No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Across the Event Horizon
Abstract
The stream of action in life, virtual environments, film, and narratives is parsed into events. This parsing has consequences for memory. The transition from one event to another can impede memory in some ways but improve it in others. Whether impairment or improvement occurs depends on the nature of the information and how it is later remembered. The Event Horizon Model of comprehension and memory goes beyond more traditional accounts of the influence of context on cognition to explain these phenomena.
... The back-end of SPECT is informed by theories of event comprehension that have been proposed and tested in the context of reading narrative texts (Gernsbacher, 1990;Graesser et al., 1994) and more recently event cognition (Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). This forms the basis of the assumption of SPECT that working memory contains a representation of the event model. ...
... Two processes support mapping. The first is situational coherence (or continuity monitoring) (Gernsbacher, 1990;Radvansky, 2012;Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). As events unfold, people habitually assess the extent to which there is continuity in spatial locations, time, entities, causality, and the goals of agents (Huff et al., 2014;Zwaan et al., 1995). ...
... Critically, when a viewer shifts to create a new current event model, what had been the current event model is transferred to long-term episodic memory as a stored event model (Radvansky, 2012). This is shown by the fact that people are less accurate at retrieving information from previous events after perceiving an event boundary (Gernsbacher, 1985;Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2016;Swallow et al., 2009). ...
Your understanding of what you see now surely influences what you will look at next. Yet this simple concept has only recently begun to be systematically studied and elaborated within theoretical frameworks. The Scene Perception & Event Comprehension Theory (SPECT) distinguishes between front-end and back-end processes that occur while viewers perceive and comprehend dynamic real-world events. Front-end processes occur during each eye fixation (information extraction, attentional selection) and back-end processes occur in memory (the current event model, prior knowledge, and executive processes). We begin with a selective review of the scene perception literature on bottom-up and top-down effects on attention in scenes, and highlight unanswered questions regarding the impact of the viewer's event model–their understanding of what is happening now. Then, we outline the SPECT theoretical framework, and review empirical evidence about how the viewer's current event model influences attentional selection. This influence is contrasted with those of visual saliency (e.g., color, brightness, motion, etc.) and task-driven control (i.e., goal setting, attentional control, inhibition). From this review, we specify a hierarchy of factors affecting attentional selection, in the order of task-driven control, visual saliency, and event models. We then propose several mechanisms by which the viewer’s event model influences attentional selection, and propose a systematic approach to investigating how that happens while watching dynamic scenes.
... Our minds readily segment and organize the continuous stream of information we experience, producing a set of distinct memories that then constitute our recollection of the past. These distinct psychological units of time (events) are typically delimited by points of significant or unexpected change in our internal and external environments (boundaries) such as initiating a change of topic in a conversation or walking through a doorway into a new room (Radvansky, 2012). The imposition of event structure on continuous experience is a ubiquitous aspect of human memory. ...
... Event boundary judgments have been found to be reliable across individuals and within individuals across time, and events are thought to encompass experiences across a broad range of timescales (Kurby & Zacks, 2008;. Event structure has an immediate impact on how we process our environment, but more lastingly, it also determines how and what we later remember ( Wang, Adcock, & Egner, 2024;Baldwin & Kosie, 2021;Shin & DuBrow, 2021;Radvansky, 2012;Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Speer & Zacks, 2005). Notably, this structure has been found to have a wide-ranging impact on episodic memory (memory for specific details or instances from the past) in terms of what we later recall when cued or how we freely recall a series of events (Table 1). ...
... Although exact definitions vary substantially ( Yates, Sherman, & Yousif, 2023), events can be generally described as periods of relative stability or predictability across a set of relevant psychological features over time. Event boundaries, in contrast, can be established by significant changes along one or more of those feature dimensions (DuBrow, 2024;Radvansky, 2012;Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). For example, as seen in Figure 1, imagine that you are watching your favorite television show involving dragons and court intrigue. ...
We experience the present as a continuous stream of information, but often experience the past in parcels of unique events or episodes. Decades of research have helped to articulate how we perform this event segmentation in the moment, as well as how events and their boundaries influence what we later remember. More recently, neuroscientific research has suggested that the hippocampus plays a role at critical moments during event formation alongside its established role in enabling subsequent recall. Here, we review and explore the relationship between event processing and recall with the perspective that it can be uniquely characterized by the contributions of the hippocampus and its interactions with the rest of the brain. Specifically, we highlight a growing number of empirical studies suggesting that the hippocampus is important for processing events that have just ended, bridging the gap between the prior and current event, and influencing the contents and trajectories of recalled information. We also catalogue and summarize the multifaceted sets of findings concerning how recall is influenced by event structure. Lastly, we discuss several exciting directions for future research and how our understanding of events might be enriched by characterizing them in terms of the operations of different regions of the brain.
... Increasing evidence shows that items encountered in a shared, or stable, context (e.g., appearing in the same room) become linked together in memory [5][6][7][8][9][10] . By contrast, when there is a sudden change in context (e.g., crossing through a doorway into a new room), items are thought to become separated in memory by a theoretical "event boundary" that defines a transition from one meaningful event to the next [11][12][13] . It is now well documented that fluctuations in the external world, such as space or perceptual features, influence how we encode and remember sequences of contextually-distinct events 5,11,13 . ...
... By contrast, when there is a sudden change in context (e.g., crossing through a doorway into a new room), items are thought to become separated in memory by a theoretical "event boundary" that defines a transition from one meaningful event to the next [11][12][13] . It is now well documented that fluctuations in the external world, such as space or perceptual features, influence how we encode and remember sequences of contextually-distinct events 5,11,13 . However, it is less clear how fluctuations in our internal world, such as emotional states, elicit similar effects on the episodic structure of memory. ...
... Previous research has argued for a meaningful link between event boundaries and memorability 59,[85][86][87] . For instance, leading theories of event cognition posit that boundaries provide opportunities for updating active representations of the current environment, or 'event model', prioritizing the processing of item and source details that define a novel event 2,11,59 . This organizational process also facilitates retrieval and comprehension of distinct episodic events by limiting competitive retrieval 88 . ...
Human emotions fluctuate over time. However, it is unclear how these shifting emotional states influence the organization of episodic memory. Here, we examine how emotion dynamics transform experiences into memorable events. Using custom musical pieces and a dynamic emotion-tracking tool to elicit and measure temporal fluctuations in felt valence and arousal, our results demonstrate that memory is organized around emotional states. While listening to music, fluctuations between different emotional valences bias temporal encoding process toward memory integration or separation. Whereas a large absolute or negative shift in valence helps segment memories into episodes, a positive emotional shift binds sequential representations together. Both discrete and dynamic shifts in music-evoked valence and arousal also enhance delayed item and temporal source memory for concurrent neutral items, signaling the beginning of new emotional events. These findings are in line with the idea that the rise and fall of emotions can sculpt unfolding experiences into memories of meaningful events.
... Internally generated goal state changes, such as spontaneously remembering a task without any discernable external cue or reminders, can bring about causal consequences through actions. In such instances, changes in internal states lead to, rather than result from, breaks in the causal connectivity between events, which is an essential element in event memory (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). Accordingly, a recent study found that voluntary task switches, which were goal state changes generated entirely internally by the participants, created event boundaries that impacted subsequent temporal order and distance memory (Wang & Egner, 2022). ...
... The Event Horizon Model expands upon Event Segmentation Theory with principles that account for memory effects of event segmentation (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). Because experiences are segmented into a series of event models and only the current event model is held in working memory, information from before an event boundary becomes less accessible (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). ...
... The Event Horizon Model expands upon Event Segmentation Theory with principles that account for memory effects of event segmentation (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). Because experiences are segmented into a series of event models and only the current event model is held in working memory, information from before an event boundary becomes less accessible (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). Furthermore, segmentation provides a "chunking" mechanism that could improve overall memory (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). ...
Our daily experiences unfold continuously, but we remember them as a series of discrete events through a process called event segmentation. Prominent theories of event segmentation suggest that event boundaries in memory are triggered by significant shifts in the external environment, such as a change in one’s physical surroundings. In this review, we argue for a fundamental extension of this research field to also encompass internal state changes as playing a key role in structuring event memory. Accordingly, we propose an expanded taxonomy of event boundary-triggering processes, and review behavioral and neuroscience research on internal state changes in three core domains: affective states, goal states, and motivational states. Finally, we evaluate how well current theoretical frameworks can accommodate the unique and interactive contributions of internal states to event memory. We conclude that a theoretical perspective on event memory that integrates both external environment and internal state changes allows for a more complete understanding of how the brain structures experiences, with important implications for future research in cognitive and clinical neuroscience.
... Events have been described as discrete moments in time lasting as short as hundreds of milliseconds (Michotte, 1963) as well as extended periods of time lasting as long as centuries (Teigen et al., 2017; see also Sastre et al., 2022). They have been likened to visual objecthood and attention (see, e.g., Casati & Varzi, 2008;De Freitas et al., 2014;Ji & Papafragou, 2022;Tversky et al., 2008;, and they have also been argued to reflect inferences about the causal structure of the world (Shin & DuBrow, 2021; see also Radvansky, 2012). They have been studied in vision (e.g., Tauzin, 2015), in memory (e.g., DuBrow & Davachi, 2013), in language (e.g., Ünal et al., 2021), and in more naturalistic scenarios (e.g., Sastre et al., 2022;Swallow et al., 2018). ...
... They have been studied in vision (e.g., Tauzin, 2015), in memory (e.g., DuBrow & Davachi, 2013), in language (e.g., Ünal et al., 2021), and in more naturalistic scenarios (e.g., Sastre et al., 2022;Swallow et al., 2018). Boundaries between them can be triggered by anything from movement through a doorway (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006;Radvansky et al., 2010; see also Radvansky, 2012), to a change in background color (Heusser et al., 2018), to the movement of dots (Ongchoco & Scholl, 2019). This complexity has led some to avoid concrete definitions altogether; Schwartz (2008) presciently wrote that events are merely "what we make of them" (p. 1). ...
... However, it is much harder to say what an event is not. If something as simple as walking through a doorway constitutes an event boundary (e.g., Radvansky, 2012), what actions, if any, are too small to constitute a boundary? (The waving of a hand? ...
