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Gun violence in North American is the subject of much speculation and debate, often based on limited or incomplete empirical evidence. We summarize the regulatory frameworks in Mexico, the United States and Canada, and provide statistics on gun misuse in these countries. Based on our analysis of publicly available information on sources of crime guns, we conclude that while the United States is a major supplier of illegal handguns to Canada and illegal firearms of all types to Mexico, quantifying the extent of its role, particularly in Mexico, is difficult because of data limitations. Still more difficult is to project the consequences of an effective crackdown by US authorities. If the illicit supply from the USA dried up, the criminal gangs could turn to a variety of other sources that already appear to be playing some role. A complete analysis of these issues must await more complete disclosure by the authorities of data on gun sources and trafficking investigations.
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Criminology & Criminal Justice
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ISSN 1748–8958; 1–22
DOI: 10.1177/1748895809336377
The illicit firearms trade in North America
PHILIP J. COOK, WENDY CUKIER AND KEITH KRAUSE
Duke University, USA, Ryerson University, Canada and Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland
Abstract
Gun violence in North American is the subject of much speculation
and debate, often based on limited or incomplete empirical
evidence. We summarize the regulatory frameworks in Mexico, the
United States and Canada, and provide statistics on gun misuse
in these countries. Based on our analysis of publicly available
information on sources of crime guns, we conclude that while the
United States is a major supplier of illegal handguns to Canada and
illegal firearms of all types to Mexico, quantifying the extent of its
role, particularly in Mexico, is difficult because of data limitations.
Still more difficult is to project the consequences of an effective
crackdown by US authorities. If the illicit supply from the USA dried
up, the criminal gangs could turn to a variety of other sources that
already appear to be playing some role. A complete analysis of these
issues must await more complete disclosure by the authorities of data
on gun sources and trafficking investigations.
Key Words
gang violence • gun control • international trafficking •
underground markets • violence
Introduction
Mexico and Canada pose very different images when it comes to violent
crime. Canada has relatively low rates of homicide and criminal violence—
with about 1.5 homicides per 100,000, its rate is approximately one-quarter
the rate of 5.7 per 100,000 in the United States. Mexico, on the other hand, 1
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has higher rates of intentional homicide than the United States (at least 11
homicides per 100,000 in recent years) (UNODC, 2008), and its heavily
armed gangs are not only killing each other in great numbers but also
targeting law enforcement and other officials, with civilians often caught in
the crossfire.1
There are a wide range of social, political and historical factors that
account for these differences (Sánchez, 2007b; Briceño-León et al., 2008).
But Canada and Mexico have one thing in common when it comes to armed
violence—the underground gun market in the United States, which is a major
source of supply to criminals and gangs in both nations. In both states the
cross-border illicit flow of weapons has become a significant concern for the
criminal justice system and police forces. As the American Ambassador to
Mexico has argued, ‘Mexico would not be the center of cartel activity or
be experiencing this level of violence, were the United States not the largest
consumer of illicit drugs and the main supplier of weapons to the cartels’
(Corchado, 2008). It is estimated, for example, that 90 percent of all US
cocaine transits Mexico (CIA, 2007).
In Canada, gang-related violence has increased dramatically over the last
decade, even though overall levels of violence and homicide rates, in parti-
cular, have declined. According to Statistics Canada, gang-related homicides,
which include those of gang members as well as police officers and innocent
bystanders, have been increasing since this information was first collected
by the Homicide Survey in 1991. In 2007, 117 homicides were reported by
police as being gang-related, accounting for about one in five homicides
nationally and 43 percent of firearm homicides. In 2007, 69 percent of
gang-related homicides were committed with a firearm. Comparatively,
only about 20 percent of homicides where gang activity was not present
involved guns (Li, 2008).
In 2009 a surge in gun violence on Canada’s west coast was linked to the
spread of violence from Mexican drugs markets. Gang violence associated
with illegal drug trafficking in British Columbia, Canada, resulted in more
than 40 shootings and 17 deaths between January and March 2009. This
led to a joint agreement being signed by the Attorney General of British
Columbia and officials from the northern Mexican state of Baja California
(Meissner, 2009). The so-called ‘UN gang’ was specifically singled out by
police (CTV News, 2009).
In spite of the obvious links between the illegal firearms and drug trade,
criminological understanding of the dynamics of illicit weapons flows,
and their impact on the scope, scale and distribution of armed violence is
limited. In this article we review available evidence concerning the illicit
flows of guns across the North American continent and consider how that
flux of guns affects security perceptions and realities in the countries of the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). We find that the conventional
wisdom on cross-border gun trafficking is based on limited evidence in some
cases, and point out areas where additional research is called for if we are to
make strong claims and to develop effective evidence-based policies. There
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 3
is enough evidence, however, to support tentative conclusions, and to offer
some reasonable speculation concerning the ‘bottom line’ question—would
a law-enforcement-led crackdown on gun trafficking make much difference
in the availability of guns to criminal gangs north and south of the US
borders? Previous research (Braga and Pierce, 2005) suggests that targeted
enforcement efforts supported by reliable evidence can have an impact on
the supply of new weapons to criminals in some local contexts; whether
such efforts can be scaled up to an international or regional scale remains,
how ever, an open question.
Our analysis is informed by the rational choice model of classical eco-
nomics (Naylor, 1994; Cook and Leitzel, 1996; Cook et al., 2007). We
assume that the buyers, sellers and intermediaries in the underground
markets for guns make choices that are influenced by their perception of the
personal costs, benefits and risks associated with buying, selling, pos sessing
and using weapons. We also assume that market forces operate in under-
ground markets, albeit with greater friction than in legal markets, due to the
illegal nature of the transaction and often limited sources of supply.
The data sources for studying the illegal movement of firearms present
challenges to researchers. Police reports of firearms recovered in crime are
one source, but often limited by the fact that police recover only a fraction of
the firearms used in crime, and the recovered guns may not be representative.
Data on seizures of firearms at the borders by customs officials are also
incomplete and generally are regarded as representing only the tip of the
iceberg. Incidence reports from police and public sources on firearm seizures
are also partial. Finally, the results of interviews and testimony by police
and investigators on the sources of firearms are often also based on partial
information.
We first review the different regulatory frameworks and patterns of
weapons ownership in the three countries, and then discuss the available
evidence for the scope and pattern of cross-border trafficking of firearms.
