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DOI: 10.1177/2041386610379257
2011 1: 53Organizational Psychology Review
Stéphane Côté and Ivona Hideg
intelligence
The ability to influence others via emotion displays: A new dimension of emotional
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The ability to influence
others via emotion displays:
A new dimension of
emotional intelligence
Ste
´phane Co
ˆte
´
University of Toronto
Ivona Hideg
University of Toronto
Abstract
We propose a new dimension of emotional intelligence (EI) that is particularly relevant in orga-
nizational settings: the ability to influence others via emotion displays. In this article, we first
describe social functional accounts of emotions and the evidence supporting social effects of
emotions. Then, we propose that individuals differ in the degree to which they can influence the
behaviors, attitudes, and emotions of others via their emotion displays, and we demonstrate that
this individual variation meets the criteria for an emotional ability. We articulate the mechanisms
by which the ability to influence others via emotion displays is related to competence in organi-
zational settings. In addition, we develop propositions about factors that moderate the effect of
this ability on competence. We describe the research implications of our model.
Keywords
emotions and moods, interpersonal relationships, performance
Paper received 17 January 2010; revised version accepted 9 June 2010.
Emotional intelligence (EI) is a set of abilities
concerned with processing emotions and emo-
tional information, as opposed to higher level
cognitive processes (Mayer & Salovey, 1997;
Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The dominant
models of EI propose a global construct and
Corresponding author:
Ste
´phane Co
ˆte
´, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
M5S 3E6, Canada
Email: scote@rotman.utoronto.ca
Organizational Psychology Review
1(1) 53–71
ª2011 SAGE Publications and the
European Association for Work and
Organizational Psychology
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/2041386610379257
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Organizational
Psychology
Review
subdimensions.
1
Salovey and Mayer (1990)
first identified three subdimensions by review-
ing and organizing findings from the literature
on individual variations in emotional process-
ing. The ability to perceive emotions is the
ability to detect and decipher emotions in faces,
pictures, voices, and cultural artifacts, and to
identify one’s own emotions. The ability to use
emotions is the ability to harness emotions to
facilitate cognitive activities such as informa-
tion processing and decision-making. The abil-
ity to manage emotions is the ability to change
emotions in oneself and others. In a subsequent
publication, Mayer and Salovey (1997) added a
fourth dimension suggested by additional
research findings: the ability to understand
emotions is the ability to comprehend emotion
language, the distinctions among discrete emo-
tions, and the causes and consequences of
emotions.
The approach used to identify the dimensions
of EI suggests that it is possible to identify other
dimensions when new research findings become
available. This is not an unusual notion; scholars
have noted that more dimensions of cognitive
ability may eventually be discovered
(cf. Carroll, 1993). The literature reviewed to
identify the current dimensions of EI pre-
dominantly concernedthe intrapersonal effects of
emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey &
Mayer, 1990). We propose that recent advances
in theory and research onthe interpersonal effects
of emotions suggest a new dimension of EI that is
particularly relevant in organizational settings:
the ability to influence others via emotion
displays. Individuals vary in their effectiveness in
displaying emotions to influence the behaviors,
attitudes, and emotions of others.
We draw on research on emotions and
emotion regulation to develop a model of the
ability to influence others via emotion displays
as a new dimension of EI. This article unfolds
as follows. We first describe social functional
accounts that provide the broad theoretical
foundation for the social effects of emotions in
organizations, and we review and integrate the
evidence for these effects. In the core section of
this article, we develop a model of the ability to
influence others via emotion displays, depicted
in Figure 1. Specifically, we describe this
ability, articulate the mechanisms by which it
relates to competence, and identify moderators
of this relation. We end by describing the
implications of our model for future research.
Social functional accounts
of emotions
The research on emotions in organizations has
primarily focused on their intrapersonal
effects—the effects of one person’s emotions
on that person’s thoughts and actions. This
research has shown that the emotions of orga-
nization members impact their own decisions,
judgments, and behaviors (see Brief & Weiss,
2002; Grandey, 2008; Weiss & Cropanzano,
1996, for reviews). To illustrate, research has
investigated which affective states are more
conducive to various forms of performance,
including task performance (Beal, Weiss,
Barros, & MacDermid, 2005) and creativity
(George & Zhou, 2007). These intrapersonal
effects may represent only a subset of the
effects of emotions in organizations because
emotions may influence the decisions, judg-
ments, and behaviors of both people who feel
emotions and people who observe displays of
emotions. For instance, the emotions that
service agents feel may influence their own
decisions, judgments, and behaviors, as well as
the decisions, judgments, and behaviors of their
customers (Grandey, 2000; Rafaeli & Sutton,
1989). The effects of displays of emotion by
one person on the thoughts, feelings, and
actions of other people have been labeled the
interpersonal, or social, effects of emotion
(Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt,
1999).
Social functional accounts posit that public
displays of emotion communicate rich and
important information about one’s attitudes,
goals, and intentions to those who observe these
54 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
displays (Darwin, 1872/1965; Frijda &
Mesquita, 1994; Izard, 1971; Keltner & Haidt,
1999). For example, displays of enthusiasm by
customer service agents communicate their
intentions to be helpful to customers. These
accounts are supported by evidence that inter-
nal experiences of emotion are accompanied by
public displays (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, &
Kim, 1986; Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead,
1986), and that different emotions involve dis-
tinct muscle movements in the face (Darwin,
1872/1965; Ekman, 2003) and distinct acoustic
features in the voice (Juslin & Scherer, 2005).
