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Integration in the post-Soviet space
Abstract
Established in 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is still struggling to define a clear and commonly accepted identity for itself. As the member states hold very different views of the future CIS, they pull the organization in different directions, giving it a somewhat fuzzy character. While the Russian-led core is seeking closer integration, possibly even a transfer of decision-making to the supranational level, another group of states is insisting that the CIS should remain a loose and non-binding forum for cooperation. As a reflection of this reality, the CIS space is home to a number of other organizations which all take their members from the CIS circle. These organizations deliver what the CIS as a whole—because of its lowest common denominator policy—cannot do. The host of acronyms offer something to most member states, but they also cause the CIS space to be highly fragmented. Russia, in particular, has worked to bring all the different parts of the CIS closer together under its own leadership, but has remained largely unsuccessful. With its most recent initiative, a Eurasian Economic Union to be established by 2015, Russia is making a new effort to achieve what has failed so far. Little suggests that it will have any greater success now than before, and it therefore seems likely that the CIS will remain in the future also a complex organizational setting and a difficult challenge for Russia to handle.
... Many of the studies of regional integration in the post-Soviet space have focused on the CIS, pointing out that the CIS has been seen by weaker states as an organisation responsible for managing a divorce, whereas Russia saw the CIS as an opportunity for integration (Hansen 2013;Vasilyeva & Lagutina 2016). Hale (2008) argues that, despite Russia's plans for Eurasian regional integration, increased ethnic nationalism in many regional states has made them wary of such plans. ...
... Hale (2008) argues that, despite Russia's plans for Eurasian regional integration, increased ethnic nationalism in many regional states has made them wary of such plans. This increased mistrust of Russia as a regional hegemon necessitated a lax institutional design in the creation of the CIS whereby member states could choose whether or not to sign individual treaties in an à la carte manner (Willerton et al. 2012;Hansen 2013;Libman & Obydenkova 2013). In other words, weaker member states would not be coerced into signing treaties that they did not want to sign and give up any of their sovereignty. ...
... Another yardstick by which the CIS is deemed a failure as a form of regional integration is the European Union (Sakwa & Webber 1999;Malfliet et al. 2007;Hansen 2013). For example, Malfliet et al. (2007) argue that the European Union has been so successful that it should serve as a natural blueprint to Eurasian regional integration. ...
This article examines how variations in the degree of integration with the Russian Federation influence relations among post-Soviet states. Eurasian integration has been a significant priority of Russian foreign policy in the Putin era; the Russian Federation serves as the regional hegemon for Eurasian integration. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that hegemonic states reduce uncertainty and provide increased opportunities for cooperation among those states operating within the international systems they manage. To what extent is this true for the states involved in Russian-led Eurasian integration? Using treaty data between 1992 and 2005 to capture the extent of integrative ties with Russia, this article examines the impact of Russian-led integration on the level of cooperation among post-Soviet states. The results of this analysis indicate that Russian hegemony influences regional political alignment, expressed in roll-call voting within the UN framework.
... In fact, there are more multilateral organizations in the post-Soviet space than there are in any other region in the world (Volgy et al. 2008). While many scholars have been dismissive of the effectiveness of multilateral organization in the FSU (see Hansen 2013;Kramer 2008;Kubicek 1999Kubicek , 2009Miller and Toritsyn 2005;M. Olcott, Aslund, and Garnett 1999), I argue that multilateral organizations were vital to creating a regional security architecture. ...
... The majority of scholars studying the post-Soviet space focus on Russia's bilateral relations with individual states and claim that the multilateral organizations in the post-Soviet space are not very important in regional governance, and are not very effective organizations (i.e. F. S. Hansen 2013;Kramer 2008;Kubicek 1999Kubicek , 2009). Yet, there are more multilateral organizations in the post-Soviet space than in any other region in the world (Volgy et al. 2008). ...
... It is important to understand that not all of the member states were enthusiastic about the CIS and its purpose (F. S. Hansen 2013;Kramer 2008;Kubicek 1999Kubicek , 2009. For example, the Central Asian states were very enthusiastic about the CIS (Marks 1996), while Moldova was very reluctant to join, even claiming that it only joined because it felt forced to by Russia (King 1994). ...
... In the absence of any other regional organizations claiming such a broad range of fields, this illustrates the intention of member states to fill the vacuum left by the USSR (Libman, 2011, p. 4). For former Soviet Union (FSU) members, even those that did not foresee closer reintegration, joining the CIS emerged as a response to a highly uncertain future of internal and intra-region security and economic concerns (Hansen, 2013). Two contradictory drivers characterized the political calculations of the early 1990s in the CIS region. ...
... Despite high treaty activism, it failed to provide a common economic integration framework, let alone a sense of common identity (Sakwa and Webber, 1999). Non-participation in individual agreements and the lack of implementation characterized the failure of the CIS to reintegrate the post-Soviet space, mostly due to the lack of cohesion among the countries of the region in integration issues or the attractiveness of Western integration opportunities (Hansen, 2013). By 1997, only approximately 15% of the CIS agreements had come into force (Libman, 2007). ...
