research
Policy
j
o
ur
nal
homep
age:
www.elsevier.com/locate/respol
Developing
a
framework
for
responsible
innovation
Jack
Stilgoea,,
Richard
Owenb,1,
Phil
Macnaghtenc,d
aUniversity
of
Exeter
Business
School/Department
of
Science
and
Technology
Studies,
University
College
London,
Gower
Street,
London
WC1E
6BT,
UK
bUniversity
of
Exeter
Business
School,
Rennes
Drive,
Exeter
EX4
4PU,
UK
cDepartment
of
Geography,
Science
Laboratories,
Durham
University,
South
Road,
Durham
DH1
3LE,
UK
dDepartment
of
Science
and
Technology
Policy,
Institute
of
Geosciences,
P.O.
Box
6152,
State
University
of
Campinas
UNICAMP,
13083-970
Campinas,
SP,
Brazil
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
i
n
f
o
Article
history:
Received
16
July
2012
Received
in
revised
form
7
May
2013
Accepted
17
May
2013
Available online 13 June 2013
Keywords:
Responsible
innovation
Governance
Emerging
technologies
Ethics
Geoengineering
a
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
The
governance
of
emerging
science
and
innovation
is
a
major
challenge
for
contemporary
democracies.
In
this
paper
we
present
a
framework
for
understanding
and
supporting
efforts
aimed
at
‘responsible
innovation’.
The
framework
was
developed
in
part
through
work
with
one
of
the
first
major
research
projects
in
the
controversial
area
of
geoengineering,
funded
by
the
UK
Research
Councils.
We
describe
this
case
study,
and
how
this
became
a
location
to
articulate
and
explore
four
integrated
dimensions
of
responsible
innovation:
anticipation,
reflexivity,
inclusion
and
responsiveness.
Although
the
frame-
work
for
responsible
innovation
was
designed
for
use
by
the
UK
Research
Councils
and
the
scientific
communities
they
support,
we
argue
that
it
has
more
general
application
and
relevance.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1.
Introduction
1.1.
Responsibility,
science
and
innovation
Responsible
innovation
is
an
idea
that
is
both
old
and
new.
Responsibility
has
always
been
an
important
theme
of
research
and
innovation
practice,
although
how
it
has
been
framed
has
varied
with
time
and
place.
Francis
Bacon’s
imperative
to
support
sci-
ence
‘for
the
relief
of
man’s
estate’,
the
institutionalisation
and
professionalisation
of
science
from
the
17th
century
onwards,
Van-
nevar
Bush’s
(1945)
‘Endless
Frontier’,
JD
Bernal’s
(1939)
arguments
for
science
in
the
service
of
society
and
Michael
Polanyi’s
(1962)
‘Republic
of
Science’
counter-argument
have
all
contained
partic-
ular
notions
of
responsibility.
Science
has
been
conventionally
invoked
by
policy
as
eman-
cipatory.
This
has
allowed
scientists
and
innovators
considerable
freedom
from
political
accountability.
From
this
perspective,
the
role
responsibilities
of
scientists
to
produce
reliable
knowledge
and
their
wider
moral
responsibilities
to
society
are
imagined
to
be
conflicted.
The
perceived
high
value
of
knowledge
to
society
This
is
an
open-access
article
distributed
under
the
terms
of
the
Creative
Commons
Attribution
License,
which
permits
unrestricted
use,
distribution
and
reproduction
in
any
medium,
provided
the
original
author
and
source
are
credited.
Corresponding
author.
Tel.:
+44
020
7679
7197.
E-mail
addresses:
j.stilgoe@ucl.ac.uk,
jackstilgoe@gmail.com
(J.
Stilgoe),
r.j.owen@exeter.ac.uk
(R.
Owen),
p.m.macnaghten@durham.ac.uk
(P.
Macnaghten).
1Tel.:
+44
01392
723458.
means
that
such
role
responsibilities
typically
trump
any
wider
social
or
moral
obligations
(Douglas,
2003).
Although
frequent
objections
from
university
scientists
suggest
a
permanent
assault
on
their
autonomy,
much
of
the
constitution
of
Polanyi’s
(1962)
self-governing
‘Republic
of
Science’
survives
to
this
day.
In
the
second
half
of
the
20th
century,
as
science
and
innova-
tion
have
become
increasingly
intertwined
and
formalised
within
research
policy
(Kearnes
and
Wienroth,
2011),
and
as
the
power
of
technology
to
produce
both
benefit
and
harm
has
become
clearer,
debates
concerning
responsibility
have
broadened
(Jonas,
1984;
Collingridge,
1980;
Beck,
1992;
Groves,
2006).
