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No access: Critical bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali famine
Abstract
The principal obstacle to effective humanitarian response in the 2011 Somali famine was lack of access to famine victims. Poor access can be traced to five distinct bottlenecks: (1) Al-Shabaab's obstructionist policies, which prevented most international aid agencies from operating in the famine zones; (2) US suspension of food aid into areas of Somalia controlled by Al-Shabaab, and other constraints on aid agencies related to counter-terrorism legislation; (3) chronic insecurity pre-dating Al-Shabaab and US policies, which led most aid agencies to suspend or close operations in south Somalia by 2009; (4) diversion of food aid by armed groups and corrupt officials in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which controlled the capital Mogadishu; and (5) a “privilege gap” in Somali society, in which low status groups lacked the social capital to access relief aid, remittances, and lateral transfers from fellow Somalis. All five of these impediments must be addressed if humanitarian access is to be improved in the future.
... The studies cover a wide variety of disaster types, including floods (de Leeuw et al., 2012;Rodríguez-Espíndola et al., 2018;Damoah, 2022;Negi, 2022;Xu et al., 2023;Santana-Robles et al., 2024), droughts (Mushanyuri and Ngcamu, 2020), hurricanes (Quarshie and Leuschner, 2020), cyclones (Chari et al., 2021) and COVID-19 (Pacheco and Laguna, 2020;Hern andez Gress et al., 2021;Minguito and Banluta, 2023). While all of the studies reference natural disasters, several also make some mention of man-made disasters (Kov acs and Spens, 2007;Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009;Balcik et al., 2010;Apte and Heath, 2011;Kunz and Reiner, 2012;Menkhaus, 2012;Yadav and Barve, 2015;Dube et al., 2016;Mora-Ochomogo et al., 2016;Lu et al., 2018, Baffoe and Luo, 2020, Fathalikhani et al., 2020. However, none of the included papers focus primarily on man-made disasters (i.e. ...
... Additionally, governments with high regulation and enforcement capabilities are better positioned to make decisions more difficult for humanitarian organizations than those with less sophisticated capabilities (Dube et al., 2016). In a study of the 2011 famine in Somalia, Menkhaus (2012) succinctly summarized the issue of limited access by external humanitarian actors by stating: "Ultimately the problem was one of access, not resource mobilization, and the impediments to access were numerous and daunting" (p. 35). ...
... Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009);Balcik et al. (2010);Akhtar et al. (2012);Menkhaus (2012);Kunz and Gold (2015);Yadav and Barve (2015);Dube et al. (2016);Kunz and Reiner (2016);Negi (2022) Easing regulations to facilitate external assistance Governments can elect to impose regulations and policies (e.g. shortened waiting times for customs clearance; exemptions from paying duty fees, value-added taxes, tolls and other regulatory fees, making warehouse space readily available) that enhance the ability of external actors (i.e. ...
Purpose
Although governments are vital stakeholders in nearly every humanitarian disaster, there is an incomplete understanding of the role of government in humanitarian logistics. The purpose of this study is to review the current literature to better understand the government’s role in the logistics for humanitarian disasters, including its particular challenges and the unique services it can offer to assist in humanitarian relief efforts.
Design/methodology/approach
This study is a systematic literature review based on thematic analysis to summarize the findings from diverse methodologies spanning multiple research disciplines.
Findings
The findings of this study propose three key government roles in humanitarian logistics: the host (and regulator), the funder (and responder) and the coordinator. These roles can be assumed simultaneously, but not all are necessarily present in each disaster. A theoretical framework is presented that illustrates these three roles in the context of a humanitarian disaster.
Research limitations/implications
This review focuses primarily on natural disasters, given the overall gap in both man-made and complex disasters in the present literature. Additionally, this research focuses heavily on disasters in developing nations rather than developed nations, with a potential implication being the focus on the government’s role as a host for external assistance. This study proposes several important avenues for future research based on gaps in the literature. This study also explains the government’s greater involvement in humanitarian supply chain management than typical supply chain management.
Practical implications
Opportunities and challenges in humanitarian logistics, respective to the three roles of governments, are presented and discussed. Opportunities for future research in this area are also presented.
Originality/value
This study advances the humanitarian logistics research domain by increasing the understanding of the foundational critical success factor for humanitarian supply chains and their resilience: the role of government.
... The most drought-prone country in EA is Somalia. Somalia has been facing chronic problems of food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition since the 1970s (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012;Menkhaus, 2012). International food relief and humanitarian aid have been playing a great role in sustaining livelihoods for decades (FEWSN, 2011;Funk et al., 2013). ...
... International food relief and humanitarian aid have been playing a great role in sustaining livelihoods for decades (FEWSN, 2011;Funk et al., 2013). For several years the country was in a state of civil war and drought shocks (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012;Menkhaus, 2012). So far, Somalia is still not free from the effects of drought and existing conflicts. ...
... Ahead of the 2010-2011 famine in Somalia, the joint technical analysis team from the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and the FAO-managed Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) gave timely reports on the drought occurrence (Hillbruner and Moloney, 2012). However, help for the 2010-2011 famine victims from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN specialised agencies, Western NGOs, Islamic NGOs and Somali NGOs was denied by an Islamist Insurgent Group (Al-Shabaab) that controlled territories in the region (Menkhaus, 2012). Disagreements among the Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the UN and the USA, and a privilege gap in Somali society also exacerbated the famine (Menkhaus, 2012). ...
... Restrictions on humanitarian aid can also occur when there is no government and the area is controlled by rebels. The Al-Shabaab rebel group, which controlled a large part of the Somali territory during the 2011 famine, did for example not allow humanitarian organizations to access the populations and distribute food to the victims (Menkhaus, 2012;L'Hermitte et al., 2014). ...