Next, we look at the possible links between illicit firearms and overall pat-
terns of armed violence in Canada and Mexico, in order to tease out plausible
effects of illicit trafficking. Finally, the conclusion addresses some of the
considerations that explain why reducing armed violence in Mexico (and to
a lesser extent Canada) will require more than just more effective policies
to restrict the trafficking of firearms across North American borders, and
points out some of the unanswered questions for future research.
Firearms and firearm regulation in North America
The flow of contraband across the long borders between the USA and
Mexico, and the USA and Canada, has been guided by the quest for
profit. Canadian whiskey flowed south during the US Prohibition of the
1920s, while cigarettes were smuggled north when Canada imposed a high
tobacco tax during the 1990s. North from Mexico come illicit drugs and
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undocumented workers seeking better jobs, while guns purchased in the
USA are smuggled south across the Mexican border and north to Canada.
In each case the direction of the flow is dictated by availability, supply costs
and price differentials.
Gun trafficking in particular is profitable because gun markets in Canada
and Mexico are strictly regulated and the USA is a relatively low-cost
supplier to those who want to acquire illicit guns. The relevant differences
in the regulatory frameworks in each country can be briefly summarized.
United States
About 250 million guns are in private hands in the USA, enough for every
adult to have one, although in fact only about one-quarter of adults own
a gun—most gun owners own several. About one-third of the guns in
circulation are handguns—pistols or revolvers (Cook and Ludwig, 1997).
Several million new guns are sold legally each year by the 56,000 federally
licensed commercial retail dealers.
Regulation in the USA operates at several levels. The manufacture in
firearms is regulated and all firearms must be marked and recorded at manu-
facture. As well, there are stringent controls on the import and export of
firearms, including a requirement that importers mark firearms with a serial
number. Firearm dealers are obligated to follow state and federal law in their
transactions, and their activities are regulated by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The federal law limits mail-order
shipments to federally licensed dealers (FFLs), and requires that they do
a background check on purchasers to determine whether they are eligible
to purchase a gun. Among those who are prohibited from purchasing a
gun are ex-convicts, illegal aliens, anyone involuntarily committed to a
mental hospital and those under 18 (for a rifle or shotgun) or under 21
(for a handgun). Certain types of firearms are closely regulated, including
firearms capable of fully automatic fire. However, the 10-year ban on
semi-automatic military-style weapons (the Federal Assault Weapons Ban)
was allowed to lapse in 2004. It has also been estimated that 30–40 percent
of all gun transfers each year do not involve an FFL, but rather are direct
sales or loans from one individual to another or transactions conducted
at gun shows—these transfers take place outside the scope of federal regu-
lation (Cook and Ludwig, 1997).
A handful of states and localities, including California, New York and
Illinois, have chosen to regulate guns more stringently than the federal pro-
visions. All but two states regulate carrying concealed weapons, although
the trend has been to loosen these regulations so that now in most states
anyone who meets minimum qualifications and pays the required fee
can obtain a permit. In 2008 the Supreme Court struck down the most
stringent gun-control ordinance in the nation, the District of Columbia’s
ban on handgun ownership, on the grounds that the Second Amendment
provides a personal right to self-defense of the home using customary
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 5
weapons, including handguns. To date that ruling does not affect the states,
although future court rulings may extend its scope (Cook et al., 2009). This
new constitutional right is very limited, but still a reflection of American
exceptionalism when it comes to guns.
Canada and the USA share the longest undefended border in the world—
5525 miles with 22 crossing points. Firearm regulations in states next to
Canada vary considerably. For example, New York has stringent regulations
while Michigan does not. Similarly, there are variations among the states
adjacent to Mexico. California has relatively stringent regulations—it
restricts purchases of handguns to no more than one per month, bans some
types of assault weapons, regulates gun shows and is one of the few states
that require individuals to register their handguns. But the other US states
along the Mexican border—Arizona, New Mexico, Texas—have not legis-
lated any significant additions to the federal regulatory system, and there
are reportedly more gun dealers than gas stations in Texas near the Mexican
border (Lumpe, 2000).
The United States is also a major producer of firearms for the global
civilian marketplace. In 2006, 3.65 million firearms were produced, and
about 10 percent of these were legally exported, as shown in Table 1.
In 2006, the United States imported 1,164,000 small arms and light
weapons, for a total value of US$245 million, according to figures from the
UN Comtrade database (NISAT, 2008). This seems to be a relatively stable
figure, since during the late 1990s there were also about 1 million firearms
imported each year, according to official ATF figures (BATF, 2000). If that
remains true, then the net addition of new weapons to the stock of firearms
in the United States in the past five years would be well over 20 million.
However, it is difficult to say whether the overall stock of guns in private
hands is growing or not. Many of the new manufactures and imports have
been exported ‘off the books’ (see later), and there is natural attrition to the
older guns in that stock through permanent loss, breakage and destruction
by authorities following confiscation. If the attrition rate is, say, 1 percent,
and no more than a half-million guns are illegally exported each year, then
there would be some growth in the stock. If the attrition rate is as high as
2 percent, then the stock is shrinking.
Table 1. US Manufacture and export of firearms for civilians, 2006
Manufacture Export
(in thousands)
Pistols 1021 145
Revolvers 382 28
Rifles 1497 103
Shotguns 715 58
Misc. 36 34
Total 3651 368
Source: BATF statistics.
Criminology & Criminal Justice6
While US manufacture of civilian firearms is large in comparison to
other countries in the Western Hemisphere, the revenues are only on the
order of $2 billion, and the industry is not very potent politically. There
are hundreds of small manufacturers, with production somewhat con-
centrated. For example, four manufacturers account for almost half of all
pistols manufactured in 2006: Smith and Wesson, Sturm Ruger, SigArms
and Beretta. (Beretta exported all of its output.) While the industry is not
directly involved in lobbying, it does support the activities of the enormously
influential National Rifle Association, through advertising and sponsorship
(Diaz, 1999) The National Rifle Association is considered one of the most
powerful lobbies in the world, with an estimated $100 million in revenues.
It has not only been active in the USA in opposing efforts to strengthen
laws and spearheading efforts to erode legislation but is increasingly active
internationally at the UN and in promoting gun lobby groups in countries
such as Australia and Canada (Cukier and Sidel, 2006).
Canada
Only 2.2 million Canadians (less than 7 percent of the population) own fire-
arms, and there are estimated to be fewer than 9 million firearms in private
hands for a population of 30 million, most of them rifles or shotguns, with
only 500,000 handguns and semi-automatic assault weapons. This implies a
per capita ownership rate about one-third that of the United States. Approxi-
mately 18 percent of households own a gun (Environics Research Group,
2003) down from 25 percent in 1991 (Angus Reid Group, Inc., 1991).
