The reasons why Zambian Game Management Areas are not functioning as ecologically or economically productive buffer zones and what needs to change for them to fulfil that role

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ZAMBIAN GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS
The reasons why they are not functioning as ecologically or economically
productive buffer zones and what needs to change for them to fulfil that role
Lindsey, P., Nyirenda, V., Barnes, J., Becker, M., Tambling, C., Taylor, A., Watson, F.
Photo: C. Masterson
A study commissioned and funded by the Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia

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Contents
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 4
Potential benefits associated with CWCs ............................................................................................... 8
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Methods ................................................................................................................................................ 12
Literature survey ............................................................................................................................... 12
Stakeholder survey ........................................................................................................................... 12
Estimating current earnings from Game Management Areas .......................................................... 13
Estimating rates of human population growth rate and encroachment in GMAs ........................... 13
Estimating mammalian biomass in GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches ................. 13
Ecological modelling ......................................................................................................................... 13
Financial and economic modelling .................................................................................................... 14
Statistical analyses ............................................................................................................................ 19
Results and discussion .......................................................................................................................... 20
Review of the ways in which GMAs are failing and the reasons why ............................................... 20
Community-related issues ............................................................................................................ 20
ZAWA-related problems ............................................................................................................... 22
Operator-related issues ................................................................................................................ 24
Other factors contributing to the poor performance of GMAs .................................................... 25
Stakeholders’ perspectives of the relative severity of various threats to wildlife populations declines
in GMAs ................................................................................................................................................. 26
Combined effects of these problems .................................................................................................... 27
Ecological impacts ............................................................................................................................. 27
Economic impacts ............................................................................................................................. 31
Social impacts ................................................................................................................................... 32
Changes needed to allow GMAs to function ........................................................................................ 33
1. Changes to the funding support of and focus of ZAWA ........................................................... 33
2. New models for the ownership, structure and functioning of GMAs ...................................... 34
Lessons from other community conservation programmes in southern Africa ........................... 34
Community wildlife conservancies (CWCs) in GMAs .................................................................... 34
Attracting donor support .............................................................................................................. 35
Identifying potentially suitable sites ............................................................................................. 35
Administrative basis and land ownership ..................................................................................... 35
Models for investor participation and stake holdings in CWCs .................................................... 36
Developing a Resource Management Trust for management of wildlife ..................................... 36
Models for how wildlife-based land uses in CWC would be managed ......................................... 37
Structuring of financial benefits for communities ........................................................................ 37
Involvement of ZAWA and ownership of wildlife ......................................................................... 37
Role of fencing .............................................................................................................................. 39
Zambian versus international investors ........................................................................................ 40
Legislation that would need to change to make CWCs possible .................................................. 40
Potential earnings from a model CWC .................................................................................................. 41
Shortcomings of our models ............................................................................................................. 41
Key findings from the modelling exercise and insights into policy issues ......................................... 41
Significantly improved benefits for communities .......................................................................... 41
Low, slow financial slow returns and the need for long leases ..................................................... 43
High economic returns and the case for government/donor investment ..................................... 44
Impact of ZAWA trophy and land fees .............................................................................................. 45
The inability of CWCs to support ZAWA ‘taxation’ ....................................................................... 45
The importance of diversifying income streams ........................................................................... 45
The importance of allowing the hunting of high value species ..................................................... 46

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Importance of not allowing resident hunting to undermine value of wildlife .............................. 46
Potential benefits associated with CWCs ............................................................................................. 46
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 47
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... 47
Abbreviations
CWC= Community wildlife conservancy
ERR = Economic rate of return
FRR = Financial rate of return
IRR = Internal rate of return
GMA = Game Management Area
GNI = Gross national income
NNI = Net national income
NPV = Net present value
USD = United States Dollar

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Executive summary
Zambia has allocated an impressive proportion of its land surface to wildlife conservation. The
protected area is comprised of 20 national parks (covering ~65,000 km2) and 36 game management
areas (GMAs) (167,000 km2) and a variety of other protected area categories. Together these areas
comprise ~40% of the nation’s land area. Human settlement is generally not permitted in national
parks and wildlife-use is limited to non-consumptive photo-tourism. In the GMAs, by contrast,
human settlement is permitted and wildlife use is focused primarily on trophy hunting (mainly by
foreign nationals) and hunting for meat by local and national residents. Despite their size and
potential, the wildlife resources in many GMAs are in a state of steep decline and are not sufficiently
productive in ecological, economic or social terms. In this study, by surveying stakeholders,
reviewing available literature, and collating available data, we identify the drivers of poor GMA
performance make recommendations for improvement, and suggest changes to legislation and
policy necessary for this improvement to occur. We then use ecological and financial modelling to
develop a proposed model for creating ‘Community Wildlife Conservancies (CWC)’ in GMAs or on
un-gazetted customary lands (open areas). We believe that such a structure (and variants of it) has
potential to significantly elevate the social, economic and ecological benefits of GMAs.
Reasons for the failure of GMAs
The reasons for the poor performance in GMAs can be broadly categorized as being those relating to
the participation of communities, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and hunting operators
respectively.
Community-related issues are primarily related to the fact that local people do not receive adequate
benefit flows from wildlife in GMAs, because community ownership of land and wildlife resources is
not recognized in GMAs and because ‘community membership’ is not defined, with the effect that
outsiders are free to move in and exploit natural resources and further diminish minimal per-capita
wildlife-based benefits. The modest per capita benefits generated from trophy hunting are
frequently misused and tend to favour local elites due to problems with the structure, functioning
and accountability of Community Resource Boards (CRBs). Consequently GMAs are effectively open
access regimes and there is an incentive for communities to occupy land and kill wildlife to obtain
meat or harvest trees before someone else does, resulting in rapid and widespread immigration,
encroachment, habitat destruction and bush meat poaching.
ZAWA-related issues are primarily related to the fact that they are grossly under-funded, required to
generate their own income, and are thus overly-dependent on GMAs for a large proportion of their
income. Consequently, ZAWA is forced to make unsustainable wildlife management decisions that
confer short-term survival at the expense of long-term sustainability. ZAWA do not have sufficient
resources to protect wildlife or monitor resources adequately. Multiple different legal quotas (e.g.
trophy hunting, resident hunting, special license off-takes) are established and subsequently utilized
with little to no data on what populations can support. In an attempt to share the burden of
protecting wildlife in GMAs, ZAWA has delegated partial responsibility for anti-poaching to
communities and to hunting operators. The result is a blurred picture of responsibility where all
three stakeholders tend to under-invest in resource protection.
Operator-related issues are related primarily to the short period of tenure of hunting concessions
which is a disincentive for adequate investment and an incentive for poor practices by operators. In
addition, corruption during the tender process for GMAs, coupled with inadequate monitoring of
hunting concessions and lack of a system to reward operators who perform well in terms of resource
protection and community outreach, means that ‘good’ operators are not rewarded and ‘bad’

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operators are not punished. Several unscrupulous operators with a track record of over-exploiting
and abusing concessions appear to repeatedly gain access to new areas. Consequently, there is little
incentive for operators to invest in anti-poaching and social projects. In addition, periodic drastic
decisions by government (such as hunting moratoria of 2001-2002, followed by that of 2013 or
major increases in the proportion of the quota that must be paid upfront, ranging between 60-
100%) undermine investor confidence among operators and further dissuade them from investing
sufficiently in GMAs.
Consequently, a picture emerges whereby all three stakeholders are incentivized to extract
maximally and reinvest minimally, resulting in increasing failure of the GMA system in ecological,
economic and social terms.
Results of the failure of GMAs
Ecological decline
High levels of human in-migration to GMAs, coupled with natural population growth of existing
communities have combined to result in higher than average human population growth rates being
recorded in districts containing or encompassed by GMAs (2.49 ± 0.18%) than those outside of
GMAs (2.31 ± 0.24%). Almost 40% of GMAs are now comprised of human-modified habitat
(compared to 2.9% in national parks and 71.2% outside of the protected area network) and the rate
of habitat loss in GMAs (0.69% conversion per year) is faster than in national parks (0.03%) or
outside of the parks network (0.51%). Wildlife populations are declining in most GMAs and wildlife
biomass is markedly lower in GMAs (mean 247 ± 69 kg/km2) than in national parks (996 ± 309
kg/km2), which in turn are lower than in extensive (unfenced) private game ranches (2,424 ± 305
kg/km2). The diversity of wild ungulates is also lower in GMAs (5.5 ± 0.71 species) than in national
parks (7.6 ± 1.2 species) or extensive game ranches (11.1 ± 0.86 species).
Economic underperformance
Gross earnings from trophy hunting in Zambia as a whole are lower than all other major trophy
hunting nations for which data are available (~USD18 million, c.f. ~USD121 million in South Africa
USD60.1 million in Tanzania; USD46.5 million in Botswana and USD21.3 million in Zimbabwe), and
earnings per km2 from trophy hunting in GMAs are lower than all but one other southern African
country for which data are available (USD291/km2 [excluding areas where no income is earned], c.f.
USD130/km2 in Mozambique, USD378/km2 in Namibia, USD474/km2 in Tanzania and USD1,028/km2
in Zimbabwe). Within Zambia, gross earnings per km2 from trophy hunting in GMAs (USD103/km2)
are almost 90% lower than on extensive game ranches (USD878 ± 226). In addition, while photo
tourism in some national parks is a major revenue generator from wildlife, photo tourism operations
are currently not eligible for bidding on GMA concessions (and there is no structure in place for
communities to benefit from photo tourism in GMAs), thereby substantially limiting revenue
generation and the diversity of wildlife-based land use options.
Weak social benefits
Revenue per capita communities from wildlife-based land uses in GMAs are small (USD11.9/km2
overall, or USD23.3/km2 if the GMAs where no income at all is generated are included) and
distribution of funds is skewed due to elite capture and misappropriation by community
representatives. At the same time, communities incur significant costs as a result of living with
wildlife. Overall, communities living in GMAs remain 30% poorer than the national rural average and