... In most cases, these restrictions will require the organization to find creatives ways to adapt to the restrictions (Bennett, 2003;Kunz and Gold, 2015). In some extreme cases, these restrictions may even force humanitarian organizations to leave a country (Kunz and Gold, 2015), or prevent them from delivering critically needed food supplies to disaster victims (Menkhaus, 2012;Merminod et al., 2014). ...
Purpose - Foreign governments do not always welcome international humanitarian organizations responding to a disaster in their country. Many governments even impose restrictions on humanitarian supply chains through import barriers, travel restrictions or excessive bureaucracy. We analyze these restrictions and try to identify the government characteristics that best explain the tendency to impose such restrictions.
Design/methodology/approach - Through a multiple case study among four international humanitarian organizations we identify and analyze the restrictions imposed on humanitarian supply chains in 143 different programs. We compare the average number of restrictions per country with different governmental and socio-economic situational factors.
Findings - We find that state fragility, a combination of government ineffectiveness and illegitimacy, is the characteristic that best explains the tendency of a government to impose restrictions on humanitarian supply chains.
Practical implications - Knowing that fragile states tend to impose a high number of restrictions helps humanitarian organizations to prepare adequately before entering a country with a fragile government. The organization can for example anticipate possible concerns and establish trust with the government. Commercial companies starting to do business in such country can learn from this knowledge.
Originality/value - Multiple studies have mentioned the strong impact of governments on humanitarian supply chains, but no paper has yet analyzed this problem in detail. Our paper is the first to identify the characteristics that explain the number of restrictions governments impose on humanitarian supply chains, and what humanitarian organizations can do to address them.
... Yet, despite this advanced knowledge of the coming famine, up until it was declared little had been done to scale up the humanitarian response to the chronic, growing food insecurity situation in Somalia. In fact, in the years leading up to the declaration of famine, humanitarian assistance in south central Somalia had been on the wane in accordance with shrinking humanitarian access and the drying up of donor funds for humanitarian work in the region Menkhaus, 2012). In marked contrast to this long-standing inaction, however, the declaration of famine triggered a massive mobilisation of humanitarian action and donor funding, quickly mitigating the worst effects of the crisis and returning the situation to sub-famine levels by early 2012 (Darcy et al., 2012). ...
... There is, of course, no single explanation for the failure of early warning systems to work in preventing famine in Somalia (cf. Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012;Menkhaus, 2012;Seal and Bailey, 2013). As a number of recent analyses of the 2011 famine in Somalia have detailed, there were an array of entangled political, economic and environmental factors contributing to this failure (i.e. ...
This article takes the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification scale and its use in the declaration of famine in Somalia in July 2011 as a site for examining how the spatial imaginary and emplaced, affective registers of emergency are implicated in marking situations as spaces of humanitarian emergency, or not. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification scale is described and its role in removing the affective registers of crisis discussed in relation to the normalisation of the conditions constituting a classification of Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Phase 4, ‘Humanitarian Emergency’, in Somalia. This is contrasted to the urgent mobilisation of humanitarian action following the reclassification of Somalia’s food insecurity situation to Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Phase 5, ‘Famine’. It is argued that the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification phase reclassification, by enacting a moment of rupture, led the normalised space of food insecurity to be seen as a space of humanitarian emergency, thereby triggering the rapid mobilisation of humanitarian action in response to crisis.
... Some of them joined cross-border refugee camps, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia, whereas others became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia (CRS, 2012). Whilst drought (leading to crop failures, livestock deaths, loss of livelihood, and soaring domestic food prices) was the dominant reason for the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the situation was exacerbated by other factors such as rising international food prices (Somalia is significantly dependent on food imports) (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012), political instability, lack of authority and policy making, an environment of insecurity due to the insurgence of the rebel Islamist group, Al-Shabaab (CRS, 2012), Al-Shabaab's ban on foreign intervention and aid agencies since 2009 leading to increased livelihood vulnerability (Lautze et al., 2012; Menkhaus, 2012 ), US counterterrorism laws suspending US food aid deliveries to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2012), and increasing fuel prices impeding transport and food distribution (CRS, 2012). All these factors explain why Darcy et al. (2012) call the drought crisis in Somalia 'a crisis within a crisis' and, thereby, illustrate the point made previously in this paper regarding the existence of multiple causes leading to a disaster. ...
... Some of them joined cross-border refugee camps, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia, whereas others became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia (CRS, 2012). Whilst drought (leading to crop failures, livestock deaths, loss of livelihood, and soaring domestic food prices) was the dominant reason for the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the situation was exacerbated by other factors such as rising international food prices (Somalia is significantly dependent on food imports) (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012), political instability, lack of authority and policy making, an environment of insecurity due to the insurgence of the rebel Islamist group, Al-Shabaab (CRS, 2012), Al-Shabaab's ban on foreign intervention and aid agencies since 2009 leading to increased livelihood vulnerability (Lautze et al., 2012; Menkhaus, 2012 ), US counterterrorism laws suspending US food aid deliveries to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2012), and increasing fuel prices impeding transport and food distribution (CRS, 2012). All these factors explain why Darcy et al. (2012) call the drought crisis in Somalia 'a crisis within a crisis' and, thereby, illustrate the point made previously in this paper regarding the existence of multiple causes leading to a disaster. ...
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to use a theory-based approach to develop a new classification model for disasters that reflects their logistics implications, and to contextualise the findings by applying the model to a particular disaster situation.
Design/methodology/approach
– A widespread literature review was conducted in order to conceptualise the proposed disaster classification model and a case study (the 2011-2012 Somali food crisis) was used to provide a practical illustration and an initial validation of the conceptual approach.
