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Revista CES Psicología
ISSN 2011-3080
Volumen 6 Número 1 Enero-Junio 2013 pp. 82-104 Artículo de investigación
Defining and characterizing
the concept of Internet Meme
Definición y caracterización del concepto de Meme de
Internet
Carlos Mauricio Castaño Díaz1
University of Copenhagen, Dinamarca.
Forma de citar: Castaño, D., C.M. (2013). Defining and characterizing the concept of Internet Meme.
Revista CES Psicología, 6
(2),82-104..
Abstract
The research aims to create a formal definition of “Internet Meme” (IM) that can be used to
characterize and study IMs in academic contexts such as social, communication sciences and
humanities. Different perspectives of the term meme were critically analysed and contrasted, creating
a contemporary concept that synthesizes different meme theorists’ visions about the term. Two
different kinds of meme were found in the contemporary definitions, the meme-gene, and the meme-
virus. The meme-virus definition and characteristics were merged with definitions of IM taken from the
Internet in the light of communication theories, in order to develop a formal characterization of the
concept. Lastly, the use for characterization and research of the developed concept is exemplified by
analysing two internet memes.
Palabras claves: Meme, Internet Meme, Lamarckism, Darwinism, Viral Propagation (Media).
Resumen
La presente investigación tiene como propósito crear una definición formal de “Meme de Internet”
(IM) que pueda ser usada para caracterizar y estudiar este tipo de memes en contextos académicos
como las ciencias sociales, de la comunicación y las humanidades. Para esto, diferentes perspectivas y
usos del término meme son analizadas y contrastadas, creando así un concepto actual que sintetiza la
visión de los diferentes teóricos de los memes. En esta fase se encontraron dos tipos diferentes de
definiciones contemporáneas de meme, el meme-gen y el meme-virus. La definición de meme-virus
fue usada y combinada con definiciones de IM tomadas del Internet usando teorías de la
comunicación, esto con el propósito de desarrollar una definición formal de dicho concepto.
Finalmente, el concepto construido de IM es ejemplificado en su uso para caracterización e
investigación en el campo de lo IM, analizando dos memes de Internet.
Keywords: Meme, Meme De Internet, Lamarckismo, Darwinismo, Propagación Viral (Media).
1 Psicólogo. Universidad de Antioquia. Colombia. Master en Cognición y Comunicación. Universidad de Copenhagen.
Dinamarca (Master of Arts in Cognition and Communication University of Copenhagen, Denmark).
c.mauricio1985@gmail.com
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Introduction
The meme concept is an academic concept
coined in 1976 by the biologist Richard
Dawkins in his book
The Selfish Gene.
He
proposed the term
meme
as a Darwinian,
gene-centred approach to cultural evolution,
defining it as “the unit of cultural
transmission”. Nevertheless, nowadays it is
possible to find the concept of meme almost
everywhere on the internet, not making
allusion to the concept created by Dawkins,
but relating to certain kinds of images, jokes
or trends popular within the cybernauts.
Since 1976, the term
meme
has evolved,
changed not only by different authors and
theorists that follow or criticize Dawkins’
theory, but also by its creator (Dawkins,
1993). The roots of the concept grew distant
from its primal definition from a Darwinian
perspective, and began to grow in different
ontological directions. This can be seen in
the different uses theorists make of the
term, e.g. by Blackmore (1999); Dawkins
(1976, 1993). The present research will
explore the implications and variations of
concept by different authors and create a
synthesis among their characteristics in
order to create an updated concept of
meme.
However, the concept of meme has gone
beyond the academic definition; this due to
the expansion of the computer usage and
the exponential growth of the Internet,
particularly forums, chats, blogs and social
networks; the concept was coined to a new
form of internet communication. Meme is
now, somehow, related with what Dawkins
define as a meme, but with some special
characteristics due to their way of
transmission and speed of replication. The
present research addresses these new
memes as
Internet Memes
(
IM
).
