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Social Psychological and Personality Science
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The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/1948550611433470
2012 3: 639 originally published online 17 January 2012Social Psychological and Personality Science Kurt Gray
Taste
The Power of Good Intentions : Perceived Benevolence Soothes Pain, Increases Pleasure, and Improves
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The Power of Good Intentions: Perceived
Benevolence Soothes Pain, Increases
Pleasure, and Improves Taste
Kurt Gray
1
Abstract
The experience of physical stimuli would seem to depend primarily on their physical characteristics—chocolate tastes good,
getting slapped hurts, and snuggling is pleasurable. This research examined, however, whether physical experience is influenced by
the interpersonal context in which stimuli occur. Specifically, three studies examined whether perceiving benevolent intentions
behind stimuli can improve their experience. Experiment 1 tested whether benevolently intended shocks hurt less, Experiment 2
tested whether benevolently intended massages were more pleasurable, and Experiment 3 tested whether benevolently intended
candy tastes sweeter. The results confirm that good intentions—even misguided ones—can sooth pain, increase pleasure, and
make things taste better. More broadly, these studies suggest that basic physical experience depends upon how we perceive the
minds of others.
Keywords
mind perception, phenomenology, morality, dyadic, agent, patient, cruelty, kindness
Why do grandma-baked cookies taste so much better than
store-bought cookies? The obvious explanation for this effect
is just memory—the warm glow that suffuses recollections of
childhood makes everything back then seem better. Another
possibility is that grandma’s kindness actually affected the
taste of the cookies; perhaps knowing that something was
benevolently intended changes how it is physically experi-
enced. This article explores whether benevolent intentions
can influence—and improve—the experience of physical sti-
muli in general, including electric shock, electric massages,
and the taste of treats.
Social Context and Experience
The intentions of others can clearly influence the experience of
complex social stimuli. In modern art, for instance, the inten-
tions of an artist can turn a urinal into a million-dollar collect-
able (Goodman, 1968; Preissler & Bloom, 2008). In
conversation, the intentions of the speaker can turn an appar-
ently cruel remark into a harmless inside joke (Clark, 1996).
Indeed, the meaning of social acts in general seems to hinge
on the intentions of others (Searle, 1995). Is someone smiling
at us in the spirit of friendship, or in the spirit of stealing our
spouse? Yet, as we move from complex social stimuli to basic
physical stimuli, others’ intention would seem to matter less;
social acts might be harmful or beneficial depending on con-
text, but the meaning of physical stimuli are less ambiguous.
A smile may be good or bad, but a tasty sweet is good, and a
slap in the face is bad.
Despite the unambiguous meaning of physical events, psy-
chological research has revealed that negative intentions can
increase the experience of pain; malicious electric shocks hurt
more than accidental shocks (Gray & Wegner, 2008). This
finding raises many questions, however, namely whether inten-
tions impact experiences beyond pain (generalizability), and
whether physical experience is also sensitive to positive inten-
tions (flexibility).
Pleasure, Taste, and Generalizability
Psychology has long focused on the negative aspects of life, on
pain and cruelty, but everyday life is also filled with good
things, with pleasure and benevolence. Despite the rise of pos-
itive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), and
recent interest in how pleasure works (Bloom, 2010) the factors
underlying pleasure are still poorly understood. Could the inter-
personal context (i.e., perceived intention) influence the expe-
rience of pleasurable stimuli? One study suggests that the
1
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
Corresponding Author:
Kurt Gray, 3123 G Biology-Psychology Bldg. University of Maryland College
Park, MD 20742, USA
Email: kurtgray@umd.edu
Social Psychological and
Personality Science
3(5) 639-645
ªThe Author(s) 2012
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contents of the experiencer’s mind can influence
pleasure—people enjoy wine more when they think it is expen-
sive (Plassmann, O’Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008)—but the
question is whether the supposed contents of another person’s
mind changes experience. It is similarly unknown whether per-
ceived intention can influence taste. Past research finds that
taste is affected by a variety physical factors ranging from hun-
ger to morphine (Drewnowski, 1997), and that the acquisition
of new tastes are sensitive to cultural learning (Harris, 2008),
but could perceived intention affect our experience of some-
thing we already know to be tasty?