We
have
seen
recog-
nition
and
negotiation
of
the
responsibilities
of
scientists
beyond
those
associated
with
their
professional
roles
(e.g.
Douglas,
2003;
Mitcham,
2003).
We
have
seen
scientists’
own
ideas
of
‘research
integrity’
change
in
response
to
societal
concerns
(Mitcham,
2003;
Steneck,
2006).
In
the
1970s,
biologists
in
the
nascent
field
of
recombinant
DNA
research
sought
to
‘take
responsibility’
for
the
possible
hazards
their
research
might
unleash,
with
a
meeting
at
Asilomar
in
1975
and
a
subsequent
moratorium.2Concerns
about
the
‘dual
use’
of
emerging
technologies
and
the
limits
of
self-
regulation,
visible
in
physicists’
agonising
about
nuclear
fission
prior
to
the
Manhattan
project
(Weart,
1976),
resurfaced
in
2012
with
the
recent
controversy
over
the
publishing
of
potentially
2We
should
point
out
that
this
meeting
was
criticised,
both
at
the
time
(Rogers,
1975)
and
in
later
scholarship
(Wright,
2001;
Nelkin,
2001)
as
being
motivated
by
an
attempt
to
escape
top-down
regulation
rather
than
to
‘take
responsibility’
0048-7333/$
see
front
matter ©
2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.05.008
J.
Stilgoe
et
al.
/
Research
Policy
42 (2013) 1568–
1580 1569
dangerous
research
on
flu
viruses
(Kaiser
and
Moreno,
2012).
The
negotiation
of
responsibility
between
practicing
scientists,
innovators
and
the
outside
world
remains
an
important
and
contested
area
of
debate
to
this
day.
Research
in
Science
and
Technology
Studies
(STS)
suggests
that
conceptions
of
responsibility
should
build
on
the
understand-
ing
that
science
and
technology
are
not
only
technically
but
also
socially
and
politically
constituted
(e.g.
Winner,
1977).
Latour
(2008)
suggests
that
science
does
not
straightforwardly
reveal
real-
ity
through
techniques
of
simplification
and
purification
aimed
at
further
mastery.
As
Callon
et
al.
(2009)
point
out,
science
and
technology
can,
paradoxically,
add
to
our
sense
of
uncertainty
and
ignorance.
They
tend
to
produce
a
continuous
movement
toward
a
greater
and
greater
level
of
attachments
of
things
and
people
at
an
ever
expanding
scale
and
at
an
ever
increasing
degree
of
inti-
macy”
(Latour,
2008,
p.
4,
italics
in
original).
These
observations
suggest
that
unforeseen
impacts
potentially
harmful,
potentially
transformative
will
be
not
just
possible
but
probable
(Hacking,
1986).
Responsibility
in
governance
has
historically
been
concerned
with
the
‘products’
of
science
and
innovation,
particularly
impacts
that
are
later
found
to
be
unacceptable
or
harmful
to
society
or
the
environment.
Recognition
of
the
limitations
of
governance
by
market
choice
has
led
to
the
progressive
introduction
of
post
hoc,
and
often
risk-based
regulation.
This
has
created
a
well-established
division
of
labour
that
reflects
a
consequentialist
framing
of
respon-
sibility,
as
accountability
or
liability
(Pellizzoni,
2004;
Grinbaum
and
Groves,
2013).
With
innovation,
the
past
and
present
however
do
not
provide
a
reasonable
guide
to
the
future
(Adam
and
Groves,
2011),
so
such
retrospective
accounts
of
responsibility
are
inher-
ently
limited.
We
face
a
dilemma
of
control
(Collingridge,
1980),
in
that
we
lack
the
evidence
on
which
to
govern
technologies
before
pathologies
of
path
dependency
(David,
2001),
technological
lock-
in
(Arthur,
1989),
‘entrenchment’
(Collingridge,
1980)
and
closure
(Stirling,
2007)
set
in.
We
have
(pre-)cautionary
tales
of
risks
whose
effects
did
not
materialise
for
many
years,
where
potential
threats
were
foreseen
but
ignored
or
where
only
certain
risks
were
considered
relevant
(Hoffmann-Riem
and
Wynne,
2002;
EEA,
2001,
2013).
Governance
processes,
often
premised
on
formal
risk
assessment,
have
done
little
to
identify
in
advance
many
of
the
most
profound
impacts
that
we
have
experienced
through
innovation,
with
the
2008
finan-
cial
crisis
being
the
most
disruptive
recent
example
(Muniesa
and
Lenglet,
2013).