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70% poorer than the urban average, and the literature suggests that they typically live further away
from main roads and are less educated on average.
Recommendations for the way forward
We propose three key recommendations required to address and correct the poor performance of
GMAs:
1. Develop new models for the structure and functioning of GMAs. These models would have
two essential components:
a) Allocating exclusive ownership of blocks of land and the wildlife therein to specific
communities (after defining the membership of such communities). In such areas,
fencing should not be pre-requisite for communities to obtain ownership of wildlife, as is
currently the requirement. These measures would provide the basis for enabling
communities to develop and benefit directly from wildlife-based land uses and retain
important ecological connectivity within and between GMA’s and national park
complexes.
b) Encourage significant and long term private investment in GMAs and the development
of robust and fair public-private partnerships. Such arrangements should allocate leases
to investors following a simple, fair and transparent tender or auction process, and
should provide scope for both consumptive and/or non-consumptive wildlife-based
revenue-generating options. Such investment would provide for much greater anti-
poaching law enforcement, which in turn would pay substantial dividends in wildlife
recovery and income generation.
2) Increase governmental funding of the ZAWA to increase their capacity and reduce the need
to generate revenue at the expense of sustainable wildlife management. ZAWA should play
a key role in facilitating development of wildlife economies on community lands in GMAs
and regulating them to ensure they operate within acceptable parameters.
3) Revise the legal framework for GMA’s to facilitate recommendations 1-2.
Financial and ecological modelling and insights for policy
Following allocation of ownership of blocks of land and wildlife to specific communities within
GMAs, there would then be scope for developing multiple different models of public-private-
partnerships for the development of wildlife economies. The most appropriate model will vary
depending on the condition and location of the particular GMA and the type of investment available.
At present, much of the GMA estate is severely depleted of wildlife and as a result, such areas
require substantial investment in re-stocking of wildlife and in anti-poaching enforcement in order to
allow viable trophy hunting or ecotourism. We propose a model for the development of Community
Wildlife Conservancies as a means of attracting that investment while empowering communities to
benefit from wildlife on their land. The focus of the ecological and financial modelling presented in
this report is for a CWC in a depleted GMA. However, the model is potentially applicable to ‘prime’
GMAs or un-gazetted land (open areas) with local adaptations to adjust to the fact that these areas
are more ecologically intact and connected to productive areas of national parks, and thus would
benefit most from improved anti-poaching under the revised wildlife management
recommendations and partnerships stated. Financial and ecological modelling of a theoretical CWC
in a theoretical depleted GMA highlighted several insights that should be borne in mind by policy
makers:

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 CWCs have potential to generate much higher gross returns than achieved by the GMAs at present
(USD2,255-3,091/km2 c.f. a mean of USD103/km2 [including GMAs that generate nothing, or
~USD200/km2 (USD34-USD2,512/km2) in the GMAs that are still utilized for trophy hunting).
 CWCs have potential to generate significantly higher net returns for communities (~USD347-381/km2
(from trophy hunting, meat sales and ecotourism) than currently earned in GMAs USD11.9/km2
(including GMAs that generate nothing, or ~USD23/km2 in the GMAs that are still utilized for trophy
hunting).
 Communities would benefit from significant levels of employment as CWCs would require
professional guides and hunters, game scouts, trackers, wildlife managers, hospitality managers and
staff and general labour (totalling ~126 jobs per 1,000 km2 CWC).
 Significant quantities of legal meat would be generated: ~20-27 tonnes would be generated by year
10, 65-127 tonnes / year by year 20, and 48-104 tonnes / year by year 40.
 Where wildlife populations are severely depleted, significant investments would be needed in,
among other things, wildlife reintroductions, infrastructure, and anti-poaching enforcement before
financially viable returns from wildlife could be derived. The CWC model included a budget for 1
anti-poaching scout per 10 km2, compared to the 1 ZAWA scout per 187 km2 currently in place in the
Zambian protected area network.
 A concern is that investment in CWCs has marginal financial attractiveness for the private sector:
predicted returns are modest and slow to accrue. In depleted areas, it would take 15-20 years for
wildlife populations to reach carrying capacity and financial returns remain low until year 40. The
minimum lease length for investors in CWCs established in depleted GMAs should thus be 40 years
(dependent on minimum standards of investor performance relating to wildlife management and
compliance with financial commitments to the community owners). Efforts would thus be needed
from government to help make such investments attractive to the private sector.
 Encouragingly, however, the projected economic returns to investment in CWCs are very high.
Government investment in the development of CWCs would contribute significantly to economic
growth, would be extremely economically efficient and would definitely be in the national economic
interest. Government support could be achieved through subsidizing key inputs, such as wildlife for
reintroduction, or by ZAWA waiving (or dramatically reducing) concession fees and animal licence
fees.
 CWCs are likely to be largely dependent on consumptive forms of wildlife use due to low wildlife
densities in the early years, their remoteness and distance from infrastructure and the fact that
there are probably not enough visitors to Zambia yet to allow them to rely solely on photo-tourism.
However, diversifying income to include a portion from photo-tourism after wildlife populations
have recovered appears to be essential for CWCs to achieve financial viability. Consequently, there is
a need for flexibility to allow both photo-tourism and various forms of consumptive use to be
practised as is appropriate and selected for by the investors and community owners. Blanket
restrictions on either are not advisable.
 Given the marginal financial viability of CWCs for investors it is important that the trophy hunting of
high-value key species such as lions and leopards is permitted once acceptable scientific
recommendations for monitoring and management of those species have been adopted.
Furthermore, the hunting of lions and leopards should only be conducted in line with emerging best
practice standards to ensure sustainability.

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 There is not scope for CWCs to support significant payments to ZAWA in the form of animal licence
and concession fees and to still allow communities to benefit significantly. Consequently, such
payments to ZAWA should be removed or significantly reduced, as would be possible if ZAWA
received adequate government funding. Alternatively, such payments could be restructured as
dividends to reflect ZAWA investment in CWCs (such as the provision of founder stock for
reintroductions). However the latter system would create a risk of a conflict of interest whereby the
regulator is also an industry player.
 Resident hunting in CWCs should only be permitted if desired by the investors and the community
owners, if it is practised sustainably and supervised properly, and if the licenses are sold for prices
that reflect the value of the wildlife to be hunted and do not undermine higher-value use of wildlife
(such as through tourism or trophy hunting).
Potential benefits associated with CWCs
The CWC model outlined above would confer an array of benefits relative to the current GMA
system:
Social and economic benefits
a) CWCs would secure land rights for communities and provide protection against the loss of land,
wildlife, forests and other natural resources which arises from open access to those resources.
b) Communities would be empowered to form equitable partnerships with ZAWA and the private
sector.
a) CWCs would contribute significantly to food security by generating substantial and sustainable
incomes, jobs and significant quantities of animal protein.
b) CWCs would provide vehicles for attracting significant investment (including foreign direct
investment) in rural areas. The formal structure outlined above would likely be attractive for
investors because it would provide a simple, transparent and secure means of investing in wildlife.
Such investment could come from the private sector, conservation and development NGOs, eco-
philanthropists, and multi-nationals wishing to purchase carbon or biodiversity credits/offsets.
c) NGOs would be provided with a very direct and effective means of investing in wildlife conservation,
local development and human welfare in a manner that is sustainable and that develops capacity,
rather than through hand outs.
d) By securing land rights, CWCs would create scope for the generation of income from communities
from the sale of carbon credits. Without secure tenure over land, communities cannot make a
credible commitment to the supply of carbon and consequently most carbon projects have been
developed on private land.
e) Communities would benefit from significant training, capacity building and work experience.
f) The protection of wildlife in GMAs would be conducted by the communities and the private sector,
and would thus relieve ZAWA of a significant responsibility and cost.
g) CWCs would generate substantial economic benefits for Zambia as a whole.
Ecological benefits
h) By attracting significant and long-term investment, CWCs have potential to achieve vastly elevated
levels of anti-poaching enforcement and thus protection of wildlife and other resources.
i) The combination of secure and exclusive land rights has potential to drastically reduce
encroachment and unplanned human settlement in GMAs

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j) These factors, coupled with active reintroductions of wild ungulates in suitable areas have potential
to allow for significant recoveries wildlife populations.
k) As a result, CWCs could enable GMAs to act as much more effective buffers for national parks than
they do at present.
The ideas presented for CWCs represent one potential suggestion for providing the basis for
revamping depleted GMAs. However, one size fits all approaches are unlikely to work and a variety
of models may be required to adapt to local situations. Variations on the model could be applied to
prime GMAs (i.e. those retaining relatively healthy wildlife populations). For example, in such areas
leases for the private sector could be somewhat shorter (perhaps 20 years instead of 40).
A business as usual approach to GMAs would almost certainly result in perpetuation of the current
cycle of declining ecological and economic productivity and waning social benefits. There is a need
for change which must include greater government funding for ZAWA (and reduced reliance on
GMAs for their income) and models that allow for much greater community ownership of and
benefits from GMAs, while providing attractive bases for investment by the private sector.

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Introduction
Most southern African countries have designated impressive proportions of their land surface as
protected areas for the conservation of wildlife and other aspects of biodiversity. However, many of
them are facing challenges regarding the provision of funding for protected area networks, and
severe threats from illegal bushmeat hunting and human encroachment (Cumming, 2004; Lindsey et
al., 2013). Zambia has a particularly vast wildlife estate, which encompasses 20 national parks
(~64,000 km2) and 36 Game Management Areas (167,000 km2) and a variety of other protected area
categories, which together comprise ~40% of the nation’s land area (Government of Zambia, 2010).
Game management areas (GMAs) were established as buffer zones around the parks networks and
are used for a variety of both consumptive and to a lesser degree, non-consumptive tourism (Figure
1). Trophy hunting is the primary land use in most GMAs and is practised over a vast area (Simasiku
et al., 2008). However, there are no effective restrictions on human settlement in GMAs and there
are large and expanding human populations in many of them, and associated high levels of illegal
hunting and habitat loss (Lewis and Phiri, 1998; Becker et al., 2013)(Simasiku et al., 2008; Becker et
al., 2013). Habitat destruction is exacerbated by shifting agriculture, burning for charcoal production,
cutting for firewood for small-scale tobacco farming, and the development of mines in some GMAs
(Chemonics International Inc, 2011); (Simukonda, 2011; Vinya et al., 2011).
In the 1980s, in response to widespread poaching of wildlife there was increasing recognition that
there needed to be greater community participation and benefit sharing from wildlife in GMAs
(Fernandez et al., 2009). In the early 1980’s, subsidiary legislation was introduced to partially
decentralize authority over wildlife to communities through what was known as the Administrative
Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE, under the jurisdiction of the
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service (the predecessor of ZAWA), and a variety of other
community wildlife projects (Fernandez et al., 2009). Such projects were harmonized through the
development of the Wildlife Act in 1998, which also provided for establishment of ZAWA as a
government parastatal responsible for managing the protected area network (Chemonics
International Inc, 2011).