Historically Canada has had strict laws governing handguns: since 1930
handguns have been strictly regulated with the requirements that indi viduals
be screened to show ‘just cause’ for ownership and the guns be registered.
Owners must prove they have a legitimate need (lawful occupation, member
of a target shooting club or bona fide collector). Personal protection is a
justification only if applicants can demonstrate that their life is in danger
and police cannot protect them—a total of about 50 permits in the entire
country are for personal protection. Generally handguns may not be carried
(except for lawful occupation) and an ‘authorization to transport’ strictly
defines where an individual can move the handgun, for example, from home
to shooting range while securely storing it with a trigger lock in a secure
container.
In 1977 screening processes were introduced for owners of rifles and
shotguns but the Firearms Acquisition Certificate concerned new acquisi-
tions, not existing possession. In 1991 the screening process for all gun
owners was strengthened to include a risk assessment, references and
background checks. In 1995, firearm licenses were introduced to possess
firearms, renewable every five years, and registration was extended to all
firearms. When a firearm is acquired it is registered to its lawful owner
and the information contained in the gun registry may be queried by law
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 7
enforcement. These measures were fully implemented by mid-2003 with
90 percent of gun owners complying.
Police databases provide some continuous eligibility checks, signaling
when a firearm owner is charged with an offense or considered to be a risk.
All sales and transfers of firearms and ammunition are regulated as indi-
viduals must present a valid gun license and private sales must be approved
ahead of time by the Chief Firearms Officer. Safe storage is also strictly
defined and includes secure locked containers. For most civilians, restricted
weapons, including handguns, must be secured during transport from their
home to the shooting range. It is unlawful to have a loaded firearm anywhere
that it is not lawful to discharge it—for example, in a public space, in a car
or on a subway.
Mexico
Mexico has a tradition of relatively restrictive weapons ownership, with
approximately 4.5 million registered firearms, and perhaps 10 million
additional unregistered firearms (Small Arms Survey, 2007: 47) These
numbers imply a rate of about 15 firearms per 100 people; a considerably
lower rate of civilian ownership than in Canada, let alone the USA.
Article 10 of the Mexican constitution says that residents have the right
to possess arms in their homes for security and legitimate defense, with
the exception of arms prohibited by federal law and those reserved for the
ex clusive use of the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard. It also
says, however, that Federal law will determine the cases, conditions, require-
ments and places in which the carrying of arms will be authorized, and
in practice, the civilian ownership of firearms has been relatively tightly
restricted (Sánchez, 2007a).2 Generally, people are restricted to owning
small calibre pistols (below .38 or .380), shotguns (12 gauge or less) and
bolt or semi-automatic rifles, usually .22 calibre.
Weapons are not easily bought and sold in Mexico; there are no private
gun shops, and new weapons can only be purchased from the Arms and
Ammunition Marketing Division of the Mexican armed forces (Burton and
Stewart, 2007). Mexico also does not produce weapons domestically for
the civilian market, although it does have a limited production capacity
for small arms and light weapons for its own armed forces (Klare and
Andersen, 1996: 21). One obvious result is that black market prices for
weapons are relatively high: one estimate (Burton and Stewart, 2007) is that
they are three times the legal market value. Penalties for illegal possession of
firearms are also fairly severe.
Implications for firearms trafficking
There is limited empirical research on the international illegal firearms
trade. However research from within the United States has shed light on
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the complex shape of supply and demand and the role of regulations.
For example, research has indicated that the proportion of crime guns
originating within the state is lower in states which license and register
firearms (Webster et al., 2001). In these states the majority of crime guns
tend to originate out of state, and are more likely to originate in states where
there are weak regulations, suggesting that regulation does affect the flow
of illegal firearms.
The international trafficking in guns follows the same economic logic.
The USA represents a low-cost supplier of guns both because of lax regu-
lations and of the great number of guns already circulating in private hands.
On the other hand, individuals and criminal gangs in Mexico or Canada
do not have ready access to firearms from local dealers or other domestic
sources, and hence resort to the illicit market. The amplitude of the illicit
market in both Canada and Mexico will depend on the level of demand
for weapons, the ‘barriers to trade’ created by border controls and anti-
smuggling enforcement and the costs and risks associated with illegal gun
transactions and ownership.
In the United States, guns may be gathered for illicit transport across the
borders in several ways. Rifles and shotguns may be purchased directly from
FFLs in unlimited quantities in most states. The purchase is legal as long as
the purchaser does not have a disqualifying characteristic (felony record,
illegal alien). Handguns may also be purchased in unlimited quantities
within state of residence, but FFLs are required to report multiple sales to
ATF. In practice, the question is whether buyers of any type of firearm
can pass a simple criminal record check, which can be accomplished either
because they are in fact qualified or that they show false identification. In
some cases the FFLs are fellow conspirators, knowing that the purchases
are intended for a subsequent illicit transfer. An important alternative is
for guns to be acquired at gun shows, which are ubiquitous and which
in most states allow private individuals to sell guns without conducting
a back ground check on the purchaser (Wintemute, 2007). These types of
trans actions could equip any one individual with dozens of guns, although
obtaining hundreds of guns would be more difficult without attracting at-
tention from the authorities. Ammunition purchases are unregulated by the
federal government and in most states.
While purchases from dealers and at gun shows or other private sources
appear to account for how most illicit shipments originate, there are
possibilities for avoiding the necessity of retail transactions and possibly
obtaining larger quantities quickly—theft from FFLs, and diversion from
manufacturers and domestic distributors. Military weapons, which are
especially prized by some criminal groups, could be obtained by diverting
legal exports or theft from military depots.
Once obtained, firearms and ammunition must be transported across
the international border and to the end users. Mechanisms for doing so are
discussed in the next section.
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 9
Cross-border firearms trafficking in North America
While the United States is a low-cost supplier of guns to Canada and Mexico,
it is by no means the only potential source of guns. It is not possible to
determine with certainty the percentage of guns used in crime in Canada or
Mexico that have been illegally exported from the United States, but there is
some relevant evidence available that indicates the proportion is high. This
information comes for the most part from chain-of-commerce traces.
In the United States, information on firearms recovered by law enforce-
ment agencies may be submitted by them to the National Tracing Center of
ATF. A successful trace provides information on which US dealer first sold
the gun at a retail outlet. To conduct a successful trace, the National Tracing
Center must track the gun (using its serial number and other identifying
characteristics) through the manufacturer or importer, to the distributor, to
the FFL that sold it. The minimum conditions for a successful trace are that
it was in fact sold at retail in the United States, that there is a valid serial
number that can be taken from the gun and that accurate records were kept
at every level of the supply chain. The lack of any central registration or
sales-notification system in the United States precludes a more direct search,
and efforts to trace crime guns as a result often fail.
