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Media Coverage of the Economy and Aggregate Economic Evaluations: Uncovering Evidence of Indirect Media Effects
Abstract
In the following analysis, we investigate two important questions: (1) how closely does media coverage of the economy reflect real changes in eco nomic conditions? and (2) to what extent does economic coverage of the economy exert an independent effect on economic evaluations? We then use this information to explore Republican claims that media coverage of the economy hurt the Bush reelection campaign. Consistent with previous research, we find that, overall, the media tend to follow negative economic conditions more closely than positive economic conditions. In addition, news coverage appears to be strongly related to aggregate public evaluations of the economy, even after controlling for real economic conditions. Final ly, we also find that news coverage of the economy was significantly differ ent during 1982, 1991, and 1992 than during other years under study. During these years, coverage of the economy was more negative than would have been expected on the basis of economic conditions alone. The implications of these findings, particularly with respect to Republican claims of media bias, are explored.
... A second set of research has focused on the relationships between economic news, public opinion and macroeconomic developments. Some works only address the influence of news on public opinion about the economy, measured in confidence indices (Boomgaarden, van Spanje, Vliegenthart & de Vreese, 2011;Damstra, 2019;Goidel, Procopio, Terrell & Wu, 2010;Hetsroni, Sheaffer, Zion & Rosenboim, 2014), while others go further and also include real economic dynamics as a variable in their empirical analysis (Blood & Phillips, 1995;Boydstun, Highton & Linn, 2018;Doms & Morin, 2004;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hester & Gibson, 2003;Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2011;Lischka, 2015;Soroka, 2006;Soroka, Stecula & Wlezien, 2015;Wu, Stevenson, Chen & Güner, 2002). The overriding goal of these studies is to determine which of these variables are independent and which are dependent, and to what extent. ...
... Similarly, the available literature concludes that the public's perception of the economy depends primarily on economic reality, although the tone used by the media also shapes perceptions among the public (Boydstun et al., 2018;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hetsroni et al., 2014;Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2011;Lischka, 2015;Soroka et al., 2015). When considering the effect of the economic reality variable on their models, works such as those by Boydstun, Highton and Linn (2018), or Goidel and Langley (1995), confirm that a significant correlation persists between the tone of the news and public perception. ...
... Similarly, the available literature concludes that the public's perception of the economy depends primarily on economic reality, although the tone used by the media also shapes perceptions among the public (Boydstun et al., 2018;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hetsroni et al., 2014;Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2011;Lischka, 2015;Soroka et al., 2015). When considering the effect of the economic reality variable on their models, works such as those by Boydstun, Highton and Linn (2018), or Goidel and Langley (1995), confirm that a significant correlation persists between the tone of the news and public perception. However, it should be noted that the way the public is influenced by media tone or the economic situation itself, differs in accordance with circumstances. ...
Research on coverage of the economic developments in the run-up to the 2008 crisis concludes that the media did not warn of the risks involved, failing in their watchdog role by not anticipating the crisis. However, a key issue remains unaddressed: what would have happened if the media had warned about the factors of instability that led to the crisis? This article explores some answers to this question, for the 2008 crisis and for economic crises in general. To do this, we perform a joint critical review of the literature on watchdog journalism, on economic crises theories, and on media effects on the economy. More specifically, we consider the media’s influence on financial markets, on macroeconomic dynamics (via conditioning the households’ and firms’ behavior), and on economic policy; discussing, at the theoretical level and supported by the empirical evidence available, the ways each kind of media influence could (or not) prevent a structural economic crisis. If the crisis is interpreted as the consequence of dysfunctions in the economic model, or specific errors by agents, it is logical to think that the media could have helped prevent it, by warning of the dangers and promoting changes in public policies and investment decisions. If, on the other hand, the crisis is understood as a necessary readjustment of capitalism in the face of an exhausted accumulation model, the media’s influence would have been very limited in terms of preventing it.
... The 1992 US Presidential elections have been a catalyst for research into the content of economic news, since these have made clear how economic news rather than real economic circumstances have the capacity to shape electoral outcomes. In the US, Goidel and Langley (1995) are among the first to systematically investigate the responsiveness of economic news to real economic conditions, concluding that the media have "plenty of latitude in deciding what economic news is important, and this latitude is exercised by focusing disproportionately on bad economic news" (Goidel & Langley, 1995, p. 320). This observed negativity bias-the tendency to systematically devote more attention to negative as compared to positive economic trends-is not a stand-alone finding but reflects a rather generalizable pattern in economic news reporting. ...
... In terms of newsworthiness, not all types of economic developments are considered equally important. Several studies point to a remarkable sensitivity among journalists towards shifts in unemployment rates (Fogarty, 2005;Goidel & Langley, 1995). Fogarty (2005) finds that changes in unemployment rates lead to more economic news, while changes in inflation rates or ICI (index of coincident indicators) do not lead to more coverage. ...
... The idea of mass media producing content that is systematically more negative than economic reality gives reason to is based on two types of findings: (1) a bad economy leads to more economic news, and (2) a bad economy leads to more negative economic news while a good or improving economy does not lead to more positive coverage. While some studies take either volume or tone as their main dependent variable (e.g., Goidel & Langley, 1995), most recent research looks at both (e.g., Fogarty, 2005;Lamla & Lein, 2014;Soroka, 2012Soroka, , 2014Soroka et al., 2015;Van Dalen et al., 2015). Volume is most often operationalized straightforwardly as the number or share of economic news items per time unit (print or television), while tone captures the general sentiment of an economic news item (i.e., valence: positive or negative). ...
... Several scholars have studied the responsiveness of economic news coverage to the economic events themselves (see for a review). Goidel and Langley (1995) showed that actual economic conditions can only account for a quarter of the variance in the number of negative economic articles, and even less in the case of positive items. Despite a small number of studies that documented a certain correspondence between economic reality and the media's portrayal of economy (Behr and Iyengar 1985;Casey and Owen 2013), most studies tend to agree that the media's economic coverage is affected by a negativity bias : the media typically foreground negative economic events and deemphasize positive ones (Fogarty 2005;Goidel and Langley 1995;Hagen 2005;Soroka 2006Soroka , 2012Van Dalen et al. 2015), as the former are considered particularly interesting by journalists (Haller and Norpoth 1997). ...
... Goidel and Langley (1995) showed that actual economic conditions can only account for a quarter of the variance in the number of negative economic articles, and even less in the case of positive items. Despite a small number of studies that documented a certain correspondence between economic reality and the media's portrayal of economy (Behr and Iyengar 1985;Casey and Owen 2013), most studies tend to agree that the media's economic coverage is affected by a negativity bias : the media typically foreground negative economic events and deemphasize positive ones (Fogarty 2005;Goidel and Langley 1995;Hagen 2005;Soroka 2006Soroka , 2012Van Dalen et al. 2015), as the former are considered particularly interesting by journalists (Haller and Norpoth 1997). ...
... Measuring the impact of media on economic events and vice versa, massively harvesting and analysing public media coverage of those events are still surprisingly unused in academia to our knowledge. Various studies have developed evidence for older states of mass media by which media coverage of news on economic processes or events impacts the very nature of the subject itself (Coyne and Leeson 2004;Goidel and Langley 1995;Doms and Morin 2004;De Boef and Kellstedt 2004;Wartick 1992;Carroll and McCombs 2003). We argue that on the one hand, today's media show certain similarities to this, but on the other hand, they have a completely different dimension in quantity and quality. ...
... Additionally, the need of mass media suppliers to produce high impact, sensational articles at high speed and frequency may lead to overestimating events. For older states of mass media, it could be shown that the news stories did not always cover the economic realities (Blood and Phillips 1995;Goidel and Langley 1995;Fogarty 2005). This has to be kept in mind when dealing with current media output as well. ...
Although conventional register and survey data on entrepreneurship have enabled remarkable insights into the phenomenon, the added value has slowed down noticeably over the last decade. There is a need for fresh approaches utilising modern data sources such as Big Data. Until now, it has been quite unknown whether Big Data actually embodies valuable contributions for entrepreneurship research and where it can perform better or worse than conventional approaches. To contribute towards the exploration of Big Data in entrepreneurship research, we use a newly developed dataset based on publications of the German Press Agency (dpa) to explore the relationship between news coverage of entrepreneurship and regional entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, we apply sentiment analysis to investigate the impact on sentiment of entrepreneurial press releases. Our results show mixed outcomes regarding the relationship between reporting of entrepreneurial events, i.e. media coverage, and entrepreneurial activity in German planning regions. At this stage, our empirical results reject the idea of a strong relationship between actual entrepreneurial activities in regions and the intensity of it being reported. However, the results also imply much potential of Big Data approaches for further research with more sophisticated methodology approaches. Our paper provides an entry point into Big Data usage in entrepreneurship research and we suggest a number of relevant research opportunities based on our results.
... Many have noted the general negativity bias in the mass media (e.g., Fogarty, 2005;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Soroka, 2006). Negativity is one, and perhaps the most, important criterion on the list of factors determining newsworthiness advanced by Galtung and Ruge (1965). ...
