PTSD Extinction, Reconsolidation, and the Visual-Kinesthetic Dissociation Protocol

Abstract

Every year thousands of returning military, state, and local police officers and civilians of every description suffer from the intrusive symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Current treatments rooted largely in extinction protocols require extensive commitments of time and money and are often ineffective. This study reviews several theories of PTSD and two important mechanisms that explain when treatment does and doesn’t work: extinction and reconsolidation. It then reviews the research about and suggests an explanatory mechanism for the visual-kinesthetic dissociation protocol (V/KD), also known as the rewind technique. The technique is notable for its lack of discomfort to the client, the possibility of being executed as a content-free intervention, its speed of operation, and its long-term, if largely anecdotal, efficacy. A case study, specific diagnostics for extinction, and reconsolidative mechanisms and suggestions for future research are provided.

Full text

Traumatology
18(2) 3 –16
© The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1534765611431835
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Although recognized in various forms from the time of
Homer’s Iliad to the present, the symptoms of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) were first designated as a distinct
psychiatric diagnosis with the publication of Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, third edition (DSM-
III; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980; Bodkin,
Detke, Pope, & Hudson, 2007; Davidson & Foa, 1991; Foa
& Meadows, 1997; Friedhelm & Sack, 2002; McHugh &
Treisman, 2007; Spitzer, Wakefield, & First, 2007).
PTSD is defined by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) in terms of
five criteria. The first criterion is the traumatizing event. To
qualify as a traumatizing event both of the following must
appear: (a) The person experienced, witnessed, or was other-
wise confronted with one or more events that actually
involved or threatened death, serious injury, or some other
threat to the physical integrity of that individual or others,
and (b) The individual’s response involved intense feelings
of horror, fear, or helplessness.
The diagnostic criteria are further divided into three
symptom clusters: the reexperiencing, the avoidance/
numbing, and the arousal. According to Foa and Meadows
(1997) the intrusion or reexperiencing symptoms include
the hallmark signs of PTSD, including nightmares, intrusive
thoughts, and flashbacks. The avoidance group includes
efforts to avoid memories of the traumatic experience and
symptoms of emotional numbing. The third symptom cluster
includes symptoms of hyperarousal, including sleeplessness,
irritability, and hypervigilance. Other criteria include the
impact and duration of the symptoms (APA, 1994).
Diagnosis is made when symptoms (at least one from the
reexperiencing cluster, three from the avoidance cluster, and
two from the hyperarousal cluster) cause clinically signifi-
cant distress or discomfort and have persisted for a minimum
of 1 month (APA, 1994).
The prevalence of PTSD among veterans of the Gulf War,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom
has been estimated at nearly twice the rate of the noncombat
population (6%). For Gulf War veterans the rate of preva-
lence ranges between 10% and 11% and between 13% and
17% for veterans of the Iraqi and Afghanistani theaters
(Gradus, 2010; Hogue et al., 2008). These returning service-
men present a serious problem for treatment professionals on
two fronts. First, they represent a significant influx of prob-
lem clients, and second, the currently approved treatments
provide inconsistent results with varying levels of effective-
ness and subsequent relapse. Another problem is that
extinction-based treatments, which have enjoyed a favorable
position in the treatment literature, often require long-term
commitments in spite of their inconsistent results (Foa, Keane,
& Friedman, 2000; Foa & Meadows, 1997; Massad &
431835TMT18210.1177/15347656
11431835Gray and LiottaTraumatology
1School of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, Fairleigh Dickinson
University, Teaneck, NJ, USA.
Corresponding Author:
Richard M. Gray, PhD, Assistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice and
Legal Studies, Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1000 River Road, T-RA2-01,
Teaneck, NJ 07666, USA
Email: rmgray@fdu.edu
PTSD: Extinction, Reconsolidation, and the
Visual-Kinesthetic Dissociation Protocol
Richard M. Gray1 and Richard F. Liotta1
Abstract
Every year thousands of returning military, state, and local police officers and civilians of every description suffer from the
intrusive symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Current treatments rooted largely in extinction protocols
require extensive commitments of time and money and are often ineffective. This study reviews several theories of PTSD
and two important mechanisms that explain when treatment does and doesn’t work: extinction and reconsolidation. It
then reviews the research about and suggests an explanatory mechanism for the visual-kinesthetic dissociation protocol (V/
KD), also known as the rewind technique. The technique is notable for its lack of discomfort to the client, the possibility of
being executed as a content-free intervention, its speed of operation, and its long-term, if largely anecdotal, efficacy. A case
study, specific diagnostics for extinction, and reconsolidative mechanisms and suggestions for future research are provided.
Keywords
PTSD, PTSD treatment, PTSD models, visual-kinesthetic dissociation, rewind technique, extinction, reconsolidation