There is some similarity in how emotions are
displayed across cultures, but cultures have
emotional dialects that shape how emotions are
expressed to some degree (Elfenbein, Beaupre´,
Le´vesque, & Hess, 2007).
Social functional accounts also posit that
individuals attend to others’ emotions because
doing so provides them with important
information about the behavior they might
expect from others. Research suggests that
individuals are particularly attuned to identify
information about emotions in their environ-
ments, presumably because these cues have
evolutionary significance. For instance, a study
of people who viewed clips of former US
President Ronald Reagan exhibited different
skin conductance and heart-rate responses
depending on whether he expressed happiness,
anger, or fear (McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan,
Masters, & Englis, 1985). Displays of emotions
that are shown outside of the conscious aware-
ness of observers elicit corresponding muscle
movements in observers (Dimberg, Thunberg,
& Elmehed, 2000). Individuals’ ability to
rapidly identify and respond to others’ emotion
displays suggests that this ability represents
an evolutionary adaptation (Brosch, Sander,
Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008; O
¨hman & Mineka,
2001).
Figure 1. The association between the ability to influence others via emotion displays and competence.
Co
ˆte
´and Hideg 55
Observers draw inferences about others’
displays of emotions, and these inferences shape
how observers think, act, and feel. For example,
employees may consult their leader’s displays of
emotions to obtain information about how their
leader will act. Employees who infer that their
leader is unsatisfied with the state of affairs via
displays of anger subsequently exert more effort
(Sy, Coˆte´, & Saavedra, 2005). Other research
has shown that people who commit a social
transgression are more likely to be forgiven if
they display embarrassment (Keltner & Buswell,
1997; Semin & Manstead, 1982) or guilt
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).
There is also considerable research showing
social effects of positive emotions. Displays of
positive emotions in yearbook pictures of women
graduating from a private college were associated
with evaluations of both competence and
affiliation by naı¨ve observers 40 years later, as
well as self-reports of marital satisfaction and
general well-being at age 52 (Harker & Keltner,
2001). Displays of emotionswere associated with
enhanced cooperation in a group (Barsade, 2002).
Illustrative findings from areas of particular
interest to organizational researchers, including
customer service, negotiations, and leadership,
appear in Table 1. Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that displays of emotions have
potent and reliable effects on the behaviors and
attitudes of those who observe these displays in
organizational settings.
The ability to influence others via
emotion displays as an emotional
ability in models of emotional
intelligence
Individuals consciously exert efforts to modify
the emotions that they show to others, because
displays of emotions influence the behaviors,
attitudes, and emotions of other people
(Andrade & Ho, 2009; Grandey, 2003). We
propose that some individuals more effectively
rely on the social effects of emotions than
others to influence the behaviors, attitudes, and
emotions of other people. We propose that this
ability consists of (a) deciding which display of
emotion will have the desired impact on others
and, then, (b) effectively eliciting these displays
during interpersonal interactions. We further
propose that this individual variation meets the
requirements for a new emotional ability within
models of EI.
Deciding which display of emotion will have
the desired impact
Discrete emotions evolved to communicate
different attitudes, goals, and intentions to
Table 1. Summary of illustrative findings on social effects of emotions in organizational settings
General effect Representative studies
1. Displays of anger elicit concessions and displays of happiness
elicit demands in negotiations
van Kleef et al. (2004a)
Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006)
2. Displays of happiness by service agents cause higher
customer satisfaction and perceptions of service quality
Barger and Grandey (2006)
Pugh (2001)
Tsai (2001)
3. Displays of happiness by leaders cause greater cooperation
and prosocial behavior; displays of anger by leaders cause
greater effort
George and Bettenhausen (1990)
Sy et al. (2005)
4. Alternating displays of positive and negative emotions by
criminal interrogators elicit more confessions by suspects
Rafaeli and Sutton (1991)
5. Displays of anger by employees cause coworkers to exhibit
more escalation of commitment to losing courses of action
O’Neill (2009)
56 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
others and, accordingly, their facial displays
differ (Darwin, 1872/1965). In an early
demonstration, Knutson (1996) showed that
people infer the dispositions of others and,
particularly, their dominance and affiliation,
from their displays of emotions. All else equal,
people who display anger or disgust are
perceived to be high in dominance and low in
affiliation, those who display happiness are
thought to be high on both traits, and those who
display fear or sadness are believed to be low on
both traits. In the domain of conflict manage-
ment, negotiators who display anger are believed
to be tough, and negotiators who display
happiness are believed to be satisfied with the
current state of affairs (Sinaceur & Tiedens,
2006; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a).
When deciding which emotion to display,
individuals must consider the match between
the discrete emotion and the communication
medium. Discrete emotions are displayed in the
face (Ekman, 2003), voice (Juslin & Scherer,
2005), and touch (Hertenstein, Holmes,
McCullough, & Keltner, 2009). Meta-analytic
research reveals that some emotions (e.g., anger)
are detected more accurately via the voice than
the face, and other emotions (e.g., happiness)
show the opposite pattern (Elfenbein &
Ambady, 2002; Juslin & Laukka, 2003). In
addition, some emotions, such as sympathy and
gratitude, are reliably communicated through
touch between the elbow and hand of the target
(Hertenstein et al., 2009; Hertenstein, Keltner,
App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 2006). Facial and
vocal displays of these emotions have not yet
been identified (Keltner, 2009).