... Mass media provide central information regarding people's perceptions of others (Schlüter & Davidov, 2013), and therefore, the media are able to shape anti-minority attitudes (Allport, 1954;Blumler, 1958) in a way that is similar to their ability to affect EU attitudes, as described in chapter 3. I assume that the media have an influence that adds to the influence of RWDs; media developments show little overlap with RWDs (e.g., for the economic realm, Goidel & Langley, 1995;Smith, 1988) because of the extent of journalistic freedom (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) and the fact that immigration inflows alone are not necessarily newsworthy. However, the media version of reality forms the foundation of a nation's collective knowledge. ...
Since the establishment of the European Union, Europe has gone through a number of transitions. Several Treaties were signed and the EU expanded from six original member states to 28 to date. Additionally, new economic-, security- and social policies were implemented. Since the fifties the political sovereignty gradually shifted from the national to supranational level (EU). But the nineties are known as a turning point with regard to the policy areas of the EU. Where the EU’s initial goals were largely economic, the focus shifted to also encompass social and cultural policy areas. In the years after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), several social policies were implemented, which directly affected European citizenry. Ever since, Europe's role in national politics and the impact on the public has become increasingly prominent. Furthermore, the political position of the EU is still
changing today.
Extant literature argues that the shift in sovereignty has made people more critical towards the EU. A large part of the European population did see EU membership as beneficial, but a growing number of people became skeptical towards the EU and its policies. Negative consequences of European policies reflected upon the European Union and ostensibly increased Euroscepticism. For Europe, the support of its citizens is crucial, as successful European integration largely depends on the support from its citizens.
This dissertation systematically observes the effects of the above-mentioned developments on attitudes towards the European Union. It covers the period between the mid 1990s up to the late 2000s. The emphasis is on social and cultural policies, as these have become increasingly prominent since the 1990s. In four empirical chapters I aim to explain existing Euroscepticism, but also the observed trend. In other words I aim to answer the question: Why is Europe becoming more Eurosceptic?
The first chapter (chapter 2) combines the most important predictors in Euroscepticism research and compares their impact in the mid-1990s to that of the mid-2000s. The study answers the question: “Has the strength of soft and hard factors in explaining Euroscepticism changed over time?” Arguably, the change of scope of the EU during the 1990s slowly changed the perception of people regarding the EU, and created a different mental linkage in their minds. Over the course of time this has allegedly caused European citizens to judge the EU on the basis of social and identity performances (i.e., soft factors) more so than on economic, utilitarian performance (i.e., hard factors). Therefore, I pose the expectation that the explanatory power of Euroscepticism has moved from hard to soft factors between the two moments of observation. My findings reveal that there is no substantial difference in the effects in the 1990s and 2000s, and that identity has always played an important role with regard to Euroscepticism. Against expectation, the impact of soft factors has not increased between the two time points due to the increased involvement of the EU regarding socio-cultural policies. Chapter 3 investigates the reciprocal influences between the valence of media messages and Euroscepticism. In this study, media are expected to have a prominent impact on how the public perceives the EU, as media are the primary source of information regarding the European Union. Meanwhile, media are increasingly competing for an audience and are therefore likely to select, and frame their
content while taking the public tendency into consideration. Since media are more likely to report on negative trends (e.g., increased Euroscepticism) and people are more responsive to negative information, the reciprocal influences between the two domains are expected to form a ‘spiral of negativity’. Causing people and media to become increasingly negative towards the EU. The results show, however, that the public is influenced mostly by negative and not by positive messages, but that this effect is not reciprocal. In other words, the media are not influenced by public opinion. This means that news media do make the public more skeptical, but this does not lead to a self-reinforcing spiral. In chapter 4 I investigate whether individual attitudes regarding immigration are affected by Real-World Developments (such as immigrant population and immigration inflows), as well as media cues (such as issue salience and the valence of news messages). It is often argued that the size of the mmigrant
population has a direct effect on people’s immigration attitudes. Yet, when people are asked to give an estimation of the immigrant population in their country they are rarely correct. Media are the alleged cause of this discrepancy, as media coverage was found to barely represent immigration-related Real World Developments (RWDs). Hence, I argue that media have an important additional influence on immigration attitudes, on top of RWDs. The results indicate that immigrant inflows significantly increase negative immigration attitudes. Media attention also increases negative attitudes, while positive media coverage reduces them. The results indicate that media affect immigration attitudes above and beyond RWDs.
In the final empirical chapter (chapter 5) I combine Euroscepticism and immigration attitudes within a single study, as I investigate perceptions towards EU’s policies on immigration and border control management. Although media often apply more than one frame to depict political issues, prior research commonly limits itself to the effects of single-frame messages. It is, however, fairly likely that people are exposed to more than one frame at the time. Hence, in this study I capture this complexity of framing effects by investigating the impact of multi-frame messages (MFMs) in a two-wave experiment. The focus in this study is on conflict- (when disagreement between individuals, institutions or groups is
emphasized) and valence- frames (depicting or mentioning the issue in either negative or positive terms) and their effects on evaluations of EU’s performance regarding immigration and border control. While conflict framing is expected to reinforce attitudes, valence framing is likely to alter people’s attitudes. Therefore, I investigate whether the two frames cancel each other out or whether they still have these presumed effects when both frames are present in the same message. The results show that a stronger conflict frame causes people’s attitudes to become more stable, while valence framing changes them. The latter effect weakened only slightly, but remained significant with the presence of the conflict frame. But how do the findings of these four chapters relate to the trend of increasing Euroscepticism? In the chapters I find that individual factors, such as socioeconomic status, gender, and an extreme left-right position affect how one thinks about the European Union. In addition, the economic situation in the EU countries also plays a role. But these factors do not change structurally between the late 1990s and two 2000s, which means they can not explain the gradual rise in Euroscepticism. To understand the rise, we need to investigate the factors that did change over this period. One of the main findings was that negative news exerted a stronger effect on EU attitudes than positive news. A systematic increase in the amount of negative news about the EU could therefore provide an explanation for the trend. Although no growth can be observed in the amount of negative news over this time period, there is a constant dominance of negative news, which can eventually also lead to more
skepticism. In addition, the number of messages on immigration gradually increased during the same period. My findings indicated that the number of reports about immigrants lead to negative attitudes towards immigration, while negative attitudes towards immigration were found to be positively correlated with negative attitudes towards Europe. That is why news media do not only have the potential to have a direct, but also an indirect effect on Euroscepticism. But the relationship is slightly ambiguous. The effect of positive reports on attitudes towards immigration has the ability to reduce Euroscepticism, if there was a structural decline of positive immigration messages. But since our data do not show such a trend, this does not contribute to the explanation of growing Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the presence of immigrant groups appeared to have no effect on attitudes towards immigration, while the influx of immigrants exerted a small but significant effect. However, since immigration inflows were especially large in the early 1990s, this effect does not
explain why there has been a gradual increase in Euroscepticism up to the late 2000s.
Overall, one can conclude from this that an increased visibility of the immigration issue in the media contributes to the explanation of growing Euroscepticism. But an even more important finding is that negative news has an effect on increasing Euroscepticism. A constant presence of predominantly negative media coverage can indeed lead to growing Euroscepticism within Europe.
... Blood andPhillips (1995, 1997) are among the first to show how economic news shapes consumer confidence over time, above and beyond the impact of real economic conditions. Many other studies find similar economic news effects, within and outside the U.S. context (e.g., Alsem, Brakman, Hoogduin, & Kuper, 2008;Boomgaarden, Van Spanje, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2011;Doms & Morin, 2004;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2011;Wu, Stevenson, Chen, & Güner, 2002). ...
... A number of studies investigate whether and to what extent economic news effects on public opinion are moderated by real economic circumstances (Damstra & Boukes, 2018;Doms & Morin, 2004;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Wu et al., 2002). However, since no cross-national research exists in this regard, all studies operationalize economic circumstances (or "crisis") in terms of over-time change and not as country-level variation. ...
This article investigates the interactions among parliamentary questions, newspaper coverage on the economic crisis, and consumer confidence. It focuses on France, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands for the period 2005–2016. Based on insights from political agenda-setting and media effects research, we expect multidirectional relationships to be present. Parliamentary records and newspaper archives are used to analyze the monthly amount of attention for the economic crisis. Pooled time series models and vector autoregression analyses are employed to demonstrate that indeed, politicians, journalists, and citizens depend on one another, but also that remarkable cross-national and over-time differences exist. In the countries where the economy was severely damaged by the crisis (France and Spain), news coverage is less strongly affecting both parliamentarians and citizens. However, when the economic situation worsens, political agenda-setting influences get stronger,while media effects on consumer confidence becomeweaker over time.
... economic journalism does not simply follow real-world economic developments (e.g., Goidel & Langley, 1995;Lamla & Lein, 2014;Soroka, Stecula, & Wlezien, 2015) but, instead, is characterized by a set of persistent biases. Another strand of studies shows how such economic coverage subsequently influences public opinion (e.g., De Boef & Kellstedt, 2004;Nadeau, Niemi, Fan, & Amato, 1999) thereby demonstrating the relevance of economic news as a research topic from both an academic and a societal point of view. ...
... Extant research finds that journalists are asymmetrically responsive to economic conditions: They overemphasize negative stories, whereas positive developments are often neglected. Negativity biases have been found in newspaper reporting on a range of economic issues: recession news (Wu, Stevenson, Chen, & Güner, 2002), employment and inflation (Soroka, 2006(Soroka, , 2012, and macroeconomic news generally (Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hagen, 2005;Hester & Gibson, 2003;Soroka et al., 2015;van Dalen, de Vreese, & Albaek, 2015). This is the case for both print media as well as television news broadcasts (Hester & Gibson, 2003) and for economic news generally as well as for specific subthemes such as unemployment, inflation, and growth rates (Harrington, 1989). ...