Experiences are stored in the mind as discrete mental units, or ‘events,’ which influence—and are influenced by—attention, learning, and memory. In this way, the notion of an ‘event’ is foundational to cognitive science. However, despite tremendous progress in understanding the behavioral and neural signatures of events, there is no agreed-upon definition of an event. Here, we discuss different theoretical frameworks of event perception and memory, noting what they can and cannot account for in the literature. We then highlight key aspects of events that we believe should be accounted for in theories of event processing––in particular, we argue that the structure and substance of events should be better reflected in our theories and paradigms. Finally, we discuss empirical gaps in the event cognition literature and what the future of event cognition research may look like.
... The Event Horizon Model, which adopts Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks, 2020;Zacks et al., 2007), proposes that people spontaneously parse experience into meaningful discrete events and that events are stored as separate units in long-term memory (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). According to this theory, the situation model 1 generates predictions about what will happen next. ...
... Together, these results suggest that event segmentation shapes how events are encoded and organized in episodic memory. The Event Horizon Model argues that situation models are stored in long-term memory as episodic units and that event memories are connected to each other via shared situational indices (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). However, it remains unknown if events uniquely organize episodic memory above and beyond changes in situational features, such as temporal changes (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011) or goal changes (Kurby & Zacks, 2019) which often, but do not always, align with the perception of event boundaries (Huff et al., 2014;Kurby & Zacks, 2012;Magliano et al., 2012;Speer et al., 2007;Zacks et al., 2009). ...
... For instance, the organization of memory according to event structure is likely the result of segmenting that structure into events when readers comprehend the story (Davis & Campbell, 2022;DuBrow & Davachi, 2016;Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011;Kurby & Zacks, 2022). According to the Event Horizon Model (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2014), readers actively maintain a mental model describing the current situation when reading, and they update the situation model whenever they perceive boundaries between events. Our results suggest that the same situation models that are constructed and maintained during online comprehension are stored in long-term memory as independent cohesive episodes when readers update their situation models at event boundaries. ...
We segment what we read into meaningful events, each separated by a discrete boundary. How does event segmentation during encoding relate to the structure of story information in long-term memory? To evaluate this question, participants read stories of fictional historical events and then engaged in a postreading verb arrangement task. In this task, participants saw verbs from each of the events placed randomly on a computer screen and then arranged the verbs into groups onscreen based on their understanding of the story. Participants who successfully comprehended the story placed verbs from the same event closer to each other than verbs from different events, even after controlling for orthographic, text-based, semantic, and situational overlap between verbs. Thus, how people structure story information into separate events during online comprehension is associated with how that information is stored in memory. Specifically, story information within an event is bound together in memory more so than information between events.
... Increasing evidence shows that items encountered in a shared, or stable, context (e.g., appearing in the same room) become linked together in memory [5][6][7][8][9][10] . By contrast, when there is a sudden change in context (e.g., crossing through a doorway into a new room), items are thought to become separated in memory by a theoretical "event boundary" that defines a transition from one meaningful event to the next [11][12][13] . It is now well documented that fluctuations in the external world, such as space or perceptual features, influence how we encode and remember sequences of contextuallydistinct events 5,11,13 . ...
... By contrast, when there is a sudden change in context (e.g., crossing through a doorway into a new room), items are thought to become separated in memory by a theoretical "event boundary" that defines a transition from one meaningful event to the next [11][12][13] . It is now well documented that fluctuations in the external world, such as space or perceptual features, influence how we encode and remember sequences of contextuallydistinct events 5,11,13 . However, it is less clear how fluctuations in our internal world, such as emotional states, elicit similar effects on the episodic structure of memory. ...
... Previous research has argued for a meaningful link between event boundaries and memorability 55,[80][81][82] . For instance, leading theories of event cognition posit that boundaries provide opportunities for updating active representations of the current environment, or 'event model', leading to the perception of distinct events 2,11,55 . This organizational process in turn facilitates the retrieval and comprehension of distinct episodic events by limiting competitive retrieval 83 . ...
Human emotions ebb and flow across time. However, it is unclear how these fluctuations in emotion influence the organization of episodic memory. Here, we examine how emotion dynamics transform experiences into memorable events. Custom musical pieces and a dynamic emotion-tracking tool were developed to elicit and measure temporal fluctuations in emotions. We demonstrate novel evidence that memory is organized around emotional states. While listening to music, fluctuations in emotional valence regulate an underlying tension between ongoing memory integration versus separation. Whereas a large absolute or negative shift in valence helps segment memories into episodes, a positive emotional shift binds sequential representations together. Both discrete and dynamic shifts in music-evoked valence and arousal also enhance delayed item and temporal source memory for concurrent neutral items, signaling the beginning of new emotional events. Emotions thereby have the power to sculpt episodic memories, informing new therapeutic methods for assessing and restoring memory organization.
... La conclusión general de Cook et al. (2007) fue que los objetos asociados al personaje principal mantienen un estatus especial en la memoria, pero referido a su accesibilidad y no a su disponibilidad. Para explicar varios de los resultados encontrados con respecto a la actualización de la dimensión espacial, Radvansky y colaboradores (Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2016a, 2016bRadvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017;Tamplin et al., 2013) desarrollaron un modelo denominado modelo de horizonte de eventos. Según Radvansky (2012), los lectores organizan la información en una narración segmentando una serie de eventos que cambian a lo largo de la lectura. ...
... Para explicar varios de los resultados encontrados con respecto a la actualización de la dimensión espacial, Radvansky y colaboradores (Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2016a, 2016bRadvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017;Tamplin et al., 2013) desarrollaron un modelo denominado modelo de horizonte de eventos. Según Radvansky (2012), los lectores organizan la información en una narración segmentando una serie de eventos que cambian a lo largo de la lectura. Cuando el límite de un evento narrativo surge en el texto, se crea un nuevo patrón de eventos. ...
Comparamos el procesamiento de anáforas y la capacidad de integrar información espacial en un modelo de situación durante la lectura entre estudiantes universitarios del trastorno del espectro autista (TEA) (N=20) y estudiantes con desarrollo típico (DT) (N=22). Diseñamos 24 textos narrativos divididos en dos condiciones: (1) referente anafórico espacialmente asociado al personaje principal y (2) referente anafórico espacialmente disociado. Analizamos diferentes medidas de movimiento ocular durante la lectura utilizando tecnología de eye-tracking. El análisis de modelos mixtos revela diferencias significativas en el efecto de grupo, el efecto de condición y la interacción entre el grupo y la condición de varias medidas y áreas de interés en el texto. Los resultados muestran un efecto facilitador en el procesamiento anafórico de la condición asociada específicamente para el grupo con DT. Este efecto no se observó en personas con TEA. Discutimos los resultados en torno a la mayor prevalencia de problemas de organización perceptiva y dificultades para integrar información en un modelo de situación durante la lectura para personas con TEA.
... Importantly, this account of event cognition also assumes that there is always only one current, activated event model, which usually contains the immediate and relevant surroundings -for example, the room that one is currently in. When walking through a doorway, this currently active event model switches and the object currently carried is immediately integrated into the newly activated model (Radvansky, 2012). ...
... It is important to note that using this theoretical framework, it is easy to explain why returning to the original room after walking through a doorway does not counteract the forgetting: The carried object still is present in two different event models. The "Event Horizon Model" is a theory based on five principles (Radvansky, 2012) that is used in previous research to explain this surprisingly consistent doorway phenomenon. ...
The “doorway effect” or location updating effect is the decrease in performance for a simple memory task after passing through a doorway. Walking through doorways, according to the Event Horizon Model, constitutes the passing of an event boundary and switching between two mental event models - thus creating an interference effect on memory items. While previous research has consistently demonstrated this effect using a simple memory task, the present study aimed to take a closer look at the robustness of this phenomenon by applying a new, more complex object layout memory task, using a highly immersive virtual reality. No convincing evidence for the presence of a location updating effect could be found, but this study still reveals potential future research opportunities. In particular, using measures of subjective confidence as well as higher working memory loads seems to be a promising direction to examine the generalizability of the “doorway effect” to different memory tasks.
... The processing of ongoing events is thought to be guided by "event models" (Richmond & Zacks, 2017): internal representations of the current circumstances which reflect subjective and environmental states relevant for the selection of suitable behaviours in a given situation (Clewett et al., 2019). Spatial boundaries between environments (Pettijohn & Radvansky, 2018a, 2018b and changes in contextual or internal cues (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013;Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Radvansky, 2012;Schapiro et al., 2013;Zacks et al., 2007) can trigger the brain to update the current event model. As such, boundaries mark the transition between the offset of the previous, and the onset of the current event. ...
... As such, boundaries mark the transition between the offset of the previous, and the onset of the current event. Event boundaries do not only guide awareness (Baker & Levin, 2015;Faber et al., 2018), but also affect later memory recall of events (Radvansky, 2012). This has been found in both spatial (Brunec et al., 2018;Horner et al., 2016) and non-spatial tasks (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013), where associative and temporal order memory performance is higher for lists of items encoded within the same event as compared to when they crossed an event boundary. ...
... The event horizon model extends event segmentation theory by suggesting that segmented events are stored in long-term memory at event boundaries. Perceived event structure can influence subsequent memory in both negative and positive ways 37 (Fig. 2b). On the one hand, encountering event boundaries, such as walking through a doorway, can temporarily impair memory 11 . ...
... Moreover, the event horizon model proposes that causal connections help organize the storage of event models in long-term memory 37,53 . Causal connections are established when one event occurs before another and when the occurrence of the first event is necessary and sufficient for the second event to occur 54 . ...
... strongly) encoded declarative memories (Denis, Mylonas, et al., 2021;Schoch et al., 2017). Compared to discrete and static stimuli like paired associates, elements in a naturalistic discourse tend to be more strongly related, due to, for example, the presence of causal links (Radvansky, 2012). This implies that elements in naturalistic stories are generally encoded with greater strength than those in discrete and static stimuli. ...
... Furthermore, sleep may primarily impact memories of schemaconsistent stories on a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, level. Compared to arbitrarily paired words or schema-inconsistent stories, elements within schema-consistent stories usually have strong associative links due to the presence of e.g., causality (Radvansky, 2012). These strong links may leave little room for subsequent sleep to boost the quantity of such links; instead, it may help maintain their quality. ...
