International Security 26.1 (2001) 93-128
No one had given Muhammad Ali a chance against George Foreman in the World Heavyweight Championship fight of October 30, 1974. Foreman, none of whose opponents had lasted more than three rounds in the ring, was the strongest, hardest hitting boxer of his generation. Ali, though not as powerful as Foreman, had a slightly faster punch and was lighter on his feet. In the weeks leading up to the fight, however, Foreman had practiced against nimble sparring partners. He was ready. But when the bell rang just after 4:00 a.m. in Kinshasa, something completely unexpected happened. In round two, instead of moving into the ring to meet Foreman, Ali appeared to cower against the ropes. Foreman, now confident of victory, pounded him again and again, while Ali whispered hoarse taunts: "George, you're not hittin'," "George, you disappoint me." Foreman lost his temper, and his punches became a furious blur. To spectators, unaware that the elastic ring ropes were absorbing much of the force of Foreman's blows, it looked as if Ali would surely fall. By the fifth round, however, Foreman was worn out. And in round eight, as stunned commentators and a delirious crowd looked on, Muhammad Ali knocked George Foreman to the canvas, and the fight was over.
The outcome of that now-famous "rumble in the jungle" was completely unexpected. The two fighters were equally motivated to win: Both had boasted of victory, and both had enormous egos. Yet in the end, a fight that should have been over in three rounds went eight, and Foreman's prodigious punches proved useless against Ali's rope-a-dope strategy.
This fight illustrates an important yet relatively unexplored feature of interstate conflict: how a weak actor's strategy can make a strong actor's power irrelevant. If power implies victory in war, then weak actors should almost never win against stronger opponents, especially when the gap in relative power is very large. Yet history suggests otherwise: Weak actors sometimes do win. The question is how.
Understanding the conditions under which weak actors win wars is im-portant for two reasons. First, if there are dynamics unique to asymmetric conflicts -- or if their analysis provides fresh insights into symmetrical conflicts -- a general explanation of asymmetric conflict outcomes is not only desirable but necessary, both to reduce the likelihood of unwinnable wars and to increase the chances of U.S. success when a resort to arms is necessary. Second, because asymmetric conflicts ranging from catastrophic terrorism to military intervention in interstate, ethnic, and civil wars are the most likely threat to U.S. security and interests, only a general theory of asymmetric conflict outcomes can guide U.S. policymakers in their efforts to build the kinds of armed and other forces necessary to implement an effective U.S. strategic response.
Thus far, only one scholar has advanced a strong general explanation of asymmetric conflict outcomes. In "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," Andrew Mack argues that an actor's relative resolve or interest explains success or failure in asymmetric conflicts. In essence, the actor with the most resolve wins, regardless of material power resources. Mack contends that this resolve can be derived a priori by assessing the structure of the conflict relationship. Power asymmetry explains interest asymmetry: The greater the gap in relative power, the less resolute and hence more politically vulnerable strong actors are, and the more resolute and less politically vulnerable weak actors are. Big nations therefore lose small wars because frustrated publics (in democratic regimes) or countervailing elites (in authoritarian regimes) force a withdrawal short of military victory. This seems true of some conflicts, but not of others.
In this article I argue that the best predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes is strategic interaction. According to this thesis, the interaction of actor strategies during a conflict predicts conflict outcomes better than do competing explanations. The first section lays out the puzzle of strong-actor defeat in asymmetric conflicts and Mack's interest asymmetry argument more fully. The second section introduces the strategic interaction thesis, which holds that strong actors will lose asymmetric conflicts when they use...