Findings
– The new classification model proposes a set of four categories of disasters based on two generic dimensions, whilst simultaneously integrating five situational factors that reflect the impact of the external environment on the logistics operations. The case study confirms that this systemic approach is necessary since, from a logistics perspective, a disaster should be considered in its entirety and within its contextual environment.
Research limitations/implications
– Further research is needed to establish the operational characteristics of each disaster type in order to determine the applicability of business logistics practices to each scenario. In addition, this paper highlights the opportunity to validate or refine the model by using a more varied range of case studies.
Originality/value
– This paper proposes a new classification model for disasters based on their logistics implications and, by integrating the key environmental factors, it moves beyond the traditional 2×2 model found in the literature.
... the country has been described as one with weak state authority and a lack of functional/basic law and order . While there has been a general belief that somali clans were acephalous (lacking headship) during the precolonial period (Menkhaus, 2012), there is a contention that they were indeed highly centralized bifurcated states that thrived as independent states based on clan kinship. in line with the theoretical framework in this article, the survival of clan formation is a strong indication of a state's failure to exert control resulting in the growth of ungoverned territories. in the same vein, the regime of siad Bare failed to initiate a nation-building exercise; rather, he continued to thrive on clan power politics. ...
This article proposes a methodology for analyzing the social network behaviour of the extremist group (Al-Shabaab) within the context of ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa. Inkblot logic is introduced as an analytical framework that highlights the role of ‘loose bonds’ and ‘hard bonds’ in the geographical distribution of terrorists’ activities ranging from the group’s epicenter in Somalia to neighboring Kenya. Traditionally, policy analysts and researchers have studied the behavior of extremists on the basis of in situ, i.e. their static geographical position. However, the stasis approach assumes that extremist groups operate in fixed position relative to the perceived enemy. Yet the elusive group has been found to establish complex familial or fictive kinship networks beyond their country of origin, while maintaining a local presence embedded within communities. Hence, efforts to predict their movements and spatial distribution can prove difficult. The inkblot approach is of theoretical and practical use, as it illuminates possibilities of indirectly plotting the ‘ungoverned spaces’, hence, improving predictability of terrorists’ activities in time and space within the kinship networks.
... Al-Shabaab actively resisted the operation of relief agencies in its territory, thereby "driving away a lucrative source of funding" (Menkhaus 2012: 31), with other income streams (e.g., taxes, charcoal trade) being much more important. The TFG controlled only around 5% of the drought-affected territory, and the looted aid was often used for political patronage (Menkhaus 2012;Pham 2011). Similarly, the collapse of agricultural livelihoods increased the number of marginalized and destitute people who could be recruited by armed groups. ...
A ground-breaking study on how natural disasters can escalate or defuse wars, insurgencies, and other strife.
Armed conflict and natural disasters have plagued the twenty-first century. Not since the end of World War II has the number of armed conflicts been higher. At the same time, natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity over the past two decades, their impacts worsened by climate change, urbanization, and persistent social and economic inequalities. Providing the first comprehensive analysis of the interplay between natural disasters and armed conflict, Catastrophes, Confrontations, and Constraints explores the extent to which disasters facilitate the escalation or abatement of armed conflicts—as well as the ways and contexts in which combatants exploit these catastrophes.
Tobias Ide utilizes both qualitative insights and quantitative data to explain the link between disasters and the (de-)escalation of armed conflict and presents over thirty case studies of earthquakes, droughts, floods, and storms in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. He also examines the impact of COVID-19 on armed conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Philippines.
... 39 The country has been described as one with weak state authority and a lack of functional/basic law and order. 40 While there has been a general belief that Somali clans were acephalous (lacking headship) during the precolonial period, 41 there is a contention that they were indeed highly centralized bifurcated states that thrived as independent states based on clan kinship. In line with the theoretical framework in this article, the survival of clan formation is a strong indication of a state's failure to exert control -a failure resulting in the growth of ungoverned territories. ...
The current military counterterrorism strategies in the Horn of Africa are state-centric, being configured based on the African Union’s model of anti-terrorism laws. However, this strategy is incongruent with the typical behaviours of terrorist groups, as such groups often establish kinship networks across borders, along with maintaining a local presence embedded within communities. Hence, predicting the movement and spatial distribution of complex organized terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab directly can prove difficult. However, indirectly plotting the occurrence of ‘ungoverned spaces’ (both physical and non-physical ones) can improve predictability—thus improving counter-terrorism (CT) strategies against the group. To provide empirical support for this hypothesis, this article utilized a combination of analytical techniques – including the ‘_ink blot’ _logic technique – to identify the role of ‘loose bonds’ and ‘hard bonds’ in the distribution of terrorists’ activities ranging from the group’s epicenter in Somalia to neighboring Kenya. This article argues that the ‘loose bonds’ established between states through official foreign policy praxis seem comparatively less likely to reinforce CT measures. Rather, the ‘hard bonds’ created among ethnic groups across borders lie at the heart of an effective transnational CT strategy.
... In East Africa's drought history, ESK have been frequently affected by multiple severe drought events (Funk, 2011;Liebmann et al., 2014;Muller, 2014). As a result, huge humanitarian and economic losses have been reported as a consequence of drought (Haan et al., 2012;Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012;Menkhaus, 2012). For example, in the 2010-2011 drought, around 250,000 deaths were observed in Somalia (Hillbruner & Moloney, 2012;Lyon & Dewitt, 2012;Lyon & Vigaud, 2017). ...
Climate change is leading to changing patterns of precipitation and increasingly extreme global weather. There is an urgent need to synthesize our current knowledge on climate risks to water security, which in turn is fundamental for achieving sustainable water management. Climate Risk and Sustainable Water Management discusses hydrological extremes, climate variability, climate impact assessment, risk analysis, and hydrological modelling. It provides a comprehensive interdisciplinary exploration of climate risks to water security, helping to guide sustainable water management in a changing and uncertain future. The relevant theory is accessibly explained using examples throughout, helping readers to apply the knowledge learned to their own situations and challenges. This textbook is especially valuable to students of hydrology, resource management, climate change, and geography, as well as a reference textbook for researchers, civil and environmental engineers, and water management professionals concerned with water-related hazards, water cycles, and climate change.
