ArticlePDF Available

SLAVIC CULTURE AND SLAVIC CIVILIZATION OR COMMUNITIES IMAGINED AND COMMUNITIES IMPOSED

Authors:

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to outline, against the historical background, some of the main aspects in today’s relations - often uneasy and more often than not emotion-dominated - between the Slavic nations and countries. These issues will be examined within the broader context of subjectivity, including race and ethnicity, and its role in the constitution and organization of social and political relations. Ideologies – like various manifestations of the so-called ‘Slavic idea’ such as Pan-Slavism in the 19th century or Slavic Unity Slavija today – represent a set of values constructed in order to attract followers from specific target groups and eventually manipulate their behavior. And since the imaginary and the unconscious occupy an extremely important place in the formation of our behavior, we may expect to see them play an equally important role in the formation of ideologies and subjectivities.
Naimushin, Boris (2003). Slavic Culture and Slavic Civilization or Communities
Imagined and Communities Imposed. In: Thracia XV. In honorem Annorum LXX
Alexandri Fol. Sofia, 2003. p.p. 425-434.
SLAVIC CULTURE AND SLAVIC CIVILIZATION
OR
COMMUNITIES IMAGINED AND COMMUNITIES IMPOSED
Boris Naimushin
New Bulgarian University - Sofia
And now do I stand here, As European,
I can't be different, God's help to me! Amen!
(F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra)
The origin and history of the Slavs, their ethnic and cultural relations with the
neighboring peoples (Iranian, Turkic, Thracian, Greek, Germanic, Celtic, Baltic, and
Finno-Ugric) have long been the focus both of academic studies and heated political,
patriotic and nationalistic debates. The purpose of this essay is to outline, against the
historical background, some of the main aspects in today’s relations - often uneasy
and more often than not emotion-dominated - between the Slavic nations and
countries.
These issues will be examined within the broader context of subjectivity, including
race and ethnicity, and its role in the constitution and organization of social and
political relations. Ideologies like various manifestations of the so-called ‘Slavic
idea’ such as Pan-Slavism in the 19th century or Slavic Unity Slavija today represent
a set of values constructed in order to attract followers from specific target groups and
eventually manipulate their behavior. And since the imaginary and the unconscious
occupy an extremely important place in the formation of our behavior, we may expect
to see them play an equally important role in the formation of ideologies and
subjectivities.
In analyzing the complex and contradictory situation in the contemporary world, we
may rely on historical analogies and on a variety of theories and concepts. It is true
that the dynamics and unpredictability of today’s developments make most historical
analogies rather superficial. Paul Valery, a famous French critic and poet, called
history the science of what never happens twice’. Decades before him, Hegel noted
that we learn from history that we do not learn from history. However, what we really
learn from history is that the policies of the various Slavic states and nationalities
over the last 200 years have been conducted primarily in accordance with what they
regarded as their national interests and not the interests of the imagined ‘Slavic
civilization’ or ‘Slavic community’. Initially, one may even be surprised by these
frequent incidents of bitter hostility in the relations between Slavic peoples
accompanied by similarly frequent incidents of friendliness toward non-Slavs. In the
broader context, however, bitter rivalry between brothers is nothing new to history
think of Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob, Israelites and Midianites. Sometimes this
tension between brothers is defined as opposition civilization versus culture,
technology versus ethics, science versus religion. What’s more, some Slavophilic
thinkers extend such opposition to the relations between the West and the East,
2
defining the West as the bearer of civilization (i.e. order, rationality, materiality) and
the East as the bearer of culture (freedom, creativity, spirituality). Thus, Nikolai
Danilevsky, a famous Russian Pan-Slavist, wrote in 1869: ‘Two sources on the banks
of the ancient Nile began the main flow of universal history. One, heavenly and
divine, has reached Kiev and Moscow by way of Palestine and Constantinople; the
other, earthly and human, divided itself into two main streams, that of aesthetic-
scientific culture and that of politics, which flowed through Athens, Alexandria and
Rome into Europe’ (Danilevsky 1869).