Benevolence and Flexibility
It is undeniable that cruelty has power: malicious social exclu-
sion (Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008; Eisenberger,
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), sexism (Swim & Cohen,
1997), and racism (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma,
2003) are all more emotionally injurious than their uninten-
tional counterparts. There is little evidence, however, that
benevolence matters in the same way as cruelty to social
events, let alone to physical events. Volumes of studies doc-
ument the relative psychological power of bad over good
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Taylor,
1991), suggesting that just because malice increases pain,
benevolence need not necessarily decrease it. People are also
typically seen to be kind by default so benevolence is less sali-
ent than malice, likely further undermining its power to influ-
ence experience (Phillips & Knobe, 2009; Pizarro, Uhlmann,
& Salovey, 2003; Ybarra, 2002).
In the case of harms, benevolently intended harms are
more likely to be repeated—‘‘I thought you liked it when I
slapped your back, that’s why I always did it’’—and the
potential for repetition increases the painfulness of stimuli
(Arntz & Claassens, 2004; Beecher, 1956). In the case of
pleasurable stimuli, research finds that the thought behind
social stimuli (e.g., gifts) matters only when it is initially dis-
liked (Zhang & Epley, 2010), suggesting that intrinsically
enjoyable stimuli should not be affected by benevolence. In
the case of taste, if people are at all sensitive to interpersonal
context, it would seem to make evolutionary sense to be sen-
sitive to bad (i.e., being poisoned) but not good (Rozin &
Royzman, 2001).
The Present Research
Despite the apparent weight of evidence suggesting the weak-
ness of benevolence, three experiments examined whether
good intentions could influence—and improve—the experi-
ence of physical stimuli, including electric shocks (Experiment
1), massages (Experiment 2), and candy (Experiment 3). If ben-
evolence does improve physical experience, it would not only
demonstrate the exceptional power of interpersonal context to
influence subjective experience, but would also be a vindica-
tion for the power of good.
Experiment 1: Benevolent Electric Shocks
In this experiment, participants received a number of electric
shocks perceived to be administered maliciously, unintention-
ally or benevolently. It was predicted that, relative to uninten-
tional shocks, maliciously intended shocks would hurt more,
but benevolently intended shocks would hurt less.
Method
Eighty-four participants (59%female) participated in a lab
study of ‘‘psychophysical perception in pairs.’’ Twelve were
excluded for suspicion/disbelief, which was assessed with a
funneled debrief as outlined in Chartrand and Bargh (2000).
This number is somewhat high, but can be understood given the
complex nature of the study and its similarity to the Milgram
paradigm.
On arrival, participants were paired with a confederate, who
(they believed) would be administering to them a variety of
psychophysical stimuli (e.g., dot counting, length assessment,
color judgment, pitch judgment). One of these stimuli were
1-ms duration electric shocks, delivered to the wrist of the
dominant hand. The shocks were precalibrated for each partici-
pant to be ‘‘very uncomfortable.’’ Voltages ranged from 40 to
75 V between subjects. After being shocked, participants rated
its painfulness on a 7-point scale from ‘‘Not at All Uncomfor-
table’’ to ‘‘Extremely Uncomfortable.’’ In order to allow parti-
cipants to practice the variety of psychophysical tasks, and to
obtain a baseline rating of pain, participants received a block
of practice trials. In these trials, all shocks were computer
administered.
On each experimental trial, the participant’s partner was
ostensibly presented with two different tasks (e.g., dot counting
vs. electric shock), and chose one to administer to the partici-
pant. In the malicious and benevolent conditions (the inten-
tional conditions), participants always completed the task
chosen by their partner. In the unintentional condition, the
computer administered the opposite task to the one chosen by
their partner (i.e., the computer switched the task). In the mal-
icious and benevolent conditions, the partner selected the
shock on two thirds of trials when it was available; in the
unintentional condition, the partner selected the nonshock
task on two thirds of trials when it was available (with the
computer then switched it to shock). Thus, participants in all
conditions thus got a shock on two thirds of trials when it was
an option, but it was only perceived as intentional in the mal-
icious and benevolent conditions. Importantly, on each trial,
participants saw what stimulus they were to receive in
advance to eliminate the possibility of surprise.
