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10.1177/1087724X04268569PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE LONDON
CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME
GEORGINA SANTOS
University of Oxford
BLAKE SHAFFER
University of Cambridge
On February 17, 2003, the London Congestion Charging Scheme came into effect.
Preliminary results show a significant response to the £5 (U.S. $8) charge. Conges-
tion over the first year decreased by 30%. Overall traffic levelswithin the charging
zone fell by 16%. Speeds for car travel increased by more than 20%, and bus travel
became more reliable. Elasticities of demand for trips by car with respect to gener-
alized costs are estimated to be between –1.32 and –2.10. The average marginal
congestion cost within the central zone is estimated at £1.65/vehicle-km (approxi-
mately U.S. $2.58/vehicle-km). The net economic benefits of the Scheme for the first
year were £50 million (U.S. $78 million) and the net revenues, £68 million (U.S.
$106 million). Net revenues are mainly being used to improve public transport.
Keywords: traffic congestion; London congestion charging; demand elasticities;
congestion costs; road pricing
Garrett Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons depicts a classic example of the harmful
effects of unabated negative externalities. In Hardin’s story, the villagers of a small Eng-
lish town have equal and free access to a commons wherein they can place their animals. When
making the decision to add a cow to the commons, a villager takes into account the animal’s own
ability to graze and roam, but not its effect on others. This is the classic description of the so-
called free-rider problem commonly associated with public goods.
The modern version of Hardin’s story could easily depict drivers as, perhaps unflatteringly,
the cows and roads in place of the commons. When a potential driver makes the decision to use
private transport by comparing his or her marginal private costs and benefits, that driver typi-
cally excludes from the analysis any external costs that his or her action of driving may impose
on others. Arthur Pigou, a Cambridge economist, first identified this problem of “divergences
between marginal social and private net products” in his book The Economics of Welfare
(Pigou, 1920). To remedy this problem, Pigou proposed a tax or levy on drivers to ensure that
their perceived private costs were consistent with the true social costs of driving.
164
Georgina Santos holds an
M.Sc. in environmental and
resource economics from
University College London
and a Ph.D. in economics
from the University of Cam-
bridge, United Kingdom,
where she was most recently
with the Department of
Applied Economics. She is
now a departmental lecturer
in the Transport Studies
Unit at the University of
Oxford. Her interests
include transport economics
and policy and environmen-
tal economics and policy.
Blake Shaffer was previ-
ously a part of the Faculty
of Economics and Politics at
the University of Cam-
bridge, United Kingdom.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: We are grateful to Jeremy Evans, Simon Burton, Charles Buckingham, Sharon
Cartwright, Ruth Excell, and Karen Grayson from Transport for London, to Kevin Austin and Richard
Tribe from the Greater London Authority,and to Georgina Osbourn from Trafficmaster PLC, for provision
of data. We are also indebted to David Reams, Ken Small, and four anonymous referees for comments on
an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are our sole responsibility. Support from the British Academy for
Georgina Santos is gratefully acknowledged. Both authors were at the University of Cambridge when this
article was written.
PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY, Vol. 9 No. 2, October 2004 164-181
DOI: 10.1177/1087724X04268569
© 2004 Sage Publications
The city of London has taken Pigou’s idea from theory to practice. Since February 17, 2003,
motorists within the central London area must pay a £5 charge (approximately U.S. $8) for the
right to drive or park within the zone. The charge differs from a true Pigouvian tax in that it is not
equal to the marginal congestion cost (MCC). A charge equal to the MCC would vary with time
and location. Although technically the charge differs temporally, given that a license costs £5
between 7:00 AM and 6:30 PM from Monday to Friday versus £0 at all other times, true marginal
cost pricing (or Pigouvian taxation) would require more finely tuned spatial and temporal dif-
ferences. Nevertheless, the London Congestion Charging Scheme is a dramatic step towards
internalizing the externalities associated with driving.
This article analyzes some of the preliminary effects, as recently published by Transport for
London (TfL, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). It presents the basic theory of optimal road pricing,
describes the London Scheme and its preliminary results, which are then used to compute elas-
ticities with respect to changes in generalized cost, as well as area marginal congestion costs. It
then briefly touches on the costs and benefits of the Scheme, the use of revenues, and the poten-
tial equity impacts. The prevailing elasticities, as shown by motorists’ responses to the Scheme,
are higher than expected. This is probably because of the public transport system in London,
which provides an alternative to the car. The calculated area MCC suggests that the £5 charge is
a reasonable approximation to marginal cost pricing.
The Economics of Congestion Charging
Suboptimal levels of congestion are a result of drivers failing to take into account the effect
that their vehicle will have on others. This “neglected externality” means that drivers will often
use private vehicles when the net marginal social benefit of doing so is actually negative.
The optimal method to internalize externalities is marginal cost pricing, whose basics Pigou
(1920) first proposed. In a seminal paper, Walters (1961) more fully developed the specific
application of marginal cost pricing to a congested highway. His model is based on engineering-
related speed-flow relationships on links to derive the optimal congestion charge. The formal
derivations shown below follow Newbery (1990) and Nash (1997).
Assume a generalized travel cost/km function that consists of money costs (fuel, mainte-
nance, etc.) and time costs:
gm b
sq
=+
()
(1)
where g= generalized cost (pence/PCU-km), m= money cost (pence/PCU-km), b= value of
time (pence/PCU-hour), s= speed as a function of total flow (km/hour), and q= flow (PCU/
hour).
PCU stands for passenger car unit, a measure of the relative disruption that different vehicle
types impose on the network. A car, for example, has a PCU rating of 1, whereas a light goods
vehicle has a PCU rating of 1.5, and so on. In the U.S. passenger car equivalents (PCE) are used
instead. The meaning, however, is the same.
Total costs (in pence/km-hour) are:
Cgqmq bq
sq
== +
()
(2)
and marginal costs are:
∂
∂
C
qmb
sq
bq
qsq=+ − ′
() [()] ()
2
(3)
or more simply:
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 165
∂
∂
C
qgb
sq esq
=+
()
(4)
where esq is the elasticity of speed with respect to flow.
This last expression clearly identifies the marginal social costs as a function of marginal pri-
vate costs, g, plus an external cost term, the congestion externality. By way of a Pigouvian tax,
an individual’s decision can be reconciled with the socially optimal choice. The tax in this case
would be equal to b
sq esq
() per PCU-km.
