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Abstract

The concept of global justice has been developed to stress the worldwide implications of moral problems. Not much, however, has been written about the actual politics of global justice. This article focuses on public opinion and argues that attitudes about international redistribution are not a simple projection of attitudes about the domestic situation. In countries where domestic income redistribution is seen as an important priority, foreign aid is less popular; where this is less so, there is more concern for the fate of the poor in the South. Far from reflecting a lack of coherence in public opinion, these counterintuitive results need to be understood in connection with policy achievements in donor countries. The authors' empirical findings suggest that although the commitment to redistribute is stronger at the national level, relationships of solidarity do not stop at national boundaries. The achievement of justice at home in fact sustains justice abroad.

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... In this view, the strength of leftist parties influences aid levels in an indirect way, since leftist party power leads to increased foreign aid only by first leading to the creation a welfare state with more socialist attributes. In the same vein, these scholars argue that popular support for reducing global inequalities through the distribution of aid increases only once domestic inequalities have been mitigated (Noël and Thérien 2002). Thus, the humanitarian values that underpin a political environment where generous domestic welfare programs are possible also generate support for sending aid overseas. ...
... A recent poll indicated that 54% of US respondents believed that the United States was spending too much on foreign aid. 4 In another poll, 47% of U.S. respondents wanted foreign aid levels to be reduced. 5 Even in countries where there is majority support for international redistribution, support for aid may be lower when the public believes that more immediate domestic concerns have not been resolved (Noël and Thérien 2002). Policymakers are sensitive to demands from their bases of support, and while certain domestic constituencies may benefit directly from donor aid programs, development aid serves a foreign constituency unlikely to provide political support or resources to decision makers. ...
Article
Why do foreign aid budgets vary across countries and over time? Existing research indicates that the same set of factors shapes commitments toward both domestic and international redistribution. While scholars have acknowledged international normative influences on aid allocations, research on levels of donor generosity has not examined how international trade influences aid budgets. This paper examines whether imports from developing countries have a ‘displacement effect’ on aid commitments. Employing a panel of nineteen OECD donor countries, we analyze aid budgets from 1980 to 2000. We find that increased imports from developing countries to donor countries are associated with aid reductions. These results persist after controlling for international and domestic variables identified in previous research, and under other estimation techniques and model specifications. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2007
... Yet, the question remains as to whether European voters also concur with policy-makers that the means of attaining this objective is by development cooperation. Understanding public preferences is of crucial importance, as policy-makers in donor countries seek to remain attuned to public opinion in setting their development priorities, devising policies and allocating financial resources for foreign aid (Lumsdaine, 1993;Milner, 2006;Mosley, 1985;Olsen, 2001;Noël and Thérien, 2002;Stern, 1998). This 'electoral connection' even extends to multilateral aid organizations such as the World Bank group and the EU, which closely monitor public opinion and develop policy conclusions accordingly (Fransman andLecomte, 2004, McDonnell et al., 2003). ...
... Second, with some notable exceptions (Bauhr and Charron, 2019;Kiratli, 2019;Noël, and Thérien, 2002), most of the literature explaining public attitudes on foreign aid disbursements focuses on individual-level variables and ignores the impact of macro-level, time-variant factors. Yet public attitudes to foreign aid considerably vary across donors and over time, and a significant portion of this variance stems from factors embedded in social, political and economic developments at the donor level. ...
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This article provides a longitudinal analysis on the driving forces behind Europeans' positions toward development aid and identifies changes in the dynamics following the migrant flows in 2015. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which policy-makers' decisions to utilize development policy as a strategic tool to manage migration resonates at the public level. Using multilevel regression models on cross-sectional survey data acquired from Eurobarometer surveys covering five waves between 2013 and 2018, supplemented by a series of macro-level covariates both at the country and regional level, we show that voters in countries and regions with higher numbers of migrants are more supportive of foreign aid. The models also verify that support for foreign aid in polities that are the destination for migrants is substantially stronger in surveys conducted after 2015 than before and among voters who are interested in politics.
... The act of giving aid thus seems to reflect public attitudes. Noel and Thérien (2002) argue that attitudes to international redistribution are not a simple projection of attitudes about the domestic situation. ...
... Although there is a consolidated literature that analyzes the relationship between public opinion and the provision of foreign aid by developed countries (BAKER, 2015;HURST, TIDWELL and HAWKINS, 2017;MILNER and TINGLEY, 2010;MOSLEY, 1985;NOEL and THÉRIEN, 2002;PAXTON and KNACK, 2012;STERN, 1998), work is in the pipeline that evaluates the domestic costs of the foreign aid provided by developing countries, generally referred to as South-South There is no consensus on the definition of SSC but it is generally used to designate a wide range of phenomena regarding relations between developing countries. However, the term can also refer to specific actions taken by a government to promote economic development in underdeveloped countries, such as technical and financial assistance (LEITE, 2012). ...
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In recent decades, Brazil has established itself as an important donor to underdeveloped countries. Although the country does not see itself as a traditional donor, its IDC policy, in the context of South-South Cooperation, has increased the country’s international profile as an influential actor in the IDC landscape. However, emerging states, generally classified as middle-income countries, continue to suffer from high levels of poverty, which leads to debate on whether resources used in international aid could not be better used at home. The supply of foreign aid is influenced by public opinion in democratic donor countries; generally speaking, foreign aid is unpopular relative to domestic programs. This article, by means of an experimental design, analyzes Brazilian public support for the country’s IDC policy and engages with the emerging literature on Brazilian public opinion and foreign policy issues. It thus contributes to the discussion about the domestic costs of Brazil becoming an emerging donor. Our findings, based on a national survey of 2276 people, show that most respondents believe the country should reduce or eliminate foreign aid spending. Moreover, support decreases even more when participants are presented with information on how that money could have been used in the domestic realm.
... Finally, the United Kingdom, France and Germany in turn score progressively higher on the global justice factor than the United States. This finding is interesting in light of the European countries' higher levels of official development assistance as a proportion of GNI, and also in light of previous aggregate-level findings that countries with higher levels of domestic redistribution are generally less favourable toward global redistribution (Noël & Thérien 2002). An explanation for these cross-national differences in mean factor scores may be found in the previously noted differences in political institutions, respective histories of foreign policy, and national strategic cultures. ...
... Our results identify an additional concept important to understanding foreign policy attitudes -a factor we call 'global justice' -that captures support for more international redistribution. These notions of global justice represent a rich literature within international political theory that has, to date, been relatively under-explored within political behaviour and the literature on foreign policy attitudes (though see Bayram 2017;Noël & Thérien 2002;Spencer & Lindstrom 2013). This raises an important question: Why do we observe separate constructs for CI and global justice when early analyses (i.e., by Wittkopf) did not? ...
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While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.
... While there is quite a high correlation between domestic and global solidarity (Pearson's r = 0.613), there are good reasons why we should examine them as two separate dependent variables. Firstly, as we will see in my final hypothesis, people are generally expected to feel greater identification with and solidarity toward other people who are closer to themselves, both spatially and culturally, and be more supportive of domestic rather than international redistribution (Goodin, 1998;Noël and Thérien, 2002). Although it is said that we live in the age of globalism, where the distance between citizens of different nations has shrunk considerably due to technological, political, and socio-economic developments that have enabled cross-border cooperation in an ever-growing pace, people are still more likely to identify themselves as national citizens rather than global citizens (cosmopolitans), at least in the wealthier countries. ...
Article
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Social cohesion, often operationalized using measures of generalized social trust, has received enormous amounts of attention in previous scholarly work. However, another dimension of this broad phenomenon, norms of social solidarity, has meanwhile largely been overlooked in previous research. This study analyzes the association between micro-perceptions of corruption and solidarity with the less privileged both domestically and beyond, and how this association might vary across different societies with different types and forms of corruption. The data come from ISSP Citizenship II and include 33 countries, analyzed with multilevel regression models. The results show that the link between individual corruption perceptions and global solidarity varies so that it is comparatively weak and positive in contexts judged as more corrupt according to the Corruption Perception Index, while it is strong and negative in contexts judged by experts as relatively corruption free. For domestic solidarity, in turn, there is some evidence of a comparatively weak positive association but no significant contextual variations.
... Foreign aid in itself is a low salience issue, easily trumped by other voter concerns (Cooper and Verloren van Themaat 1989;Lancaster 2000). Although the public generally supports increased allocation, especially for development (Noel and Therien 2002, Milner 2006, McDonnell 2003, Smillie et al 1998, this low salience may mean that politicians can use aid for their aims, without concern for electoral repercussion (Lundsgaarde 2007). However, politicians may be less free to ignore crucial-hot-button‖ issues, such as terrorism and immigration-problems that voters might readily link to Muslim nations. ...