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Figure 1. The Zambian protected area network
In GMAs, the Wildlife Act provided for the establishment of Community Resource Boards (CRBs) as
the institutions through which communities could work with ZAWA (Chemonics International Inc,
2011). CRBs co-manage wildlife in GMAs with ZAWA and receive a share of revenues from trophy
hunting. From that income, CRBs are required to recruit village scouts to assist ZAWA with law
enforcement (Chemonics International Inc, 2011). These village scouts are appointed by ‘village
action groups’ (3-10 of which are developed per chiefdom), which fall under CRBs.

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Wildlife-based land uses have significant potential to improve livelihoods for communities in GMAs
(and similar Open Areas). Many such areas have low agricultural potential, there are few economic
opportunities for communities, and people are less educated and poorer on average than those
living outside of GMAs (Manning, 2011). However, GMAs are generally failing to deliver in social,
economic and ecological terms with rapidly declining wildlife populations and waning income from
trophy hunting as a result (Simasiku et al., 2008). A plethora of consultancies and research projects
have cast light on the failings of GMAs in Zambia and the reasons for them, and there has been
much verbal discussion of the issue within Zambia at various stakeholder workshops. There have
been several pointed efforts made by government in response to problems associated with GMAs.
For example, a moratorium on trophy hunting was imposed in 2001 (Manning, 2011). In 2006, the
Government of Zambia embarked upon a reclassification programme for protected areas in an
attempt to achieve improved management of them (Government of Zambia, 2010). In September
2012, a consultative meeting was called by the Minister of the Environment to discuss the way
forward for managing GMAs and for allocating hunting concessions. Then in early 2013, a temporary
moratorium on hunting in GMAs and an indefinite moratorium on the hunting of lions and leopards
were imposed following alleged corruption in the tender process for GMAs and concerns over the
negative impacts of hunting on populations in the light of paucity of monitoring data, including
population estimates.
The Zambian wildlife industry is thus at a low ebb and in a state of turmoil, and the future of
Zambia’s wildlife is under threat. However, at recent stakeholder meetings, there was a clear desire
demonstrated by the various stakeholder groups, government (ZAWA and the Ministry of Tourism),
communities and the private sector to work together to develop solutions to improve the
functioning and productivity of the GMAs. In this paper, we review the reasons why GMAs are not
functioning effectively at present, provide evidence of their non-functionality and suggest
interventions that are needed to increase their productivity in economic, ecological and social terms.
Methods
Literature survey
A literature search was conducted using a web search of terms such as community based natural
resource management, Game Management Areas, wildlife estate, etc. The few peer-reviewed
papers on Zambian game management areas were reviewed, as were the large numbers of ‘grey-
literature’ consultancy reports.
Stakeholder survey
A structured questionnaire survey was developed to canvas opinions of key stakeholders on the
reasons behind the decline of wildlife populations in GMAs. The seven highest ranking ZAWA
officials were interviewed (including the Director General, Head of Research and Senior Ecologist), as
were as many NGO representatives (n=14), wildlife industry experts (including photo-tourism
operators) (n=11, identified during the course of a related study on the Zambian game ranching
industry) and trophy hunting operators (we managed to contact n=13 of the 23 that occur in Zambia)
as possible. Communities were not surveyed for this study because comprehensive community
surveys in GMAs have been completed by other authors in recent years (e.g. (Fernandez et al., 2009;
Bandyopadhyay and Tembo, 2010; Bandyopadhyay and Tembo, 2010; Chemonics International Inc,
2011) and their findings (combined with the opinions of CBNRM experts) were deemed sufficient to
provide insights into community-related issues.

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Estimating current earnings from Game Management Areas
Data on earnings from trophy hunting and resident hunting from the year 2012 were obtained from
ZAWA. The earnings of safari operators in GMAs were estimated using data on trophy off-takes for
2012 obtained from ZAWA and using assumptions on hunt packaging following (Lindsey et al., 2012)
and the mean pricing for Zambian trophy hunting from a survey of n=10 websites. Current per
kilometre earnings from trophy hunting in Zambia were compared with regional estimates derived
from trophy hunting (Lindsey et al., 2012). Total earnings from trophy hunting in Zambia were
compared with the latest regional estimates derived from the literature (which were converted into
2013 values after taking into account inflation rates in each country).
Estimating rates of human population growth rate and encroachment in GMAs
The 2010 Zambian census was used to obtain district level estimates of human population growth
rates (Zambia Central Statistical Office, 2011). A comparison was then conducted between districts
that fall within or partially within GMAs and those that do not. Spatial data on the extent of human
landscape encroachment were taken from Watson et al. (unpublished data) for the Luangwa Valley,
and extended here using the same methods to include the southern Kafue region. The mapping
methods are described in detail by Watson et al. (2013 in prep.) and are summarized here. For the
1984-1987 and 2009-2011 periods, the primary mapping method involved manually drawing
polygons around areas that could be subjectively recognized in satellite imagery as being
substantially cleared of pre-existing natural vegetation. This included any land cleared for
cultivation, fuel-wood, or dwellings; it did not include small isolated roads and tracks, as these could
not be consistently recognized in the available imagery for all parts of the Luangwa and southern
Kafue study areas. The satellite data sources that were used included: Landsat; ASTER; SPOTmaps;
and, MODIS. A 2-km buffer was added to all polygons both to reduce variation due to different
scales at which manual polygons were drawn, and to recognize that human influence on wildlife
extends at least this far beyond the visibly encroached area (Watson et al. unpublished data).
Encroachment data for 1972 were taken from an aerial photography-based land use map published
by Schultz in 1976. The map was georeferenced in ArcMap, polygons were manually drawn around
human-dominated land use types depicted in the map, and a two kilometer buffer was applied as
with the satellite imagery-based polygons.
Estimating mammalian biomass in GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches
Data on wildlife abundance in national parks and GMAs was gathered from the latest aerial survey
reports available from as many protected areas as possible (Simwanza, 2004a; Simwanza, 2004b;
Simwanza, 2005; Simukonda, 2008; Frederick, 2011; Simukonda, 2011). Data on wildlife abundance
of extensive (unfenced) private game ranches was obtained from a survey of game ranches in which
all such ranchers in the country were asked to provide estimates of the numbers of each species
occurring on each ranch (Lindsey et al., 2013a). Estimates of mammalian abundance were made by
removing all species of bushbuck size or smaller (as they are difficult to count from the air or to
estimate the numbers of), hippopotamuses and predators (as many aerial census reports do not
provide estimates of the numbers of those species) to make estimates comparable to aerial survey
data. We then multiplied these estimated population sizes by the typical mass of an individual in a
population for each species (following (Coe et al., 1976)) to estimate biomass.
Ecological modelling
We conducted modelling of wildlife population growth in the context of a new model for the
functioning of GMAs to estimate the potential harvests from trophy hunting and other forms of off-

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take, assuming that proper wildlife management and anti-poaching was put in place. Modelling was
conducted for two scenarios, one for high rainfall (~1,200mm) and low soil nutrients and the other
for the same rainfall but with high soil nutrients. There is a close relationship between rainfall and
above ground primary productivity which in turn relates closely to herbivore biomass up to 700mm
of annual rainfall (Coe et al., 1976). This relationship was extended to ~1,000mm by (Fritz and
Duncan, 1994), while additionally being split into high and low soil nutrient scenarios. Under high
soil nutrients and rainfall >1,000 mm we assumed that the relationship shown for environments
receiving <1,000mm continued, but that under low soil nutrients there was an inverse but equal
relationship to that shown <1,000 mm, due to increased leaching of soil nutrients (East 1984). Using
these animal numbers we then estimated the carrying capacity density of each species in each of the
two scenarios (high rainfall level and high and low soil nutrient levels). We then used data from
unfenced game ranches in Zambia as the basis for determining the proportion of mammalian
biomass that was comprised by each species. Using these proportions estimated above we
apportioned the biomass estimates to the prey species and converted these back to animal numbers
using unit body masses available in (Coe et al., 1976). Using these animal numbers we then
estimated the carrying capacity density of each species in each of the scenarios (rainfall level and soil
nutrient level).
To model a depleted GMA, we assumed that there would be existing small populations of prey
species (50 individuals of small and common/resilient ungulates species (bushbuck, grysbok, kudu,
klipspringer, oribi, reedbuck, warthog) and 20 individuals of other ungulates. We assumed that 50
individuals of all ungulate species would be reintroduced, except for buffalo (a species of key
importance for trophy hunting (Lindsey et al., 2012)) for which we assumed 100 individuals would be
reintroduced. We modelled ungulate population growth using a Ricker equation (Sinclair et al., 2009)
where the individual ungulate populations were regulated by the carrying capacity estimates
calculated for each species and the intrinsic growth rates estimated using the unit weights for each
species (Coe et al., 1976).
Due to the absence of site-specific prey profile data, we were unable to model the specific impact of
each predator species on prey populations. Initially we attempted to use data on prey preferences of
predators to infer what they might eat, but these produced spurious results. We think this was
because in Zambian systems a higher proportion of the biomass tends to be comprised of mega-
herbivores (Bell, 1986) and so feeding strategies of predators may have to differ from those
observed elsewhere in the region. Therefore using predation data collected from areas with
different prey assemblages would not readily provide predation estimates that mimic the Zambian
system. We thus adopted a generic approach, where we assumed that for the first ten years,
predators would occur at 10% of the density they would if prey populations had recovered fully, at
50% for the second 10 years and then at 100% thereafter. We estimated that the rate of increase of
ungulates would be suppressed by 5% in the first ten years, 25% in the second 10 years and 50%
thereafter, due to predation by the predator guild. The ungulate population at each time period was
calculated as the growth from the Ricker equation based on the intrinsic rate of increase with off-
takes from predators, culling and trophy hunting (described shortly) removed from the population.
Although generic in its approach, the reduction in growth as a consequence of predation can be
monitored and these variables can easily be changed to reflect data obtained from any monitoring
programmes.
Financial and economic modelling
We conducted financial and economic modelling to assess the financial and economic output of a
hypothetical 1,000 km2 Community Wildlife Conservancy (CWC) established in a depleted GMA. It
should be noted however, that from an ecological perspective, the larger the area, the better.