This suggests that by focusing predominantly
on facial displays of emotions, organization
members may be missing social effects of
emotions that occur through frequently used
communication media such as the telephone,
electronic mail, and instant messaging. Given
that emotions more effectively communicate
their meanings via some channels than others, it
is important to consider the communication
channel when exhibiting the ability to influence
others via emotion displays. Specifically, we
suggest that individuals equipped with the abil-
ity to influence others via emotion displays will
not only choose the most appropriate emotion to
express but also express it via the optimal
communication medium, when possible. There
may be situations, however, when using the
optimal medium is not an option, such as when
the optimal medium is face-to-face interaction,
but the parties interact in different physical
locations.
The regulation behind the displays
Many emotional displays result from sponta-
neously felt emotions, but many are voluntarily
triggered via emotion regulation efforts (Gross,
1998; Hochschild, 1983). Individuals with high
ability to influence others via emotion displays
understand which displays will produce the
desired effects. This requires, to a degree, that
emotion displays are voluntarily elicited,
because not all spontaneously felt emotions will
be beneficial in that moment.
There is more than one way in which
individuals can regulate emotions. An individual
with high ability to influence others via emotion
displays will be aware that the effect of
displayed emotions may depend on how emotion
is regulated, and use the more effective strategy
for regulating emotions. At a broad level,
researchers have identified two forms of emotion
regulation that differ in their timing during the
unfolding of an emotion: antecedent-focused
regulation, or deep acting, and response-
focused regulation, or surface acting (Gross,
1998; Hochschild, 1983). Deep acting occurs
early in the emotion generative process. Labora-
tory studies show that deep acting changes
internal experiences and public displays of emo-
tion (Gross, 1998). Leaders may use deep acting,
for example, by thinking about uplifting
moments to amplify both their internal experi-
ence and public display of confidence. Surface
acting, in contrast, occurs late in the emotion
generative process. In laboratory research,
Co
ˆte
´and Hideg 57
surface acting predominantly changed the public
display (Gross, 1998). Leaders may use surface
acting, for instance, by pretending to be excited
externally about a change in the organization
while leaving their subjective experience of
doubt intact.
Deep acting produces relatively authentic
displays of emotions because the internal
experience matches the public display (Coˆte´,
2005; Grandey, 2003). Surface acting produces
more inauthentic displays because the internal
experience is less likely to match the public
display. The authenticity of the display, in turn,
has important consequences. Past research
generally concludes that observers generally
respond adversely to expressers’ inauthentic
displays of emotion, because observers inter-
pret these displays as calculated attempts to
control them, a lack of interest in developing a
close relationship, or evidence that expressers
do not trust them (Coˆte´, 2005; Grandey, Fisk,
Mattila, Jansen, & Sideman, 2005; Rafaeli &
Sutton, 1989). For instance, rather than infer-
ring that an angry leader is dissatisfied with
their performance, team members may infer
that the leader has malevolent intentions if the
leader’s anger is deemed inauthentic.
These theoretical considerationsare supported
by past research. In two laboratory studies,
interaction partners of individuals who used sur-
face acting to hide their displays of emotions
reported liking their partner less, felt less rapport
with their partner, and exhibited larger increases
in blood pressure than interaction partners of
individuals who used deep acting or who did not
regulate emotion (Butler et al., 2003). Field
studies have shown that the more individuals
amplify or suppress emotion through surface
acting (and, hence, the more inauthentically they
display emotion), the worse receivers respond to
them (Grandey, 2003; Gross & John, 2003;
Holman, Chissick, & Totterdell, 2002). Service
agents who displayed authentic positive emotions
were rated as better performers than those whose
emotions were inauthentic (Grandey, 2003;
Groth, Hennig-Thurau, & Walsh, 2009). This
suggests that the ability to influence others via
emotion displays involves individuals’ choice
of strategy to generate displays of emotions.
Choosing the best way to manage emotions
may not be sufficient. The distinction between
knowledge and implementation from the larger
literature on abilities (Ackerman, 1996) sug-
gests that people who know the best strategies
may not implement them well (Coˆte´, Gyurak, &
Levenson, in press). For example, a customer
service agent who knows that cognitively
reframing an interaction with a difficult cus-
tomer is the best strategy to display genuine
positive emotions may not implement that
strategy well during the interaction. Thus,
another aspect of the ability to influence others
via emotion displays consists of successfully
operating the machinery of emotion regulation
to successfully execute the chosen strategy.
Summary and definition
The preceding discussion identifies the two key
aspects of the ability to influence others via
emotion displays: (a) making good decisions
about which emotion to display, given the
context and (b) choosing and implementing
strategies to display emotion effectively. These
processes are currently underemphasized in
models of EI. Although models of EI include
deciding which emotion to feel, this is typically
discussed in the service of influencing one’s
own actions, thinking, and feelings (Mayer &
Salovey, 1997). In contrast, the dimension of EI
that we introduce concerns modifying the
actions, thinking, and feelings of other people.