... When it comes to redistribution on a global scale, liberals and conservatives export these views to the domain of FDA. A number of studies have found support for the ideology argument, demonstrating that liberals are more supportive of foreign aid than conservatives (Breuning, 1995;Fleck & Kilby, 2006;Noel & Therien, 2002;Tingley, 2010;Milner & Tingley, 2013). ...
Article
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Do basic human values facilitate prosocial behaviour on a global scale? This study, for the first time, analyzes the effect of values on prosocial behaviour in the context of public support for foreign development assistance. Support for foreign development assistance is a prosocial act intended to benefit the less fortunate in developing nations. Despite a plethora of evidence showing the effect of personal values on prosocial behaviour, the literature has neglected the value origins of support for development assistance. I argue that personal values play a crucial role in shaping individuals' support for foreign development assistance. Using data from nationally representative samples covering 11 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, I show that self-transcendence and openness to change values, as defined by Schwartz' theory of values, are reliable predictors of support for foreign development assistance. By linking human values to foreign development aid, this study expands the purview of values research to the domain of global governance and opens up new avenues of interdisciplinary inquiry that apply theories of values to different dimensions of world affairs.
... Second, our findings complement the growing body of research that investigates the determinants of individual preferences for foreign aid. While previous studies tend to focus on socio-demographic, political, material, and attitudinal factors that change little over time (Noël & Thérien 2002, Chong & Gradstein 2008, Van Heerde & Hudson 2010, Paxton & Knack 2012, Milner & Tingley 2013, Henson & Lindstrom 2013, Bauhr, Charron & Nasiritousi 2013, our work points to an important source of over-time changes in aid support. The focus on changes in one's personal fortunes introduces a powerful over-time variation in support of foreign aid. ...
Article
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Economic crises generally lead to reductions in foreign aid. However, the widely held view that budgetary constraints caused by economic crises reduce aid is inaccurate because donor government outlays actually tend to increase. We develop an argument that aid cuts occur because voters place a lower priority on aid during economic downturns and politicians respond by cutting aid. Using data from Eurobarometer, we demonstrate that economic downturns lead to reduced public support for helping the poor abroad. These findings are robust across a large number of alternative specifications. Our findings have implications for how advocates may prevent aid reductions during economic recessions.
... This is why it is so important to address the ways in which news media outlets in Colombia represent foreign aid in the context of peacebuilding and how this is articulated in news narratives. This is a critical issue to address in times in UK FOREIGN AID PROGRAMMES IN COLOMBIA 3 which important segments of the public inside Colombia and from the donor countries are now questioning the effectiveness of delivering aid to alleviate poverty , rather than dedicating those resources to the most needy at ' home ' ( Noël and Thérien 2002 , p . 633 ) . ...
Article
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This article considers research approaches often associated with media and journalism studies as complementary assessment strategies to inform decisions associated with evaluating foreign aid. In order to do so, the case of British foreign aid towards Colombia in the context of the War on Drugs is examined as a case study. The authors explore the relationship between aid giving and the receipt of aid by focusing on how the media can be used as a peacebuilding indicator. There is a dearth of academic inquiry into these issues. This article attempts to flesh out some future lines of scholarly enquiry using the UK–Colombia case study example. It uses research interviews with state officials, multilateral organizations and NGO representatives as well as a review of press coverage in Colombia over a two-year period. The article argues that media could potentially be used as an important indicator of peacebuilding success and failure in the context of aid giving and receipt but that to achieve that there are specific pre-conditions and issues to be addressed by the different parties.
... De Europese hulp is mede gebaseerd op een 'socialistisch' motief en aldus ruimer, maar alleen in die landen waar de politieke cultuur traditioneel sterk links is -Noorwegen, Zweden, Denemarken en Nederlandheeft dit geleid tot hulpverlening in de buurt van de internationale 0,7 procentafspraak (Lumsdaine 1993;Noël en Thérien 1995;Kamminga 2004). Sachs' plan vereist op zijn minst een snelle verandering van de Amerikaanse (en deels ook Europese) politieke cultuur, wat onhaalbaar is zolang links politiek zo zwak vertegenwoordigd is en de samenleving enorme inkomensongelijkheden kent die de publieke opinie ertoe brengen eerst versterkte sociale programma's te eisen alvorens meer ontwikkelingshulp gerechtvaardigd te achten (Noël en Thérien 2002). Zo bezien zijn de door Sachs beoogde 'grote klappen' volstrekt irreëel. ...
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Er wordt jaarlijks door UWV en gemeenten 2 miljard euro besteed aan re-integratie. Daarvan gaat 360 miljoen naar private re-integratiebedrijven. De re-integratietrajecten die private bedrijven inzetten voor hun klanten hebben een klein positief effect op de kans op werk. Is dit voldoende om de kosten van de trajecten terug te verdienen? Niet als je kijkt naar de besparing op de uitkeringslast. Maar de maatschappelijke baten zijn hoger dan alleen de besparing op de uitkeringen.
... They argue that these institutions are relatively fixed, but recent scholarship argues that this is not necessarily the case, and that the Esping-Andersen measures are deceptively static (Allan and Scruggs 2004). It is unclear what dynamics they have in mind (see also (Noel and Therien 2002)). Their mixing of cross-sectional analysis and somewhat vague theory of what changes what make evaluating these questions difficult. ...
Article
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Foreign aid plays a key, and often contentious, role in discussions about development. The vast majority of scholarship on foreign aid looks at either the effectiveness of foreign aid or why particular countries receive aid from particular donors. This scholarship misses a more general, yet understudied, question: what are the domestic sources of support for foreign aid. Specifically, how does the donor's domestic political and economic environment influence the amount of money it commits to foreign aid? This paper uses a new time-series cross-sectional data set to analyze the influence of changes in political and economic variables on foreign aid commitments. As governments become more conservative, their commitments to foreign aid (relative to total GDP) are likely to fall. Economic variables seem less relevant. These results are relatively robust to a broad range of model specifications. 1 I would like to thank Raymond Hicks for many things, including brainstorming, interpretation of statistical models, and data manipulation, members of the Princeton IR research seminar for feedback on previous drafts. All mistakes are my own.
... Given the relevance of economic inequality between societies as expressed in these three points, some authors have called into attention the lack of research and theorization coming from sociology in this area (Morris & Western, 1999). But apart from a lack of research, what is possible to find are a series of theoretical proposals and research lines that have developed somehow in a parallel way and that only recently appear under the umbrella of so-called global inequality (Noel & Therien, 2002). The interest in addressing economic inequality between countries can actually be traced back to the 1950s and the debate on the modernization theory, in which poverty and inequality seemed to be only a problem of underdeveloped nations. ...
... Los desarrollos en la investigación empírica en justicia social han sido bastante productivos en términos académicos en las últimas dos décadas, no sólo porque se ha validado como un ámbito central en la comprensión de la sociedad y su funcionamiento actual, sino también dados los crecientes niveles de desigualdad a nivel global (Battaleme, 2001;Edmunds & Möhring-Hesse, 2005;Hinsch, 2001;Noel & Therien, 2002). En este contexto, la investigación sobre justicia distributiva en Chile es interesante porque el país presenta altos niveles de desigualdad económica, como también por la marcada introducción de mecanismos de mercado, privatizaciones, precariedad en el mercado laboral y desigualdad en el acceso a una educación de calidad. ...
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Es posible hablar de una brecha salarial que las personas consideren justa? El presente trabajo aborda esta pregunta desde un punto de vista empírico, en la línea de estudios conocida como investigación en justicia social. Para ello se centra en el análisis de dos aspectos principales: (1) la brecha salarial percibida y la brecha considerada justa para ocupaciones de alto y bajo estatus, y (2) la influencia del ingreso económico, la satisfacción con el ingreso, e ideologías de justicia en la determinación de la brecha justa. Los datos estudiados corresponden a la encuesta del Proyecto Internacional en Justicia Social (International Social Justice Project, ISJP), en la que Chile participó el año 2007. Resultados del análisis multivariado indican que hay signos de consenso respecto de la brecha salarial considera-da justa en la población, lo que apoya argumentos en la dirección de la legitimación de la desigualdad. Graduate School of Social Sciences -Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. Investigador asocia-do del International Social Justice Project (www.isjp.de). juan.castillo@rz.hu-berlin.de. 1 Agradezco las correcciones y sugerencias de Andrea Riedemann (Universidad Libre de Berlín), de Matías Dewey (Universidad de Rostock) y de árbitros anónimos de Estudios Públicos.