15
Monetary values are presented as United States Dollar (USD) at mean 2012 values (ZMK 5,066 to
USD1). This project was concerned exclusively with direct use values (those generated from
consumptive or non-consumptive use of wildlife resources) and did not consider indirect use values
(such as the linkages with other economic sectors or the value of ecosystem services conserved as a
result of associated habitat preservation), or non-use values (such as the value of having the option
to use the resources in the future or the existence value of knowing that they are conserved), both
of which are significant. Use values are reflected in a) the returns to private investment in game
ranching, such as in wealth accumulation and annual operating profitability, and b) the net
contribution to the national income in terms of value-addition and asset accumulation.
In looking at business viability and economic contributions of CWC enterprises in GMAs, use was
made of a system of financial and economic enterprise or activity models developed by (Barnes,
1998). They have already been applied to a limited extent to measuring private and economic values
for natural resource use in the GMAs (MCC, 2009; Chemonics International Inc, 2011). The system is
compatible with that used in appraisal of projects for GMAs by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC, 2009).
The financial and economic enterprise/activity models were based on detailed budget/cost-benefit
spreadsheets, which were integrated with the ecological models described above. The models were
based on empirical estimates of capital start-up costs, and recurrent fixed and variable running costs
(derived from surveys with extensive game ranchers (n=10) and hunting operators (n=13) (Lindsey et
al unpublished data), discussions with stakeholders, Tables 1 and 2) and publically available
economic data, and were constructed to represent a typical example of a prospective wildlife
conservancy in a GMA.
Table 1. Schedule of typical initial capital expenditures needed at start-up, applicable to the high
rainfall, low soil nutrient Community Wildlife Conservancy [1,000 km2] (USD 2012)
Capital Costs at Start-up
USD
USD/km2
Fixed Assets
Houses
240,000
240
Offices, storerooms, cold rooms
52,000
52
Hunting camps lodges
20,000
20
Boreholes dams water reticulation
411,000
411
Roads, airstrips firebreaks
51,000
51
Water pumps
22,500
23
Fencing
505,000 *
505
Other costs
6,000
6
Contingencies
65,375
65
Movable Assets
Vehicles
410,000
410
Tools, generators, other equipment
41,320
41
Office equipment
13,200
13
Contingencies
46,452
46
Stock
Initial stock purchases
152,868**
153
Contingencies
15,287
15
Working Capital
Initial Working Capital
170,637
171
Total Initial Capital
2,222,639
2223

16
* As discussed shortly, fencing should only be used under certain circumstances and will not
always be necessary
** We assumed that most of the ~USD2 million needed to re-stock such an area from very
low wildlife densities would be subsidized by government, and/or NGOs, and/or the private
game ranching sector
Table 2. Schedule of typical annual variable and fixed cost expenditures needed during year 20 of
project life (USD 2012) for a 1,000 km2 Community Wildlife Conservancy
Costs in year 20
USD
USD/km2
Variable Costs
Marketing – advertising
9,332
9
Marketing - agent's fees
12,130
12
Cost of sales
87,461
88
Transport/communications
49,147
49
Trophy handling/training/consultancies
19,598
20
Statutory licenses
7,932
8
Support fee
13,997
14
VAT/sales tax
248,013
248
Total variable costs
447,610
448
Fixed Costs
Salaries and wages – unskilled
167,994
168
Salaries and wages – skilled
49,194
49
Salaries and wages – management and anti-
poaching scouts
102,000
102
Administration
27,000
27
Maintenance and repairs
44,387
44
Insurance
15,000
15
Loan amortization and interest
83,010
83
Provisions for capital replacement
132,743
133
Interest on variable working capital
19,695
20
Interest on overhead working capital
17,845
18
Land rental
37,500
38
Resource royalty
184,882
185
Total fixed costs
881,250
881
Total operating costs
1,328,860
1329
Major start up costs included fencing (though as discussed later we believe that in most cases, that
will not be necessary), vehicles, wildlife stock for reintroduction, water reticulation, buildings,
vehicles and other equipment. We assumed that there would be a significant subsidization of the
wildlife for reintroduction (due to either provision of wildlife for a reduced price by ZAWA, NGOs or
private game ranchers) such that associated costs would be ~150,000 as opposed to the ~USD2
million that would be needed if the requisite wildlife was purchased at market values.
The annual running costs included, inter alia, a significant component relating to anti-poaching
enforcement, including a scout-force of 100 men (or 1/10km2). In addition, an annual land rental of
USD38/km2 and a resource royalty of 8% payable to communities were incorporated, designed to

17
capture the maximum amount of economic rent from the system, while retaining financial viability.
It was assumed that a portion of the land rental and resource royalties would be used to pay ZAWA
for license fees for animals shot (according to 2012 license fees, though the advisability and
justification of such taxation is questionable, as is discussed later). The remainder was assumed to
be available for community partners.
The models were run for the two rainfall/nutrient scenarios outlined earlier. The high rainfall/low
nutrient case was considered likely to be the commoner of the two and was used as the base
scenario. Key assumptions associated with the financial and economic models are presented in Table
3. Ecological modelling indicated that some 15-20 years were required for densities of wildlife to
recover and attain the long-term average productive carrying capacity of the habitat at 0.35 km2 per
large stock unit equivalent for the high rainfall / low soil nutrient setting and some 0.19 km2 per LSU
for the high-high setting, following the reintroduction regime described above. An LSU was defined
as the metabolic equivalent of a 450 kg steer by (Meissner, 1982).
Table 3: Key assumptions applicable to the high rainfall, low soil nutrient financial and economic
GMA game ranch model (USD, 2012)
Physical Assumptions
Unit
Quantity
Land Extent
Km2
1,000
Initial Stock Purchases
Number
1,000
Stock on Land (by Year 20)
Large Stock Units (LSU)
3,019
Stock on Land (by Year 40)
Large Stock Units (LSU)
2,879
"Economic" Carrying Capacity
Hectares per LSU Equivalent
35
Stocking Rate (by year 20)
Hectares per LSU Equivalent
33
Stocking Rate (by year 40)
Hectares per LSU Equivalent
35
Number of Hunting Camps (by Year 10)
Number
1
Number of Hunting Camps (by Year 20)
Number
2
Number of Hunting Camps (by Year 40)
Number
4
Number of Lodges/Camps (by Year 20)
Number
1
Average Management Staff
Number
6
Average highly skilled Staff
Number
18
Average less skilled Staff
Number
102
Financial Assumptions
Land rental
USD per km2
38
Resource royalty
% of Sales Turnover
8%
Long term borrowing
% of Initial Capital
25%
Short term borrowing
% of Recurrent Costs
20%
Financial discount rate
%
8%
Economic Assumptions
Economic discount rate
%
8%
Economic foreign exchange premium
%
8%
General VAT/sales tax adjustment
%
11%
Shadow wage adjustment management staff
Factor
1.00
Shadow wage adjustment skilled staff
Factor
0.60
Shadow wage adjustment unskilled staff
Factor
0.35

18
We assumed that land use would include trophy hunting and hunting for meat (after 10 years to
allow wildlife populations to recover somewhat). In addition, we assumed that one mid- to up-
market non-consumptive viewing lodge could also be sustained (in localized portions of the GMA
such as those with particular scenic appeal or particularly high densities of wildlife) after 15 years of
recovery in wildlife populations. To estimate the value of trophy hunting, we followed the methods
of (Lindsey et al., 2012), using 2012 prices. We assumed that each trophy animal hunted also had a
meat value equivalent to the dressing percentage of the mean male body mass of each species
(following (du P Bothma and du Toit, 2010)). For animals hunted specifically for meat, we assumed a
body mass intermediate between the male and female weight and mean dressing percentages (du P
Bothma and du Toit, 2010). We assumed that the meat price would be USD3/kg (which is 40% lower
than is obtained from game ranchers based near urban areas as prices obtainable for bushmeat are
lower in rural areas, (Lindsey et al., 2013a)). We assumed that a 1,000 km2 block could sustain one
hunting camp by year ten, two hunting camps by year 20, and four fully functional hunting camps by
year 40. During each year we estimated trophy and culling quotas (the latter only for common
species) based on the maximum percentage off-takes for each category recommended by (WWF,
1987). Trophy quotas for modelling income from hunting lions and leopards were derived from (Caro
et al., 2009).
In order to provide insights on several policy issues, we conducted a number of sensitivity analyses
to assess the impact of variation in several factors:
a) Providing a subsidy on the price of wildlife reintroductions (we reduced the cost of reintroductions
to ~USD150,000 from the approximately USD2 million that would be needed to re-stock a 1,000 km2
GMA)
b) Assessing potential returns if there was no potential for photo-tourism lodge or if a second one was
built and functioned
c) Assessing the impact of whether the hunting of lions and leopards is permitted
d) Assessing the impact of whether the density of lions was low (i.e. the 3.5/100km2 density observed
in the Luangwa ecosystem , or the higher densities 10/100 km2 observed in the most prey-rich parts
of that ecosystem, Zambia Carnivore Programme, unpublished data)
e) Assessing what the impact would be on investor viability if the concession and animal license
payments were charged in addition to the royalties payable to communities (and not drawn from
them).
The financial cost-benefit models were run over 10, 20- and 40-year periods, and depicted annual
flows of initial and replacement capital costs, variable operating costs, operating overhead costs,
and gross income, over the periods. Constant 2012 values were used. These were linked to ranch
stock projections which were derived from the ecological modelling, and depicted annual wildlife
stock numbers, potential off-takes for different forms of hunting over the time intervals. Residual
values for stock and depreciated capital assets were accounted for in the final year of the period
analysed. Financial internal rates of return were calculated for 10, 20 and 40 years. Financial net
present values were calculated for the periods at 8% real discount rate.
The financial budget models provided financial data on the initial capital costs required for the
enterprise, annual variable operating costs, annual operating overhead costs (including annual costs
associated with capital) and annual financial income for the 20th year of enterprise life. The budget
model provided the net cash income (net profit), wage bill, financial and in-kind income accruing to
local communities, and production taxes such as value added tax (VAT), rentals accruing to
government, landholders, etc. for that year. Resource royalties and land rentals, which could accrue
to communities and government depending on policy, were treated as variable so that they could be
maximized in the model. Positive net present values and financial internal rates of return above the