Speaking of the lessons of history, it may also be interesting to mention another
historical analogy - our globalizing world with modern technologies spreading and
imposing Western civilization and values in every corner of the planet versus the
empire of Alexander the Great, who carried Greek civilization to the ends of the then-
known world. It seems to me that both of these worlds can be described in terms of
the clash of civilizations and imagined communities. As a result of Alexander’s
conquests, the then-known world went through a period of clashes of civilizations as
he marched through Asia Minor, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Afghanistan to the
borders of India. However, this world also acquired a unity turning into an imagined
and cosmopolitan Hellenistic community - based on the Greek language and the
Greek civilization mixed with many Asiatic traits. If we add to this the contrasting
economic extremes of the Hellenistic world, one may really wonder ‘whether the
Hellenistic age is not one of the most “relevant” in the entire human record for
comparison with our own’ (Lerner et al. 1988:169).
Clash of Imagined Civilizations or Conflict of Material Interests?
Samuel Huntington discusses the theory and practice of international politics after the
end of Cold War in terms of ‘clash of civilizations arguing that the defining
characteristic of the 21st century will be the interaction and conflict between
civilizations rather than nation-states (Huntington 1993). The world is on the
threshold of a new era where the growing interaction between societies and
civilizations inevitably causes new problems and deepens the existing ones. The
terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 and in Russia in 2002 as well as many other
international developments over the last couple of years have only proved the
importance of the issues raised by Huntington. These issues are directly linked to the
ongoing globalization, which, as any large-scale process, brings not only many
obvious benefits but also plenty of apparent and not-so-apparent negatives.
Unfortunately, the current globalization model leads mainly to the escalation of the
existing conflicts, including those on national and civilization basis, because this
model is almost exclusively West-oriented. As a result, traditional and semi-
traditional societies feel endangered by this rather ruthless encroachment on their
culture, religion and values. The growing anti-globalization movement in Western
Europe and North America also clearly shows that many people even in these
countries are not happy with the current globalization model. Of course, globalization
is an objective process brought to life by the very nature of the postmodern world and
modern technologies, so it would be unrealistic and absurd to try and stop it.
However, its current model is far from being optimal and human-oriented.
Huntington’s approach focuses on the notion of ‘civilization’ and this, in my opinion,
requires special attention. The term ‘civilization’, pivotal to many historical and
3
political theories, has been used in various ways at different times. Thus, in eighteenth
century France, culture was a synonym of ‘civilization’ implying a relationship
between manners and morals, and embracing a pan-national type of refinement. The
German signification of culture, in use at the same time, implied a nationally based
religious, artistic and intellectual standard of excellence (Eagleton 2000). According
to Karl Jaspers, Civilization is often viewed as a cultural identity representing the
broadest level of identification, broader than nation or region, and is usually tied to
religion or some other belief system. Thus, Huntington defines civilization as a
cultural entity, as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of
cultural identity people have short of what which distinguishes humans from other
species. It is defined both by common religion, customs, institutions, and by the
subjective self-identification of people” (Huntignton 1993). An opposing view claims
that culture and civilization are in deep conflict. Such an approach was pioneered by
Russian Slavophils who described culture in terms of spirituality and divinity
opposing it to the earthly, materialistic civilization of the West. This distinction was
further developed in the pessimistic philosophy of Spengler, for whom civilization is
the death of culture (Spengler 1918).
In my opinion, culture and civilization may not be confused or opposed. Civilization
is aimed at the cultivation of the order and therefore implies awareness and
compliance. Culture is aimed at the cultivation of the soul and therefore rejects any
form of physical or intellectual tyranny. In culture, it is virtually impossible to talk
about progress or supremacy. Who is greater - Kant or Confucius, who is more gifted
- Shakespeare or Dante, Brecht or Shakespeare, Pushkin or Omar Hayam? I can only
agree that the major sign of progress in culture is the increase in the number of
partners in the dialogue, the intensification of the dialogue between cultures.
In the long run, what Huntington describes as ‘the clash of civilizations’ can be with
equal success explained as ‘the clash of interests’, having nothing to do with
civilizations, religions and cultures but having everything to do with the struggle for
power, influence, oil etc. For instance, the famous American actor Dustin Hoffman
used his appearance at this year's Empire film awards to express his views on
President Bush's pending war with Iraq: "I don't think, like many of us, that the
reasons we have been given for going to war are the honest reasons. I believe... that
this war is about what most wars are about: hegemony, money, power and oil."
Hoffman went on to claim that he felt that the Bush administration was "manipulating
the grief of the country" in the wake of September 111.