The episodic context account (Gaskell et al., 2019) proposes that the act of language comprehension gives rise to an episodic discourse representation, and that this representation is prone to sleep-related memory effects. In three experiments, we tested this prediction by asking participants to read/listen to naturalistic stories before their memory was tested after a 12-hr interval, which included either daytime wakefulness or overnight sleep. To assess discourse memory, we used sentence recognition (Experiment 1; N = 386), free story recall (Experiment 2; N = 96), and cued recall (Experiments 2 and 3; N = 192). We found no evidence of sleep-related effects in sentence recognition or free recall, but cued recall (aka fill-in-the-blank) showed that the degree of time-related distortion, as indexed by both a subjective categorisation measure and Latent Semantic Analysis, was lower after sleep than after wake. Overall, our experiments suggest that the effect of sleep on discourse memory is modest but observable and may [1] be constrained by the retrieval processes (recollection vs. familiarity & associative vs. item), [2] lie on a qualitative level that is difficult to detect in an all-or-nothing scoring metric, and [3] primarily situated in the textbase level of the tripartite model of discourse processing.
... If children had appropriately segmented the experimental events and were able to recall them, we were interested in the content and structure of their memory reports. The event horizon model proposes that when recalling an event after a long delay, people may rely on event models, which represent specific event occurrences, as well as general knowledge that is consolidated and organized across multiple event models (Radvansky, 2012), which may be represented in the form of scripts or schemas (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014. In the following section, the contribution of general event knowledge on recall will be considered. ...
... Perhaps once children had recognized that the events were different from their typical school day, the activities at the beginning and end of the events were markers for the perception of boundaries around the events. This aligns with the idea that transitions, such as a change in location, a break in the causal structure, or the introduction of a new activity leads to the perception of event boundaries (Radvansky, 2012). Aspects of an event that occur during event boundaries tend to be better remembered because these aspects are processed more extensively (e.g., Heusser et al., 2018;Swallow et al., 2009). ...
In this study, we examined children's memory for a staged repeated event after a two‐year delay to gain insights about how they represented the events in long‐term memory. Children aged 4–8 experienced six events and were interviewed about the last occurrence shortly after the event and 2 years later ( N = 29). Various characteristics of their memory reports at the delayed interview were analyzed (e.g., accuracy, specificity). Though the event was brief and embedded within their school day, the patterns in recall suggest that children represented the events as distinct from what usually happens at school. For example, all children were able to recall accurate information, and incorrect details were most often details they experienced during another occurrence of the events. The results of this preliminary investigation are considered in relation to prominent theories of event memory, and generate interesting directions for future repeated‐event research.
... Perhaps the most remarkable effect of event segmentation involves the influence of walking through a doorway on working memory. After memorizing items from a list and then walking across a room, people are worse at remembering these items when they pass through a doorway during their walk than when they do not-equating time and distance traveled (28)(29)(30), and this also holds for memory of visual stimuli such as objects or faces (31)(32)(33). ...
... These effects generalized across several of the most prominent examples of anchoring, with mere visual event boundaries eliminating incidental anchoring effects for economic valuation, general knowledge, and legal judgment-and restricting anchoring effects induced with explicit comparisons, which are especially robust. We interpret this in terms of event segmentation leading to active forgetting in working memory (28,35): the doorway serves as a trigger that previously acquired information may have become obsolete in the context of the new event, and so, even though that memory trace still exists (since subjects generally had no trouble explicitly recalling the anchor value after the fact; see Dataset S1), that value nevertheless ceases to be available as an automatic guide to online behavior. ...
Research on higher-level thought has revealed many principles of reasoning and decision-making but has rarely made contact with how we perceive the world in the first place. Here we show how a lower-level property of perception—the spontaneous and task-irrelevant segmentation of continuous visual stimulation into discrete events—can restrict one of the most notorious biases in decision-making: numerical anchoring. Subjects walked down a long room in an immersive three dimensional (3D) animation and then made a numerical judgment (e.g., of how much a suitcase is worth, or of how many hours of community service a minor crime deserved). Critically, some subjects passed through a doorway (a visual event boundary) during their virtual walk, while others did not—equating time, distance traveled, and visual complexity. The anchoring manipulation was especially innocuous, not appearing to be part of the experiment at all. Before the online trial began, subjects reported the two-digit numerical value from a visually distorted “CAPTCHA” (“to verify that you are human”)—where this task-irrelevant anchor was either low (e.g., 29) or high (e.g., 92). With no doorway, we observed reliable anchoring effects: Higher CAPTCHA values produced higher estimates. With the doorway, however, such effects were attenuated or even eliminated. This generalized across tasks involving item valuations, factual questions, and legal judgments and in tests of both incidental and explicit anchoring. This demonstrates how spontaneous visual event segmentation can have profound consequences for higher-level thought.
... Understanding the cognitive and neural underpinnings of episodic memory formation in realistic environments is largely influenced by the view that continuous experiences are rapidly transformed into discrete episodic units via the detection of event boundaries (Zacks et al. 2007). Indeed, event segmentation affects not only our perception of an experience, but its subsequent organization in long-term memory (Kurby and Zacks 2008;Radvansky 2012;Sargent et al. 2013), such that elements within an event are bound together more cohesively than elements across events (Ezzyat and Davachi 2011;DuBrow and Davachi 2013;2014;Horner et al. 2016). Processing at event boundaries has been associated with improved longterm memory for the corresponding event (Newtson and Engquist 1976;Schwan, Garsoffky, and Hesse 2000;Schwan and Garsoffky 2004). ...
... The majority of frontal electrodes included in this analysis were located in the rostral medial cortex, which have also been associated with prospective memory (Volle et al. 2011). Although the precise role of the frontal cortex in the current task remains uncertain, it seems reasonable to hypothesize its involvement in monitoring working memory maintenance during an event (Kurby and Zacks 2008;Radvansky 2017). The temporal dynamics of ripple coupling between the frontal cortex and hippocampus was not associated to whether an event would be later recalled or forgotten. ...
Memory formation relies on effective communication between the hippocampus and neocortical areas. Ripples have been proposed as a key neural signature facilitating information transmission in the brain. However, their role in human memory encoding during naturalistic scenarios remains unexplored. Here, we recorded intracranial electrophysiological data from ten epilepsy patients watching a movie. Ripples were analyzed in the hippocampus and in neocortical regions (i.e., temporal and frontal cortex). Our results revealed a coordinated neocortico-hippocampal ripple-based interaction during encoding. However, this interaction exhibited distinct timing patterns: ripples in the temporal cortex preceded those from the hippocampus which then preceded those from frontal cortex. Additionally, enhanced hippocampal ripple recruitment was observed at event boundaries, reflecting hippocampal involvement in event segmentation. These findings shed light on the neural mechanisms underlying memory encoding and provide insights into the role of ripples in event segmentation, suggesting their potential role in forming long-term memories of distinct episodes.
... Though we interact with the world continuously, a long line of work suggests that our experiences are divided into a series of distinct events (e.g., Newtson, 1973;Radvansky, 2012;Zacks et al., 2007). Event boundaries are perceived whenever we experience a shift in time (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011), location (Horner et al., 2016;Radvansky & Copeland, 2006), or goals Wang & Egner, 2022), and these event boundaries trigger attentional mechanisms that can affect how events are stored in long-term memory (DuBrow & Davachi, 2016;Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011;Horner et al., 2016). ...
... Individual differences in working memory updating (i.e., two-back performance) related to a larger within > between cued-recall effect in older, but not younger adults. We hesitate to conclude that working memory updating is less important for event distinctiveness in younger adults based on this single null result, especially given the theoretical role of working memory updating in event segmentation (Radvansky, 2012;Zacks et al., 2007) and the considerable evidence that access to information in working memory is reduced following event boundaries in younger adults (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006;Speer & Zacks, 2005;Swallow et al., 2009). It could be that our use of a single working memory updating task, at a load that may not have been particularly challenging for young adults (i.e., two-back instead of three-back), was not ideal for measuring individual differences in working memory updating in this group. ...
We experience the world as a continuous flow of information but segment it into discrete events in long-term memory. As a result, younger adults are more likely to recall details of an event when cued with information from the same event (within-event cues) than from the prior event (between-event cues), suggesting that stronger associations are formed within events than across event boundaries. The present study aimed to investigate the effects of age and working memory updating on this within > between cued-recall effect and the consequences for subsequent memory. Across two studies, participants viewed two different films (Hitchcock's Bang You're Dead and BBC's Sherlock). They were later shown clips taken from either the beginning/middle (within-event cues) or end (between-event cues) of a scene and asked to recall what happened next in the film. While the main effect of age was not significant in either experiment, overall memory performance related to the within > between effect in older, but not younger, adults. Low-performing older adults showed less of a difference in cued recall for within- and between-event cues than high performers. In Study 2, better two-back task performance also related to a greater within > between effect in older, but not younger, adults, suggesting that working memory updating relates to the distinctiveness of events stored in long-term memory, at least in older adults. Taken together, these findings suggest that age differences in event memory are not inevitable and may critically depend on one's ability update working memory at event boundaries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
... If coherence is not present, the reader cannot integrate the current text into their developing situation model. Previous research has suggested that the detection of incoherence requires the completion of the current situational structure and the construction of a new one (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1990;Radvansky, 2012), and converging analyses treat each of these situational structures as distinct events (Radvansky, 2012;Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007;Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). ...
... If coherence is not present, the reader cannot integrate the current text into their developing situation model. Previous research has suggested that the detection of incoherence requires the completion of the current situational structure and the construction of a new one (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1990;Radvansky, 2012), and converging analyses treat each of these situational structures as distinct events (Radvansky, 2012;Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007;Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). ...
As we read, we develop mental models of the discourse content called situation models. Situation models are integral to how we keep track of information, and to do so in an ongoing event incoming information needs to be integrated into the model or discarded. The type of information being presented, and its relation to prior data, impacts how that new information is processed. The current research examined discourse passages containing concepts that were either previously mentioned (match), mentioned with a general term (general category), unmentioned in lieu of another concept (mismatch), or completely unmentioned previously (indeterminate), and examined how these four target/antecedent relation types were integrated. Before this research these four types of relations had never been directly compared in one experiment and as such, the current work aimed to establish a baseline for the mental processing of these relations during online reading tasks.
