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Kuhn’s Legacy: Theoretical and Philosophical Study of History
Abstract
This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other.
... A philosopher of science who has promoted the study of the philosophy of historiography is James W. McAllister, for instance through his research programme on 'Philosophical Foundations of the Historiography of Science' at Leiden University (PFHS 2009). One of its results is the article by Kuukkanen (2013), cited in note 5. More generally, McAllister (2008, 2) also argues for a stronger focus on the philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaften, for example in the sessions of European philosophy of science conferences. ...
... [5] Two other articles relevant in this context are Mladenović (2007) and Kuukkanen (2013). ...
The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science.
... As duas principais intenções de Thomas Kuhn ao escrever A estrutura das revoluções científicas eram em certa medida inaugurar um novo modo de se fazer a historiografia da ciência e descrever uma nova imagem de ciência (KUUKKANEN, 2013). A primeira delas, apesar de sua importância, a saber, entender cada ciência como um produto histórico de seu tempo e, como fica claro na introdução de A estrutura, a necessidade de evitar anacronismos; a segunda empreitada de Kuhn nos é aqui mais aproximada do tema do artigo. ...
Em sua obra capital, A Estrutura das Revoluções Cientificas, Thomas Kuhn inaugura uma noção muito própria do progresso científico. No presente artigo, é exposta tal concepção de progresso a partir tanto de uma primeira contextualização histórica inicial, quanto de um sobrevoo pelos principais conceitos da obra mencionada. Para tanto, faz-se uso não apenas de seu escrito mais famoso, mas também de trabalhos posteriores do autor, bem como textos de comentadores e estudiosos do tema. Em um primeiro momento serão apresentados os aspectos gerais da chamada ciência normal, com ênfase na noção de progresso cumulativo, adicionando, por parte dos autores, um exemplo contemporâneo de tal forma de progresso. Em seguida, discorre-se a respeito do processo de ruptura entre a tradição normal e um novo modelo de ciência, processo chamado de revolução científica. A pesquisa resulta na defesa da ideia que o progresso quantitativo — presente nos períodos de desenvolvimento da ciência normal — e o salto qualitativo presente nas mudanças de paradigma ocorridas nas revoluções científicas são processos complementares da mesma estrutura, através da qual o desenvolvimento histórico da ciência tem lugar.
... Kindi (2005). 19 For systematic reflections in this direction see Kuukkanen (2013). 20 Cf. ...
The article is a case study on the views of the famous T.S. Kuhn about the so-called Copernican revolution. Generally, Kuhn is presented as a very successful historian and philosopher of science: an author of world bestsellers. The division among his supporters, i.e. about so-called left-wing and right-wing Kuhnians, is recalled, and the fact that Kuhn himself vehemently dissociated from a large proportion of his adherents. It is also noted here, that in the last 30 years, in addition to abundant hagiographic literature on T. S. Kuhn, there have also been a few critical studies of Kuhn’s achievements. The rest of the article presents the author’s critical analysis of Kuhn’s views on the so-called Copernican Revolution, which formed the basis of Kuhn’s scheme of scientific development presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); i.e. the world’s most famous monograph in social sciences and humanities so far. The criticism encompasses a genesis, content and reception of Kuhn’s views and the development of his interpretations. The analysis is carried out by the means of methodology of historical sciences and a scientific method, which the author describes as the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking. The criticism is based on the author’s current publications (developed here further on), which were sadly unnoticed by the researchers, although presented in the world center for the Copernican research, and are available on the Internet freely. This fact leads the author to the assumption that international Kuhnian research is underdeveloped seriously and that strong prejudices – barriers may exist in scientific circles, such as, e.g., primacy of number of citations (and other bibliometric indicators) over content analysis, the Matthew effect, the effect of alleged and actual scientific centers and peripheries, some mental remnants of the Cold War, as well as underdevelopment of scientific communication.
This article takes issue with Kuhn’s description of the ‘Aristotle experience,’ an event that took place in 1947 and that he retrospectively characterized as a revelation that instantly delivered to him the key concepts of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). We trace a certain transformation of this narrative over time: whereas it commenced from a description of his impression of disparity between the textbook image of science and the study of historical sources, Kuhn started to characterize it as a revelation after learning of the English translation of Fleck’s 1935 Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. This book anticipates many central Kuhnian claims. Kuhn read it as early as 1949, but never fully acknowledged it as a source of inspiration. We discuss four hypotheses concerning the possible influence of Fleck’s theory on Kuhn’s in light of the available evidence. We conclude that the degree of similarity between them is too great to be coincidental.