Bioethics,
another
major
governance
response,
has
drawn
criticism
for
privileging
individual
ethical
values
such
as
autonomy
over
those
such
as
solidarity
that
might
lead
to
a
genuine
‘public
ethics’
(Nuffield
Council
on
Bioethics,
2012;
also
Prainsack
and
Buyx,
2012)
and,
in
its
consequentialist
version,
serving
to
bol-
ster
the
narrow
instrumental
expectations
of
innovators
in
some
areas
(Hedgecoe,
2010).
Callon
et
al.
(2009)
use
the
metaphor
of
science
and
technol-
ogy
‘overflowing’
the
boundaries
of
existing
scientific
regulatory
institutional
frameworks.
They
point
to
the
need
for
new
‘hybrid
forums’
that
will
help
our
democracies
to
be
“enriched,
expanded,
extended
and.
.
.
more
able
to
absorb
the
debates
and
con-
troversies
surrounding
science
and
technology”
(Callon
et
al.,
2009,
p.
9).
Such
controversies
have
demonstrated
that
pub-
lic
concerns
cannot
be
reduced
to
questions
of
risk,
but
rather
encompass
a
range
of
concerns
relating
to
the
purposes
and
motivations
of
research
(Grove-White
et
al.,
2000;
Wynne,
2002;
Grove-White
et
al.,
1997;
Macnaghten
and
Szerszynski,
2013;
Stilgoe,
2011),
joining
a
stream
of
policy
debate
about
the
direc-
tions
of
innovation
(Smith
et
al.,
2005;
Stirling,
2008;
Morlacchi
and
Martin,
2009;
Fisher
et
al.,
2006;
Flanagan
et
al.,
2011).
Yet,
despite
efforts
at
enlarging
participation
(see,
for
example,
RCEP,
1998;
House
of
Lords,
2000;
Wilsdon
and
Willis,
2004)
current
forms
of
regulatory
governance
offer
little
scope
for
broad
ethical
reflection
on
the
purposes
of
science
or
innova-
tion.
1.2.
A
new
scientific
governance?
One
alternative
to
a
consequentialist
model
of
responsibility
has
been
to
succumb
to
moral
luck
(Williams,
1981),
to
hope
that
an
appeal
to
unpredictability
and
an
inability
to
‘reasonably
foresee’
will
allow
us
to
escape
moral
accountability
for
our
actions.
Dis-
satisfaction
with
both
this
approach
and
risk-based
regulation
has
moved
attention
away
from
accountability,
liability
and
evidence
towards
those
future-oriented
dimensions
of
responsibility
care
and
responsiveness
that
offer
greater
potential
to
accommodate
uncertainty
and
allow
reflection
on
purposes
and
values
(Jonas,
1984;
Richardson,
1999;
Pellizzoni,
2004;
Groves,
2006;
Adam
and
Groves,
2011).
Emerging
technologies
typically
fall
into
what
Hajer
(2003)
calls
an
‘institutional
void’.
There
are
few
agreed
structures
or
rules
that
govern
them.
They
are
therefore
emblematic
of
the
move
from
old
models
of
governing
to
more
decentralised
and
open-ended
gov-
ernance,
which
takes
place
in
new
places
markets,
networks
and
partnerships
as
well
as
conventional
policy
and
politics
(Hajer
and
Wagenaar,
2003).
A
number
of
multi-level,
non-regulatory
forms
of
science
and
innovation
governance
have
taken
this
forward-looking
view
of
responsibility,
building
on
insights
from
STS
that
highlight
the
social
and
political
choices
that
stabilise
particular
innovations
(Williams
and
Edge,
1996;
Pinch
and
Bijker,
1984;
Winner,
1986).
New
models
of
anticipatory
governance
(Barben
et
al.,
2008;
Karinen
and
Guston,
2010)
Constructive,
Real-Time
and
other
forms
of
technology
assessment
(Rip
et
al.,
1995;
Guston
and
Sarewitz,
2002;
Grin
and
Grunwald,
2000),
upstream
engagement
(Wynne,
2002;
Wilsdon
and
Willis,
2004),
value-sensitive
design
(Friedman,
1996;
van
den
Hoven
et
al.,
2012)
and
socio-technical
integra-
tion
(Fisher
et
al.,
2006;
Schuurbiers,
2011)
have
emerged.
These
have
been
complemented
by
policy
instruments
such
as
normative
codes
of
conduct
(see,
for
example,
European
Commission,
2008),
standards,
certifications
and
accreditations,
running
alongside
expert
reports,
technology
assessments
and
strategic
roadmaps.
Such
initiatives
have,
to
varying
degrees,
attempted
to
introduce
broader
ethical
reflection
into
the
scientific
and
innovation
pro-
cess,
breaking
the
existing
moral
division
of
labour
described
above.
They
have
attempted
to
open
up
science
and
innovation
(Stirling,
2008)
to
a
wider
range
of
inputs,
notably
through
the
creation
of
new
spaces
of
‘public
dialogue’
(Irwin,
2006).