Moreover, models of EI include the regulation
of emotions, but theoretical discussion of this
dimension typically focuses on regulating one’s
own or others’ internal feelings, rather than
expressive displays directly. These considera-
tions point to the following definition of a new
emotional ability within models of EI:
The ability to influence others via emotion
display reflects variation in how effectively
58 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
individuals can change the behaviors, attitudes,
or emotions of other people by expressing
emotions. This ability involves identifying the
best emotionto display and choosingand imple-
menting a strategy to display this emotion
effectively.
The ability to influence others via
emotion displays meets the
criteria for an ability
Abilities reflect ‘‘the possible variations over
individuals in the liminal [threshold] levels of
task difficulty [ ...] at which, on any given
occasion in which all conditions appear to be
favorable, individuals perform successfully on
a defined class of tasks’’ (Carroll, 1993, p. 8).
This definition provides guidance for identify-
ing and defining new abilities, and for distin-
guishing constructs that are abilities from
constructs that are not. According to Carroll’s
(1993) definition, a first criterion is that an
ability must represent individuals’ maximum
performance on tasks, under favorable condi-
tions. A second criterion implied by this
definition is that there should be variation
among individuals. A third criterion is provided
by Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) indication that
‘‘emotional intelligence requires at least some
‘right’ answers as to feelings’’ (p. 9). A fourth
criterion for an ability to be considered a
dimension of EI in particular is that it must
involve emotional processing (Salovey &
Mayer, 1990). A final criterion is that emotional
abilities help individuals show competence in
daily life (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). We show
how the ability to influence others via emotion
displays satisfies these criteria.
Criterion 1: Maximum performance
For a construct to represent an ability, it must
represent the highest level of performance a
person can attain in a given domain. For
instance, verbal ability represents the maximal
level of competency that a person can exhibit in
the domain of language. A construct is outside
the realm of ability and is instead located within
the realm of personality traits if it reflects the
degree to which people typically engage in a
behavior (Coˆte´, 2010). For individual variation
in influencing others via emotion displays to
represent an ability, it must represent the
highest level of performance a person can attain
in this domain and be defined as maximal per-
formance. A person has high level of the ability
to influence others via emotion displays if that
person has the potential to produce a relatively
large change in the behaviors, attitudes, and
emotions of other people. A person has low level
of this ability if that person has the potential to
produce only a small change in the behaviors,
attitudes, and emotions of other people. Thus, the
ability to influence others via emotion displays
indeed represents the maximal level of influence
that people can exert on the behaviors, attitudes,
and emotions of others via their displays of
emotions, suggesting that it meets this first cri-
terion for an ability.
Criterion 2: Individual variation
For the ability to influence others via emotion
displays to represent an ability, individuals
must differ on this construct. Specifically, some
individuals must be able to influence others via
displays of emotions better than other individ-
uals. Past research suggests that this is the case.
In a qualitative study, bill collectors who were
better able to convey urgency to debtors were
more likely to be hired and rewarded at the
agency (Sutton, 1991). Further, bill collectors
were trained to augment their ability to adjust
their displays of emotions depending on the
demeanor of debtors. Additional evidence is
provided by findings that some individuals are
better able to modify their emotional expressive
behavior than others (Coˆte´ et al., in press; Gross
& Levenson, 1993; Jackson, Malmstadt,
Larson, & Davidson, 2000), an important
ingredient of the ability to influence others via
Co
ˆte
´and Hideg 59
emotion displays. This evidence suggests that
the criterion of individual variation is met.
Criterion 3: Correct and incorrect outcomes
A particularly important criterion is that there
must be more ‘‘correct’’ and ‘‘incorrect’’
outcomes to problems within the domain of an
ability (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). ‘‘Correct’’
outcomes to the ability to influence others via
emotion displays involve an actual change in
the behaviors, attitudes, or emotions of another
person in the desired direction. A person is
correct if this person has influenced the other
person in the desired way (i.e., by changing
behaviors in the desired direction). For exam-
ple, if one person uses anger strategically to
obtain concessions from another person, and
the other person actually concedes, this repre-
sents a correct type of change. ‘‘Incorrect’’
outcomes involve a lack of change, or a change
in others’ behaviors, attitudes, and emotions in
an unwanted direction. For instance, if one uses
anger strategically to obtain concessions from
another person, but the other person gets angry
and becomes demanding instead of giving in,
this represents an incorrect type of change.
If some outcomes are more ‘‘correct’’ and
others are more ‘‘incorrect,’’ then it should be
possible to document this difference objec-
tively. Change in the behaviors, attitudes, and
emotions of others can be measured objectively
in several ways. Changes in others’ behaviors
can be measured, for example, by counting
purchases in a store (Tsai, 2001). Changes in
others’ attitudes can be measured, for example,
by asking targets to report on their favorability
towards a product or the person displaying
emotions (Grandey et al., 2005). Changes in
others’ emotions can be measured, for example,
by capturing psychophysiological indicators
such as skin conductance (Butler et al., 2003).
A person will exhibit the ability to influence
others via emotion displays when others’
behaviors, attitudes, and emotions change, as
objectively indicated by measures like the ones
described above. This suggests that the criterion of
correct and incorrect outcomes is likely to be met.