In politics, there is (overt) ideology and there is (not-so-overt) strategy. Ideology is, to
put it in modern terms, a screen saver of strategy, a publicity mass product aimed at
attracting followers, developing in them a specific set of values, thus making their
reactions as predictable as possible. Since ideology is meant for the masses, it has to
appeal to the most basic instincts and needs food, housing, family, security. As
Nikolay Berdyaev put it back in 1937, The average man of our time possesses not
ideas, he possesses instincts and affections’ (Berdyaev 1937). From this point of view
race, ethnicity and religion have always been among the most widely used elements in
the formation of ideologies. History shows that even the most humane ideas, imposed
by force, may lead to violence and bloodshed. The major paradox of the struggle
between good and evil is that this struggle constantly gives rise to new evil -
intolerance, violence, fanaticism: The man, fanatical over some sort of idea, like a
4
person who would save himself alone, cannot be said to seek the truth. The search for
truth presupposes freedom. Truth is not external to freedom, truth is bestown only by
freedom. Outside of freedom there is only that which is useful, but not truth, there is
only the interests of power. The fanatic of some sort of orthodoxy2 seeks for power,
and not for truth” (Berdyaev 1937).
The Slavic idea throughout the centuries
Benedict Anderson defines nations as ‘imagined communities’ - imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members will never know
most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion. It is limited because it has finite, though elastic boundaries beyond
which lies other nations. In other words, the nation is a construct that requires a
certain amount of representational work (Anderson 1991).
Anderson’s approach is fruitful for the purpose of this essay because, in my opinion,
the Slavic community - Slavjanstvo - is a typical example of an imagined community.
In fact, supporters of the ‘Slavic idea’ do not seem to have ever had common
definitions of the notions such as ‘Slavic unity’, ‘Slavic brotherhood’, ‘Slavic
solidarity’ etc. It cannot be denied that theoretical recognition of the ‘Slavic unity’ has
always been present in the cultural and ethnic identity of all Slavic peoples. However,
this recognition has more often than not come in conflict with the interests and
aspirations of separate Slavic peoples and countries.
The Slavic cultural community appeared on the crossroads of history, in close contact
with the West and the East experiencing influence both from the Roman Catholic and
Byzantine Orthodox traditions, at the same time being greatly indebted to the steppe
world of Pax Nomadica. Suffice it to say that supreme rulers of the Rus’ adopted the
title of ‘khagan’, which was in use, alongside the Proto-Slavic title of ‘knyaz’, at least
till the reign of Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, i.e. till the second half of 11th
century (Petrukhin 1995:123). This indisputable fact, supported by a number of
historical documents, receives different explanations (e.g. as a borrowing from the
Khazars, as an evidence of Khazar rule over Rus’ in the past, as demonstration of
independence of Rus’ from the Khazars etc.). The title of ‘khagan’ was at that time a
supreme title in Eastern Europe and unambiguously demonstrated the empire
ambitions of the respective state in the steppe world. The adoption of this title by the
early Rus’ khaganate - and not of the Greek title ‘Basileus’ shows that its relations
with the steppe world on the whole and with Khazaria in particular were much more
intensive than with the Byzantine Empire3.
Our ancestors inhabited vast territories in Europe from the Danube and the Balkan
Peninsula to the Ural Mountains extending also across northern Asia to the Pacific
Ocean and coming into contacts and conflicts with various local peoples and nations.
As centuries went by, the former linguistic and religious unity of the Slavs began to
disappear leading to the formation of the east, west and south Slavs. Additional
divergence came along religious lines with the division of the Slavs into two main
groups: those associated with the Eastern Orthodox Church and those associated with
the Catholic Church. In the Middle Ages cultural and political relations between the
Slavs were significantly reduced as many of the Slavic peoples lost their state
sovereignty becoming part of the Habsburg (later Austro-Hungarian) and Ottoman
5
Empires, and Prussia. The 19th century saw a certain resurrection of the rather faint
feeling of Slavic ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity stimulated by the process of the
formation of nations and nation-states and the awakening of the Slavs within the
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, where the actual political movement of Pan-
Slavism arose.
Pan-Slavism, stimulated by the rise of romanticism and nationalism, was aimed at
promoting the political and cultural unity of all Slavs. The first Pan-Slav Congress,
held at Prague in 1848 and presided over by F. Palacky, was confined to the Slavs
under Austrian rule. Its main objective was to demand equality with the Germans
advocating Czech autonomy within a strong Austrian Empire as the best protection
against German and Russian pressure. It was later, after the humiliating defeat
suffered by Russia in the Crimean War (185356), that a specific form of Russian
Pan-Slavism emerged based on imperial ‘big brother’ thinking and messianic
conviction in Russia’s special role in Europe and the world.