This article studies the tripartite relationship between the economy, economic news, and public economic perceptions. Our analysis is twofold: We investigate the impact of the real economy on economic news in Dutch newspapers (2002-2015, N = 127,120); second, we analyze the impact of economic news on public economic perceptions. Our empirical approach builds on and contributes to the literature by making nuanced distinctions between (a) economic levels and changes (positive/negative), (b) volume and tone of coverage (positive/negative), and, most importantly, (c) people’s retrospective and prospective economic judgments. Our analyses show that the public is presented a version of economic reality that is skewed to the negative, which strongly affects people’s economic expectations but not evaluations. Extending media-dependency theory, these results demonstrate the necessity to both conceptually and empirically distinguish between people’s retrospective and prospective judgments.
... Soroka & McAdams, 2015). Since the public perception of the overall economy is closely associated with the nature of the media coverage, it is not hard to imagine why individuals might feel their personal situation is disconnected from the world apparently crumbling around them (Goidel & Langley, 1995;Hester & Gibson, 2003;Wu et al., 2002). Once this viewpoint becomes pervasive, social contagion could explain why it is adopted as the default mindset by an increasing proportion of the population. ...
We evaluate changes in the perception of Romanians about their own economic prosperity and the overall economy during the transition to free markets. We use ten questions from the Life in Transition Survey measuring people's attitudes and values related to the economic situation, from three successive waves (2006, 2010, and 2016). We first conduct an exploratory factor analysis to identify potential latent constructs within the data. In the second step, we use multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to test whether our measurement is invariant across waves. The results show a relatively stable factorial structure and a relatively complex dynamic. Consistent with previous research, we find a significant disconnect between how individuals perceive the overall economy in contrast to their own well-being, but with a Romanian twist. Most people consider their personal situation is improving; yet, at the same time, they perceive the economy is progressively deteriorating. We contend this perception disconnect is due to a combination of biases, including, but not limited to, availability bias and social contagion. We strongly suspect the culturally embedded lack of social trust, so pervasive in Romania, is also part of the explanation. To our knowledge, this is the first research that systematically investigates the perception of economic development during the transition process in Romania across multiple periods of time. Our findings underscore the challenge this perception disconnects poses to understanding and anticipating public responses to long-term growth strategies and policies. We dub this unique cultural fatalism "the Mioritic Syndrome."
... Scholars have also stud ied the respon sive ness of eco nomic news cov er age to the eco nomic events them selves (for a review, see ). Goidel and Langley (1995) showed that actual eco nomic con di tions in the United States accounted for only a quar ter of the var i ance in the num ber of neg a tive eco nomic arti cles from the New York Times-and even less in the case of pos i tive items. Despite the fact that few stud ies documented a cer tain cor re spon dence between Amer i can eco nomic real ity and its por trayal by tele vi sion and print news (Behr and Iyengar 1985;Casey and Owen 2013), the major ity of stud ies agreed that eco nomic news cov er age in print and tele vi sion broad casts is affected by a neg a tiv ity bias . ...
We argue that media-conveyed economic narratives are crucial for understanding contemporary fertility dynamics, net of objective economic constraints. Individuals use these narratives to project themselves into an actionable imagined future and make decisions that may be relatively independent from their actual economic situation. We test this hypothesis for Italy by combining individual-level data from the 2009 and 2016 releases of the nationally representative Family and Social Subjects Survey with Media Tenor data on the coverage of the economy in the evening newscast of Italian TV's most-viewed channel (Rai 1). Our findings reveal that both the incidence and tone of news reports on the state of the economy are associated with fertility behavior. An increase in the number of negative economic news items is negatively associated with fertility, whereas an increase in positive items is positively correlated with fertility. Interestingly, when positive news items outnumber negative ones, an increase in the share of economic reports is positively associated with fertility. These associations are statistically significant and substantially relevant, net of traditional individual and contextual socioeconomic fertility correlates. Overall, our findings bolster the claim that media-conveyed narratives of the economy influence fertility behaviors.
... Media coverage of economic events has been studied, to some extent, in the economics literature (see Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Nimark and Pitschner (2019)), but the bulk of contributions comes from the political science literature. The key finding in this field is the existence of a negativity bias in economic news reporting: negative events receive higher media attention than positive events, see Goidel and Langley (1995), Fogarty (2005), Soroka (2006 and Soroka (2012). This is typically shown in the context of simple linear regressions where the tone of unemployment news is regressed on positive and negative changes in the unemployment rate, together with an additional set of controls. ...
We study the dynamic link between economic news coverage and the macroeconomy. We construct two measures of media coverage of bad and good unemployment figures based on three major US newspapers. Using nonlinear time series techniques, we document three facts: (i) there is no signifi cant negativity bias in economic news coverage. The asymmetric responsiveness of newspapers' coverage to positive and negative unemployment shocks is entirely explained by the effects of these shocks on unemployment itself; (ii) consumption reacts to bad news, but not to good news; (iii) bad news is more informative to the agents and affects their expectations more than good news.
... Goidel & Langley find that, overall, the media tend to follow negative economic conditions more closely than positive economic conditions. In addition, news coverage appears to be strongly related to aggregate public evaluations of the economy, even after controlling for real economic conditions (Goidel & Langley, 1995). These studies have been conducted outside Bangladesh and there are variations in the findings of the studies. ...
Background: In recent years, various studies have raised the issue of economic progress in Bangladesh. Therefore, the government's various economic steps for the development of Bangladesh next year are very significant. The development of a country depends on its economy. The media has a big role to play in keeping the economy dynamic and strong. Various media information about the economy helps the government and the people to make any decision.
Method: The study of mixed-mode has been conducted through content analysis. As a research sample, two well-known dailies of Bangladesh, Prothom Alo and The Financial Express have been selected as the medium of purposive sampling. Media Political Economy is the theoretical framework of this research.
Result: The results show that the two newspapers have a total of 235 pieces of economic news. 64% of the news is straight news and 36% in-depth news. Although Prothom Alo has done most of its investigative reporting on various irregularities, it has focused on remittances, import-export, and the banking sector. And The Financial Express covers in-depth news on development, investment, prospects, and energy. The economic news coverage of The Financial Express was better than Prothom Alo. However, Bangladesh is going through a critical period in terms of economy, the two newspapers should have published more economic news with in-depth news. Although there are some reports about irregularities in the country's financial sector, the amount of information and coverage is not enough.
Conclusion: The media plays the role of a watchdog of society. Many financial irregularities in the country will be stopped if the media monitors various issues of the financial sector impartially and actively. The role of media is essential for the economic prosperity of the country.
... There is general agreement that media content has a negative bias (Goidel & Langley, 1995;Graber, 1979;Hartung & Stone, 1980). This negative bias implies that negative life events are likely to be preferred to positive news in the mediated reality. ...
The media correlation function has mainly been evaluated in cognitive domains from theoretical perspectives, such as agenda-setting, framing, or priming. Here we examined the correlation function in an emotional domain by investigating the association between media use and the degree of embitterment, which is a psychological symptom that originates from the accumulation of negative life experiences. A survey of 1,720 South Koreans revealed that those who had higher frequencies of media use felt a greater degree of embitterment. When different media types were examined, frequent use of print newspapers was associated with a level of embitterment from personal experiences, whereas heavy consumption of the internet and TV news was associated with embitterment from mediated reality. The implications of these findings are addressed in the context of both communication function and social epidemiology.
... Naturally, as news volumes about economic index changes are high, people are more likely to be exposed to such news (Soroka et al., 2015;Wlezien et al., 2017). Additionally, the public is more interested in predicting future economic conditions than in evaluating past conditions (Damstra et al., 2018;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Mackuen et al., 1992;Soroka et al., 2015). However, the links among economic news, consumers, and the real market are not relatively linear. ...
Housing is one of the hottest issues in South Korea. Despite mounting interest in the issue, little is known about a media role in the housing market. This study analyzes the dynamic relationships among consumer sentiment, news coverage, housing markets, and presidential approvals rates. We used monthly time-series big data, including more than 40,000 articles pertaining to housing news coverage and 70,000 home exit prices, and the Granger causality and vector error correction models. The results of this study show that housing consumers negatively respond to related media reporting, i.e., they actively interpret economic news to judge the current market and use it to make decisions on buying and selling homes. The study's theoretical and practical implications are discussed in detail.
... The extant scholarly literature has explored the connection between objective economic conditions and individuals' subjective evaluations of the economy (cf. Goidel and Langley, 1995;Holbrook and Garand, 1996;Hetherington, 1996;De Boef and Kellstedt, 2004;Newman, 2015). Applied to the positive and negative consequences of international trade, the theoretical arguments underlying this body of research assume that (1) individuals have the ability to connect their personal well-being to events and conditions that are a direct result of international trade/trade openness, and (2) if given a chance, making that connection will result in attitudinal and behavior change. ...
Objective
In this paper we consider the possible effects of contextual economic conditions (i.e., job losses attributed to trade, general unemployment) and subjective economic evaluations on how Americans think about international trade.