This chapter explores the relationship between the EAEU and other Eurasian regional organizations. To do so, first, it distinguishes theoretically between interplay and interaction as two types of relationship between regional organizations. While interplay is understood as the overtime and indirect relations between regional organizations in the regional institutional environment, interaction is direct in-time relations between them. The latter is suggested to be embedded in the former. Consequently, the second part explores interplay in the regional institutional environment of Eurasia and embeds the EAEU in this interplay, and the third part addresses interactions between the EAEU and other regional organizations. The concluding remarks highlight the changing dynamics and interactions between regional organizations in the post-Soviet space, emphasizing the rise of the EAEU, the potential shift towards the SCO, and the impact of the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia on these organizations’ relevance and future trajectories.
... Ortak tehdit veya zorluklarla karşı karşıya olan devletlerin ortak kurumsal çaba ve prosedürlerle bunlara cevap vermesi beklenir. Müttefiklerin istediklerini başarmaları ve NATO'yu etkili şekilde kullanabilmeleri için öncelikle uyumlu çıkarlarının olması gerekmektedir (Herd & Kriendler, 2013). Ukrayna meselesinde görüldüğü üzere NATO bu bağlamda da test edilmektedir. ...
... Tabii ki üç şeytana karşı mücadelede derin bir işbirliği geliştirildiği için diğer anlarda da beklentiler artmaktadır (Song, 2014). Aslında diğer gündemlerdeki girişimler de geniş yorumlamada üç şeytana karşı daha etkili bir mücadele arayışının ürünü olarak görülebilir (Hansen, 2013). Üyelerin gerçek anlamda ŞİÖ'nün entegrasyonda derinleşmesini istemedikleri de söylenmektedir. ...
Bu çalışmada NATO ve Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü’nün (ŞİÖ) terörle mücadele stratejilerini ve üyeleri arasındaki güven sorunu karşılaştırmalı olarak tartışılmaktadır. Hem NATO hem de ŞİÖ bölgesel örgütler olarak güvenlik arayışının bir ürünü olarak kurulmuştur. Ancak iki örgüt de güvenlik sorununa farklı yaklaşmaktadır. NATO için klasik tehditler öne çıkarken ŞİÖ için geleneksel olmayan tehditler önceliklidir. Aynı şekilde NATO bir yıkıcı düşman olan SSCB’ye karşı bir askeri ittifak olarak ortaya çıkmışken ŞİÖ ise üyelerinin üç şeytan olarak tanımladıkları terörizm, ayrılıkçılık ve aşırılıkçılığa karşı kurulmuştur. Her iki örgütünde gündemleri kurulduğu günden beri gelişip dönüşmektedir. NATO’nun, bu gelişimde, önceliklerini fazla değiştirmediği için terörle mücadele gündemini ikincil bir konu olarak gördüğü söylenebilir. ŞİÖ’nün ise önceliği zaten üç şeytanla mücadele olarak belirlendiği için terörle mücadelede işbirliği düzeyinin kurulduğu günden beri gelişip derinleştiği ileri sürülebilir. Bu çalışma iki örgütün terörle mücadelesini ele alırken büyük oranda betimleyici bir metot kullanmaktadır. Bu yönüyle betimleyici karşılaştırma da elde edilen verilerin bir yorumu olarak sunulmaktadır. NATO ve ŞİÖ’nün belli bir gündem üzerinden karşılaştırmalı analizinin konuya ilişkin Türkçe literatüre bir katkı sunması umulmaktadır.
... The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia's first attempt at the reintegration of the post-Soviet space, established in 1991, has proved unable to move its decision-making procedures to the supranational level. The success of CIS integration has been weakened by national fears of losing autonomy in decision-making and by concerns pertaining to distributional imbalances (Hansen 2013). The failure of the CIS project reflected internal divergences and asymmetries between its member countries and the primarily political, economic, population and territorial dominance of Russia. ...
... The Treaty has not developed an organisational structure and complex law base; however, it has evolved towards greater institutionalisation. It was designed to address new threats and challenges through a joint military command, a rapid reaction force for Central Asia, a common air defence system and 'coordinated action' in foreign, security and defence policy, in summary to combat external threats (Hansen 2013). ...
As a top trading partner and the foreign investor in Kazakhstan, attempting to deepen bilateral relations and review its previous policy towards Kazakhstan and the post-Soviet Central Asian region (The post-Soviet Central Asian region unites five former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) as a whole, the European Union is facing up to a new set of internal and external conditions which affects its approach to the East. One of the crucial determinants taken into account in terms of the European Union policy towards its Kazakh partner derives from the more advanced processes of Eurasian integration created by the Russian Federation. The question is whether the EU will be able to compete or complement the consistent steps of the Russian integration project and whether the EU should move beyond a trade and investment approach and place emphasis on the other strategic areas? The main research objective concentrates on the identification and examination of the relationship between political decisions and the economic ties of Kazakhstan and its main strategic partners. Considering the current geopolitical situation in Ukraine and Central Asia, the new ‘EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ will develop more areas targeted at security and stabilization issues. However, the top-down initiatives are only the legal basis of sectorial cooperation, and the intensification of bilateral relations comes from bottom-up cooperation and people-to-people contacts.