... The language of social policy is primarily a moral and democratic language, and only secondarily institutional and technocratic. The pivotal role of principles and values in policy-making can be seen in their propensity to extend beyond the policy domain with which they were first associated (Noël and Thérien, 2002: 645 and 650). The power of established conceptions of justice also tends to prevent societies from going back radically in terms of rights. ...
Article
In recent years, governments, international institutions, and a broad array of social movements have converged around what an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report has described as an emerging ‘global anti-poverty consensus’. This new global social policy agenda has changed the terms of the debate between the left and the right, and redefined the world of policy possibilities, in global but also in domestic politics. This article proposes a constructivist interpretation of this multi-scale shift in discourse, and discusses the political and policy implications of the new global politics of poverty.
... Los desarrollos en la investigación empírica en justicia social han sido bastante productivos en términos académicos en las últimas dos décadas, no sólo porque se ha validado como un ámbito central en la comprensión de la sociedad y su funcionamiento actual, sino también dados los crecientes niveles de desigualdad a nivel global (Battaleme, 2001;Edmunds & Möhring-Hesse, 2005;Hinsch, 2001;Noel & Therien, 2002). En este contexto, la investigación sobre justicia distributiva en Chile es interesante porque el país presenta altos niveles de desigualdad económica, como también por la marcada introducción de mecanismos de mercado, privatizaciones, precariedad en el mercado laboral y desigualdad en el acceso a una educación de calidad. ...
Article
Full-text available
Es posible hablar de una brecha salarial que las personas consideren justa? El presente trabajo aborda esta pregunta desde un punto de vista empírico, en la línea de estudios conocida como investigación en justicia social. Para ello se centra en el análisis de dos aspectos principales: (1) la brecha salarial percibida y la brecha considerada justa para ocupaciones de alto y bajo estatus, y (2) la influencia del ingreso económico, la satisfacción con el ingreso, e ideologías de justicia en la determinación de la brecha justa. Los datos estudiados corresponden a la encuesta del Proyecto Internacional en Justicia Social (International Social Justice Project, ISJP), en la que Chile participó el año 2007. Resultados del análisis multivariado indican que hay signos de consenso respecto de la brecha salarial considera-da justa en la población, lo que apoya argumentos en la dirección de la legitimación de la desigualdad.
... See Lumsdaine (1993) for evidence on the correlation between welfare states, ODA flows and public support for ODA, and Noël and Thérien (2002) on the links between public opinion and national and global justice in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. ...
Article
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Summary of trends on public opinion and international development co-operation in OECD DAC member countries: i) Public support in OECD DAC member countries for helping poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue; ii) Donations from the public to development and emergency NGOs have been increasing, mostly in reaction to emergencies and natural disasters in developing countries; iii) Concern among the public about aid effectiveness exists alongside continued high support for aid; iv) The relationship between public support and ODA volumes is complex, but a positive correlation exists at the national level between satisfaction with ODA volume, and reaching or bypassing the UN target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income; v) People’s understanding of poverty and development issues remains very shallow. Public awareness about ODA and development co-operation policies is also low; vi) Awareness does increase significantly as a result ... Ce document propose une synthèse des tendances de l’opinion publique et de la coopération internationale au développement dans les pays membres du CAD de l’OCDE: i) dans ces pays, le soutien du public en faveur de l’aide aux pays pauvres s’est maintenu, pratiquement sans interruption depuis près de 20 ans, à un niveau élevé: il n’y a pas de « lassitude » de l’aide ; ii) les dons du public aux ONG humanitaires et de développement sont en augmentation, surtout pour répondre aux situations d’urgence et aux catastrophes naturelles dans les pays en développement; iii) la société civile est parfois sceptique quant à l’efficacité de l’aide, mais cela n’entame pas son soutien, qui continue d’être important; iv) les relations entre le soutien de la société civile et les volumes d’APD sont complexes mais il existe une corrélation positive dans les pays entre la satisfaction éprouvée à l’égard du volume d’APD et l’atteinte, ou le dépassement, de l’objectif de 0,7 pour cent du revenu ...
... This research line has been extended to exploring how support for welfare states might reflect development of related regulatory insurance or protections, such as employment protection legislation or voluntary firm-level assistance (Berens 2015;Gingrich and Ansell 2012). And it has been extended also to the possibility that existing generosity of national welfare states affects support for European-level social protections (Burgoon 2009) or support for foreign development assistance (Noël and Thérien 2002). ...
Article
This article explores whether private regulatory activity to promote labour and social standards might hollow out traditional public regulations to provide welfare and labour protection at home and abroad. Such exploration has hitherto been frustrated by empirical limitations of measures of private regulatory activity and its implications for public regulation. The present article extends those limits by focusing on how new measures of labour-related private regulation affect attitudes in 27 European polities towards welfare redistribution and for foreign assistance. Our analysis suggests that private-regulatory CSR promoting labour and social standards may directly and indirectly diminish public support for domestic welfare redistribution, but appears to have little effect on support for foreign aid. We see, hence, possible crowding-out only with respect to domestic, not international, assistance.
... For 854 instance, the paradox of redistribution in ODA has testable 855 predictions on public opinion. If the stigmatization effects 856 are large, we would expect public opinion to be more skeptical 857 about ODA in donor countries that target their domestic poor 858 directly (Noel & Therien, 2002). Also, the paradox can be 859 extended to other policy areas relevant in development 860 research such as gender policy. ...
Article
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Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction. We investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short country studies on Germany and the United Kingdom. We find that there is a trade-off between the total amount of money given, and the amount of money given to poor countries. The trade-off is similar to the paradox of redistribution of targeting vs. redistribution in rich welfare states. Case-study evidence illustrates how countries have managed this tradeoff.
... 25Before proceeding, we want to address the generalizability of our U.S.-based results to other major donor countries. While differences in level of public support for aid across donor countries exist (see the respective Tables 1 inNoël & Thérien (2002) andPaxton & Knack (2012)), the heterogeneity of individual-level effects need not necessarily be noteworthy. In a rare effort examining this,Heinrich, Kobayashi & Bryant (2016) report that individual (parochial) pocketbook effects on the support for aid are not unusual for the ...
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Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.
... According to the "saturation" (Dallinger, 2010) or "growth to limits" (Jaeger, 2006) hypothesis, popular demand for redistribution is curbed once the maximum amount of taxes that citizens are willing to pay for the financing of redistributive policies is reached. This should help to explain why Scandinavians, eg. are often found to be less supportive of further redistribution than Southern Europeans, given that they live in mature and already high-spending welfare states (Gelissen, 2001b;Noël & Thérien, 2002). Some empirical studies have used a quadratic term for social spending to capture the curvilinear nature of the spending-support relationship, but have not corroborated it (Dallinger, 2010;Jaeger, 2006). ...
Article
Over two decades ago, Korpi and Palme (1998) published one of the most influential papers in the history of social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox. More specifically, we break down the paradox into seven core assumptions, which together form a causal chain running from institutional design to redistributive outcomes. For each causal assumption, we offer a comprehensive and critical review of the relevant empirical literature, also including a broader range of studies that do not aim to address Korpi and Palme’s paradox per se, but are nevertheless informative about it.
... Even though mass publics might not be as interested in foreign policy compared to domestic policy, research indicates that foreign aid spending is an issue that the public takes seriously. For example, survey evidence shows that publics consider the tradeoffs between domestic welfare spending and foreign aid (Heinrich, 2013;Noél and Thérien, 2002), their country's trade relations with recipients (Hudson and van Heerde-Hudson, 2012), as well as other policy priorities (Heinrich, 2013;Heinrich et al., 2016) when thinking about foreign aid spending. ...
Article
Bringing together psychological approaches to empathy with research on public preferences for foreign development aid, we shed light on the role empathy plays in global helping behavior. We argue individuals combine their affective empathic responses with situational factors when forming foreign aid preferences. Testing our theory with two novel experiments embedded in a national survey of US citizens, we find that affective empathy not only predicts the individual variation in foreign aid preferences but also explains why Americans weigh aid effectiveness and recipient deservingness—the two important situational aspects of foreign aid—differently. We show that the ability to feel others’ pain is what facilitates global helping behavior, not simply knowing their pain. However, even though this affective ability moderates the impact of aid effectiveness, it amplifies that of recipient merit. Our results contribute to a richer understanding of when empathy facilitates public support for foreign development aid and add to the burgeoning research program on behavioral international politics.