In Chapter 2 the four aforementioned types of relations were examined in two ways: through event-related potential (ERP) technology and sentence completion surveys. The ERP analysis was performed to observe what happens within the brain during reading as it happens. The sentence completions were implemented to provide insight into howreaders incorporated these discourse concepts into their situation models. In this chapter the target stimuli were always preceded by the definite article The, which adds a certain level of contextual constraint by presupposing that the referent already exists within the situation model. The N400 amplitudes showed that the mismatch and the indeterminate relations were the least congruent with the provided discourse. The extended N400 results indicated that the indeterminate relations showed the highest cost of integration into the situation model, compared to the match, mismatch, and general category relations.
Chapter 3 applied the exact same methodologies as Chapter 2, but instead had the target stimuli preceded by the indefinite article A/An. The goal of these experiments was to determine what, if any, differences became apparent when an indefinite article was used to indicate the target stimuli, rather than a definite article. Indefinite articles are not as contextually constraining as definite articles and therefore may allow for more open interpretation of the four target/antecedent relation types. It was found that when presented with an indefinite article, targets in the indeterminate condition had the least semantic congruency with developing situation models, less so even than the mismatching information, as shown by the N400 amplitudes. The sentence completions results indicated that the indefinite article led to slightly more variability in how concepts were integrated into the situation model than the definite article. General category targets were much less likely to be considered coreferential with the relevant antecedent when an indefinite article was used. This finding aligns with the overall increase in semantic availability (less negative N400) following indefinite article use, particularly with the general category relations.
In Chapter 4 the same ERP methodology and stimuli as seen in Chapter 2 were again used, however the visual hemifield technique (VHF) was applied to allow for comparison of processing between the left (LH) and right hemispheres (RH). It was found that the indeterminate relations were more difficult semantically to integrate into the situation models than the mismatching relations, but only in the LH and not the RH, where they did not differ. There was no difference found in the integration cost between the indeterminate, mismatching, or general category concepts. These findings support the idea that both hemispheres are required for the processing of such nuances and therefore to optimal discourse processing as a whole.
Overall, this dissertation provides novel neurocognitive data on how people integrate discourse concepts into situation models during language processing, both across and between the cerebral hemispheres. The sentence completion results provided insight into what exactly the examined ERP components express in the process of situation model development. By examining the definite and indefinite articles, this dissertation emphasized the importance of grammatical nuances on the ease of mental processing, as well as how it may influence what information is integrated or not in the situation model.
... The influence of event boundaries on memory is perhaps most famously illustrated by the observation that walking through doorways can cause forgetting (for a review, see Radvansky, 2012). In the initial experiments that demonstrated such effects, subjects were given a list of items (such as objects, or even words) to remember, and then their recognition memory was tested after they walked through a series of rooms. ...
... As a result, it may be adaptive for memories to be reset or refreshed to some degree in the face of such cues. (This phenomenon has been discussed in various terms in the literature -e.g., in terms of the updating of "event models", Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Radvansky, 2012; but we prefer the terminology of "memory flushing" given its synergy with how we actively and adaptively flush memory stores in certain computer-programming contexts.) Such effects may thus represent instances in which memory "failures" are not failures at all, but rather serve a useful purpose (see also Davis & Zhong, 2017;Richards & Frankland, 2017). ...
Visual input arrives in a continuous stream, but we often experience the world as a sequence of discrete events - and the boundaries between events have important consequences for our mental lives. Perhaps the best example of this is that memory not only declines as a function of elapsed time, but is also impaired when crossing an event boundary - as when walking through a doorway. (This impairment may be adaptive, as when one "flushes" a cache in a computer program when completing a function.) But when exactly does this impairment occur? Existing work has not asked this question: based on a reasonable assumption that forgetting occurs when we cross event boundaries, memory has only been tested after this point. Here we demonstrate that even visual cues to an impending event boundary (that one has not yet crossed) suffice to trigger forgetting. Subjects viewed an immersive animation that simulated walking through a room. Before their walk, they saw a list of pseudo-words, and immediately after their walk, their recognition memory was tested. During their walk, some subjects passed through a doorway, while others did not (equating time and distance traveled). Memory was impaired (relative to the "no doorway" condition) not only when they passed through the doorway, but also when they were tested just before they would have crossed the doorway. Additional controls confirmed that this was due to the anticipation of event boundaries (rather than differential surprise or visual complexity). Visual processing may proactively "flush" memory to some degree in preparation for future events.
... For instance, CMR's predictions are consistent with other current cognitive model frameworks which segment sequences of items and make predictions of memory. Whereas other models can infer event structure based on stimulus features and predictability (e.g., Radvansky, 2012;Zacks et al., 2007), CMR needs to be provided the event structure explicitly to update source context and temporal context. Despite the different objectives of these types of models, CMR assumes event boundaries cause a disruption to memory associations, similar to established accounts of event processing such as Event Segmentation Theory and the Event Horizon Model (Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017;Zacks et al., 2001). ...
... Whereas other models can infer event structure based on stimulus features and predictability (e.g., Radvansky, 2012;Zacks et al., 2007), CMR needs to be provided the event structure explicitly to update source context and temporal context. Despite the different objectives of these types of models, CMR assumes event boundaries cause a disruption to memory associations, similar to established accounts of event processing such as Event Segmentation Theory and the Event Horizon Model (Kurby & Zacks, 2008;Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2017;Zacks et al., 2001). Thus, our findings may be explained by the Event Horizon Model framework, which embodies Event Segmentation Theory. ...
The transformation of experiences into meaningful events and memories is intertwined with the notion of time. Temporal perception can influence, and be influenced by, segmenting continuous experience into meaningful events. Episodic memories formed from these events become associated with temporal information as well. However, it is less clear how temporal perception contributes to structuring events and organizing memory: whether it plays a more active or passive role, and whether this temporal information is encoded initially during perception or influenced by retrieval processes. To address these questions, we examined how event segmentation influences temporal representations during initial perception and memory retrieval, without testing temporal information explicitly. Using a neural measure of temporal context extracted from scalp electroencephalography in human participants (N = 170), we found reduced temporal context similarity between studied items separated by an event boundary when compared to items from the same event. Furthermore, while participants freely recalled list items, neural activity reflected reinstatement of temporal context representations from the study phase, including temporal disruption. A computational model of episodic memory, the context maintenance and retrieval (CMR) model, predicted these results, and made novel predictions regarding the influence of temporal disruption on recall order. These findings implicate the impact of event structure on memory organization via temporal representations, underscoring the role of temporal information in event segmentation and episodic memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
... And this is evident from boundary ends leading to more false alarms and lower detection performance. Our results can also be tied to the Event Horizon Model, which suggests that people track the causal structure of events, and causality helps segment events (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). Research indicates that when causal structure is absent, the perception of temporal structure also suffers. ...
While watching someone kicking a ball, missing moments of ball contact can be incorrectly identified as seen if the event is continued in a causal manner (i.e., the ball flying off). Does event completion also occur for events of a larger scale such as having breakfast (macro-event), which consists of multiple sub-steps like toasting bread (micro-event)? We conducted two experiments to measure event completion in macro-events presenting portions of multiple micro-events. In Experiment 1, video summaries were formed with or without event boundary information where a macro-end was either present or absent. Macro-end signified an overarching goal achievement that signaled the completion of previous tasks (such as leaving the kitchen with a full breakfast plate). More completion occurred for summaries with event boundary information and macro-ends. In Experiment 2, we tested two alternative hypotheses to explore the underlying process by showing the beginnings or ends of a micro-event. While the predictive processing hypothesis suggests that event completion is based more on predicting the future states of the event based on beginning information, the backward inferences hypothesis suggests that event completion relies more on deductions formed after the fact based on event endings. Results of Experiment 2 suggest that the ends of event boundaries lead to more event completion, possibly due to their role in forming causal connectivity. These results help to further understand event completion on a macro level.
... Within a typical day, we experience many occurrences that seemingly flow continuously from event to event. Models of event perception postulate that we notice shifts in a context as event boundaries (Radvansky, 2012;Zacks et al., 2007), where we are able to take continuous sensory inputs and segment them. These boundaries help to update mental representations of contexts, which may promote the selection of behaviors suited for current environments (Clewett et al., 2019). ...
Endel Tulving defined episodic memory as consisting of a spatiotemporal context. It enables us to recollect personal experiences of people, things, places, and situations. In other words, it is made up of what , where , and when components. However, this definition does not include arguably the most important aspect of episodic memory: the why . Understanding why we remember has important implications to better understand how our memory system works and as a potential target of intervention for memory impairment. The intrinsic and extrinsic factors related to why some experiences are better remembered than others have been widely investigated but largely independently studied. How these factors interact with one another to drive an event to become a lasting memory is still unknown. This review summarizes research examining the why of episodic memory, where we aim to uncover the factors that drive core features of our memory. We discuss the concept of episodic memory examining the what , where , and when , and how the why is essential to each of these key components of episodic memory. Furthermore, we discuss the neural mechanisms known to support our rich episodic memories and how a w hy signal may provide critical modulatory impact on neural activity and communication. Finally, we discuss the individual differences that may further drive why we remember certain experiences over others. A better understanding of these elements, and how we experience memory in daily life, can elucidate why we remember what we remember, providing important insight into the overarching goal of our memory system.
... Temporal sequence has also been linked to memory, with amnesic patients showing impaired recall of order of situations (Downes, Mayes, Mac-Donald, & Hunkin, 2002;Gillis, Quinn, Phillips, & Hampstead, 2013;Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990). Furthermore, memory retrieval is improved when the retrieved information is linked to temporal boundaries (Kurby & Zacks, 2011;Radvansky, 2012;Sargent et al., 2013;Sonne, Kingo, & Krøjgaard, 2017;Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009;Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 2006, see also Tulving, 1984), and the temporal structure of situations guides attentional focus (Nobre & Van Ede, 2018;Olson & Chun, 2001), facilitating both action learning (O'Reilly, McCarthy, Capizzi, & Nobre, 2008) and action planning (Bailey, Kurby, Giovannetti, & Zacks, 2013; see also Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001;Lashley, 1951). ...