Even so, an important issue concerns
potential cultural variation in what are correct
and incorrect answers to problems (Mayer &
Salovey, 1997). People of all cultures can
exhibit changes in their behaviors, attitudes,
and emotions as a result of viewing displays of
emotions by others. For instance, displays of
positive emotions by service agents have been
shown to influence customer behavior across
cultures (Grandey et al., 2005; Tsai & Huang,
2002). Although change in the behaviors, atti-
tudes, and emotions can be observed in all
cultures, what constitutes a desired change in
others’ behaviors, attitudes, and emotions may
vary across cultures. In addition, the same dis-
plays of emotion will likely be interpreted dif-
ferently in a different culture. For example,
negative emotional displays produce different
reactions in North American versus East Asian
negotiators (Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). Thus,
we advocate taking into account cultural factors
when determining whether a specific social
effect of emotion is correct or incorrect.
Criterion 4: Emotional content
For a construct to represent an emotional
ability, its content must focus principally on
emotion. There are various mechanisms by
which organization members may influence
others’ behaviors, attitudes, or emotions. The
ability to influence others via emotion displays
implies that some of this influence occurs via
emotional processes. This ability specifically
involves regulating and displaying emotions,
and the consequent reactions to displayed
emotions represent the cause of change in the
behaviors, attitudes, or emotions of the target.
Thus, the criterion of emotional content is met.
Criterion 5: Relation to competence
The final criterion for the ability to influence
others via emotion displays to be considered an
60 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
ability consists of demonstrating associations
with competence in organizational life. As a
new ability that we are introducing, there is no
extant research showing such associations. In
the next section, we articulate the mechanisms
by which individual variation in the ability to
influence others via emotion displays may
be related to competence in organizational
settings.
The ability to influence others via
emotion displays and competence
Several complementary mechanisms may
underlie the effects of the ability to influence
others via emotion displays on competence.
Past research and, in particular, the emotions as
social information model (van Kleef, 2009; van
Kleef et al., 2009) suggest two broad categories
of processes: affective reactions and strategic
inferences.
Affective reactions mechanism
Affective reactions concern the emotions that
are elicited in observers and the liking that
observers develop as a result of observing
others’ displays of emotions (van Kleef, 2009;
van Kleef et al., 2009). Affective reactions, in
turn, shape how observers think, feel, and act
during social interactions, and these observer
reactions may facilitate expressers’ perfor-
mance by providing them with support, infor-
mation, and other resources. Affective reactions
may be elicited in observers via the process of
emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
Rapson, 1994; Neumann & Strack, 2000) or
when others’ displays of emotion constitute
emotionally evocative stimuli (e.g., a display of
anger by an opponent may be an event that
elicits happiness in a negotiator, like other
events such as attractive offers from counter-
parts). Another type of affective reaction,
liking, may also result from observing the
emotions that others display. People judge
individuals who display happiness to be likable
and trustworthy (Clark, Pataki, & Carver,
1996), and individuals who display anger are
not well-liked (Clark et al., 1996; Glomb &
Hulin, 1997).
Evidence that affective reactions explain, in
part, the social effects of emotions includes
findings that subordinates’ emotions mediate
the effect of leaders’ emotions on the degree of
coordination among subordinates (Sy et al.,
2005) and the task performance of teams
composed of members with reduced epistemic
motivation (defined as the willingness to
expend an effort to achieve a thorough under-
standing of the situation; van Kleef et al., 2009).
In addition, several studies have found that
customers’ emotions mediate the effect of ser-
vice agents’ displays of emotions on customers’
attitudes and intentions (Barger & Grandey,
2006; Pugh, 2001; Tsai, 2001; Tsai & Huang,
2002). These arguments and empirical evidence
suggest that affective reactions such as emo-
tional experiences and liking explain, in part,
why individuals who use the ability to influence
others via emotion displays become competent.
Strategic inferences mechanism
Strategic inferences consist of inferential
processes in observers that shape their behavior
during the interaction (van Kleef, 2009).
Observers draw inferences about a host of
qualities of expressers from their emotion dis-
plays, including their competence, dominance,
friendliness, and ability (Knutson, 1996;
Tiedens, 2001). Observers’ inferences help
them coordinate their behavior with the beha-
vior of their interaction partners (Maddux,
Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Tiedens & Fragale,
2003). For example, past research suggests that
subordinates infer from leaders’ expressions of
anger that their efforts do not meet expecta-
tions, and that they increase their efforts to
attain expected standards of performance (Sy
et al., 2005; van Kleef et al., 2009).
Evidence for the strategic inference
mechanism comes from findings that team
Co
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´and Hideg 61
members’ inferences about their current level
of performance mediated the effect of leaders’
emotions on performance, among teams
composed of members with high epistemic
motivation (van Kleef et al., 2009). In addition,
negotiators’ inferences about their opponents’
attributions mediated the effects of their
opponents’ displays of emotions on their own
behavior (van Kleef et al., 2004a; van Kleef, De
Dreu, & Manstead, 2006, Study 2), and
inferences about a negotiation opponents’
interpersonal sensitivity explained the effect of
displays of guilt, regret, disappointment, and
worry on the impressions observers form about
opponents (van Kleef et al., 2006, Study 1).
Further, the effects of service agents’ displays
of positive emotions on customers’ satisfaction
are explained, in part, by judgments of service
quality as a strategic inference (Barger &
Grandey, 2006). These arguments and empiri-
cal evidence suggest that strategic inferences
(e.g., inferences about others’ status and
friendliness) explain, in part, why individuals
who use the ability to influence others via
emotion displays attain competence.
Summary
We articulated two categories of mechanisms
by which the ability to influence others via
emotion displays may help people demonstrate
competence in organizations: affective reac-
tions and strategic inferences. Identifying and
describing these mechanisms provides con-
ceptual evidence that this ability meets the last
criterion for an emotional ability.