Methods
We use data from the 2016 Voter Study Group survey and from the 2016 American National Election Study, and we supplement these survey data with data on state contextual variables from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and from the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Results
We find that state job losses linked to trade have discernible effects on Americans' attitudes toward trade, as do subjective economic evaluations tied to confidence and anxiety about the economy.
Conclusion
Simply, (trade‐related) economic context has a strong effect on how Americans think about expanded and free trade.
... can indirectly influence consumer confidence as it impacts on consumers' perceptions of trust and economic indicators. Consumers formulate their perceptions of these indicators in terms of experience, which can span from personal experience to information provided by the media (Hester & Gibson, 2003;Goidel & Langley, 1995). Thus, the media can affect consumer confidence through sharing true news. ...
Personal consumption expenditure has long been a key driver of the US economy, accounting for roughly two-thirds of GDP. Consumer confidence is a significant predictor of consumer expenditure especially in times of shocks. The US has experienced many shocks since 1978; the latest of which is the outbreak of coronavirus. COVID19 has spread from China to the whole world; the pandemic has had far-reaching consequences for global political, social, economic, and financial structures. Consumer confidence is one of the leading economic indicators that provides information on the current and future path of the economy, helps in stimulating economic activity, and predicts change in macroeconomic variables, especially during times of economic and political uncertainty. Our study investigates the relationship between consumption expenditure and consumer confidence in the USA. It analyzes the US consumer confidence response to 11 different shocks since 1978, focusing on COVID-19 shock. Our investigation uses Michigan's monthly Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) and its five components from January 1978 to April 2020. The paper is unique in quantifying the potential variations in US consumer confidence due to COVID-19 under different scenarios; by providing a projection until August 2021. The goal is to estimate the time needed for recovery and provide guidance to policymakers on ways to restore consumer confidence to tame the impact of coronavirus on effective demand. Under the two more optimistic scenarios we predict that recovery will begin by January 2021. Under the third, less optimistic, scenario we predict that recovery will begin by April 2021.
Keywords
Consumer Confidence; COVID19; Recovery; USA; Shocks; Pandemic
... One of the issues to be considered before using newspapers for forecasting, is that unlike survey methods, media coverage of economic news may be politically biased. Empirical studies have shown that there is considerable bias in media coverage (Bovitz, Druckman, & Lupia, 2002;Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006, 2010, 2011Goidel & Langley, 1995;Larcinese, Puglisi, & Snyder, 2011;Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005). It is not unusual to think of UK print media showing such biases. ...
We investigate the performance of newspapers for forecasting inflation, output and unemployment in the United Kingdom. We concentrate on whether the economic policy content reported in popular printed media can improve on existing point forecasts. We find no evidence supporting improved nowcasts or short-term forecasts for inflation. The sentiment inferred from printed media, can however be useful for forecasting unemployment and output. Considerable improvements are also noted when using individual newspapers and keyword based indices.
... Considering the results from the analyses, this study tried to measure the magnitude of effect of Media freedom on Economic Development/Growth and Political Stability. The results are positive and are in line with the results of Goidel (1995), Pal (2011) and Khondker, (2011 in different contexts but, with different measures and variables under study. ...
With the advent of technology Mass Media has been flourishing day by day. Research shows that Media freedom is beneficial for the stability and health of the economic system of a country. Since 1947, Pakistan has a free and fair Media, but nothing can be said certainly due to absence of empirical evidence and concrete literature on the relationship between Media Freedom, Political Stability and Economic growth.
This study focuses on the empirical bases and relation among the Independent variable Media freedom and Dependent variables, Political stability and Economic growth. Political stability index has been used as a proxy for political stability, World press freedom index for Media Freedom and Annual GDP growth percentage for Economic Growth. The data is secondary in nature and spans 2001-2018, the structural equation modeling has been used to check the significance of hypotheses using IBM-AMOS.First, Media freedom has significantly positive effect on Political Stability. Second, Media freedom has insignificantly positive effect on economic growth. Third, Since 2001- 2018 Pakistan has been negatively scored in Political stability index showing instability in the country.This research study is authors’ original work and is the 1st of its kind to check the impact of Media freedom on Political stability and economic growth using proxies via structural equation modeling.
... Вместе с тем и представления об экономи-ческой ситуации, по крайней мере на уровне страны в целом, и ассоциации между политика-ми и наиболее значимыми проблемами, с кото-рыми сталкивается общество, испытывают зна-чительное влияние массовых коммуникаций 11 . Можно утверждать, что основную информа-цию о политике люди получают из сообщений СМИ 12 . ...
В статье рассматриваются особенности освещения кандидатов в президенты на выборах 2018 г. в российских СМИ. Акцент делается на региональных печатных изданиях. Опираясь на теорию повестки дня, авторы анализируют интенсивность освещения кандидатов в федеральной и региональной прессе и на крупнейших телеканалах. В освещении кандидатов во всех видах СМИ присутствует неравенство между кандидатами: в медиа существенно большее внимание уделяется В. Путину по сравнению с другими участниками гонки, в печатных СМИ есть различия в количестве новостей и между остальными кандидатами. Более известные до начала президентской кампании кандидаты получают больше внимания СМИ, что усугубляет неравенство в медиапространстве. При этом количество публикаций о кандидатах в региональной прессе не связано с результатом на выборах ни для хорошо знакомых россиянам кандидатов, занимавших на тот момент государственные посты (В. Путин, В. Жириновский) или являющихся публичными лицами (К. Собчак), ни для кандидатов-аутсайдеров. Исключение составляют П. Грудинин и Г. Явлинский, число публикаций о которых положительно связано с их результатами. Возможно, для оппозиционных кандидатов, в том числе новых игроков на политической арене, доступ к региональной прессе может быть значимым фактором, влияющим на результаты выборов.
... In the economic context, Nadeau et al. (2000), Soroka (2006), and van Raaij (1989) show that the assessment of the state of the economy and economic expectations depends, at least in part, on media reports. 2 Alsem et al. (2008), Goidel and Langley (1995), as well as Doms and Morin (2004) analyze the impact of media Does the 4th estate deliver? The Political Coverage Index and… reporting on the consumer climate. ...
With the upswing of populist, right-wing, and EU-skeptical parties and politicians in Europe, as well as the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential elections, the media and its role in democracies are, once again, under scrutiny. To investigate whether the media fulfill its role as the fourth estate, i.e. providing another level of control for government, or whether there is evidence of media capture, first, we introduce the Political Coverage Index (PCI), a new measure of the relative positioning of media within the political spectrum. In contrast to existing measures of political positioning (e.g., language similarities, explicit endorsements, mentions of ideological references), we utilize the tonality of articles and newscasts on political parties and politicians. Then, we apply the PCI to 35 opinion-leading media in Germany, on the basis of more than 10 million news items on political parties and politicians between 1998 and 2012. Lastly, we use the PCI to investigate whether the media fulfil its fourth estate role. Our findings show that the media outlets in our sample report more negatively on governing parties, which we interpret as suggestive evidence that media is fulfilling its role as fourth estate in democracies.
... Existing research that operationalizes the tone of economic news can roughly be divided into four approaches; all of these are top-down approaches in the sense that they do not include supervised machine learning techniques (i.e., specifically training an algorithm based on manually coded data)and neither will our investigation. First, a considerable number of published works have manually coded the tone of economic news by trained coders (Boomgaarden, Van Spanje, Vliegenthart, & De Vreese, 2011;Boukes & Vliegenthart, 2017;Fogarty, 2005;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Goidel, Procopio, Terrell, & Wu, 2010;Hester & Gibson, 2003;Kalogeropoulos, Svensson, Van Dalen, de Vreese, & Albaek, 2015;Soroka, 2006). The coders read (or watch) a news item, and judge whether its tone is negative, neutral or positive. ...
This article scrutinizes the method of automated content analysis to measure the tone of news coverage. We compare a range of off-the-shelf sentiment analysis tools to manually coded economic news as well as examine the agreement between these dictionary approaches themselves. We assess the performance of five off-the-shelf sentiment analysis tools and two tailor-made dictionary-based approaches. The analyses result in five conclusions. First, there is little overlap between the off-the-shelf tools; causing wide divergence in terms of tone measurement. Second, there is no stronger overlap with manual coding for short texts (i.e., headlines) than for long texts (i.e., full articles). Third, an approach that combines individual dictionaries achieves a comparably good performance. Fourth, precision may increase to acceptable levels at higher levels of granularity. Fifth, performance of dictionary approaches depends more on the number of relevant keywords in the dictionary than on the number of valenced words as such; a small tailor-made lexicon was not inferior to large established dictionaries. Altogether, we conclude that off-the-shelf sentiment analysis tools are mostly unreliable and unsuitable for research purposes – at least in the context of Dutch economic news – and manual validation for the specific language, domain, and genre of the research project at hand is always warranted.
... For example, the focus of economic news may play an important role in how coverage affects economic perceptions. Several researchers have shown that the attention across economic topics in the news is not evenly distributed; news tends to be particularly focused on unemployment rates (and its dynamics) compared with other economic subtopics (e.g., Fogarty 2005;Goidel and Langley 1995). Arguably, this has consequences for media effects: Valenced news about different topics may yield different effects on economic perceptions. ...