19
financial discount rate or opportunity cost for capital, as well as positive annual net cash incomes
indicate that the enterprise is a potentially attractive business investment.
The models also measured the contribution of the enterprise to the national economy as the
incremental change in the national income generated by the activity and measured at opportunity
cost to the nation. Empirical financial data were converted, where necessary, through a process
termed shadow pricing, to reflect this. Incremental national income embraces not only the profits
and asset value gain earned in an enterprise, but also all new wages and salaries, taxes net of
subsidies, returns (interest and amortization) to and of capital, rentals and royalties. It is the return
to the internal factors of production in the enterprise (land, labour, capital, and entrepreneurship. It
is the value added after expenditures on external inputs are subtracted from the gross income.
Shadow pricing criteria developed in Namibia and Botswana (Barnes, 1994; Humavindu, 2008) were
utilized with slight adaptations to Zambian conditions. The main adjustments were in the removal of
transfers between stakeholders within the economy which do not change national income as costs
or benefits (taxes, rentals, new wages, interest, etc.), and the inclusion of foreign payments out as
costs, and foreign payments in as benefits. Adjustment of wages to reflect opportunity costs
involved a factor of 30% for unskilled and 60% for semi-skilled wages. Adjustment to account for
excess demand for foreign exchange involved a premium of 8% on tradable items. A real economic
rate of discount of 8% was adopted as the opportunity cost of capital. This was based on the
analytical work of Humavindu (2008) in Namibia and the use of discount rates in Zambian conditions
(Chemonics International Inc 2011).
Economic cost-benefit models were also run for 10, 20 and 40-year periods. These accounted for
annual capital expenditures, annual economic costs of production, annual income, foreign inflows
and outflows, and in the last year of analysis, residual values of stock, assets, and foreign debt. They
generated, economic internal rates of return and economic net present values in terms of value
added to net national income over the analysis periods at opportunity cost. The budget models, for
year 20 of enterprise life, depicted initial capital annual, gross output plus annual stock value
appreciation, and the annual economic costs on inputs from outside the enterprise. They resulted in
the key measure of annual change in gross national income (GNI), after costs were subtracted from
gains in output and stock. The models also generated the key measure of net national income after
subtraction of asset depreciation from gross national income (GNI).
The gross national income and net national income measures as well as the measures of return in
national income from investment over 10, 20 and 40 years (economic rate of return and net present
value) determine whether investment in the enterprise is economically sound. Positive net present
values and economic rates of return above the economic rate of discount or opportunity cost
indicate soundness, as do positive annual value added to national net income and gross national
income. The economic models computed the direct returns that the enterprises make for private
investors and for the national income.
Statistical analyses
Questionnaire data were analysed using multiple logistic regressions, chi-squares and analyses of
variance as appropriate (SAS Institute., 2000). When commencing with multiple logistic regressions
or multiple analyses of variance, all variables expected to influence the dependent variable were
included in the models and removed following a backwards stepwise procedure until all remaining
variables were statistically significant (SAS Institute., 2000).

20
Results and discussion
Review of the ways in which GMAs are failing and the reasons why
Community-related issues
Perhaps the most fundamental basis for the failure of the GMAs is a failure in the Wildlife Act to
recognize communities as the rightful owners of the land in GMAs or of the wildlife resource. As
such, the Wildlife Act contradicts the Lands Act of 1995 (Manning, 2012). There are no mechanisms
for specific communities to obtain exclusive rights over land or the wildlife resources therein.
Consequently, mechanisms to prevent in-migration of external communities into GMAs are weak
and there is an incentive for communities already present in GMAs to occupy land before someone
else does. Encroachment is exacerbated by the use of shifting agriculture, charcoal production and
the cutting of trees for fuel for the curing of tobacco by small-scale farmers (Chemonics International
Inc, 2011; Simukonda, 2011; Vinya et al., 2011). Uncontrolled immigration means that land use
planning is difficult to design and enforce (Simukonda, 2011), especially where the appropriate
statutory instruments and regulation are absent.
ZAWA collects all of the revenue from trophy hunting, and remits 20% of the concession fees (15%
accruing to CRBs and 5% to the chief, in spite of the fact that the land is under customary tenure and
thus belongs to the community) and 50% of animal license fees for wildlife shot as trophies in GMA
(45% of which goes to the CRB and 5% to the chief) (Fernandez et al., 2009). Furthermore, these
remittances are often paid late (Chemonics International Inc, 2011). The allocation of funds in the
form of government hand-outs, the calculation of which is unclear to community members, and
removes any incentive to earn the income through good management of natural resources
(Bandyopadhyay and Tembo, 2010; Chemonics International Inc, 2011). The tripartite agreement
comprising the hunting concession agreements that are signed between ZAWA, hunting operators
and CRBs on the leasing of GMAs favour ZAWA. ZAWA retain high proportions of revenues, delegate
numerous responsibilities to other stakeholders, allocate minimal rights (e.g. communities are not
given permission to utilize or manage wildlife), are able to dismiss CRBs or to cancel the leases of
hunting operators and are not obliged to make their financial records relating to hunting available to
the CRBs (Manning, 2011; Bandyopadhyay and Tembo, 2010; Chemonics International Inc, 2011).
As a result of these failings, communities receive a fraction of the benefits that they should from
WBLU in GMAs and are largely marginalized from the decision making process associated with
wildlife management. In 2012, communities received 43.1% of the income collected by ZAWA from
trophy hunting in GMAs (Table 4) with the effect that wildlife-based land uses were taxed at 56.9%,
whereas livestock production and small-scale agriculture are largely untaxed. Consequently,
incentives for conservation are weak and there is widespread resentment towards ZAWA, hunting
and tourism operators (anon survey respondent, pers. comm.).

21
Table 4. Gross earnings from trophy hunting and non-resident hunting in game management areas
(excluding land under 99 year lease within or near to GMAs) (NB that operators’ net earnings are
markedly lower than the gross income, due to the costs associated with paying concession and
animal license fees to ZAWA, the costs of running and marketing safaris, and the costs of managing
the concessions)
Total
Operators*
ZAWA*
CRBs*
Chiefs*
Trophy hunting
Concession fees
N/A
N/A
580,572
108,857
36,286
Animal license fees
N/A
N/A
1,697,878
1,528,090
169,788
Operators license fees
N/A
N/A
80,500
0
0
PH license fees
N/A
N/A
65,621
0
0
Daily rates
N/A
11,655,430
N/A
N/A
N/A
Trophy fees
N/A
4,506,987
N/A
N/A
N/A
Sub total
16,162,417
16,162,417
2,424,571
1,636,947
206,074
Gross trophy hunting earnings / km2
102 a
102 a
15.3
10.3
1.3
Resident hunting
Total earnings
88,932
N/A
44,489
40,040
4,449
Non resident hunting earnings / km2
0.6
N/A
0.3
0.3
0.0
Total earnings
16,251,349
16,162,417
2,469,060
1,676,988
210,522
Total earnings / km2
103
N/A
15.6
10.6
1.3
a NB Operators’ were assumed to generate the total gross income from trophy hunting, from which
ZAWA and community income is derived. This income excludes income generated from extensive
game ranches which are on 99 year lease
A second suite of problems associated with the role of communities in GMAs is in the make-up and
functioning of CRBs. CRBs are required to distribute 45% of the revenues received from ZAWA to
resource protection, 35% to community projects and 20% to administration costs (Fernandez et al.,
2009). The Wildlife Act does not provide for mechanisms for downward accountability of CRBs and
as a result there are frequent financial irregularities ranging from overuse of funds for travel and
meeting allowances to theft of CRB funds (Chemonics International Inc, 2011)(Manning, 2012) and
inappropriate influence on the use of the funds by chiefs (Simasiku et al., 2008). Local chiefs appear
to have the ability to dismiss any board member and village scouts as and when they please.
Consequently, CRBs are unstable and can collapse quickly due to the interference of traditional
leaders and ZAWA.
The receipt of funding from trophy hunting in GMAs is skewed, such that more affluent community
members tend to benefit, whereas the poorest sectors of communities do not (Bandyopadhyay and
Tembo, 2010). CRBs lack resources to fulfil their function correctly and all lack office space and other
essential equipment (Chemonics International Inc, 2011). The funds allocated to resource protection
are inadequate, and the 850 village scouts employed in GMAs throughout Zambia are poorly and
irregularly paid in addition to receiving inadequate training and equipment and are consequently
largely ineffective (Manning, 2011). There is a lack of appropriately educated or skilled community
members with which to form CRBs (and no programmes to provide such training) which limits the
ability of CRBs to negotiate effectively with either ZAWA or operators (Chemonics International Inc,
2011). The skills shortage is exacerbated by the three-year tenure of CRBs, which means that there is
little skills development or transfer as the entire board is dissolved after 2-3 years (Sichilongo et al.,
2013).
Finally, there are a multitude of different authorities in GMAs with jurisdiction over the
use/management of different resources, which undermines scope for developing coordinated
natural resource management or land use planning (including among others, the forestry
department, lands department, district council, ministry for water affairs, etc) (Simukonda, 2011).
Lastly, chiefs are able to allocate land to private investors in the middle of GMAs without consulting
CRBs (Chemonics International Inc, 2011).