Russian Pan-Slavism insisted that there was strong opposition between Slav and non-
Slav peoples with the former seeking political and cultural integration with Russia
the only great sovereign Slavic state at that time. Discussing the role of Russia in
history, some Slavophilic historians and public figures (M.Pogodin, Y.Kireevski,
P.Butkov etc.) developed a theory insisting on a special mission of the Russian people
in solving the so-called ‘Eastern problem’ viewed as struggle between the Slavic
world and Europe. Thus, A. Fadeyev claimed that it was Russia’s mission to liberate
the Slavs from Austrian and Ottoman domination by war and to form a Russian-
dominated Slavic federation. In the same wake, N. Danilevsky wrote, The requisite
political achievement of political independence has still another importance in the
cultural as well as in all other spheres: the struggle against the German-Roman world
(without which Slav independence is impossible) will help to eradicate the cancer of
imitativeness and the servile attitude towards the West, which through unfavourable
conditions has eaten its way into the Slav body and soul… But first, as a sine qua non
condition of success, strong and powerful Russia has to face the difficult task of
liberating her racial brothers; for this struggle she must steel them and herself in the
spirit of independence and Pan-Slav consciousness…’ (Danilevsky 1869).
Developed as a movement among intellectuals, scholars, and poets, Pan-Slavism
rarely influenced practical politics. The Soviet government renounced it after the
triumph of the Russian Revolution of 1917 promptly replacing it by the idea of
‘proletarian internationalism’. The breakup of the USSR and the Soviet bloc resulted
in the formation of fourteen new independent European countries based on nationality
with ten of them being predominantly Slavic in language. Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarus emerged from the European part of the former USSR, Czechoslovakia split
into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Yugoslavia divided into five Slavic countries -
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro.
These new states are based on specific nationalities, but some scholars claim it would
be inappropriate to label them nation states because each has its very own minority
problems (Mikesell 1983). Relations between these countries have gone through
various stages from total denunciation of the past to ambitions to form new
federations, e.g. between Russia and Ukraine. It seems that the initial hostility and
suspicion between the former Warsaw Pact allies is beginning to wane and new
6
pragmatic relations are being built. It takes time to overcome old stereotypes and
negative emotions, to learn from history and develop a new type of relations.
The Slavic cultural community: problems and perspectives
Over the last decade, especially in Russia, the problems of the Slavic world have been
the focus of numerous articles, books and projects based on the assumption that there
exists a specific ‘Slavic civilization’. For instance, in May 2000 a conference was
held in St.Petersburg entitled ‘The Slavic Civilization in the 21st Century’.
V.Kalashnikov insists that east, west and south Slavs represent common civilization
artificially divided along religious, political and military lines (Kalashnikov 2001). In
fact, this idea, with insignificant variations, is to be seen in the works of many
Russian scholars who ardently claim that Russia has always wanted to unite the
fraternal Slavic peoples protecting them from numerous enemies of the Slavs. Such
theories only strengthen my conviction that one of the major problems of today’s
Slavic movement is that its supporters quite often live in a strange ‘virtual’ world
where reality and fantasy mix at will. The proletarian theory of ‘rotting capitalism’
transformed into the theory of ‘exhaustion of creative potential of Western
civilization’. As a result, it is claimed that it will not be possible to create a Central
European alternative to American influence without the Slavs (Panarin 1999), because
such an alternative must be pluralistic and based on at least three major traditions
Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox.
In my opinion, one of the main misconceptions, whether unconscious or not, of such
theories is that they view the Slavic world as an independent reality, as a common
civilization. In this respect I can only agree with A.Dugin that contemporary Slavs do
not represent an independent reality and cannot be regarded as a single geopolitical
category (Dugin 2001). The Slavs are divided along religious, political and cultural
lines. Part of the Slavs belongs primarily to the European context (Slovenes, Croats,
Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks) while the other part of them belongs to the Eurasian
nomadic as well as Eastern Orthodox, e. g. Byzantino-Slavic world (Russians,
Ukrainians, Belorussians, Serbs, and Bulgarians). At the same time significant groups
of the population of all these countries living in the so-called buffer or contact zones
where Europe comes in contact with Eurasia. Vaclav Havel, the former President of
the Czech Republic, even insisted on the necessity to strengthen the (positive) Central
European identity of the peoples of Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovak Republic) as opposed to the (negative or, at best, neutral) Eastern
European identity of the peoples of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Russia etc.