This study provides a longitudinal, cross-national account of the relationship between negative news coverage and consumer confidence across all twenty-eight European Union (EU) member states for the period 2005–2017. We rely on an extensive data set of international news agency coverage and a range of economic indicators retrieved from Eurostat. Employing fixed-effects pooled time series and multilevel models, we demonstrate that negative news coverage is negatively associated with consumer confidence, generally. Confirming our hypotheses grounded in media system dependency theory, more specifically, this association was stronger for the sociotropic attribute of consumer confidence than its egocentric attribute. Moreover, the association weakened under circumstances where unemployment was rising as well as in those countries that faced the most severe consequences of the financial crisis. Altogether, news coverage matters especially when people are affected less directly by the consequences of economic downturn.
... More recent studies confirmed the findings of Behr and Iyengar (1985), and demonstrated that television news broadcasts did not just focus upon those issues or topics that viewers wanted to hear. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the issues the media chooses to cover, and how the media chooses to cover those issues, influences how viewers prioritized issues (Goidel and Langley 1995;Iyengar and Simon 1993;Miller 2007;Mutz 1992). Coupled with the statistically significant findings from numerous scholars in the field of media effects (Bartels 1993;Forgette and Morris 2006;Groseclose 2011;Martin 2008;Mutz 1998;Zaller 1992;, it can be stated with confidence that the influence that television media has over the American public is not a mirage, and that television content is not just a reflection of the values and norms of the home viewing audience. ...
Prior works in the social sciences have demonstrated the importance that television can have in shaping the views and outlooks of viewers. Studies have examined how it is that overtly political broadcasting, such as political commercials or ideological cable news channels, can impact viewers. However, precious little scholarship in the field of political science has been devoted to examining how non-news programming, the lion's share of what is shown on television, can shape and mold viewers' outlooks and opinions. Television programming is often built around conflict, presenting a distorted view of the world wherein certain "in-groups," mainly the assumed audience of the broadcast, are invited to ridicule or feel hostility towards certain "out-groups." It is hypothesized that non-news programming can influence how television viewers feel toward the "out-groups" targeted for ridicule or exclusion in their broadcasts. In order to test this hypothesis, both statistical analysis of pre-assembled data and an experimental design will be utilized. Cross-sectional data assembled by GSS and Annenberg will be analyzed using logit and ordinary least square models. Controlling for the socio-demographic, partisan, and ideological characteristics of a typical viewer of late-night satirical broadcasting or religious broadcasting, it is demonstrated that increased viewing of these types of television programs is significantly correlated with increased antipathy toward the "out-groups" or public figures held up for scorn or ridicule during these programs. The experimental design involves an online survey where respondents answered a series of questions pertaining to their political views, political knowledge, and socio-demographic characteristics. Respondents were then randomly selected to be exposed to one of three video clips, one of religious broadcasting discussing California's Proposition 8, one of satirical broadcasting discussing California's Proposition 8, and a sample of network news discussing the same issue. A post-screening questionnaire regarding feelings towards targeted out-groups was then administered to the subjects. Exposure non-news television programming increased antipathy toward the "out-groups" targeted for hostility or ridicule within the television clips.
... Впрочем, данная проблема также присуща не только России: негативный уклон экономических новостей наблюдается в Великобритании (Soroka, 2006), Корее (Ju, 2014), США (Blondheim, Segev, Cabrera, 2015;Lowry, 2008) и Японии (Wu, McCracken, Saito, 2004). Особенно важной проблема дисбаланса между позитивными и негативными новостями оказывается в связи с тем, что последние оказывают более сильное влияние на общественное мнение (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, Semetko, 2011;Goidel, Langley, 1995). Вместе с тем, больший интерес населения к негативным новостям может объясняться не низменными потребностями людей, а сформированной эволюционно привычкой отслеживать угрозы и риски (Shoemaker, 1996). ...
... Having heard of accidents related to self-driving cars did negatively influence trust in them, but not participants' risk perception. However, future research may consider studying media coverage in a more nuanced way, as most people's current knowledge of self-driving cars comes from the media, which often portray the technology negatively by focusing on risks rather than benefits and reporting extensively and dramatically about accidents and legal or ethical issues (e.g., Borchers, 2013;Goidel & Langley, 1995). Significant media coverage with affect-laden images and stories also makes events like accidents more vivid and easily available in people's minds, which in turn can increase people's perceptions of risk (Raue & Scholl, 2018;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). ...
Self‐driving vehicles will affect the future of transportation, but factors that underlie perception and acceptance of self‐driving cars are yet unclear. Research on feelings as information and the affect heuristic has suggested that feelings are an important source of information, especially in situations of complexity and uncertainty. In this study (N = 1,484), we investigated how feelings related to traditional driving affect risk perception, benefit perception, and trust related to self‐driving cars as well as people's acceptance of the technology. Due to limited experiences with and knowledge of self‐driving cars, we expected that feelings related to a similar experience, namely, driving regular cars, would influence judgments of self‐driving cars. Our results support this assumption. While positive feelings of enjoyment predicted higher benefit perception and trust, negative affect predicted higher risk and higher benefit perception of self‐driving cars. Feelings of control were inversely related to risk and benefit perception, which is in line with research on the affect heuristic. Furthermore, negative affect was an important source of information for judgments of use and acceptance. Interest in using a self‐driving car was also predicted by lower risk perception, higher benefit perception, and higher levels of trust in the technology. Although people's individual experiences with advanced vehicle technologies and knowledge were associated with perceptions and acceptance, many simply have never been exposed to the technology and know little about it. In the absence of this experience or knowledge, all that is left is the knowledge, experience, and feelings they have related to regular driving.
... Soroka (2006), for example, reported that the economy was covered in a negatively skewed manner; The Times reported on a greater number of economic news stories when the economy was in decline but did not pay close attention to the economy when the labor market, consumer prices, or other economic indices showed a positive change. The asymmetric response to the economy has been observed mostly in the United States (Blood & Phillips, 1995;Fogarty, 2005;Goidel & Langley, 1995;Harrington, 1989;Hester & Gibson, 2003). Harrington (1989), for example, found that the average number of seconds devoted by the three major network news programs to the unemployment rate, Consumer Price Index, and the gross national product for 1973-1984 was significantly greater when the U.S. economy of each domain was deteriorating than when it was improving. ...
Negativity of news coverage is widely documented. We examined whether the news media’s preference for reporting negative events was salient in news coverage of the outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in South Korea, which was characterized by intensification or mitigation of viral spread. The daily number of news stories on the outbreak was compared with several viral spread indices to determine if the media responded to negative changes more than positive changes. At the aggregate level, the amount of MERS news coverage was associated with positive changes. When the number of newly confirmed patients decreased, the MERS news increased. However, a separate investigation of breakout and abatement
stages showed that the media covered more negative changes during the breakout stage and shifted to more positive occurrences during abatement. These findings are discussed in light of the dynamics of journalistic attention to health crisis.
... First, the pervasive nature of economic crises means that many individuals will come into contact with the economy beyond the group of individuals who are directly affected. We know that negative economic performance is disproportionately covered by the mass media (e.g., Goidel and Langley 1995;Harrington 1989;Soroka 2006). Heightened press coverage of the economy makes macroeconomic information readily accessible to the public, also through political discussion and via social media (Eveland and William 2004). ...
A strong argument can be made for the prime importance of information in the context of an economic recession. It is in times of crisis that information on the state of the economy is abundant and citizens have incentives to acquire it in order to sanction incumbents for mismanagement of the economy. Simultaneously, however, economic hardship strains people’s cognitive resources and motivations to seek relevant information. Using a novel research design, we assess how the recent economic recession has shaped information acquisition. Our results indicate that while personal economic hardship depresses levels of information, the recession overall boosted considerably the public’s knowledge of the state of the economy and, to a lesser degree, of parties’ policy positions in elections. For both economic and electoral types of information, economically marginal groups caught up to the economically secure in contexts of economic hardship, thereby reducing information inequalities. We discuss the findings’ implications for representative democracy.
... Д. Казун ТЕОРИЯ, МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ И МЕТОДЫ лучшим образом решать экономические вопросы, может помочь ему на выборах в том случае, если проблемы такого рода остро стоят на повестке дня. К примеру, подобная ситуация наблюдалась во время выборов в США в 1992 г. на фоне восстановления после рецессии [Fogarty, 2005;Goidel, Langley, 1995;Soroka, Stecula, Wlezien, 2015]. Однако если во время выборов для населения более актуальны другие вопросы, компетенции кандидата в области экономики могут показаться менее важными. ...
The article systematizes the main provisions of issue ownership theory. This theory states that politicians and parties closely associated with the most topical issues and perceived by the public as capable of solving the problems receive greater public support. This theory has gained popularity in recent years. However, researchers still disagree over the definition of issue ownership and its measurement. The stability of the phenomenon over time as well as its applications not only to political parties but for individual politicians is still under discussion. Researchers distinguish two types of issue ownership: competence (confidence in the ability of a political actor to solve problem) and associative ownership (spontaneous identification of a political actor with an issue). Each of these «forms of ownership» is measured using various questions. This makes it more difficult to compare research results through the lens of this theory. Issue ownership plays a significant role in the political struggle and can contribute to the victory of the candidate (or party) in elections. This situation stimulates politicians to «capture» the most advantageous issues. However, political actors have unequal opportunities for that. The advantage is enjoyed by parties currently in power. In addition, the effect of issue ownership can be different for the authorities and the opposition. The opposition benefits from the media attention to the opposition-related issues but does not lose significantly due to active discussion of the issues that the ruling party owns. Meanwhile, the ruling parties lose their votes when the news media cover the issues owned by the opposition and do not gain much from the attention to the issues they own. © 2018 Russian Public Opinion Research Center VCIOM. All Rights Reserved.