Although the above concept of first-best road pricing remains central to transport theory, its
application to a congested urban design poses a few problems. Introducing marginal cost pric-
ing in the transport sector does not guarantee an efficient outcome when there are externalities
in other (related) sectors in the economy, which are not priced according to marginal cost. In
addition, marginal cost pricing has proved difficult to implement in dense networks. In today’s
technologically advanced world, the calculation of instant marginal cost pricing may not be
very difficult to envisage. Its cost-effectiveness, however, would be dubious; and most impor-
tant, its transparency would be at least arguable, as drivers would not know what congestion
charge they would be required to pay before starting their journey. Marginal cost pricing would
require highly differentiated pricing systems in time and space and would be expensive to
provide and confusing to users (Nash & Sansom, 2001).
Because marginal cost pricing is not very practical, transport economists have lately devoted
their efforts to the study of second-best alternatives (May, Liu, Shepherd, & Sumalee, 2002;
Shepherd & Sumalee, 2004; Verhoef, 2002; Zhang & Yang, 2004). Policy makers have opted
for simpler, less expensive, more practical, and transparent options such as cordon tolls and
area-licensing schemes. Examples are the original Singaporean scheme, the Norwegian toll
rings, and the new London area-license scheme.
The London Congestion Charging Scheme
The London Scheme traces its origin back to the Smeed report (Ministry of Transport, 1964),
which studied the technical feasibility of road pricing in the United Kingdom. Numerous stud-
ies have been produced since then, including the influential report by the TfL-commissioned
London Congestion Charging Research Programme (LCCRP) in 1995 (MVA Consultancy,
1995). The LCCRP final report suggests as its medium case a £4 electronic cordon toll (using
intravehicle units) to enter a central London area, which is essentially identical to the ultimately
chosen charging zone. The Road Charging Options for London (ROCOL) report published in
2000 followed the LCCRP. The ROCOL report (ROCOL Working Group, 2000) presents the
technical details as well as predicted impacts of a variety of congestion-reducing strategies that
encompass area-licensing schemes, and cordon tolls (central only, multizone, paper, and
electronic) as well as workplace parking levies.
The discussion became closer to reality in May 2000, when Ken Livingstone was elected
mayor of London based on a manifesto promising the introduction of congestion charging. The
Greater London Authority (GLA) Act 1999 (Acts of Parliament, 1999) gave this new mayor the
power, for the first time, to impose congestion charges.1
The final decision, made by the mayor, was to go with an area-licensing scheme using a £5
charge applied to central London only. The method was chosen because of its relative ease of
implementation as compared to full-scale road pricing. Automatic number plate recognition
(ANPR) technology was selected as a feasible intermediate between an inexpensive but ineffi-
cient paper-based system and a sophisticated, yet complex and expensive electronic road pric-
ing scheme (ROCOL Working Group, 2000).
One of the key features of the run-up to the Scheme was the extensive consultation process,
which took place over 18 months. The process included meetings with key stakeholders, the
distribution of thousands of information leaflets on the proposed Scheme to all the 33 London
166 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
Because marginal cost
pricing is not very
practical, transport
economists have lately
devoted their efforts to
the study of second-best
alternatives.
boroughs, and placement of newspaper and radio advertisements with details of the Scheme and
information on how the public could participate in the consultation process. This consultation
exercise increased the public acceptability of the Scheme.
HOW THE SCHEME OPERATES
Figure 1 shows the limit of the area where the charges apply, the Inner Ring Road, which runs
along Euston Road, Pentonville Road, City Road, Old Street, Commercial Street, Tower Bridge
Road, New Kent Road, Kennington Lane, Vauxhall Bridge Road, Park Lane, Edgware Road,
and Marylebone Road. No charge is made for driving on the Inner Ring Road itself.
We can see from the figure that the charging area is relatively small. It only covers 21 km2(8
miles2), representing 1.3% of the total 1,579 km2(617 miles2) of Greater London.
There are 174 entry-and-exit boundary points around the zone. Traffic signs make clear the
exact location of the charging zone. A red symbol accompanies the signs on each laneof traffic
at the entry points to the charging zone. The Scheme charges all cars driving into or within the
zone, plus those parked in nonprivate spaces within the zone, regardless of movement. Essen-
tially, one can consider the charge a “day pass” for use of central London’s roads. The ROCOL
report (2000) used a further scenario encompassing all of inner London and a differentiated-
price scheme using both zones. Ultimately, it was thought that implementating the Scheme in
the somewhat more manageable smaller size of central London would be more suitable as a first
step, with the possibility of later expansion.
The applicable hours of the Scheme are 7:00 AM to 6:30 PM, Monday to Friday, excluding
bank and public holidays. This is a slight departure from the ROCOL recommendation of 7:00
AM to 7:00 PM. The decision to change the evening end-time was primarily a result of lobbying
by the entertainment community who argued that having the charge apply until 7:00 PM would
damage the West End and discourage theatre-goers from coming downtown.
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 167
The Scheme charges all
cars driving into or
within the zone, plus
those parked in
nonprivate spaces
within the zone,
regardless of movement.
Figure 1: Map of the Charging Zone
SOURCE: www.london.gov.uk/approot/mayor/congest/pdf/zone_map.pdf
NOTE: Map reproduced with permission from Transport for London.
The ROCOL consultants analyzed scenarios of £2.50, £5, and £10 charges. Theyused stated
preference results from surveys as well as spatially detailed representations of road-traffic
movements to estimate changes in travel conditions due to the introduction of area licensing.
They predicted reductions in car trips and vehicle-km driven in Central London of 20% to 23%
(ROCOL Working Group, 2000, pp. 69-70). These predictions are not out of line with what has
actually happened. TfL (2004) reports reductions in vehicle-km driven within the charging
zone during charging hours of 15% for vehicles with four or more wheels between 2002 and
2003. For potentially chargeable vehicles (cars, vans, and lorries) the reduction of vehicle-km
driven has been 25%. When only cars are considered, vehicle-km driven have been reduced by
34%.