The origin of the international debate about Central Europe was an article by Milan
Kundera (Kundera 1984). According to him, Central Europe belonged to the West all
along, and it was only the political developments following the Second World War
that shifted it towards the East. As a result, Prague, Warsaw and Budapest strove to
play up the specific cultural identity of Central Europe as distinct from Eastern
Europe, especially the Soviet Union. Havel claimed that both “Central European
identity” and “common historical experience” with Poland and Hungary could make a
valuable contribution to the entire European and world cultures. "Macedonia
definitely belongs to Europe," stressed in response the President of Macedonia Boris
Trajkovski, answering a reporter's question about Macedonia's Central European
identity.
7
There is no doubt that the Slavs as an indisputable ethnic and linguistic community
share many common traits. I believe that there exists something that can be called a
Slavic cultural community - Slavjanstvo - as a unity of supra-ethnic mental
structures. However, I would be cautious to talk about the existence of a common
‘Slavic civilization’ as a geopolitical category because in contemporary world ethnic
and linguistic ties are not a sufficient prerequisite for that. Endless referrals to
common origin and related languages, not supported by realistic policies and
economic incentives, can only result in nostalgic recollections and emotional
declarations.
On the other hand, from the very dawn of human history, rivalry between brothers (in
a wider sense) has been more than common. In fact, more often than not brothers fight
and kill each other with more violence and more hatred than they would a stranger.
Examples of Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob etc. play a paradigmatic role being
among the well-known ones. The story of the Israelites and the Midianites is maybe a
bit less known but it also gives food for thought. Midian was a son of Abraham by his
second wife, Keturah. So Israelites and Midianites were very closely related. Moses
found sanctuary with Jethro, the priest of Midian, when he fled Pharaoh, and even
married Zipporah, Jethro's daughter. When Jethro heard of what God had done to
liberate the Hebrews, he went to meet Moses in the desert and congratulate him on
such a wonderful liberation. Moses also took part in Midianite worship - the story in
Exodus (18:12) is the evidence of a cultic comradeship between the Midianites and
Israel. Apart from that, Jethro advised Moses on how to introduce greater discipline
among his people laying the foundations of a future Jewish state. In spite of all this,
because of the alliance of the Kenites with the Moabites in the days of Exodus, Moses
ordered his people to handle the Midianites as enemies because of their idolatry. As a
result, all Midian men, including their five kings, were killed, all their cities burned to
the ground, all their women and children taken into captivity.
Similarly, Russia quelled Polish uprisings of 1830-31 and 1863-64; the Soviet Army
suppressed the Prague Spring of 1968; Poland and the Czech Republic, just 12 days
after joining NATO on March 12, 1999, supported the initiation of military campaign
against former Yugoslavia; Bulgaria allowed NATO warplanes to use its airspace for
their bombing missions over Belgrade etc. These examples of ‘fraternal relations’ can
only support the well-known dictum that in politics there are no friends or brothers but
interests. From this point of view, ‘Slavic solidarity’ and ‘Slavic idea’ are a rather
uncertain and extremely insufficient - basis to rely on in international politics.
Conclusion
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that in spite of the obvious linguistic, cultural
and religious differences there exists something that can be called a Slavic cultural
community - Slavjanstvo - as a unity of supra-ethnic mental structures. The Slavic
peoples are among the most numerous ethnic and linguistic body of peoples in Central
and Eastern Europe - And now do I stand here, As European, I can't be different,
God's help to me! Amen! and share many common traits. Their future depends on
many factors and, of course, on all of us, because even the most sincere and the most
intimate feelings cannot be taken for granted and must be cultivated and cherished.
8
Thus, a meeting organized by Slovenian Culture Minister Andreja Rihter in December
2002 put forward an initiative to establish a forum of Slavic cultures, which would
aim at protecting cultural identities and strengthening all forms of mutual cooperation
between Slavic. The conference was attended by ministers (or their deputies) of
Russia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Republic of
Srpska, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
I recall an old anecdote of the famous Radio Erevan series. A listener calls in and
asks, “Will there be World War III?” Radio Erevan replies, “There will be no World
War III. However, there will be such a struggle for peace that no stone will be left
unturned”. I sincerely hope that there will be no WW III, no bloody struggle for peace
or clashes of civilizations. We do not need that. What we really need is an ever-
expanding dialogue of cultures, in which every voice of every culture will be heard
and every single language will be preserved, including the languages and cultures of
the Slavic peoples.