Proposition 1: The ability to influence others
via emotion displays is an emotional ability
within models of emotional intelligence.
Proposition 2: The ability to influence others
via emotion displays is positively associated
with competence. This association is mediated
by affective reactions (Proposition 2a) and
strategic inferences (Proposition 2b).
Moderators of the effects of the
ability to influence others via
emotion displays
Strong theories often describe the conditions in
which a phenomenon occurs and when it does
not occur (Davis, 1971). We propose that the
nature of the association between the ability to
influence others via emotion displays and
competence depends on targets’ motivation
to process emotional displays, targets’ ability to
process emotional displays, and the culture of
the interaction partners.
The observer’s motivation to process
emotional displays
The ability to influence others via emotion
displays assumes that observers will pay close
attention to expressers’ displays of emotions.
There is reason to believe, however, that
observers will vary in the extent to which they
are motivated to pay attention to and process
expressers’ displays of emotions. Negotiators,
subordinates, and customers will be less
affected by their interaction partners’ emotion
displays if they have little motivation to inter-
pret the meaning of those displays. Past
research has suggested that indicators of moti-
vation include power, epistemic motivation,
and the observer’s trust in the expresser.
The observer’s power. Power represents the
relative influence of an individual over the
outcomes of others (Dahl, 1957; Fiske, 1993).
Research suggests that high-power negotiators
are less affected by the emotions that their
counterparts display, presumably because they
have substantial resources and hence can act
at will without serious consequences (van Kleef
&Coˆte´, 2007; van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, &
Manstead, 2006). For example, Sinaceur and
Tiedens (2006) found that displays of anger led
to concessions from negotiators with low
power, but not from negotiators with high
power.
62 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
The observer’s epistemic motivation. Epistemic
motivation is the degree to which a person is
motivated to develop and maintain a complex
understanding of situations (Kruglanski, 1989).
When epistemic motivation is high, people
expend more effort and process information
about the situation more deliberately and
systematically. In past research, these individ-
uals were more strongly influenced by their
counterparts’ emotions, relative to those with
low epistemic motivation (van Kleef, De Dreu,
& Manstead, 2004b). For example, van Kleef
et al. (2009) found that team members only
considered the strategic implications of their
leaders’ emotions if they were high in epistemic
motivation.
The observer’s trust in the expresser. There is
evidence that how much the observer trusts the
expresser influences the observer’s motivation to
interpret displays of emotions. In the absence of
trust, observers may have little motivation to
attend to and respond to displayed emotions,
because observers are not certain that these
emotions are felt or that what they reveal about
the counterparts are accurate. For instance,
research has shown that displays of emotions
only impact the behaviors of negotiation oppo-
nents when these opponents trust them (van
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006, Study 2).
Summary. The preceding discussion suggests
that power, epistemic motivation, and trust
moderate the effects of the ability to influence
others via emotion displays on competence.
These factors influence observers’ motivation
to pay attention to and process expressers’
displays of emotion. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 3: The association between the
ability to influence others via emotion displays
and competence depends on observers’ moti-
vation, such that the association will be stron-
ger when motivation is high (as in the case of
low power, high epistemic motivation, and
high trust in the expresser) than when motiva-
tion is low.
The observer’s ability to identify emotions
There are differences among observers in the
degree to which they are able to identify
expressers’ emotions correctly, even if they are
highly motivated to identify those emotions
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Rosenthal, Hall,
DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979; Wedeck,
1947). People’s thoughts, feelings, and beha-
viors are more likely to be shaped by others’
displays of emotions if they can perceive these
emotions correctly. For example, customers
who are not able to perceive the enthusiasm
displayed by a service agent should not be very
likely to decide to make more purchases. In past
research, displaying positive emotions during a
service interaction exhibited a stronger positive
association with customers’ perceptions of
service agents’ interest in, and ability to fulfill,
customers’ service-related needs (which were
associated with customers’ intentions to be
loyal to the store) if customers had high rather
than low ability to identify whether emotions
are authentic (Groth et al., 2009).
Further, observers can altogether misperceive
emotions, and one emotion can be taken for
another, leading to opposite effects than the
ones intended by the expresser. For example, a
negotiator may miss the anger in the expresser
and perceive the expresser to be calm and
satisfied, which, in turn, may lead to fewer
concessions as opposed to more (as the
expresser could have hoped for). Thus, despite
attempts by expressers to show emotions to
influence outcomes in a desired way, the
ability to influence others via emotion displays
will exhibit a weak relation to competence if
observers have little ability to accurately
perceive these emotions.
Proposition 4: The association between the
ability to influence others via emotion dis-
plays and competence depends on observers’
Co
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´and Hideg 63
ability to perceive emotions, such that the
association will be stronger when observers
have high rather than low ability to perceive
emotions.
The culture of the interaction
partners
The similarities and differences in how
emotions are expressed across cultures have
been frequently examined in the literature.
There are strong similarities in how emotions
are expressed across cultures (Ekman, 2003).
Meta-analytic research has shown some dif-
ferences, however, so that cultures express
emotions with a certain dialect. Specifically,
people are about 7%more accurate when
identifying emotions in the voice of members
of their own cultural group (Juslin & Scherer,
2005), and 9%more accurate when identify-
ing emotions in the face of members of their
own cultural group (Elfenbein & Ambady,
2002).