The
other
important
aspect
of
a
forward-looking
view
of
respon-
sibility
in
science
and
innovation
is
that
it
is
shared
(Richardson,
1999;
Mitcham,
2003;
Von
Schomberg,
2007).
The
unpredictability
of
innovation
is
inherently
linked
to
its
collective
nature.
Follow-
ing
Callon’s
account
of
innovation
as
‘society
in
the
making’
(Callon,
1987),
we
can
see
that
implications
are
‘systemic’,
coming
from
the
interplay
of
the
technical
and
the
social
(Hellström,
2003).
This
sug-
gests
that
scientists,
research
funders,
innovators
and
others
have
a
collective
political
responsibility
(Grinbaum
and
Groves,
2013)
or
co-responsibility
(Mitcham,
2003).
This
reflects
understanding
that
while
actors
may
not
individually
be
irresponsible
people,
it
is
the
often
complex
and
coupled
systems
of
science
and
innovation
that
create
what
Ulrich
Beck
(2000)
calls
‘organised
irresponsibility’.3
We
can
point
to
‘second-order’
(Illies
and
Meijers,
2009)
or
‘meta-
task’
responsibilities
(van
den
Hoven,
1998;
van
den
Hoven
et
al.,
3von
Schomberg
(2013)
suggests
four
categories
of
irresponsible
innovation
that
typically
manifest:
Technology
push,
Neglect
of
ethical
principles,
Policy
Pull
and
Lack
of
precaution
and
foresight.
1570 J.
Stilgoe
et
al.
/
Research
Policy
42 (2013) 1568–
1580
2012)
of
ensuring
that
responsible
choices
can
be
made
in
the
future,
through
anticipating
and
gaining
knowledge
of
possible
consequences
and
building
capacity
to
respond
to
them.
This
reframing
of
responsibility
and
the
approaches
aimed
at
opening
up
scientific
governance
described
above
provide
impor-
tant
foundations
for
responsible
innovation.
The
phrase,
sometimes
lengthened
to
‘responsible
research
and
innovation’,
is
starting
to
appear
in
academic
and
policy
literature
(Guston,
2006;
Hellström,
2003;
von
Schomberg,
2011a,
2011b;
Lee,
2012;
Sutcliffe,
2011;
Owen
and
Goldberg,
2010;
Owen
et
al.,
2012;
Randles
et
al.,
2012),
but
it
is
still
lacking
conceptual
weight.
Around
nanotechnology
and
other
emerging
areas
of
science
and
technology,
Rip
(2011)
identifies
a
move
from
a
discourse
of
responsible
science
to
one
of
‘responsible
governance’.
US
nanotechnology
debates
have
tended
to
use
the
phrase
‘responsible
development’
(Kjølberg,
2010).
But
the
meaning
of
such
terms
remains
contested.
Rather
than
rep-
resenting
a
clear
novel
governance
paradigm,
we
might
instead
see
responsible
innovation
as
a
location
for
making
sense
of
the
move
from
the
governance
of
risk
to
the
governance
of
innova-
tion
itself
(Felt
et
al.,
2007).
In
the
following
sections
we
develop
these
concepts
and
associated
literatures
to
articulate
a
framework
for
responsible
innovation.
This
has
been
informed
by
a
geoengi-
neering
research
project
in
which
we
were
involved.
Finally,
we
offer
some
conclusions
on
how
this
framework
might
be
taken
for-
ward,
based
in
part
on
our
experiences
within
this
case
study
of
technoscience-in-the-making.
2.
Four
dimensions
of
responsible
innovation
von
Schomberg
(2011a)
offers
the
following
definition
of
Responsible
Research
and
Innovation:
“A
transparent,
interactive
process
by
which
societal
actors
and
innovators
become
mutually
responsive
to
each
other
with
a
view
to
the
(ethical)
acceptability,
sustainability
and
societal
desirability
of
the
innovation
process
and
its
marketable
prod-
ucts
(in
order
to
allow
a
proper
embedding
of
scientific
and
technological
advances
in
our
society).”
This
definition
is
anchored
to
European
policy
processes
and
values.
As
we
will
discuss
in
the
final
section
of
this
paper,
our
framework
has
similar
elements
but
emerges
from
a
different
con-
text.
We
offer
a
broader
definition,
based
on
the
prospective
notion
of
responsibility
described
above:
“Responsible
innovation
means
taking
care
of
the
future
through
collective
stewardship
of
science
and
innovation
in
the
present.”
The
dimensions
that
make
up
our
framework
originate
from
a
set
of
questions
that
have
emerged
as
important
within
pub-
lic
debates
about
new
areas
of
science
and
technology.