It is important to understand the transition
between Dawkins’ Meme and the IM in order
to understand the characteristics of the
memes of the new era. In addition,
introducing an analysis of the transition of
the concept will facilitate future research
about both memes and internet memes;
providing a theoretical, historical and
bibliographical basis for the concept of IM.
Finding a formal definition of
Internet meme
is not easy. Theorists have not defined it or
characterized the concept of IM in an official
manner that can be used and excerpted by
academics. It is important to create a formal
definition of IM in order to facilitate their
study in scholarly contexts (e.g., cultural
analysis). Meanwhile, on the internet the
use of the term
meme
has grown in
exponential proportions, that it is possible
to say that the term meme is a meme itself
(Sperber, 1996, p. 101).
The present research is articulated as
follows: first, I will introduce the concept of
meme from different perspectives, starting
with the former definition by Dawkins and
following by other authors as Sperber,
Blackmore, Dennet and Olesen. This aims to
familiarize the reader with the different
perspectives about the concept of meme.
Next, different nuisances in the diverse uses
that the authors give to the concept will be
assessed. Consequently, the different
elements stated above will be used in order
to synthesize a contemporary, formal and
academic definition of meme. In the
following section, the mentioned definition
will be contrasted with definitions of IM
taken from unofficial sources (Internet web
pages) and critically compared using
communication sciences theories in order to
create a formal definition of Internet meme.
In the end, this definition will be used with
three IM in order to exemplify its use and to
study and characterize memes found on the
Internet.
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84
What is a Meme?
In this chapter, perspectives and definitions
worked by different theorist about memes
will be introduced. However, no critical
discussion will be carried out as the only
purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the
reader with the different theories and
perspectives of the authors. Diverse
nuisances will be highlighted and critically
analysed later on in the text, in light of
teleological understanding of the concept.
The concept of meme comes first when the
biologist Richard Dawkins in his book The
Selfish Gene coin it as the unit of cultural
transmission. In the author’s words:
We need a name for the new replicator, a
noun that conveys the idea of a unit of
cultural transmission, or a unit of
imitation
. ’Mimeme' comes from a
suitable Greek root, but I want a
monosyllable that sounds a bit like
'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will
forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to
meme.
(Dawkins, 1976, p. 192)
[The italics
are from the author].
Some examples of memes are tunes,
ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions,
ways of making pots or of building arches.
Just as genes propagate themselves in the
gene pool by leaping from body to body
via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping
from brain to brain via a process which, in
the broad sense, can be called imitation
[…]. As my colleague N. K. Humphrey
neatly summed up an earlier draft of this
chapter:'...
memes should be regarded as
living structures, not just metaphorically
but technically
” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 192)
[The italics are mine].
The previous idea shows how Dawkins
creates a term that represents an indivisible,
gene-like cultural unit, able of propagation
from person to person with the help of
imitation. This unit possesses a proper
power that allows its reproduction and
spread.
In addition, Dawkins defines meme based
on the notion of replicator (applied to
culture). A replicator is a biological or
chemical singularity of indivisible
proportions. This “molecule” acts as a
template, and has the capacity of creating
copies of itself. (Dawkins, 1976, p. 15)
Furthermore, Dawkins states in his book
three properties that a replicator should
encompass in order to be “successful” (that
is, to manage to make copies of itself): a)
Longevity
is the amount of time the
replicator can live or otherwise the amount
of time it can reproduce itself. b)
Fecundity
is the rate at which copies are done. c)
Copy-
Fidelity
is the precision of which copies of
itself can be created, taking into account
that every replication process generates a
certain amount of mistakes every time a
copy is made.
Other concepts linked to the memes’
proprieties uncovered in “The Selfish Gene”
by Dawkins are the
competition
as well as its
role in the development of the replicators.
With this concept, the author points to the
core of the Darwinian theory: the effect that
environmental pressure exerts over
replicators and how the competition for
resources and space shapes them, as well as
how more successful mutations can
maintain, multiply and compete with other
memes in the same space (Dawkins, 1976,
pp. 18-19).