22
ZAWA-related problems
When ZAWA replaced the National Parks and Wildlife Service, a key objective was to increase
efficiency and to reduce costs by increasing capacity for financial self-sufficiency (Sichilongo et al.,
2013). The initial plan was for ZAWA to retain government support, but in practise support from
central government was radically reduced, resulting in a huge budget deficit and debts currently
standing at USD12 million (Sichilongo et al., 2013). ZAWA generates USD4.6 million per year and yet
has an annual wage bill of at least USD12 million (Sichilongo et al., 2013). ZAWA’s resources equate
to USD20/km2/year, which compares poorly with regional investments in parks made during the
1990s (when data were available) of USD143/km2/year and is well short of the USD200/km2/year
that was estimated in the 1980s to be required to protect elephant populations from poaching
adequately (without considering inflation) (Cumming, 2004).
Funding shortages mean that ZAWA’s mandate of protecting the vast wildlife estate is effectively
impossible to achieve. ZAWA has a field staff complement of 1,179 to protect 220,000 km2, which
equates to 1/187 km2 which compares poorly with regional average of 1/40 km2 (Cumming, 2004).
Furthermore, as little as 8% of the ZAWA budget is spent on GMAs even though they generate >50%
of ZAWA earnings and comprise >70% of land under their jurisdiction (Simasiku et al., 2008). ZAWA
are encumbered by large numbers of sick and unproductive staff members who produce little and
yet consume a high proportion of the working budget for the organisation. Finally, there has been an
increasingly inappropriate allocation of funds within ZAWA, with greater proportions accruing to
head office and reduced allocations accruing to field stations (anonymous survey respondent pers.
comm.). Consequently, field capacity is extremely low at a time when the threat to wildlife from the
bushmeat trade is unprecedented and that from ivory poachers is resurgent (Douglas-Hamilton,
2009; Lindsey et al., 2013).
Ed Sayer from Frankfurt Zoological Society provided the following example:
In the Munyamadzi GMA (which lies between North and South Luangwa national parks and is one of
the highest-earning GMAs in the country), ZAWA deploy a maximum 10 staff members, of which
perhaps five are capable of doing a patrol, and zero funds are provided for rations, equipment, fuel
or management to protect revenues of ~USD400,000/year. Frankfurt Zoological Society covers the
tab for enforcement in that area, but with the revenues earned from trophy hunting, there should be
enough for ZAWA and the CRBs to manage the area effectively.
In an attempt to rectify this situation, ZAWA have attempted to allocate partial responsibility for
resource protection on CRBs and hunting operators with the effect that the responsibility for anti-
poaching is blurred, with none of the three stakeholders contributing sufficiently (anonymous
respondent, pers. comm.). This is despite the fact that responsibility for anti-poaching falls firmly
upon ZAWA according to the Wildlife Act (Manning, 2011). This vague arrangement (coupled with
failure to enforce partnership obligations) whereby responsibility for anti-poaching is shared by the
three stakeholders, with no specific required or enforced contributions means that all three under-
invest in most cases.
Funding shortages have reduced the technical support that ZAWA can provide to CRBs. When ZAWA
was formed in 2000, a team was developed to focus specifically on CBNRM, but has subsequently
been greatly reduced in size and effectiveness due to funding shortages, with the effect that
technical support from ZAWA to CRBs is inadequate and communication between CRBs and ZAWA is
reduced (Chemonics International Inc, 2011).

23
Forced to generate their own funding, ZAWA rely on safari hunting in GMAs for ~45-67% of their
revenue (Manning, 2011; Sichilongo et al., 2013). This reliance creates a conflict of interest, whereby
the regulatory body is also a direct beneficiary of wildlife-based land uses in GMAs. Under extreme
financial pressure, ZAWA have made a number of decisions in the past that have compromised
sustainability in order to maximize immediate financial returns. For example, in 2003, ZAWA
increased the sizes of quotas and reduced the size of hunting blocks (Simasiku et al., 2008). In
addition, ZAWA have imposed high ‘fixed-quotas’ (of 60-100%) whereby operators are forced to pay
for a proportion of animal license fees before hunting commences for the season (Simasiku et al.,
2008; Manning, 2011). Such quotas represent a perverse incentive, forcing operators to harvest
wildlife regardless of the sustainability of the off-take (and in some cases against their wishes).
Nonetheless, utilization of quotas has remained at an average of 40%, implying that they are higher
than populations can support (Simasiku et al., 2008).
Resource monitoring activities have also suffered due to funding shortages, and there is a lack of an
organised programme to research and monitor wildlife populations to inform management and
quotas, or to monitor trophy quality as bases for establishing quotas. Trophy quotas are established
arbitrarily and often bear little resemblance to what wildlife populations can support. Quotas for
lions are notably excessive, and negative impacts of trophy hunting on lions in both GMAs and
neighbouring national parks have been recorded (Yamazaki, 1996; Yamazaki, 1996; Becker et al.,
2012). Recent research also suggests that quotas of leopards may be too high (Ray, 2011).
ZAWA is also under political pressure to allocate quotas to other stakeholders. For example, resident
hunting licenses are granted to citizens and established residents of Zambia who live outside the
GMA (mostly in urban centres). Such licenses are heavily subsidized to the point where their cost is
~1/3 the meat value of the animals in question (Table 5). There is thus an incentive for hunters to
shoot more wildlife than they have licenses for in order to obtain meat for sale. Such abuse is made
possible through inadequate supervision of such hunts and corruption and the scale of non-resident
hunting harvests are probably much greater than reflected in the ZAWA records (anonymous survey
respondent, pers. comm.). Resident hunts conducted by GMA residents, district residents, and
citizens/ established residents disrupt the safari hunting industry (as both can occur at the same
time), and generate a fraction of the income generated by foreign clients (Lindsey et al., 2007).

24
Table 5. The USD price of citizen licenses for hunting in GMAs, the meat value of those species and
the value of the meat relative to the price of citizen licenses
Citizens
Meat value a
Meat value relative
to license fee
Buffalo
493
1398
2.8
Bushbuck
40
142
3.6
Bush pig
16
146
9.1
Duiker
32
40
1.3
Eland
592
1425
2.4
Hartebeest
158
355
2.2
Impala
40
150
3.8
Kudu
493
551
1.1
Oribi
59
33
0.6
Puku
69
159
2.3
Reedbuck
79
159
2.0
Warthog
79
185
2.3
Waterbuck
158
615
3.9
Wildebeest
158
593
3.8
Zebra
296
757
2.6
Average ± S.E.
2.9±0.75
a Assuming male animals are hunted, a meat price of USD4.3/kg (the price paid by Lusaka butchers
for dressed meat) and assuming the mean mass of dressed carcasses presented by (du P Bothma and
du Toit, 2010)
In addition, a varying amount of wildlife is killed in GMAs under ‘special licenses’ (Sichilongo et al.,
2013). Special licenses are allocated on a discretionary basis by the Minister of Tourism and Arts to
individuals and to communities (often distant from the GMA where the hunt happens) (Sichilongo et
al., 2013). Special licenses and non-resident hunting licenses strip the value and earning potential of
wildlife in GMAs and create minimal incentives for conservation by communities except in the case
of local wildlife utilisation for community traditional ceremonies. Furthermore, such licenses
undermine efforts to ensure that quotas are sustainable. Respondents surveyed during the survey
tended to indicate that abuse of special licenses was a more common problem in the past than at
present.
As a result of the different categories of legal use, many species of wildlife in GMAs are subjected to
mortality via natural predation, high levels of illegal bushmeat hunting, and legal off-takes via trophy
hunting, resident hunting, non-resident hunting and special license hunting, and in some cases, live
capture. The combined impact of these off-takes is contributing in some cases to precipitous wildlife
population declines, particularly given that quotas are established in the absence of rigorous or
sufficiently recent data.
Operator-related issues
The current system creates disincentives for investment by hunting operators. Leases are granted for
ten years (except for depleted blocks, which are leased for 15 years), which is arguably less than is
required to confer a real sense of ownership of an area for operators. As is demonstrated shortly, in
areas where wildlife populations are depressed, 10 years does not allow for sufficient time for
operators to recoup the costs that would be required to control illegal hunting and wait for

25
populations to recover. In addition, ten years is arguably not sufficient to develop a close working
relationship with the communities in their hunting blocks. Due to the short lease terms, operators
are disincentivized to build permanent structures such as housing, offices and substantial workshop
complexes. While leases in several other countries (and notably Tanzania) are shorter than those in
Zambia, most of those countries also suffer from underinvestment by hunting operators (Nelson et
al., In press). In some cases, town-based operators allow professional hunters from multiple
different operating companies to hunt in their areas. That situation creates a scenario where the
people utilizing the area have no-sense of ownership over the area, no knowledge of the local
wildlife (such as which male lions are resident with dependent cubs) and extract what they can while
investing as little as possible (anonymous survey respondent, pers. comm.).
Superimposed on this situation is an environment in which ZAWA has a tendency to periodically
‘shift the goal posts’ and introduce significant rule changes, which further undermine investor
confidence. Examples include temporary hunting moratoria, which were imposed in 2001 and again
in January 2013, the cancelling of leases for some operators, and substantial increases in the
proportion of the hunting quota (the fixed quota) that must be paid by operators up front (Manning,
2011). The last tender cycle (concluded in December 2012) was cancelled and a moratorium on
hunting in GMAs imposed due to alleged corruption in the allocation of GMAs to operators. Such
corruption is extremely damaging because it allows unscrupulous operators to continue to access
hunting blocks (Leader-Williams et al., 2009).
There is a lack of a system in place to link the past performance of hunting operators to the
prospects of them obtaining an extension of a lease or a lease for a new area. As a result of these
factors, responsible operators are not adequately rewarded, and unscrupulous operators not
adequately punished, reducing incentives for best practise. In late 2012, several operators known to
invest very little in resource protection did not re-bid for the areas previously under their tender.
Allowing such operators to bid for new areas has enabled some of the worst operators to
sequentially deplete GMAs. The Hunting Concession Agreements that operators sign when they take
over leases (and which outline their commitments to anti-poaching and community outreach) are
not effectively enforced, and so the contributions of operators rely solely on the good will of
individuals (Chemonics International Inc, 2011). Furthermore, operators often vacate the hunting
blocks during the ‘off’ or rainy season, thus leaving their areas vulnerable to bushmeat poachers.
Some of the hunting blocks in GMAs are extremely large, and several operators complained that
their size renders enforcement by a single operator an impossible task. There is a range in operator
performance, whereby some operators invest a significant amount into anti-poaching and into
community outreach work and where others invest virtually nothing. In general, declining wildlife
populations have resulted in declining incomes (Simasiku et al., 2008) and thus waning abilities of
operators to protect the wildlife resource.
Other factors contributing to the poor performance of GMAs
Conflicting legislation
There are conflicts in different pieces of legislation that preclude effective land use planning for
wildlife-based land uses. For example, the wildlife act states that ZAWA is responsible for wildlife
resources in the area, and by implication habitat whereas the Local Government Act says that local
councils are responsible for planning and development in districts that the GMAs fall within, posing
major challenges for effective land management (Sichilongo et al., 2013).