Firearms recovered by law enforcement may be viewed as a sample from
an underlying population of firearms used in crime. How representative
that sample is of the population is unknown. Firearms that are successfully
traced are a sample of that sample, which adds further uncertainty about
representativeness. Only a fraction of recovered firearms are submitted for
tracing, and only a fraction of those are successfully traced (Cook and Braga,
2001). Still, the trace information is usually the best available in developing
a statistical characterization of sources.
Canada
The best statistical description of sources of crime guns in Canada comes
from a systematic tabulation of the characteristics of firearms recovered by
the police in Toronto in 2006. Details were available on 1528 recovered
guns. Of those, 832 were connected to criminal activity. The most common
of the recovered crime guns (39%) were restricted weapons (handguns)—
the rest were either rifles and shotguns (29%) or air pistols, toys and starter
pistols (27%).
Although most of the rifles and shotguns were not registered or traced,
there is little evidence that long guns are targets of smugglers, since they are
widely available from Canadian dealers. The supply of legal handguns is
significantly more restricted. Of the 327 handguns recovered in crime by the
Toronto Police Service in 2006, only 181 were traced successfully to their
first retail sale. Of those, 120 (two-thirds) were traced to the United States.
Criminology & Criminal Justice10
A recent report on illegal firearms reported similar patterns at the
provincial level in Ontario:
The Firearms Tracing and Enforcement Program (FATE) was established in
1994 in response to a requirement that all Ontario Police services would be
required to trace seized firearms not registered in Canada:
• In 2007, FATE traced 705 crime guns, 90% of which were prohibited
(399) or restricted (237)
Sources of traced crime guns included:
490 (69%) traced to U.S.
74 (10.5%) traced to a Canadian dealer
78 (11.5 %) were too old to trace and
60 (8%) could not be traced due to lack of information.
(Heemskerk and Davies, 2008: 82)
According to the Annual Report (2007) of the Tactical Analysis Unit, part of
the Firearms Support Services Directorate of the Canadian Firearms Program,
which operates at the national level, 5,616 firearms were seized in 2007. Of
these:
2,863 (51%) were crime guns
1,629 (57%) of crime guns were handguns
1,011 (35%) of crime guns were prohibited firearms (including prohibited
handguns and assault weapons)
• 837 (30%) were restricted firearms (including other handguns and semi
automatic assault and tactical weapons).
Of the 710 crime guns where the source was known, 324 were domestic
and 386 were smuggled.
Washington State was the source for103 of these firearms, the next closest
state was Florida with 50.
(Heemskerk and Davies, 2008: 80)
These data are incomplete and may not be representative as only a portion of
the guns are recovered and traceable. However, among all data sources, the
majority of the successfully traced handguns recovered in crime in Canada
are found to originate in the United States and we know of no evidence
that would lead one to believe that other countries are a major source of
smuggled handguns.
Another major source of illegal guns in Canada, and in many other coun-
tries in the world is ‘leakage’ from state stockpiles (police and military)
through theft, corruption or other forms of diversion. For example, in one
case, over 3000 firearms recovered in crime or surrendered in amnesties
to the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service in Canada were illegally sold
by officers and civilians working in the unit (Duncanson and Rankin,
1997, 1998).3
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 11
The main mechanisms by which weapons are illegally trafficked from
one country to another are concealment, false declaration and falsification
of documents and mail order. The networks for smuggling guns are diffuse
and range from individuals concealing a few guns in their car to large-scale
commercial operations. Long, undefended borders between Canada and the
United States, in particular, present a challenge for customs officials who
must balance the demands for free flow of goods and people with security
needs. Corrupt officials have also been implicated in smuggling activities.
Mail is another means of illegal importation and one that is often difficult
to detect. Smugglers have used false documentation, misreporting and
concealment with other commodities to ship weapons commercially from
the United States to Canada. For example, an effort was made to import
a large quantity of Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles into Canada in a
package mislabeled as hunting rifles (Associated Press, 1994).
According to Canadian customs officials, 662 firearms including 180
restricted guns (handguns and semi-automatics), 334 prohibited firearms
and 148 rifles and shotguns were seized in 2007 (RCMP, 2008). This, how-
ever, is only the tip of the iceberg as customs officials only check 3 percent of
traffic crossing the border. Most of the existing studies of illicit trafficking
are based on secondary literature or anecdotal information. Our analysis
of media accounts in Canada for the period 2006–8 indicates that there
are few accounts that involved more that 10 guns. There were a handful of
larger movements, and largest of all by far was diversion from authorized im-
ports for use in making movies in British Columbia, that accounted for 800
replica handguns (Canadian Press, 2008). Also important was direct mail:
the Canada Post international mail center in Vancouver reported seizing
330 guns and gun parts during a 12-month period (Canwest News, 2008).
Mexico
According to the ATF director, investigators have traced 90 to 95 percent of
the weapons found in Mexico to the United States (Caldwell, 2008).4 This
figure, however, needs to be unpacked in light of the above considerations,
since it may overestimate the role of the USA in supplying guns used in
Mexican crime, and says little about how they may have got there. First, the
figure reflects firearms submitted for tracing by Mexican authorities. Only a
fraction of firearms used in crimes and gun battles are recovered by author-
ities, and traces are requested on only a subset of those recovered, so the
sample of traced guns may not be completely representative of weapons in
use. It is also not certain that only 10 (or less) percent of weapons recovered
are from other sources, since no data are available on the weapons that have
not been submitted for an American trace (Carpenter, 2009).
There are a variety of routes by which firearms can move from the USA
to Mexico. In general, the descriptions offered by authorities suggest that
the guns are first sold at retail in the United States and end up in the hands
of Mexican or Canadian criminals via smuggling on the ground across the
Criminology & Criminal Justice12
border, mostly in small batches (tráfico hormiga, or trail of ants) (Lumpe,
1998). Although the number of weapons crossing the border in any one
ship ment may be small, the sources of weapons may be more concentrated.