In the malicious condition, there was no clear reason why
their partner was choosing to shock participants, other than
they wanted them to feel pain. In the benevolent condition, par-
ticipants were told that since many people were hesitant to
administer shocks, their partner was led to believe that every
time a shock was chosen, the participant would receive a ticket
for a $50 lottery. Thus, from the viewpoint of participants, the
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partner had their best intentions in mind when shocking them.
Of course, the very presence of such a draw could influence
pain (Pavlov, 1927), so there was no draw. Instead, participants
in all conditions were told—right before the beginning of the
experimental trials—that they would receive an additional $5
due to the ‘‘nature of the study.’’
Participants in all conditions received six experimental
shocks. At the end of the study, they completed two
manipulation-check questions, assessing both the intentionality
of shocks and the valence of that intention. The intentionality
question asked, on the trials in which they received a shock,
if the other person intended that outcome. Participants
responded on a 7-point scale from Definitely No (3) to
Definitely Yes (3), with Not sure (0) as the midpoint. The
valence question asked the extent to which, on such trials,
‘‘your partner had your best interests at heart,’’ and was
answered on a 5-point scale from Not at All (1) to Completely
(5).
Results and Discussion
As a manipulation check, ratings of intention in each condition
were submitted to one-sample ttests, with the midpoint of the
scale (0) as the comparison value. Values below this midpoint
demonstrate that the shocks in a given condition were per-
ceived to be unintentional, while values above demonstrate
that the shocks were perceived to be intentional. As expected,
shocks in the malicious condition were seen to be intentional
(M¼1.8, SD ¼1.88), t(23) ¼2.17, p< .05, as were those in
the benevolent condition (M¼2.39, SD ¼.92), t(17) ¼11.06,
p<.01.Shocksintheunintentional condition were seen to be
unintentional (M¼2.40, SD ¼.85), t(29) ¼15.38, p<.01.
As predicted, an independent-samples ttest found that the
partner in the benevolent (M¼3.68, SD ¼.89) and uninten-
tional (M¼4.17, SD ¼.95) conditions was seen to have par-
ticipants’ best intentions at heart more so than the partner in the
malicious condition (M¼2.63, SD ¼.88), ts > 3.92, ps < .01.
There was no significant difference between ratings of the ben-
evolent and unintentional condition, p> .15.
To investigate differences in experienced pain, the average
pain ratings of each participant were submitted to a one-way
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with condition (mali-
cious/unintentional/benevolent) as the independent variable
and pretest discomfort ratings as the covariate. This ANCOVA
revealed a significant effect of condition, F(2,69) ¼3.57, p<
.05, Z
2
¼.10. Comparing confidence intervals of the adjusted
marginal means (adjusted pretest discomfort ratings ¼4.29)
revealed that shocks in the malicious condition (M¼4.48,
SE ¼.13) were experienced as significantly more painful than
those in both the unintentional (M¼4.23, SE ¼.11) and ben-
evolent conditions (M¼3.95, SE ¼.14), ps < .05. Importantly,
the benevolent condition was experienced as significantly less
painful than the unintentional condition, p< .05 (Figure 1).
These results replicate previous findings that malice can
increase pain (Gray & Wegner, 2008), but importantly also
show that benevolence can decrease pain, suggesting that the
mind encodes not only the presence of intention behind stimuli
but also its valence (cruel vs. kind). This conclusion is further
supported by a regression analysis in which ratings of both the
presence of intention (the intention question) and its perceived
valence (the best interest question) were entered as simulta-
neous predictors of pain, after controlling for pretest ratings.
Although raw intention did not predict pain, b¼.04, t(70) ¼
.52, p> .61, the valence of this intention did, b¼.16, t(70) ¼
2.30, p< .05. Itappears, then, that benevolence can decrease pain,
demonstrating the flexibility of intentions to influence physical
experience. This finding should also providerelief to doctors and
even those caring parents who are sometimes compelled to inflict
pain on their charges for their own good.