By seeking answers to ontological and epistemological questions, nursing scholars explored the foundations of nursing and articulated the meaning of nursing science from various philosophical perspectives. This ongoing search for advancement and development of nursing aligns with the concept of "normal science" by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn's science influenced nursing knowledge, resulting in the development of nursing metaparadigm and paradigms. Despite this influence, Kuhn's science's relevance for nursing science received a little scrutinization. This article presents a critical analysis of Kuhn's science and its influence on and relevance for nursing discipline and suggests implications for nursing knowledge development.
Discussing the work of Kuhn, Winch and Wittgenstein in relation to fundamental question of methodology, 'Wittgenstein among the Sciences' undertakes an examination of the nature of (natural) science itself, in the light of which a series of successive cases of putatively scientific disciplines are analysed. A novel and significant contribution to social science methodology and the philosophy of science and 'the human sciences', this book is of interest to social scientists and philosophers, as well as to psychiatrists, economists and cognitive scientists.
On this occasion, and in this place, I feel that I ought, and am probably expected, to look back at the things which have happened to the philosophy of science since I first began to take an interest in it over half a century ago. But I am both too much an outsider and too much a protagonist to undertake that assignment. Rather than attempt to situate the present state of philosophy of science with respect to its past — a subject on which I’ve little authority — I shall try to situate my present state in philosophy of science with respect to its own past — a subject on which, however imperfect, I’m probably the best authority there is.
Preface Note on the third impression 1. Logic of discovery of psychology of research? T. S. Kuhn 2. Against 'Normal Science' J. W. N. Watkins 3. Does the distinction between normal and revolutionary science hold water? S. E. Toulmin 4. Normal science, scientific revolutions and the history of science L. Pearce Williams 5. Normal science and its dangers K. R. Popper 6. The nature of a paradigm Margaret Masterman 7. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes I. Lakatos 8. Consolations for the specialist P. K. Feyerabend 9. Reflections on my critics T. S. Kuhn Index.
The narrativist turn of the 1970s and 1980s transformed the discussion of general history. With the rejection of Rankean historical realism, the focus shifted to the historian as a narrator and on narratives as literary products. Oddly, the historiography of science took a turn in the opposite direction at the same time. The social turn in the historiography of science emphasized studying science as a material and practical activity with traceable and documentable traits. This empirization of the field has led to an understanding that history of science could be directly describable from scientific practice alone without acknowledging the role of the historian as a constructor of narratives about these practices. Contemporary historians of science tend to be critical of science's ability to describe its object—nature, as it is—but they often are not similarly skeptical of their own abilities to describe their object: past science, as it is. I will argue that historiography of science can only gain from a belated narrativist turn.
On this occasion, and in this place, I feel that I ought, and am probably expected, to look back at the things which have happened to the philosophy of science since I first began to take an interest in it over half a century ago. But I am both too much an outsider and too much a protagonist to undertake that assignment. Rather than attempt to situate the present state of philosophy of science with respect to its past — a subject on which I’ve little authority — I shall try to situate my present state in philosophy of science with respect to its own past — a subject on which, however imperfect, I’m probably the best authority there is.
As a number of you know, I’m at work on a book, and what I mean to attempt here is an exceedingly brief and dogmatic sketch of its main themes. I think of my project as a return, now underway for a decade, to the philosophical problems left over from the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
In surveying the field of history and philosophy of science (HPS), it may be more useful just now to pose some key questions than it would be to lay out the sundry competing attempts to unify H and P. The ten problems this essay presents are grounded in a range of work of enormous interest - historical and philosophical work that has made use of productive categories of analysis: context, historicism, purity, and microhistory, to name but a few. What kind of account are we after - historically and philosophically - when we attempt to address science not as a vacuous generality but in its specific, local formation?.
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism.
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle.
-H. Putnam (1975)
L'A. demontre que les historiens ont tendance a decrire les actions et les travaux passes avec un certain anachronisme et suggere qu'il serait utile de donner des limites concernant les presuppositions explicatives et interpretatives de chaque discipline scientifique
Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist `tendency' has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's `epistemic' structural realism; the latter with Ladyman's `ontic' form. And both raise important issues of general interest within the philosophy of science and metaphysics, respectively. The former invites questions regarding the identification and appropriate representation of these commonalities; the latter touches on different views regarding the nature of objects, the constitutive role of properties and the seat of causal powers. Both strands have recently come under critical fire. It is my intention to present a unified account of the `structuralist tendency' which emphasizes the dual roles of structure as representational and constitutive, and to indicate how the more acute critical remarks can be dealt with.