... In other words, research should consider the feedback arrow in Figure 1 concerning information on accuracy, effectiveness, and side effects of previous measures. In Somalia, the people most impacted by famine often do not receive food aid due to: conflict preventing access; long-term instability reducing the presence of donor agencies; armed groups and officials diverting aid elsewhere; and low-status groups lacking the social capital to access aid (Menkhaus 2012). In the wider Horn of Africa region, it has been pointed out that emergency relief alone is insufficient unless it is supported by development to build droughtresilient societies (Muller 2014). ...
Drought management is currently informed by a variety of approaches, mostly responding to drought crisis when it happens. Toward more effective and integrated drought management, we introduce a conceptual drought diagnosis framework inspired by diagnostic concepts from the field of medicine. This framework comprises five steps: 1. Initial diagnostic assessment; 2. Diagnostic testing; 3. Consultation; 4. Communication of the diagnosis; and 5. Treatment and prognosis. To illustrate the need for the proposed approach, four case studies of recently drought‐affected regions were selected: the city of Cape Town, the state of California, the Northeast region of Brazil, and the Horn of Africa. Contrasting elements for these cases include the geographic extent and political boundaries, climate, socio‐economics, and the relevance of different water resources (e.g., rainfall, reservoirs, and aquifers). For each case, we identified documented practices and policies and reflected on them in terms of drought misdiagnosis or incomplete diagnosis that have aggravated socio‐economic and environmental drought impacts. A common example is the preference for technical solutions (e.g., installing infrastructure to augment water supply), rather than measures that reduce vulnerability. Analysis of these four drought case studies confirmed the anticipated need for a comprehensive approach to drought diagnosis for more successful treatment and prevention of drought. Using an analogy with medical science can be helpful toward comprehensively diagnosing droughts for a variety of contexts and assessing the effectiveness of proposed interventions. This framework can help drought managers to be more proactive in enabling drought‐affected regions to become more drought resilient in the future.
... Not only did al-Shabaab deny the existence of a famine; they also hindered individuals living in the southern parts of the country from traveling to places where they could have accessed the aid. 16 Having realized the high cost of waging conventional war on AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, the group retreated from most of its territories in the capital. On the one hand, the group's withdrawal from Mogadishu can be viewed as a considerable victory, but on the other hand it could be regarded as a strategic decision signaling al-Shabaab's return to guerrilla tactics. ...
This is a comparative analysis of the secret service of al-Shabaab, the Amniyat, and the Somali government’s security unit, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). It begins with the short history of al-Shabaab as an introduction to understand the roots of the movement and how the resurgence of the group is tied to the effective management of the Amniyat. Then it analyzes the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence apparatuses of al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), highlighting the similarities and differences between the organizations. Viewed from the perspective of the local population, the terrorist group provides security and predictability for individuals living under its control, gained local respect for managing its forces, and uses its secret service, the Amniyat, effectively. NISA suffers from the same problems as its predecessor in the Siad Barre regime, such as lack of transparency, overpoliticization, and involvement in illegal activities. Furthermore, there is lack of cooperation and transparency between local intelligence services and police forces. While the FGS realized the importance of doing away with clan-based security systems, the dominance of clans is still constantly increasing at the expense of the government. Today, al-Shabaab’s intelligence capacities and capabilities are more advanced than those of the NISA, hence the centralization and unification of the security architecture is of chief importance.
... Street, 2012;Zicherman et al., 2011). Many case studies on disaster response in conflict-affected situations, including Sri Lanka (Hyndman, 2011), Indonesia (Waizenegger and Hyndman, 2010), Haiti (Schuberth, 2017), Pakistan (Arai, 2012) and Somalia (Menkhaus, 2012), have provided evidence supporting the need for conflict-sensitive disaster response and Do No Harm approaches, but there is still no guidance on how conflict-affected states could design DRR strategies, particularly with a view to ex-ante and long-term engagement. General policy design in conflict situations often focuses on the limitations imposed by the operational context, including insecurity, low capacity and low economic growth (Center on International Cooperation, 2011; Messineo and Wam, 2011). ...
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies are the cornerstone of formalised action for reducing natural hazard-related disaster risk and setting the strategic direction for a district, country or region to become more resilient to disasters. Of the seven Sendai Framework global targets, international attention has increasingly concentrated on the one with the most urgent deadline, Target E. Target E commits governments to increase the number of countries with local and national DRR strategies by 2020. While advancing progress on Target E and increasing the number of local and national DRR strategies has been adopted as a global policy priority (McElroy, 2017), less attention has been paid to how strategies can or should take context into consideration, especially contexts affected by violent conflict. This working paper explores whether DRR strategies, frameworks, tools and approaches make reference to conditions of conflict, and if so how. While evidence on the coverage of DRR strategies is patchy, preliminary information suggests that contexts typically classified as conflict-affected, post-conflict or fragile are least likely to have DRR strategies. DRR strategies could potentially acknowledge and address how vulnerabilities to disaster and conflict may be shared, how conflict could contribute to disaster risk and vice-versa, and how DRR strategies could be used as a vehicle for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
... Forth, hunger is used deliberately as a political weapon to exterminate regime enemies. This last argument underlines intentional behaviour and can be applied to the case of Somalia in 2011 when famine was declared in several regions controlled by the radical group Al-Shabaab which forbade most international aid agencies to provide humanitarian aid (Menkhaus 2012). ...