Accordingly, it is possible to propose a first
characterization of the concept of meme as a
unit
of
transmission
that can
replicate
itself
by means of
imitation,
and that possesses
three characteristics that make it successful:
longevity, fecundity, and copy-fidelity
. It is
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sensitive to environmental pressures
including the ones caused by its peers and is
non-teleological
(Dawkins, 1976, p. 18).
In
addition, it is possible to say that memes
behaviour is technically, and not
metaphorically as
living structures,
as
pointed out above in Dawkins (1976, p. 192).
The present research aims to go beyond the
original definition of meme, creating a
formal definition that synthesizes other
visions and uses of the concept provided by
other authors, while covering the
transformations of the principle over time.
Consolidate a broader concept of meme
gives more stability to the construction of
the concept of “Internet meme”. As a matter
of fact, the present research assesses five
theorists that have studied the concept of
meme and are, simultaneously, up to date in
the research field of meme studies: Dan
Sperber, Susan Blackmore, Daniel Dennet,
Mogens Olesen and Richard Dawkins.
The cognitive scientist Dan Sperber
understands meme as a synonym of
cultural
replicators
(based on the definition provided
by Dawkins), defined by the author in terms
of
representations
. It explains the replicators
have a representational basis, they are
symbols and associations in the human
mind. What is more, there are two main
kinds of representations highlighted by the
author: the
mental representations
, which
are internal to the subject, such as beliefs;
and the
public representations
, which are
external to the subject, such as paintings
(Sperber, 1996, p. 24). However, there is a
third representation type derived from the
previous two, the
cultural representations,
understood as a combined subset of the
public and the mental representations
within a social group (Sperber, 1996, p. 33).
Consequently, Sperber assesses the
transmission, media and copy fidelity of
representations in the same way as Dawkins
considers memes. For Sperber, there is no
difference between representations and
memes. He exemplifies this subject by
comparing the oral transmission, which he
states to have a low reliable means of
reproduction and creates low fidelity copies;
with other kinds of transmission, as the
writing, with a higher reliability and copy
fidelity (Sperber, 1996, p. 32).
However, the author moves away from one
of Dawkins main characteristics of the
concept of meme, putting them into another
level. Specifically he moves the memes (or
representations) from the level of chemistry
to the level of
epidemiology
. This new way
to relate with the concept has ontological
implications:
A representation can be slowly
transmitted over generations and are
comparable with
endemics
; other
representations spread rapidly thorough
a whole population and have a short life-
span, they are comparable with
epidemic
”
(Sperber, 1996, pp. 57-58)[the italics are
mine].
As a matter of fact, Sperber is not only
taking representations to an epidemic layer
in a metaphorical way, but in a technical
way. Also, he suggests two ways of
representations can propagate:
vertical
(over
generations, as genes do), and
horizontal
(across a certain population like viruses).
This jump to the field of epidemiology in the
characterization of memes has important
ontological consequences that will be
closely examined later on in the text.
On the other hand, Psychologist Susan
Blackmore takes the original definition of
meme proposed by Dawkins in 1976 with
other emphases. First of all, she stresses the
role of imitation as central for the
replication of memes, stating that it is what
makes humans different from animals. Thus,
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moving the concept from the field of biology
to the field of social learning (Blackmore,
1999, pp. 3, 4, 47). Second, Blackmore
defines replicators in a broader sense than
the one of his creator, as: “anything of which
copies are made” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 5).
Finally, Blackmore adds an actor to the
meme replication chain, the
interactor,
defined by the theorist as “the entity that
interacts with the environment. That carry
the replicator inside and protect it”
(Blackmore, 1999, p. 5). Therefore, opposite
to the former characterization of meme by
Dawkins, the units of transmission are not
autonomous; they require of a subject in
order to be replicated.