Because of the unsophisticated nature of an area-licensing scheme, the system lacks the abil-
ity to adequately charge differentiated prices temporally and spatially. Ultimately, the mayor
settled upon the £5 charge, deciding that it provided adequate incentive to achieve significant
congestion reduction but with less public backlash likely to be associated with a £10 charge.
The heavy goods vehicle (HGV) charge, originally set at £15 (3 times the car charge), was
reduced to be the same as that for cars.
The Scheme allows for a variety of 90% to 100% discounts, as well as exemptions. A sum-
mary is shown in Table 1.
168 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
Table 1: Exemptions and Discounts
Discount/Status Category
Fully exempt Motorcycles, mopeds, and bicycles
Emergency vehicles
Public service vehicles with nine or more seats licensed as buses
Vehicles used by (and for) disabled persons that are exempt from VED
Licensed London taxis and minicabs
100% discount with
free registration
Certain military vehicles
Local government service vehicles (e.g., refuse trucks, street maintenance)
Vehicles with nine or more seats not licensed as buses (e.g., community minibuses)
100% discount with a one-
off £10 registration
Vehicles driven by (or for) individuals or institutions that are Blue Badge holdersa
100% discount with
£10 registration
Alternative fuel vehicles—requires emission savings 40% above Euro IV standards
Roadside assistance vehicles (e.g., motoring organizations such as the Automobile
Association)
90% discount with
£10 registration
Vehicles registered to residents of the central zone
SOURCE: Transport for London, Congestion Charging Web site: www.cclondon.com/exemptions.shtml
NOTE: VED: Vehicle excise duty.
a. Blue Badges, which existed before the scheme was implemented, are special parking permits issued to people with
disabilities to allow them to park near shops, stations, and other facilities. The badge belongs to the person who is dis-
abled who qualifies for it (who may or may not be a car driver) and can be used in any vehiclehe or she is traveling in.
Table 2: Methods of Payment
Percentage (%)
Retail outlets 36
Telephone 19
Post < 1
Internet 26
SMS text messaging 19
SOURCE: Transport for London (2004, p. 30).
NOTE: SMS = short message service.
Payments can be made by a variety of methods. These are shown in Table 2, along with their
share of use during the first year.
The charge has to be paid in advance or on the day until 10:00 PM with late payment available
between 10:00 PM and 12:00 AM but with the charge rising to £10 (U.S. $16). Drivers can pay
the charge daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly. It is at the drivers’ initiative to pay the charge.
Enforcement is undertaken with video cameras. There is a network of 203 camera sites, with
these located at every entrance and exit to the congestion-charging zone as well as inside the
charging zone. The cameras provide high-quality video signals to ANPR software, which reads
and records each number plate with a 90% accuracy rate. At midnight, images of all of the vehi-
cles that have been in the congestion-charging zone are checkedagainst the vehicle registration
numbers of vehicles for which congestion charges have been paid that day. The computer keeps
the registration numbers of vehicles for which these charges have not been paid. A manual
check of each recorded image is then made, and a penalty charge notice of £80 (U.S. $126) is
then issued to the registered keeper of the vehicle. As with parking penalties, this amount is
reduced to £40 (U.S. $63) for prompt payment within 14 days. Failure to pay the penalty charge
within 28 days results in the penalty being increased to £120 (U.S. $190).
Preliminary Results of the London Scheme
In this section, we summarize the traffic impacts of the Scheme over the first year.
EFFECTS ON TRAFFIC
According to TfL (2003a, 2003b, 2004), the average travel speed in the charging zone in the
first few months after the Scheme was implemented, was 17 km/hour (10.6 miles/hour), and this
continued over the first year. This number compares with the average speed precharging, which
was 14 km/hour (8.7 miles/hour), as listed in the TfL first annual report (2003c, p. 52). There
has therefore been a 21% increase in average travel speeds in the charging area.
TfL defines congestion as “the difference between the average network travel rate and the
uncongested (free-flow) network travel rate in minutes per veh-km” (TfL, 2003a, p. 46). The
uncongested network travel rate of 1.9 minutes/km (approximately 32 km/hour) from TfL
(2003a, p. 52), and pre- and postcharging average travel ratesof 4.2 and 3.5 minutes/km respec-
tively, show that congestion has decreased from 2.3 to 1.6 minutes/km. Note that the optimal
amount of congestion is not zero congestion. Zero congestion would suggest an underuse of
road space. On the other hand, TfL admits that there is an optimal level of congestion, which is
achieved at the optimal level of traffic. However, it considers the optimal level of congestion dif-
ficult to define and that is the reason why it defines congestion using free-flow time as the base
(TfL, 2003a). Bearing this caveat in mind, we can conclude that congestion has been reduced by
30.5%. This calculated value is roughly equal to the listed value in the Update of Scheme
Impacts and Operations (TfL, 2004, point 1.8, p. 4) of 30%. Furthermore, it is in line, albeit at
the upper end, with expectations of congestion reduction of between 20% and 30%.
Traffic levels are a measure of the volume or number of vehicles entering or driving within
central London. Compared to precharging conditions, the count of all cars entering the central
zone has decreased by 31%. Increases in incoming motorcycles (by 19%), taxis (by 19%), and
buses (by 16%) have partially offset the reduction in the number of cars. Traffic levels (all vehi-
cles) inside the central zone have decreased by 15%, again roughly in line (but at the upper end)
with TfL’s expectations of 10% to 15%.
Finally, travel times also show significant improvements. Travel times to central London
from outer London, inner London, and central London have all decreased. A basket of 5,000
journeys from all areas of greater London showed a reduction in travel times of 13% (TfL,
2003a, point 2.4, p. 5).
A summary of the above results is shown in Table 3.
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 169
There has therefore
been a 21% increase in
average travel speeds in
the charging area.
Because traffic traveling on the Inner Ring Road does not pay the congestion charge, TfL
expected that through traffic, with origin and destination outside the charging zone, would
instead divert and use the Inner Ring Road . This indeed happened and raised the total vehicle-
km on the Inner Ring Road by 4% when compared with 2002 (TfL, 2004). However, improved
traffic management arrangements were put in place on the Inner Ring Road before the Scheme
started, and this prevented an increase in congestion. For example, between 1 and 2 seconds
were taken off green-light time on radial roads, which were anticipated would have less traffic,
and added to green-light time on the Inner Ring Road. This made a sufficient difference to keep
the Ring Road operating satisfactorily with marginally lower levels of congestion, compared to
precharging conditions.