... A great deal of research has been done on the levels of public support for development cooperation policies [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. These studies began in the second half of the 20th century [10] at around about the same time as the first studies relating public opinion and government policy: "As early as 1952, Berelson [11] noted that-public opinion research can help a democracy to know itself, evaluate itself and bring its practices more nearly in accord with its own fundamental ideas" [8]. ...
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The official development aid provided by donor countries does not solely depend on government decisions; it is also affected by trends in public opinion. This means that it is important to find out more about the opinions, views and attitudes of the citizens of donor countries. In spite of this, very few research studies have specifically analysed the opinions of people from rural areas. The aim of this research is to analyse the attitudes of the inhabitants of rural areas in northeast Spain to assess the degree of support for policies of international cooperation and development. To this end we carried out a survey of 403 people resident in small towns, selected using a stratified sampling process. We then conducted multivariate statistical techniques of the information we had gathered, in which we found that there were three types of individuals according to their level of interest, concern and action: aware but not actively involved, not interested and passive, and proactive with strong convictions. This research has shown that educational level, size of the town and age all influence the person's interest in the problems affecting the rest of the world and their support for international cooperation.
Article
This paper explores attitudes about alternative paths to promoting labor and social standards in the global political economy: public welfare states protecting workers and social standards through policy and regulation, versus private ‘red consumerism’ protecting standards through consumer buying-power and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Scholarly debate has emerged over whether these public and private realms reinforce or undermine one another, but has lacked empirical traction to systematically judge such relationships. This paper provides such traction by analyzing European public opinion towards welfare redistribution and towards using consumer power to protect labor and social standards. It matches public opinion data on attitudes towards such issues to measures of existing public and private social protection. The analysis of public opinion suggests that red consumerism is more popular in settings with already-generous public protection, including strong social-policy programs and labor regulation. But the tendency of trade competition and other economic risks to spur a citizen's support for welfare-state redistribution is diminished where CSR activity and ethical consumerism have stronger footholds. While ‘red’ ethical consumerism and CSR activities may be facilitated by generous existing social policies, they might well erode citizen support for those policies.
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This article argues that opinions on distant suffering must be understood via three variables: recipients of aid and sympathy; cause of suffering; and providers of aid and sympathy. These insights are present in the literature but have not to date been combined. One advantage of such a combination is that it allows us to explore the extent to which providers of aid and sympathy employ deservingness criteria in their opinion formation. Theoretically, the article thus opens a dialogue between the distant issue literature and theories of deservingness in welfare state research. Methodologically, it builds on an original survey of 2003 Danish respondents. The article’s main ambition is to probe (1) the relationships between political preference and opinions on distant suffering; (2) the extent to which Danes engage in deservingness calculations when they relate to it; and (3) whether deservingness calculations are patterned along political preference. The data show that political preference predicts opinions and that deservingness calculations are indeed prevalent. Yet they also demonstrate that these differences should be interpreted against the background of a high aggregate level of support for distant issue engagement. The effect of political preference is most pronounced at the outer poles of the political spectrum, and less so at the centre. And while deservingness logics are most prevalent on the right, the pattern is moderate and non-consistent.
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Building and sustaining solidarity is an enduring challenge in all liberal-democratic societies. The claims of solidarity require individuals to tolerate views and practices they dislike, to accept democratic decisions that go again their beliefs or interests, and to moderate the pursuit of their own economic self-interest to help the disadvantaged. Ensuring that individuals are willing to accept these “strains of commitment,” to borrow John Rawls’ apt phrase, has been a worry even in relatively homogeneous societies, and the challenge seems even greater in ethnically and religiously diverse societies. Anxiety about the impact of diversity on solidarity has been a recurring theme in both academic scholarship and public debates around immigration and multiculturalism. In order to better understand the nature of this challenge, we need to understand the meaning of solidarity, and the mechanisms by which it can be enhanced or diminished. Our approach to these questions focuses on the sources of solidarity. Recent research has concentrated on diagnosing the dynamics that undermine solidarity and generate backlash and exclusion in diverse societies. This is understandable, since political life in democratic countries has been characterized by both neoliberal attacks on the welfare state and populist attacks on immigration. However, we look at the politics of diversity from the opposite direction, exploring the potential sources of support for an inclusive solidarity. How is solidarity built? How is it sustained over time? How has been strengthened as well as weakened in the contemporary era?
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Resumo A teoria democrática revela que os sistemas democráticos são imperfeitos e passíveis de contradições. Uma delas refere-se à capacidade de regulação pertencente ao escopo nacional, o que não coaduna-se naturalmente com as necessidades e os imperativos de internacionalização contemporâneos. Portanto, dotados de demanda de inserção internacional e qualificados pelo grau de desenvolvimento em que estão, Estados democráticos contemporâneos são marcados pela busca de políticas domésticas cada vez mais eficientes, transparentes e inclusivas, ao mesmo tempo em que imperativos de circulação de bens e pessoas criam obrigações distintas para estes mesmos Estados. Com isso, a qualificação de uma órbita de direitos nacionais torna visível, ao mesmo tempo, a dificuldade de garantir direitos de circulação de pessoas. Este artigo preza pelos princípios filosóficos de parte da teoria democrática contemporânea quanto ao assunto em questão. Palavras-chaves: Teoria Democrática, Fluxos Internacionais, Direitos Domésticos. Abstract The democratic theory discloses that the democratic systems are imperfect and full of contradictions. One of them is the capacity to regulating the national target, what is not into the necessities and the imperatives of contemporary internationalization. Therefore, endowed with demanding of international insertion and qualified for the development degree where they are considered, democratic contemporary States are marked by the search for more efficient, transparent and inclusive domestic politics each time, at the same time where imperative of circulation of goods and people same States create distinct obligations for these. With this, the qualification of an orbit of domestic laws becomes visible, at the same time, the difficulty to guarantee rights of circulation of people. This article is focused on the philosophical principles of part of the democratic theory in which it has to the question above.
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While the global justice movement has often been said to suffer from notable North-South divisions, survey findings from the World Social Forums 2005 (Porto Alegre, Brazil) and 2007 (Nairobi, Kenya) contradict this notion. Logistic regression analyses show no systematic variation between the political attitudes held by respondents from the global North and those held by respondents from the South. While Southern activists are somewhat more likely to hold radically anti-capitalist views than their Northern colleagues, North-South differences regarding the question of whether capitalism should be abolished or reformed are neither robust, nor statistically significant. Response patterns differ, however, between participants from the world-system’s periphery and semiperiphery, as well as between the majority of Latin American participants in the Porto Alegre survey and the majority of African participants in the Nairobi survey. In short, South-South differences among respondents from different world-systemic zones (periphery versus semiperiphery) and socio-geographic regions (Latin America versus Africa) appear to be more pronounced than the oft-assumed North-South differences. The common North-South dichotomy, while quite popular among authors criticizing the notion of an emerging global civil society as empirically inadequate, turns out to miss the mark.
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Events in 2005 such as the G8 Summit in Gleneagles and the Make Poverty History campaign have been successful in focusing the public's attention on the problem of world poverty. Despite these high-profile events and consistently high levels of public support for development assistance programmes, people's understanding of poverty and development issues remains shallow and levels of official development aid for many OECD countries fall well below the 0.7 percent GDP goal. In this article we examine what factors drive individual-level attitudes of concern for poverty, how the media portray poverty in developing countries and how media portrayal affects individuals' concern for poverty. Drawing on extant literature on motivations for aid, we argue that individual concern for poverty can stem from self-interest or moral drivers. However, the implications of the different drivers do not appear to be well understood, yet they have important consequences for DFID and the OECD; strategies based on preference-accommodation rather than preference-shaping strategies may undermine rather than strengthen public concern for poverty. The data for the article come from DFID's 2005 Omnibus survey of public attitudes towards development and a content analysis of eight UK newspapers from January to December 2005. Using a binary logistic regression model we estimate individual concern for poverty in developing countries as a function of moral judgements, self-interest, awareness of poverty and assessments of achieving Millennium Development Goals, controlling for a host of demographic variables. Results from the content analysis show that economic and political frames dominate media coverage of poverty in developing countries. We find differential effects for moral and self-interested attitudes on concern for poverty; moral attitudes are positively related to concern, whereas self-interested attitudes are negatively related to concern.
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Egalitarians disagree about the extent to which states should have open borders. Sometimes, this disagreement is due to a deeper disagreement about the scope of egalitarian justice. Egalitarians holding that equality has domestic scope only may be inclined to favor restrictive immigration policies to protect the welfare state. Egalitarians holding that equality has global scope, on the other hand, may be inclined to support more open borders in order to reduce global inequality. This chapter argues that equality has global scope and then considers the implications of global egalitarianism for the issue of open borders. Furthermore, the chapter provides an argument for why (more) open borders can be expected reduce global inequality. Then some objections to this argument are considered, based on brain drain, threats to welfare states, and in-group bias. Finally, the chapter considers the suggestion that (more) open borders is not the best (or most efficient) way of reducing global inequality.
