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Coercing non-liberal persons: Considerations on a more realistic liberalism
Abstract
The central contention of this article is that contemporary liberal theory is without an account of what legitimates coercing those who reject liberalism that is consistent with its own stipulations of the conditions of political legitimacy. After exploring the nature of the liberal principle of legitimacy, and in particular how it is intended to function as a way of protecting individuals from domination and oppression by reconciling freedom and public law, the article considers four different possible accounts of what might legitimate coercing non-liberals. While some of them have independent plausibility, the article argues that none of them meets the requirements of liberal legitimacy. The final section of the article considers the implications of this theoretical gap for liberal theory more widely. The argument is made that liberalism must accept that even liberal politics will necessitate the oppressive use of coercive power, i.e. compelling people to live according to wills other than their own, and that insofar as this is a position central to the recent burgeoning literature on political realism, liberalism ought therefore to be more realist.
... Rawls is committed to thinking that all solutions to the stability problem must be those that provide stability 'for the right reasons', or, in other words, show that a liberal, well-ordered society could provide its own internal motivation, without relying on either coercion or ideology. This is not an uncontroversial move, as some recent critics of Rawls argue (e.g., Sleat 2013). But for my purposes this debate could be safely side-stepped; whatever normative conception of legitimate power one holds, facts about human motivation would inform the conditions for political and institutional stability, and whether it could be legitimately attained. ...
Should facts about motivation play a role in the justification of political ideals? Many theorists argue that political ideals should be tailored to the limitations of human nature—‘taking people as they are’—while others maintain that facts about motivation should be excluded. This article offers a critical intervention in this debate: the important question is not so much whether people can motivate themselves, or whether they are capable of being motivated, but what social mechanisms would be required to motivate them, and whether these mechanisms are legitimate. Reframing the question of motivation as a political question of legitimacy, I argue that if people could only be motivated to act through illegitimate use of power, the ideal in question cannot be fully justified.
... pl. : Forrester 2010;Galston 2010;Newey 2010;North 2010;Rossi 2010;Sleat 2010;Sleat 2013). Jelen tanulmányban összehasonlítom a két fél elméleteinek legfontosabb elemeit, és arra keresem a választ, hogy ezek a kritikák valóban megfelelnek-e a valóságnak, illetve hogy tényleg ilyen egyszerű lenne-e Kant politikafilozófiája? ...
... pl. : Forrester 2010;Galston 2010;Newey 2010;North 2010;Rossi 2010;Sleat 2010;Sleat 2013). Jelen tanulmányban összehasonlítom a két fél elméleteinek legfontosabb elemeit, és arra keresem a választ, hogy ezek a kritikák valóban megfelelnek-e a valóságnak, illetve hogy tényleg ilyen egyszerű lenne-e Kant politikafilozófiája? ...
... pl. : Forrester 2010;Galston 2010;Newey 2010;North 2010;Rossi 2010;Sleat 2010;Sleat 2013). Jelen tanulmányban összehasonlítom a két fél elméleteinek legfontosabb elemeit, és arra keresem a választ, hogy ezek a kritikák valóban megfelelnek-e a valóságnak, illetve hogy tényleg ilyen egyszerű lenne-e Kant politikafilozófiája? ...
... It tends to be defended (when it is defended at all and not simply adopted without argument) by appeal to realism. No 'sensible person', we are told, will deny that existing coercive institutions are 'necessary'; therefore, we should be 'realistic' and accept that complying with them is a prerequisite for progress (Sleat 2013). Note that the promise of progressthrough-compliance is essential to this argument, at least on a charitable reading. ...
The familiar irony of ‘real existing socialism’ is that it never was. Socialist ideals were used to legitimize regimes that fell far short of realizing those ideals—indeed, that violently repressed anyone who tried to realize them. This paper suggests that the derogatory concept of ‘the criminal’ may be allowing liberal ideals to operate in contemporary political philosophy and real politics in a worryingly similar manner. By depoliticizing deep dissent from the prevailing order of property, this concept can obscure what I call the ‘legitimation gap’. This is the gulf between (a) liberal accounts of state legitimacy, and (b) the actual functioning of liberal states. Feminists have long pointed out that the exclusion of what is deemed ‘personal’ from political consideration is itself a political move. I propose that the construction of the criminal as a category opposed to the political works similarly to perpetuate unjust forms of social power.