How events are ordered in time is one of the most fundamental pieces of information guiding our understanding of the world. Linguistically, this order is often not mentioned explicitly. Here, we propose that the mental construal of temporal order in language comprehension is based on event-structural properties. This prediction is based on a central distinction between states and events both in event perception and language: In perception, dynamic events are more salient than static states. In language, stative and eventive predicates also differ, both in their grammatical behavior and how they are processed. Consistent with our predictions, data from seven pre-registered video-sentence matching experiments, each conducted in English and German (total N = 674), show that people draw temporal inferences based on this difference: States precede events. Our findings not only arbitrate between different theories of temporal language comprehension; they also advance theoretical models of how two different cognitive capacities - event cognition and language - integrate to form a mental representation of time.
... In addition, memory is heavily influenced by whether information is presented within events or at their boundaries (e.g., Sargent et al., 2013;Swallow et al., 2009). Perhaps most famously, when working memory is assessed after a walk down a long hallway, performance is worse when people pass through a doorway (as a type of event boundary) during their walk, equating time and distance traveled (e.g., Ongchoco et al., 2023;Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; for reviews see Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). ...
During visual processing, input that is continuous in space and time is segmented, resulting in the representation of discrete tokens—objects or events. And there has been a great deal of research about how object representations are generalized into types—as when we see an object as an instance of a broader category (e.g., an animal or plant). There has been much less attention, however, to the possibility that vision represents dynamic information in terms of a small number of primitive event types (such as twisting or bouncing). (In models that posit a “language of vision,” these would be the foundational visual verbs.) Here we ask whether such event types are extracted spontaneously during visual perception, even when entirely task irrelevant during passive viewing. We exploited the phenomenon of categorical perception—wherein differences are more readily noticed when they are represented in terms of different underlying categories. Observers were better at detecting changes to images or short videos when the changes involved switches in the underlying event type—even when the changes that maintained the same event type were objectively larger (in terms of both brute image metrics and higher level feature change). We observed this categorical “cross-event-type” advantage for visual working memory for twisting versus rotating, scooping versus pouring, and rolling versus bouncing. Moreover, additional control experiments confirmed that such effects could not be explained by appeal to lower-level non-categorical stimulus differences. This spontaneous perception of “visual verbs” might promote both generalization and prediction about how events are likely to unfold.
... SPECT draws upon theories of narrative comprehension [7,14,15] and event cognition [16][17][18]. SPECT distinguishes between front-end and back-end processes. Front-end processes are the moment-to-moment perceptual processes that support scene, object, and motion perception and attentional selection, which determines where observers look next. ...
Scene Perception and Event Comprehension Theory (SPECT) posits that understanding picture stories depends upon a coordination of two processes: (1) integrating new information into the current event model that is coherent with it (i.e., mapping) and (2) segmenting experiences into distinct event models (i.e., shifting). In two experiments, we investigated competing hypotheses regarding how viewers coordinate the mapping process of bridging inference generation and the shifting process of event segmentation by manipulating the presence/absence of Bridging Action pictures (i.e., creating coherence gaps) in wordless picture stories. The Computational Effort Hypothesis says that experiencing a coherence gap prompts event segmentation and the additional computational effort to generate bridging inferences. Thus, it predicted a positive relationship between event segmentation and explanations when Bridging Actions were absent. Alternatively, the Coherence Gap Resolution Hypothesis says that experiencing a coherence gap prompt generating a bridging inference to close the gap, which obviates segmentation. Thus, it predicted a negative relationship between event segmentation and the production of explanations. Replicating prior work, viewers were more likely to segment and generate explanations when Bridging Action pictures were absent than when they were present. Crucially, the relationship between explanations and segmentation was negative when Bridging Action pictures were absent, consistent with the Coherence Gap Resolution Hypothesis. Unexpectedly, the relationship was positive when Bridging Actions were present. The results are consistent with SPECT’s assumption that mapping and shifting processes are coordinated, but how they are coordinated depends upon the experience of a coherence gap.
... There is substantial evidence that people understand ongoing activity, in part, by segmenting it into meaningful events (see J. M. Zacks, 2020, for a review) and that event segmentation during encoding structures how representations are stored in long-term memory (Clewett & Davachi, 2017;Davis & Campbell, 2023;Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011;Radvansky, 2012;Smith et al., 2023). Event segmentation theory (EST) proposes that event segmentation functions as an attentional control mechanism during the formation of new event memory representations (J. ...
People spontaneously segment an observed everyday activity into discrete, meaningful events, but segmentation can be modified by task goals. Asking young adults to attend to event segmentation while watching movies of everyday actions improved their memory up to 1 month later (Flores et al., 2017). Does attending to event segmentation improve memory across the lifespan? Participants between the ages of 20 and 79 watched movies of actors performing everyday activities while intentionally encoding them for a recall and a recognition memory test 1 week (Experiment 1) or 1 month (Experiment 2) later. In addition to intentionally encoding the movies, half of the participants segmented the movies into fine-grained events. Young adults who segmented recalled more words in their recall responses than those who intentionally encoded 1 week and 1 month later. Middle-aged adults benefited from the intervention after a 1-week delay but not after a 1-month delay. Older adults over the age of 70 did not benefit from attending to segmentation. Of those who segmented, young and older adults showed similar agreement about the locations of event boundaries. Together, the results suggest that older adults are less able, compared to young adults, to maintain or retrieve well-encoded event memories after a delay. In addition, individual differences in segmentation agreement predicted memory up to 1 month later, regardless of age. These results suggest a practical and easy-to-implement intervention for improving recall of everyday events in young and middle-aged adults that is ineffective in older adults.
... Especially for other cognitive variables and consequences of model construction and updating processes, such as memory formation or attention allocation, findings from event cognition could provide a sound basis. For example, the EHM makes explicit assumptions about how event boundaries may either enhance or reduce memory depending on the characteristics of the retrieval task (Radvansky, 2012). In this context, it is argued that external cues such as walking through doorways (Pettijohn et al., 2016; or spreading information across different sections of a computer screen (Pettijohn et al., 2016) elicit the creation of new mental models and thus cause memory effects. ...
The plot of a narrative is represented in the form of event models in working memory. Because only parts of the plot are actually presented and information is continually changing, comprehenders have to infer a good portion of a narrative and keep their mental representation updated. Research has identified two related processes (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1997): During model construction (shifting, laying a foundation) at large coherence breaks an event model is completely built anew. During model updating (mapping ) at smaller omissions, however, the current event model is preserved, and only changed parts are updated through inference processes. Thus far, reliably distinguishing those two processes in visual narratives like comics was difficult. We report a study ( N = 80) that aimed to map the differences between constructing and updating event models in visual narratives by combining measures from narrative comprehension and event cognition research and manipulating event structure. Participants watched short visual narratives designed to (not) contain event boundaries at larger coherence breaks and elicit inferences through small omissions, while we collected viewing time measures as well as event segmentation and comprehensibility data. Viewing time, segmentation, and comprehensibility data were in line with the assumption of two distinct comprehension processes. We thus found converging evidence across multiple measures for distinct model construction and updating processes in visual narratives.
... Converging evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging studies shows that the functional connectivity between the hippocampus and the vmPFC plays a role in binding within-events (Ezzyat and Davachi, 2011). WM is also essential for within-event binding and associating events with each other (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky and Zacks, 2017;Zacks, 2020), though the specific roles and mechanisms remain to be explored. When it comes to binding across events, the hippocampus is shown to be involved (Hahamy et al., 2023). ...
... Relative to arbitrarily paired words or schema-inconsistent stories, elements within schemaconsistent stories usually have strong associative links due to the presence of e.g., causality (Radvansky, 2012). Such strong links may leave little room for subsequent sleep to boost the quantity of such links; instead, it may help maintain their quality (see section on Neurocognitive effects of sleep for further discussion). ...
The episodic context account (Gaskell et al., 2019) proposes that the act of language comprehension gives rise to an episodic discourse representation, and that this representation is prone to sleep-related memory effects. In three experiments, we tested this prediction by asking participants to read/listen to naturalistic stories before their memory was tested after a 12-hr interval, which included either daytime wakefulness or overnight sleep. To assess discourse memory, we used sentence recognition (Experiment 1; N = 386), free story recall (Experiment 2; N = 96), and cued recall (Experiments 2 and 3; N = 192). We found no evidence of sleep-related effects in sentence recognition or free recall, but cued recall (aka fill-in-the-blank) showed that the degree of time-dependent distortion, as indexed by both a subjective categorisation measure and Latent Semantic Analysis, was lower after sleep than after wake. Our experiments suggest that the effect of sleep on discourse memory may [1] be constrained by the retrieval processes (recollection vs. familiarity & associative vs. item), [2] lie on a qualitative level that is difficult to detect in an all-or-nothing scoring metric, and [3] primarily situate in the textbase level of the tripartite model of discourse processing. Overall, in line with the episodic context account, our findings highlight a specific role of declarative memory and sleep in day-to-day language comprehension, but with limitations on their impact depending on the nature of the retrieval processes.
... In real life, episodic encoding relies on the possibility to form a coherent memory trace that integrates the temporally evolving sequence of elements into a meaningful context, so that if there is a shift in contextual information, this is perceived as the end of one episode and the beginning of another (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). These episodic boundaries are thought to support the segmentation of the continuous experience into discrete episodes (Zacks et al., 2007), and their detection has a direct impact on how events are organized into meaningful units in longterm memory (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013, 2014Radvansky, 2012;Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011;Kurby & Zacks, 2008). ...
Prior animal and human studies have shown that post-encoding reinstatement plays an important role in organizing the temporal sequence of unfolding episodes in memory. Here, we investigated whether post-encoding reinstatement serves to promote the encoding of “one-shot” episodic learning beyond the temporal structure in humans. In Experiment 1, participants encoded sequences of pictures depicting unique and meaningful episodic-like events. We used representational similarity analysis on scalp EEG recordings during encoding and found evidence of rapid picture-elicited EEG pattern reinstatement at episodic offset (around 500 msec post-episode). Memory reinstatement was not observed between successive elements within an episode, and the degree of memory reinstatement at episodic offset predicted later recall for that episode. In Experiment 2, participants encoded a shuffled version of the picture sequences from Experiment 1, rendering each episode meaningless to the participant but temporally structured as in Experiment 1, and we found no evidence of memory reinstatement at episodic offset. These results suggest that post-encoding memory reinstatement is akin to the rapid formation of unique and meaningful episodes that unfold over time.