4 Traumatology 18(2)
Hulsey, 2006; McNally, 2007; Rothbaum, Davis, King,
Ferris, & Lederhendler, 2003; Rothbaum, Meadows, Resick,
& Foy, 2000; Schiller et al., 2010; Shalev, Bonne, & Eth,
1996; Ursano et al., 2004; Wessa & Flor, 2007). This article
introduces and suggests a mechanism for a relatively
unknown, short-term treatment for PTSD— the visual-
kinesthetic dissociation protocol (V/KD).
The V/KD protocol (as discussed in the following) is an
intervention originally designed in the early 1980s for use
with phobias. The protocol is one of many anecdotally sup-
ported interventions that emerges from the field of neurolin-
guistic programming (NLP). NLP is a controversial approach
to modeling, replicating, and transforming behavior that
includes a number of specific therapeutic techniques; among
these is the V/KD protocol. NLP finds its roots in models of
the therapeutic techniques of Milton Erickson, Virginia
Satir, and Fritz Perls. NLP has generated a great deal of
anecdotal evidence of effectiveness but has undergone little
empirical testing. There have been recent calls from within
the NLP Community for more research into its efficacy
claims (Bandler & Grinder, 1975b, 1979; Bolstad, 2002;
Bostic St. Clair & Grinder, 2002; Dilts, Grinder, Bandler, &
DeLozier, 1980; Wake, 2008).
Theoretical Models of PTSD
Classical Learning Theory
There are multiple theories of the mechanisms of PTSD. The
earlier theories were rooted in basic behavioral psychology.
Consistent with classical conditioning paradigms, the trau-
matic memory is associated with implicit and explicit cues
that evoke the memory outside of the conscious control of
the sufferer. Implicit memory effects related to amygdalar
function and conditioned evocation explain anxiety effects
and attentional effects. Implicit and explicit conditioned
associations to flashbulb memories explain certain aspects
of the reexperiencing facets. Secondary effects are attributed
to operant conditioning of efforts to avoid continuing
trauma. According to Wessa and Flor (2007), aversive learn-
ing in PTSD is extremely resistant to extinction because it is
supported by a network of second-order conditionings that
maintain behavioral strength in spite of the absence of the
original unconditioned trauma. There is also evidence of
impaired responsivity of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), a crucial mediator of extinction-based learning
and modulation of amygdalar responses (Diamond,
Campbell, Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 2007; Foa et al., 2000;
Foa & Meadows, 1997; Gharakhani, Mathew, & Charney,
2006; Layton & Krikorian, 2002; Liberzon, Sripada, & De
Kloet, 2007; Rescorla, 1988).
The Bioinformational Theory
A bioinformational theory set forth by Foa and her colleagues
(Foa et al., 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa & Meadows, 1997)
sees emotions as information networks that are presumed to be
stored in long-term memory as both a set of propositions
about the circumstance and a set of motor programs in
response to the circumstance. When a person experiences an
emotion he or she evokes three levels of information: infor-
mation about the stimulus and its meaning in a given con-
text, the appropriate response to the stimulus (emotional
language, appropriate motor responses, and the autonomic
responses that support them), and the relationships between
the stimulus and possible responses. For fearful responses,
the networks tend to hold together as consistent patterns of
response; they are easily activated—even by partial stimulus
representations—and whether or not they result in overt
action, there is always a characteristic autonomic response.
According to this model, treatment of PTSD, or other
fear-based pathologies, is dependent on two elements:
(1) elicitation of the fearful experience as fully as possible,
and (2) modification of the memory structure to include
information (experiences) that transform the meaning of the
memory structure. The PTSD response is generally linked to
multiple stimuli and is more easily evoked than other fearful
responses. To insure effective treatment, care must be taken
to insure that the fear response is evoked as fully as possible.
In transforming the memory structure at the root of PTSD
symptoms, new information that is incompatible with some
or all of its pathological structure must be incorporated into
the memory schema itself (Foa et al., 2000; Foa & Kozak,
1986; Foa & Meadows, 1997).
Dual Representational Theory
More recently, behavioral explanations have given way to
explanations rooted in cognitive theory that involve levels of
conscious control and an hypothesized need to integrate the
memory of the trauma into a coherent life narrative. Among
these is the dual representation theory of Brewin and
Dalgleish (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996).
Brewin and Dalgleish hold that traumatic memories are
stored in two separate forms: explicit, verbally accessible
memories, and implicit, situationally accessible memories.
Each type of memory is stored in a different manner and in a
different brain system. PTSD occurs when traumatic events
produce incomplete or inconsistent records in the two kinds
of memory store and when those memories prove to be
incompatible with the existing schemas and beliefs that
define the client’s world. Healing proceeds through two
stages as the client moves to (a) integrate the explicit narra-
tive of the traumatic event with his or her beliefs and expec-
tations (as recommended by social-cognitive theories), and
(b) make the implicit experience explicit by reexperiencing
and coming to grips with the nonverbal traumatic experi-
ence (as recommended by information-processing theories).
Accordingly, healing is never complete until both kinds of
processing are accomplished.
Many of these theories are unsatisfactory insofar as they
tend to rely on top-down processes and ideas of integration

Gray and Liotta 5
rather than a direct assault on the emotional core of the prob-
lem. In a 2006 review of progress in the neurobiology of
PTSD, van der Kolk notes that emotions are seldom under
conscious control. He concludes that they are much more
often in control of us than we are of them.
It is instructive that, in line with root behavioral princi-
ples, Foa et al. (1989), Brewin et al. (1996), and others have
pointed to the need to direct our attention to the core facet of
the problem, the traumatic memory itself.
The Temporal Dynamics Model
of Emotional Memory Processing
A model that appears to specify all of the mechanisms involved
in the basic phenomenology of PTSD at the level of physiol-
ogy is set forth by Diamond et al. (2007) in their exhaustive
review, “The Temporal Dynamics Model of Emotional
Memory Processing.” According to them, the phenomenol-
ogy of PTSD is explained by temporally sequenced patterns
of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression
(LTD) in the hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex
(PFC) as part of a generalized response to stress.
LTP is the (generally assumed) process whereby short-
term memory is converted into long-term memory. It
includes protein synthesis and physical changes in the struc-
ture of neurons at the synapse. LTD refers to processes that
inhibit the creation of memories more generally and sub-
sumes a more diffuse set of phenomena.
At the center of the theory is the observation that intense
fear or stress sets in motion a period of enhanced LTP in both
the amygdala and the hippocampus that is followed shortly
by a refractory period in which these structures only con-
tinue processing with some difficulty. Like the dual-factor
model proposed in Brewin and colleagues’ (1996) and
Layton and Krikorian’s (2002) appeal to amygdalar and hip-
pocampal mechanisms, Diamond et al. (2007) also appeal to
activation of the amygdala to explain the implicit aspects of
the fear memory and the sequential activation and partial
suppression of hippocampal function to explain the flash-
bulb aspects of traumatic memory. Crucially, their theory
depends on LTP as the signal that the structure is currently
responding to stressors and focuses on temporal sequencing
as key to the observed effects.
Diamond et al. (2007) provide extensive support for the
idea that under conditions of extreme stress, which create
high levels of amygdalar activation, the hippocampus
switches from its higher-order function as integrator of time,
place, and sequence to a simpler focus on the immediate con-
text. Stress initiates a brief period of facilitated LTP, which
is followed by a longer refractory period in which the struc-
ture may be thought of as having limited response potentiali-
ties. This refractory period isolates the memory and creates a
near indelible trace of the dangerous circumstance that is
not subject to interference from subsequent stimuli (in the
immediate context) and may be useful for protecting the
organism from similar threats in the future.
This activation of the hippocampus is short lived and does
not produce a coherent narrative of the event but only the
sharply focused memory of the trauma or its precursors.
These are the flashbulb memories that accompany trauma
and are often characterized by what Loftus has called gun
focus and others have described as tunnel vision. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that in the present formulation the hip-
pocampus enters a phase of lessened efficiency rather than
total inactivation. The continued lowered sensitivity of the
hippocampus explains the disorientation, amnesia, and the
perception that the event is not connected in time and not
susceptible to integration into the continuing narrative of the
client’s life.
At the same time that the hippocampus is recording what
will become the fragmented flashbulb memories (vivid,
eidetic representations of the memory formed under periods of
great emotional impact) of the incident (driven by amygdalar
afferents), the amygdala is also in a phase of enhanced LTP. In
this case, the amygdala, the center of emotion, creates
long-lasting and extinction-resistant behavioral connections
between the emotional response and the cues surrounding the
event. These connections become the root of the flashbacks,
nightmares, and phobic aspects of PTSD. The event is encoded
as a verbally inaccessible set of conditioned responses. Like
the hippocampus, the amygdala enters a refractory period after
the initial period of enhanced LTP. The length of activation
for this implicit conditioning phase appears to last somewhat
longer for the amygdala. In this case, the amygdalar deactiva-
tion would explain numbness, fugue states, and dissociations
in the immediate aftermath of the event.
Unlike the amygdala and the hippocampus, the PFC—
which normally modulates amygdalar function—is not
subject to enhanced LTP under the effects of extreme stress
and almost immediately falls into a state of LTD. Insofar as
it is no longer capable of modulating amygdalar function,
the amygdala becomes the driving force in the current state
of the organism. Moreover, because the PFC is the center
of executive function and is responsible for most higher-
level functions, including evaluations, decision making,
and divided attention tasks, when it enters a state of less-
ened responsivity, the capacity for creating a coherent nar-
rative of the stressful circumstance is lost.
Furthermore, because the LTP in the amygdala may occur
during the refractory phase of hippocampal function, both
the PFC and the hippocampal editing and organizing func-
tions will be impaired, resulting in emotionally driven but
often inaccurate memories of the circumstances. These dis-
ordered recollections of the event—as a result of stress-
related inhibition of the integrative functions of the PFC and
the hippocampus—may later give rise to fabricated memories,
rationalizations, and various psychological and psychiatric
responses that contribute to the inability to make sense of the
traumatic event.
With the caveat that the model provided by Diamond et al.
(2007) is based on animal studies, and some of the mechanisms
have not been subjected to extensive confirmation, this

