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Financial contagion and depositor monitoring
Abstract
This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact. We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are undercapitalized, and the probability of success of the risky asset is low, depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment.The results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline.
... Kyle and Xiong (2001) define the contagion phenomenon through two risky financial instruments and strategies of three different types of investors-noise traders, long-term investors, and convergence traders. Hasman et al. (2013) examine the banking sector for the interaction of contagion and bank runs. The authors suggest monitoring banks to enhance the market discipline. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has induced a different and more severe version of the contagion phenomenon. In this study, we examine the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on six different stock markets. Empirical analyses are conducted for four different time intervals to reveal the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. The modified ICSS test shows that the pandemic has led to structural breaks in the volatility of stock indexes. While break dates intensify around February 19-21, 2020 in most of the markets, for the Chinese stock market, the break appears approximately three weeks earlier, on January 30, 2020. The DCC-MVGARCH and DCC-MVFIGARCH models illustrate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on dynamic conditional correlations. According to the changes in unconditional correlation coefficients, although the relationship of the Chinese and Turkish stock markets weakens across 2005 to 2019, it displays a 20% rise following the pandemic. Some other market pairs also show soaring correlation coefficients, although these increases are lower, at approximately 10%.
... Second, a liquidity shock can result from the revelation of asymmetric information about the balance sheet of non-performing banks (Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; . We characterize the asymmetric information by introducing a gambling asset that delivers extra profits to investors if the gambling is successful (Hellmann et al., 2000;Agliardi et al., 2009;Hasman et al., 2013). Third, banks' ex-ante safe assets could see their values suddenly depreciated. ...
In this Ph. D. thesis, we analyze the conditions for the emergence and the aggravation of the recent crisis in Europe from 2008 to 2012. The major objective of this Ph. D. thesis is to develop theoretical models which will be effective in investigating the twin banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union with a broadly similar institutional design to the EMU before 2012. Different from 'traditional' financial crisis models that shed light on the role of the central bank in crisis policy response, the models developed in this thesis investigate and underline the importance of fiscal crisis management. White accentuating financial vulnerability, we explore the relationship between the banking sector, the realeconomy and the public budget in the context of a monetary union. This thesis consists of four theoretical models of the banking crisis, with the first framework depicting the financial crisis which burst in 2008 in small European economies outside the EMU and the next three models elucidating the crisis situation in the Eurozone from early 2009 until August 2012.
The presumption in most discussions of the Basel pillars is that in practice each will prove to reinforce the others. This chapter evaluates this official presumption. It provides a basic overview of the Basel guidelines regarding market discipline and related conceptual issues. It reviews alternative suggestions for contributing to improved bank safety and soundness via enhanced market discipline, including proposals mandating the issuance of subordinated debts. It discusses recent research that encompasses analysis of market discipline within a basic banking model and applies this model to an analysis of the relationship between bank market structure and market discipline. The chapter then considers what the literature tells us about the extent to which markets actually discipline banks and about interactions between market discipline and supervisory discipline applied by government regulators. The chapter concludes by evaluating the market discipline pillar in relation to the Basel capital-standards and supervisory-process pillars.
Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used.
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of different government policies to prevent the emergence of banking crises. In particular, we study the impact on welfare of using taxpayers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial transactions (the Tobin tax). We illustrate the trade-off between these policies and derive policy implications.
This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources; (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership.The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.
This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in a sample of 101 banking crises over the 1989-2007 period. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using an international panel data set of 3,254 banks from 87 countries. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis management policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. Our results suggest that on average market discipline diminishes after a banking crisis. The reduction of market discipline is, moreover, higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promote market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodating kind of intervention is used. Specifically, forbearance and recapitalizations are the two kinds of interventions that have the most negative effect on market discipline.
The authors review the economics of bank regulation as developed in the contemporary literature. They begin with an examination of the central aspects of modern banking theories in explaining the asset transformation function of intermediaries, optimal bank liability contracts, coordination problems leading to bank failures and their empirical significance, and the regulatory interventions suggested by these considerations. In particular, the authors focus on regulations aimed primarily at ameliorating deposit-insurance-related moral hazards, such as: cash-asset reserve requirements, risk-sensitive capital requirements and deposit insurance premia, and bank closure policy. Moreover, they examine the impact of the competitive environment (bank charter value) and industry structure (scope of banks) on these moral hazards. They also examine the implications of banking theory for alternatives to deposit insurance.
Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both information-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.
L'int�r�t de l'approche par les jeux globaux ("global games'') est pr�cis�ment d'ancrer les anticipations sur des variables exog�nes r�elles. On peut ainsi garder l'aspect auto-r�alisateur des anticipations mais en restaurant l'unicit� de l'�quilibre et donc un meilleur pouvoir pr�dictif du mod�le. Nous illustrons ces m�canismes sur deux exemples. Le premier a trait au choix r�sidentiel d'agents qui ont une pr�f�rence "identitaire''. Le second a trait � la contagion de paniques bancaires d'un pays � un autre. De mani�re plus g�n�rale, tous les jeux qui pr�sentent des compl�mentarit�s strat�giques sont susceptibles d'�tre analys�s au moyen des techniques des "global games''. Il convient toutefois de rappeler que les techniques utilis�es demeurent assez sp�cifiques: l'incertitude strat�gique porte essentiellement sur les croyances de premier degr� des autres acteurs. Or, si de mani�re plus g�n�rale on suppose que cette incertitude peut porter sur des ordres plus �lev�s, les conclusions des mod�les peuvent changer. Ainsi, Weinstein et Yildiz (2004) montrent que dans un oligopole de Cournot, il y a une tr�s grande multiplicit� d'�quilibres si on suppose que l'incertitude porte sur les croyances de niveaux suffisamment �lev�s.