Experiment 2: Person versus Computer
Pleasuring
Experiment 1 found that pain is soothed by perceived benevo-
lence, suggesting that intentions can flexibly impact experi-
ence. This tested whether the power of intention generalizes
beyond pain, and examined whether perceived benevolence
increased the experience of pleasure. This experiment used a
paradigm inspired by Davis and colleagues (e.g., Davis &
Martin, 1978; Davis, Rainey, & Brock, 1976), who used a vibrat-
ing massage pad to examine ‘‘interpersonal pleasuring.’’ It was
predicted that an intentional massage would evoke more plea-
sure than an unintentional computer administered massage.
Method
Twenty participants (55%female) were recruited as in Experi-
ment 1. Two participants were excluded for suspicion after a
funnel debrief, leaving a total of 18.
Theprocedurewassimilartomalicious condition from
Experiment 1, save two exceptions. The first was that electric
shocks were replaced with electric massages: participants
received a number of different three second massages from
an electric chair massage pad placed behind them (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Ratings of pain from malicious, unintentional and benevo-
lently intended shocks in Experiment 1. Error bars 1 SE.
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After each massage, participants rated how pleasurable
the massage was on a 7-point scale ranging from NotatAll
Pleasurable (1) to Extremely Pleasurable (7).
The second change in procedure was that the partner (con-
federate) selected the psychophysical task on only half of trials.
On the other half of trials, a computer randomly selected the
stimulus, and because only their partner was capable of human
intention, it was expected the partner condition to be seen as
more intentional than the computer condition. In both types
of trials, the probability of receiving a massage when available
was .5. This within subjects experiment allows us to compare
the pleasure elicited by either an intentional, partner adminis-
tered massage, or an unintentional computer administered mas-
sage. During the course of the study, participants received nine
massages ostensibly administered by their partner and nine
identical massages administered by the computer.
Two questions served as manipulation checks. The first
asked which of the partner and computer trials were more
intentional: ‘‘Between the partner and computer trials, on
which trial type was a massage more intentional?’’ Participants
answered on a 7-point scale ranging from Definitely partner
trials (3) to Definitely computer trials (3). The second asked
‘‘How comfortable did you feel getting the massages from your
partner?’’ and was answered on a 5-point scale from Notatall
Comfortable (1) to Extremely Comfortable (5). This question
is important because though pain might hurt no matter its
source, pleasure may be more context dependent. It was
expected that intentional massages should feel better only for
those at least moderately comfortable with their partner. In
order to develop this comfort, participants briefly met their
partner before moving to separate rooms. This introduction
proved successful, with 16 of 18 participants reporting a three
(‘‘Moderately comfortable’’) out of five on the comfort scale.
The remaining two uneasy participants were excluded from
subsequent data analysis.
Results and Discussion
A one-sample ttest of the manipulation check, using the mid-
point of the scale (0) as the comparison value, confirmed that
the massages in the partner condition were indeed seen to be
more intentional than those of the computer condition (M¼
1.42, SD ¼1.43), t(15) ¼5.16, p< .001. To check whether
these intentions were indeed seen to be benevolent, a 1-item
survey was given to a new sample of participants (N¼65).
This survey explained the experimental setup and asked them
to rate the intentions of the partner administering the massages
from Extremely Cruel (1) to Extremely Kind (7), with Indiffer-
ent (4) as the midpoint. As expected, a one-sample ttest with
four as the test value revealed that these new participants saw
the person administering the massages to have benevolent
intentions (M¼5.00, SD ¼1.25), t(64) ¼32.25, p< .001.
The pleasure ratings of participants were averaged within
each condition to obtain a partner pleasure rating and a com-
puter pleasure rating for each participant. These values were
compared with a paired-samples ttest, which revealed that
partner massages caused significantly more pleasure (M¼
4.72, SD ¼1.27) than the computer massages (M¼4.44,
SD ¼1.54), t(15) ¼2.60, p< .05. These results suggest that for
those who are comfortable with their partners, receiving the
identical massage is more pleasurable when it appears to come
intentionally from a human being, rather than from a computer.
Although computers may be more efficient than humans at
many things, pleasure is still better coming from another per-
son. More broadly, it appears that benevolent intentions not
only decrease the experience of pain, but also increase the
experience of pleasure.