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The G8 nations (the Group of 7 industrialized countries plus Russia) "account for 48% of the global economy and 49% of global trade, hold four of the United Nations' five permanent Security Council seats, and boast majority shareholder control over the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank" (G8 Research Group, 2005: 5). The G8 provide roughly 75 percent of the world's development assistance; their deep pockets, organizational resources and superior bargaining power provide them with formidable advantages in trade negotiations and dispute resolution proceedings. In other words, their decisions matter for the well-being of literally billions of people outside their own borders. Although the G8 "lacks the two main characteristics of more structured international governmental organizations (IGOs): a constitutive intergovernmental agreement, and a secretariat" (Hajnal, 2005), its annual Summits and periodic ministerial meetings - in particular, meetings of finance ministers - have
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This study examines the attitudes, knowledge and engagement of the German population regarding development policy, development cooperation and global sustainable development. It provides state and civil society actors with up-to-date information and analyses on this topic area that they can use for the strategic orientation of their work as well as for communication and education work. The data essentially comes from the Aid Attitudes Tracker, a comparative panel survey that has been collecting data in Germany, France, Great Britain and the US since 2013.
According to David Miller, duties of domestic national and global justice are of equal importance, given that nationhood is both intrinsically valuable and not inherently an unjust way of excluding outsiders. The consequence of this ‘split‐level’ view is that it may be reasonable to prioritize domestic justice in some cases, while letting demands of global justice take precedence in others, depending on a weighting model which seeks to account for the relative urgency of domestic and global claims and the extent to which agents are more closely attached to compatriots than to outsiders. In this chapter, I argue against this weighting model on grounds of internal coherence with the theory set out in National responsibility and global justice (NRGJ). I first inquire into the conditions under which justice at home conflicts with justice in the world at large, according to Miller’s main principle of global justice – respect for basic human rights. I then show that on Miller’s own understanding of the various duties of global and domestic justice, cases of conflict rarely arise, and that when they do, there is a powerful argument for prioritizing global duties on grounds of urgency, which contradicts the reasoning of the weighting model. Finally, I address a problem arising from Miller’s basic assumption that under‐fulfillment of basic human rights in poor countries only generates claims of global justice to which rich nations are under a duty to respond, following the acceptance of a scheme of remedial responsibilities to provide aid by each of these nations. The normative structure of the split‐level view set out in NRGJ needs to be clarified with respect to the key question of whether nations can be held to be under a duty of justice to bring such a scheme into existence in the first place.
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Die Studie befasst sich mit den Einstellungen, dem Wissen und dem Engagement der Bevölkerung Deutschlands zu Entwicklungspolitik, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und globaler nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Sie stellt staatlichen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren in diesem Themenbereich aktuelle Informationen und Analysen bereit, die diese für die strategische Ausrichtung ihrer Arbeit sowie für die Kommunikations- und Bildungsarbeit nutzen können. Als Datenbasis dient im Wesentlichen der Aid Attitudes Tracker, eine ländervergleichende Panelbefragung, die seit 2013 Daten in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und den USA erhebt.
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Building and sustaining solidarity is an enduring challenge in all liberal-democratic societies. Ensuring that individuals are willing to accept these “strains of commitment,” to borrow John Rawls’ apt phrase, has been a worry even in relatively homogeneous societies, and the challenge seems even greater in ethnically and religiously diverse societies. This paper focuses is on the political sources of solidarity. Much has been written about the economic and social factors that influence the willingness of the public to accept and support immigrants and minorities. But solidarity is also a political phenomenon, which can be built or eroded through politics. In addition, our focus on the political sources of solidarity. Understandably, the existing literature concentrates on the politics of backlash and exclusion. This paper looks at the politics of diversity from the opposite direction, asking what are the potential sources of political support for inclusion, and the conditions under which they are effective. How is solidarity built? How is it sustained? Reframing the analysis in this way does not necessarily produce optimism about the future prospects. But exploring the potential political sources of support leads to broader, multilayered perspective with long time horizons. The paper advances a framework for analysis which incorporates three levels: the sense of political community, the role of political agents, and impact of political institutions and policy regimes. Each of these levels, and the interactions among them, matter.
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In this article we argue that existing survey instruments used to examine public attitudes to global poverty are not fit for purpose. Surveys need to be redesigned to successfully support the threefold purpose of development education and public engagement. The core of our critique is that existing measures suffer from poor measurement validity, and fail to control for knowledge-levels or perceptions of aid effectiveness, both of which are thought to limit support. Researchers also lack understanding of the factors that motivate support for development aid in the first place. We conclude by making recommendations for future surveys of public attitudes and suggest that building support for development may require speaking to many publics as opposed the public.
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Despite interest in public support for aid to developing countries, there has been limited academic research. This paper reports analysis of survey data for the United Kingdom that explores the factors driving support for cuts in aid spending as a case example. Dominant factors are found to be beliefs in the moral imperative to help reduce poverty in developing countries versus the prioritization of efforts to tackle poverty in the United Kingdom. Most socio-demographic factors are insignificant. The results highlight the need to examine support for aid in the context of government spending more generally.
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Esping-Andersen developed a typology of welfare regimes: conservative, liberal and social democratic, which are measured on the basis of seven indicators. We re-examine Esping-Andersen's data as well as replication data compiled by Scruggs and Allan to show that the seven indicators do not form valid measures of these welfare regimes. In addition to divergences in their measurement, the seven indicators are a mixture of institutional characteristics of welfare systems and outcome measures of social stratification. A measurement model based on the five institutional characteristics of welfare regimes that pertain to social insurance, however, does fit both the original and replication data. This article therefore proposes a three-dimensional model of conservative and liberal social insurance, which treats universal insurance coverage as the third dimension, instead of Esping-Andersen's ‘socialist’ regime. Although this does not fundamentally alter the typology of countries, it has implications for previous studies that employ country scores based on Esping-Andersen's method as independent variables in causal models. To illustrate these implications, this article re-examines a study by Noël and Thérien and calls into question their conclusions on the causal connections between the social democratic welfare state and levels of foreign aid.
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South Africa's rising international presence is undeniable. The country has recently joined the BRICS club of powerful emerging countries, is in the G20, is a member of IBSA (the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum) and has aspirations to become a permanent member of a potentially reformed UN Security Council. Furthermore, South Africa has set up a new international development agency, a key marker of a middle power. And yet South Africa is not a typical middle power, given that half of its citizens live below the poverty line. Through various methods such as print and online media content analysis and interviews with policy-makers, journalists, civil society and international donors between 2009 and 2011, this paper examines the two different and divergent faces of South African politics – one focused on the domestic development state and the other focused on its international middle power aspirations.
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The UK Public Opinion Monitor (UKPOM) provides a unique opportunity to explore changes in attitudes of the UK public over time. This article presents findings from the UKPOM on how people in the UK have experienced the financial crisis and how, if at all, this has caused them to think differently about aid and development. We find that respondents had been affected by the economic crisis and were worried about the impact on their own finances and the UK economy. Although respondents had a feeling of interconnectedness with the world and were broadly supportive of aid in principle, these perspectives were often trumped by local and domestic priorities, particularly during such a period of financial turmoil, with support for aid spending in decline. We see some appetite for changing the way in which the world is governed, but the extent to which this encompasses aid reform is uncertain. Finally, we draw some conclusions for development policymakers and communicators.
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As a consequence of the Eurozone crisis and the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the prospect of a transfer union has become a particularly contested aspect of European integration. How should one understand the public backlash against fiscal transfers? And, what explains voter preferences for international transfers more generally? Using data from the 2014 European Elections Study (EES), this article describes the first cross-national analysis of voters’ preferences on international transfers. The analysis reveals a strong association between voters’ non-economic cultural orientations (i.e., their cosmopolitanism) and their position on transfers. At the same time, it is found that voters’ economic left-right orientations are crucial for a fuller understanding of the public conflict over transfers. This counters previous research that finds economic left-right orientations to be of little explanatory value. This study demonstrates that the association between economic left-right orientations and preferences for international transfers is conditional on a person's social class. Among citizens in a high-income class an economically left-leaning position is associated with support for transfers, whereas it is associated with opposition to transfers among citizens in a low-income class.