Now, following the principles of Darwinian
Theory propounded by Dawkins, memes are
not teleological. Nevertheless Blackmore
adds teleology and
intentionality
as another
feature of the concept of meme: “[Memes]
Interest
in their own replication, like genes”
(Blackmore, 1999, p. 4) [The italics are
mine], reiterating this as a problem of the
memetic later on in her text. She highlights
intentionality and
Lamarckism
as one of the
three problems the detractors of the meme
theories have pointed to: “we cannot specify
the unit of a meme, we don’t know the
mechanism for copying and storing memes
,
memetic evolution is ‘Lamarckian’
”
(Blackmore, 1999, p. 47)[The italics are
mine]. Later on, the stress added by the
author in the intentionality of the memes
will be a key element in the evolution of the
concept. This transit will be adopted by
Dawkins in 1993 in order to reformulate the
notion.
It is also important to add that Blackmore
refers tacitly to the memes in an
epidemiological way: “meme-immunological
system was not well developed” (Blackmore,
1999, p. 19). This position keeps up a
correspondence with the perspective of
meme raised by Dan Sperber.
The third meme theorist to be analysed,
Daniel Dennet, takes the definition of meme
closest to the former concept formulated by
Dawkins. He defines meme, in a Darwinian
basis, as the name of any item of cultural
evolution (Dennet, 1995, p. 342). The
Darwinian traces can be followed in three
characteristics named by the author as
variation, heredity, and differential fitness
(copy-fidelity, longevity and fecundity for
Dawkins). Dennet follows Dawkins in every
aspect, except that he stresses the variation
of a meme as its core feature instead of its
stability, by defining copy-fidelity in terms of
variation.
In addition, the cultural perspective is of
great significance in Dennet’s approach to
memes, bringing about a major difference
with Dawkins understanding of the concept.
For Dennet, the pressure that culture exerts
over the genetic evolution plays an essential
role for understanding behavioural
innovations such as memes (Dennet, 1995,
p. 338)
Dennet, following Dawkins’ proposal,
describes memes as technically comparable
to genetic evolution (Dennet, 1995, p. 345).
Articulating this, the author propounds that
memes in the same way as genetic
evolution, are susceptible to the
environmental pressure while propagating
and mutating generationally. This proposal
will play an influential role later on in the
characterization of the concept meme. In
spite of the technical analogy between
memes and genes, the author alludes to the
memes as
parasites
with intentionality
(Dennet, 1995, p. 346); raising the problems
of the teleology of memes as well as their
direction of transmission again.
In fact, the author (Dennet, 1995, pp. 349,
355) brings about the nature of memes of
competing for acquiring space (minds) in
the
infosphere
, just as genes do in the
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biosphere. This competition is non-
teleological by definition. Nevertheless
there is a conflict between the
acknowledgment of Darwinian meme-
evolution given by the author, and the
reference to memes as intentional parasites
given previously. However, the author solves
this contradiction by turning towards a
different evolutionary perspective:
It is a sort of Lamarckian replication of
acquired characteristics as Gould and
others have suggested. The very creativity
and activity of human minds as
temporary homes for memes seems to
guarantee that lines of descent are
hopelessly muddled, and that phenotypes
(the ‘body design’ of memes) change so
fast that there is no keeping track of the
‘natural kinds’ (Dennet, 1995, p. 355).
Thus, the position of Dennet towards the
Darwinian characteristics of memes is
discarded. Specifically, Darwinian evolution
depends more on high copy fidelity, whereas
the meme relies more on a high rate of
replication by means of a tool. This tool not
only copies the meme, but transforms,
invents, interpolates, censors and mixes
them up producing different outcomes every
time.
A last thought-provoking idea from Dennet
points towards other meme types not
highlighted by previous theorists; this is
what cognitive psychology would call bias.
For Dennet, the meme filters each person
has, act themselves as memes, shaping the
environment, as well as their replication
opportunities. The author exemplifies this in
the following way: if a person ignores
everything coming from
A
and, on the
contrary, accepts everything coming from
B
;
that person is giving the opportunity to all
memes coming from
B
to replicate in his
brain and none to the memes coming from
A
to do so. At the same time, the person may
transmit that filter to other minds, for
instance, by saying that
A
is not a reliable
source, so other people will not attend to
A
and prefer
B
instead. (Dennet, 1995, p. 350).