Experiment 3: The Taste of Kindness
The two previous experiments revealed that good intentions
could decrease pain and increase pleasure. This experiment
examined whether benevolence can make things taste better,
perhaps explaining why food seems to taste better when lov-
ingly prepared.
Method
Ninety-one participants (55%female) were recruited next to a
busy path on campus and asked to participate in a study about
snacks. Four participants were excluded for failing the instruc-
tions, leaving a total of 87.
Participants were told that, the day before, another person
had picked out a snack for them to eat and placed it in an opa-
que tupperware box. The snack was ostensibly selected from a
set of Snickers Mini, Skittles Mini, Tootsie Rolls, and
Figure 2. Massage pad used in Experiment 2. Massages were
ostensibly administered by either another person or a computer.
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Lollipops. Participants were told that the person selecting the
snack was also instructed to write a brief note and place it in
the box with the snack. All participants received a Tootsie Roll,
but it was accompanied by one of two different notes. In the
benevolent condition, it read, ‘‘I picked this just for you. Hope
it makes you happy!’’ In the nonbenevolent condition, it read,
‘‘Whatever. I don’t care. I just picked randomly.’’
In private, participants opened the box, read the note, ate the
candy, and responded to four questions. Two questions focused
on the taste of the candy, asking ‘‘How sweet did this snack
taste?’’ and ‘‘How good did this snack taste?’’ One question
focused on the perceived benevolence of the snack-chooser’s
intentions and served as the manipulation check. It read,
‘‘Judging by the note, how nice are the other person’s inten-
tions towards you?’’ Participants responded to these three ques-
tions on a 5-point scale from NotatAll(1) to Extremely (5).
The fourth question asked, ‘‘How big or small was the snack?’’
and was answered on a 7-point scale from Extremely Small (1)
to Extremely Big (7). This was included as a control question.
After filling out these questions, participants also complete a
10-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule scale.
Results and Discussion
A between-subjects ttest confirmed that the intentions of the
snack-chooser were perceived to be more benevolent in the
benevolent condition (M¼3.73, SD ¼.92) than in the nonbe-
nevolent condition (M¼1.19, SD ¼.45), t(82) ¼16.19, p<
.001. As predicted, the snack tasted sweeter in the benevolent
condition (M¼3.57, SD ¼.63) than in the nonbenevolent con-
dition (M¼2.98, SD ¼.77), t(82) ¼3.89, p< .001. It also tasted
better in the benevolent condition (M¼3.33, SD ¼.82) than in
the nonbenevolent condition (M¼2.58, SD ¼.91), t(82) ¼4.02,
p< .001 (Figure 3). Furthermore, there were significant
correlations between perceived benevolence and sweetness,
r(82) ¼.32, p<.005, and between perceived benevolence and
goodness of taste, r(82) ¼.41, p<.001. The perceived size of
the snack was not influenced by perceived benevolence, t¼
1.05, p¼.29, suggesting that intentions have some specificity
in their ability to affect experience. Neither positive nor negative
affect varied by condition, ts < 1.3, ps > .22, providing evidence
that this effect could not be accounted for with the overt experi-
ence of affect. These results suggest that perceived benevolence
not only improves the experience of pain and pleasure, but can
also make things taste better.
General Discussion
Three experiments suggest that the basic physical experiences
of pain, pleasure, and taste are influenced by the interpersonal
context in which they are experienced. Specifically, perceiving
benevolent intention behind physical stimuli improves their expe-
rience. In much the same way we take conversational cues from
others (Clark, 1996), and use others’ evaluations of social stimuli
to inform our own judgments (Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011),
it seems we also use the intentions of others as a guide for basic
physical experience.
Any set of studies suggests some potential alternative
explanations, and three are reviewed here. First, it could be
that participants used ratings not as indicators of experience but
as a way of communicating with partners. In order to guard
against this possibility, participants were explicitly told that
their partner would not be privy to their responses. Second, it
could be that the effects weredrivenbyabiasinmemory
instead of experience. This was guarded against by having par-
ticipants make their report immediately after encountering sti-
muli. Third, it could be that experimenter demand was
influencing judgments. This was guarded against by providing
no contact between experimenter and participant during experi-
mental trials.