In recent years, Ethiopia has experienced fast economic growth and has been a major recipient of development and humanitarian aid. However, these developments were unsuccessful in eliminating food insecurity problems, and Ethiopia continues to be a considerably famine-prone country. The aim of this paper is to examine the applicability of Howe's framework of the six archetypal situations symptomatic to famines (watch, price spirals, aid magnet, media frenzy, overshoot, and peaks) to the 2015-2016 food crisis, which left an estimated 15 million Ethiopians in need of acute food assistance. This paper observes that the food crisis proved to have some of Howe's archetypes including watch, price spirals, and, to a lesser extent, media frenzy and peaks. Even though the aid magnet and overshoot were not recorded, the dynamics of the 2015-2016 food crisis confirmed Howe's argument that the current system of humanitarian assistance does not lead to timely and effective responses. In this paper, I also argue that the Ethiopian political context further exacerbates the food insecurity situation of the country.
... This explained why the two groups responded differently in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. In Somalia, a very high level of hostility between the militant group Al-Shabaab and the Somalian government played an important role in Al-Sh`abaab's strategy of sabotaging the government's relief efforts and attacking humanitarian workers during the 2011 drought (Menkhaus, 2012). ...
This chapter introduces the tourism–disaster–conflict nexus through a comprehensive review of the contemporary social science literature. After reviewing conceptual definitions of tourism, disaster and conflict, the chapter explores various axes that link through this nexus. The linkages between tourism and disaster include tourism as a trigger or amplifier of disasters, the impacts of disasters on the tourism industry, tourism as a driver of disaster recovery and disaster risk reduction strategies in the tourism sector. Linkages between tourism and conflict include the idea that tourism can be a force for peace and stability, the niche status of danger zone or dark heritage tourism, the concept of phoenix tourism in post-conflict destination rebranding, tourism and cultural conflicts, and tourism’s conflicts over land and resources. Linkages between disaster and conflict include disasters as triggers or intensifiers of civil conflict, disaster diplomacy and conflict resolution, disaster capitalism, and gender-based violence and intra-household conflict in the wake of disasters. These are some of the conversations that organise this volume, and this introductory chapter ends with a summary of the chapters that follow.
... In recent years, food relief convoys in sub-Saharan Africa have been attacked [95]. The famine in Yemen and the catastrophe of Syria have also been worsened by the breakdown in international institutions, intended to prevent the grossest civilian suffering [96,97]. ...
Purpose of Review
To combine evolutionary principles of competition and co-operation with limits to growth models, generating six principles for a new sub-discipline, called “planetary epidemiology.” Suggestions are made for how to quantify four principles.
Recent Findings
Climate change is one of a suite of threats increasingly being re-discovered by health workers as a major threat to civilization. Although “planetary health” is now in vogue, neither it nor its allied sub-disciplines have, as yet, had significant impact on epidemiology. Few if any theorists have sought to develop principles for Earth system human epidemiology, in its ecological, social, and technological milieu.
Summary
The principles of planetary epidemiology described here can be used to stimulate applied, quantitative work to explore past, contemporary, and future population health, at scales from local to planetary, in order to promote enduring health. It is also proposed that global well-being will decline this century, without radical reform.
... In Somalia, humanitarian actors had to compromise with Al-Shabaab, which started to adopt 'puzzling, inconsistent, and self-defeating' policies thereby making it harder for aid agencies to physically access famine-affected areas (Menkhaus, 2012). Moreover, Al-Shabaab imposed an average fee of $90,000 per aid agency every six months putting under pressure the humanitarian actors who had to report these large pay cheques to the OFAC and therefore making themselves liable under the US penal system for giving material support to a designated FTO (United Nations Monitoring Groups, 2011). ...
The paper reflects on the impact of the counter-terror agenda on humanitarian actions. It explores the socio-political and legal implications and constraints that Non-Governmental Organisations incur when managing humanitarian projects in critical environments such as Somalia where, an important famine stroke in 2011 as consequence of the counter-terror agenda, insecurity and politicization. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab, a group well-known to the international authority as affiliated to Al-Qaeda was in charge of the area in which the famine stroke. The dilemma to consider in this paper is paper is related to the binomial situation between the people in need and the counter-terrorism strategy against Al-Shabaab.The paper outlines three issues that the humanitarian actors incur, namely structural, operational and of internal nature. These three issues undermines the relationship between the Humanitarian actors and the donors as well as between humanitarian actors and their recipients. At the end, the relationship continues to be highly controversial.
... In the complex political scenario prevailing in Somalia, faith identity alone, whether Christian or Islamic, did not have the power to facilitate access to humanitarian space. Rather, in 2011 the ban was the outcome of an obstructionist policy by Al Shabaab against all the actors who in one way or another had relations with the UN-backed Somali Transitional Federal Government, 37 whether Christian, lay or Muslim. ...
There is rhetoric to the effect that Islamic NGOs are in a better position to access victims of a conflict or of natural disasters in a Muslim country. However, events in Somalia contradict that rhetoric by demonstrating that religious identity alone does not determine the opening of the humanitarian space in a conflict-prone area. What matters is the political dialogue that the organization is able to establish with the factions that control the territory, combined with the NGO’s capacity to negotiate its presence in the field.
The following article provides a narrative of the 2006 and 2011 drought emergency responses in Somalia, showing how both Christian and Muslim organizations experienced difficulties in accessing the Somali population in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Two examples are cited, which suggest the need to frame religious identity within a political discourse, where all NGOs, as political actors, need to find their strategies to negotiate access and be allowed to operate.