In one recent case, for example a dealer was charged with having sold
hundreds of weapons to Mexican drug cartels (McKinley, 2009). According
to ATF data analyzed by Glenn Pierce and Anthony Braga, 97 cases under
investigation between 1996 and 2003 involved more than 30,000 firearms,
with the average number of firearms per case (excluding two very large
cases) being 124 (Pierce and Braga, 2008).5
Although some of these guns may be smuggled by individuals not associ-
ated with organized criminal groups for their personal security (or subse-
quent resale), the concentration of sources makes it appear that the traffic is
mostly organized by gangs for the explicit purpose of providing them with
arms. As one source has described it:
drug trafficking organizations who are vying for control of drug trafficking
routes to the United States and engaging in turf battles for disputed distribution
territories. … rely on firearms suppliers to enforce and maintain their illicit
narcotics operations. Intelligence indicates these criminal organizations have
tasked their money laundering, distribution and transportation infrastructures
reaching into the United States to acquire firearms and ammunition. (Project
Gunrunner Fact Sheet, 9/08)
While the US route is likely the most important one, at least three other
sources of arms for drug gangs and armed groups operating in Mexico can
be identified. It is difficult, however, to assess their relative importance.
First, guns can flow northwards to Mexico from Central America, a region
awash with weapons imported by both governments and rebel groups during
the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. It is clear (Cragin
and Hoffman, 2003; Stohl and Tuttle, 2008) that extensive cross-border
trafficking of weapons takes place in Central America, and it is difficult to
see why Mexico should remain immune from this trafficking. High levels
of armed violence and drug trafficking along the southern Mexican border
area with Guatemala (Grainger, 2009) are indirect but solid indicators of
high levels of weapons availability and a concentration of cross-border
illegal activities, as they are in the northern states of Mexico. There is some
evidence that hand grenades used in recent violence are sourced in Central
America, from supplies left over after that region’s civil wars (Ginsburg,
2009, personal communication).
The second potential source of firearms would be those smuggled into
Mexico from Chinese, Russian, Eastern European or other sources. Again,
the evidence is anecdotal and not systematic, but nevertheless indicative. In
some documented armed clashes the weapons used include hand grenades,
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and AK-47 rifles, in particular in large-
scale clashes with drug gangs that have occurred in 2007–9. Some of these
weapons are not easily bought on the open market in the USA (although
variants of AK-47s are available in the USA). Several court cases from the
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 13
late 1990s also identified particular links between Mexican and Russian
criminal operations, including those that smuggled weapons, drugs and
other illicit goods (Míro Ramón, 2003: 30), and it has been claimed that
weapons produced in Russia, Israel and the former Yugoslavia were enter-
ing the country (Procuraduría general de la república, 2007; Sánchez,
2007a). The rise of drug trafficking links with China also may indicate
increased availability of arms from that source (Ginsburg, 2009, personal
communication).
A third source of weapons, the least well understood, would be the
Mexican security forces themselves. As one report has noted:
In addition to acquisitions from the United States and other countries,
Mexico supplies its own arsenal from local production. Some of the weapons
confiscated from the Miguel Aleman ranch this month reportedly had the
initials of the Mexican Defense Ministry stamped on them. As is routine prac-
tice, the most recent numbers released to the press did not shed light on the
origin of illegal grenades. (Frontera Norte Sur, 2008)
In this respect, Mexico would resemble many other countries where diversion
from national stockpiles (police and armed forces) represent a major (often
the main) source of illicitly held weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2008).
The negative consequences of illicit firearms trafficking
Overall, on the basis of the available data, we can conclude that handguns
smuggled from the USA constitute a large but unknown share of handguns
used in crime in Canada, and that the USA is likely the main source of crime
guns to Mexico, especially in the northern border states.
Data on firearms traces may somewhat exaggerate the role of US-sourced
weapons in crime in Mexico. For example, some of the weapons recovered
such as grenades, RPGs and fully automatic weapons are not easy to obtain
in the USA and could have originated from other sources. The evidence—
which is based on trace reports, media sources and reports from police—is
not fully conclusive but evidence to support alternative explanations is
rare. In contrast, in the case of Canada, there are very few cases that show
handguns used in crime coming from anywhere other than the USA, except
of course for those cases where the guns are diverted from the legal supply
in Canada.
How much of the illegal transnational flows of firearms across North
America are organized? Regular and repeated use of the same gun dealers
on the US side of the Mexican border suggests that, in this region at least,
the illicit traffic is organized. To use the distinction introduced by Cook
and Braga (2001), it is organized around ‘point sources’, which is to say
specific scofflaw dealers and trafficking organizations, rather than ‘diffuse
sources’ (small transactions in the informal market). It makes sense that the
connections and know-how on both sides of the border that help criminal
Criminology & Criminal Justice14
entrepreneurs move illicit goods (drugs and people) into the United States
might also help move guns back. But sourcing guns in the USA is a distinct
enterprise from delivering drugs to wholesalers. The actual border crossing
requires bribing a different group of officials or careful concealment meas-
ures. So while organized gangs are financing the gun smuggling, they may
draw on different people and different connections for different kinds of
trafficking.
Based on this analysis, there are two other questions worth reflecting
upon. First, what do we know about the impact of illicitly trafficked fire-
arms on patterns of armed violence in Canada and Mexico? Second, to
what extent would stricter enforcement on cross-border firearms trafficking
make a difference to weapons availability in Mexico or Canada? We treat
the second question in the next section.
In general, we know little about the specific impact and effects of illicitly
trafficked firearms. Although we know that armed violence can have a
variety of deleterious effects on perceived and real insecurity, public health,
economic development and political stability (Small Arms Survey, 2003), we
do not know how much of this can be associated specifically with changes in
the availability of firearms. The economic consequences of armed violence
are undeniable: one global model (using a ‘willingness to pay’ approach and
reductions in life expectancy) estimated the social value of violence reduc-
tion (to zero) at 67 percent of GDP for Mexico, the eighth-highest global
value. Life expectancy is diminished by 0.6 years for all Mexicans as a result
of armed violence. The figures for the USA and Canada, for comparison,
are 0.31 and 0.08, respectively (Soares, 2006). A macro-economic study of
direct and indirect costs of violence in Latin America estimates these at 9.5
percent of GDP for Mexico; lower than the 20 percent for Colombia and
El Salvador, and around the same level as Brazil (Londõno and Guerrero,
2000).