Trafficmaster PLC, a private company that provides real-time traffic information on major
routes, began a study on February 17, 2003, to assess the commuting impacts of the Scheme
outside the zone. Although after 6 months of monitoring, average travel times recorded by
Trafficmaster had increased on most routes, there were no constant patterns. Table 4 shows the
average travel times (in minutes) and travel time changes for the first 7 months after the Scheme
started. We can see from the table that most routes had longer travel times. Table 5 compares
some examples of how travel time on some routes increased and decreased in comparison to the
same month the year before and shows no constant pattern of variation.
170 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
Table 3: Preliminary Effects on Traffic
Precharging Postcharging Change (%)
Average speed 14 km/h 17 km/h +21
Congestion 2.3 min/km 1.6 min/km –30.5
Traffic levelsa
Incoming (cars only) 193,912 133,016 –31
Incoming (noncars) 178,149 193,485 +9
Inside central zone na na –16
Travel times to central zone
From outer London 59 min 52 min –12
From inner London 37 min 33 min –11
From central London 38 min 35 min –8
Basket of 5,000 journeys 47 min 41 min –13
Source: Transport for London (2003a, b).
NOTE: na = nonapplicable.
Precharging: spring 2002; Postcharging: spring 2003.
a. Data supplied by Transport for London on request.
Table 4: Average Workday Travel Times Into London (Morning Peak)
Feb. to Sept. 2002 Feb. to Sept. 2003 Change
Route Orientation (min) (min) (%)
A1 Mill Hill to Islington N-NW 46 49 7
A41 Mill Hill, Five Ways to Regent’s Park NW 36 38 6
A40/M Denham to Marylebone W 62 61 -3
A4 Langley, Slough to Talgarth Road W 57 57 1
A30 Stanwell to Osterley W-SW 15 16 6
A316 Sunbury Cross to Ravenscourt Park W-SW 40 41 2
A3 Cobham to Clapham SW 50 62 25
A23 Hooley to Brixton S 59 64 8
A20 Swanley to Eltham SE 20 23 14
A2/A102 Dartford to Blackwall Tunnel E-SE 39 44 14
A12 Harold Wood to Blackwall Tunnel E-NE 66 72 9
A10 Waltham Cross to Stoke Newington N 44 51 15
SOURCE: Trafficmaster PLC (data supplied on request).
The apparent contradiction between Tables 3 and 4 can be explained by the fact that Table 4
measures travel times all the way up to and including the charging zone, where travel times have
decreased and therefore push the average down. Table 4, on the other hand, does not include any
road inside the charging zone.
EFFECTS ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT
TfL predicted that approximately 20,000 individuals would switch from car travel to public
transport during the morning peak period as a result of the Scheme. Of this number, 5,000 were
expected to use the Underground system; 14,000, the buses; and the remainder, rail system
without transfers to bus or Underground. It was also expected that the morning peak hour (8:00
AM to 9:00 AM) increase would be of an additional 7,000 bus users (TfL, 2002b).
Although bus ridership increased in line with expectations, Underground travel did not.
Underground usage across London and especially in centralLondon decreased. The decrease in
passenger levels on the London Underground is probably linked to the slowdown of the econ-
omy and the decrease in tourism in London, which, in turn, may be linked to the war in Iraq
(TfL, 2003b). In addition, the Central Line was temporarily closed for almost 3 months follow-
ing a derailment at Chancery Lane station in January.
Average bus speeds in the morning peak did not change too much, and it is difficult to estab-
lish a pattern of variation. Although speeds on some route sections increased, speeds on others
decreased (TfL, 2003b). On the other hand, additional time waited by passengers over and
above the route schedule decreased by 25% across Greater London and by more than 33% in the
routes serving the charging zone and the Inner Ring Road (TfL, 2003b, point 3.75). To accom-
modate the increase in bus ridership, TfL increased the number of buses in the central zone by
19% over the year previous to the introduction of the Scheme. Other improvements included the
addition of new routes, the switch of 10 major routes from single-deck to double-deck buses,
and the addition of 18-metre ‘bendy’ buses on heavily traveled routes.
The provision of good public transport is a key part of implementing a fair pricing scheme.
Without or with inferior public transport alternatives, a road pricing scheme is just a regressive
tax on the middle and poor classes.2With good public transport, road pricing is, to some degree,
a luxury tax—without it, it is just a regressive tax. TfL’s increase in the bus service before and
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 171
Although bus ridership
increased in line with
expectations,
Underground travel did
not.
Table 5: Examples of Nonconstant Patterns in Percentage Changes in Travel Times
April 2002 April 2003 Change May 2002 May 2003 Change
Route (min.) (min.) (%) (min.) (min.) (%)
A1 Mill Hill to Islington 50.1 51.7 3 55.4 53.9 –3
A41 Mill Hill, Five Ways to
Regent’s Park 35.8 38.4 7 42 46.4 10
A40/M Denham to Marylebone 65.4 68.9 5 62.6 58.7 –6
A4 Langley, Slough to Talgarth Road 58.6 56.1 –4 64.4 59.7 –7
A30 Stanwell to Osterley 16.5 17.5 6 14.8 17.7 20
A316 Sunbury Cross to Ravenscourt
Park 42.9 39.7 –7 44.3 48.4 9
A3 Cobham to Clapham 58.4 59.3 2 51.2 66 29
A23 Hooley to Brixton 66 66.7 1 64.8 71.6 10
A20 Swanley to Eltham 23 23.2 1 21.7 26 20
A2/A102 Dartford to Blackwall
Tunnel 46.7 46.7 0 40.7 45.8 13
A12 Harold Wood to Blackwall
Tunnel 72.5 70.7 –2 71.7 69.4 –3
A10 Waltham Cross to Stoke
Newington 55.8 58.1 4 53.4 57 7
SOURCE: Trafficmaster PLC (data supplied on request).
NOTE: Both months are within school term.
after the Scheme started is an example of changes that need to be part of the process to promote
fair social outcomes.