... Fighting groups might also impose extortion/taxation, forcing some traders to withdraw from the market and inducing a separate increase effect on food prices as the total quantities of traded food decrease. 6 Finally, insecurity and conflict in host communities and along routes may prevent the flow and operations of food and emergency aid, resulting in unabated food insecurity (Majid and McDowell 2012;Menkhaus 2012). In some instances the situation can worsen if conflict involves the destruction of road infrastructure and looting from market centers and food storage facilities, implying that traders may need to find alternative routes and markets to reach consumers in host communities. ...
An emerging literature shows how the mass arrival of refugees induces both short- and long-term consequences to hosting countries. The main contribution of this paper is to conduct a selective review of this literature from a food-security and resilience perspective. First, the paper identifies a number of direct and indirect food-security consequences of hosting refugees. It provides a conceptual framework for discussing these various channels through which refugee inflows influence food security in the hosting countries. Second, the literature review finds that the impact of large-scale influxes of refugees on host communities and on their food security is unequally distributed among the local population.
This study provides an analysis of al-Shabaab’s secret- and intelligence service, the Amniyat. It begins with the short history of the organization to explain the roots of the movement, and how its resurgence is connected to the efficient management of the Amniyat. Then it analyzes the capacities and capabilities of the group’s intelligence apparatus, highlighting the most vital elements that have made it more effective. Scrutinizing the security sector is of great importance, since analyzing the activities of the Amniyat may help us understand the conflict dynamics in the country. The article contends that al-Shabaab’s intelligence agency is one of the key instruments in enforcing leadership mandate and silencing dissent, especially responding to divergences. The infiltration of al-Shabaab operatives into Somali government institutions poses significant challenges to the country. Simultaneously the capabilities and capacities of the Amniyat, including information-gathering, counter-intelligence activities, liquidations and assassinations continue to disrupt government efforts. While coordinated counter-terrorism practices and rehabilitation programs for al-Shabaab defectors may contribute to weakening the organization, it must be emphasized that even if the group could be ultimately defeated, the Amniyat may survive its dissolution and could integrate into various entities or merge into an existing criminal network.
The article examines the development and employment of the al-Shabaab secret service, Amniyat, in its fight against African Union troops and security forces in Somalia. It first elaborates on the historical background of the terrorist group, which may serve as an introduction to understanding the roots of the organization and how its resurgence is tied to the effective management of Amniyat. The governance structure and intelligence activities of the terror group are also scrutinized. The study then analyzes the capacities and capabilities of the al-Shabaab intelligence apparatus , highlighting the elements that have contributed to its efficiency. In light of the growing importance of intelligence and counter-intelligence, the development of a secret service proved to be crucial for the survival of the terrorist group. Over the last decade, not only has al-Shabaab survived but also managed to thrive, presenting a number of obstacles to better-equipped multinational forces and the international community. Even if al-Shabaab were to be defeated, Amniyat could outlast its dissolution and may be "reborn" in various entities or merge into a criminal network.
La presente tesi ha per oggetto i movimenti migratori indotti da fattori ambientali e il loro inquadramento sotto il profilo del diritto internazionale e regionale.
La prima parte (capitoli 1-2) inquadra il fenomeno delle migrazioni collegate a fattori ambientali e le sue cause, naturali o dovute ad attività umane.
La seconda parte (capitoli 3-7) esamina gli strumenti internazionali potenzialmente o concretamente applicabili ai migranti ambientali sulla base del contenuto delle norme, di teorie dottrinali o di interpretazioni seguite nella prassi applicativa degli strumenti giuridici. In particolare, sono esaminate la Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 sullo status di rifugiato, la Convenzione sullo status degli apolidi e altri strumenti giuridici di natura regionale, compreso il regime di diritto dell’UE.
La terza parte (capitoli 8-12) analizza, più specificamente, il contenuto e l’applicabilità degli strumenti internazionali sui diritti umani, di natura universale e regionale. Viene esplorata la possibilità, da un lato, di ricorrere alla teoria degli obblighi positivi degli Stati in materia di diritti umani, alla luce di un’ampia analisi della prassi rilevante in materia, dall’altro di valorizzare soprattutto l’interpretazione evolutiva delle suddette norme internazionali.
Under what circumstances might climate change lead to negative security outcomes? Over the past fifteen years, a rapidly growing applied field and research community on climate security has emerged. While much progress has been made, we still don't have a clear understanding of why climate change might lead to violent conflict or humanitarian emergencies in some places and not others. Busby develops a novel argument – based on the combination of state capacity, political exclusion, and international assistance – to explain why climate leads to especially bad security outcomes in some places but not others. This argument is then demonstrated through application to case studies from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. This book will provide an informative resource for students and scholars of international relations and environmental studies, especially those working on security, conflict and climate change, on the emergent practice and study of this topic, and identifies where policy and research should be headed.
Climate change is leading to changing patterns of precipitation and increasingly extreme global weather. There is an urgent need to synthesize our current knowledge on climate risks to water security, which in turn is fundamental for achieving sustainable water management. Climate Risk and Sustainable Water Management discusses hydrological extremes, climate variability, climate impact assessment, risk analysis, and hydrological modelling. It provides a comprehensive interdisciplinary exploration of climate risks to water security, helping to guide sustainable water management in a changing and uncertain future. The relevant theory is accessibly explained using examples throughout, helping readers to apply the knowledge learned to their own situations and challenges. This textbook is especially valuable to students of hydrology, resource management, climate change, and geography, as well as a reference textbook for researchers, civil and environmental engineers, and water management professionals concerned with water-related hazards, water cycles, and climate change.