6 Traumatology 18(2)
theory may serve as a foundation for understanding the root
mechanisms of PTSD and to make useful differentiations
between the multiple dimensions of the problem. At the heart
of the problem are the intrusion or reexperiencing symp-
toms, including flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, and night-
mares. These appear to be rooted in the emotional memories
as both implicit and explicit elements that are fully explained
by the mechanism just described. These may be understood
as the core of the disorder and, for the most part, they are the
aversive stimuli that drive the next group: the avoidance
cluster.
Within the avoidance cluster are found efforts to avoid
memories of the traumatic experience and symptoms of
emotional numbing. Note that numbing may not be fully
explained by operant processes, for it may arise as the result
of habituation to the more intense stimulation of the trau-
matic eruptions.
The third symptom cluster arises as a direct expression of
implicit memory effects mediated by the amygdala in the
absence of PFC and hippocampal regulation. They include
sleeplessness, irritability, and hypervigilance (APA, 1994;
Davidson & Foa, 1991; Diamond et al., 2007; Foa & Meadows,
1997; Keane, Weathers, & Foa, 2000; Lamprecht & Sack,
2002; McHugh & Treisman, 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007).
A second layer of emotional responses often character-
izes PTSD clients. These include sadness, anger, fear for the
future, and an inability to make plans. These are character-
ized by Brewer, Dalgleish, and Joseph (1996) as secondary
emotions. Depending on the level to which they have
become integrated into the life schemas and personal defini-
tions of the individual, they may or may not be resolved with
the elimination of the core symptoms. On a final level are
depression, family dysfunction, and substance abuse issues.
These and other comorbidities will generally require treat-
ment independent of the central issue, the primary symp-
toms of PTSD.
Extinction and Reconsolidation
Effects in the Treatment of PTSD
If PTSD is understood as being, at heart, a group of behaviors
associated with a classically conditioned fear response, then
neural models of learning and forgetting become crucial
components of our understanding. Two specific mechanisms
appear to be most important theoretical models for the treat-
ment of PTSD. These are extinction and reconsolidation.
Extinction
When the memory linkage between a conditioned stimulus
(CS) and a fear-evoking event (unconditioned stimulus
[UCS]) is extinguished, a new memory is created that com-
municates the absence of the feared object and blocks access
to the original memory that signaled the onset of the feared
event. These new memories tend to be context sensitive and
somewhat more fragile than the original memories. Extinction,
therefore, in the classical learning paradigm, refers to the
learning of new information about the changed learning
context as it is now provided by the CS. It does not refer to
the elimination, forgetting, or modification of the memory.
Extinction models in the treatment of PTSD are character-
ized by four specific effects through which the behavior may
be reestablished or through which relapse occurs. As they
appear in the posttreatment or relapse behavior of PTSD
clients, they may be viewed as diagnostic of the fact that
extinction is the specific mechanism underlying the treat-
ment. These effects are spontaneous recovery, contextual
renewal, reinstatement, and rapid reacquisition (Bouton,
2004; Bouton & Moody, 2004; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007;
Hartley & Phelps, 2009; Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Quirk &
Mueller, 2007; Rescorla, 1988; Vervliet, 2008).
Spontaneous recovery refers to the reoccurrence of the
extinguished or unreinforced fear response after the passage
of time. It was first observed by Pavlov and is one of the first
evidences that extinction does not remove the memory. As
noted, extinction involves the creation of a new contextual
association to the effect that, in this context, the CS does not
predict the feared stimulus (the UCS) and, therefore, the fear-
ful response is irrelevant. That new memory of the new con-
tingencies, if unreinforced, is subject to a time-based decay. It
is forgotten over time and the fear reemerges (Bouton, 2004;
Bouton & Moody, 2004; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Massad
& Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla, 1988; Vervliet, 2008).
Contextual renewal refers to the reemergence of the con-
ditioned response in a new circumstance where the extinc-
tion memory was not created. If the client is subjected to
unreinforced (extinction) trials in one context, so that the CS
fails to evoke the feared response in that context, a subse-
quent test of that same CS in another context may show little
or no reduction in expression. Even though the original fear
response may generalize to multiple contexts, extinction
phenomena are much more context dependent. Contextual
renewal is contextually bound; the response is only renewed
in the contexts where the UCS has again appeared (Bouton,
2004; Bouton & Moody, 2004; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007;
Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla, 1988; Vervliet, 2008).
Reinstatement occurs when the fearful stimulus, the UCS,
is presented without the CS. In that context where the origi-
nal UCS is presented, despite the fact that the fearful response
had been fully extinguished, the CS will be restored. It will
not, however, reappear in other contexts where the UCS has
not been presented (Bouton, 2004; Bouton & Moody, 2004;
Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla,
1988; Vervliet, 2008).
Rapid reacquisition, as the name suggests, describes the
reacquisition of the fear memory after it has been success-
fully extinguished. In this case, there is a net savings in the
number of trials needed to reacquire the memory. If, for
example, the original fear association took 10 trials to install,
during postextinction training it may take only 3 trials