This suggests that the interaction between
the culture of the expresser and the culture of
the observer may moderate the association
between the ability to influence others via
emotion displays and competence. Members of
the same cultural groups should most reliably
capture the signals of expressers’ goals, atti-
tudes, and intentions, because interaction
partners are most likely to identify each other’s
emotions correctly. In contrast, members of
different cultural groups should be expected to
miss social signals more often. This suggests
the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The association between the
ability to influence others via emotion dis-
plays and competence depends on the cultural
match between expressers and observers, such
that the association is stronger when expres-
sers interact with observers from the same
cultural group than observers from different
cultural groups.
There are also likely effects due to the
cultural group of observers. Cultural values may
influence how individuals react to the displays
of certain emotions. Past research has shown that
displaying anger has different consequences on
the behavior of East Asian observers because
anger conveys antagonism that counters their
collectivistic values. In negotiations, displaying
anger may have worse consequences with a
counterpart from East Asia, because negative
emotions undermine the values of respect and
the protection of face that are particularly
important to East Asians (Adam, Shirako, &
Maddux, 2010; Kopelman & Rosette, 2008).
Consistent with this reasoning, in past research,
East Asian negotiators were less likely than
Israeli negotiators to accept an offer from a
counterpart displaying negative emotions
(Kopelman & Rosette, 2008), and less likely to
concede than North American negotiators who
presumably considered expressions of anger to
be more appropriate (Adam et al., 2010). Thus,
cultural orientations and values may guide
which emotions are appropriate to express and
which emotions are not. People with different
cultural values may react differently to the same
display of emotions.
Proposition 6: The association between the
ability to influence others via emotion
displays and competence depends on the
cultural appropriateness of the emotional
display as assessed by observers, such that the
association is stronger when cultural appropri-
ateness is high rather than low.
Implications for research
Our theory of the ability to influence others via
emotion displays as an emotional ability offers
several opportunities for future research. In
particular, researchers must develop procedures
to assess this ability, demonstrate that it is
distinct from extant abilities and that it predicts
competence, and provide further insight on the
64 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
mechanisms underlying the ability–competence
relationship (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Measuring the ability to influence others via
emotion displays
Individual variation in emotional abilities exists
when person A can successfully perform more
challenging emotional tasks (e.g., perceive
subtle expressions of emotions, quickly modify
an emotion) than person B. The superiority of
person A must cause person A to receive a higher
score on the measure than person B. Describing
the processes by which variations on the ability
to influence others via emotion displays cause
variations on measures of this ability is critical
to the validity of inferences (Borsboom,
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004).
Valid measures of this new ability may be
developed by extending existing paradigms
from the research on the social effects of
emotions. For instance, individuals could be
instructed to influence the behavior of others by
displaying certain emotions. Sinaceur and
Tiedens (2006) asked participants to show
anger to their opponents to win a negotiation.
Individuals could similarly be asked to amplify
their displays of anger. Their ability to do it
could be assessed by objectively measuring the
degree of change in their counterparts’ beha-
viors, attitudes, and emotions. It would also be
important to demonstrate that these changes
occur via changes in expressive displays (Coˆte´
et al., in press; Gross & Levenson, 1993). These
procedures map on the definition of the con-
struct, increasing confidence in the validity of
inferences (Borsboom et al., 2004).
This approach to developing measures of
this ability would circumvent problems that
plague research on emotional abilities, such as
the use of self-judged abilities and consensus-
based scoring, in which respondents’ responses
to hypothetical scenarios are compared to the
judgments of people from the general popula-
tion (Legree, Psotka, Tremble, & Bourne,
2005).
Demonstrating independence from extant
abilities and testing associations with
competence
The development of measures of the ability to
influence others via emotion displays will allow
researchers to conduct formal tests of dis-
criminant validity. This new ability should
demonstrate discriminant validity with the
extant dimensions of EI from Mayer and
Salovey’s (1997) model to demonstrate that it is
not a proxy for these dimensions. It must
also demonstrate discriminant validity with
cognitive ability to demonstrate that it is
predominantly emotional rather than cognitive
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Finally, the ability to
influence others via emotion displays should
demonstrate discriminant validity with person-
ality traits to demonstrate that it does not reflect
preferred ways of behaving. Independence from
extant abilities will also be demonstrated by
examining direct effects of the ability to influ-
ence others via emotion displays on compe-
tence, above and beyond competing predictors.
In addition, the strongest tests will involve
testing hypotheses about when it will show
the strongest and weakest associations with
competence. This involves testing the moderators
of the effects identified above.
Investigating additional mechanisms
underlying the ability–competence
association
To complete our theoretical understanding, it is
also important in future research to examine
other mechanisms by which emotions may
exert social effects, above and beyond affective
reactions and strategic inferences. One possible
additional mechanism concerns social com-
parison, whereby organization members react
to the behaviors of others that indicate that
others are feeling emotions (Elfenbein, 2007,
2009). For example, an employee may react to a
sudden increase in coworkers’ efforts on a task
because this increase in efforts may reveal that
Co
ˆte
´and Hideg 65
coworkers are anxious. Another potential
mechanism concerns empathy, whereby orga-
nization members react to the emotions that
they believe their peers are feeling because
of the events that they are experiencing
(Elfenbein, 2007, 2009). Observers note the
events that others are encountering, infer which
emotions others feel as a result of these events,
and respond to these inferred emotions rather
than the emotions that others actually show (as
in emotional contagion). For example, sales-
persons may feel happy because they infer that
a coworker is satisfied with a closed sale. These
and other potential mechanisms should be
studied in future research.