EFFECTS ON OTHER TRANSPORT
TfL (2003b, point 3.64) estimates that 15% to 25% of the reduction in car use per charging
day is the result of car users switching to other modes of transport—such as car share, motorcy-
cles, and bicycles—or making adaptations such as altering travel plans to avoid the charging
hours or charging zone, and walking. Table 6 shows that the total counts of bicyclesand motor-
cycles going into the charging zone increased by 31% and 19%, respectively. The increases,
higher than TfL’s expectations (2003b, point 3.38), are not surprising, given the fact that neither
of those vehicle categories pays the charge. Surprisingly enough, the number of powered two-
wheelers (motorcycles and mopeds) and bicycles involved in accidents following the introduc-
tion of the Scheme fell by 15% and 17%, respectively, when compared to the same period in
2002 (TfL, 2003b, point 3.97). These results probably reflect the long-term trend of declining
accidents in London rather than any feature linked to the Scheme.
Incoming taxis also increased by 19%, more than TfL expected (2003b, point 3.38). In addi-
tion, the count of working vehicles, such as LGVs and HGVs, decreased.
Although when PCU ratings are taken into account the percentage changes change, the final
results do not change too much, mainly as a consequence of traffic composition. Table 6 shows
changes in vehicle counts and in PCU counts. It can, therefore, be concluded that the increase in
the use of buses, taxis, motorcycles, and bicycles does not jeopardize the reduction in overall
traffic, which has been larger than expected. Grounds to extend the charge to include other vehi-
cle categories, as done in Singapore, seem absent.
Empirical Analysis
This section includes a calculation of the elasticity of demand for car trips with respect to the
generalized cost of travel, as well as a calculation of the marginal cost of congestion within the
central London zone. The results are then compared with estimates from the literature.
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
An elasticity measures the percentage change in one variable with respect to a percentage
change in another. Herein it measures the responsiveness of demand for trips due to a change in
travel costs. The generalized costs of travel include money costs and time costs, as defined in
Equation 1.
To proceed with the calculations, it is necessary to determine the average generalized cost of
travel into central London. The U.K. Automobile Association provides detailed estimates of
motoring costs (money costs) for cars, split out by fixed and variable costs (Automobile Associ-
ation, 2003). The values depend on annual mileage (for fuel, maintenance) and cost of vehicle
(financing, insurance, depreciation).
We had to make several assumptions in selecting the appropriate measure of motoring costs.
Firstly, we chose the Automobile Association’s above-average cost of car category to reflect the
fact that the average Londoner has a higher income than the national average (National Statis-
tics, 2003). The cost of a car affects the fixed costs of insurance and financing. To attain per km
costs, we used the average annual distance driven by a Londoner of 8,800 km (5,466 miles)
(TfL, 2001, p. 2). The corresponding motoring costs for an average Londoner are thus roughly
47.5 pence/km (U.S. $1.2/mile), of which 12.25 pence (U.S. $0.20 cents) are variable costs. The
motoring costs are presented in Table 7.
To calculate time costs, it is necessary to determine a value of travel time savings (VTTS).
The Transport Economics Note (Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions,
172 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
Table 6: Vehicle Counts Pre- and Postcharging
Bus & HGVs Total Pedal and
Pedal Cycles Motorcycles Cars Taxis Coach LGVs & Other 4+ Wheels Total Noncars Motorcycles
Spring 2002 incoming 13,836 25,840 193,912 55,971 13,393 53,780 15,329 332,386 372,062 178,149 39,676
Spring 2002 outgoing 11,346 22,940 192,840 57,036 13,079 59,487 16,256 338,697 372,982 180,143 34,285
Spring 2002 total 25,181 48,780 386,752 113,007 26,472 113,267 31,585 671,083 745,044 358,292 73,961
Spring 2003 incoming 18,131 30,779 133,016 66,836 15,518 48,745 13,476 277,591 326,501 193,485 48,910
Spring 2003 outgoing 12,535 25,426 125,151 64,917 15,735 50,660 14,402 270,865 308,826 183,675 37,961
Spring 2003 total 30,666 56,205 258,168 131,753 31,253 99,405 27,878 548,456 635,328 377,160 86,871
Changes (%)
Incoming vehicles 31 19 –31 19 16 –9 –12 –16 –12 9 23
Outgoing vehicles 10 11 –35 14 20 –15 –11 –20 –17 2 11
Total vehicles 22 15 –33 17 18 –12 –12 –18 –15 5 17
PCU ratings 0.2 0.5 1 1 2.5 1.5 2.5
Changes (%)
Incoming PCUs –14 –13 3 21
Outgoing PCUs –17 –16 –1 11
Total PCUs –16 –15 1 16
SOURCE: Transport for London, data provided on request.
NOTE: PCU = passenger car units, LGVs = light goods vehicles, HGVs = heavy goods vehicles.
173
2001) provides base figures and guidelines on how to estimate working and nonworking VTTS.
Another source for VTTS in the United Kingdom is a report to the Department for Transport by
Mackie et al. (2003). This comprehensive report reexamines a substantial stated preference data
set used in an earlier investigation commissioned by the same department in 1994. In addition,
the results are cross-referenced with those obtained from meta-analysis. Table 8 details some of
their recommended estimates.
Although we computed the elasticity of demand following the Transport Economics Note
(Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions, 2001) in the first instance, we
also used another set of values following the recommendations in Mackie et al. (2003). The
main difference between the two documents is that Mackie et al. (2003) recognize that although
commuting trips are nonworking they tend to have a slightly higher VTTS than shopping or lei-
sure trips.3
To produce working and nonworking VTTS following the Transport Economics Note
(Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions, 2001), we updated the values to
2003 prices. We also increased the working value of time by 34%, to reflect the difference in the
average earnings in London, as indicated in the New Earnings Survey 2003 (National Statistics,
2003). We considered two categories of trips: working, as trips made in the course of work,
excluding commuting, and nonworking. We estimated the working VTTS at 42.2 pence/minute
and the nonworking VTTS at 4.9 pence/min. TfL provided us with provisional data indicat-
ing that 10% of car trips in London are business trips. The weighted VTTS we used was there-
fore 8.6 pence/minute. Using the average car occupancy rate of 1.35 (TfL, 2002c, p. 19), this
amounts to 11.7 pence/PCU-minute. Other numbers needed to calculate the elasticities are
shown in Table 9.