Kuhn argued against both the correspondence theory of truth and convergent realism. Although he likely misunderstood the nature of the correspondence theory, which it seems he wrongly believed to be an epistemic theory, Kuhn had an important epistemic point to make. He maintained that any assessment of correspondence between beliefs and reality is not possible, and therefore, the acceptance of beliefs and the presumption of their truthfulness has to be decided on the basis of other criteria. I will show that via Kuhn’s suggested epistemic values, specifically via problem-solving, his philosophy can be incorporated into a coherentist epistemology. Further, coherentism is, in principle, compatible with convergent realism. However, an argument for increasing likeness to truth requires appropriate historical continuity. Kuhn maintained that the history of science is full of discontinuity, and therefore, the historical condition of convergent realism is not satisfied.
The causal theory of reference is often taken to provide a solution to the problems, such as incomparability and referential discontinuity, that the meaning-change thesis raised. I show that Kuhn successfully questioned the causal theory and Putnam's idea that reference is determined via the sameness relation of essences that holds between a sample and other members of a kind in all possible worlds. Putnam's single ‘essential' properties may be necessary but not sufficient to determine membership in a kind category. Kuhn argued that extension is fixed by similarity-dissimilarity relations that are liable to change in taxonomic reorganizations of science.
We are accustomed to thinking of science and its findings as universal. After all, one atom of carbon plus two of oxygen yields carbon dioxide in Amazonia as well as in Alaska; a scientist in Bombay can use the same materials and techniques to challenge the work of a scientist in New York; and of course the laws of gravity apply worldwide. Why, then, should the spaces where science is done matter at all? David N. Livingstone here puts that question to the test with his fascinating study of how science bears the marks of its place of production. Putting Science in Its Place establishes the fundamental importance of geography in both the generation and the consumption of scientific knowledge, using historical examples of the many places where science has been practiced. Livingstone first turns his attention to some of the specific sites where science has been madeâthe laboratory, museum, and botanical garden, to name some of the more conventional locales, but also places like the coffeehouse and cathedral, ship's deck and asylum, even the human body itself. In each case, he reveals just how the space of inquiry has conditioned the investigations carried out there. He then describes how, on a regional scale, provincial cultures have shaped scientific endeavor and how, in turn, scientific practices have been instrumental in forming local identities. Widening his inquiry, Livingstone points gently to the fundamental instability of scientific meaning, based on case studies of how scientific theories have been received in different locales. Putting Science in Its Place powerfully concludes by examining the remarkable mobility of science and the seemingly effortless way it moves around the globe. From the reception of Darwin in the land of the Maori to the giraffe that walked from Marseilles to Paris, Livingstone shows that place does matter, even in the world of science.
A generation ago scientific ideas floated free in the air, as historians gazed up at them in wonder and admiration. From time to time, historians agreed, the ideas that made up the body of scientific truth became incarnate: they were embedded into the fleshly forms of human culture and attached to particular times and places. How this incarnation occurred was a great mystery. How could spirit be made flesh? How did the transcendent and the timeless enter the forms of the mundane and the contingent? Platonist and providentialist perspectives offered ways of speaking about the mystery, but, in general, it remained unresolved at the core of orthodox idealist historiography.
History of Science Version of Record
Focusing on the notion of representation and on the necessity of distinguishing between representation and description, this book argues that the traditional semantic apparatus of meaning, truth, and reference that we use for description must be redefined if we are to understand properly the nature of historical writing. ---------- Frank Ankersmit is Professor of History at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Among his many books are Political Representation (Stanford, 2001) and Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford, 1997). ---------- This book fully recognizes the aestheticism inherent in historical writing while acknowledging its claim to satisfy the demands of rational and scientific inquiry. Focusing on the notion of representation and on the necessity of distinguishing between representation and description, it argues that the traditional semantic apparatus of meaning, truth, and reference that we use for description must be redefined if we are to understand properly the nature of historical writing. The author shows that historical representation is essentially aesthetic, though its adequacy can be discussed rationally. He defines the criteria for representational adequacy, and examines the relationship between these criteria and value judgments. He also investigates the historicist conception of historical writing and the notions of identity and narrativity. This investigation takes place against the backdrop of the ideas of four of the most influential contemporary historical theorists: Erich Auerbach, Arthur Danto, Hayden White, and Jörn Rüsen. The book aims to identify and to explore for historical theory the juste milieu between the extravagances of the literary approach to historical writing and the narrow-mindedness of empiricists. The search for this juste milieu leads to a rationalist aesthetics of historical writing, a position that repeats both the aesthetic dimension of all historical writing and the criteria defining the rationality of the discipline of history.