Olesen (2009), works in the development of
the notion of meme based on theories of
communication, defining them from this
perspective. This is a different point of view
compared with the ones raised previously as
memes are explained under transmission of
communication and not under information
theories. Supporting his work on Dawkins,
Dennet and Blackmore; Olesen defines a
meme as: “any form of cultural phenomenon
that can be copied from one mind to
another” (Olesen, 2009, p. 71). This
operationalization of meme positions the
term as a social and cultural phenomenon
from a starting point.
Although, the author points out
characteristics previously referred following
the Darwinian Theory: a meme that is easy
to learn, available to many and easy to
remember, are more likely to spread and
survive. He stresses the idea of memes
behaving like a virus, with memes battling
for being transferred from brain to brain. In
fact, the author points out the lack of
autonomy of a meme compared with a gene
in matters of hosting and transmission: “A
meme is not a true form of life like a gene.
Though, it is more like a virus and in that
way we are hosts to parasites. A meme relies
on his host to reproduce itself” (Olesen,
2009, p. 71).
However, the biggest contribution from
Olesen to the debate about memes is
acknowledging the problem that generates
the lack of agreement in a definition of the
notion of meme, pointing at the same time a
gap in the meme-gene analogy:
The unclear nature of the relation
between the individual and the meme
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allows a variety of interpretations of the
meme concept, which has lead to a low
consensus of its definition:
-Distinct memorable units (Dennet 1995)
-Unit of cultural transmission (Dawkins
1976)
-Unit of imitation (Blackmore 1999)
-An observable cultural phenomenon
(Gatherer 1998)
-An element of a culture that may be
considered to be passed on by non-
genetic means, especially imitation
(Oxford English Dictionary)
(Olesen, 2009, p. 73)
Accordingly, it is possible to state that
Olesen accounts for the
quid
of the meme-
gene analogy problem, not as a matter of
autonomy/dependence
of the replication
units or a teleological question. For the
theorist, it is a theoretical problem created
by dissimilar definitions of the term by
different theorist including its creator; this
fact will be developed in the next
paragraphs.
Dawkins, in
The Blind Watchmaker
(1986),
modifies his former definition of meme. In
his own words, the meme concept is still
comparable with the DNA, but instead of
being defined as the unit of transmission, it
is defined as
patterns of information
. This
implies that memes are, in fact, more
complex than a unit. Simultaneously, he
introduces an agent for the meme to
reproduce, suggesting that contrary to the
DNA, memes have no autonomy.
The new replicators are not DNA […].
They are patterns of information that can
thrive only in brains or the artificially
manufactured products of brains - books,
computers, and so on. […] As they
propagate they can change - mutate. And
perhaps 'mutant' memes can exert the
kinds of influence that I am here calling
'replicator power'. […] Cultural evolution
is many orders of magnitude faster than
DNA based evolution, which sets one
even more to thinking of the idea of
'takeover'. And if a new kind of replicator
takeover is beginning, it is conceivable
that it will take off so far as to leave its
parent DNA (Dawkins, 1986, pp. 157-158).
According to this statement, the author
makes a rupture with his previous
conception of meme by accentuating the
mutation capabilities of the meme. This
contrast with the argument rose in his text
from 1976 where stability is said to be what
yields success to the DNA. In other words,
Dawkins is assessing the mutational
capabilities of memes in the same way of a
virus that is transmitted horizontally,
instead of a generational mutation.
There is also an influential development on
the author’s position in The Blind
Watchmaker. Contrary to his opinion quoted
in the selfish Gene in the words of N.
Humphrey, where he states that the
relationship between gene and meme is a
technical relation; Dawkins reckons the
relationship between memes and genes as
only an analogy “between true Darwinian
evolution and what has been called cultural
evolution” (Dawkins, 1986, p. 196).