The negative effects of firearms are highly context dependent : they depend
on the strength of demand factors, the types of weapons in circulation, the
groups in society with access to weapons and the purposes for which they
possess them. In the case of Canada and Mexico, illegal trafficked weapons
are primarily used by criminal groups of varying degrees of organization, and
in Mexico there are some weapons also in the hands of armed groups chal-
lenging state authority. The use of guns by criminal groups increases their
relative power, and in the dramatic circumstances we see in Mexico, contri-
butes to subverting legitimate authority and creating such fear as to have
a substantial economic and political impact. In spite of the comparatively
low rates of gun violence in Canada, random shootings in public places
and increasingly weaponized conflict between criminal groups, however
statistically rare, fuels a sense of insecurity. In addition, even a small number
of illegal guns in circulation can have a significant impact, particularly when
a cycle of retaliatory violence begins. Although data show gun homicide in
Canada has declined significantly since 1991, public perceptions are that
it has increased. When Toronto, a city with 2.8 million people hit 52 gun
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 15
homicides in 2005, it became ‘the year of the gun’ (Regular, 2005) in spite
of the fact that the city had one of the lowest murder rates on the continent
for a city of its size.
The consequences of an influx of weapons are relatively straightforward.
In Mexico, it has intensified the violence associated with gang-on-gang
struggles over turf, and gang versus police/armed forces clashes, the result
of a government crackdown on organized drug smuggling. The firearms do
not per se cause the violence, but their availability (especially of automatic
and semi-automatic weapons) amplifies its severity and lethal consequences.
In 2008 alone, more than 6200 people were killed in Mexico in drug-related
violence (Watson, 2009). In unorganized crime or misuse, recourse to fire-
arms, rather than knives or clubs, has the effect of intensifying violence
(Cook, 1983; Reedy and Koper, 2003). But the broader effect of illicit fire-
arms trafficking on homicide rates is unclear. In Mexico, for example, the
official numbers for registered homicides (excluding ‘manslaughter’) has
been steadily declining from an average of 14,346 a year between 1981–
2000, to an average of 9861 a year from 2001–7 (SINAIS, 2009).6 But the
price of guns remains very high on the black markets, so it seems likely that
there has not been much diffusion outside of organized crime groups, at
least until now.
Although rates of homicide without guns are similar in Canada and
the USA, rates of homicide with guns are 6.7 times higher in the USA. The
same is true for robberies—robberies without guns are similar, but the
USA has 5.1 times Canada’s rate per 100,000 of gun robberies (Cook and
Khmilevska, 2005; Cukier and Sidel, 2006) (see Figure 1).
Interdiction policies: drugs versus guns
There is increasing recognition by US authorities that the Mexican drug wars
are serious and demand greater effort in regulating gun transactions at the
source and at the border, as well as cooperating with Mexican authorities.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total Homicide Homicide with
Firearms
Homicide without
Firearms
Handgun
Homicide
Rate per 100,000
US
Canada
Figure 1 Canada–US homicide 2007
Source: Li (2008); United States Department of Justice (2008).
Criminology & Criminal Justice16
This effort has included a major campaign against transnational gangs in the
United States, together with efforts to interdict trafficking through improved
border security and intelligence. For example, ATF is facilitating on-line
gun-trace requests from Mexican authorities through a new initiative called
Project Gun Runner (www.atf.gov/press/factsheets/0908-factsheet-project-
gunrunner.pdf). Meanwhile the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agency has partnered with Mexican authorities in Armas Cruzadas, a pro-
gram intended to encourage intelligence sharing and operational coordina-
tion. The Attorney General of Mexico announced in September 2008 that
Mexico would begin searching 10 percent of the vehicles heading south
from the United States, a considerable increase (Asbury, 2008). ATF has
also stepped up regulatory inspections of the numerous licensed dealers
and gun shows in the border states (Asbury, 2008). Since 2006 the ATF
has dedicated approximately 100 special agents and 25 industry operations
investi gators (IOIs) to Project Gunrunner, which ‘aims to deny firearms to
criminal organizations in Mexico, and to combat firearms-related violence
affecting communities on both sides of the border’ (Seelke, 2009: 13). In
2007 alone, ATF agents investigated 187 firearms trafficking cases and
recommended 465 defendants for prosecution (Seelke, 2009).
What factors affect the prospects for reducing gun trafficking out of the
United States to Canada and particularly Mexico? Improvements to regu-
lations of firearms (for example regulating transactions at gun shows in
Texas, New Mexico and Arizona as they do in California), better enforce-
ment of existing regulations that prohibit straw purchases and illicit sales
at gun shows and enhanced investigations of smuggling operations would
all increase the transactions costs for smuggling operations and ultimately
raise the price of firearms in Mexico. However, they might result in these
sources being displaced by alternative sources and trafficking routes that
are currently less utilized or dormant. Such alternative sources could include
purchases on the unorganized secondary market in the USA, or arms acqui-
sitions in Central America, where millions of firearms remain in circulation
as a result of past or on-going conflicts, and South America, where Brazilian
manufacturers will soon face new competition from new small-arms factories
in Venezuela (Stohl and Tuttle, 2008). Within Mexico there is an ongoing
possibility of diversion from the military and police—a possibility that will
become more difficult to deter if the price goes high enough, especially
given evidence of high levels of corruption in Mexican security institutions
(López-Montiel, 2000; Davis, 2006).
Consequently, the net effect of shutting down the flow of guns from the
United States to Mexico is unclear—it might curtail the flow of firearms
some what and increase the effective costs of obtaining weapons but it
would not likely choke off the supply. The situation in Canada would likely
be somewhat different. Relatively strong domestic regulation, the lower
likelihood of leakage of weapons from security forces, and stricter enforce-
ment mean that stronger cross-border interdiction may have an impact on
the availability of weapons, especially handguns, in Canada. The impact
Cook et al.—The illicit firearms trade in North America 17
that this would have on levels of armed violence, however, is more difficult
to say.
Concluding thoughts
There is enough unclassified data on the illicit gun trade in North America
to establish the importance of guns smuggled from US sources in arming
criminals in Canada and Mexico. The immediate result is a somewhat higher
murder rate in Canada and a vast intensification of drug crime conflict near
the Mexican border. But the United States is not the only source of guns
to criminals in Canada and Mexico. The current importance of US sources
reflects the basic economic facts of the situation: suitable guns are easily
obtained on the open market in the United States and can be smuggled to
Mexico at fairly low cost using routes and connections that have been well
established for other sorts of contraband.
But what would happen if current efforts by US authorities to interdict
gun smuggling were to prove successful? At this point we can only speculate.
If that flow of guns is cut off while the illicit demand remains high, then we
expect that prices will increase still higher and a variety of criminal organ-
izations would seek other sources of supply. In a world awash in small arms
there is no lack of possibilities, beginning with near-at-hand sources (military
diversion, Central America) and on to Eastern Europe and elsewhere. But
if these alternative sources prove more costly, or can be effectively curtailed
by authorities, then the net result would be to provide some check on the
deadly arming of criminals and criminal organizations.