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The political fault lines surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis have underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union. Against the backdrop of an emerging political integration-demarcation divide, this contribution examines how cosmopolitanism structures people’s willingness to redistribute internationally within the European Union. To this aim, we conducted laboratory experiments on redistributive behaviour towards other European citizens in the United Kingdom and Germany and analysed cross-national survey data on support for international redistribution covering the EU-28. Our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism increases generosity towards other Europeans and support for international redistribution even when controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, concern for others and political ideology.
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Why do publics in donor countries support development foreign aid? Focusing on material factors, ideology, and identities, the literature has largely neglected the moral basis of foreign aid attitudes. I argue that generalized trust, defined as the belief in the integrity and trustworthiness of people, is a crucial component of the moral calculus of publics in donor countries. Using data from independently conducted surveys of global (World Values Survey) and American mass publics (Core Values Project Survey), I show that generalized trusters are more likely to aid the have-nots of the world than those who lack trust in people. This finding indicates that the bonds of trust expand the boundaries of global justice. By illuminating the role generalized trust plays in shaping donor public attitudes towards development foreign aid, this study helps improve the political economy, ideology, and identity models of aid, contributing to the literatures on foreign aid and foreign policy attitudes, and to theories of cosmopolitan global justice.
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This chapter explores the South–South development cooperation contribution of South Africa, the smallest BRICS member. It discusses the emergence of South Africa’s development partnership as a mechanism to secure its prosperity and security on a volatile continent. The country’s extensive peace-building initiatives and investment in the establishment of a pro-development architecture in Africa are key pillars of its approach. Lack of engagement with South Africa’s private sector and civil society actors is exposed as a serious gap in bolstering the country’s development offering. Finally, the chapter considers the importance of trilateral cooperation as a significant enabler of South African engagement in its region, alongside the multiple identities that BRICS can offer South Africa as a development partner.
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South Africa occupies an interesting position in the international development debate. On the one hand, as Africa’s most developed, diversified and, until recently, largest economy representing close to one-third of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), it is an active player in numerous global governance and development fora, it maintains an extensive development partnership with the rest of Africa and is a member of the group of emerging countries, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) Forum. Yet, on the other hand, it positions itself within the developing world, insisting that South Africa is itself a developing state despite its wealth relative to the rest of the continent and other developing countries. Indeed, South Africa’s middle-income status, ranking as the twenty-seventh largest economy in the world and with per capita income of US$7,508, masks ongoing significant inequality and poverty in its society. In part, it is the outcome of the legacy of apartheid despite 20 years of freedom, but also the result of massive and endemic unemployment, extremely weak health indicators (which have only begun improving recently) and persistently poor technical skills and educational results. With reference to the latter, this has been the case despite consistently high levels of expenditure on education over many years. South Africa has spent on average around 5 per cent of its GDP on education over the past 20 and preceding seven years, reaching an all-time high of 6.07 per cent of GDP in 1993 (World Bank 2014). While South Africa has enjoyed the longest continuous economic upswing since 1999 (eNews Channel Africa 2013), with a brief interruption following the 2008 financial crisis, its annual growth rate has been insufficient to create the number of jobs required to seriously address its high unemployment rate of 25 per cent.It is against this background that South Africa has been both a recipient and a ‘giver’ of aid.According to the National Treasury (2012), South Africa receives around ZAR8bn (US$1bn) a year of mainly European and United States (US) development assistance aimed primarily at the health and education sectors. This places South Africa among the top quintile of recipients of donor aid in Africa. While South Africa could not be described as donor dependent, given that official development assistance (ODA) represents less than 1 per cent of its annual budget, this aid has been important in helping the South African government to find innovative ways to deal with some of the key socioeconomic challenges that the country faces. Indeed, most government departments use ODA as seed funding to pilot government initiatives, experiment and innovate, but also to leverage domestic resources and improve service delivery. It is also worth recognising that South African civil society organisations (CSOs) are highly dependent on overseas project grants as an important contribution to their operating income. An important corollary to this narrative is that South Africa has also emerged as a key strategic partner for several Northern, but also Southern, partners. This is largely informed by its mineral wealth, but more importantly by the strategic position and role that it plays in the rest of Africa. This is apparent in its various political and economic engagements in the region and the pivotal role that it has historically played since 1994 as an economic hub and a gateway to the rest of Africa. While this position is increasingly being challenged by other emerging gateways to the rest of Africa such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal, South Africa’s sophisticated banking system and well-developed and diversified economy and infrastructure provide it with a historic comparative advantage relative to its peers. A study conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in 2008 found that over half of South African government departments are involved in providing development assistance in one form or another to the region (Braude, Thandrayan and Sidiropoulos 2008). By 2004, it was estimated that a total of US$1.6bn of South African donor assistance had been provided to the rest of the region since the mid-1990s (Chin and Quadir 2012). But even these figures are under dispute, given that this process has been largely demand-driven and evolved incrementally without a central coordinating mechanism in place; hence, the current discourse and process underway in South Africa to establish a South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) to act as a central coordinating body through which South Africa’s various aid interventions would be channelled. During the course of this research, it became very clear that South Africa cannot be regarded as a ‘donor country’ or a ‘provider of development assistance’ in the mold of the definition of donors used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The OECD-DAC criteria of development aid sit uneasily with both the actual activities that South Africa undertakes in the region, and conceptually do not square with South Africa’s world view. Rather, South Africa’s development interventions in the region are framed within the broad interpretation of South-South cooperation as articulated in the United Nations Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) of 1978 and the High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi in 2009. As noted by Simplicio et al. (2013: 23) and by Besharati (2013a), South-South cooperation ‘operates on the foundational principles of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit which comprise the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions, among the developing nations’. This approach suggests an exchange of resources, technical expertise, peer learning and cooperation based on a common definition of partnership. It is thus no surprise that the South African government is wary of describing itself as a donor country and even the name of its ‘donor agency’ reflects this unease, having changed from the initially conceptualised South African International Development Agency (SAIDA) to SADPA, which emphasises partnership (Besharati 2013b). As will be noted below, a great number of South Africa’s ‘development interventions’ in its region fall under the broad rubric of peace-building, conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation of the region in partnership with mainly African actors and often under a UN and/or African Union (AU) mandate. These types of interventions are not regarded as aid contributions under the traditional DAC framework. Nonetheless, it is a prominent feature of South Africa’s support to the stability and development of Africa. South Africa is among the biggest African contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations through the AU and the UN. It has been involved in peacekeeping operations in countries as diverse as Burundi, Central African Republic, Comores, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and South Sudan. Importantly, apart from providing peacekeepers on the ground, South Africa has invested heavily in regional mediation and institution-building efforts in Africa. Of the former, its engagement in DRC has been the most extensive and ongoing. It has chosen continental initiatives and institutions focused on the development and stabilisation of Africa as the key vehicles through which it has pursued its ‘development partnership agenda’ and the re-emergence or ‘renaissance’ of Africa.
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This analysis of public opinion toward foreign aid shows that Canadians are divided over internationalism, on two counts. First, while most citizens agree that development assistance is important, their support often remains shallow, unmatched by a commitment to undertake concrete actions. Second, the attitudes that Canadians hold toward development assistance indicate that there is a division in the country's public between liberal and conservative internationalists, a cleavage that is anchored in domestic ideological and partisan differences. Comparable to what is found in other countries, the internationalism of Canadians does not appear as vigorous and as consensual as is often suggested.
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The literature on the determinants of welfare state effort displays many inconsistencies and contradictions. This article takes important steps toward resolving these issues with the use of pooled cross-sectional and time-series analyses. The findings are that various independent variables affect different measures of welfare state effort in different and theoretically meaningful ways. Of special importance are the contrasting effects of Christian democracy and social democracy on transfer payments, social benefits expenditure, and total government revenue. There is also a strong effect of constitutional structure on welfare state effort, a finding that provides the first solid support for the state-centered perspective in a quantitative analysis.
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The influence of partisan politics on public policy is a much debated issue of political science. with I respect to foreign policy, often considered as above parties, the question appears even more problematic. This comparison of foreign aid policies in 16 OECD countries develops a structural equation model and uses LISREL analysis to demonstrate that parties do matter even in international affairs. Social-democratic parties have an effect on a country's level of development assistance. This effect, however, is neither immediate nor direct. First, it appears only in the long run. Second, the relationship between leftist partisan strength and foreign aid works through welfare state institutions and social spending. Our findings indicate how domestic politics shapes foreign conduct. We confirm the empirical relevance of cumulative partisan scores and show how the influence of parties is mediated by other political determinants.