Using all this information, we computed the percentage change in generalized costs. We esti-
mated elasticities of demand for trips by car with respect to changes in generalized costs includ-
ing all vehicle costs as well as generalized costs including time costs and car running costs but
excluding fixed costs. For a change in travel demand, the appropriate statistic is the 31% reduc-
174 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
Table 7: Motoring Costs
Standing Costs (£ Annual)
Road tax 160
Insurance 448
Cost of capital 412
Depreciation 2080
Standing costs total (pence/km) 35.2
Running costs (pence/km)
Fuel 7.18
Service: tires, parts, and labor 3.95
Parking 1.13
Running costs total (pence/km) 12.25
Total costs (pence/km) 47.48
SOURCE: U.K. Automobile Association at www.theaa.com/allaboutcars/advice/advice_rcosts_home.html
Table 8: Estimates of the Value of Car Travel Time Savings at End of 1997 Values
Income Band Commuting (p/min) Other (p/min)
Below £17,500 3.6 4.6
£17,500 to £35,000 5.9 5.9
Above £35,000 8.6 7.1
SOURCE: Mackie et al. (2003).
NOTE: p/min.: pence/minute.
tion in car travel entering the central zone. This statistic best represents the demand response of
those who are not exempt from the charge, such as residents. Unfortunately it is not possible to
determine whether the reduction in demand for car trips is entirely the result of the charge or the
result of a combination of factors in addition to the charge, such as the economic slowdown.
Table 10 presents the results. The most relevant value in the short run is –1.32, as that
excludes fixed costs from the calculations.
For the calculations following Mackie et al. (2003), we considered three categories of trips:
working, commuting, and other. Of all trips made by car in London, 10% are for business pur-
poses, 26% for commuting, and 64% for other purposes such as leisure, shopping, etc.4We
derived the value of working time from the gross weekly earning in London indicated in the
New Earnings Survey 2003 (National Statistics, 2003). We took the VTTS for commuting and
other purposes for different income levelsfrom Mackie et al. (2003), updated them to 2003 val-
ues, and calibrated them to the average salary in London. In this way, we estimated the average
VTTS at 32.9 pence/minute, 7.7 pence/minute, and 6.4 pence/minute for working, commut-
ing, and other-purpose car trips, respectively. The weighted VTTS we used was therefore 9.4
pence/min, equivalent to 12.7 pence/min, assuming a car occupancy rate of 1.35. Thus, we
obtained elasticities of –2.5 and –1.6, very similar to –2.1 and –1.3 of Table 10.
Literature regarding elasticity of demand with respect to congestion charges is relatively
rare. In Singapore, however, where charges are revised regularly, there has been considerable
scope for evaluating effects of price changes. Dodgson et al. (2002) summarize various studies
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 175
Table 9: Details of an Average Trip by Car in London
Distance traveled per daya23.4 km
Time traveled per day (precharging) 94 min
Time savings per day (postcharging) 12 min
Vehicle costs 47.5 pence/km
Running costs 12.3 pence/km
Value of time per car 11.7 pence/min
Average occupancy 1.35
a. Transport for London (2002a) concludes that the average car trip in London is 11.7 km (Table 7.1, p.25) and two trips
per day are assumed in the current study.
Table 10: Elasticities of Demand for Car Trips With Respect to Costs
All GC GC Excluding Fixed Costs
Occupancy rate 1.35 1.35
Average car trip (km) 11.7 11.7
Number of trips per day 2 2
VTTS per person (pence/min) 8.6 8.6
Time per trip (min) 47 47
Time savings per trip (min) 6 6
Vehicle operating costs (pence/km) 47.5 12.3
GC per day (£) 22.07 13.82
Toll (£) 5.00 5.00
Time benefits (£) 1.40 1.40
Reliability benefitsa(£) .35 .35
Change in GC (£) –3.25 –3.25
Change in GC (%) –14.7 –23.5
Change in Demand (%) 31 31
Elasticity –2.1 –1.3
SOURCE: Own calculations with numbers from Tables 7 and 9.
NOTE: Dodgson, Young, and van der Veer (2002) argue that reliability benefits are worth approximately 25% of time
benefits.
a. VTTS = value of travel time savings.
for Singapore suggesting point elasticities in the order of –.12 to –.35 with respect to congestion
charges.
More commonly calculated are elasticities of demand with respect to fuel prices. Goodwin
(1992) calculated short-run and long-run elasticities of –.16 and –.32, respectively. These num-
bers are still considered standard values for the responsiveness of car travel demand with
respect to changes in fuel prices (Graham & Glaister, 2002).
As a general rule, the sensitivity of demand to generalized cost changes will broadly be equal
to the fuel price elasticity divided by the fuel share of generalized cost (Dodgson et al., 2002,
p. 28). For example, if fuel costs change by 10%, but the share of fuelcosts in terms of total costs
is only one fourth, then generalized costs have changed by only 2.5%. In heavily congested
London, where time costs have a much larger share of total costs, the share of fuel costs can be
estimated at roughly 8% to 16%, with the higher range going to the running-costs-only scenar-
ios. Therefore, Goodwin’s value of –.16 for short-run fuel price elasticity corresponds to a gen-
eralized cost elasticity of between –1.3 and –2.1, exactly the values computed in Table 10.
These high elasticities in London are probably linked to the wide availability of public trans-
port. In a region with poor public transport alternatives, we would expect to observe a lower
elasticity of demand for travel by car.
MARGINAL CONGESTION COST
As explained earlier, the MCC is equal to the value of time divided by speed, then multiplied
by the elasticity of speed with respect to flow.
MCC b
sq esq
=
()
(5)
This expression typically computes the MCC of vehicles on a given link. Here the same
expression computes an “area MCC,” when traffic is assumed to be homogeneous within the
small, congested central zone with disregard for link-versus-intersection differences.
The calculations within the central zone can thus be carried out assuming that speed within
the zone has risen from 14 km/hour to 17 km/hour (21% increase) and total traffic levels, mea-
sured in PCUs and including all vehicle types, have decreased by 15%, as indicated in Table 6.