A firmer factual base for this sort of speculation could be established if
data from criminal investigations and gun tracing were released for research
pur poses. The statements made by public officials are usually intended to
influence public opinion by offering conclusions, rather than providing the
sorts of information that would allow the researchers to do our own analysis.
A broader inquiry is warranted: the stakes are very high for developing
effective strategies for limiting the illicit movements of guns.
Notes
1 There is some uncertainty over homicide statistics, especially for Mexico,
and some annual variation, but the overall relationship between the three
states is roughly 1:4:8. Statistics are taken from UNODC (2008) for com-
parability; national sources have slightly different figures.
2 Artículo 10. Los habitantes de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos tienen derecho
a poseer armas en su domicilio, para su seguridad y legítima defensa, con
excepción de las prohibidas por la Ley Federal y de las reservadas para el
uso exclusivo del Ejército, Armada, Fuerza Aérea y Guardia Nacional. La
ley federal determinará los casos, condiciones, requisitos y lugares en que se
podrá autorizar a los habitantes la portación de armas.
Criminology & Criminal Justice18
3 Similarly, investigators from the US General Accounting Office discovered
that gun parts were routinely stolen from US military bases and resold at
gun shows or to gun dealers. In 1997 undercover FBI agents arrested six
US Marines and seven civilians for weapons trafficking after recovering
over 50 machine guns, explosives, rockets and other military devices. These
arrests were part of a larger investigation in the south-eastern United States
that focused on gun shows, military bases and dealers (Nowell, 1997).
4 There are literally dozens of media accounts of firearms flows from the
USA into Mexico in recent years. See, for example, Grillo (2007); Caldwell
(2008); Verini (2008); Billeaud (2009); Robbins (2009).
5 Not all of the weapons under investigation were allegedly trafficked to
Mexico.
6 Figures from the Mexican SINAIS database (available at SINAIS http://
sinais.salud.gob.mx/). Thanks go to Katherine Aguirre for preparing these
statistics. The figures appear, however, suspiciously low given the body
count for gang-related violence; homicide figures will not include people
killed by police or the army, and the figures for manslaughter would roughly
double these numbers.
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... Mexico's gun policies are more restrictive than those of the US. The Small Arms Survey (2007) and Cook, Cukier and Krause (2009) both make the point that there are twice as many unregistered firearms than registered ones in Mexico. These numbers might indicate that firearms are common in Mexico for probably the same reasons they are in the US, such as hunting and protection. ...
... These numbers might indicate that firearms are common in Mexico for probably the same reasons they are in the US, such as hunting and protection. Article 10 of Mexico's constitution allows its citizens to have firearms in their homes for protection (Cook et al. 2009). The only exception to Article 10 of the Mexican Constitution is that the Mexican residents cannot possess firearms which are prohibited or any firearms that are deemed for military use. ...
... It does allow them to own small caliber handguns, shotguns, and .22 caliber riffles (Cook et al. 2009). Firearms are not easily bought, sold, or obtained in Mexico due to the fact that Mexico does not have private gun shops, pawn stores or gun shows; rather, they are purchased from one store, Directorate of Commercialization of Arms and Ammunition, in Mexico City (Burton and Stewart 2007;Cook et al. 2009). ...
... These might be employed by Mexican cartels, or just trying to make a good deal by privately reselling their firearms in Mexico; if the former is the case, this is called a straw purchase and the actors involved in it are called strawmen (Goodman, 2013). Usually, there is a large number of such individuals, each carrying only a small quantity of firearms, mostly light weapons like handguns, across the border; this is referred to as tráfico hormiga or ant trafficking (Cook et al., 2009;UNODC, 2020a). Cook et al. also mention the possibility of obtaining and smuggling weapons, which are not even available for sale within the US, through the diversion of official exports or theft from military deposits. ...
... At the same time, there are indications of certain cartels like the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) being connected to the SEDENA, therefore potentially having access to imported firearms (Ahmed, 2020). Besides foreign weapons imported to Mexico, there is a considerable number of domestic weaponry present in the country, which is readily distributed to all branches of military and law enforcement as well as, occasionally, criminal groups through corruptive practices like the ones described (Cook et al., 2009). ...
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In this paper, we expanded on the challenges when researching complex cases of white-collar crime due to the clandestinity of available information or the lack thereof. We used established concepts of the networks of greed as well as the organisational power apparatus to construct a novel approach for analysing the actors in such cases and their interactions. This new scheme was then applied to three cases, the exploitation of coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the trafficking of arms in Mexico, and the grabbing of land in Bangladesh. Following our approach, we made some first steps towards a deeper understanding of the cases at hand. We were also able to draw some superficial conclusions on general topics of white-collar crime research. These included the hierarchy of criminal networks, the role of regular street crime therein, and the necessity to look beyond strictly empirical data that might otherwise remain unnoticed by research.
... In some cases, weapons are shipped and concealed in parcels or with other merchandises. Declarations about the content of the parcels are falsified (Cook et al., 2009;UNODC, 2020). In other situations, mules are used to cross borders, sometimes involving vulnerable populations such as migrants or refugees (Leuprecht & Aulthouse, 2014). ...
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Purpose. Based on the crime script approach, the main objective of this study was to identify steps involved in firearms trafficking in the Province of Quebec, Canada. Our analysis focused on actions performed by actors, facilitating conditions, obstacles and errors for each step of the firearms trafficking process. Method. A deductive thematic analysis was conducted to build the firearms trafficking script with 76 investigation files, conducted between 1996 and 2020, that were provided by the Quebec State Police. Results. Firearms trafficking included six steps: (1) preparation; (2) acquisition of firearms; (3) storage of firearms; (4) search for customers; (5) transaction; and (6) exit. Since each step can be completed with different actions, a total 1,200 combinations of actions could be used to traffic firearms. Results also indicated that several actors were involved at different steps of the script such as suppliers, middlemen, and vendors. Unregulated tools (e.g., hydraulic press, mold), materials and components (e.g., steel sheets, barrels) facilitated the fabrication of private firearms, while advertising firearms on social media was an error made by some suspects. Conclusion. The dynamic and sequential nature of firearms trafficking was highlighted by our script analysis. Crime script analysis also proved to be a useful approach to predict potential crime displacement, plan program evaluation and implementation, and prioritize prevention measures involving multiple agencies.