... The Russian Federation dominated the Soviet Union, and Russia continues to wield the most influence in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet region, there is a high level of mistrust of Russia, the regional hegemon (Hansen 2013(Hansen , 2015Slobodchikoff 2013Slobodchikoff , 2014Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2015). That is not to say that there is an equal level of mistrust of the regional hegemon in the region. ...
... The Russian Federation dominated the Soviet Union, and Russia continues to wield the most influence in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet region, there is a high level of mistrust of Russia, the regional hegemon (Hansen 2013(Hansen , 2015Slobodchikoff 2013Slobodchikoff , 2014Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2015). That is not to say that there is an equal level of mistrust of the regional hegemon in the region. ...
This article investigates how states can begin to cooperate and form bilateral relationships given severe barriers to cooperation. Certain issues can prevent cooperation from occurring despite strategic interests in doing so by both states. However, if states agree to use the institutional design feature of territorial or issue neutralization, then conflict can be averted even if some of the major hindrances to cooperation remains unresolved. I examine in greater detail how both territorial and issue neutralization are used as institutional designs feature in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. Through two major case studies, the self-imposed territorial neutralization of Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union as well as issue neutralization in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am able to show that territorial and issue neutralization may be effective tools for resolving conflict in the post-Soviet space and could create cooperative relationships instead of conflictual ones. Keywords territorial neutralization – issue neutralization – neutralization – Russia – Ukraine – mistrust – conflict management
... In fact, they occur within a regional framework of interaction created by the CIS. Meanwhile, others have analyzed more recent multilateral organizations (e.g. the Eurasian Economic Union) that have proven more successful than the CIS at facilitating issue-area agreements and regional governance (Hansen, 2013). In actuality all these multilateral organizations are encompassed by the CIS framework for interaction and, we contend, build on this foundation. ...
... Much attention is understandably given to such arrangements as the [Eurasian] Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 9 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and these organizations rely on institutional design features grounded in those of the CIS illuminated here. Hansen (2013) shows, for instance, how the SCO (since 2001) has built on the CIS logic of 'lowest common denominator' to construct collective security arrangements that differentially accommodate the contrasting needs of both weaker states and hegemons (Russia and China). Potential SCO members understandably had brought considerable wariness to the multilateral proceedings. ...
Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many relationships between states over the centuries. One approach that states can take to deal with these two, often interrelated, problems is to create intergovernmental institutions and arrangements designed to accommodate the interests of states with varied power capabilities. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) embodies an interesting institutional design in an effort by former Soviet Union (FSU) countries to address these dilemmas. The CIS was not only the first multilateral FSU organization created following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it also provided a necessary and important framework for the further construction of bilateral and multilateral relations among the former Soviet republics as they reengaged one another. CIS arrangements have been augmented by extensive bilateral negotiations and treaties and, brought together, these interconnected multilateral and bilateral instruments yield a system of cautious regional security governance and framework for international relations within the FSU. This paper analyzes three key features of this foundational CIS institutional design: (1) legalism, (2) an à la carte choice of treaty instruments, and (3) nested bilateralism, wherein many details of the regional, multilateral agreements are implemented via bilateral treaties (hence constituting a combination design feature). Empirically, the paper illuminates this institutional design using a unique dataset of all multilateral security treaties of the CIS (approximately 185) and all bilateral security treaties (more than 500) between the regional hegemon, Russia, and the smaller CIS members. We further investigate the causal mechanisms of the CIS institutional design as it copes with the conditions of hegemony and mistrust in two bilateral case studies, Russia–Armenia, and Russia–Ukraine (Black Sea Fleet status). We find the CIS institutional design, built upon by subsequent FSU regional organizations (including the Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization), has permitted both more and less powerful states to advance their interrelated security interests in the face of considerable power asymmetry and mistrust. More than twenty years after the CIS’s formation, a patchwork of Eurasian regional organizations and numerous related bilateral treaties widen regional security and other arrangements. Meanwhile, the dramatic events surrounding the February 2014 Ukrainian coup and the joining of Crimea to the Russian Federation only reinforce the importance of understanding state treaty activity in channeling state action. Questions surround Russia respecting the 1992 treaty and protocol with Ukraine and the US on the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine and the joint recognition of Ukraine’s sovereign borders. But Russia’s spring 2014 actions involving Crimea and its Crimean bases accorded with the various treaties concluded with Ukraine in 1997; treaties addressing the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimean Peninsula that are a subject of our analysis.
... The CIS emerged on December 21, 1991, due to pressure from states (mainly Kazakhstan) that wanted to be part of a larger organization that would successfully reintegrate the FSU and that were initially excluded from the trilateral Belovezh Accords, which acknowledged the end of the USSR and was signed on December 8, 1991, between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. As Flemming S. Hansen (2013) showed, disagreements regarding the CIS would tear at the organization from the beginning: either a confederal regional organization inspired by the EU or a default mechanism to address the systems of interdependence inherited from the USSR (p.143). The CIS emerged during the catastrophic transition to capitalism, against the backdrop of the devastating consequences on interrepublican trade at the time of the USSR's dissolution (Metcalf, 1997, pp.531-534). ...