... Facing the sudden and massive Islamic invasion, Western political thought tends to rethink its foundations to 'wake up' from the idealistic drowsiness that began after the collapse of communism at the beginning of the 1990 s and to become more realistic and mobilized to meet new challenges. One such attempt is presented by (Sleat 2013), who attempts to consider how legitimate it would be for liberals to coerce non-liberals. The mentioned article was written before the flood of refugees began in 2015, so it calls upon liberals to be realistic but does not take into account the new realities. ...
There is widespread opinion that, notwithstanding deviations, the political life of humanity on a large scale is on the path of progress, and humans are becoming freer and more enlightened with time. I am going to contend with this opinion, namely, with a part of it telling that the prevailing mass of the people strives to achieve more freedom and enlightenment. On the opposite, freedom, individual independence, and political rights (not to be confused with social rights, such as state care and protection) are of minor importance to the mass. The ideology of liberalism in its classical form, as created by John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and others, yields to the pressure of the ideology of state paternalism. The pressure comes not only from above (that is, from authorities); the people also welcome more paternalism. They appear not to value their individual freedom and independence, and they are inclined to give them up voluntarily to some mighty organization such as the state in exchange for care, protection and leadership. Liberalism has played an important role in the development of human civilization and the formation of the Western world, but new ideologies and political practices are pushing it out of people’s minds. For the author, as adherent of classical liberalism, this is unfortunate. However, I wish to treat this issue realistically, even if the facts conflict with my own convictions and desires.
... Matt Sleat (2013) notes that the above is correct in a sense: when deciding how to cut a cake fairly one should disregard views of those wanting to keep the whole cake to themselves. What is unclear, however, is how this claim 'regarding the basis for excluding unreasonable persons from consideration in the justificatory process of the constitutional essentials can possibly explain or validate the legitimacy of coercing those same individuals to obey the principles which that process gives rise to'. ...
This paper examines the ways in which illiberal and unreasonable views can be legitimately contained in a politically liberal society, and discusses some of the pressing reasons to undertake, or abstain from, such measures. Theoretical background for the discussion is provided by Rawlsian political liberalism. The paper focuses on the particular justification for the preventive containment of unreasonable views offered by Jonathan Quong (2011). It is claimed that Quong’s approach raises some significant worries (not unrelated to the ‘third-order pathologies’ discussed above in Chapter 2). The suggestion is put forward that political liberals would do well to pay more attention to respect and relations of recognition.
... This assumption can be supported by the interpretation that political liberalism is another internal turn within the overall model of liberal-normativist political theory since the 1970s. The most explicit treatment of political liberalism (rather than of more self-confidently abstract universalist political theory) that is regarded as sharing the realist impetus is possibly Jeremy Waldron's Law and Disagreement (1999); more recently Freyenhagen (2011) and Sleat (2013b) have also engaged with political liberalism from a broadly realist perspective. understanding of the political conception of justice is justifiable, as the construction of the political conception of justice is decisive for realizing the principal goal of political liberalism, which is to "work out a political conception of political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal, and nonliberal, may endorse for the right reasons" (PL: xxxix). 2 Each definition of (the) 'political' will be critically discussed (2). ...
This thesis intervenes into the current debates about realism in political theory. Realism is a new challenge to the liberal mainstream in political theory. However, the extent to which realism, in its heterogeneity, actually has the potential to pose such a challenge, has thus far remained largely unexplored. The thesis offers the first differentiated assessment of this potential of realism and, finding it limited, embarks on a radicalization of realism. Having established a critical foil through a political reading of Rawls’ Political Liberalism, I divide contributions to realism into those who aim to revise, reform and reject liberal-normative political theory. This ‘ordering perspective’ of realism allows analyzing the thus far neglected similarities between realists and their liberal-normative opponents. This analysis suggests that the less critical subdivisions of realism limit themselves to be internal correctives to the liberal mainstream. However, even the most critical and challenging of the prevalent subdivisions of realism, which I call ‘vision of politics’ realism, remains caught in tensions between realist and liberal-normative commitments. In reaction to this limitation, my re-interpretation of Raymond Geuss’ realism as a modification of early Critical Theory through Foucauldian elements provides the basis for the development of a radical realism. This radical realism departs radically from the prevalent understandings of liberal-normative political theory and transcends the limitations of realism through changing the relationship between political theory and its political context. Radical realism brings the tensions and entanglements between normative and descriptive aspects of political theorizing into view and bases its critical purchase and practical orientation on the diagnostic examination of the political context. A discussion of the criteria for legitimacy in public justification liberalism, realism and radical realism finally ties together the argumentation of the thesis and offers a reflection on its bearing on a key question of contemporary political theory.