... When someone recalls the details of an event, such as a morning before work, they tend to explain what happened by relaying a series of smaller events (e.g., I walked my dog, ate breakfast, brushed my teeth and checked the news). According to Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks et al., 2007) and other influential models of event perception (see the Event Horizon Model; Radvansky, 2012), this recall pattern occurs because continuous experiences are automatically segmented into discrete units and stored in long-term memory as distinct events. During event perception, people construct event models in working memory that contain the details of an on-going event, comprised of dynamic sensory-perceptual information and prior knowledge (or schemas) from similar past events. ...
Event boundaries impose structure on how events are stored in long-term memory. Research with young adults has shown that associations within events are stronger than those that cross event boundaries. Recently, this effect was observed in both young and old adults using movie stimuli (Davis, Chemnitz, et al., 2021). Here, we test whether this effect extends to written narratives. Young and old participants read a series of narratives that were interspersed with temporal shifts in the storyline meant to elicit the perception of an event boundary. Later, participants were cued with sentences and were asked to recall the sentence that immediately followed. We expected participants would have worse memory when a cue and correct answer flanked a boundary than when it did not. In Experiment 1, we found that despite older adults’ lower performance overall, both age groups had lower accuracy for cues that flanked a boundary, compared to cues that elicited a response from within the same event. Experiment 2 replicated the results from Experiment 1. Our results support past work that did not find age differences in event perception and demonstrate that older and younger adults may store events similarly in long-term memory.
... Despite the shared agreement across people as to where event boundaries are located, there are important individual differences in where people segment, and these individual differences in event segmentation affect the organization of memory representations (Radvansky, 2012;Radvansky & Zacks, 2011;Sargent et al., 2013). Specifically, the better an individual's perceived event boundaries align with others' in the sample (i.e., higher segmentation agreement), the better the individual remembers the activity Zacks et al., 2006). ...
Memory for personally experienced events (episodic memory) declines with age; however, memory for facts about the world and the steps involved in completing common actions (semantic memory) remains relatively stable with age. In a series of recent studies, we examined whether older adults could leverage their semantic knowledge to facilitate the acquisition of new episodic memories. Previous studies provided mixed results as to whether top-down processing, such as relevant knowledge, affects encoding, but these studies used young adult participants. Across multiple experiments, we found that semantic knowledge influences encoding processes, such as the ability to parse ongoing activity into discrete events, a process called event segmentation. Here, we review previous literature, and our own recent studies, that examined age-related changes in event segmentation and memory for everyday events, and how semantic knowledge affects these processes. We relate our current findings to previous results, and then we discuss the implications for theories of event cognition and open questions for the field.
The contents of visual perception are inherently dynamic—just as we experience objects in space, so too events in time. The boundaries between these events have downstream consequences. For example, memory for incidentally encountered items is impaired when walking through a doorway, perhaps because event boundaries serve as cues to clear obsolete information from previous events. Although this kind of “memory flushing” can be adaptive, work on visual working memory (VWM) has focused on the opposite function of active maintenance in the face of distraction. How do these two cognitive operations interact? In this study, observers watched animations in which they walked through three-dimensionally rendered rooms with picture frames on the walls. Within the frames, observers either saw images that they had to remember (“encoding”) or recalled images they had seen in the immediately preceding frame (“test”). Half of the time, a doorway was crossed during the delay between encoding and test. Across experiments, there was a consistent memory decrement for the first image encoded in the doorway compared to the no-doorway condition while equating time elapsed, distance traveled, and distractibility of the doorway. This decrement despite top–down VWM efforts highlights the power of event boundaries to structure what and when we forget.
Memories reflect the ebb and flow of experiences, capturing unique and meaningful events from our lives. Using a combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), neuromelanin imaging, and pupillometry, we show that arousal and locus coeruleus (LC) activation transform otherwise continuous experiences into distinct episodic memories. As sequences unfold, encountering a context shift, or event boundary, triggers arousal and LC processes that predict later memory separation. Boundaries furthermore promote temporal pattern separation within left hippocampal dentate gyrus, which correlates with heightened LC responses to those same transition points. We also find that a neurochemical index of prolonged LC activation correlates with diminished arousal responses at boundaries, suggesting a connection between elevated LC output and impaired event processing. These findings align with the idea that arousal processes initiate a neural and memory reset in response to significant changes, constructing the very episodes that define everyday memory.
We examined the impact of prospective information on the processing of information occurring within the present timeline of narrative stories. Participants read target sentences that were consistent with events occurring within a protagonist’s present timeline but inconsistent with events in the protagonist’s future. When prospective information was readily available and/or received strong contextual support, processing difficulties were
immediate, (i.e. they occurred on the target sentence). When the prospective information was backgrounded and/or not supported with additional contextual information, processing disruptions were delayed until the spillover sentence. Results are discussed within memory-based theories, specifically the RI-Val model.
Adults remember items with shared contexts as occurring closer in time to one another than those associated with different contexts, even when their objective temporal distance is fixed. Such temporal memory biases are thought to reflect within‐event integration and between‐event differentiation processes that organize events according to their contextual similarities and differences, respectively. Within‐event integration and between‐event differentiation are hypothesized to differentially rely on binding and control processes, which may develop at different ages. To test this hypothesis, 5‐ to 12‐year‐olds and adults ( N = 134) studied quartets of image pairs that contained either the same scene (same‐context) or different scenes (different‐context). Participants remembered same‐context items as occurring closer in time by older childhood (7–9 years), whereas different‐context items were remembered as occurring farther apart by early adolescence (10–12 years). The differential emergence of these temporal memory biases suggests within‐event integration and between‐event differentiation emerge at different ages.
Research Highlights
Children are less likely than adults to use contextual information (e.g., location) to organize their continuous experience in memory, as indicated by temporal memory biases.
Biases reflecting within‐event integration (i.e., remembering elements with a shared context as occurring closer together in time) emerged in late childhood.
Biases reflecting between‐event differentiation (i.e., remembering elements from different contexts as occurring farther apart in time) emerged in early adolescence.
The differential emergence of biases reflecting within‐event integration and between‐event differentiation suggests they are distinct, yet complementary, processes that support developmental improvements in event memory organization.
When adults are asked to recall personal past events, transitional episodes occurring in late adolescence and early adulthood are especially likely to be remembered. In addition, recent research has shown that older adults' memories of middle adulthood tend to cluster around the transitional event of moving to a new residence. In the present research, adults recalled five memories of events that occurred between ages 7 and 13, and they subsequently identified family moves that occurred during the same age interval. As hypothesised, participants' event memories were over-represented in the year of their most important childhood move. Memory clustering was enhanced for moves that were linked retrospectively to other salient coinciding events (e.g., a parental divorce). The results provide additional support for the idea that prominent life transitions provide an organising structure for autobiographical memory.
When Paul Werth invented the concept of ‘text-worlds’ (1999), he drew on existing psychological accounts of how the mind processes stimuli, such as the idea of the ‘situation model’ (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). Yet despite the important advancements to Werth’s approach that have been made in stylistics over the years, situation-model research is rarely, if ever, referenced in what is now called Text World Theory (Gavins 2007). In this article, I consult empirical research on situation models, consequently making two significant contributions: I show how empirical situation-model research bolsters the validity of Text World Theory; I propose a new concept for Text World Theory—‘world-retrieval’—to account for how readers trace the interconnections between text-worlds and attempt to resolve processing difficulties. An analysis of the opening to Ray Loriga’s (2003) novel Tokyo Doesn’t Love Us Anymore demonstrates the value of the ‘world-retrieval’ concept.
While aging has been associated with decreased retrieval of episodic memory details, subjective ratings about memory quality seem to remain stable. This suggests that subjective memory judgments are based on different information according to age. Here, we tested the hypothesis that older people would rather base their subjective judgments on the retrieval of personal elements (such as emotions and thoughts), whereas younger people would rather base their judgments on the retrieval of event-related elements (such as time, place, and perceptual details). Sixty participants (20 to 79 years old) performed eight actions in a virtual apartment and were then asked to verbally recall each action with a maximum of associated elements and to rate the subjective quality of their memories. The elements reported were classified into "person-related" and "event-related" categories. Executive functions, memory performance on traditional memory tasks, and subjects' perception of memory functioning were also evaluated. Results revealed that aging was associated with reduced retrieval of event-related elements, which was explained by decreasing executive resources. However, age did not affect the retrieval of person-related elements, and the subjective memory judgments of older people were not based on these elements to a greater extent than those of younger people. Finally, our results highlight the value of virtual reality (VR) in memory evaluations since subjects' perception of memory functioning was associated with their performance in the VR task but not in traditional memory tasks.
The present study examined the effect of event segmentation on cognitive control mode use in a sample of older adults (N = 30; Mage = 73, SDage = 4.75) using a modified AX-Continuous Performance Test (AX-CPT). This task included a perceptual event boundary between each cue and its forthcoming probe by means of a spatial shift across the left and right side of the display. Past research showed that young adults' existing proactive control bias could be enhanced in an event segmented AX-CPT relative to their performance on a standard AX-CPT. For older adults who adopt reactive control by default, the event boundary was expected to impede cue-reactivation during probe presentation, and thus further enhance their existing reactive control bias. To examine this, older adults were tested with a standard and an event segmented AX-CPT in two blocks, with error rates revealing a shift toward greater reactive control use in the event segmented relative to the standard AX-CPT. Findings supported our hypothesis that placing a spatial event boundary between each cue and forthcoming probe would further enhance older adults' reactive control bias. This study contributes to the sparse but growing literature on the effects of task-specific manipulations on cognitive control use. The results are discussed in light of the dual mechanisms of control framework and the event horizon model.
With aging, our pool of cognitive resources becomes more restricted, and our life goals tend to correspondingly shift from knowledge acquisition to pursuing emotional well-being. This shift consequently shapes our cognitive processes. This scope review integrates literature on goal-directed cognition and discusses it in light of aging. Specifically, this review focuses on three goal-directed cognitive processes: cognitive control, inhibition, and motivated cognition. Overall, older adults tend to shift from a resource-demanding proactive to a resource-reserving reactive control mode, experience more interference due to their reduced inhibitory function, and their cognition remains sensitive to motivational factors such as emotion, value, and reward. Promisingly, older adults' proactive control use or inhibition could be improved in such optimal situations as through extensive practice/training and/or optimized task parameters. Additionally, their attention and memory performance tend to be more selective and could be enhanced through motivational manipulations such as emotion, value, and rewards. This review sheds light on the significant theoretical and practical implications of an aging-related shift in overarching life goals in cognitive selectivity and plasticity.