Gray and Liotta 7
(Bouton, 2004; Bouton & Moody, 2004; Dillon & Pizzagalli,
2007; Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla, 1988; Vervliet, 2008).
Extinction has traditionally been held to be the tool of
choice for the treatment of PTSD. Foa and her colleagues
have indicated that extinction, in its various forms—from
desensitization through imaginal and in vivo exposure—inter
alia, is the most well-researched and most highly regarded of
treatments and, in combination with cognitive behavioral
interventions or supplements, represents the scientific treat-
ment of choice (Foa et al., 2000; Foa & Meadows, 1997;
Rothbaum et al., 2003; Wessa & Flor, 2007).
Extinction-based exposure treatment is the most common
form of intervention, and one of the only treatments sup-
ported and funded by the federal government. Nevertheless,
one would expect that relapse data from extinction-based
studies will provide the following predictable kinds of
relapse behavior. Because PTSD and trauma-related memo-
ries are resistant to extinction, it is to be expected that extinc-
tion effects would be variable at best. Because the extinction
memory is subject to decay over time, extinction-based treat-
ments may be expected to be characterized by a certain level
of temporal instability. In light of the crucial role played by
the VMPFC in the inhibition of amygdalar function in
extinction training, the decreased function of those circuits
under conditions of extreme stress mitigates the efficacy of
exposure models. For these reasons, without further treat-
ment, extinction measures alone may be only partially effec-
tive (Diamond et al., 2007; Gharakhani et al., 2006; Liberzon
et al., 2007; Wessa & Flor, 2007).
An examination of the exhaustive work of Foa and her
colleagues (Foa et al., 2000; Foa & Meadows, 1997) along
with data from other researchers (Massad & Hulsey, 2006;
McNally, 2007; Wessa & Flor, 2007) reflects that extinction-
based results are inconsistent in their long-term effects.
A review by Shalev and colleagues (1996) finds mixed
results with cognitive behavioral interventions based largely
on extinction practices. Rothbaum and colleagues (2000)
reviewed 19 studies of extinction-based treatments for PTSD
at various levels of sophistication. The studies included
exposure treatments, systematic desensitization, and combi-
nations of treatments including exposure elements. The
results were uneven and ranged from little or no effect on PTSD
symptoms to 85% reductions in symptoms. Unfortunately,
they do not report follow-up studies in a consistent manner
that would allow us to assess whether the treatments contin-
ued to produce positive effects, lost strength, or possibly
increased in effect over time. Measurements were often
reported in terms of percent of change in treatment score,
and when effect sizes were reported they were most often in
comparison to waiting-list controls and relaxation condi-
tions. This suggests only that the treatments were better than
nothing. Practice guidelines for the treatment of PTSD pro-
vided by the APA (Ursano et al., 2004) find similar uneven
results and report that exposure-based treatments and EMDR
(eye movement desensitization and reprocessing) have the
best clinical and research track records. A meta-analysis by
Bisson and colleagues (2007) evaluated comparative
treatments but provided little useful information for our
purposes.
Pitman et al. (1996) reviewed several cases of Vietnam
Veterans who were subjected to multiple sessions of imagi-
nal flooding. An average improvement between pre- and
post-measures of intrusion and avoidance at 26% reduced
to 14% in posttreatment follow-up. These findings were con-
sistent with other comparisons between combat and non-
combat treated trauma victims, including clients from the
Israeli “Koach” program where similar problems were
encountered. In their final analysis, the authors determined
that the extent of emotional processing was unrelated to the
efficacy of treatment measured in terms of the decrease of
intrusive symptoms.
Reconsolidation
During the early 21st century, reconsolidation came to the
forefront of memory research when it was illustrated that
propranolol, a noradrenalin inhibitor, when injected directly
into the amygdalar tissue of rats, was capable of modifying
or erasing the trace of traumatic memories. Other studies
found that the introduction of anisomysin into the basolat-
eral amygdala had similar results. Further chemical studies
revealed that the crucial element, further upstream, was the
inhibition of glutamate production and release, which pre-
vents the reconsolidation of the activated memory (Cao et al.,
2008; Jacek, Ecedil, & LeDoux, 2006; Riccio, Millin, &
Bogart, 2006; Tronson & Taylor, 2007).
This research revived a long-standing debate into the
nature of long-term memory. Whereas classical extinction,
as noted previously, held that new memories blocked access
to permanent associations between conditioned stimuli and
responses in long-term memory stores, reconsolidation the-
ory held that the process of long-term memory consolidation
took place over time and that each access to the memory
rendered the association labile, subject to change. The
research has also differentiated reconsolidation from extinc-
tion; reconsolidation, it was emphasized, is not facilitated
extinction (Akirav & Maroun, 2006; Alberini, 2005; Cao
et al., 2008; Debiec, Doyre, Nader, & LeDoux, 2006;
Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Forcato, Pedreira, & Maldonado,
2009; Gharakhani et al., 2006; Lee, Milton, & Everitt, 2006;
Milekic & Alberini, 2002; Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000;
Riccio et al., 2006; Tronel, Milekic, & Alberini, 2005).
Insofar as the reactivated memory associations were
always reinforced with the same or similar data, in the same
or a similar context (including subjective contexts) over
time, the memory grew less and less susceptible to change.
If, however, when the memory was reactivated, the organism
encountered new information, the actual content of the mem-
ory may be modified or even erased. Here is a clear mecha-
nism for understanding the variability of long-term memory

8 Traumatology 18(2)
as examined by Elizabeth Loftus and others (Loftus &
Yuille, 1984). Lee (2009) has characterized reconsolidation
as a mechanism for maintaining the relevance of learned
associations (see also Alberini, 2005; Hupbach, Hardt,
Gomez, & Nadel, 2008; Labar, 2007; Tronel et al., 2005).
Just as extinction procedures have distinctive characteris-
tics, so, reconsolidation mechanisms can also have their signa-
ture aspects. These include diminution or complete elimination
of the target memory, resistance to spontaneous recovery, lack
of net gain in reacquisition learning, and lack of contextual
renewal.
The root material regarding reconsolidation is a body of
studies of the blockade or enhancement of cellular processes
related to glutamate activity in various areas of the brain. In
general, in the activation of a presumably permanent, non–
hippocampus-dependent memory (Eichenbaum, 2006), infu-
sions of protein inhibitors administered before memory
activation tended to erase or decrease the intensity of the
memory, whereas infusions of chemicals that support protein
synthesis, enhanced or stabilized the memory. Crucially, the
memory must be activated by a brief exposure to a first-order
cue. The effects are time dependent and only occur within a
specific window of opportunity after the memory is acti-
vated. These changes typically do not appear in short-term
memory but in measures of long-term memory. The effects
may thus be seen to increase over time (Akirav & Maroun,
2006; Alberini, 2005; Debiec, LeDoux, & Nader, 2002;
Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Forcato et al., 2007; Kaang, Lee, &
Kim, 2009; Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009; Nader et al.,
2000; Riccio et al., 2006).
Memories so treated tend to be permanently removed or
permanently modified. If they are subject to spontaneous
recovery, they reappear in the modified form (Loftus &
Yuille, 1984). If they have been erased or replaced they can-
not be revived without retraining de novo (Cao et al., 2008;
Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Forcato et al., 2007, 2009; Kindt
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2006). There is also some evidence to
suggest that, unlike extinction, reconsolidation may not
apply to instrumental conditioning and pure place condition-
ing. The same evidence may be understood as pointing to
differences in reconsolidation windows for different kinds of
memories or sensitivity to different levels of pretraining for
different kinds of memories (Lee, 2009).
Reacquisition in extinction typically shows enhanced
efficiency of relearning; that is, it takes fewer trials to rees-
tablish the subject behavior. In memories that have been
modified using reconsolidation-based procedures, there is no
net gain in relearning; when relearned, they are learned as if
they were totally new behaviors (Cao et al., 2008; Duvarci &
Nader, 2004; Kindt et al., 2009).
Contextual renewal does not occur. This means that even
when the unconditioned fear stimulus is presented in a novel
context, the learned fear response does not reappear. This is
not enhanced extinction (Duvarci & Nader, 2004).
Procedurally, reconsolidation and extinction are initiated
using distinct protocols. The crucial difference appears to be
that a single, short presentation of the CS reactivates and
labilizes the memory and longer presentations and multiple
presentations activate the extinction memory. When protein
synthesis inhibitors or other chemical agents are used, they
must be administered before the reactivation trial to affect
either process. Where experiential effects are used as amnes-
tic agents—essentially modifying, overwriting, or eliminat-
ing the target memory—their efficacy is in part determined
by their temporal proximity to the eliciting stimulus (Lee,
2009; Pedreira, Perez-Cuesta, & Maldonado, 2004).
In human studies of the phenomenon, it has been found
that reconsolidation can be used to eliminate or modify the
emotional component of a traumatic memory while leaving
the declarative elements intact. It has also been shown that
reconsolidation processes have a direct effect on first-order
memory but not on associative chains based on that original
experience (Kindt et al., 2009).
Shiller et al. (2010) have illustrated the efficacy of recon-
solidation in the modification of conditioned fear memories
in humans. In this study, massed extinction trials during a
reconsolidation window created reductions in autonomic
responses that were not subject to spontaneous recovery or
reinstatement. Those effects persisted after 1 full year.
Reconsolidation and the Visual-
Kinesthetic Dissociation Protocol
Reconsolidation effects have been suggested as a powerful
method for the treatment of PTSD. Although historically the
mechanism has been associated with the nonpharmacologi-
cal creation of retroactive amnesia, there has been little work
that explicitly links this material to treatments for PTSD.
Despite other explanations, the authors believe that a little
known intervention originally described by Richard Bandler
(1985) makes specific use of reconsolidation mechanisms
and deserves serious reconsideration (Forcato et al., 2007;
Labar, 2007; Riccio et al., 2006).
The technique, visual-kinesthetic dissociation (V/KD), is
supported by anecdotal reports by practitioners that cover
nearly a quarter century. Consistent with the pattern of mem-
ory reconsolidation, the intervention includes minimal evo-
cation of the problem response along with multiple overlays
of new associations that, in essence, rewrite the memory. As
in previously reported reconsolidation studies, the traumatic
event either becomes inaccessible, significantly modified, or
subject to nontraumatic declarative access (Alberini, 2005;
Hupbach et al., 2008; Labar, 2007; Tronel et al., 2005).
Among the anecdotal reports are those provided by
Richard Bandler, Steve and Connierae Andreas, Robert
Dilts, and William McDowell who severally relate that each
of them has treated thousands of persons suffering from
PTSD and phobic conditions with immediate, lasting results