26
Low levels of investment by NGOs
The level of NGO investment in many GMAs has been extremely low, due to lack of confidence in
legislative and policy framework governing GMAs, in ZAWA’s implementation of that policy and in
the performance of CRBs (Simasiku et al., 2008).
Over-reliance on trophy hunting for income and inadequate framework for ecotourism
The success of wildlife-based land uses in southern Africa has derived largely from the multiple
revenue streams that are obtainable from wildlife, including income from trophy hunting,
ecotourism, hunting for meat and skins and the capture and live-sale of wildlife (Bond, 2009).
However, in GMAs legal wildlife use is limited almost entirely to trophy hunting, which significantly
reduces the potential returns from wildlife. Ecotourism operations exist in only 10 of the 36 GMAs
and only two CRBs receive revenues from ecotourism lodges, mostly concentrated around Lower
Zambezi and South Luangwa national parks (Simasiku et al., 2008). Furthermore, the existing legal
framework does not require tourism operators to involve or pay CRBs in the development of tourism
enterprises in GMAs (Chemonics International Inc, 2011). Even if CRBs were empowered to derive
benefits from ecotourism in GMAs, such operations would likely struggle under current
circumstances due to the suite of problems listed above which damage the wildlife product. Viable
ecotourism operations typically require significant infrastructure, high densities of visible wildlife
and/or attractive scenery, conditions which are not prevalent in many GMAs. Consequently, simply
replacing trophy hunting with photo-tourism (as has been suggested by a number of protectionist
organisations but without any details on how such a transition could work) will not resolve the
underperformance of GMAs. What is needed is the development of an appropriate framework to
allow for the successful development of whichever forms of wildlife use are most suitable and
profitable on a case by case basis.
Stakeholders’ perspectives of the relative severity of various threats to wildlife populations
declines in GMAs
Respondents considered the primary causes of loss of wildlife in GMAs to be: human encroachment
and habitat loss; under funding of ZAWA and inadequate anti-poaching effort by ZAWA; and
bushmeat poaching (Figure 2). Categories of respondents differed in their opinions on the severity of
some threats. For example, operators did not consider lack of operator anti-poaching effort to be a
significant factor, whereas a significant proportion of ZAWA and expert/NGO respondents did
(χ2=17.9, d.f.=4, p=0.001) and only NGOs/experts considered inappropriate trophy quotas or
overshooting of quotas by safari operators to be a key factor (χ2=11.3, d.f.=3, p=0.003)

27
Figure 2. Proportion of respondents who indicated that each of a variety of threats are major
contributing factors to the decline of wildlife populations in depleted and under-stocked GMAs (NB
zero values imply that the respondent group did not consider that issue to be problematic)
Combined effects of these problems
Ecological impacts
Encroachment and habitat loss
Human encroachment of protected areas in Zambia is worse than in most other African countries
(Pfeifer et al., 2012), and Zambia is one of the world’s worst affected countries in terms of
deforestation (~2,500-3,000 km2 of land are deforested in Zambia annually) (Vinya et al., 2011).
High levels of in-migration to GMAs, coupled with natural population growth of existing
communities have combined to result in higher than average population growth rates being
recorded in districts containing or encompassed by GMAs (2.49 ± 0.18%) than those outside of
GMAs (2.31 ± 0.24%, T-test 0.577, d.f.=70, p=0.566) (Zambia Central Statistical Office, 2011). Almost
40% of GMAs are now comprised of human-modified habitat (compared to 2.9% in national parks
and 71.2% outside of the protected area network) (Table 6). Furthermore, the rate of habitat loss in
GMAs (0.47% conversion per year) is faster than in national parks (0.03%) or outside of the parks
network (Table 6, Figure 3).
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1Overall
Experts/NGOs
Operator
ZAWA

28
Table 6. Estimates of the extent and rate of habitat conversion in GMAs, national parks and land outside the protected area network in Zambia
1972
1984-1987
2009-2011
1972 - 1980s
1980s - ~2010
Type
Total in study
area (km2)
Area human
(km2)
Percent
human
Area
human
(km2)
Percent
human
Area
human
(km2)
Percent
human
Increase per
year (km2)
Percent
increase
per year
Increase
per year
(km2)
Percent
increase
per year
Non-NP, Non-GMA
85,277
49,206
57.7%
50,061
58.7%
60,706
71.2%
22
0.07%
280
0.51%
NP
27,098
252
0.9%
218
0.8%
552
2.0%
-1
-0.01%
9
0.05%
GMA
47,430
9,468
20.0%
10,448
22.0%
18,492
39.0%
26
0.15%
212
0.69%
Whole study area
159,805
58,926
36.9%
60,727
38.0%
79,750
49.9%
47
0.08%
501
0.49%
Luangwa region GMAs (statistics relate only to portions within study area)
Mukungule
Northern
1,661
1336
80.4%
1208
72.7%
1355
81.6%
-3
-0.57%
4
0.36%
Munyamadzi
Northern
2,675
591
22.1%
386
14.4%
523
19.5%
-5
-0.57%
4
0.21%
Lumimba
Eastern
4,149
823
19.8%
743
17.9%
959
23.1%
-2
-0.14%
6
0.21%
Lupande
Eastern
4,393
1,278
29.1%
1169
26.6%
1994
45.4%
-3
-0.18%
22
0.77%
Musalangu
Eastern
7,810
1,965
25.2%
1842
23.6%
2769
35.5%
-3
-0.12%
24
0.48%
Sandwe
Eastern
1,299
213
16.4%
178
13.7%
426
32.8%
-1
-0.20%
7
0.78%
West Petauke
Eastern
1,498
242
16.2%
50
3.3%
203
13.6%
-5
-0.95%
4
0.42%
Chisomo
Central
3,016
368
12.2%
446
14.8%
552
18.3%
2
0.19%
3
0.14%
Luano
Central_Lusaka
0.3
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
Southern Kafue region GMAs (statistics relate only to portions within study area)
Mumbwa
Central
2,089
68
3.2%
139
6.6%
978
46.8%
2
0.25%
22
1.64%
Bilili
Southern
3,697
136
3.7%
2387
64.6%
3660
99.0%
59
4.51%
34
1.41%
Kafue Flats
Southern
1,372
561
40.9%
456
33.2%
445
32.5%
-3
-0.57%
0
-0.03%
Mulobezi
Southern
3,591
310
8.6%
287
8.0%
591
16.4%
-1
-0.05%
8
0.34%
Namwala
Southern
3,162
658
20.8%
644
20.4%
2643
83.6%
0
-0.03%
53
2.58%
Nkala
Southern
202
19
9.6%
0
0.0%
68
33.6%
-1
-0.71%
2
1.37%
Sichifulo
Southern
3,022
0
0.0%
50
1.6%
910
30.1%
1
0.12%
23
1.16%
Mufunta
Western
3,795
900
23.7%
465
12.3%
416
11.0%
-11
-0.85%
-1
-0.05%

29
Figure 3. The extent of human encroachment of natural habitat in two focal areas in Zambia
The rate of human encroachment of GMAs averages 8.9 hectares per daylight hour, just within the
study area. Scaling up to a national level, that finding would suggest that approximately 82 hectares
per hour of habitat are lost (Table 6). Some GMAs are much worse affected than others: for
example, Lupande and Musalangu in the Luangwa region, and Mumbwa, Bilili, Namwala, and
Sichifulo in the southern Kafue region. Bilili is probably a lost cause: the area has been transformed
from 3.7% encroachment to 99% in the last 40 years (Table 6). Furthermore, some GMAs essential
for retaining connectivity in transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs), but are severely threatened
(For example Sichifulo GMA south of Kafue National Park (Figure 3) which provides vital links to the
remainder of the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA.
Insights into the status of wildlife populations in GMAs
Habitat destruction, bushmeat poaching, uncontrolled fires, and the cumulative impact of multiple
forms of legal harvest have resulted in steeply declining populations in many GMAs. Wildlife biomass
(excluding species of bushbuck size and smaller, predators and hippos) is markedly lower in GMAs
(mean 247 ± 69 kg/km2) than in national parks (996 ± 309 kg/km2), which in turn are markedly lower
than in extensive (unfenced) private game ranches (2,424 ± 305 kg/km2) (F Ratio 10.0, d.f.=2,
p<0.001) (Figure 4). Combining data from GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches, wildlife
densities were lower where human settlement was present (311 ± 243 kg/km2) than where no
human settlement occurred (2,433 kg/km2) (F Ratio 26.4, d.f.=1, p<0.001). Wildlife densities were

30
higher where there was investment by the private sector or NGOs than where no such investment
occurred (mean 1,614 ± 355kg/km2 c.f. mean 610 ± 298 kg/km2) (F Ratio = 4.7, d.f.=1, p=0.035).
Figure 4. The biomass of wild ungulates larger than a bushbuck (and excluding predators or hippos)
in GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches in Zambia
The diversity of wild ungulates (excluding small species and hippos) is also lower in GMAs (5.5 ± 0.71
species) than in national parks (7.6 ± 1.2 species) or extensive game ranches (11.1 ± 0.86 species (F
Ratio 8.0, d.f.=2, p<001) (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The diversity of ungulates (excluding species of bushbuck size and smaller, and hippos) in
GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches
Combining data from GMAs, national parks and extensive game ranches, wild ungulate diversity was
influenced by whether they had human settlement present (in areas with settlement, mean diversity
was 10.0 ± 0.83 species c.f. 5.91 ± 0.70 for unsettled areas), and by whether investment was made