This study examined how the chronological distance between 2 consecutively narrated story events affects the on-line comprehension and mental representation of these events. College students read short narrative passages from a computer screen and responded to recognition probes. The results of 4 experiments consistently demonstrated that readers used temporal information to construct situation models while comprehending narratives. First, sentence reading times increased when there was a narrative time shift (e.g., as denoted by
an hour later) as opposed to when there was no narrative time shift (e.g., as denoted by
a moment later). Second, information from the previously narrated event was less accessible when it was followed by a time shift than when it was not. Third, 2 events that were separated by a narrative time shift were less strongly connected in long-term memory than 2 events that were not separated by a narrative time shift. The results suggest that readers use a strong iconicity assumption during story comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Several factors potentially influence the extent to which readers form a coherent mental representation during story comprehension. The main factors are argument overlap (i.e., connections between text constituents) and situational continuity (i.e., connections between the components of the referential situation model). The authors distinguished 3 dimensions of situational continuity: temporal, spatial, and causal continuity. Results of 2 reading-time studies involving naturalistic stories suggest that readers simultaneously monitor multiple dimensions of the situation model (particularly temporality and causality) under a normal reading instruction. In addition, the construction of a situation model does not critically depend on the presence or absence of argument overlap. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This article reviews research on the use of situation models in language comprehension and memory retrieval over the past 15 years. Situation models are integrated mental representations of a described state of affairs. Significant progress has been made in the scientific understanding of how situation models are involved in language comprehension and memory retrieval. Much of this research focuses on establishing the existence of situation models, often by using tasks that assess one dimension of a situation model. However, the authors argue that the time has now come for researchers to begin to take the multidimensionality of situation models seriously. The authors offer a theoretical framework and some methodological observations that may help researchers to tackle this issue.
The idea of episodic memory implies the existence of a process that segments experience into episodes so that they can be stored in memory. It is therefore surprising that the link between event segmentation and the organization of experiences into episodes in memory has not been addressed. We found that after participants read narratives containing temporal event boundaries at varying locations in the narrative, their long-term associative memory for information across event boundaries was lower than their memory for information within an event. This suggests that event segmentation during encoding resulted in segmentation of those same events in memory. Further, functional imaging data revealed that, across participants, brain activity consistent with the ongoing integration of information within events correlated with this pattern of mnemonic segmentation. These data are the first to address the mechanisms that support the organization of experiences into episodes in long-term memory.
When people read narratives, they often need to update their situation models as the described events change. Previous research has shown little to no increases in reading times for spatial shifts but consistent increases for temporal shifts. On this basis, researchers have suggested that spatial updating does not regularly occur, whereas temporal updating does. The current study looked more deeply into this reading time pattern for spatial updating. If the prior interpretation is correct, then the absence of a reading time increase reflects a failure to update the situation model. Two experiments evaluated this claim by assessing whether other indicators of updating, namely memory probes, converge on a similar interpretation as that derived from the reading time data. Our results showed that, in contrast to previous accounts, although there was no change in the pattern of reading times, spatial updating was occurring and was extensive. As a comparison, we also looked at temporal updating. Unlike spatial updating, the temporal shifts had an influence on reading time but did not have as extensive an influence on memory probe performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).
Memory for naturalistic events over short delays is important for visual scene processing, reading comprehension, and social interaction. The research presented here examined relations between how an ongoing activity is perceptually segmented into events and how those events are remembered a few seconds later. In several studies, participants watched movie clips that presented objects in the context of goal-directed activities. Five seconds after an object was presented, the clip paused for a recognition test. Performance on the recognition test depended on the occurrence of perceptual event boundaries. Objects that were present when an event boundary occurred were better recognized than other objects, suggesting that event boundaries structure the contents of memory. This effect was strongest when an object's type was tested but was also observed for objects' perceptual features. Memory also depended on whether an event boundary occurred between presentation and test; this variable produced complex interactive effects that suggested that the contents of memory are updated at event boundaries. These data indicate that perceptual event boundaries have immediate consequences for what, when, and how easily information can be remembered.
Explanations of data from fan effect experiments have been based on propositional network models. This article presents findings not readily predicted by such models. In particular, in three experiments we found that, during a speeded-recognition test, subjects retrieved facts about several objects associated with a single location faster than facts about several locations associated with a single object. Indeed, there was no fan effect in the former case despite the fact that there were an equivalent number of associations among concepts in both conditions. We suggest that such data are consistent with a mental model representational account.
Five experiments related anaphor resolution to a classic memory variable, namely, interference created by multiple uses of a given object-concept, and by spatial distance of the referent from the reader's focus of attention. Participants memorized a diagram of a building with rooms containing objects, and then read narratives describing characters' activities there. Reading was self-paced word by word. Accessibility was measured by readers' time to understand anaphoric sentences containing a definite noun phrase referring to an object in its room. Spatial distance between the object and the current focus of attention increased reading times for names of the object, the room, and sentence wrap-up. Multiple examples of a target-object increased its reading time only if they were scattered across different rooms. An associative model of memory retrieval during text comprehension was used to interpret the complex pattern of results.
To address questions about human memory's dependence on the coincidental environmental contexts in which events occur, we review studies of incidental environmental context-dependent memory in humans and report a meta-analysis. Our theoretical approach to the issue stems from Glenberg's (1997) contention that introspective thought (e.g., remembering, conceptualizing) requires cognitive resources normally used to represent the immediate environment. We propose that if tasks encourage processing of noncontextual information (i.e., introspective thought) at input and/or at test, then both learning and memory will be less dependent on the ambient environmental contexts in which those activities occur. The meta-analysis showed that across all studies, environmental context effects were reliable, and furthermore, that the use of noncontextual cues during learning (overshadowing) and at test (outshining), as well as mental reinstatement of appropriate context cues at test, all reduce the effect of environmental manipulations. We conclude that environmental context-dependent memory effects are less likely to occur under conditions in which the immediate environment is likely to be suppressed.
In two experiments we assessed the degree to which memory for events are similar or differ depending on whether they were narrative or autobiographical events. Consistent with previous research on autobiographical memory, memories for events captured the sequential order of events. However, in contrast to autobiographical memory research, ratings of importance did not appear to be related to retrieval speed. An analysis of causal connectivity of the recalled events was significantly related to retrieval speed. Issues of narrative comprehension and memory, autobiographical memory, and their overlap are discussed.
People perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events. Here the authors propose a theory according to which the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing and regulates attention and memory. Perceptual systems continuously make predictions about what will happen next. When transient errors in predictions arise, an event boundary is perceived. According to the theory, the perception of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures that represent previously learned information about event parts and inferences about actors' goals and plans. Neurological and neurophysiological data suggest that representations of events may be implemented by structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex and that perceptual prediction error is calculated and evaluated by a processing pathway, including the anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical neuromodulatory systems.
This article addresses J. R. Anderson and L. M. Reder's (1999) account of the differential fan effect reported by G. A. Radvansky, D. H. Spieler, and R. T. Zacks (1993). The differential fan effect is the finding of greater interference with an increased number of associations under some conditions, but not others, in a within-subjects mixed-list recognition test. Anderson and Reder concluded that the differential fan effects can be adequately explained by assuming differences in the weights given to concepts in long-term memory. When a broader range of data is considered, this account is less well supported. Instead, it is better to assume that the organization of information into referential representations, such as situation models, has a meaningful influence on long-term memory retrieval.
It was the purpose of the study to determine to what extent the amount of retroactive inhibition, following interpolated activity, would be reduced by lessening the possibility of associative connection between the original and interpolated activities. When the sensory mode of presenting the second material was changed from that of the first, not only did higher average anticipation and savings scores result, but the average savings scores closely approached those of the conditions in which no interpolated material was introduced. The dissociation of two room environments in which the first and second learning activities occurred led to approximately the same amount of retroactive inhibition as occurred in that condition where two activities occurred in the same room environment. When the first of two learning activities involved the motor pathways of one hand and the second the motor pathways of the other hand, there appeared to be less resultant retroactive inhibition than when both activities involved the same motor elements. The dissociation of the original and the interpolated activities through hypnotic technique led to less retroactive inhibition than occurred where the two activities proceeded in the same state. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Events are central elements of human experience. Formally, they can be individuated in terms of the entities that compose them, the features of those entities, and the relations amongst entities. Psychologically, representations of events capture their spatiotemporal location, the people and objects involved, and the relations between these elements. Here, we present an account of the nature of psychological representations of events and how they are constructed and updated. Event representations are like images in that they are isomorphic to the situations they represent. However, they are like models or language in that they are constructed of components rather than being holistic. Also, they are partial representations that leave out some elements and abstract others. Representations of individual events are informed by schematic knowledge about general classes of events. Event representations are constructed in a process that segments continuous activity into discrete events. The construction of a series of event representations forms a basis for predicting the future, planning for that future, and imagining alternatives. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 608–620 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.133
For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Excerpts available on Google Books.
A primary property of mental models is that they represent what the text is about (the events, objects, and processes described in the text), rather than features of the text itself. We used this property to demonstrate that mental models are operative during text comprehension. Subjects read texts that were propositionally equivalent, but described events in which the main actor was either spatially associated with a target object or spatially dissociated from the object. Pronominal reference kept the actor foregrounded throughout the text, but the target object was never repeated. The question of interest was whether the target object remained foregrounded when the text described events in which the actor and the object were spatially associated. Data from experiments using item recognition and reading time measures provided an affirmative answer. Thus the mental model controlling foregrounding reflected the structure of the events described by the text, not just the structure of the text.