Gray and Liotta 9
from this short-term intervention. In many cases, they report
complete symptom alleviation after long-term follow-up
(Andreas & Andreas, 1989; Bandler, 1985; Dilts & Delozier,
2000; McDowell & McDowell, n.d.).
The procedure was originated by Richard Bandler and
first appeared in his work, Using Your Brain for a Change
(1985). An expanded version of the procedure appeared in
Andreas’ description, in their work, Heart of the Mind
(Andreas & Andreas, 1989). Dilts and Delozier (2000) pro-
vided a slightly different version of the protocol in their The
Encyclopedia of Systemic Neuro-linguistic Programming.
The technique has since been popularized in the United
Kingdom as the rewind technique (Guy & Guy, 2003; Muss,
1991, 2002). A fully manualized and standardized version of
the protocol, renamed Reconsolidation of Traumatic Memory
(RTM) is now the subject of pilot studies at the Brain
Resource Center in New York (F. Bourke, personal commu-
nication, November 25, 2011).
In early studies, the roots of the technique were traced to
the work of Erica Fromm and her use of hypnosis for the
control of pain and anxiety. In light, however, of Bandler and
Grinder’s extensive studies of the work of Milton Erickson
and their participation in his classes and with his students, it
would seem more likely that the technique has its roots in
Erickson’s well-documented use of dissociative techniques
(Bandler, 1985; Bandler & Grinder, 1975b, 1979; Dietrich,
2000; Dietrich et al., 2000; Erickson, 1964/1980a, 1964/198 0b;
Fromm, 1965; Koziey & McLeod, 1987).
Psychological investigations of the technique are limited
to three scientific studies, two reviews, and several mentions
in the literature. Figley reviews the technique and provides a
case study. Each of the referenced studies recommends the
technique as a valuable tool for treating PTSD and makes
suggestions for further research (Carbonell & Figley, 1999;
Dietrich et al., 2000; Figley, 2002; Hossack & Bentall, 1996;
Koziey & McLeod, 1987; Muss, 1991, 2002). There is also
one non–peer-reviewed study that is reported online (Guy &
Guy, 2003).
Koziey and McCleod, writing in 1987, reported their
experiences in treating two rape victims with a mixed tech-
nique employing Bandler’s three-place dissociation in com-
bination with hypnotic trance. An initial pretreatment session
was used to review the technique and to complete an assess-
ment package. In a second session, the authors used hypnotic
trance to provide a resource state to ensure that the traumatic
memories would not become overwhelming. One week later,
in a second treatment session, the clients completed another
set of evaluations, were hypnotized, and then led through the
three-part dissociation. In particular, they were led through
an imagined, dissociated review of the trauma in which they
watched themselves watching themselves viewing a movie
of the trauma. The movie began with a still image of the cli-
ent in a safe time before the traumatic event, projected on an
imaginary screen. The experience ended with a safe place
after the trauma, with each of the clients merging her own
dissociated identities with her imagined selves on the screen
and sharing the learnings from her experience. Unspecified
measures of 28 dependent variables showed significant
changes in pre-post comparisons with near-total abatement
of symptoms in one client.
Muss (1991, 2002) reports having used the technique first
with 19 police officers who met the DSM-III diagnostic cri-
teria for PTSD and later with all types of traumatized per-
sons (Muss, 2002). In nearly all of the 19 police cases, he
reports remission of symptoms. He provides no control con-
ditions and few details of the study; however, in long-term
follow-ups (3 months to 3 years), for 15 of the 19 cases, he
reports a complete absence of intrusive imagery. Crucially,
as noted by Andreas and Andreas, he indicates that the tech-
nique is appropriate to clients whose primary symptoms are
experienced as intense, suddenly arising experiences of the
trauma symptoms usually experienced as flashbacks or panic
reactions (Andreas, 2008, Personal communication).
A third study, by Hossack and Bental (1996), included five
clients who were treated with a combination of guided visual-
izations, Jacobsen’s deep muscle relaxation, and two sessions
of the V/KD protocol. Although one of the five clients was
unable to complete the visualizations associated with the
V/KD procedure, the other four who completed such visual-
izations all reported significant reduction of intrusive images
and were able to return to normal life activities.
Guy and Guy report that the technique, renamed by Muss
(1991, 2002) as the rewind technique, was applied to 30 peo-
ple between 2000 and 2002. All were diagnosed with PTSD
or partial PTSD. Participants were interviewed 10 days post-
treatment. Guy and Guy report that 40% of the clients treated
by them adjudged their improvement as extremely success-
ful, 53% adjudged their treatment as successful, and 7% as
acceptable. None rated the treatment either as poor or as a
failure (Guy & Guy, 2003).
The following description of the basic protocol depends
on extensive personal communications with Andeas, Dilts,
and Hallbom and continued reference to their descriptions of
the protocol in several written sources (Andreas & Andreas,
1989; Bandler, 1985; Dilts & Delozier, 2000). A detailed
protocol is available from the author.
The Visual-Kinesthetic Dissociation
It is important to understand that Andreas emphasizes that this
technique is only effective when the client’s difficulties are
essentially a phobic, instantaneous, conditioned response to
stimuli related to a traumatic event. In general, the symptoms
will focus on flashbacks and other immediate panic responses
to stimuli associated with the traumatic event. In terms of clas-
sical PTSD symptomatology, this is associated with simple
PTSD. Although it may be effective in complex cases, its effi-
cacy will be limited to the intrusive and avoidant symptoms.

