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Deductivism Surpassed: Or, Foxing in its Margins?
Abstract
John Fox argued that deductivism must be supplemented with ‘epistemic syllogisms’, non-deductive arguments whose vindication is trivial if deductivism is correct. I resist this attempt to surpass deductivism.
... La scoperta, sosteneva, risponde a situazioni contingenti, allorquando la spiegazione richiede istruzioni chiare e ripercorribili da chiunque, anche in assenza delle condizioni di base del gesto euristico primigenio. Dell'induttivismo di Popper resta però molto poco in Musgrave (2012), il quale contesta a filosofi del calibro di Fox l'adesione implicita ai modelli deduttivi: in fin dei conti, sostiene, la conoscenza deve poter essere articolata in chiave logica -e prima o poi tutti tornano all'ovile della deduzione (classica), proprio per impossibilità di formalizzare appieno il processo di scoperta. ...
La formazione dottorale italiana in ambito pedagogico si scontra con la condizione generale dei laureati nell’ambito delle scienze sociali: i corsi EQF 6 ed EQF 7 (triennale e magistrale) non sempre formano alla ricerca. Quest’ultima carenza formativa non si ripropone in termini di scrittura scientifica, bensì di comunicazione. Quest’ultima avviene in un contesto accademico dominato da quella che il presente contributo definisce ‘la maniera’, cioè il modus operandi neopositivistico per la redazione e distribuzione degli studi scientifici. Di qui, i due corni della questione: se non apprende a essere manierista, il dottorando rischia l’esclusione; la maniera stessa, però, marginalizza la creatività e l’eccentricità tipica dei fenomeni euristici nella scienza. Ricollocando tale problematica alla luce delle svolte epistemologiche del Ventesimo Secolo, è possibile ridefinire la formazione dottorale alla luce di un’idea di scienza come risultato di un esercizio di razionalità discorsiva.
... AGORA-net currently seems to be the only software tool that, on the one hand, does not allow construction of arguments without using an argument scheme and, on the other, provides only deductively valid argument schemes from propositional logic such as modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism. I do not plan to defend this design decision here; the interested reader might have a look at Hoffmann (2013) and the considerations developed by Cloy (2010), especially in the section "Argument Reconstruction and Proof" of his article (see also Musgrave 2012). For the purpose of this paper, it will be sufficient to show the differences in the example discussed below. ...
Technology is not only an object of philosophical reflection but also something that can change this reflection. This paper discusses the potential of computer-supported argument visualization tools for coping with the complexity of philosophical arguments. I will show, in particular, how the interactive and web-based argument mapping software “AGORA-net” can change the practice of philosophical reflection, communication, and collaboration. AGORA-net allows the graphical representation of complex argumentations in logical form and the synchronous and asynchronous collaboration on those “argument maps” on the internet. Web-based argument mapping can overcome limits of space, time, and access, and it can empower users from all over the world to clarify their reasoning and to participate in deliberation and debate. Collaborative and web-based argument mapping tools such as AGORA-net can change the practice of arguing in two dimensions. First, arguing on web-based argument maps in both collaborative and adversarial form can lead to a fundamental shift in the way arguments are produced and debated. It can provide an alternative to the traditional four-step process of writing, publishing, debating, and responding in new writing with its clear distinction between individual and social activities by a process in which these four steps happen virtually simultaneously, and individual and social activities become more closely intertwined. Second, by replacing the linear form of arguments through graphical representations of networks of inferential relations which can grow over time in an infinite space, these tools do not only allow a clear visualization of structures and relations, but also forms of collaboration in which, for example, participants work on different “construction zones” of larger argument maps, or debates are performed at specific points of disagreement on those maps. I introduce the term synergetic logosymphysis (defined as a process in which an argumentative structure grows in a collaborative effort) to describe a practice that combines these two dimensions of collaborative- and web-based argument mapping.
Traditional attempts to understanding inductive reasoning in science have typically involved analyzing language, focusing on statements or propositions. However, recent arguments suggest that this approach misconceives induction, prompting the need for a new perspective. This study offers a fresh view on induction by integrating William Whewell's theory of induction, which distinguishes two forms of reasoning: interpretation and representation. This perspective suggests that induction can be seen as a reasoning process based on semantic and pragmatic models rather than statements or propositions.
The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics.
In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.
The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics.
Although I have offered some criticisms of her views on evidence and testing (Achinstein, 2001, pp. 132–40), I very much admire Deborah Mayo's book (1996) and her other work on evidence. As she herself notes in the course of showing how misguided my criticism is, we actually agree on two important points. We agree that whether e, if true, is evidence that h, in the most important sense of “evidence,” is an objective fact, not a subjective one of the sort many Bayesians have in mind. And we agree that it is an empirical fact, not an a priori one of the sort Carnap has in mind. Here I will take a broader and more historical approach than I have done previously and raise some general questions about her philosophy of evidence, while looking at a few simple examples in terms of which to raise those questions. It is my hope that, in addition to being of some historical interest, this chapter will help clarify differences between us. Mill under Siege.One of Mayo’s heroes is Charles Peirce. Chapter 12 of Mayo’s major work, which we are honoring, is called “Error Statistics and Peircean Error Correction.” She has some very convincing quotes from Peirce suggesting that he was a model error-statistical philosopher. Now I would not have the Popperian boldness to say that Mayo is mistaken about Peirce; that is not my aim here.
In this paper I prove one interesting result and provide strong argument for another. First, I refute deduetivism. To be precise, I show that there are deductively invalid forms of inference that a deductivist cannot consistently reject as unsound. These forms are not, however, inductive. Second, I argue that precisely if there are sound inductive forms of argument, science can be given an adequate rational reconstruction using only non-inductive forms of argument. So to this extent, inductive forms are either unsound or unnecessary. This, I suggest, is the core of truth in much Popperian argument. However, I also argue that precisely if scientific argument can be so analysed, there must be sotmd inductive forms of argument. Inductive inferences, therefore, are either needed for the analysis of scientific inference, or sound. This, I suggest, is the core of truth in much anti-Popperian argument. In fact, surprisingly, relative to uncontroversial assumptions, these two positions are in fact equivalent.