This stand will be accentuated in his text
Viruses of the Mind
(1993), where Dawkins
will change even further his definition of
meme. What is more, the author issues that
memes behave more like computer viruses
do: they spread horizontally, from vehicle to
vehicle, and from medium to medium at a
very high speed (Dawkins, 1993, p. 3).
Making emphasis on what a computer virus
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is and how it develops, replicates and
propagates:
Think about the two qualities that a virus
or any sort of parasitic replicator […]
These qualities are, firstly, a readiness to
replicate information accurately, perhaps
with some mistakes that are subsequently
reproduced accurately; and, secondly, a
readiness to obey instructions encoded in
the information so replicated. […] What
this phenomenon means is that human
brains are capable of pretty accurate
copying (otherwise the accents of, say,
Newcastle would not be stable enough to
be recognized) but with some mistakes
(otherwise pronunciation would not
evolve, and all speakers of a language
would inherit identically the same
accents from their remote ancestors). […]
The second requirement of a virus-
friendly environment --- that it should
obey a program of coded instructions ---
[…] Less portentously, and again
especially prominent in children, the
``craze'' is a striking example of behavior
that owes more to epidemiology than to
rational choice. Yo-yos, hula hoops and
pogo sticks, with their associated
behavioral fixed actions, sweep through
schools, and more sporadically leap from
school to school, in patterns that differ
from a measles epidemic in no serious
particular […] Trivial though they are,
crazes provide us with yet more
circumstantial evidence that human
minds, especially perhaps juvenile ones,
have the qualities that we have singled
out as desirable for an informational
parasite. (Dawkins, 1993, pp. 6-7)
According to the previous paragraph, it is
possible to identify ontological turns in the
notion of meme, all of them brought about
by its original creator. The now called
analogy is not anymore related with DNA
evolution but with a viral and
epidemiological perspective. The analogy
possesses two proprieties: one associated
with its way of reproduction and a second
connected with the salience of the meme for
it to be acquainted, therefore, replicated by
others. Dawkins assesses populations
memes like, for they can spread themselves
in an “epidemic” manner. Parallel to this
affirmation, he is underlining the role of
stability and variation in viral reproduction.
When this perspective is introduced, the
meme concept is subject to a teleological
turn: the
goal
of the meme is to spread and
replicate. This perspective shares the
principles of Lamarckian evolution; thus,
disregarding the Darwinian perspective that
the author used when defining the term for
the first time.
Assessing the aforementioned authors and
the problems rose by the disagreement
between their definitions of the term meme,
the main perspectives of the term and its
devenir
will be discussed in the following
sections. This will be done, in order to
surpass the conflict with the
operationalization of the term and, at the
same time, generate a holistic definition
that agrees both with the general points
emphasised by the authors and a
contemporaneous perspective of the term.
Perspectives about Memes I: Genes vs.
Virus.
As stated in the previous section, one of the
main issues when defining the concept of
meme is to typify the way it replicates and
spreads. Despite of the fact that the early
definition of meme is based on a purely
genetic perspective (a proto-form of DNA, a
simple molecule able to self-reproduce) the
becoming of the notion has taken other
branches, even for Richard Dawkins.
Besides, every change in the characterization
of the term influences its ontology.
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When
defining
meme based on DNA
characteristics, it would be the smallest unit
of transmission able to replicate itself. When
defining meme based on a virus perspective,
the term becomes more sophisticated.
Indeed, a virus is not a simple molecule; it is
formed at least by two parts as the Oxford
English Dictionary describes:
Virus: Pronunciation: / v rəs/
noun
1. An infective agent that typically
consists of a nucleic acid molecule in a
protein coat, is too small to be seen by
light microscopy, and is able to multiply
only within the living cells of a host:
The hepatitis B virus
(“Oxford English Dictionary,” June 2013)
In addition to this, a virus cannot self
replicate; it needs an agent or host in order
to do so. This marks an important difference
with the prime mould-unity proposed by
Dawkins (1976), in the sense that thinking
about a meme in terms of a virus is thinking
about a complex unity. In the first case, the
behaviour of memes will correspond to the
deeds of emergent agents that can self-
support their procreation in a proper
environment. Defining meme in the second
way depends on a complex unity that
behaves like a system and needs a host to
self-copy.