This paper seeks to show that Bernard Williams’ approach to legitimacy falls short of its aspirations in ways that cast doubt on its fitness for guiding the practice of future realist political theory. More precisely, the paper focuses on the shortcomings of Williams’ realism in establishing a connection to (the practices of) politics, and on how to redeem those shortcomings in a way that would render them suitable for guiding future realist political theory. The first substantive section of the paper considers how compatible Williams’ commitments to diagnosis and interpretation are, with how he spells out his realist thought. The second section argues that making good on Williams’ commitments requires realist political theorists to rethink the sources of their insights and the basis of their claims, and sketches pragmatist and ethnographic approaches as promising examples of how realists could match theoretical commitments in practice.
The paper begins with a hypothetical story and asks: how should a Rawlsian political liberal state justify its coercion over Nozick, an unreasonable but intelligible citizen (UIC)? I use this thought experiment to illustrate a recent critique of political liberalism. It argues that political liberalism coerces UIC on a sectarian ground. Call it the sectarian critique. My paper addresses the sectarian critique from a political liberal perspective. I suggest a condition of state conjecture, which argues that the state officials should use conjecture to engage with UIC, like Nozick. This brings two benefits to the stability of a political liberal society. First, UIC may be convinced and become reasonable citizens. Secondly, the activity of offering conjectures can strengthen the public confidence of political liberalism as a valuable collective project. Although, eventually, some UIC may remain unpersuaded and be coerced on grounds that are unjustified to them, the force of the sectarian critique will be significantly weakened after the condition of state conjecture is fulfilled.
This article examines the conceptualisations of peace and its preconditions manifested in the critical turn in peace theory: bottom-up approaches which begin with particular contexts and postulate diverse local actors as integral to the process of peace-building. This article argues that the turn is at an impasse and is unable to address the crucial charge that its conceptualisation of peace is inconsistent. To explain the persistence of inconsistency and to move us forward, the article analyses, evaluates and responds to the turn through the lens of Nicholas Rengger’s work on the anti-Pelagian imagination in political theory. This is defined as a tendency to begin theorising from non-utopian, anti-perfectionist and sceptical assumptions. Through this examination the article argues that the critical turn is anti-Pelagian but not consistently so because it often gives way to perfectionism, adopts naïve readings of institutions and postulates demanding conceptions of political agency and practice. This inconsistency with its own philosophical premises makes the turn’s conceptualisation of peace and its preconditions incoherent. Finally, the article sketches an alternative account of peace which draws upon a number of anti-Pelagian scholars and mobilises Rengger’s particular defense of anti-Pelagianism. The suggested alternative, the article argues, provides us with a more coherent theory of peace and a way out of existing dead ends.
In the last two decades, an ever-increasing number of scholars have challenged the conceptual borders of political philosophy and the supposed universalism of its normative pre-commitments. Surprisingly enough, the normative underpinnings of this debate have had very little impact on contemporary disputes about pluralism. This article asks how contemporary disputes about the conceptual borders of political theory can help in constructing a more plural theory of pluralism. It shows that such contributions inspire three ways of constructing a more plural political theory of pluralism: a self-transformative approach, a dialogical approach and a pre-relational approach. While all three approaches progress towards less exclusionary theories of pluralism, I argue that a pre-relational approach can lead to a normative theory that is more plural than the alternatives.
Recently several political theorists have argued that mainstream political theory, exemplified by John Rawls’ political liberalism, is based on such idealist and moralist presuppositions, that it cannot be relevant for real politics. This article aims to show that the criticism of these ‘realists’, as these critics are referred to, is based on an incorrect reading of Rawls’ work. The article explains that there are three ways in which his political liberalism can be said to offer a realist understanding of politics: (a) political liberalism interprets the morality inherent in engaging in politics; (b) it acknowledges reasonable disagreement about justice; and (c) it develops standards of public reason, with which to assess the legitimacy of political compromises. The article recovers the realism of political liberalism and indicates new sites of discussion between political liberals and political realists.
This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.
Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome example advanced by Jonathan Quong. While we may be able to impersonally justify coercing the illiberal dissenter, public reason liberals must explain how we can interpersonally justify such coercion—meaning justify given the perspective of the dissenter. The two prominent strategies for dealing with dissenters involve idealization of reasoning and requiring liberal values; I show that these strategies do not succeed in a way compatible with the public reason project. That is, the prominent strategies leave public reason theorists with a dilemma between denying the legitimacy of using coercion to protect core freedoms against deeply illiberal people or abandoning the fundamental public reason project. I conclude by proposing a different answer to public reason liberalism’s fundamental question: what requires justification? On my account, it is not that coercion requires interpersonal justification for its permissibility, but that such justification is necessary as a constitutive element of a kind of moral community.
This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen's advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO's The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points.
Can liberal ideals clean up dirty politicians or politics? This article doubts they can. It disputes that a ‘clean’ liberal person might inhabit the dirty clothes of the real politician, or that a clean depoliticised liberal constitution can constrain real world dirty politics. Nevertheless, the need for a democratic Prince to wear clean liberal gloves offers a necessary and effective political restraint. However, it also means that citizens share the hypocrisy and dirt of those who serve them - for we legitimise the dirtiness of politics by requiring politicians to seem cleaner than we know they ever can be in reality.
Soulignant la proximite des conceptions libertaire et autonomiste de la vie politique chez Habermas et Rawls, l'A. montre que les deux philosophes negligent de la meme facon la question du fondement moral de la politique. Mesurant la possibilite d'un accord raisonnable concernant l'organisation de la vie politique en fonction de principes liberaux, l'A. montre que cet engagement constitue le centre moral de la pensee liberale et qu'il incarne le principe du respect des personnes. Se referant aux premiers dialogues entre Habermas et Rawls, l'A. interroge la legitimite de l'association politique qui caracterise la democratie et qui permet de depasser les desaccords sur la question de la nature du bien humain
The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person.
John Locke
In recent decades, a ‘realist’ alternative to ideal theories of politics has slowly taken shape. Bringing together philosophers, political theorists, and political scientists, this countermovement seeks to reframe inquiry into politics and political norms. Among the hallmarks of this endeavor are a moral psychology that includes the passions and emotions; a robust conception of political possibility and rejection of utopian thinking; the belief that political conflict — of values as well as interests — is both fundamental and ineradicable; a focus on institutions as the arenas within which conflict is mediated and contained; and a conception of politics as a sphere of activity that is distinct, autonomous, and subject to norms that cannot be derived from individual morality. For political realists, a ‘well-ordered society’ is rarely attainable; a modus vivendi without agreement on first principles is often the only practical possibility. Not only will ‘full compliance’ never be achieved, but also it is an assumption that yields misleading accounts of political norms. While realists offer a number of compelling criticisms of ideal theory, there are some lacunae in their stance. It is not yet clear whether realism constitutes a coherent affirmative alternative to idealism. Nor have realists clarified the extent of conflict that is consistent with political order as such. And because both sides accept ‘ought implies can’ as a constraint on the validity of political norms, much of the debate between realists and idealists revolves around deep empirical disagreements that are yet to be clarified.
Can Rawlsian theory provide us with an adequate response to the practical question of how we should proceed in the face of widespread and intractable disagreement over matters of justice? Recent criticism of ideal theorizing might make us wonder whether this question highlights another way in which ideal theory can be too far removed from our non-ideal circumstances to provide any practical guidance. Further reflection on it does not show that ideal theory is redundant, but it does indicate that there is a need for a nonideal theory that does not consist simply in an account of how to apply the principles which are yielded by ideal theory to non-ideal circumstances in the light of what is feasible and an assessment of the costs of implementation. Indeed any non-ideal theory that can adequately address this question will have to be partially autonomous, drawing on a notion of legitimacy that is rather different to the one which lies at the heart of Rawlsian ideal theory.
This review presents a critical account of the most powerful critique of liberal political thought to have emerged in recent years: a critique it calls the . Drawing on the work of a wide range of critics of contemporary liberalism, this article contends that although those who advance this critique are divided in many ways they are nonetheless held together by a series of powerful descriptive and normative challenges to liberal political philosophy as it has developed since the publication of John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism. The article further demonstrates that most of these challenges centre on the place of coercive power in modern political life and suggests that, although these challenges should not undermine liberals' commitment to their central normative claims, they do nonetheless provide an essential rejoinder to some of liberalism's more complacent assumptions.