We examine the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy. In economies where banks use real demand deposits to finance their lending, fluctuations in the tinting of production can force banks to scramble for real liquidity, or even fail, which can greatly affect lending and aggregate output. The adverse effect on output can be reduced if banks finance with nominal deposits. Nominal deposits also open a "financial liquidity" channel for monetary policy to affect real activity. The banking system may be better off, however, issuing real deposits (e.g., foreign exchange denominated) under some circumstances.
This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.
Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the first-best allocation of risk sharing can be achieved. However, this arrangement is financially fragile. A small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout the economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. Complete claims structures are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures.
This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.
What causes a financial crisis? Can financial crises be anticipated or even avoided? What can be done to lessen their impact? Should governments and international institutions intervene? Or should financial crises be left to run their course? In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many blamed international institutions, corruption, governments, and flawed macro and microeconomic policies not only for causing the crisis but also unnecessarily lengthening and deepening it. Based on ten years of research, the authors develop a theoretical approach to analyzing financial crises. Beginning with a review of the history of financial crises and providing readers with the basic economic tools needed to understand the literature, the authors construct a series of increasingly sophisticated models. Throughout, the authors guide the reader through the existing theoretical and empirical literature while also building on their own theoretical approach. The text presents the modern theory of intermediation, introduces asset markets and the causes of asset price volatility, and discusses the interaction of banks and markets. The book also deals with more specialized topics, including optimal financial regulation, bubbles, and financial contagion.
Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both information-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.
Can bank runs be avoided and should they be avoided? I analyze a banking environment where bank runs can occur as a result of negative signals about the bank's investments. In this environment, banks can make sure that runs do not occur by designing the deposit contract appropriately. I show that there are conditions under which it is profit-maximizing for the bank to avoid runs, and others under which occasional runs are part of optimal bank behavior. I also compare the banking arrangement to an arrangement based on trading in equity.
We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.
This paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002. After controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables, the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power, although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation, supervision, and institutions. Their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects: restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline, but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power. Institutional quality has the two opposite effects. Better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance, however, have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk-taking incentives.
In this paper, the authors contrast panics and information-based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausib le model of how bank runs are triggered. The model of information-bas ed runs is characterized by two-sided asymmetric information: the ban k cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while dep ositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality. They al so examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank depo sit contracts and traded equity contracts. They show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information abo ut the underlying investment returns. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.
In an infinitely repeated version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without Diamond and Dybvig's assumption of no side trades. The bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits. The latter cause, which cannot occur in Diamond and Dybvig's one-generation model, implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs. Government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, the additional costs associated with a sudden stop of net capital flows to the United States could be quite substantial. But we observe that emerging market governments have continued to acquire US assets even as yields have fallen, and the incentives for continuing to do so remain strong. Moreover, the Bretton Woods II system, which has clearly been the most resilient of the forces driving current markets, continues to generate low real interest rates in industrial countries and growth in emerging markets that will help limit the damage from the liquidity crisis. Copyright © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
We study the propagation of financial crises among regions in which banks are protected by limited liability and may take excessive risk. The regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks, so liquidity coinsurance is Pareto improving. The moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized. Under autarky a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk-taking, but when financial markets are open capital becomes insufficient. Thus, bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crisis spreads to other regions via financial linkages. Opening financial markets is nevertheless Pareto improving; consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance, although they pay the cost of excessive risk-taking. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.
We examine the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy. In economies where banks use real demand deposits to finance their lending, fluctuations in the timing of production can force banks to scramble for real liquidity, or even fail, which can greatly affect lending and aggregate output. The adverse effect on output can be reduced if banks finance with nominal deposits. Nominal deposits also open a "financial liquidity" channel for monetary policy to affect real activity. The banking system may be better off, however, issuing real deposits (e.g., foreign exchange denominated) under some circumstances.
We investigate the role of a central bank (CB) in preventing and avoiding financial contagion. The CB, by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system, trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long-term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises. We argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market, but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies. As long as incomplete contracts are present, the CB may have a useful role in curbing contagion. Moreover, the CB allows the banking system to reach first-best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive-efficiency is considered. If the analysis is restricted to constrained-efficiency, the CB still avoids contagion without, however, reaching first-best consumption allocation. The model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information.
We show in this article that bank failures can be contagious. Unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks, we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity, creating, or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. This could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system. Given the costs of a meltdown, there is a possible role for government intervention. Unfortunately, liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other, making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis. We propose a robust sequence of intervention. Copyright 2005 by The American Finance Association.
Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline.
Demand Deposits as an Incentive Mechanism. Unpublished Paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania textquotedblleft Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior
- E Jean-Baptiste
Jean-Baptiste, E., 1999. Demand Deposits as an Incentive Mechanism. Unpublished Paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Martinez Peria, M.S., Schmukler, S.L., 2001. textquotedblleft Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Journal of Finance 56, 1029–1051.