Tras el Euromaidán, Rusia respondió con una intervención militar en territorio ucraniano. Esta revisión del status dio un giro más brutal en febrero de 2022. Las razones del revisionismo de Rusia encajan en el debate sobre el creciente distanciamiento entre la Federación Rusa y Occidente, junto con una renovación de la caracterización clásica de Rusia como un Estado “imperialista” empeñado en restaurar el poder de la ex Unión Soviética centrado en Moscú. Aunque la caracterización amplia de Rusia como “imperialista” capta hábilmente su brutal negación de la soberanía de Ucrania, todavía combina diferentes vectores geográficos y períodos históricos. Este artículo contribuye a los debates en curso empleando los conceptos de “perspectivas geoestratégicas” de William Walters (es decir, marcha, frontera colonial y limes) y los modelos geopolíticos westfalianos e imperiales de Christopher S. Browning y Pertti Joenniemi. Este marco resume, por un lado, la compleja compatibilidad de los procesos de revisionismo territorial y, por el otro, la integración regional de la ex Unión Soviética centrada en Rusia. En última instancia, el objetivo es analizar la política fronteriza de Rusia posterior al Euromaidán, abordando tanto la revisión de las fronteras de Ucrania como la integración regional a través de la Unión Económica Euroasiática durante el statu quo que duró hasta 2022. El panorama resultante muestra que el modelo geopolítico westfaliano de la Federación Rusa de expansión del limes contradice el modelo geopolítico imperial basado en la creación de fronteras coloniales. El refuerzo incremental del modelo westfaliano desde febrero de 2022 plantea la interesante pregunta de cómo afectará esto a la geopolítica imperial con respecto a otros países de la ex Unión Soviética.
... The Council of Foreign Ministers is established under Article 27 of the Charter to coordinate the foreign political activity of the members, including their positions in international organizations, and to organize consultations on issues of world politics. While these provisions suggest that the drafters' initial desire was decidedly to achieve a greater policy convergence among the CIS members (Hansen 2013), the union appears to have failed to deliver on its ambitious mandate and goals, including in the area of foreign policy alignment. ...
This paper examines the voting behavior of the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in order to find out their preference similarities on foreign policy issues. Based on a specific dataset of UNGA resolutions from 2000 to 2020 and using two different indices of voting cohesion, the present research addresses two empirically motivated questions: To what extent does the EAEU speak in unison externally in the context of UNGA plenary? And second, what has been the impact of the formation of the EAEU in 2015 on the common foreign policy? The results reveal that the EAEU scores a ‘medium’ level of cohesion as measured in the context of the UNGA, which may indicate that members often speak with one voice, while defections still occur during controversial votes. Moreover, the findings suggest that there is no meaningful difference in cohesion between the pre- and post-EAEU periods. Finally, the study finds that Eurasian states are most cohesive on development resolutions, but least cohesive on security and human rights issues, as reflected in their recorded voting behavior.
... Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia tried to pursue regional integration. It focused first on developing bilateral relationships with each of the former Soviet republics as well as developing new multilateral organizations to try to create new rules of interaction for the post-Soviet space (Hansen 2013(Hansen , 2015Slobodchikoff 2014;Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz 2012). It viewed the former Soviet Union (fsu) as within its own sphere of influence. ...
In democracies, elites should be responsive to public opinion. This is especially true in Eastern Europe, where politicians fear electoral sanctions in the process of reform (Roberts and Kim 2011). Public opinion in general in Eastern Europe has been overwhelmingly in favor of European integration (Caplanova et al. 2004). In Ukraine, public opinion was in favor of increased cooperation with the eu, while in Moldova, public opinion was in favor of increased cooperation with the Russian led Customs Union. Ukraine refused to sign an association agreement with the eu, while Moldova enthusiastically signed the same association agreement. Why should both Ukrainian and Moldovan political elites have chosen not to be responsive to public opinion in such an important decision? Using network analysis of bilateral treaties between Russia and Moldova and Russia and Ukraine, I predict the responsiveness of political elites to public opinion toward European integration. I argue that the denser a treaty network between a weaker state and the regional hegemon, the less likely political elites will be to cooperate and move toward European integration. Conversely, less dense treaty networks allow politicians more flexibility in following their own preferences. Further, I offer a prediction for other states in the fsu to seek further cooperation with the eu. Keywords Ukraine – public opinion – European Union – Russia – former Soviet Union – treaty networks – elite constraints
... Paradoxically, following the August 2008 war Georgia left the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the very organization that Putin has strived to strengthen. His reasons for doing so are multiple, but given Russia's shortage of allies, there is little doubt that he sees in the CIS also a pool of potential allies in the struggle to balance US power and unipolarity, including the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hansen, 2013). The most ambitious integration scheme so far, Putin (2012) has announced the establishment by 2015 of a new Eurasian Economic Union, built on the foundations of the CIS, that is, its own 'backyard', and delivering what this latter has failed to do. ...