Famine is not on the global justice theory agenda. Two plausible reasons explain why. First, that global justice theory has moved toward a concern with international justice and reforming existing international organizations and away from what was considered to be a question of global ethics. And second, that famine was influentially identified by Amartya Sen as question of the domestic political economy and thus indeed a domestic justice concern. However, the political economy of famine has changed: it has transnationalised. I argue that famine should be on the global justice theory agenda, but that to do so requires that global justice theory reform itself first. The argument unfolds in three steps. Initially, I diagnose the benefits and constraints of methodological nationalism in famine studies and global justice theorization. I then set out an exploratory case study of the transnationalisation of famine, focusing on Somalia and taking note of the role of remittances, transnational social and economic networks, the consequences of de-risking, and the emergence of cash-transfers programs. Finally, I consider in more normative depth the transnational entitlement map of famine including: (i) transnational remittance networks (not national safety nets); (ii) global financial regulation (beyond international law); and (iii) diaspora politics (not democracy), where the parenthetic juxtapositions signal dissimilarities with current thinking about famine and global justice.
Weather risk management products can be critical for supporting effective humanitarian actions to mitigate and prevent disasters; however, to be truly actionable, they must be based in an understanding of how weather contributes to disaster risk, informed by humanitarians’ decision-making context. Our paper seeks to identify considerations for weather risk management products to support disaster risk management, through analysis of humanitarian perceptions of the factors and processes that contribute to weather-influenced disasters, taking Somalia as a case study. We carry out semi-structured interviews with humanitarian actors familiar with using weather information in their work, and we apply social cascades and disaster risk creation as conceptual tools in our analysis.
Our study finds that humanitarian actors perceive historically-influenced social networks, livelihood dependence on seasonality, terrorist territorial control, public capacities to manage disasters, and household-level factors related to asset control and coping mechanisms contribute to weather-influenced disasters in Somalia. These factors and processes are part of humanitarians’ dynamic decision-making context. Key insights from our study concern the importance of understanding local geographies of marginalization to design weather risk management products with the context specificity necessary for effective humanitarian actions. Also, assessing weather effects on livelihood calendars can help identify those seasonal weather conditions most responsible for detrimental livelihood impacts. Consideration of livelihood calendars can also promote accurate assessment of the effects of consecutive weather-related hazards on coping capacities and resiliency.
My article is concerned with the reproduction of power differentials among Somali refugees in Kakuma refugee camp, in Northern Kenya’s Turkana County. By examining how the spatial organisation of the camp mirrors, and amplifies, pre-existing inequalities, it discusses the importance of refugees’ social relations crossing, and blurring, the boundaries of the camp. Based on interviews and focus group discussions with refugees and humanitarian personnel in the camp and in Nairobi, this paper builds upon Adam Ramadan's spatialising approach to the refugee camp and Doreen Massey’s notion of ‘power geometry’ to empirically contribute to the debate on space, biopolitics and the reproduction of inequality. In doing so, it describes how, in Kakuma, Somali entrepreneurs, mostly from Darood and Hawiye clans, leveraged their social networks to gain better access to the connectivity infrastructure of the camp, thus consolidating their position of economic dominance while entrenching the dependency and marginality of Somali Bantu, a community with a history of socio-economic exclusion within the Somali society. This article argues that relations of power are entwined to the materiality of the camp, showing that the plan of Kakuma has been shaped by the rush of resourceful Somali entrepreneurs to secure privileged access to the connectivity infrastructures of the camp, such as the main road and the telecommunication network. The control of these infrastructures through which goods, money and information circulate has thus contributed to reproducing pre-existing power relations.
Somali women's participation in peace-building and conflict resolution in Somalia has been very limited, and they have been marginalized in all aspects of decision-making and governance. However, their political participation is closely linked to peace-building and state-building in Somalia, hence the need to study the various factors which promote or inhibit women's involvement in mainstream peace and reconciliation in Somalia. This chapter summarizes broader research conducted in Galkayo (South and North) and Kismayo, and a focus group discussion conducted in Garowe. The study addressed four research objectives: (1) levels of women's participation in peace-building; (2) factors constraining women's participation; (3) policies, frameworks, rules, and regulations encouraging women's participation; and (4) UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and an agenda to catalyse action and bring about positive change.
In 2011–12, Somalia experienced the worst famine of the twenty- first century. Since then, research on the famine has focused almost exclusively on the external response, the reasons for the delay in the international response, and the implications for international humanitarian action in the context of the “global war on terror.” This paper focuses on the internal, Somali response to the famine. Themes of diversification, mobility and flexibility are all important to understanding how people coped with the famine, but this paper focuses on the factor that seemed to determine whether and how well people survived the famine: social connectedness, the extent of the social networks of affected populations, and the ability of these networks to mobilize resources. These factors ultimately determined how well people coped with the famine. The nature of reciprocity, the resources available within people’s networks, and the collective risks and hazards faced within networks, all determined people’s individual and household outcomes in the famine and are related to the social structures and social hierarchies within Somali society. But these networks had a distinctly negative side as well—social identity and social networks were also exploited to trap humanitarian assistance, turn displaced people into “aid bait,” and to a large degree, determined who benefited from aid once it started to flow. This paper addresses several questions: How did Somali communities and households cope with the famine of 2011 in the absence of any state-led response—and a significant delay in a major international response? What can be learned from these practices to improve our understanding of famine, and of mitigation, response and building resilience to future crises?
Over two decades of external efforts at institution-building in Somalia have failed to revive a functional central government there. There are many reasons for this, not least of which are powerful local interests in perpetuating weak government institutions, facilitating corruption and other illicit activities. But some notable successes have occurred at the local level, both with formal and informal governance mechanisms. Municipalities have been particularly effective sources of formal governance in Somalia’s failed state, providing basic security and services via legitimate and responsive local authorities. In addition, informal hybrid governance arrangements, drawing on a combination of customary authority, sharia courts, business leaders, women’s market groups, and professionals, have been a critical source of routinized, legitimate governance and rule of law in Somalia. External actors have struggled to understand these arrangements and their place in wider state-building efforts. Where external aid has helped with local and informal governance in Somalia, it has been carefully calibrated and based on close contextual knowledge, not template-driven projects.