These
are
questions
that
public
groups
typically
ask
of
scientists,
or
would
like
to
see
scientists
ask
of
themselves.
Table
1
draws
on
Macnaghten
and
Chilvers’
(forthcoming)
analysis
of
cross-cutting
public
concerns
across
17
UK
public
dialogues
on
science
and
technology
and
categorises
these
questions
as
to
whether
they
relate
to
the
products,
processes
or
purposes
of
innovation.
Con-
ventional
governance
focuses
on
product
questions,
particularly
those
of
technological
risk,
which
can
obscure
areas
of
uncertainty
and
ignorance
about
both
risks
and
benefits
(Hoffmann-Riem
and
Wynne,
2002;
Stirling,
2010).
Tools
of
ethical
governance
and
research
integrity
move
into
questions
of
process,
especially
when
human
volunteers
and
animals
are
involved
in
experimentation.
Approaches
to
responsible
innovation
extend
the
governance
discussion
to
encompass
questions
of
uncertainty
(in
its
multiple
forms),
purposes,
motivations,
social
and
political
constitutions,
trajectories
and
directions
of
innovation.
If
we
take
these
questions
to
represent
aspects
of
societal
concern
and
interest
in
research
and
innovation,
responsible
inno-
vation
can
be
seen
as
a
way
of
embedding
deliberation
on
these
within
the
innovation
process.
The
four
dimensions
of
responsi-
ble
innovation
we
propose
(anticipation,
reflexivity,
inclusion
and
responsiveness)
provide
a
framework
for
raising,
discussing
and
responding
to
such
questions.
The
dimensions
are
important
char-
acteristics
of
a
more
responsible
vision
of
innovation,
which
can,
in
our
experience,
be
heuristically
helpful
for
governance.
We
will
go
on
to
describe
one
application
of
our
framework
at
a
project
level,
where
the
main
actors
were
the
project
scientists,
research
fun-
ders,
stakeholders
and
ourselves.
However,
the
framework
may
be
applicable
at
other
levels,
such
as
with
the
development
of
policy
or
thematic
programmes
(see
Fisher
and
Rip,
2013).
Each
dimen-
sion
demands
particular
explanation,
but
the
lines
between
them
are
blurred.
We
therefore
end
this
section
by
discussing
the
impor-
tance
of
integration.
For
each
dimension,
we
explain
the
conceptual
and
policy
background,
give
meaning
to
the
term,
describe
some
mechanisms
and
approaches
that
might
articulate
the
dimension
in
practice
and
offer
criteria
and
conditions
for
effective
innovation
governance.
2.1.
Anticipation
The
call
for
improved
anticipation
in
governance
comes
from
a
variety
of
sources,
from
political
and
environmental
concerns
with
the
pace
of
social
and
technical
change
(e.g.
Toffler,
1970),
to
schol-
arly
(and
latterly,
policy)
critiques
of
the
limitations
of
top-down
risk-based
models
of
governance
to
encapsulate
the
social,
ethi-
cal
and
political
stakes
associated
with
technoscientific
advances
(amongst
others,
see
Wynne,
1992,
2002;
RCEP,
1998;
Jasanoff,
2003;
Henwood
and
Pidgeon,
2013).
The
detrimental
implications
of
new
technologies
are
often
unforeseen,
and
risk-based
estimates
of
harm
have
commonly
failed
to
provide
early
warnings
of
future
effects
(European
Environment
Agency,
2001,
2013;
Hoffmann-
Riem
and
Wynne,
2002).
Anticipation
prompts
researchers
and
organisations
to
ask
‘what
if.
.
.?’
questions
(Ravetz,
1997),
to
con-
sider
contingency,
what
is
known,
what
is
likely,
what
is
plausible
and
what
is
possible.
Anticipation
involves
systematic
thinking
aimed
at
increasing
resilience,
while
revealing
new
opportunities
for
innovation
and
the
shaping
of
agendas
for
socially-robust
risk
research.
The
attempt
to
improve
foresight
in
issues
of
science
and
inno-
vation
is
a
familiar
theme
in
science
and
innovation
policy
(Martin,
Table
1
Lines
of
questioning
on
responsible
innovation.
Product
questions
Process
questions
Purpose
questions
How
will
the
risks
and
benefits
be
distributed?
How
should
standards
be
drawn
up
and
applied?
Why
are
researchers
doing
it?
What
other
impacts
can
we
anticipate?
How
should
risks
and
benefits
be
defined
and
measured?
Are
these
motivations
transparent
and
in
the
public
interest?
How
might
these
change
in
the
future?
Who
is
in
control?
Who
will
benefit?
What
don’t
we
know
about?
Who
is
taking
part?
What
are
they
going
to
gain?
What
might
we
never
know
about?