... Writing in the late 1990s, Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber (1999: 379) noted that the organisation "has failed to integrate the Soviet successor states in any meaningful sense", and a majority of writers seem to have reached similar conclusions, if not always expressed so directly, since then. These writers will usually point to the continued existence of serious conflict, military even, within the membership circle, the frequent policy opt-outs, the low of the lowest common denominator, the lack of supranational decision-making bodies and enforcement mechanisms as well as withdrawals e or a combination of it all (for instance Åslund, Olcott, & Garnett 1999;Hansen, 2013;Kramer, 2008;Kubicek, 1999Kubicek, , 2009. ...
Relying on a large quantitative data set from the United Nations General Assembly voting records in the years 1992–2013, this study analyses developments in the foreign policy preferences of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. It finds that the general level of disagreement between the member states as a whole has increased significantly and that policies have become more radicalised, causing member states to hold directly opposing views still more often. It also finds that a majority of member states, led by Russia, have converged on the foreign policy mean, causing the core of the organisation to become still denser. This suggests that the CIS will undergo a future development where member states will travel along increasingly different trajectories. This research has important implications for our understanding of the CIS and of the policies of the individual member states.
NEET, ne eğitimde ne de istihdamda olan gençleri ifade eden bir kavramdır. NEET gençliği son yıllarda birçok ülkede ve Türkiye'de bir sorun haline gelmiştir. Literatür incelendiğinde, Türkiye'de NEET üzerine yapılan akademik çalışmaların sınırlı sayıda olması bu çalışmayı gerekli kılmıştır. TÜİK verilerine göre 2014 yılında 2 milyon 914 bin olan NEET sayısı 2022 yılında 2 milyon 900 bine, %24,9 olan NEET oranı ise %24,2'ye gerilemiştir. Yüksek NEET oranları, iş bulmanın daha zor olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, NEET gençlerin çalışma hayatındaki sorunlarını ve ihtiyaçlarını görünür kılmak ve bu konuda sorun çözücü mekanizmaları harekete geçirmektir. Heterojen bir yapıya sahip olan NEET'in oluşumunda bireyin kişisel ve fiziksel özellikleri, eğitim, aile, çevre ve işgücü piyasası gibi faktörler etkin rol oynamaktadır. Bu gençlerin doğru yönlendirilmeleri ve işgücü piyasasına girebilecek niteliklere sahip olmalarını sağlamak için sürdürülebilir politikalara ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu bağlamda İŞKUR, ne eğitimde ne de istihdamda olan gençleri işgücü piyasasına kazandırmak ve istihdamlarına katkı sağlamak için önemli danışmanlık hizmetleri sunmaktadır. Ancak NEET sadece İŞKUR'un bir sorunu değildir. NEET gençliği sorunu, ilgili tüm aktörlerin işbirliği ile çözüm bulacaktır. Bu nedenle, gençlere gerekli rehabilitasyon hizmetlerinin sağlanması için NEET izleme merkezleri kurulmalıdır. Araştırmada NEET gençlerinin topluma yeniden entegrasyonu için çözüm önerileri geliştirilmiştir.
This paper seeks to assess Russia’s policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the organization turned thirty years old. CIS is frequently depicted as a failure of integration in the former Soviet space, plagued by Russia’s damaging policies of aggression against smaller partners, diverging goals of its members, and inadequate institutional design. This paper argues that Russia continues to support CIS, notwithstanding these issues. By referring to the variables of the theory of cooperative hegemony, I show how Moscow’s commitment to it through the creation of a regional identity validates the continued existence of the Commonwealth.
Regional integration creates a common economic, social, and political space, which is based on interstate dialogue. A common integration space forms the territory of security, since the security sphere is not only to solve specific tasks, but also to create permanent instruments for preventing various risks. The Post-Soviet space remains a complex territory, the states of which have gone through a period of political destabilization, faced various threats, and come to the idea that only collective security mechanisms in the framework of constant cooperation are capable of preventing risks. Therefore, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is not only an economic project, it is a project that forms a common security space for all participants, and not only for its member states. In this regard, this chapter is structured around two key problems: established conceptual approaches in the field of security in relation to integration processes and tools of the EAEU for the formation of a common and indivisible security space for all its participants.
The article examines and compares the Russian and Western research agendas on the European Union (EU)–Russia policies in their shared neighbourhood. The analysis will be implemented in four successive steps. (1) The conceptualisation of the EU–Russia common neighbourhood in the Western and Russian researches will be analysed in three dimensions (terminology attributed to this region, political–social transformations, regionalism) that will contextualise the subsequent analysis of the Western and Russian research agendas on (2) EU policies (European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership) and (3) Russia’s policies (including the issues of the Eurasian integration) towards the common neighbourhood and also on (4) EU–Russia interactions within this area. The conclusions will identify and systemise the major trends as well as nuances in each agenda and also the differences and asymmetries between the Western and Russian research agendas will be outlined and analysed. These differences are determined by both, the policy-oriented and academic factors. The agendas are asymmetric, yet they are not monolithic, pluralism exists in both of them. Prospects for the further research will be outlined.