The average VTTS within the central zone was estimated at 29.6 pence/PCU-minute at 2003
prices. This value computes the precharging shares of traffic as implied by Table 6, their associ-
ated PCU values and occupancy rates, and trip purposes as provided by TfL on request. Follow-
ing the practice set for the London Congestion Charging Research Programme (MVA Consul-
tancy, 1995 ) and for the ROCOL study (ROCOL Working Group, 2000) a single value of time
was used for all modes in the case of working time, and a single value of time was used for all
person types in the case of nonworking time.
Ordinarily, flow measures in terms of vehicles per hour on a link; however, in the context of
an urban setting, this link-based measurement is less applicable. Therefore, the use of traffic
volumes serves as a better proxy for flow in urban areas. Using this data, the implied area mar-
ginal cost of congestion is:
MCC =××=
29 6 60
14
021
015 186 5
..
..pence/PCU-km.
When converted to vehicle-km from PCU-km using an average PCU/vehicle rate of 1.13, the
calculated MCC is 165 pence/vehicle-km at 2003 prices. This calculated MCC value is higher
than the value computed by Sansom, Nash, Mackie, Shires, and Watkiss (2001), who by esti-
mating speed-flow relationships for a variety of road settings, calculated a MCC of 86 pence/
vehicle-km updated to 2003 prices in a major urban center such as London. The values we esti-
mated here, however, rest on the latest data and empirical evidence and are therefore more
reliable.
176 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
The estimated area MCC of £1.65 illustrates that for the £5 congestion charge to reflect on
average the congestion externality, an average vehicle would need to travel a distance of about 3
km/day inside the charging zone, which is a reasonable expectation given that the zone has a
diameter of roughly 5 km.
Costs and Benefits
The capital costs of the Scheme were approximately £200 million at 2003 prices, most of
which the central government provided.5The annual operational costs and benefits are pre-
sented in Table 11, as detailed in the Six Months On report (TfL, 2003b). The table suggests a net
benefit of around £50 million for the first year of operation.
A 5-year monitoring program has been set up, beginning 1 year before the start of charging
and ending 4 years after. It consists of more than 100 surveys and studies designed to measure
and understand the impacts of the Scheme. Although 1 year into the Scheme may still be early to
draw any conclusions, it is clear that the Scheme will have economic, social, and environmental
impacts. The monitoring program is already assessing all these different aspects, and Transport
for London will produce annual reports describing and explaining them.
Westminster City Council conducted a survey to find out how businesses felt about the con-
gestion charge. Of all the respondents, 68% have their businesses inside the charging zone, 44%
are retailers, and 27% are bars and/or restaurants (Westminster City Council, 2003). Almost
69% of the respondents feel the Scheme has had a negative impact on their business, 8% feel it
has had a positive impact, and 23% feel it has had no impact. Almost 28% of the respondents are
considering relocating outside of the zone as a result of the charge.
During October and November 2003, TfL surveyed more than 700 businesses in and around
the charging zone. Concerns about the negative impact of the Scheme mainly came from the
retail and leisure sectors, which reported a 2% reduction in sales for the first half of 2003 (TfL,
2004). According to these sectors, the reasons for the decline in sales were economic and tour-
ism factors, though congestion charging constituted about one fifth of the reported causes (TfL,
2004).
TfL (2004) presents some preliminary evidence of the relationship between the reduction in
sales, tourism, and Underground patronage. The main conclusion is that retail sales and tourism
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 177
The table suggests a net
benefit of around £50
million for the first year
of operation.
Table 11: Preliminary Estimates of the Annual Costs and Benefits of the London Scheme (£ million at 2003
prices)
Annual costs
Transport for London administrative and other costs 5
Scheme operation 90
Additional bus costs 20
Charge payer compliance costs 15
Total 130
Annual benefits
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, business use 75
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, private use 40
Time savings to commercial vehicle occupants 20
Time savings to bus passengers 20
Reliability benefits to car, taxi, and commercial vehicle occupants 10
Reliability benefits to bus passengers 10
Vehicle fuel and operating savings 10
Accident savings 15
Disbenefit to car occupants transferring to public transport, and so on –20
Total 180
SOURCE: Transport for London (2003b, Table 3).
numbers are strongly correlated and show a negative trend during the first months of 2003.
Underground patronage during 2003 was 7% to 10% lower in the charging zone and 4% to 7%
lower across the entire network when compared with 2002. When Underground travel is added
on to the analysis, the significant reductions in Underground travel during spring 2003 (reflect-
ing not only lower tourism levels but also the Central line closure) coincide with the period of
negative retail growth (TfL, 2004, p. 25). Although the exact impact cannot be quantified, a link
between the decline in Underground travel and in sales in the charging zone is clear. The
Scheme encouraged the switch from the car to the Underground. A reduction in Underground
travel cannot be linked to the Scheme in any way.
A central area where the centers of government, law, business, finance, retail activity, and
entertainment concentrate creates positive externalities. With businesses considering relocation
in the long run, the benefits of the Scheme would be affected by losses in social welfare, mainly
a result of the loss of these positive externalities. It is early to determine what the trend will be,
and some more monitoring is needed before any conclusions can be drawn.
Use of Revenues
The mayor’s transport strategy (Greater London Authority [GLA], 2001), as well as conges-
tion reduction, also includes objectives such as investing in the Underground, improving bus
services, and integrating National Rail with other transport systems. The GLA Act 1999 (Acts
of Parliament, 1999) ensures that revenues from charging schemes will be earmarked for the
mayor’s transport strategy projects for at least 10 years from their implementation date.
Transport investment in London has been inadequate since the mid 1980s and, therefore,
unable to accommodate economic and demographic growth, resulting in high levels of conges-
tion together with overcrowded and unreliable public transport (GLA, 2001, p. 23). The plan to
revert the situation entails delivering the necessary additional public transport capacity and reli-
ability in conjunction with demand management policies, such as congestion charging.
The Scheme raised £68 million in 2003/04 and is expected to raise £80 to £100 million in
future years for investment in transport.6Transport improvements in London in 2003/04 totaled
£82.8 million at 2003 prices (GLA, 2004, p. 51). Thedifference wascovered withresources that
became available from other sources such as increased revenues from public transport.7TfL
constantly monitors changes in revenues from the Scheme, as well as other incomes and expen-
diture. It constantly adjusts the budget appropriately and makes reallocations where necessary.