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The representation of public preferences in public policy is fundamental to most conceptions of democracy. If representation is effectively undertaken, we would expect to find a correspondence between public preferences for policy and policy itself. If representation is dynamic, policy makers should respond to changes in preferences over time. The integrity of the representational connection, however, rests fundamentally on the expectation that the public actually notices and responds to policy decisions. Such a public would adjust its preferences for 'more' or 'less' policy in response to what policy makers actually do, much like a thermostat. Despite its apparent importance, there is little research that systematically addresses this feedback of policy on preferences over time. Quite simply, we do not know whether the public adjusts its preferences for policy in response to what policy makers do. By implication, we do not fully understand the dynamics of representation. This research begins to address these issues and focuses on the relationships between public preferences and policy in a single, salient domain.
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The Nordic aid approach has become less distinguishable from that of other OECD donors. The early 1990s witnessed the ascension of conservative governments across the region whose objectives included dismantling much of the Nordic welfare state and promoting market-driven economic policies. The Nordic approach to foreign aid will continue its adaptation to the post-Cold War development climate. The Nordic approach epitomized altruism and unselfishness in the 1960s and 1970s, which paired economic growth and social equity. Today the Nordic model of development is less influential as it confronts ongoing criticism both internally and from overseas. As the Nordic states determine what it means to be Nordic in the next millennium, they must also redefine their relationship with the impoverished peoples of the world; this will have an impact on global development that transcends the states' individual roles, economic capabilities, and political influence.
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In sharp contrast to the Cold War era, when Western leaders sought to strengthen and enhance France's privileged role in francophone Africa as a bulwark against communism, the end of the Cold War has heightened economic and political competition among the Western powers. As a result, French policymakers increasingly claim that the US and Japan particularly pose potential economic and political threats to French interests in francophone Africa. This competition over great-power influence in Africa has been manifested since World War II in several areas of foreign policy, including that of foreign assistance. Some perspective on this phenomenon is offered by contrasting the ODA policies of France and its two greatest perceived challengers in the post-Cold War era, the US and Japan.
Article
This paper examines the validity of predominant assumptions about popular support for the welfare state. These presuppositions include the notion that support for the welfare state varies in different types of regimes (be they ‘liberal’ or ‘social democratic’ or ‘conservative’), the idea that different social groups (for example, the middle and working classes and the unemployed) have different interests with respect to the welfare state, and the view that political alignments have a strong influence on attitudes to welfare. To investigate these issues we analyze the 1990 International Social Survey Programme Role of Government Survey and compare it to the findings of an analysis we conducted on the 1985 survey. The aim therefore is to examine the relationship between mass attitudes and specific types of welfare state regime and the social and other correlates of mass opinion.
Article
This article integrates research on political psychology with welfare state development of social provisions aimed at mollifying unemployment and other conditions of life. Utilizing the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), we examine three types of welfare state regimes: Liberal; Conservative; and Social democratic. The article compares the relationship between unemployment and subjective well-being across these regime types. We should observe that citizen preferences in social democratic countries will be most favorable toward government intervention in securing employment, and support for active government policies regarding employment and social welfare should be strongest there. In comparison, Liberal regimes such as the U.S.A. and Australia should be the least disposed toward such activity, while conservative regimes should fall in between. It is further hypothesized that differences in well-being between the employed and unemployed will be smallest in social democratic regimes. Our analysis indicates at best mixed support for the hypotheses. Our results lead us to the conclusion that the micro-foundations of macro-theories about the connection between public opinion and social security policies need to be reconsidered.
Article
This paper places an individual's attitude toward South African sanctions into a causal belief system model. Specifically, the model posited here hypothesizes that Americans primarily use two general postures to orient their attitudes toward South African sanctions: general racial postures, derived from knowledge and attitudes about domestic race relations, and general foreign policy postures. Further, I hypothesize that these racial and foreign policy postures are supported and structured by partisanship, ideology, and three contextual variables: cognitive abilities, income, and region of residence. The paper finds that general racial postures eclipse all other variables in their ability to predict respondents' attitudes toward anti-apartheid sanctions. Further, members of Congress based their South African sanctions voting in 1985 and 1986 on similar domestic racial considerations. The theoretical implications of domestic racial postures structuring foreign policy attitudes are seriously addressed, both specifically for the South African case, and for other issues and the broader implications for belief system modeling, and especially mass-elite communication.
Article
This article surveys and assesses theories and research on public opinion and foreign policy. Most of the evidence is drawn from the literature on the United States. Three twentieth-century wars have had a significant impact on theory and scholarship. World War I—the first public relations war—and postwar efforts to create a new international order directed much attention to the nature of public opinion and its impact on foreign affairs, issues on which realists and liberals came to quite different conclusions. The period surrounding World War II coincided with the development of scientific polling. Much of the attention during and immediately after the war focused on the extent to which the public might support or oppose an internationalist American role. Extensive research during the first two decades after World War II yielded a broad agreement (the “Almond-Lippmann consensus”) on three propositions about public opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies, (2) it lacks coherence or structure, but (3) in the final analysis, it has little if any impact on foreign policy. The Vietnam War and its aftermath stimulated a new outburst of research activity on public opinion and foreign policy, much of which has challenged each of these three propositions. The article concludes with suggestions for further research efforts, including: (1) case studies employing archival sources to assess more directly the impact of public opinion, (2) cross-national studies, (3) development of standard questions in order to encourage better cumulation of survey results, and (4) research that will enable us to distinguish findings that are time-and context-bound from those that transcend the Cold War period.
Article
Denmark has recently seen a significant drop in unemployment that has not been matched by any corresponding increase in inflation. This article assumes that this remarkable achievement is rooted in the ongoing transition from the Keynesian welfare state (KWS) to a Schumpeterian workfare regime (SWR). The article compares the main features of the KWS with those of the SWR. It analyses the economic and political pressures behind the transition from the KWS to a SWR, and argues that we need to focus on the discursive construction of these pressures in order to avoid the dangers associated with functionalist explanations of societal changes. It then goes on to analyse the introduction of workfare policies in Denmark. The central claim is that Denmark has adopted an offensive workfare strategy. Hence, in Denmark workfare is disarticulated from the neo-liberal context within which it is located in the UK and the US and rearticulated with the social-democratic and universalistic welfare model. This disarticulation and rearticulation has produced significant emphases on activation rather than benefit and minimum wage reductions; on improving the skills and work experience of the unemployed rather than merely increasing their mobility and job-searching efficiency; on training and education rather than work-for-benefit (quid pro quo); on empowerment rather than control and punishment; and on broad workfare programmes rather than programmes which only target the unemployed. In addition, although it contains strong neocorporatist elements, the Danish workfare strategy can be characterized as a neo-statist strategy. The article concludes with some tentative remarks about the mix of political and institutional factors that contribute to explaining the particular Danish variant of the SWR, and about what we can learn from the Danish case.
Article
Rejetant l'idee selon laquelle l'existence de devoirs specifiques envers ses compatriotes releve de principes moraux generaux, et rejetant la these populaire selon laquelle l'attachement a ses compatriotes est constitutif de leur identite propre, l'A. montre que le sens de ces obligations particulieres resulte de la valeur intrinseque de la citoyennete, definie par analogie avec la conception de l'amitie developpee par J. Raz
Article
Theory: Democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well-informed about what policymakers actually do. Such a public would adjust its preferences for ''more'' or ''less'' policy in response to policy outputs themselves. In effect, the public would behave like a thermostat; when the actual policy ''temperature'' differs from the preferred policy temperature, the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly, and once sufficiently adjusted, the signal would stop. Hypotheses: In domains where policy is clearly defined and salient to the public, changes in the public's preferences for more policy activity are negatively related to changes in policy. Methods: A thermostatic model of American public preferences for spending on defense and a set of five social programs is developed and then tested using time series regression analysis. Results: Changes in public preferences for more spending reflect changes in both the preferred levels of spending and spending decisions themselves. Most importantly, changes in preferences are negatively related to spending decisions, whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward (upward) when appropriations increase (decrease). Thus, consistent with the Eastonian model, policy outputs do ''feed back'' on public inputs, at least in the defense spending domain and across a set of social spending domains.
Article
The international aid regime is currently faced with a major paradox. On the one hand, officials in bilateral and multlateral agencies increasingly agree that 'aid matters' and can contribute significantly to development. This confidence has been reinforced by the fact that, after a decade dominated by the objective of structural adjustment, the much less controversial one of sustainable development has taken over as the new mantra of aid policies. On the other hand, development assistance appears to be a declining priority for foreign policy-makers in the developed countries. The generosity of donors has diminished to the point that aid reached an all-time low in 1997. The aim of this article is to make sense of this paradox. After examining the grounds for optimism within the aid community, the article then explains why there is reason to doubt that foreign assistance can effectively foster sustainable development over the course of the next generation.