Neste trabalho analisamos a Rússia no período compreendido entre 1998 e 2015, fazendo para isso uso da Teoria da Dependência e do modelo de análise do “sistema-mundo” de Immanuel Wallerstein. Considera-se que esta teoria irá contribuir para esclarecer o poder e o potencial deste país no seio das Relações Internacionais hodiernas, pois oferece uma visão destas numa perspectiva “centro”/”periferia”, em que o poder é um reflexo das relações de produção. O fim da URSS em 1991 marcaria um período de periferização da Rússia que se alastraria até ao ano de 1999, tendo um importante impacto do ponto de vista socioeconómico e político. Isto significou um aumento da “dependência” face ao “centro”, e em particular ao “centro hegemónico” do “sistema-mundo”, através de um processo de enfraquecimento das suas estruturas produtivas e políticas. Procuramos estudar aqui a actual posição da Rússia no sistema-mundo e qual a tendência que regista, considerando as alterações após 1999 com a chegada de Vladimir Putin ao poder. A dependência russa das exportações de petróleo e gás natural são o factor fundamental na sua relação com o sistema-mundo e da divisão internacional do trabalho a ele associada. Coloca-se a hipótese de a Rússia se encontrar numa posição “semi-periférica”, registando uma tendência de melhoria da sua condição sistémica rumo ao centro, ainda que com fragilidades e contradições associadas à sua estrutura económica e política, que limitam o seu desenvolvimento e acção. O nosso modelo de análise retoma os cinco níveis de “imperialismo” (e “dependência” a eles associada) apontados por Johan Galtung. Ou seja, a nível económico, comunicativo, cultural, militar e político. Também será aqui argumentado que a actual elite dominante na Rússia assume características semelhantes àquelas encontradas nos regimes da América Latina entre os anos de 1960-90, a que alguns autores denominaram de “burocrático-autoritários”, caracterizadas pelas suas perspectivas objectivistas, racionalistas e tecnocráticas. No entanto, é exactamente este regime que suporta a Rússia enquanto “semi-periferia”, que a impede de ascender a centro.
Palavras-chave: imperialismo; teoria da dependência; sistema-mundo; desenvolvimento; semi-periferia; modelo burocrático-autoritário; Rússia.
This article investigates the effect of economic crises on the development of post-Soviet regional integration, focusing on Russia–Kazakhstan relations and particularly the case of the Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan customs union. While the literature often argues that crises are accompanied by growing protectionism, we observe a substantially more complex relation. We find that crises as a rule result in an increase in integration rhetoric and can also result in an increase in actual economic and institutional integration. However, the actual integration effort goes up only when a crisis has followed a prolonged period of economic growth, i.e. the countries have accumulated sufficient reserves. At the same time, the existing ties must be strong, with no viable alternative available to the policy makers. Otherwise there is too strong an incentive to use protectionist measures to compensate for the decrease in budgetary revenue.
Networks of treaties with treaty nesting, wherein treaties build upon, expand upon, or are grounded in preexisting treaties, are an increasingly important dimension of interstate cooperation. Focusing on relations within the area of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with special attention to both multilateral and bilateral arrangements between Russia and other FSU states, we illuminate treaty activism and regional cooperation among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members in the security domain. Beyond an analysis of multilateral and bilateral CIS alliance agreements, we evaluate the more focused security arrangements of two FSU–CIS bilateral relationships: Russia–Turkmenistan and Russia–Georgia. We intentionally analyze these two complex and problematic bilateral relationships, where treaty activism and networks permitted the signatory states to address common security issues. The breakdown of the Russian–Georgian relationship with the August 2008 war should not obscure the significant conflict management efforts of the preceding decade and a half; efforts that were grounded in intensive treaty activity. Joined together, these CIS multilateral and focused bilateral relationships point to a treaty complex and architecture that partially manage the contrasting security interests of FSU states.
A plan for the most ambitious political reform in Soviet history was approved by the USSR's parliament in late 1988. As the reform unfolded, a key component came to be what Mikhail S. Gorbachev called “a renewed federal structure. ”Reform proponents argued that only a renewed federalism could provide for the continued integrity of the Soviet state while assuring greater responsiveness to local demands. However, the attempt to breathe life into the USSR's pseudo-federal structure unleashed long-suppressed nationalist, territorial, and localist sentiments. Beginning in 1990, “refederalization” passed from mainly rhetorical discussion to a plan for a more loosely organized federation under the auspices of a Union Treaty. Following the attempted coup d'état by Kremlin hard-liners in August 1991, pressures for decentralization led, in the closing weeks of 1991, to the complete abandonment of the “Great Soviet experiment.” With the demise of the USSR, the plan for federal redesign was superseded by the rapid emergence of independent states.