... Em estudo similar, Valentino Larcinese, Riccardo Puglisi e James M. Snyder Jr. substituem a popularidade do presidente pelas variáveis "partido do presidente" e "apoio do jornal" e encontram resultados consistentes de viés na cobertura da economia de jornais democratas contra os candidatos republica-nos, se comparados a jornais que declaram apoio aos republicanos (Larcinese et al., 2011). Outro trabalho semelhante encontra não somente disparidade entre o real estado da economia e o conteúdo das notícias sobre economia, mas também influência da cobertura na avaliação do público e, por fim, viés negativo da cobertura da economia durante a campanha de George Bush pai à presidência (Goidel e Langley, 1995). Um resultado semelhante foi obtido por Marc J. Hetherington, ao detectar grande viés negativo da cobertura da economia na eleição de 1992, na qual Bush teve frustradas as pretensões de permanência no cargo (Hetherington, 1996). ...
A partir de uma revisão dos trabalhos sobre o voto econômico e a cobertura da imprensa em eleições, propomos a hipótese de que o enquadramento (com noções de valência e responsabilização dos eventos) impresso pelo veículo em sua cobertura está associado à percepção do leitor/eleitor sobre a economia e o desempenho do governo federal. Fazemos uma análise quantitativa do enquadramento da economia e do governo federal nas notícias dos seguintes veículos: Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de S. Paulo, O Globo e Jornal Nacional, entre os meses de agosto e outubro de 2014. Utilizamos um survey com os dados sobre as percepções da situação da economia e do governo federal de consumidores de tais jornais e telejornal, no período. A partir de modelos logísticos multinomiais, concluímos que assistir JN e ler O Globo reduzem as chances de avaliar bem a economia, mas não impactam na avaliação do governo; ler a FSP não altera tais chances.
Is there a relationship between income inequality and the electoral success of incumbent governments in developing and transitional democracies, and if so, what explains its variations? Using a large N study of national legislative elections in 38 developing and transitional democracies from 1987 to 2016 and controlling for economic growth, inflation, and unemployment rates, this paper tests: (i) whether change in income inequality is negatively associated with the vote share for the incumbent party and (ii) whether the level of media freedom affects the extent of economic voting. Overall, we find evidence that increasing income inequality is negatively and significantly related to the vote share for the incumbent but only in countries with free or somewhat‐free media. Furthermore, consistent with past studies, the most robustly significant economic factor in affecting incumbent vote shares remains economic growth.
Around the world, there are increasing concerns about the accuracy of media coverage. It is vital in representative democracies that citizens have access to reliable information about what is happening in government policy, so that they can form meaningful preferences and hold politicians accountable. Yet much research and conventional wisdom questions whether the necessary information is available, consumed, and understood. This study is the first large-scale empirical investigation into the frequency and reliability of media coverage in five policy domains, and it provides tools that can be exported to other areas, in the US and elsewhere. Examining decades of government spending, media coverage, and public opinion in the US, this book assesses the accuracy of media coverage, and measures its direct impact on citizens' preferences for policy. This innovative study has far-reaching implications for those studying and teaching politics as well as for reporters and citizens.
This study examined Chinese, Russian, and Egyptian news articles from December 2014 to December 2019 on 18 different native language news sites to determine how countries with close media-state relationships use Egypt’s economic crisis to build narrative alliances and boost national identity. Using a ratio-oriented approach to strategic crisis narratives, this article shows that Scene-driven ratios are instrumental for crisis-ridden countries to rhetorically rebuild their economic order for national audiences and for other countries to forge alliances and boost their national economic identities. Similarities in narrative ratios and shifts between Chinese and Egyptian national media suggest a dual strategy by which China exploits Egypt’s economic crisis to enhance its national identity and depict Egypt as an economic partner in its Road and Belt initiative. Russia’s narrative ratios and shifts highlight Russia’s economic and military actors as the dominant drivers influencing Russian-Egyptian relations, indicating more short-term and self-centered narrative strategies. This article advances ideas about strategic crisis narratives by introducing a framework for theorizing relationships between the (in)consistency of ratios and international actors’ ability to narrate crisis resolutions and elevate their crisis identities and interests for national audiences.
We examine the individual-level characteristics and political and economic conditions associated with political discussion. To build our model of discursive engagement, we draw on existing research on political participation as well as our own theoretical reasoning. Our data cover two million individuals in twenty-eight European countries over forty-five years, and we employ a little-used approach to multilevel analysis that distinguishes variations in engagement attributable to cross-country differences from those stemming from within-country changes. Our primary findings reveal that, within countries, citizens are more likely to talk about politics at election time, when there are more electorally competitive political parties, during periods of recession, when unionization levels are higher, and when racial and ethnic diversity is greater. Across countries, political discussion is more likely where elections are ongoing and in countries with lower levels of income inequality and corruption. We also find that men and the higher-educated are more likely to discuss politics, as are those who are middle aged or employed. Our approach is wide-ranging, but it is also deliberately correlational. Future observational and experimental studies might expand on and identify the causal underpinnings of the associations we establish here.
Objective
Do voters hold accurate perceptions about economic conditions and what factors drive those perceptions? Some work suggests that voters are too hopelessly biased by partisanship or other commitments to be able to develop accurate perceptions of the economy upon which to base judgments of incumbent performance (Evans and Andersen, 2006). By contrast, other work shows that voters do a good job of developing accurate perceptions about economic conditions in which partisan bias is a minor influence (Lewis‐Beck et al., 2013).
Methods
The research note draws on a pooled data set of Canadian Election Studies from nine national elections for the period 1988–2015 to explore the relative influence of both approaches using multilevel modeling.
Results
Findings indicate evidence for both camps: partisan bias does exert some independent influence on shaping national economic evaluations and national economic evaluations reflect actual real‐world economic conditions.
Conclusions
Implications of these results suggest that economic perceptions have mixed origins that lend some, not insignificant, support to the claim that economic voting remains a viable scholarly enterprise.
Automated text analysis methods have made possible the classification of large corpora of text by measures such as topic and tone. Here, we provide a guide to help researchers navigate the consequential decisions they need to make before any measure can be produced from the text. We consider, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of such choices using as a running example efforts to measure the tone of New York Times coverage of the economy. We show that two reasonable approaches to corpus selection yield radically different corpora and we advocate for the use of keyword searches rather than predefined subject categories provided by news archives. We demonstrate the benefits of coding using article segments instead of sentences as units of analysis. We show that, given a fixed number of codings, it is better to increase the number of unique documents coded rather than the number of coders for each document. Finally, we find that supervised machine learning algorithms outperform dictionaries on a number of criteria. Overall, we intend this guide to serve as a reminder to analysts that thoughtfulness and human validation are key to text-as-data methods, particularly in an age when it is all too easy to computationally classify texts without attending to the methodological choices therein.
Studies of recent presidential elections emphasize the importance of personal economic evaluations as well as the growing importance of racial attitudes. Less clear, however, is the degree to which economic evaluations are independent of racial considerations. The election of the first African American president offers a unique opportunity to evaluate how elite cues may trigger racial attitudes, a process called “racialization.” Once activated, racial attitudes may become a basis for political evaluations. Despite evidence that racial resentment is a predictor of many political attitudes, there is surprisingly little research exploring relationships between racial resentment and economic evaluations. In this investigation, we examine the influence of racial resentment on personal retrospective and prospective economic evaluations in the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. These findings have important implications for democratic accountability, particularly in terms of citizens accurately “rewarding or punishing” incumbents based on economic performance.
People have limited experiences and rely on the media to learn about events and issues occurring in the world around them. The way the media presents news coverage can influence how individuals understand that issue or event, and subsequent policy actions that are taken. In this way, the media can influence both what the public sees as an important issue, and the priorities that end up on the policy agenda. One such issue area is that of poverty alleviation, and the 2017-2018 basic income pilot in Ontario is an example of a policy intended to address this problem. In an environment of increasing precarity, basic income emerged as a possible way to reduce uncertainties through the provision of a guaranteed grant to low-income Ontarians. Poverty alleviation is subject to political debate due to differing attitudes towards the cause and solutions. So, examining how the media covered the basic income pilot is important as the frames used by the media can shape public response to the issue. Specifically, the aim here is to focus on how local media outlets framed the pilot taking place in their communities. A content analysis of the main local newspaper in the cities of Lindsay, Hamilton, and Thunder Bay was conducted. Articles were selected for analysis from three timeframes in the pilot's duration: the pilot's announcement, implementation, and cancellation. The key question was whether the media framed coverage through a human-interest perspective, by focusing on individual stories, i.e., episodically, or if the frames were more "thematic," whereby the focus was more on general societal patterns. Judging from how poverty and poverty alleviation have typically been covered in the media, the expectation was that coverage of the basic income pilot would have followed an episodic frame, attributing the cause of poverty to individual choices, and thereby presenting the basic income pilot in a negative light. It was found that local media outlets in Ontario framed the pilot thematically and with a neutral tone. The articles examined included socioeconomic information on factors contributing to situations of poverty, which is typically left out of media coverage. Furthermore, the content was critical of the government's decision to cancel the pilot early. While limited in scope, this project provides a review of the media climate in Ontario. The findings demonstrate that while basic income may not currently be on the government's agenda, there is a favourable media climate that sets the stage for a possible revival of basic income in the future.