Who
will
take
responsibility
if
things
go
wrong?
What
are
the
alternatives?
How
do
we
know
we
are
right?
J.
Stilgoe
et
al.
/
Research
Policy
42 (2013) 1568–
1580 1571
2010).
This
is
not
to
say
there
is
a
shortage
of
future-gazing.
Indeed,
there
is
a
growing
literature
in
STS
concerned
with
scientists’
and
innovators’
‘imaginaries’
of
the
future
(van
Lente,
1993;
Brown
et
al.,
2000;
Fortun,
2001;
Brown
and
Michael,
2003;
Hedgecoe
and
Martin,
2003;
Fujimura,
2003;
Borup
et
al.,
2006;
Selin,
2007).
These
expectations
work
not
just
to
predict
but
also
to
shape
desirable
futures
and
organise
resources
towards
them
(te
Kulve
and
Rip,
2011).
Research
in
genomics
and
nanotechnology
has,
for
example,
been
shown
to
carry
highly
optimistic
promises
of
major
social
and
industrial
transformation,
suggesting
a
need
for
what
Fortun
(2005)
calls
‘an
ethics
of
promising’
to
instil
some
form
of
responsibility
in
disentangling
present
hype
from
future
reality
(Brown,
2003).
Any
process
of
anticipation
therefore
faces
a
tension
between
pre-
diction,
which
tends
to
reify
particular
futures,
and
participation,
which
seeks
to
open
them
up.
Upstream
public
engagement
(Wilsdon
and
Willis,
2004)
and
Constructive
Technology
Assessment
(Rip
et
al.,
1995)
are
two
techniques
that
involve
anticipatory
discussions
of
possible
and
desirable
futures.
Guston
and
Sarewitz’s
(2002)
‘Real-Time
Tech-
nology
Assessment’
is
another
model
of
what
they
call
‘anticipatory
governance’
(see
also
Barben
et
al.,
2008;
Karinen
and
Guston,
2010).
Anticipation
is
here
distinguished
from
prediction
in
its
explicit
recognition
of
the
complexities
and
uncertainties
of
sci-
ence
and
society’s
co-evolution
(Barben
et
al.,
2008).
Methods
of
foresight,
technology
assessment,
horizon
scanning
or
scenario
planning
can
be
important
techniques,
although
used
narrowly
they
risk
exacerbating
technological
determinism.
Scenarios
(Selin,
2011;
Robinson,
2009)
and
vision
assessment
(Grin
and
Grunwald,
2000)
have
been
used
in
various
settings.
Some
scholars
(e.g.
Miller
and
Bennett,
2008)
have
also
suggested
that
socio-literary
techniques
drawing
on
science
fiction
may
be
powerful
ways
to
democratise
thinking
about
the
future.
Much
of
the
academic
literature
here
makes
the
point
that
suc-
cessful
anticipation
also
requires
understanding
of
the
dynamics
of
promising
that
shape
technological
futures
(Borup
et
al.,
2006;
Selin,
2011;
van
Lente
and
Rip,
1998).
Anticipatory
processes
need
to
be
well-timed
so
that
they
are
early
enough
to
be
constructive
but
late
enough
to
be
meaningful
(Rogers-Hayden
and
Pidgeon,
2007).
The
plausibility
of
scenarios
is
an
important
factor
in
their
success
(Selin,
2011;
von
Schomberg,
2011c)
and
we
should
not
underes-
timate
the
work
involved
in
building
robust
tools
for
anticipation
(Robinson,
2009).
We
must
also
recognise
institutional
and
cul-
tural
resistance
to
anticipation.
As
Guston
(2012)
points
out,
a
lack
of
anticipation
may
not
just
be
a
product
of
reductionism
and
dis-
ciplinary
siloes.
It
may,
at
least
in
part,
be
intentional
as
scientists
seek
to
defend
their
autonomy
(Guston,
2012).
2.2.
Reflexivity
Responsibility
demands
reflexivity
on
the
part
of
actors
and
institutions,
but
this
is
not
straightforwardly
defined.
Lynch
(2000)
unpacks
the
word
‘reflexivity’
to
reveal
its
multiple
meanings
and
modes
of
engagement
with
social
worlds.
Social
theorists
(Beck,
1992;
Beck
et
al.,
1994)
have
argued
that
reflexivity
is
a
condition
of
contemporary
modernity.
Scientists’
own
version
of
reflexivity
often
echoes
Popper’s
(1963)
argument
that
self-
referential
critique
is
an
organising
principle
of
science
(Lynch,
2000).
We
would
argue,
following
Wynne
(1993),
that
there
is
a
demonstrated
need
for
institutional
reflexivity
in
governance.