10 Traumatology 18(2)
The technique begins by establishing rapport and framing
the intervention as a short visualization process. The process
is usually comfortable for clients, but it does sometimes
induce a very short period of moderate discomfort. This
stage may include practice behaviors, including the running
of an innocuous, unrelated experience backwards in subjec-
tive experience.
Insofar as the technique may be pursued content free, the
clinician should decide whether to proceed with or without
content. After framing, the problem state is briefly accessed
by questioning and probing until the client responds physio-
logically. Access to the problem state is typically marked by
physiological and paralinguistic elements that reflect height-
ened arousal and fast onset of the physiological and paralin-
guistic symptoms of fear or trauma. These may include
changes in breathing, heart rate, skin tone and color, vocal
pitch, and speech rate.
As soon as the state is identified, the client’s attention
should be moved from the problem state and reoriented to
the present context.
The actual three-part dissociation begins with asking the
client to imagine that he or she is seated in a movie theater.
On the screen is a still image of the client performing some
neutral activity in a safe context, at a time before the trauma
occurred. The picture on the screen represents one level of
dissociation, whereas watching the picture constitutes a sec-
ond level of dissociation. Having established these initial
dissociative experiences, the client is asked to dissociate
from the image of him or herself sitting in the theater by
imagining him or herself floating away from their body in
the theater to a projection booth behind a Plexiglas barrier.
From this vantage point, they are instructed to watch them-
selves in the theater, watching themselves on the screen.
At this point, an anchor or conditioned association is
made between a specific touch stimulus and the current dis-
sociated experience. This is intended to reinforce the experi-
ence of dissociation from the image on the screen. This may
also be used to evoke or enhance dissociation during later
parts of the protocol.
After taking care to create a dissociated context and a CS
that can evoke and reinforce that context, the client is
instructed to observe a black and white picture of him or
herself on the screen of the movie theater, at a time before
anything ever happened. As the client focuses on the imag-
ined picture, he or she is directed to watch him or herself in
the theater as he or she watches a black and white movie of
the triggering event or the root trauma. The client is to con-
tinue to watch the observer in the theater, seeing him or her-
self going through it, all the way to a point past the end of it,
where he or she can see that he or she survived and is safe
once again. The client is further instructed that upon reach-
ing the end of the movie, he or she should stop the movie as
a still, black and white image of a safe time after the trauma
has passed. After the signal to the clinician that all is well,
the protocol is to either proceed to the next step or to repeat
the previous step until the viewing of black and white, dis-
sociated movie can be completed comfortably.
Beginning with the safe, black and white representation
of him or herself that is on the screen at the end of the dis-
sociated rehearsal, the client is now instructed to imagine
stepping into the movie and experiencing the entire sequence,
fully associated, in color, in reverse, and at very high speed
(in 2 seconds or less). This step may take several repetitions
unless it has been practiced during the framing. If the client
reports that the reversed rehearsal has gone well, he or she
may be debriefed and a determination made whether further
iterations are necessary.
To determine whether the procedure has had the desired
effect, every effort is now made to evoke the problem state
using the same questions and probes that evoked the problem
state at the beginning of the procedure. Special attention
should be given to those questions that were associated with
a clear physiological reaction.
Consistent with practices suggested by Foa and Kozak
(1986), each sensory system should be probed for possible
triggers for the problem behaviors. If there is no reaction, the
intervention is presumed to have worked. When the practi-
tioner is satisfied that he or she cannot evoke the PTSD
response, the basic intervention is complete.
Some practitioners suggest the addition of a third level of
novel experience that includes a reliving of the traumatic
event in which they are either protected from harm, only act-
ing as if they were a stunt double in a movie of the event, or
they missed the crucial trauma altogether. This level is espe-
cially recommended in the case where physical injury was
part of the traumatic event.
Mechanism. Each of the authors noted above attempts to
explain the mechanism of the intervention by various means,
including changes in the perceptual structure of memory
(McDowell & McDowell, n.d.), changes in the integration
of memory mediated by modulation of arousal (Dietrich,
2000), and dissociation from any traumatic sequelae (Dietrich
et al., 2000).
Having reviewed the literature on PTSD, extinction, and
reconsolidation, the authors believe that the mechanism of
the V/KD intervention is most parsimoniously explained in
terms of memory restructuring through the mechanism of
reconsolidation.
In accordance with previously outlined studies of the phe-
nomenon, the technique begins with a short-term activation
of the traumatic experience. Insofar as the experience is
marked by significant changes in physiology, it meets Foa
and Kozak’s suggestion that an appropriate intervention be
rooted in a full activation of the event. Here, full activation
does not imply flooding, only sufficient activation of the
core memory to render it labile. Nevertheless, to prevent the
shutdown of the cognitive capacities detailed by Diamond
et al. (2007) the client is distracted from the trauma and his
consciousness returned to the present context, as quickly as
possible. This not only prevents retraumatization but also