The paper considers the asymmetry of information waves and the relation of their news trails with market indicators and exchange rates. It draws on the crises of 1998, 2008 and 2014. The relationship between information waves and scenarios for the development of economic crises is established by comparing the frequency characteristics of certain phrases in the media and the group of financial indicators. A comparative and content analysis shows that the representation of crises in the Russian media coincides with the real state of the national economy only at the initial stage, after which the crises cease to be reflected in economic thinking in accordance with their significance. Thus, the paper concludes that the scale of economic crises is predictable in terms of the size of the information waves’ acute phase generated by these crises.
This article argues that individuals should monitor the economy most during times of economic and political uncertainty or hardship. To test the argument, we investigate macrolevel factors that shape individuals’ attention to, and retention of, economic information in the U.S. Beyond economic indicators, including unemployment, inflation, and stock prices, we investigate political and electoral changes, international crises, and media coverage. In addition, we ask if individuals monitor the economy in fundamentally different (and politically consequential) ways, depending on their level of education. We test the hypotheses with over 80,000 survey respondents in the national, monthly Surveys of Consumers from 1979 to 2013. The findings reveal that respondents from all educational backgrounds respond in remarkably similar ways to changing national political and economic conditions. We conclude by discussing the findings’ implications for our conventional understanding of opinion formation.
Recently, terms such as the “fourth industrial revolution”, or the “second machine age”, have been used both in the business press and by academics to describe the current era of technological development. Embedded in these catchphrases is an assumption about the role of technology in the economy, who it serves, and the outcomes it provides. Communication scholars have long studied how the economy and technology are independently framed in the media, but little work has focused on how these terms are framed together. Understanding how the media frames technology’s role in the economy, and how those frames change over time, is necessary to fully analyze the role of technology in today’s society. This paper conducts a comparative frame analysis of the business press in two recent periods heavily influenced by technological development: 1992–1998 and 2010–2016. Results of this frame analysis show that a positive Growth frame was the most popular frame used in both periods. Overall coverage of technology’s role in the economy has dropped significantly since 1992. The 2010–2016 period saw a notable drop in positive Market Disruption frames but an increase in positive Social Recomposition and Employment frames.
Whenever governments or international organizations provide aid in the aftermath of natural disasters, they typically justify this support by humanitarian motives. Previous empirical research found that media reports on natural disasters have a systematic impact on the amount of provided disaster aid. While this is unproblematic as long as media reports are unbiased and thus deliver an undistorted picture of the occurrence and severity of worldwide occurring disasters, systematic reporting biases would lead to distorted aid flows and perhaps other distortions like an insufficient perception of a region in international organizations. Based on data on three US news shows we show that disaster reporting is subject to a distance bias, e.g., the likelihood that a disaster is covered by the media depends on the distance between the country where the media are located and the country where the disasters occur. We also find evidence that besides the distance bias the state of economic development of a country and importance as export markets have a positive effect on the probability that US news shows are reporting on a natural disaster. As a result, international aid flows might be systematically biased and not distributed in line with the needs of the victims.
[straipsnis, santrauka, reikšminiai žodžiai lietuvių kalba; santrauka ir reikšminiai žodžiai anglų kalba]
Straipsnio tikslas – nustatyti, kaip žiniasklaida atstovauja viešajam interesui kalbėdama apie emigraciją ir emigracijos problemas Lietuvoje, bei atskleisti emigracijos klausimo nušvietimo aspektus, nulemtus žiniasklaidos viešojo ir privataus interesų derinimo. Viešojo ir privataus intereso siekimas skatina skirtingą požiūrį į auditoriją, kas savo ruožtu lemia visuomenei aktualių socialinių problemų nušvietimo ypatumus. Atliepiant viešąjį interesą pateikiama įvairiapusiška informacija, skirtingos nuomonės, neapsiribojama situacijos nupasakojimu, stengiamasi ją analizuoti ir visuomenę supažindinti su problemos priežastimis, galimais sprendimo būdais. Privataus intereso tenkinimas lemia pateikiamos analizės seklumą, negatyvaus aspekto dominavimą, emocionalumą, straipsnių teksto ir antraščių nederėjimą.
Do economic performance and economic news coverage influence public perceptions of the economy? Efforts to assess the effects are hampered by the interrelationships among the variables. In this paper, we bring to bear a more careful accounting of available economic variables than previous studies have used. We find that both media tone and economic attitudes are strongly related to actual economic performance. Moreover, after taking into account the economy itself, a substantial relationship between media tone and economic attitudes persists. Given that economic attitudes influence a wide variety of political outcomes, this finding carries important normative and political significance.
This study develops a model that contributes to our understanding of the complex relationship between economic motivations and anti-Muslim attitudes by analyzing the underexplored role of news consumption. Using a large-scale Dutch panel dataset (n = 2694), we test a structural equation model theoretically grounded in group conflict theory, in which the relationship between news consumption and anti-Muslim attitudes is mediated by perceptions and emotions about the economy. Findings offer sound empirical support for the hypothesized model: news consumption increases pessimistic economic perceptions and negative emotions about the economy, which in turn strengthens anti-Muslim attitudes. The mechanism, however, largely depends on the type of news outlet and genre: watching television seems more decisive than reading newspapers; moreover, especially exposure to soft and popular news formats plays a dominant role.
Publizistik und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung – der Titel der Festschrift für Wolfgang Donsbach ist das Credo seiner akademischen Tätigkeit. Ob als Hochschullehrer oder als Präsident der International Communication Association (ICA) oder der World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) standen und stehen die Analyse der Leistungen der Massenmedien für das politische System, der Stellenwert eines unabhängigen und neutralen Journalismus und einer daraus resultierenden qualitativ anspruchsvollen Berichterstattung im Zentrum seines Schaffens. Das Buch beinhaltet Aufsätze von Weggefährten und Schülern, die ein gemeinsamer roter Faden eint: Die Überzeugung, dass Forschung nicht um ihrer selbst willen betrieben werden darf, sondern dann zu rechtfertigen ist, wenn sie sich in den Dienst eines pluralen, demokratischen Gemeinwesens stellt.
Der Inhalt
· Wolfgang Donsbach und die Entwicklung des Fachs
· Mediennutzung und Medienentwicklung
· Die Rolle des Journalismus in der Gesellschaft
· Public Opinion and Public Opinion Research
Die Zielgruppen
· Dozierende und Studierende der Sozialwissenschaften mit den Schwerpunkten Politische Kommunikation, Journalismus- und Umfrageforschung
Die HerausgeberInnen
Prof. Dr. Olaf Jandura lehrt Kommunikationswissenschaft an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.
PD Dr. habil. Thomas Petersen ist Projektleiter am Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach.
Dr. Anna-Maria Schielicke ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am IfK der TU Dresden.
Dr. Cornelia Mothes ist Postdoc-Stipendiatin an der School of Communication, Ohio State University.
Το παρόν άρθρο επιχειρεί μια συνοπτική επισκόπηση της επιστημονικής συζήτησης για τις επιδράσεις της ημερήσιας διάταξης των MME στο κοινό. Περιγράφονται οι βασικές έννοιες που συγκροτούν το θεωρητικό πλαίσιο του παραδείγματος και οι κύριες αναλυτικές διακρίσεις για τη μελέτη της διαδικασίας καθορισμού της θεματολογίας. Καταγράφονται οι κύριοι εξωγενείς και παρεμβαίνοντες παράγοντες που περιορίζουν ή ενισχύουν την επίδραση των MME στις θεματολογικές προτεραιότητες του κοινού. Η παρουσίαση ολοκληρώνεται με την αναφορά στις προοπτικές που διαγράφονται σε ό,τι αφορά τη συζήτηση για τη σχέση των δύο θεματολογιών, δίνοντας έμφαση σε ερευνητικά ερωτήματα σχετικά με τη διαδικασία και το επίπεδο εκδήλωσης των επιδράσεων καθώς και σε μεθοδολογικές στρατηγικές για την περαιτέρω διερεύνηση της σχέσης αυτής.
We describe and test two process models of candidate evaluation. The memory-based model holds that evaluations are dependent on the mix of pro and con information retrieved from memory. The impression-driven model holds that evaluations are formed and updated “on-line” as information is encountered. The results provide evidence for the existence of stereotyping and projection biases that render the mix of evidence available in memory a nonveridical representation of the information to which subjects were exposed. People do not rely on the specific candidate information available in memory. Rather, consistent with the logic of the impression-driven processing model, an “on-line” judgment formed when the information was encountered best predicts candidate evaluation. The results raise both methodological and substantive challenges to how political scientists measure and model the candidate evaluation process.