It could also be argued that the studies involved some kind
of implicit demand characteristics, whereby people rated ben-
evolently intended outcomes as better as a reflexive form of
politeness. Future studies could rule out this concern by pre-
senting information about intentions either before or after the
experience (as was done in Lee, Frederick, & Ariely, 2006),
because only intentions known in advance can influence the
experience per se, rather than the simple reporting of that
experience.
The Moral Dyad: An Explanatory Framework
One way to understand these results is through the lens of dya-
dic morality. Research suggests that people conceive of good
and evil as essentially dyadic, pairing an intentional moral
agent and an experiencing moral patient (Gray & Wegner,
2009, 2011). For example, assault links an intending perpetra-
tor and a suffering victim, while rescue links an intending hero
and a grateful beneficiary. This constant pairing of malice and
pain (for evil) and kindness and pleasure (for good) leads
Figure 3. Ratings of taste in Experiment 3. Text of handwritten note
included with snack is written above data. Error bars 1 SE.
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people to ‘‘complete the dyad’’ and see pain in response to
malice, and pleasure in response to kindness (Gray & Wegner,
2010). For instance, in flag burning, there is blameworthy
intention without apparent suffering, but those who see it as
immoral nonetheless see it as causing pain to others (DeScioli,
2008; Gray, Young & Waytz, in press). The present experi-
ments demonstrate experiential dyadic completion: people
actually feel increased pain from malice and increased pleasure
from benevolence.
Implications and Extensions
These data suggest a number of future directions. For exam-
ple, while perceived intention appears to influence experience
independently of affect, it is clear that pain, pleasure, and taste
are all affectively charged. Does the power of intention apply
to nonaffective stimuli? For example, does a patch of blue
seem bluer, or loud noise seem louder if someone intended
it to be so?
There might also be individual differences in the extent to
which intentions can impact physical experience. Perhaps
those who have difficulty representing the intentions of others
(e.g., autistics; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein,
& Wegner, 2011; Happe´, 1995) are unaffected by the interper-
sonal context of pain, pleasure, or taste. Another unique group
to test would be masochists (Baumeister, 1988), who feel
pleasure from pain—though typically in overall benevolent
contexts.
The intentions of others are often ambiguous, and future
research might undercover individual differences in baseline
perceptions of benevolence—and their resulting impact on
experience. Likewise, the intentions of supernatural agents are
even harder to determine, and people’s views of God may
determine how they react to life events. If you believe in a ben-
evolent New-Testament God, then seeing God behind harms
may lead to better coping (Pargament et al., 1990); if you
believe in a malicious Old-Testament God, then perceiving
God’s hand behind harms may lead to increased suffering
(Gray & Wegner, 2010).
Finally, the link between perceived intention and
physical experience suggests a way for people to decrease
suffering and increase pleasure as they go about their days
(Edmiston & Scheff, 2010). To the extent that we view others
as benevolent instead of malicious, the harms they inflict
upon us should hurt less, and the good things they do for us
should cause more pleasure. Stolen parking spaces cut less
deep and home-cooked meals taste better when we think well
of others.
Conclusion
The thought behind deeds may often count for little, but phys-
ical experience appears to depend in part on the perceived
intention of the person administering it. So, while subjective
experience is clearly in our own mind, this research suggests
it also depends on how we perceive the minds of others.
Acknowledgments
For help with data collection, the author thanks Lillian Asaph, Andrew
Breese, David Caparrelli, Angela Chouinard, Katherine Flaschen,
Alex Hacker, Brian Huh, Andrew Olsen, Tom Miller, Jason Popps,
Katherine Rippe, Claire Sheldon, Dan Schreff, Carly Sheridan, Dorian
Storbeck Chris Siuzdak, Abby Vigderman, and Stanley Zheng. For
helpful comments, I thank Kristen Lindquist, Josh Greene, Wendy
Mendes, Mike Norton, Adam Waytz, and Dan Wegner.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
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Bio
Kurt Gray completed his PhD at Harvard University and is an assis-
tant professor at the University of Maryland, College Park. He studies
morality and mind perception, and their real-world implications.
Gray 645
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