Notes
1 Guardian Unlimited. Dustin Hoffman blasts 'reprehensible' war. Staff and agencies,
Thursday February 6, 2003. http://film.guardian.co.uk/news/
2 For more details on this controversial issue see, for instance, Golden, P.B. The
Question of the Rus’ Qağanate. – In: Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 2, 1982, pp. 77-
97; Zuckerman, K. On the Date of the Khazars’ Conversion to Judaism and the
Chronology of the Kings of the Rus Oleg and Igor Revue des Études Byzantines, 53
(1995); Sedov, V. Russkij kaganat ІХ v. In: Otechestvennaja istorija, 1998, No 4,
pp. 3-15.
3 Russian usage has two different words, both of which are translated as “orthodoxy”.
The word “ortodoksiya” (“orthodox” in this translation) bears a generic and pejorative
sense of a narrow-minded adherence to a “right-belief” of whatever the teaching, be it
an orthodox Marxism or an orthodox atheism even. In contrast, the Russian word
“pravoslavniya” (“right-glory” or “right-doxology”) refers to Orthodox Christianity
(“Orthodoxy”), which, as Berdyaev observes, properly precludes fanaticism.
References
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London, 1991.
Berdyaev, N. A. Concerning Fanaticism, Orthodoxy and Truth. 1937. Translated into
English by Fr. S. Janos. - In: http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/
Danilevsky, N. Russia and Europe. The View on Cultural and Political Relations of
the Slavic World with the German-Roman. St. Petersburg, 1869. In:
Thomas Riha, Readings in Russian Civilization. 1964, pp.392ff.
Dugin, A. Slavjanskij mir i osnovnyje tendentsii geopolitiki. 2001 In:
http://www.arctogaia.com/public/slavgeop.html.
Eagleton, Terry. Versions of Culture. In: The Idea of Culture. Basil, Blackwell.
2000, 1-31.
9
Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations? - Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No 3,
Washington, USA, 1993.
Kalashnikov, V. Slavjanskaja tsivilizatsija. Moscow, 2001.
Kundera, M. The Tragedy of Central Europe. - The New York Review of Books,
April 26, 1984.
Lerner, R.E., Meacham, S, Burns, E. Western Civilizations. Their History and Their
Culture. London NY. 1988. p. 169 (first published 1941).
Mikesell, M.W. 1983. The myth of the nation state. Journal of Geography 82:257-
260.
Panarin, A. V kakom mire nam predstoit zhit’. – In: Russkij uzel. Idei I prognozy
zhurnala Moskva. 1999.
Petrukhin V. Slavjane, varjagi I khazary na juge Rossii. K probleme formirovanija
territorii Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva. In: Drevnejshie gosudarstva
Vostochnoj Evropy. 1992-1993. Moscow, 1995.
Spengler, O. The Sunset of Europe. 1918.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
K probleme formirovanija territorii Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva. – In: Drevnejshie gosudarstva Vostochnoj Evropy
  • V Petrukhin
  • Slavjane
Petrukhin V. Slavjane, varjagi I khazary na juge Rossii. K probleme formirovanija territorii Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva. – In: Drevnejshie gosudarstva Vostochnoj Evropy. 1992-1993. Moscow, 1995.
The Sunset of Europe
  • O Spengler
Spengler, O. The Sunset of Europe. 1918.
Slavjanskij mir i osnovnyje tendentsii geopolitiki
  • A Dugin
Dugin, A. Slavjanskij mir i osnovnyje tendentsii geopolitiki. 2001 – In: http://www.arctogaia.com/public/slavgeop.html.
Versions of Culture. – In: The Idea of Culture
  • Terry Eagleton
Eagleton, Terry. Versions of Culture. – In: The Idea of Culture. Basil, Blackwell. 2000, 1-31.
V kakom mire nam predstoit zhit'. – In: Russkij uzel. Idei I prognozy zhurnala Moskva
  • A Panarin
Panarin, A. V kakom mire nam predstoit zhit'. – In: Russkij uzel. Idei I prognozy zhurnala Moskva. 1999.