We examine the development of the CIS under four separate headings: · cooperative projects outlined in CIS documentation and nominally subject to CIS oversight; · organisational development; · patterns of inter-state relations within the CIS area; and · attitudinal differences among CIS member states. These are intended to have an evaluative as well as a descriptive purpose. Overall, they show that the CIS has developed in an attenuated form. Its mere survival is enough to suggest that it has avoided outright failure and that it provides a benign environment for independent state development. However, it remains a 'semi-amorphous' rather than a consolidated organisation.
Many argue that balance of power theory is as applicable to the Third World as it is to other states. Without substantial modification, however, balance of power theory cannot explain Third World alignments, because it ignores key characteristics of Third World states that determine alignment. The author develops a theory, “omnibalancing,” that is relevant to the Third World and that repairs these defects. Rather than balance of power's emphasis on states seeking to resist threats from other states, omnibalancing explains Third World alignments as a consequence of leaders seeking to counter internal and external threats to their rule. The superiority of omnibalancing over balance of power in making Third World alignments understandable is related to the Third World in general and to the alignment decisions of two key Third World states in particular. The author concludes by discussing why an understanding of the Third World, including Third World alignment, is central to the study of international relations.
Charles A. Kupchan is Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University.
Clifford A. Kupchan is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Columbia University.
The authors would like to than the following individuals for their assistance: Robert Art, Henry Bienen, James Chace, Cherrie Daniels, Joanne Gowa, Robert Jervis, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Nicholas Rizopoulos, Jack Snyder, Patricia Weitsman, and the participants of the International Relations Study Group at Princeton University, the Olin National Security Seminar at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, and the Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Council on Foreign Relations. Research support was provided by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, and a German Marshall Fund grant to the Dulles Program on Leadership in International Affairs.
1. The most prominent proponent of this view is John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 1-56. Mearsheimer's main concerns stem from his assertion that multipolar worlds are inherently more unstable than bipolar ones.
Other analysts, some of whom fall into the optimist camp, voice different concerns about the end of the Cold War: that Germany might again seek to dominate Europe; that failed attempts at political and economic reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe might produce aggressive autocratic regimes; that ethnic hatreds might trigger border conflicts. For a review of these arguments and documentation, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-9.
2. See Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization," World Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215-250; Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 77-101; James Goodby, "A New European Concert: Settling Disputes in CSCE," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-6; Clifford Kupchan and Charles Kupchan, "After NATO: Concert of Europe" (Op-Ed), New York Times, July 6, 1990; Harald Mueller, "A United Nations of Europe and North America," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-8; John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, No. 77 (Winter 1989-90), pp. 3-16; Alice Rivlin, David Jones, and Edward Myer, "Beyond Alliances: Global Security Through Focused Partnerships," October 2, 1990, available from the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; Richard Ullman, "Enlarging the Zone of Peace," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 102-120; and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace."
3. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 6-7. For arguments challenging the notion that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity, see Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 33-40.
4. For classical statements of the Realist position see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965). For a more recent and concise statement of the Realist vision see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
5. See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-508.
6. Many analysts of balance-of-power theory contend that balancing under anarchy, when it works properly, produces a roughly equal distribution of power. The underlying logic of this proposition is that states turn to internal mobilization and alliance formation to respond in kind to each other's actions, thereby producing a rough equilibrium of power. See, for example, Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 42.
7. The events of the 1930s represent...
Charles A. Kupchan is Senior Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University.
Clifford A. Kupchan is Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to Congressman Harry Johnston.
The authors would like to thank Richard Betts, George Downs, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin, Jack Snyder, and Alexander Wendt for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. For further discussion, see Richard Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; George Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case Against Collective Security," in George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-21; and Charles Lipson, "Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?" in ibid., pp. 105-131.
2. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49. The conceptual muddle caused by Mearsheimer's restrictive definition of collective security is also apparent in his discussion of the empirical record (pp. 33-34). Mearsheimer refers to the League of Nations and the United Nations as collective security organizations. Neither, however, comes close to fulfilling the standards of ideal collective security. The League Covenant and the UN Charter do not entail automatic and binding commitments to respond to aggression with force. Both organizations created inner councils to enhance the influence of the great powers. In these respects, the League and the UN resemble concerts more than they do ideal collective security organizations.
3. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), p. 117, n. 6.
4. See ibid., p. 126. Collective security seeks to expand the realm of private interest so that even states whose security is not immediately threatened have a stake in preventing aggression. It does not, as Mearsheimer writes, require that states "not think in terms of narrow self-interest" (p. 29). Rather, it seeks to broaden how states define their self-interest through two different pathways. First, assuming that interests are fixed and confined to realist notions of rational egoism, collective security alters incentives so that states more often find it in their interests to cooperate as opposed to compete. Second, collective security alters the character of state interests themselves, not just the behavior that states adopt to attain those interests. Through processes of learning and socialization, states can come to define their interests in more collective terms. Through its participation in the EU and NATO, for example, Germany has come to define its interests in European rather than in purely national terms. For further discussion, see pp. 57-59 below.
5. See Charles Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in Downs, Collective Security, pp. 59-63.
6. See Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," pp. 138-144. Collective security institutions that do not make responses to aggression automatic and legally binding also take care of Mearsheimer's charge that collective security "transforms every local conflict into an international conflict" by mandating that all members respond to every act of aggression (p. 32). Concerts can play as important a role in orchestrating mutual restraint as in coordinating collective action.