It is widely assumed that political action is motivated most powerfully by issues that impinge immediately and tangibly upon private life. For example, this assumption pervades the aggregate research that has reported consistent relationships between general economic conditions and congressional election outcomes (e.g., Kramer, 1971). Our analysis of individual-level data, however, indicates that voting in congressional elections from 1956 to 1976 was influenced hardly at all by personal economic grievances. Those voters unhappy with changes in their financial circumstances, or those who had recently been personally affected by unemployment, showed little inclination to punish candidates of the incumbent party for their personal misfortunes. The connection between economic conditions and politics was provided, instead, by judgments of a more general, collective kind--e.g., by judgments regarding recent trends in general business conditions, and, more powerfully, by judgments about the relative competence of the two major parties to manage national economic problems. These collective economic judgments had little to do with privately experienced economic discontents. Rather they stemmed from voters' partisan predispositions and from their appraisal of changes in national economic conditions.
Recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the impact of prospective evaluations of the economy on vote choice. Yet, little attention has been focused on the actual process whereby such evaluations are formed. This paper employs panel data to test a model of the formation of prospective evaluations of inflation and unemployment. Our findings indicate that retrospective assessments of economic conditions do not greatly influence economic forecasts. Instead, economic forecasts are shaped by personal economic circumstances and partisan assessments of governmental performance. The political implications of such findings are discussed.
This study combines contemporary research on the effects of mass communication with findings on sociotropic voting to build a general model that explains the origins and effects of economic perceptions. This model is then tested in the context of retrospective personal and social concerns about unemployment. Survey evidence suggests that retrospective assessments of unemployment result primarily from mediated information rather than from direct experiences. Mass media are found to have an "impersonal impact," influencing social, but not personal perceptions of the issue, while personal experiences with unemployment influence exclusively personal-level judgments. Mass media also influence the weighting of pocketbook as opposed to sociotropic concerns by means of a "sociotropic priming effect." Rather than priming all considerations that surround economic issues, high levels of media exposure to economic news prime the importance of collective perceptions to political evaluations and decrease the importance of personal concerns.
This article examines how three potential effects of television news affect the public's perceptions of candidates. Data are used from the networks' nightly news coverage of each candidate during the 1984 Democratic primary campaign and from the National Election Study's 1984 Continuous Monitoring Survey. The analysis provides support for the existence of candidate-specific attention, horse race, and tone effects on (1) the mass public's assessment of a candidate's attractiveness, (2) people's willingness to vote for a candidate, and (3) judgments about a candidate's likelihood of garnering the nomination. Television coverage of candidates matters but in different ways and to different degrees across candidates. Finally, there is evidence for the power of strong indirect media effects, a testimony to the rapid diffusion of media messages into the wider political culture.
This research offers clear evidence that what is presented in the media influences the policy preferences of the American public. More important, it reconciles some earlier problems that led to an inability to determine the approximate relationships between television and newspaper information concerning policy. By correcting some methodological problems in earlier attempts to examine the impact of New York Times policy news, I am able to conclude that different actors or news sources do indeed have differential impacts on public opinion and that in both newspaper items and television broadcasts experts and commentators wield heavy influence.
This paper examines the television networks' coverage of the unemployment rate, the inflation rate as measured by the Consumer
Price Index, and the growth rate of real GNP over the twelve years from 1973 through 1984. This time period includes two major
recessions, two severe bursts of inflation, and three presidential elections. A common complaint is that the networks overemphasize
bad economic news. Using two measures of coverage, this paper examines whether the television networks give greater coverage
to these statistics when they are deteriorating. The empirical results reveal that the networks do give greater coverage to
bad economic news during nonelection years, but this pattern disappears during election years. The empirical results also
reveal that presidential comments are very powerful in shaping the amount of coverage given to these economic statistics.
Increasing evidence of connections between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy-making suggests the importance of determining what influences shape the collective foreign policy preferences of the public. A data set involving repeated measures of public opinion and content analyses of TV news broadcasts before and between opinion surveys is used to estimate the impact of news stories from various sources on opinion. Reported statements and actions by media commentators, allegedly nonpartisan “experts,” opposition party figures, and popular (but not unpopular) presidents have the largest estimated effects, while the impact of other sources is negligible. Despite ideas about the “two presidencies” and the like, the process of shaping opinion on foreign policy does not appear substantially different from that affecting domestic policy preferences. Some implications for the democratic control of foreign policy are discussed.
The usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the “retrospective” economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience (voter as “peasant”). A second model assumes a “sophisticated” economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations (voter as “banker”). Using the components, both retrospective and prospective, of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval, we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series. With aggregate consumer expectations about long-term business conditions in the approval equation, neither the usual economic indicators not the other ICS components matter. Moreover, short-term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy. The qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome: the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen.
This paper tests two hypotheses regarding the effects of the economy on the popularity of British governments. First, we consider the "attention hypothesis" — the possibility that voters pay attention to economic fluctuations primarily when those changes are severe. Second, we test the "asymmetry hypothesis," which argues that voters punish politicians for economic "hard times," but fail to reward them for periods of prosperity. Our analysis of quarterly data between 1954 and 1987 supports the "attention hypothesis," but fails to support the "asymmetry hypothesis." We do, however, find some evidence suggesting that negative economic news may be more likely to capture public attention in the first place. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of political economy on both sides of the Atlantic.
Media coverage of Iowa and New Hampshire has traditionally played a significant role in presidential nominations. The 1988 Democratic race is no exception. However, the media's effect was not particularly dramatic, and no candidate ever acquired media-driven momentum. The absence of momentum should not, however, obscure the fact that early coverage was essential to Dukakis's victory. This finding points to three relatively stable aspects of presidential nominations that help explain early media effects. These are the sequential nature of the nominating process, the low information levels and unstable opinions typical of the electorate early in the process, and the media's emphasis on the early contests and on the horse race. These characteristics interact to produce significant early media effects on presidential nominations.
Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight--which we call fire-alarm oversight--over another form--police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals.
This paper examines the interrelationships between real-world cues, television news coverage, and public concern for the issues
of energy, inflation, and unemployment. On the basis of longitudinal data, the authors show that media agenda setting is indeed
unidirectional—television news influences public concern and not vice versa. Lead stories are significantly more powerful
than ordinary stories in shaping the public's agenda. Prevailing conditions and events affect public opinion both directly
and indirectly, by determining the degree of news coverage accorded issues.
Previous research on economic voting has focused on the link between economic policy attitudes and candidate choice, taking the existence and formation of policy evaluations for granted. Arguments about the appropriateness of electoral control over economic policymaking, however, implicate directly the sources and the quality of those issue opinions. This research investigates the way in which policy evaluations on macroeconomic management are formed.The paper formulates a model of voter information processing and inferential reasoning that accounts for the connection between objective conditions and policy judgments. A notable feature of the model is its hypothesis of complementary roles for personal financial condition and “contextual” information about economic activity in the local area as sources of subjective economic grievances and economic policy evaluations. The model is estimated with national sample survey data collected in 1978.
In recent years, a great deal of evidence has been generated regarding the impact of retrospective evaluations of the economy on vote choice. Yet little attention has been focused on the actual process whereby such evaluations are formed. This paper employs panel data to test a model of retrospective evaluations of inflation and unemployment. Our findings suggest, first, that retrospective evaluations are influenced by personal economic circumstances and knowledge about national economic conditions. And second, our findings indicate that the lag times in the public's learning of economic trends differs significantly for inflation and unemployment, with the public reacting more quickly to changes in unemployment. The reasons for such findings' and their political implications are discussed.
American elections depends substantially on the vitality of the national economy. Prosperity benefits candidates for the House of Representatives from the incumbent party (defined as the party that controls the presidency at the time of the election), whereas economic downturns enhance the electoral fortunes of opposition candidates. Short-term fluctuations in economic conditions also to appear to affect the electorates's presidential choice, as well as the level of public approval conferred upon the president during his term. By this evidence, the political consequences of macroeconomic conditions are both pervasive an powerful. But just how do citizens know whether the incumbant party has succeeded or failed? What kinds of economic evidence do people weigh in their political appraisals? The purpose of our paper is to examine two contrasting depictions of individual citizens - emphasizing the political signifigance of citizens' own economic predicaments, the other stressing the political importance.
We examined Ronald Reagan's 1980 election campaign to judge the effects of his Issue of the Day (IOD) media management strategy on his image as portrayed in the print and televised news media. The IOD strategy attempts to shape the content and tone of coverage by limiting press access to Reagan, formalizing the relationship, and conveying a single message over extended periods of time. Our analysis shows Reagan had success shaping the content of the press's coverage, but not its tone. We also found that the IOD strategy had greater effects on televised news programs than on the print media.
Two of the questions in the Surveys of Consumer Attitudes undertaken by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan
deal with households' expectations about inflation and the change in unemployment. We compare quarterly time series of the
mean responses with the actual behavior of inflation and unemployment to see whether households are overly optimistic or pessimistic
about the future behavior of inflation and unemployment. We find an asymmetry. Over the 21 years of our analysis, on average
the public is neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic about future inflation. However, the public has been significantly
too pessimistic about the future behavior of unemployment. These results have an important implication for macroeconomic policy.
If politicians respond to complaints from the public about inflation and unemployment they will target policy instruments
at unemployment to a greater extent than if the public was not so pessimistic about the behavior of unemployment. The result
may be a higher rate of inflation than if the public were not mistakenly pessimistic about the behavior of unemployment.