Considering moderating factors in relation
to underlying mechanisms
In our discussion of the ability to use the social
effects of emotions and our development of a
model linking this ability to competence, we
considered moderators and mediators of the
association independently. We did not specify
where exactly the moderating effects take
place in the mediated chain, linking ability to
affective reactions and strategic inferences
and, finally, to competence. The association
between the predictor (the ability to influence
others via emotion displays) and mediators
(affective reactions and strategic inferences)
may be moderated; the association between the
mediators and competence may be moderated;
or both of these links may be moderated.
Further, it remains unclear when and why
each mechanism operates. When an organiza-
tion member displays an emotion, various
affective reactions and strategic inferences may
simultaneously occur in observers. Some of
these affective reactions and strategic infer-
ences may, in turn, influence the attitudes and
behaviors of observers (and, therefore, act as
mediators), and others may not relate to atti-
tudes and behaviors. Developing a clear
understanding of when and why each mediating
process operates would increase our theoretical
understanding. Future research should expand
our model and offer more precise predictions
as to where the moderation effects occur. In
particular, future research should develop
moderated mediation models, in which mediat-
ing effects are influenced by separate, moderator
variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Edwards &
Lambert, 2007).
The ethical use of ability to
influence others via emotion
displays
Researchers have noted that emotional abilities
are not always used ethically (Austin, Farrelly,
Black, & Moore, 2007; Fineman, 2006). In their
original paper on EI, Salovey and Mayer noted
that ‘‘those whose skills are channeled anti-
socially may create manipulative scenes or lead
others sociopathically to nefarious ends’’ (1990,
p. 198). In addition, influence strategies such as
liking, authority, and consistency can be used to
attain prosocial and self-serving goals (Cialdini,
2001). These considerations are relevant to the
emotional ability that we introduce, because
influencing others is inherent to this ability.
We are not advocating employing the ability
to influence others via emotion displays toward
unethical or selfish ends, but we acknowledge
that organization members may display
emotions strategically in the service of both
prosocial and self-serving goals. By influencing
others via emotion displays, organization
members may sometimes increase their own
competence in ways that help the organization.
For instance, fundraisers may strategically use
the social effects of compassion to draw atten-
tion to their cause, and inspirational leaders
may strategically use the social effects of
confidence to elicit hope. At other times,
organization members may use this ability to
increase their own competence at the expense
of the organization. For example, supervisors
may strategically use anger to persuade
subordinates to act unethically. Future research
66 Organizational Psychology Review 1(1)
should examine the factors that lead organiza-
tion members to use the ability to influence
others via emotion displays more prosocially
or self-servingly. In addition, research is
needed to understand the various consequences
of using this ability prosocially versus
self-servingly. For example, it is possible that
using this ability unethically hurts a person’s
competence in the long run by damaging the
person’s reputation, relationships with others,
or social capital, especially if the ability is used
repeatedly.
Conclusion
The social effects of emotions are pervasive in
organizational life, and organization members’
displays of emotions continually shape the
attitudes and behaviors of their coworkers. We
proposed that recent developments in the
research on the social effects of emotions
suggest that the ability to influence others via
emotion displays is a new dimension within
models of EI abilities. This ability may be
crucial in today’s interdependent workplace, in
which performance depends on coordinating
efforts and managing relationships with others
(Grant & Parker, 2009; Griffin, Neal, & Parker,
2007). We hope that this article encourages
researchers to study this ability and continue
completing and improving theoretical models
of EI.
Funding
This research was supported by a research grant to
the first author and a doctoral fellowship to the
second author, both from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Note
1. Some models of EI include abilities, plus various
other characteristics such as traits of personality,
motivation, and affective states. These models
have been critiqued for being overly broad
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Further, including
factors that do not fit with the definition of intel-
ligence within models of EI has been critiqued for
being imprecise and potentially misleading (Coˆte´,
2010). Thus, in this article, we consider models
of EI that only include concepts that meet the
definition of ability.
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Author biographies
Ste
´phane Co
ˆte
´is Associate Professor of
Organizational Behaviour and Psychology at
the Joseph L. Rotman School of Management
at the University of Toronto. He received his
PhD and MA degrees from the University of
Michigan in Organizational Psychology. Dr.
Coˆte´’s research focuses on how emotional abil-
ities shape the performance and prosocial beha-
vior of individuals and groups. His articles have
been published in journals such as the Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly,Academy of Manage-
ment Review, and Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, among others. He serves
on four editorial boards, including the Academy
of Management Review and Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
Ivona Hideg is a PhD candidate in Organiza-
tional Behaviour and Human Resource
Management at the Joseph L. Rotman School
of Management at the University of Toronto.
She received her MSc degree in Industrial and
Organizational Psychology at the University
of Waterloo. Her primary research interests
include emotions and emotion regulation in the
workplace, cultural differences in perceiving
and reacting to emotions in social interactions,
and cultural diversity in the workplace. Her
research has been published in the Journal of
Applied Psychology and in the Research in
Occupational Stress and Well-Being book
series.
Co
ˆte
´and Hideg 71