Few philosophers of science have influenced as many readers as Thomas S. Kuhn. Yet no comprehensive study of his ideas has existedâuntil now. In this volume, Paul Hoyningen-Huene examines Kuhn's work over four decades, from the days before The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to the present, and puts Kuhn's philosophical development in a historical framework. Scholars from disciplines as diverse as political science and art history have offered widely differing interpretations of Kuhn's ideas, appropriating his notions of paradigm shifts and revolutions to fit their own theories, however imperfectly. Hoyningen-Huene does not merely offer another interpretationâhe brings Kuhn's work into focus with rigorous philosophical analysis. Through extended discussions with Kuhn and an encyclopedic reading of his work, Hoyningen-Huene looks at the problems and justifications of his claims and determines how his theories might be expanded. Most significantly, he discovers that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions can be understood only with reference to the historiographic foundation of Kuhn's philosophy. Discussing the concepts of paradigms, paradigm shifts, normal science, and scientific revolutions, Hoyningen-Huene traces their evolution to Kuhn's experience as a historian of contemporary science. From here, Hoyningen-Huene examines Kuhn's well-known thesis that scientists on opposite sides of a revolutionary divide "work in different worlds," explaining Kuhn's notion of a world-change during a scientific revolution. He even considers Kuhn's most controversial claimsâhis attack on the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification and his notion of incommensurabilityâaddressing both criticisms and defenses of these ideas. Destined to become the authoritative philosophical study of Kuhn's work, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions both enriches our understanding of Kuhn and provides powerful interpretive tools for bridging Continental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions.
What is temperature, and how can we measure it correctly? These may seem like simple questions, but the most renowned scientists struggled with them throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. In Inventing Temperature , Chang examines how scientists first created thermometers; how they measured temperature beyond the reach of standard thermometers; and how they managed to assess the reliability and accuracy of these instruments without a circular reliance on the instruments themselves.
In a discussion that brings together the history of science with the philosophy of science, Chang presents the simple yet challenging epistemic and technical questions about these instruments, and the complex web of abstract philosophical issues surrounding them. Chang's book shows that many items of knowledge that we take for granted now are in fact spectacular achievements, obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and controversy. Lurking behind these achievements are some very important philosophical questions about how and when people accept the authority of science.
What big questions and large-scale narratives give coherence to the history of science? From the late 1970s onward, the field has been transformed through a stress on practice and fresh perspectives from gender studies, the sociology of knowledge, and work on a greatly expanded range of practitioners and cultures. Yet these developments, although long overdue and clearly beneficial, have been accompanied by fragmentation and loss of direction. This essay suggests that the narrative frameworks used by historians of science need to come to terms with diversity by understanding science as a form of communication. The centrality of processes of movement, translation, and transmission is already emerging in studies of topics ranging from ethnographic encounters to the history of reading. Not only does this approach offer opportunities for crossing boundaries of nation, period, and discipline that are all too easily taken for granted; it also has the potential for creating a more effective dialogue with other historians and the wider public.
Towards a classification of approaches to the history of science
- Kartens
Reconstructing scientific revolutions Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Translated by Levine A T with a foreword by Thomas S
- Hoyningen
- Huene
Historical epistemology Questions of evidence. Proof, practice and persuasion across the disciplines
- L Daston
Social epistemology The Routledge companion to epistemology
- M Kusch
Thomas Kuhn’s revolution. An historical philosophy of science
- J A Marcum
- JA Marcum
The place of knowledge
- A Ophir
- S Shapin
Kuhn. Philosopher of scientific revolution
- W Sharrock
- R Read
Colligatory concepts in history The philosophy of history
- Wh Walsh
Colligatory concepts in history
- W H Walsh
- WH Walsh
Meaning changes. A study of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy
- J-M Kuukkanen
Philosopher of scientific revolution
- Sharrock
- R Read