Retroactive inhibition (RI) in free-recall learning was studied under three conditions of context change: Not Changed (N), in which List 1 and List 2 were learned in the same room; Changed (C), in which different rooms were used; and Disrupted (D), in which the same room was used, but S was taken from the room during the interlist interval. All Ss were given a final recall test in the context of List 1. The D and C groups both showed less RI than the N group, but did not differ from each other. It was concluded that RI experiments involving context change may be explainable in terms of reduced unlearning due to the disruption between List 1 and List 2, rather than to reduced overlap of physical context cues.
Previous research using virtual environments has revealed a location-updating effect in which there is a decline in memory when people move from one location to another. Here we assess whether this effect reflects the influence of the experienced context, in terms of the degree of immersion of a person in an environment, as suggested by some work in spatial cognition, or by a shift in context. In Experiment 1, the degree of immersion was reduced by using smaller displays. In comparison, in Experiment 2 an actual, rather than a virtual, environment was used, to maximize immersion. Location-updating effects were observed under both of these conditions. In Experiment 3, the original encoding context was reinstated by having a person return to the original room in which objects were first encoded. However, inconsistent with an encoding specificity account, memory did not improve by reinstating this context. Finally, we did a further analysis of the results of this and previous experiments to assess the differential influence of foregrounding and retrieval interference. Overall, these data are interpreted in terms of the event horizon model of event cognition and memory.
Memory for objects declines when people move from one location to another (the location updating effect). However, it is unclear whether this is attributable to event model updating or to task demands. The focus here was on the degree of integration for probed-for information with the experienced environment. In prior research, the probes were verbal labels of visual objects. Experiment 1 assessed whether this was a consequence of an item-probe mismatch, as with transfer-appropriate processing. Visual probes were used to better coordinate what was seen with the nature of the memory probe. In Experiment 2, people received additional word pairs to remember, which were less well integrated with the environment, to assess whether the probed-for information needed to be well integrated. The results showed location updating effects in both cases. These data are consistent with an event cognition view that mental updating of a dynamic event disrupts memory.
Do spatial directions, such as "to the right," influence the integration and segregation of information into situation models? According to a single-framework hypothesis, spatial location serves as an event framework, and spatial directions serve as relational information within that framework but do not establish separate sublocation frameworks. Alternatively, according to a fragmented-framework hypothesis, spatial directions lead the larger framework to be broken down such that each direction is treated as a separate sublocation, thereby producing retrieval interference. In three experiments, people memorized sentences about objects in locations. The results support the fragmented-framework hypothesis. Control conditions ruled out explanations based on the ease of memorization, retrieval demands, or sentence complexity.
Previous research (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991) has shown that the fan effect is mediated not by the number of nominal associations paired with a concept but by the number of mental models into which related concepts are organized. Specifically, newly learned "facts" about different objects in one location are integrated into a single mental model and no fan effect is produced, whereas facts about one object in different locations are not integrated and a fan effect is produced. In 6 experiments we investigated several factors' influence on location-based organization preferences. We found no impact of either article type (definite or indefinite) or object transportability. However, animate sentence subjects (people) reduced preference for location-based organizations. A clear person-based organization emerged by using locations that typically contain only a single person (e.g., phone booth) to make location-based situations less plausible.
This article addresses J. R. Anderson and L. M. Reder's (1999) account of the differential fan effect reported by G. A. Radvansky, D. H. Spieler, and R. T. Zacks (1993). The differential fan effect is the finding of greater interference with an increased number of associations under some conditions, but not others, in a within-subjects mixed-list recognition test. Anderson and Reder concluded that the differential fan effects can be adequately explained by assuming differences in the weights given to concepts in long-term memory. When a broader range of data is considered, this account is less well supported. Instead, it is better to assume that the organization of information into referential representations, such as situation models, has a meaningful influence on long-term memory retrieval.
We examined whether the functionality of spatial relations affects the construction and memory of information in situation models. A functional relationship involves the interaction of entities that is implied by either typical use or contextual demands. Previous research has shown that spatial relations are less likely to be encoded during comprehension unless there is extensive prior knowledge, explicit instructions to attend to spatial information, or a clear emphasis on spatial information. If the construction of a situation model is guided by a need to understand the functional structure of a situation, then functional spatial relations should be more likely to be encoded. The results of our study showed that sentences with functional spatial relations were read faster and remembered better in both recall and recognition tests than sentences with nonfunctional spatial relations.
Situation model updating requires managing the availability of information as a function of its relevance to the current situation. This is thought to involve some aspect of working memory. The present study assesses the relation between updating ability and various measures of working memory span or capacity. In addition, a primitive general measure of situation model processing, a situation model identification test, and its relation to updating ability was also assessed. The present experiment used a version of a paradigm developed by Glenberg, Meyer, and Lindem (1987) to assess updating. Although updating was observed in both anaphoric reading time and recognition test accuracy measures, the reading time measure was relatively weak. Importantly, the updating effect on the recognition test was unrelated to working memory capacity. In contrast, updating was related to performance on the situation model identification task. Specifically, people who were good at model processing were better able to keep associated objects available than were people who were less adept. There were no differences in the maintenance of dissociated objects. These results suggest that the relationship between situation model processing and working memory capacity is relatively weak.
Two "experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that retroactive inhibition would be decreased if the similarity between the environments in which original and interpolated learning took place was reduced " The original learning consisted of eight repetitions of ten paired-associate adjectives, which were relearned in the original ("standard') learning situation, following 8 min. of interpolated activity The results showed that the interpolated list lost approximately half its retroactive effect on recall if learned under conditions markedly different from those of original learning."
Previous studies have found that interference in long-term memory retrieval occurs when information cannot be integrated into a single situation model, but this interference is greatly reduced or absent when the information can be so integrated. The current study looked at the influence of presentation format-sentences or pictures-on this observed pattern. When sentences were used at memorisation and recognition, a spatial organisation was observed. In contrast, when pictures were used, a different pattern of results was observed. Specifically, there was an overall speed-up in response times, and consistent evidence of interference. Possible explanations for this difference were examined in a third experiment using pictures during learning, but sentences during recognition. The results from Experiment 3 were consistent with the organisation of information into situation models in long-term memory, even from pictures. This suggests that people do create situation models when learning pictures, but their recognition memory may be oriented around more "verbatim", surface-form memories of the pictures.
We investigated the ability of people to retrieve information about objects as they moved through rooms in a virtual space. People were probed withobject names that were either associated withthe person (i.e., carried) or dissociated from the person (i.e., just set down). Also, people either did or did not shift spatial regions (i.e., go to a new room). Information about objects was less accessible when the objects were dissociated from the person. Furthermore, information about an object was also less available when there was a spatial shift. However, the spatial shift had a larger effect on memory for the currently associated object. These data are interpreted as being more supportive of a situation model explanation, following on work using narratives and film. Simpler memory-based accounts that do not take into account the context in which a person is embedded cannot adequately account for the results.
Readers structure narrative text into a series of events in order to understand and remember the text. In this study, subjects read brief narratives describing everyday activities while brain activity was recorded with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjects later read the stories again to divide them into large and small events. During the initial reading, points later identified as boundaries between events were associated with transient increases in activity in a number of brain regions whose activity was mediated by changes in the narrated situation, such as changes in characters' goals. These results indicate that the segmentation of narrated activities into events is a spontaneous part of reading, and that this process of segmentation is likely dependent on neural responses to changes in the narrated situation.
People make sense of continuous streams of observed behavior in part by segmenting them into events. Event segmentation seems to be an ongoing component of everyday perception. Events are segmented simultaneously at multiple timescales, and are grouped hierarchically. Activity in brain regions including the posterior temporal and parietal cortex and lateral frontal cortex increases transiently at event boundaries. The parsing of ongoing activity into events is related to the updating of working memory, to the contents of long-term memory, and to the learning of new procedures. Event segmentation might arise as a side effect of an adaptive mechanism that integrates information over the recent past to improve predictions about the near future.
Event perception: A mind/brain per-spective An overview and review of event-perception findings and theory
- J M Zacks
- N K Speer
- K M Swallow
- T S Braver
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., Swallow, K. M., Braver, T. S., & Reynolds, J. R. (2007). Event perception: A mind/brain per-spective. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 273–293. An overview and review of event-perception findings and theory.
Situation models in lan-guage comprehension and memory An overview and review of situation model theory Similarity in stimulat-ing conditions as a variable in retroactive inhibition
- R A Zwaan
- G A Radvansky
Zwaan, R. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in lan-guage comprehension and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 123, 162–185. An overview and review of situation model theory. References Bilodeau, I. M., & Schlosberg, H. (1951). Similarity in stimulat-ing conditions as a variable in retroactive inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41, 199–204.
Walking through doorways causes remembering. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association The fan effect: A tale of two theories. Jour-nal of Experimental Psychology: General
- K A Pettijohn
- G A Radvansky
Pettijohn, K. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (2012, May 3). Walking through doorways causes remembering. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL. Radvansky, G. A. (1999). The fan effect: A tale of two theories. Jour-nal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 198–206.
Aging and memory for event boundaries. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL Causal cohesion and story coherence Learning and comprehension of text Strategies in discourse com-prehension
- A N Thompson
- G A Radvansky
- T Trabasso
- T Secco
- P Broek
Thompson, A. N., & Radvansky, G. A. (2012 May 3). Aging and memory for event boundaries. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL. Trabasso, T., Secco, T., & van den Broek, P. (1984). Causal cohesion and story coherence. In H. Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Learning and comprehension of text (pp. 83–111). Hills-dale, NJ: Erlbaum. van Dijk, T. A., & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies in discourse com-prehension. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Walking through doorways causes remembering. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association
- K A Pettijohn
- G A Radvansky
Pettijohn, K. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (2012, May 3). Walking through
doorways causes remembering. Paper presented at the meeting of
the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.
Aging and memory for event boundaries. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association
- A N Thompson
- G A Radvansky
Thompson, A. N., & Radvansky, G. A. (2012 May 3). Aging and
memory for event boundaries. Paper presented at the meeting of
the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.
See References). An overview and review of event cognition theory
- G A Radvansky
- J M Zacks
Radvansky, G. A., & Zacks, J. M. (2011). (See References). An
overview and review of event cognition theory.
A novel study: The mental organization of events
- G A Radvansky
- D E Copeland
- R A Zwaan
Radvansky, G. A., Copeland, D. E., & Zwaan, R. A. (2005). A
novel study: The mental organization of events. Memory, 13,
796-814.