7. For further discussion, see Downs and Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case Against Collective Security," pp. 26-29.
8. We acknowledge that it is conceivable that collective security could produce a weaker opposing coalition than balancing under anarchy. At least hypothetically, aggression could take place as a bolt from the blue, or directly threatened states could be dangerously overconfident about the willingness of their coalition partners to join the fray. But for the reasons just enumerated, the risks of such an outcome are low. And these risks are well worth taking in light of collective security's considerable advantages.
9. Mearsheimer incorrectly claims that the empirical record undermines the case for collective security. The Concert of Europe preserved peace in Europe for forty years, not, as Mearsheimer asserts, for eight. The...
This study examines the consequences of the collapse of the unified Soviet market at the end of 1991, the dilemmas of choice generated by the economic and political costs and benefits of reintegration with differ ent states, and the resulting attempts to create new forms of economic cooperation. A gravity model is used to determine whether these new forms of cooperation have had a positive impact on the members' bilat eral trade. This reveals that in the first few years of its existence member ship in the Commonwealth of Independent States has not generally had a positive impact on trade, while membership in the Baltic Free Trade As sociation and the Central Asian Commonwealth have, although they are composed of small states which produce similar products and, in the case of the Central Asian Commonwealth, are at a lower level of development.
Since achieving full sovereignty, the Baltic nations as well have pursued regional integration among themselves and with the Scandinavian countries, and have made "joining Europe' their strategic foreign policy goal. Central European and Baltic elites do not consider that forming these regional groups or joining the EU and NATO will weaken their peoples' national identities. One indicator of the persistence of a Ukrainian or Belarusian "younger-brother' relationship with the Russians would be foreign policies seeking integration into the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and close bilateral ties. As the rationale for such policies, younger brothers would cite their historical association with the elder brother and cultural kinship with Russia. This article compares and contrast the views and policies of Ukrainian and Belarusian foreign affairs decision makers vis-a-vis these two poles of integration; Europe and Russia. The author also offers some historical perspectives on the problem of national identity in Ukraine and Belarus. -from Author
In the late 1980s regional integration emerged as one of the most important developments in world politics. It is not a new phenomenon, however, and this book presents the first analysis of integration across time, and across regions. Walter Mattli examines projects in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, but also in Latin America, North America and Asia since the 1950s. Using the tools of political economy, he considers why some integration schemes have succeeded while many others have failed; what forces drive the process of integration; and under what circumstances outside countries seek to join. Unlike traditional political science approaches, the book stresses the importance of market forces in determining the outcome of integration; but unlike purely economic analyses, it also highlights the impact of institutional factors. The book will provide students of political science, economics, and European studies with a new framework for the study of international cooperation.
Some member-states of the European Union (EU) want a supranational foreign and security policy, while other member-states oppose any significant limitation of national sovereignty in this domain. What explains this variation? Answering this question could help us to better understand not only the trajectory of European unification, but also the conditions and prospects of consensual political integration in other regional contexts and territorial scales. The main research traditions in international relations theory suggest different explanations. I examine the roles of relative power capabilities, foreign policy interests, Europeanized identities, and domestic multilevel governance in determining the preferences of the fifteen EU member governments concerning the institutional depth of their foreign and security policy cooperation. I find that power capabilities and collective identities have a significant influence, but the effect of ideas about the nature and locus of sovereignty, as reflected in the domestic constitution of each country, is particularly remarkable.A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th ECPR Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8 10 September 2001. For their valuable comments, I would like to thank Filippo Andreatta, Daniele Archibugi, Simone Borra, Nicola Dunbar, Fabio Franchino, Alkuin K lliker, Leonardo Morlino, Angelo Panebianco, Eiko Thielemann, Ben Tonra, the editors of IO, and three anonymous reviewers. I am responsible for any mistakes.
International institutions are a ubiquitous feature of daily life in many world regions, and nowhere more so than contemporary Europe. While virtually all would agree that such institutions matter, there is less agreement on exactly how they have effects. This special issue brings together European Union specialists and international relations theorists who address the latter issue. In particular, we explore the socializing role of institutions in Europe, with our central concern being to better specify the mechanisms of socialization and the conditions under which they are expected to lead to the internalization of new roles or interests. Drawing on a multifaceted understanding of human rationality, we consider three generic social mechanisms strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion and their ability to promote socialization outcomes within international institutions. This disaggregation exercise not only helps consolidate nascent socialization research programs in international relations theory and EU studies; it also highlights points of contact and potential synergies between rationalism and social constructivism.For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to two anonymous referees, IO editors Lisa Martin and Thomas Risse, as well as to John Duffield, Alexandra Gheciu, Liesbet Hooghe, Peter Katzenstein, Ron Mitchell, Frank Schimmelfennig, Martha Snodgrass, and Michael Z rn. More generally, thanks are owed to all the project participants for numerous and valuable discussions on the themes addressed in this volume.