The Mayor’s Annual Report (GLA, 2004, p. 51) gives details of the transport improvements
carried out in the period 2003/04. Of the £82.8 million, £62.8 million were allocated to bus net-
work improvements (higher frequencies, additional routes, enhanced route supervision, and
conversion to higher capacity routes); £10.5 million to road safety (research, engineering
works, and education campaigns); £2 million to safer routes to schools, £6 million to walking
and cycling (strategic and local engineering schemes on all London’s roads as well as informa-
tion campaigns); and £1.5 million to freight (measures to make the distribution of goods more
sustainable).
A very important factor in the success of the Scheme is the revenues going back into the
transport sector. Londoners can see where the money is going. The integrated nature of TfL
seems to be a positive example of the kind of coordination that may produce good social out-
comes from a pricing scheme.
Equity Impacts
A regressive tax, by definition, takes a larger percentage of the income of low-income people
than of high-income people. Strictly speaking, a congestion charge is not a tax but is perceived
as a tax by the motoring public. According to the System of National Accounts 1993 (Commis-
178 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2004
sion of the European Communities et al., 1993) taxes are “compulsory, unrequited payments”
for which “the government provides nothing in return to the individual unit making the pay-
ment, although governments may use the funds raised in taxes to provide goods or services to
other units” (Point 8.43).
Although congestion charges are not taxes, they are still regressive in the sense that they do
not vary with income (i.e., the charge paid by drivers is the same regardless of their income). A
daily toll of £5 to drive into central London, for example, represents a larger percentage of the
income of low-income people than of the income of high-income people.
In that sense the Scheme may be having perverse impacts on lower income groups. Although
the answer to this problem would be a switch to public transport, the necessary conditions of
reliability, safety, and frequency may have been met during the times of operation of the Scheme
but not during other times, and this may pose a problem. For example, when low-income work-
ers drive into the charging area at early hours in the morning (2:00 AM for some butchers) the
charge does not apply, yet they have to pay the charge when they finish work later in the morning
and want to leave the zone to drive home. Public transport during the night is perceived as infre-
quent, unsafe, or unreliable. These low-income workers have to choose between the inconve-
nience of traveling by bus or paying the charge when they finish work. The 5-year monitoring
program will assess any impacts on equity when more evidence becomes available.
The data on traffic counts presented in Table 6 combined with the occupancy rates given in
the London Travel Report 2002 (TfL, 2002b, Table 5.1, p.19) and in the Transport Economics
Note (Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions, 2001, Table 2/3 imply that
52% of all people traveling to or from the charging zone used buses before the Scheme was
introduced. Taxi, pedal, and motorcycle use raises the total share of people that did not use a
chargeable mode of transport before the Scheme to 63.9%. These are winners, in the sense that
they are enjoying lower congestion without paying a penny, and suffer no disutility from chang-
ing mode. From a very conservative point of view, the remaining 36.1% would be losers. How-
ever, those with very high values of time also have a net benefit after paying the congestion
charge. In addition, Table 1 gives a number of exemptions and discounts. The share of people
travelling by car was reduced from 27% to 18%; thus 9% of the original car users have trans-
ferred to some other mode or made alternative arrangements. The second part of Table 11 shows
a disbenefit of £20 million for this group.
Conclusions
The preliminary results suggest that the London Scheme has so far succeeded in achieving
the stated congestion reduction targets. Traffic decreased by more than expected, which means
that elasticities might have been underestimated prior to the implementation of the Scheme.
Goodwin (2003) suggests that elasticities were revised down by a sort of so-called ratchet effect
from one study to the next. Their authors probably wanted to be conservative and would choose
the lowest estimate. The fact that public transport in London was substantially improved before
the Scheme started points to the rationale for these high elasticities of demand.
The calculated area MCC suggests that the £5 charge is a reasonable approximation to mar-
ginal cost pricing.
The largest potential hurdle, the political one, is perhaps where the largest success has been
made. Although economists have suggested for over 80 years that drivers should face the true
social cost of their actions, it is inevitably a politically unpopular decision to implement any
form of charge on the act of driving. However, despite this there hasbeen surprisingly little pub-
lic backlash. The system is simple, feasible, and transparent, a key factor that accounts for its
success. Furthermore, the hypothecation of revenues, guaranteed by the Greater London
Authority Act 1999 (Acts of Parliament, 1999), and a lengthy consultation process before the
Scheme was introduced provided a feeling of trust to the public in knowing where their money
would be spent. Surveys carried out by Market & Opinion Research International, an independ-
Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 179
The preliminary results
suggest that the London
Scheme has so far
succeeded in achieving
the stated congestion
reduction targets.
ently owned research company in the U.K., show that although only 50% of London residents
support the Scheme, 73% think it has been effective at reducing congestion (Market & Opinion
Research International, 2003).
Public consultation on a revision to the mayor’s transport strategy began on February 16,
2004 and lasted for 10 weeks. The revision would allow an extension of the charging zone to
include parts of the City of Westminster, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (GLA,
2004, p. 52). This reform would double the size of the charging area, imply higher revenues, and
thereby allow more investment in public transport.
In London, where traffic had returned to speeds of 100 years ago (TfL, 2002a) the costs of
congestion were recognized as being too high and the public acknowledged that supply-side
measures do not work in themselves. The introduction of congestion charging to one of the
major cities of the world is perhaps a sign that the world is ready to shift road pricing from its
theoretical hideaway to a practical center stage.
Notes
1. The following year the Transport Act 2000 (Acts of Parliament, 2000) was passed, allowing for joint schemes,
including ones involving London authorities, as long as the order has been submitted to and confirmed by the Greater
London Authority. This power to make joint local-London charging schemes does not limit any of the powers to intro-
duce road-user charging in greater London given by the Greater London Authority Act 1999.
2. A brief discussion on the potential equity impacts of the Scheme is presented beginning on page 178.
3. This is probably because of the potential penalty for arriving late.
4. These figures were provided by TfL on request and are part of the LondonArea Transport Survey 2001, House-
hold Survey, Interim weighted data. They will be included in the London Travel Report 2003 when it is published.
5. Information provided by TfL via e-mail.
6. Even though net revenues were £69 million (U.S. $108 million), net economic benefits were £50 million (U.S.
$78 million).
7. Information provided by GLA via e-mail, on request.
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Santos, Shaffer / LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 181