Gray and Liotta 11
limits the activation of the memory to a temporal window
that is appropriate to reconsolidation but too brief to support
extinction (Akirav & Maroun, 2006; Alberini, 2005; Foa &
Kozak, 1986; Hupbach et al., 2008; LeBar & Phelps, 1998;
Riccio et al., 2006).
This foreshortening of exposure may be crucial to the ini-
tiation of memory labilization that allows for reconsolidative
memory modification. According to Pedreira et al. (2004),
neither reconsolidation nor extinction is possible without the
termination of the CS—the fear-evoking stimulus context.
According to their research, a stimulus offset is required to
effect significant change. Both processes require the termi-
nation of the fear context before new learning can occur.
Having awakened the traumatic memory, it now becomes
subject to reinforcement or modification depending on the
immediate stimulus context. Remembering that the memory
is still active in the background, through its intentional reviv-
ification and its presence in the semantic context, the V/KD
model now provides several experiences of dissociation: the
dissociative anchor, the dissociated safe representation on
the imagined movie screen, and the client’s floating out of
the body to view the viewer who is sitting in the theater
watching the screen. Insofar as the memory is dissociated
and is not actively reinforcing the fear response, its novel
stimulus properties may preferentially support memory updat-
ing through reconsolidation rather than extinction (Pedreira
et al., 2004).
At this point, the first of several layers of active interven-
tion in the structure of the traumatic memory begins. The
dissociated black and white movie provides a multileveled
opportunity for reshaping the memory context. First, it is tri-
ply dissociated (Dietrich, 2000; Hossack & Bentall, 1996;
Koziey & McLeod, 1987; Muss, 2002). Second, insofar as it
is a voluntary reexperience of the trauma, the context is
restructured as voluntary rather than involuntary. This is
what various authors have described as prescribing the
symptom. It is also a direct remedy for the loss of control
described by Foa as a significant contributor to PTSD symp-
tomatology (Bandler & Grinder, 1979; Erickson & Rossi,
1980; Foa & Meadows, 1997; Haley, 1973). In this context,
the novelty of symptom prescription may enhance the recon-
solidation response as noted by Pedreira and colleagues and
also by Lee. These authors indicate that unexpected stimulus
properties support reconsolidative updating of memory con-
tent (Lee, 2009; Pedreira et al., 2004). Third, because the
movie is viewed in black and white, its emotional impact is
further vitiated (Bandler, 1985; Bandler & MacDonald,
1987; Kringelbach, 2005). In theory, all of these elements
are incorporated into the structure of the original memory.
Once the client has successfully completed the dissoci-
ated review, another layer of new meanings is added to the
memory through the reverse, associated rewind of the mem-
ory. At this point, attempts have been made to recall the
affect associated with the traumatic event and, by now, it
should already be difficult. This rewind phase constitutes a
significant restructuring of the memory. The associated
reversal of the experience leaves the client with a subjective
memory of the problem, “undoing itself.” This is performed
quickly. The speed takes advantage of the narrow window of
memory lability and the heightened salience accorded to
fast-moving, multisensory stimuli. Bandler suggested that
the reversal of memory sequence was a valuable tool for
undoing decisions, preconceived notions, and other artifacts
of temporal experience (Bandler, 1985; Simons, Detenber,
Reiss, & Shults, 2000).
As with many of the elements of this intervention, novelty
may be a significant element in its efficacy. It has already
been noted how the unexpected features of the intervention
may support the reconsolidation mechanism. The complex-
ity of this part of the intervention may also support further
modification of the experience through simple cognitive
overload. Given the limited capacity of short-term memory,
the simple act of learning and executing the reverse rehearsal
may not leave sufficient capacity in short-term memory to
access the fear response (Miller, 1956; Pedreira et al., 2004).
After completing the multisensory, high-speed, reversed,
imaginal exposure, the client is again debriefed and every
effort is made to reaccess the trauma response. If the inter-
vention has been successful, the client may retain declarative
access to the event, but without the strong negative affect
that characterizes the symptoms of PTSD (Andreas &
Andreas, 1989; Bandler, 1993; Dilts & Delozier, 2000; Kindt
et al., 2009; Muss, 1991).
In those cases where an imagined restructuring of the
original event is performed, the mechanism may be as sim-
ple as layering in another set of experiences that are incom-
patible with the trauma. Moreover, the addition of modified
memories reflects one of the standard reappraisal methods of
cognitive regulation strategies. Such interventions are known
to increase activity in the VMPFC, which exercises a modula-
tory influence on the amygdala. Insofar as the emotional impact
of the traumatizing memory has already been significantly
modified, the new version of the traumatic event may serve
to provide a coherent narrative for the now-nontraumatizing
memory (Diamond et al., 2007; Hartley & Phelps, 2009;
Williams et al., 2006).
Case Study
A recent case study provided by William A. McDowell,
PhD, professor emeritus and chair of counseling, Marshall
University, Huntington, West Virginia (William McDowall,
personal communication, July 9, 2010) involved a 30-year-
old veteran of the Iraq war. The Veterans Administration
(VA) had diagnosed him with PTSD, and he reported to the
NLP therapist after 1.5 years of standard treatment from the
VA, including individual and group psychotherapy, with no
abatement of symptoms. At the time that he came to the
NLP-trained therapist, he was reporting the following symp-
toms: flashbacks, nightmares, high anxiety while driving

12 Traumatology 18(2)
(e.g., unable to let others drive him; getting panicked by
large trucks moving near his vehicle, often forcing him to
pull off the road). He also reported a fear of crowds and
enclosed spaces (restaurants, classrooms) where he had to be
near an exit with a clear view of the entire space. He also
reported some anger problems at home and an inability to
have the doors unlocked. Although the client felt his family
problems were minimal, his wife reported that the family
was experiencing severe difficulties.
The client was seen for three 1-hour videotaped sessions,
with a 3-day break between the sessions. Pre- and post-tests
using the PTSD Checklist—Civilian Version (PCL;
Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993, 1994) were
completed before treatment, at the beginning of the second
treatment session, after the third session, and 30 days post-
treatment. Pretreatment scores on the PCL were about 90%.
After the first treatment session, the scores were reduced to
30%. All symptoms disappeared after the third treatment. At
30 days posttreatment, the symptom scores were still zero
and no symptoms were reported by the client.
After the second session, the client reported no more
nightmares and abatement of all symptoms by the end of
treatment. To behaviorally evaluate the client’s posttreat-
ment improvement, after the last session he was driven to a
crowded, noisy McDonalds restaurant and ate with his back
to the door. He reported having no anxiety with someone
else driving him and was able to eat without being concerned
for the exits. A video record of the excursion validates his
visible physiological responses and demeanor.
He and his wife were interviewed together at the last ses-
sion and in a 1-month follow-up. At the 1-month follow-up,
he reported being able to allow his wife to drive and experi-
enced no anxiety while driving near large trucks. He also
reported being anxiety free while in crowded places.
For independent verification, the client’s family was
asked to substantiate his recovery. His wife reported in a
3-month posttreatment clinical interview that her husband no
longer checked the locks in the house more than once, was
able to let her drive, and no longer demonstrated the high
anxiety and anger at home that he had before treatment. In
her words, “I feel like I have my husband like he was before
he left for Iraq.”
Discussion
PTSD is a problem that is currently affecting as many as 13%
to 17% of returning Iraqi veterans and 10% to 11% of those
returning from Afghanistan. Reports indicate that up to 40%
of these returning veterans affected with PTSD remain
untreated. Aside from cultural issues that discourage mental
health treatment, the long-term commitments required by
standard treatment modalities and inconsistent results do lit-
tle to change motivation to obtain treatment (Gradus, 2010;
Hoge et al., 2004).
The V/KD model is supported by 25 years or more of
anecdotal reports covering thousands of clients. The interven-
tion does not retraumatize the client and can be completed in
a short duration—about 45 minutes. Although the V/KD
model was assessed only in 3 peer-reviewed evaluations in
the past 25 years, each of these 3 evaluations deemed it wor-
thy of further investigation. One scholar-practitioner, Muss,
has continued using the V/KD technique, and through his
efforts it is now a recognized treatment for PTSD in the
United Kingdom (Carbonell & Figley, 1999; Dietrich, 2000;
Koziey & McLeod, 1987; McDowell & McDowell, n.d.;
Muss, 1991, 2002).
Until recently, the possible mechanism of action for this
highly innovative treatment was difficult to specify and was
often described in terms of brain lateralization, changes in
perspective, and other nonoperationalizable constructs.
Here, an argument for a mechanism based on the emerging
evidence for memory reconsolidation has been presented
that is congruent with the structural elements of the interven-
tion and predicts similar results (Dietrich, 2000; Hossack &
Bentall, 1996; Koziey & McLeod, 1987; McDowell &
McDowell, n.d.).
As noted previously, reconsolidation protocols depend on
a brief reactivation of the traumatic memory followed, after
stimulus cessation, by an intervening amnestic or confound-
ing event. In the V/KD protocol, the memory is briefly acti-
vated and several layers of dissociative experience and
confounding imaginal memories are introduced during the
(presumed) labile period. For experiences subjected to
amnestic reconsolidation, insofar as a sufficiently intense
memory is introduced during the labile phase of reconsolida-
tion, the memory may be disrupted, erased, or modified.
After the V/KD process, the original memory becomes either
inaccessible, innocuous, or is transformed into a similar but
nonthreatening memory. Human studies of the reconsolida-
tion phenomenon have found that although the affective
dimensions of previously negative memories are gone, the
events remain accessible on a declarative level. Similarly,
clients who have undergone treatment with the V/KD proto-
col retain declarative and episodic access to the stimulus
event but without the traumatic affect (Andreas & Andreas,
1989; Bandler, 1985; Dilts & Delozier, 2000; Kindt et al.,
2009; Lee, 2009; Lee et al., 2006; Riccio et al., 2006).
This analysis leads to several falsifiable predictions and
diagnostic indicators of the underlying mechanism in PTSD
treatments. Because the mechanism outlined here depends
on the known process of reconsolidation, interventions for
PTSD may be behaviorally evaluated in terms of their results
to determine whether extinction or reconsolidation is oper-
ative. Where extinction mechanisms have been invoked,
spontaneous recovery, contextual renewal, reinstatement,
and rapid reacquisition will characterize the posttreatment
period and further treatment will be necessary to deal with
the intrusive elements of the disorder (Bouton, 2004; Bouton