... To investigate whether there was an increase in the circulation of these firearms in the illegal market, firearm seizure data was analyzed, a technique widely used in the literature on the subject (Braga & Pierce 2005;Collins et al. 2018;Cook et al. 2009;Laqueur et al. 2023). For this, data from the Sou da Paz Institute obtained from the governments of the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro was used to produce a report on the increase in seizures of more potentcaliber firearms in these locations. ...
... As recently as 1991, 25% of households had guns, while in 2003 they were in only 18% of homes. 38 Usually these are hunting weapons, as Canada has a strong hunting tradition. After the change in the gun law, no increase in crime was observed, no increase in homicides and suicides. ...
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The paper reviews the literature with a view to answering the question as to whether the easier availability of firearms affects the level of homicides and suicides with their use. The author compared Polish and other similar laws where the access to firearms is strictly regulated, as against systems where the availability of firearms is facilitated, either owing to liberal laws (Colombia, Brazil, Switzerland) or to Constitutional guarantees (USA, Mexico). The comparison revealed a correlation between the availability of firearms and levels of homicide and suicide by firearms.
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Endorsed Ontario Medical Students Association (OMSA) position paper on the topic of firearms
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Objective: to summarize and study the North America’s intra-continental gun trafficking networks. Methods: the work applies social network analysis (SNA) to understand structures, identify brokers and discover patterns in the way guns are being procured, transported across the border, and further distributed. Results: Since Canada adjoins the largest weapons market in the world, it is unsurprising that guns used to commit criminal acts in Canada largely originate in the United States. But how are such weapons transported across the border: by individual entrepreneurs, by small networks, or by sophisticated cartels? This article analyzes six cases that resulted in prosecutions of 40 Canadian and American citizens implicated in Canada-U.S. gun trafficking networks between 2007 and 2010. This study is a plausibility probe that applies social network analysis—investigating networks that come into existence by the creation of pairwise links among their members—to analyze global structures, identify brokers and their roles, and discover patterns in the way guns are being procured in the United States, transported across the border, and distributed in Canada. Scientific novelty : In the process, this study generates hypotheses about network structure and works towards modeling these networks functionally: Since guns are available legally in the United States, we expect to find a proliferation of relatively simple networks. In contrast, drugs, which are not as readily available, might require more sophisticated networks to be trafficked across the border. Results revealed that the trafficking network structures seem to be driven by function. When the objective of the network is mere rent-seeking, transborder trafficking networks for guns tend to be simple. By contrast, when the objective is to manage violence as a constituent element of a larger criminal organization and its activities, networks tend to be more sophisticated, although the gun trafficking networks remain simpler. Practical significance : the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific, pedagogical and law enforcement activities when considering the issues related to the illegal firearms trafficking through the US and Canadian territories.
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Western law enforcement agencies have made multiple arrests targeting individuals purchasing firearms on Dark Web platforms in recent years, as these transactions may violate national laws and facilitate offline violence. Despite its market presence and growth, research exploring these online illicit markets has been scant, especially as it relates to how firearms are priced on the Dark Web, and the factors that influence their price point. Given this gap in the literature, the current study utilized a sample of 287 firearm products across 20 Dark Web vendors operating in both crypto markets and shops to identify the range and pricing model of illicit weapons. Analyses revealed that long guns offered on the Dark Web had lower average listed prices than their manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP), while handguns had higher advertised prices than their recommended retail value. Further, products’ MSRP was a significant predictor of firearms’ price point for both handguns and long guns, whereas offering a customer service line was only significant for handguns’ price point. The implications of this analysis for our understanding of illicit online market operations are discussed in detail.
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The spectacular increases in violent crime that began in the mid-1960s continue, and Americans are currently being murdered, robbed, and raped at historically unprecedented rates. Firearms are used in a minority of violent crimes but are of special concern because more than 60 percent of the most serious crimes-criminal homicides-are committed with firearms. This essay presents a variety of evidence to the effect that the widespread availability of firearms contributes to the criminal homicide rate and influences violent crime patterns in several other respects as well. A gun is usually superior to other weapons readily available for use in violent crime; even in the hands of a weak and unskilled assailant, a gun poses a credible threat and can be used to kill quickly, from a distance, and in a relatively "impersonal" fashion. Guns are particularly valuable against relatively invulnerable targets. Hence, gun availability facilitates robbery of commercial places and lethal assaults on people who would ordi...
Chapter
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world. Mexican DTOs dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. As a result, some of the drug-related violence in Mexico has spilled over into the United States. On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a proposed package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. Congress appropriated roughly $1.3 billion for Mexico and Central America, as well as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 1118), and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111- 32). Each of these Acts contained human rights conditions on 15% of certain law enforcement and military assistance provided. Throughout 2009, drug-related violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover along the Southwest border focused congressional concern on the pace of implementation of the Mérida Initiative. On December 3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had actually been spent. The pace of implementation has accelerated since that time, particularly in Mexico, but implementation challenges remain. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million in Mérida funding for Mexico and $100 million for Central America. On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which allows for $210.3 million for Mexico and $83 million for Central America under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). These Mexico (Mérida) and Central America (CARSI) funds are subject to the same human rights conditions as those provided in P.L. 111-8. Congress also provided $37 million in P.L. 111-117 for a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). During its second session, the 111th Congress is likely to maintain a strong interest in how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are implementing the Mérida Initiative and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress may also monitor enforcement of Mérida’s human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is likely to play a role in the design of post- Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration’s FY2011 budget request. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the Initiative. For related information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence.
Article
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world. Mexican DTOs dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. As a result, some of the drug-related violence in Mexico has spilled over into the United States. On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a proposed package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. Congress appropriated roughly $1.3 billion for Mexico and Central America, as well as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32). Each of these Acts contained human rights conditions on 15% of certain law enforcement and military assistance provided. Throughout 2009, drug-related violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover along the Southwest border focused congressional concern on the pace of implementation of the Mérida Initiative. On December 3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had actually been spent. The pace of implementation has accelerated since that time, particularly in Mexico, but implementation challenges remain. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million in Mérida funding for Mexico and $100 million for Central America. On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which allows for $210.3 million for Mexico and $83 million for Central America under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). These Mexico (Mérida) and Central America (CARSI) funds are subject to the same human rights conditions as those provided in P.L. 111-8. Congress also provided $37 million in P.L. 111-117 for a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). During its second session, the 111th Congress is likely to maintain a strong interest in how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are implementing the Mérida Initiative and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress may also monitor enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is likely to play a role in the design of post-Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget request. This chapter provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the Initiative. For related information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R40582, Mexico's Drug-Related Violence.