Reflexivity,
at
the
level
of
institutional
practice,
means
holding
a
mirror
up
to
one’s
own
activities,
commitments
and
assumptions,
being
aware
of
the
limits
of
knowledge
and
being
mindful
that
a
particular
framing
of
an
issue
may
not
be
universally
held.
This
is
second-order
reflexivity
(Schuurbiers,
2011)
in
which
the
value
systems
and
theories
that
shape
science,
innovation
and
their
governance
are
themselves
scrutinised.
Unlike
the
private,
professional
self-critique
that
scientists
are
used
to,
responsibility
makes
reflexivity
a
public
matter
(Wynne,
2011).
Mechanisms
such
as
codes
of
conduct,
moratoriums
and
the
adoption
of
standards
may
build
this
second-order
reflexivity
by
drawing
connections
between
external
value
systems
and
scien-
tific
practice
(Busch,
2011;
von
Schomberg,
2013).
Recent
attempts
to
build
reflexivity
have
tended
to
focus
at
the
laboratory
level,
often
with
the
participation
of
social
scientists
or
philosophers.
The
argument
is
that
in
the
bottom-up,
self-governing
world
of
science,
laboratory
reflexivity
becomes
a
vital
lever
for
opening
up
alternatives
through
enhancing
the
“reflections
of
natural
scien-
tists
on
the
socio-ethical
context
of
their
work”
(Schuurbiers,
2011,
p.
769;
also
see
Schuurbiers
and
Fisher,
2009).
Approaches
such
as
‘midstream
modulation’
(Fisher
et
al.,
2006;
Fisher,
2007)
and
‘eth-
ical
technology
assessment’
(Swierstra
et
al.,
2009)
give
familiar
ethnographic
STS
laboratory
studies
an
interventionist
turn
(see
Doubleday,
2007
for
a
similar
approach).
Rosalyn
Berne’s
(2006)
account
of
her
interviews
with
nanoscientists
suggests
a
similar
intention.
The
conversation
becomes
a
tool
for
building
reflexivity.
Wynne
(2011)
concludes
that,
while
this
work
has
been
demon-
strably
successful
in
beginning
to
build
reflexivity
at
the
laboratory
level,
such
concepts
and
practices
need
to
be
extended
to
include
research
funders,
regulators
and
the
other
institutions
that
com-
prise
the
patchwork
of
science
governance
(a
conclusion
that
has
also
surfaced
from
public
dialogues
in
areas
of
synthetic
biology
and
beyond
(e.g.
TNS-BRMB,
2010)).
These
institutions
have
a
respon-
sibility
not
only
to
reflect
on
their
own
value
systems,
but
also
to
help
build
the
reflexive
capacity
within
the
practice
of
science
and
innovation.
Building
actors’
and
institutions’
reflexivity
means
rethink-
ing
prevailing
conceptions
about
the
moral
division
of
labour
within
science
and
innovation
(Swierstra
and
Rip,
2007).
Reflexivity
directly
challenges
assumptions
of
scientific
amorality
and
agnos-
ticism.
Reflexivity
asks
scientists,
in
public,
to
blur
the
boundary
between
their
role
responsibilities
and
wider,
moral
responsibili-
ties.
It
therefore
demands
openness
and
leadership
within
cultures
of
science
and
innovation.
2.3.
Inclusion
The
waning
of
the
authority
of
expert,
top-down
policy-making
has
been
associated
with
a
rise
in
the
inclusion
of
new
voices
in
the
governance
of
science
and
innovation
as
part
of
a
search
for
legiti-
macy
(Irwin,
2006;
Felt
et
al.,
2007;
Hajer,
2009).
Over
the
last
two
decades,
particularly
in
Northern
Europe,
new
deliberative
forums
on
issues
involving
science
and
innovation
have
been
established,
moving
beyond
engagement
with
stakeholders
to
include
mem-
bers
of
the
wider
public
(e.g.
RCEP,
1998;
Grove-White
et
al.,
1997;
Wilsdon
and
Willis,
2004;
Stirling,
2006;
Macnaghten
and
Chilvers,
forthcoming).
These
small-group
processes
of
public
dialogue,
usefully
described
as
‘mini-publics’
by
Goodin
and
Dryzek
(2006),
include
consensus
conferences,
citizens’
juries,
deliberative
mapping,
deliberative
polling
and
focus
groups
(see
Chilvers,
2010).
Often
under
the
aegis
of
quasi-governmental
institutions
such
as
Sciencewise-ERC
in
the
UK
or
the
Danish
Board
of
Technology,
these
can,
according
to
the
UK
government,
“enable
[public]
debate
to
take
place
‘upstream’
in
the
scientific
and
technological
process”
(HM
Treasury/DTI/DfES,
2004,
p.