Article
By means of a re‐analysis of public opinion surveys between 1973–76 (Political Action), 1985 and 1990 (International Social Survey on the ‘Role of Government I + II'), perceptions of government responsibilities are studied over time and across nations. Even if affiliated to government parties, the public, in the short run, does not reinforce prevailing trends uncritically, but in a mood of sophisticated scepticism tends rather to take an anti‐cyclical stance. Inspite of a uniform change across all nations from ‘interventionist’ beliefs to a more ‘neo‐liberal’ creed in the long run, historically endorsed national differences, rooted in inherited attitudes towards the proper role of government still exist.
Article
The Euro-Barometer values battery has provided much of the empirical evidence for the thesis that a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values has occurred in advanced industrial societies over the past two decades. It has been argued, however, that this widely, used instrument is seriously flawed because of its sensitivity to current economic conditions We present data from experiments in Canada and Germany that tested the performance of the values battery in an era of joblessness. Analyses reveal that (I) substituting an unemployment statement for the standard inflation statement in the battery has major consequences for the classification of respondents as materialist or postmaterialist and (2) answers to the battery are conditioned by the interaction between its content and respondents' economic issue concerns. These findings support the argument that much of the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values recorded by the Euro-Barometer since the early 1980s is a measurement artifact.
Article
The field of comparative political behavior has experienced an ironic course of development. Over the past generation, the field has generated a dramatic increase in the knowledge about how people think about politics, become politically engaged, and make their political decisions. Empirical data on citizen attitudes are now available on a near global scale. However, this increase in knowledge has occurred as the processes and structures of contemporary politics are transforming citizen politics. Thus, although more is known about contemporary electorates, the behavior of the public has become more complex and individualistic, which limits the ability to explain the behavior with the most common models. This article documents the expansion of this knowledge in several areas—political culture, political cognition, voting behavior, and political participation—and discusses the current research challenges facing the field.
Article
For more than a generation the North± South divide was central to the explanation of world poverty. In recent years, however, the North± South analytical framework has been upset by the emergence of two competing approaches: theBretton Woods paradigm' and theUN paradigm'. Both approaches emphasise the impact of globalisation, but they differ considerably in their world-views, interpretations of the determinants of poverty and political platforms. In short, according to theBretton Woods paradigm', the gap between the haves and the have-nots is in the process of being narrowed, whereas, from the point of view of theUN paradigm', the rich± poor divide is growing wider. In spite of the greater degree of political support currently enjoyed by the `Bretton Woods paradigm', theUN paradigm' offers the most coherent alter- nate narrative on world poverty. Therefore, because they comprise the main theses in an unresolved debate, these two approaches can fruitfully be examined together.
Article
Apart from the preoccupation with raising revenue for the welfare state, the question of popular support is central to its future. Arguments about the prospects for the welfare state, about its social and political bases of support and about classifying different types of regime provide the context of our investigation. Our approach is to examine empirical evidence of the connection between support for the welfare state and (a) different types of regime and (b) social and political factors. The analysis of these relationships has important implications for policy-makers who are concerned about consent to their programmes and about the experiences of comparable regimes.
Article
A persisting question in international studies is whether academic research can have an impact on the making of foreign policy. Much research has shown that policy decisions can be greatly influenced by misperceptions, just as much as by objective factors. The article describes an effort by academic researchers to challenge U.S. policymakers' image of an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process—the American public. The study's focus was a widely held assumption in the U.S. foreign policy community that the American public in the wake of the Cold War was entering a renewed phase of isolationism, similar to the interwar years. The study first interviewed policy practitioners on their perceptions of the public, then performed a comprehensive review of existing polling data, and finally conducted new polls with input from policymakers themselves. The net result of the elite interviews and the analysis of public attitudes revealed a significant gap in all areas, which is presented in synopsis. Interviews with policy practitioners reveal two key dynamics that could well contribute to policymakers' misreading the public: a failure to seek out information about the public and a tendency to assume that the vocal public is representative of the general public. Indications that the study did have some impact on the thinking of policy practitioners are discussed in the conclusion.
Article
From 1982 to 1993, a decade of tight economic constraints, the Danish welfare state was governed by bourgeois parties. The expectation of the power resources model, the most prevalent theory about the Scandinavian welfare states, was that the Danish welfare state would be turned further in a residual direction. Those expectations were, however, never fulfilled – on the contrary, the Danish welfare state was further expanded in a social democratic direction. A focus on how the bourgeois governments, often in a difficult parliamentary situation, tried to adapt the popular Danish welfare state to less favorable economic conditions accounts for important aspects of this development. The bourgeois governments relied on a combination of increased benefits to large groups of voters and well-hidden measures to strengthen public finances.
Article
Persistent gaps between the policy preferences of leaders and those of citizens are problematic from the point of view of democratic theory. Examination of the foreign policy preferences of samples of citizens and leaders from seven Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) surveys between 1974 and 1998 reveals many differences of 30, 40, and even 50 percentage points. Often a majority of the public has disagreed with a majority of leaders. Some of the same gaps have persisted over the full 24-year period of these surveys.
Article
One aspect of the multifaceted controversy on value change in advanced industrial societies concerns the measurement of values. Analyses of 1976–86 Euro-Barometer data have indicated that responses to the four-item materialist-postmaterialist values index are very sensitive to current economic conditions, especially inflation and unemployment rates and, hence, much of the recorded increase in postmaterialism in eight Western European countries since the mid-1970s is artifactual. Although it has been claimed these findings disappear if more recent data are considered, time series analyses reveal that responses to the values measure are strongly affected by prevailing economic conditions throughout the entire 1976–92 period. These aggregate-level findings are buttressed by individual-level analyses of 1989 Euro-Barometer data.
Book
This monumental study is a comprehensive critical survey of the policy preferences of the American public, and will be the definitive work on American public opinion for some time to come. Drawing on an enormous body of public opinion data, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro provide the richest available portrait of the political views of Americans, from the 1930's to 1990. They not only cover all types of domestic and foreign policy issues, but also consider how opinions vary by age, gender, race, region, and the like. The authors unequivocally demonstrate that, notwithstanding fluctuations in the opinions of individuals, collective public opinion is remarkably coherent: it reflects a stable system of values shared by the majority of Americans and it responds sensitively to new events, arguments, and information reported in the mass media. While documenting some alarming case of manipulation, Page and Shapiro solidly establish the soundness and value of collective political opinion. The Rational Public provides a wealth of information about what we as a nation have wanted from government, how we have changed our minds over the years, and why. For anyone interested in the short- and long-term trends in Americans' policy preferences, or eager to learn what Americans have thought about issues ranging from racial equality to the MX missile, welfare to abortion, this book offers by far the most sophisticated and detailed treatment available.
Article
In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the liberal tradition in international thought, with particular attention being paid to liberal conceptions of international distributive justice. This article describes and criticizes three different approaches to international distributive justice represented in the recent literature: (1) social liberalism, which takes the nation-state as basic and argues for international transfers to the extent necessary to sustain just domestic institutions; (2) laisser-faire liberalism, which, in its redistributivist variant, aims to rectify injustices arising from the unequal appropriation of natural resources; and (3) cosmopolitan liberalism, which takes each individual's interests as equally deserving of concern in the design of global (and sectional) institutions.
Article
Foreign aid often is interpreted as an international projection of domestic income-redistribution mechanisms, and many authors suggest that differences between welfare states account for variations in donor behavior. A new understanding of the welfare state can improve traditional explanations of this linkage. Existing studies of the welfare-aid relationship use two welfare state indicators: domestic spending and partisan politics. We propose a third type of indicator--the institutional attributes of the welfare state--and demonstrate its relevance. The level of foreign aid provided by a country varies with social spending, but even more so with the degree to which its welfare state embodies socialist attributes, defined on the basis of social program universalism and benefit equality. This finding helps explain how domestic political institutions influence the evolution of international cooperation. Welfare principles institutionalized at the domestic level shape the participation of developed countries in the international aid regime. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.
Article
This paper examines trends in income distribution since the war in a number of OECD economies. It is shown that while most economies during the first two decades experienced decreasing income inequality, associated with the post-war boom, there has been considerable divergence thereafter. In this process the institutions of each country have mattered a great deal. By examining both liberal and corporatist economies we seek to delineate the links between economic performance and restructuring, and income inequality. The evidence is that, in contrast to the experience of liberal economies, the more corporatist economies have been able to adjust to the worsening economic climate without an increase in income inequality. Copyright 1994 by Taylor and Francis Group