Meme’s
direction and speed
of replication
are affected by the change in the defining
metaphor, as well. In the same way, as
stated by the abovementioned authors, the
genetic metaphor entails a vertical
transmission; that is to say: from generation
to generation, inside a certain population,
and in a determined environment. From an
epidemiological perspective, a meme can be
transmitted horizontally; that is in the same
generation, to several agents belonging to
one or different groups, inside or outside a
specific environment. This change brings
about an inherent increment of speed in the
reproduction as well as augment of reach.
Defining meme as a computer virus
following Dawkins in 1993: “2 (also computer
virus) a piece of code which is capable of
copying itself and typically has a detrimental
effect, such as corrupting the system or
destroying data.” (Dictionary). It is possible
to surpass the problem of self-replication
created by the change of metaphor. On the
contrary, a new problem arises with this
analogy: a virus can self-replicate, but only
by means of a host; what is more, such
defined virus needs a creator in order to
exist.
As a result of this change and the
transformations it generates, the strength
trait of the concept of meme is changed. As
Dawkins points out in his first definition, a
gene can mutate, but its strength lies in its
stability. The mutation is just a vicissitude,
and if it is more or less successful in the
next generation is a matter of chance. On
the other hand, the strength of the virus lies
in its capacity of mutation, which helps it to
change hosts and environments and be
difficult to annihilate. Accordingly, when
referring to memes, each metaphor places
its strong point in a different and somehow
opposite quality.
Thus, while trying to solve the unevenness
created by the dissimilar definitions and
metaphors underlying to the term memes,
new questions arise. The following
questions will lead the next section: which
are the components of a meme that are
maintained or mutated? Which are the
characteristics of a meme passed on to the
next generation or individual?
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Perspectives about Memes II: What lies
beneath, structure or meaning?
When meme theorists refer to the concepts
of stability and mutability, they are standing
for what is constant and what changes in a
simple biological unit. The DNA, for
instance, is a protein chain which structure
is steady while the order in which proteins
are aligned changes. In a virus, either the
DNA/RNA or the protein coat changes; it can
even develop other features allowing it to
“survive” longer. Nonetheless, when talking
about memes it is difficult to tell what
remains and what mutates. What is more, is
it the same meme after it has mutated?
According to the previous theorists, there
are essentially two things that can change or
remain in a meme, shaping them:
structure
and
content
(semantics).
Dan Sperber defends the structural
approach, understanding the meme
transformation as resemblance in the
structure and a semantic change. He states
that in spite of the transformations or bias
given by the medium to a meme, the
invariability of structure is what is
transmitted. (Sperber, 1996, p. 108) The
author uses
the little red riding hood
story
in order to exemplify this approach. He
explains that the tale/meme possesses a
structure that shapes it, putting into
perspective the content of the tale. If you are
told a tale with different characters but the
same structure, you will identify it as a copy
of the little red riding hood tale (this is, of
course, in the case where you already know
the story). What is more, the structure is so
important to the meme that an incomplete
version of the tale is less likely to be
replicated than a complete version of it.
The other perspective is the content
approach; Daniel Dennet defends this
approach, understanding the meme in terms
of language (semantic): “What is in common,
of course, is not a
syntactic
property or
system of properties, but a semantic
property or system of properties: The story,
not the text; the characters and their
personalities, not their names and
speeches” (Dennet, 1995, p. 356). In other
words, when talking about what changes and
what is maintained in a meme, Dennet is for
the idea that what identifies memes when
they are passed on is their content, their
semantics and meanings.
The current research proposes a
combination between both postures,
arguing that both are characteristics that can
be passed on in memes. This perspective
also underlines that depending on the
meme one of the two can be more salient
than the other.