History and Illusion in Politics Cambridge The Concept of the Political
- E G See
- Raymond
See e.g. Raymond Geuss (2001) History and Illusion in Politics, pp. 28–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Carl Schmitt (1996) The Concept of the Political. London: University of Chicago Press; Max Weber (1994) Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The canonical texts for these developmentsSecond Treatise of Government Two Treatise of Government CambridgePrinciples of Politics Applicable to All Representative GovernmentsOn Liberty
- Locke
The canonical texts for these developments include John Locke (2005) ‘Second Treatise of Government’, in Locke: Two Treatise of Government, ed. P. Laslett, pp. 265–428. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Benjamin Constant (1999) ‘Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments’, in Constant – PoliticalWritings, ed.B. Fontana, University Press; John Stuart Mill (1991) ‘On Liberty’, in J. S. Mill – On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. S. Collini, pp. 1–116. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
After Politics Basingstoke: Palgrave; Mark Philp (2007) Political Conduct
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London: Verso; Glen Newey (2001) After Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Mark Philp (2007) Political Conduct. London: Harvard University Press; Matt Sleat (2011) 'Liberal Realism', Review of Politics 73: 469–96;
Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments
- Cambridge
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Benjamin Constant (1999) 'Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments', in Constant – Political Writings, ed. B. Fontana, pp. 169–305.
For similar expressions of the liberal principle of legitimacy see Thomas Nagel (1991) Equality and Partiality, p. 33The Politics of Justification
- Waldron
Waldron (n. 10), p. 140. For similar expressions of the liberal principle of legitimacy see Thomas Nagel (1991) Equality and Partiality, p. 33. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Stephen Macedo (1990) 'The Politics of Justification', Political Theory 18: 280–304;
18), p. 352; emphasis added
- Larmore
Larmore (n. 18), p. 352; emphasis added. 26. Bohman and Richardson (n. 20), p. 257.
The Concept of the Political Political Writings
- Cambridge
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Carl Schmitt (1996) The Concept of the Political. London: University of Chicago Press; Max Weber (1994) Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Justificatory Liberalism
- Gerald F Gaus
Gerald F. Gaus (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Law and Disagreement In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument
- Jeremy Waldron
Jeremy Waldron (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bernard Williams (2005) In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 37; emphasis in original
- Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant (1997) Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 37; emphasis in original. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Cunning of Unreason. London: HarperCollins; Raymond Geuss (2008) Philosophy and Real Politics
- John Dunn
John Dunn (2000) The Cunning of Unreason. London: HarperCollins; Raymond Geuss (2008) Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Chantal Mouffe (2005) On the Political.
Political Legitimacy and DemocracyTheoretical Foundations of Liberalism
- Allen Buchanan
See e.g. Allen Buchanan (2002) 'Political Legitimacy and Democracy', Ethics 112: 689–
719; Jeremy Waldron (1987) 'Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism', Philosophical
Quarterly 37: 127–50; Christopher Wellman (1996) 'Liberalism, Samaritarianism, and
Political Legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 211–37.
History and Illusion in Politics The Concept of the Political Political Writings
- Raymond Geuss
See e.g. Raymond Geuss (2001) History and Illusion in Politics, pp. 28–31. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Carl Schmitt (1996) The Concept of the Political. London:
University of Chicago Press; Max Weber (1994) Political Writings. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
After Politics Basingstoke: Palgrave Political ConductLiberal RealismLiberalism and the Politics of Compulsion Law and Disagreement
- London
London: Verso; Glen Newey (2001) After Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Mark Philp
(2007) Political Conduct. London: Harvard University Press; Matt Sleat (2011) 'Liberal
Realism', Review of Politics 73: 469–96; Mark Stears (2007) 'Liberalism and the Politics
of Compulsion', British Journal of Political Science 37: 533–53; Jeremy Waldron (1999)
Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bernard Williams (2005) In the
Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. Oxford: Princeton
University Press.
Schmitt (n. 5); Sleat (n. 4); Stears (n. 4)
- Newey
Newey (n. 4); Schmitt (n. 5); Sleat (n. 4); Stears (n. 4); Waldron (n. 4);
This is a foundational concern for any theory that calls itself ''liberalJohn Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable Persons
- Marilyn As
- Friedman
- It
As Marilyn Friedman put it, 'This is a foundational concern for any theory that calls itself ''liberal''': (2000) 'John Rawls and the Political Coercion
of Unreasonable Persons', in V. Davison and C. Wolf (eds) The Idea of a
Political Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls, pp. 16–33, p. 17. Oxford: Rowman &
Littlefield.