105;
see
also
Royal
Society/Royal
Academy
of
Engineering,
2004).
Additionally,
we
can
point
to
the
use
of
multi-stakeholder
partnerships,
forums,
the
inclusion
of
lay
members
on
scientific
advisory
committees,
and
other
hybrid
mechanisms
that
attempt
to
diversify
the
inputs
to
and
delivery
of
governance
(Callon
et
al.,
2009;
Bäckstrand,
2006;
Brown,
2002).
The
practice
of
these
exercises
in
inclusive
governance
and
their
impact
on
policymaking
has
been
uneven,
and
has
attracted
1572 J.
Stilgoe
et
al.
/
Research
Policy
42 (2013) 1568–
1580
substantial
critique
(among
others,
see
Horlick-Jones
et
al.,
2007;
Kerr
et
al.,
2007;
Rothstein,
2007).
Public
engagement
practition-
ers
can
be
accused
of
following
an
emerging
orthodoxy,
with
an
assumed
reasoning
that
“the
technical
is
political,
the
political
should
be
democratic
and
the
democratic
should
be
participatory”
(Moore,
2010,
p.
793).
In
response,
STS
scholarship
has
begun
to
problematise
public
dialogue
as
a
public
good
in
itself
(see
Chilvers,
2009).
The
proliferation
of
participatory
approaches
activities
has
led
to
arguments
for
greater
clarity
about
the
meth-
ods
of
participation,
the
purposes
for
which
they
are
used
and
the
criteria
against
which
they
might
be
evaluated
(Rowe
and
Frewer,
2000,
2005).
In
addition,
a
growing
body
of
critique
has
developed,
drawing
attention
to,
among
other
things:
framing
effects
within
dialogue
processes
which
can
reinforce
existing
relations
of
professional
power
and
deficit
understandings
of
the
public
(Wynne,
2006;
Kerr
et
al.,
2007),
thus
constituting,
at
times,
a
new
“tyranny”
with
questionable
benefits
(Cooke
and
Kothari,
2001);
the
ways
in
which
engagement
processes
construct
particular
kinds
of
publics
that
respond
to
contingent
political
imaginaries
(Lezaun
and
Soneryd,
2007;
Macnaghten
and
Guivant,
2011;
Michael
and
Brown,
2005);
and
the
diverse,
occasionally
competing
motivations
that
underpin
dialogue
(see
Fiorino,
1989;
Stirling,
2008;
Macnaghten
and
Chilvers,
forthcoming).
Irwin
and
colleagues
suggest,
however,
that
“the
(often
implicit)
evocation
of
the
highest
principles
that
engagement
might
ideally
fulfil
can
make
it
difficult
to
acknowledge
and
pay
serious
attention
to
the
varieties
of
engagement
that
are
very
much
less
than
perfect
but
still
somehow
‘good”’
(Irwin
et
al.,
2013,
p.
120).
The
importance
of
public
dialogue
in
“opening
up”
(Stirling,
2008)
framings
of
issues
that
challenge
entrenched
assumptions
and
commitments
has
been
emphasised
(Lövbrand
et
al.,
2011).
And
while
there
has
been
a
resistance
to
attempts
to
proceduralise
public
dialogue
for
fear
that
it
becomes
another
means
of
closure
(Wynne,
2005;
Stirling,
2008)
or
technocracy
(Rose,
1999;
Lezaun
and
Soneryd,
2007),
there
have
been
efforts
to
develop
criteria
aimed
at
assessing
the
quality
of
dialogue
as
a
learning
exercise.
On
the
latter,
Callon
et
al.
(2009,
p.
160)
offer
three
criteria:
intensity
how
early
members
of
the
public
are
consulted
and
how
much
care
is
given
to
the
compo-
sition
of
the
discussion
group;
openness
how
diverse
the
group
is
and
who
is
represented;
and
quality
the
gravity
and
continu-
ity
of
the
discussion.
In
relation
to
what
actually
is
at
stake
in
the
advance
of
new
science
and
technology,
Grove-White
et
al.
(2000)
argue
that
public
dialogue
needs
to
open
up
discussion
of
future
social
worlds
(building
on
the
dimension
of
anticipation)
in
ways
that
critically
interrogate
the
‘social
constitutions’
inherent
in
tech-
nological
options
that
is,
the
distinctive
set
of
social,
political
and
ethical
implications
that
their
development
would
likely
bring
into
being
(see
Macnaghten,
2010
for
an
articulation
of
this
approach
with
respect
to
nanotechnology
and
Macnaghten
and
Szerszynski,
2013
on
geoengineering).
Processes
of
inclusion
inevitably
force
consideration
of
ques-
tions
of
power.
Agencies
commissioning
such
exercises,