To illustrate this position, take a vertically
transmitted meme as a Catholic mass. This
ritual is passed from parents to children via
immersion (children attend to the
ceremony) and repetition (they attend
periodically). Now, the structure of the ritual
does not change as it has a beginning,
lectures from the bible, communion and an
ending. Nonetheless, this structure can be
changed (e.g., people can sing during the
whole mass, there can be not communion,
the mass can be celebrated in Latin, etc.)
while the meaning (praise the lord) is
maintained and transmitted. Now, imagine
that you go to another culture and find a
ritual that is totally similar to the mass, but
whose purpose is to give thanks because
there is enough food to eat. In that case, the
structure will be the same, but the meaning
will be different. At the beginning, you might
think that it is a mass, finding out later that
the meaning is entirely different. In that
circumstance, what is passed on is the
structure, not the meaning. Therefore, the
structure and meaning of a meme are
independent, but they are connected to
some degree that each one tells something
about the other.
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Perspectives about Memes III: Lamarckian
and Darwinian perspectives (Teleology and
becoming)
Another ontological issue on defining meme
is whether it is or not teleological. It has
been acknowledged how some authors,
based on the analogy of DNA and Darwinian
Theory, argue that memes are not
teleological as they obey the laws of
Darwinian Natural Selection. As pointed out
by Dennet (1995, p. 345): “Meme evolution is
not just analogous to biological or genetic
evolution, according to Dawkins. It is not
just a process that can be metaphorically
described in these evolutionary idioms, but
a phenomenon that obeys the laws of
natural selection quite exactly”.
Other authors, based on epidemiological
perspectives, attribute a certain
intentionality to the memes in a Lamarckian
manner. They state that memes have a goal,
thus making an effort in order to achieve it;
this
effort
affects the next generation of
memes, who would be more suited to
survive in a certain environment. In Sperber
(1996, p. 103) words:
The number of artefactual replicas of a
would-be cultural item is only a poor,
indirect indicator of its genuine cultural
success. [...] the cultural importance of a
public production is to be measured not
by the number of copies in the
environment but by their impact on
people’s minds [...] each token is a replica
not of one parent token nor...of two
parent tokens, nor of any fixed number of
parent tokens, but of an infinite number
of tokens some of which have played a
much greater ‘parental’ role than others.
Different to the parametric integration
proposed in the last chapter for the different
theoretical approaches to memes, it is
difficult in this case to advocate for
integration. Instead, a counter example
approach will be used.
The first example retakes the case of the
ritual brought in the last chapter as it is an
already exposed case of vertical
transmission (that is, slow and
generational). The main questions that arise
in this case are: how did the ritual begin?
What was its purpose in the first place? (1) It
is possible to hypothesize that the ritual
began in order to fulfil a necessity (suppose,
to make it rain). (2) It could be that the ritual
began when an action was associated with a
consequence (suppose dancing and rain), or
(3) the ritual was associated with a belief
(the god of rain is angry, and he will bring
the rain back if by making him happy). These
three scenarios are teleological. The ritual
(as a meme that is passed from generation
to generation) holds a structure, a meaning,
and intentionality. In other words, it was
created with a purpose.
A counter example is a piece of gossip. A
piece of gossip has the characteristics of a
viral-shaped meme. It spreads horizontally,
quickly among a population, mutates from
person to person, has a peak in its
transmission and then dies, although
sometimes it can endure the time. The
question here is: does it have a purpose or
does it just auto-replicate willy-nilly? From a
sociological perspective, it is possible to say
that gossiping has a social function. The
purpose of the gossip is to inform, to update
the information of people in a certain
environment; thus they can tell, for instance,
who is available for marriage. Gossip tells
the state of a particular institution in a
certain environment, at a fixed moment. As
a result, it is possible to argue by means of
examples and theories that, in spite of their
way of transmission, memes behave in a
teleological way. They have a purpose;
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Revista CES Psicología ISSN 2011-3080 Volumen 6 Número 2 Julio-Diciembre 2013 pp.82-104
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therefore, their evolution is