Gray and Liotta 13
& Moody, 2004; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Massad &
Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla, 1988; Vervliet, 2008). Where recon-
solidative mechanisms have been appropriately marshaled,
the memories will be transformed, inaccessible, and, even if
accessible, to declarative and episodic recall, they will have
been rendered nontraumatizing. They will not be subject to
spontaneous recovery, contextual renewal, reinstatement,
and rapid reacquisition (Cao et al., 2008; Duvarci & Nader,
2004; Forcato et al., 2007, 2009; Kindt et al., 2009; Lee
et al., 2006). These results may also be used as diagnostics
for the evaluation of a mechanism where technique and results
are variable and may further lead to the refinement of
results based on the length and intensity of CS presentation
and the timing of introduction of confounding or amnestic
stimulus (Lee, 2009; Pedreira et al., 2004). Finally, these
observations may lead to new interventions based on recon-
solidative mechanisms.
Future research into this technique should look toward
large-scale trials of the protocol in the treatment of PTSD.
The international troops returning from service in various
theaters of war could provide a significant test population for
this already established and relatively unknown treatment.
There remain hundreds of thousands of war victims, refu-
gees from earthquakes, and tsunami victims who would pro-
vide a large pool of clients.
Follow-up studies and surveys to take advantage of the
now-anecdotal evidence compiled by NLP practitioners
would also be instructive. Such follow-up studies could pro-
vide crucial long-term reports of the incidence of posttreat-
ment relapse that would be capable of falsifying the proposal
that the technique is rooted in reconsolidation rather than
extinction.
Further research might also investigate the construction
of even shorter interventions that depend on reconsolidation.
For instance, just as the current technique relies in part on a
conditioned resource to amplify dissociation, it may be pos-
sible to create an even more efficient restructuring of mem-
ory or an event using a powerful, positive resource state as a
conditioned response whose introduction during the labile
period would create a memory transformation or erasure.
The current explanation invites further exploration of the
mechanism of reconsolidation to other interventions that
have been, up to now, poorly understood.
Directions for Future Research
Thus far, the article has discussed a theoretical mechanism
for the V/KD protocol to be used in the treatment of PTSD
and has made specific predictions with regard to its efficacy
and how the proposed mechanism, that is, reconsolidation,
may be differentiated from protocols that invoke extinction.
It was predicted that clients treated with the V/KD protocol
would not be subject to spontaneous recovery, contextual
renewal, reinstatement, and rapid reacquisition—all hallmarks
of extinction (Bouton, 2004; Bouton & Moody, 2004; Dillon
& Pizzagalli, 2007; Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Rescorla,
1988; Vervliet, 2008). To the contrary, in clients treated
with the V/KD protocol the previously traumatizing and
intrusive memories will be transformed, often inaccessible,
and, where accessible, to declarative and episodic recall,
they will have been rendered nontraumatizing. The clients
will not be subject to spontaneous recovery, contextual
renewal, reinstatement, and rapid reacquisition (Cao et al.,
2008; Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Forcato et al., 2007, 2009;
Kindt et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2006).
These results should be measurable using repeated appli-
cations of a standard PTSD symptom inventory such as the
PCL-M (PTSD Checklist—Military). The authors predict
consistently reduced or continuously reducing scores for the
intrusion and avoidance measures of the scales for clients
treated with the V/KD protocol and variable or increasing
scores for the extinction-based treatments (Weathers et al.,
1993, 1994). Increasing scores would indicate the presence
of the various kinds of mechanisms that are associated with
extinction: spontaneous recovery, contextual renewal, rein-
statement, and rapid reacquisition. Continued reduction of
symptoms and/or symptom intensity would indicate the
action of reconsolidation.
To test this prediction a pilot study should be conducted
using a large sample of recent veterans of the Iraqi or
Afghanistani wars who have been diagnosed with PTSD that
is primarily characterized by intrusive and avoidant symp-
toms. A standard diagnostic instrument with well-established
validity may be used on all clients, in order to exclude those
with significant comorbidities and for whom the intrusive
and avoidant symptoms are not a primary issue. Exclusion
criteria would eliminate veterans who suffer from severe
cases of comorbidity (severe, long-standing alcohol and drug
addictions, preexisting personality disorders, psychoses, or
any of these secondary to PTSD symptoms). It should be
remembered that the V/KD protocol is specifically targeted
at the reliving and phobic elements of PTSD and is not indic-
ative of those characterized by Brewin and colleagues (1996)
as secondary emotions and comorbidities such as alcohol-
ism, drug addictions, and family dysfunctions.
After prescreening, clients would be randomly assigned
to treatment groups using either the V/KD or an extinction-
based protocol. In general, the evaluation should follow the
gold standards for evaluation research as reported by Foa
and Meadows (1997).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.

14 Traumatology 18(2)
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