What causes forced displacement flows, defined as refugee or internally displaced person (IDP) flows, to vary over time within conflict? While forced displacement displays clear relationships with conflict dynamics, little is known about what actually causes forced displacement to vary during a conflict and when that variation is likely to occur. This article explores whether fluctuations in daily violence levels, structural aspects of conflict or both cause variation in forced displacement within conflict. Analysis of daily displacement data and violent events data finds that structural aspects, particularly changes in the conflict’s geographical scope and balance of power, drive increases or decreases in forced displacement. These effects occur due to the portion of the population affected by conflict, security disruptions and fear. There are two main contributions. First, the findings illustrate the complexity of the violence-displacement relationship. Second, this article demonstrates the importance of considering structural aspects of conflict even as data and methodological advancements have allowed scholars to zoom in on the details of conflict.
Under what conditions do rebel groups collaborate with the government in disaster relief operations? Despite the fact that many natural disasters occur in armed conflict contexts, little is known about the impact of conflict actors on natural disaster relief efforts. Affected by the same typhoon, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the New People's Army (NPA) behaved differently in the aftermath of the natural disaster. While the MILF collaborated with the government in relief efforts, the NPA did not. This article explains this variation by arguing that the level of hostility between the rebel group and the state in the pre-disaster period as well as the type of social contract that exists between the rebels and the local population shape collaboration during natural disaster relief efforts. The theoretical argument is explored through a comparative case study between these two rebel groups in the aftermath of a devastating typhoon in the Philippines in 2012.
The attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 intensified international scrutiny of the war against Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (Movement of the Warrior Youth). This article analyses the current state of affairs with reference to the three principal sets of actors in this war: Al-Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its international partners, and the various actors currently involved in building the Somali Federal Government's security forces. It argues that although the newly reconfigured Al-Shabaab poses a major tactical threat in Somalia and across the wider Horn of Africa, the movement is becoming a less important actor in Somalia's national politics. As Al-Shabaab loses territory and its popularity among Somalis continues to dwindle, other clan- and region-based actors will become more salient as national debates over federalism, the decentralization of governance mechanisms beyond Mogadishu and the place of clannism will occupy centre stage. As a consequence, AMISOM's principal roles should gradually shift from degrading Al-Shabaab towards a broader stabilization agenda: encouraging a national consensus over how to build effective governance structures; developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces; and ensuring that the Federal Government delivers services and effective governance to its citizens, especially beyond Mogadishu in the settlements recently captured from Al-Shabaab. As it stands, however, AMISOM is not prepared to carry out these activities. More worryingly, nor is the Somali Federal Government.
On July 20, 2011, the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) operated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, declared a Famine in several areas of the southern part of the country. There had been warnings of the deteriorating situation for some period of time prior to the declaration, but a variety of factors delayed the response. Then humanitarian actors scrambled to scale up a response. The Somalia famine of 2011–2012 thus touched on many familiar themes, and also raised many new ones. This special issue of Global Food Security analyzes the famine—mostly from the perspective of humanitarian actors themselves: analysts, practitioners, and managers of the response. This article introduces the special issue and notes the main questions that the special issue tries to address.
On July 20, 2011, the UN declared a famine in southern Somalia, affecting some 3.1 million people. Although largely described by the media as being caused by drought, the Somalia famine of 2011 was caused by multiple factors—including drought, but also conflict, rapidly-rising global food prices, and other long-standing, structural factors. The response to the famine was substantially complicated by several more factors, which combined to make the crisis worse. These include constrained humanitarian access, and the absence of the World Food Programme. This article analyzes these factors, and poses a set of questions, many of which are addressed by other articles in this issue.
On July 20, 2011, the UN declared a famine in southern Somalia, affecting some 3.1 million people. Although largely described by the media as being caused by drought, the Somalia famine of 2011 was caused by multiple factors—including drought, but also conflict, rapidly-rising global food prices, and other long-standing, structural factors. The response to the famine was substantially complicated by several more factors, which combined to make the crisis worse. These include constrained humanitarian access, and the absence of the World Food Programme. This article analyzes these factors, and poses a set of questions, many of which are addressed by other articles in this issue.
Zones of state failure are assumed to be anarchic. In reality, communities facing the absence of an effective state authority forge systems of governance to provide modest levels of security and rule of law. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Somalia, where an array of local and regional governance arrangements have emerged since the 1991 collapse of the state. The Somalia case can be used both to document the rise of governance without government in a zone of state collapse and to assess the changing interests of local actors seeking to survive and prosper in a context of state failure. The interests of key actors can and do shift over time as they accrue resources and investments; the shift from warlord to landlord gives some actors greater interests in governance and security, but not necessarily in state revival; risk aversion infuses decisionmaking in areas of state failure; and state-building initiatives generally fail to account for the existence of local governance arrangements. The possibilities and problems of the mediated state model, in which weak states negotiate political access through existing local authorities, are considerable.
Somalia today is the site of three major threats: the world's worst humanitarian crisis; the longest-running instance of complete state collapse; and a robust jihadist movement with links to Al-Qa'ida. External state-building, counter-terrorism and humanitarian policies responding to these threats have worked at cross-purposes. State-building efforts that insist humanitarian relief be channelled through the nascent state in order to build its legitimacy and capacity undermine humanitarian neutrality when the state is a party to a civil war. Counter-terrorism policies that seek to ensure that no aid benefits terrorist groups have the net effect of criminalising relief operations in countries where poor security precludes effective accountability. This paper argues that tensions between stabilisation and humanitarian goals in contemporary Somalia reflect a long history of politicisation of humanitarian operations in the country.
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