31
by the private sector or NGOs (in areas with funding mean diversity was 9.6 ± 0.83 species c.f. 5.8 ±
0.70 where there was no investment) (F Ratio 9.71, d.f.=2, p<0.001).
Declining wildlife populations in GMAs have been reflected in changes to the way ZAWA classifies
GMAs. GMAs are classified as: prime, secondary, under-stocked and depleted (in declining order of
wildlife abundance) or specialized (based on the presence of rare and geographically restricted
species (Simasiku et al., 2008). In 2008, 24 (66.6%) GMAs were classified as depleted or secondary
(up from 16 (44.4%) in 1997 (Simasiku et al., 2008)).
Economic impacts
The GMAs are performing poorly in terms of income generation. In 2012 ZAWA only earned
concession fees from 81,106 km2 (or ~51%) of the GMA estate. Trophy quality is slipping (Simasiku et
al., 2008) and in 2012, only 63.2% of the trophy quota was utilised, indicating that harvests are
higher than populations can support. Furthermore, the earnings per km2 from trophy hunting are
lower than all other SADC countries for which data are available (Figure 6) (F-Ratio 11.0, d.f.=1,
p=0.001).
Figure 6. Mean gross USD earnings from trophy hunting per km2 in five southern Africa countries
(excluding blocks in which zero income from hunting is generated)
The comparisons made in Figure 6 were calculated after excluding blocks where zero income is
generated from hunting: in reality the proportion of such blocks in Zambia is likely to be higher than
in other countries (except perhaps Mozambique) with the effect that the data presented may flatter
Zambia somewhat. Similarly, estimated gross earnings from the hunting industry in Zambia are lower
than all other SADC countries for which data are available (Figure 7).
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Zimbabwe Tanzania Namibia Zambia Mozambique

32
Figure 7. Gross earnings from the trophy hunting industry (USD million/year, inflated to 2012 values)
(Booth, 2002; Bond et al., 2004; Martin, 2008); http://www.phasa.co.za/ (accessed 2009);
Lamprechts, 2009; Booth, 2009))
Within Zambia, gross earnings per km2 from trophy hunting in GMAs (USD103/km2 when including
areas that do not generate any income, or US$USD244 ± 97) are almost 90% lower than on extensive
game ranches (USD878 ± 226, also including areas that generate no income) (F Ratio 15.9, d.f.=1,
p<0.001). Unsurprisingly, earnings from trophy hunting in GMAs and extensive game ranches are
also positively related to the biomass of wildlife (F Ratio 27.3, d.f.=1, p<0.001).
Social impacts
In some GMAs, such as those in the Luangwa Valley and Bangweulu system, livelihood
improvements associated with revenues from trophy hunting are significant (Bandyopadhyay and
Tembo, 2010), and families in ‘prime’ GMAs (the GMAs identified by ZAWA as retaining viable
wildlife populations) are estimated to be 17% better off than those outside of the GMAs, and have a
7.8% higher chance of obtaining employment (Fernandez et al., 2009). However, no earnings
whatsoever are generated in about half of all GMAs and so the average earnings accruing to
communities per km2 across all GMAs are low (mean = USD11.9/km2) (Table 4). However, even after
excluding the areas where no income is earned, income for communities is still only US$23.3/km2. At
the same time, communities incur significant costs as a result of living with wildlife: for example, at
least 49 people per year are killed by wildlife (Chomba et al., 2012). Overall, communities living in
GMAs remain 30% poorer than the national rural average and 70% lower than the urban mean, and
typically live further away from main roads and are less educated on average (World Bank, 2007).
Consequently, it is reasonable to say that the GMAs are not functioning effectively on ecological,
economic or social levels. Zambia will find it increasingly difficult to justify such a large land area for
wildlife production if those areas cannot be turned into productive zones that contribute
significantly to local and national economies and livelihoods and to wildlife and habitat conservation.
There is thus a strong case for major changes in which the GMAs are administered and run.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
South Africa Tanzania Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Zambia

33
Changes needed to allow GMAs to function
We recommend three major changes that we feel would help to unlock the potential for productive
wildlife-based land uses in GMAs. The first is in how ZAWA is funded and functions, the second in is
in the ownership of land and wildlife resources in GMAs and the third is to create an enabling policy
and legislative environment.
1. Changes to the funding support of and focus of ZAWA
In line with several other authors, we recommend the Government of Zambia to make two changes
to allow ZAWA to function effectively as the custodian over the nation’s wildlife resources (World
Bank, 2007; Simasiku et al., 2008; Sichilongo et al., 2013).
a) First, we urge the Government of Zambia to drastically increase the level of funding directed to
ZAWA as required by the Wildlife Act of 1998. As alluded to earlier, the underfunding of ZAWA has a
number of impacts, including: preventing them from fulfilling their mandate and from protected
natural resources effectively, creating conflicts of interest whereby they are encouraged to over
utilize wildlife populations to generate income for survival; by creating an environment of mistrust,
and even occasional conflict and competition with the private wildlife sector and with CRBs; and by
creating disincentives for ZAWA to support the proper devolution of user rights over wildlife to
communities and the private sector (which would reduce income to ZAWA) (Manning, 2011).
b) Changing the focus of ZAWA from a hands-on implementing agency to that of a more hands-off
regulatory and facilitating body – designed to promote and facilitate the development of wildlife-
based land uses by communities and the private sector, while ensuring that they operate within
defined parameters.
There is a strong case for making such changes. If Zambia’s protected area network was conserved
properly, an array of benefits would result, ranging from: the retention ecosystem services;
provision of buffers to climate change (through wildlife-based land uses which are less vulnerable to
reduced rainfall than livestock farming, (Barnes et al., 2010); and allow the development of a major
tourism industry that would yield returns through foreign currency generation, tax revenues and
economic development in remote rural areas (Sichilongo et al., 2013). Even at current rates of
funding for wildlife, there is evidence of impressive returns on investment. For example, in 2005, the
government of Zambia received revenues of USD8 million from tourism related to parks from an
investment of only USD1 million (World Bank, 2007). The Zambian tourism industry is poorly
developed compared to that of regional peers and there is substantial potential for growth in the
industry (Hamilton et al., 2007). However such benefits can only arise if the government invests
sufficiently in protecting the resource and in the infrastructure and capacity for it to be utilized
effectively (World Bank, 2007).
A change of ZAWA focus for it to become a centrally funded, regulatory and facilitating body would
enable the organisation to actively promote wildlife-based land uses through devolution of user-
rights to communities (in GMAs and open areas) and private landowners (on leasehold land) without
worrying about loss of income. If successful, wildlife-based land uses could contribute much more
significantly to food security and the economy via generation of foreign currency and tax revenues,
the creation of jobs, and the production of large quantities of meat protein (Lindsey et al., 2013b). In
addition, ZAWA could reduce their costs incurred by efforts involved in protecting 220,000 km2 of
protected areas by soliciting the development of additional co-management agreements with NGOs
and the private sector, in line with the ZAWA guidelines on public-private-partnerships (ZAWA,
2008).

34
2. New models for the ownership, structure and functioning of GMAs
There is a need for a change in the way in which GMAs function such that much greater and more
business-like benefits accrue to communities from wildlife, while attracting much more significant
private investment. In such areas, community/private sector partnerships would conduct wildlife
management and anti-poaching enforcement to protect wildlife resources.
Lessons from other community conservation programmes in southern Africa
There are a number of community-based natural based resource management (CBNRM)
programmes in southern Africa and a vast literature devoted to the topic. The most successful of
these programmes is the Namibian communal land conservancy programme. There, communities
who organise themselves appropriately are able to form community conservancies in which they are
allocated the user rights over wildlife that occurs therein (Jones and Weaver, 2008). That
programme has been extremely successful, and there are now 79 conservancies, covering 160,000
km2 in which wildlife populations are increasing rapidly (www.nacso.org, accessed March 2013). Key
lessons from the conservancy programme and other CBNRM projects elsewhere in the region
include: the importance of defining who belongs to ‘the community’, securing collective
proprietorship for communities over land and wildlife; the importance of devolving authority over
wildlife resources to the lowest possible level in community areas; the importance of involving
communities in decision-making processes involving wildlife; the importance of enabling legislation
and a supportive government; the importance of allowing sustainable use of wildlife; and the
importance of having long term support from donors in the form of financial and technical input
(Child, 2008; Jones and Weaver, 2008; Taylor, 2009).
The Namibian conservancy programme benefitted from stable, relatively clearly defined
communities, low human population densities and limited options for alternative land uses in the
semi-arid climate. The Zambian GMAs, by contrast, have much higher rainfall (and thus potential for
agriculture), and higher and more mobile human population densities and so the challenges
associated with conserving wildlife in communal lands are arguably greater (although ultimately so is
the potential for wildlife production).
Community Wildlife Conservancies (CWCs) in GMAs
In the next section, we present a suggestion for the development of CWCs in GMAs. CWCs are
considered to be clearly defined areas within GMAs where ownership of the land and wildlife is
allocated to a specific community and where blocks within the area are leased out to private
investors, who assume responsibility for managing the area and wildlife therein.
Our ideas focus on securing land for wildlife production, formalizing community ownership of land
and resources and attracting the private investment needed to protect, rehabilitate and develop
those areas. Several authors have provided key insights into the way forward for GMAs, aspects of
which have been incorporated into our suggestions (Simasiku et al., 2008; Martin, 2010; Chemonics
International Inc, 2011; Manning, 2012). Virtually all commentators who have suggested changes to
the management of GMAs have emphasized the need for avoiding ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches and
we too are cognizant of that. Consequently, we have endeavoured to propose a framework to work
from as a basis for adapting locally applicable models. In prime GMAs, for example, the leases could
be shorter (perhaps 20 years). Such models could be tested in one or several GMAs and then rolled
out more widely if found to be successful.

35
The ongoing Government of Zambia / UNDP reclassification project for the national protected area
system proposes several new categories of protected area (subject to a revision of legislation), two
of which have potential for addressing some of the reasons for the failure of GMAs (Government of
Zambia, 2010). 1) Partnership Parks are areas to be established following a consultative process with
communities on customary lands where no human settlement is permitted, and where only non-
consumptive tourism would be allowed. 2) Game reserves are proposed to be set aside for
sustainable consumptive wildlife use in areas where no human settlement is permitted, and where
wildlife management would be conducted by ZAWA. However, as discussed later there would need
to be measures to provide for community ownership of land and wildlife resources in such areas.
Attracting donor support
Realistically, the development of a programme to develop CWCs in GMAs would require significant
coordination and funding. A key element of the success of the Namibian community conservancy
programme was the provision of long term technical and financial support from a variety of donors
and NGOs. During 1990-2009, USD173 million was invested in the conservancy programme, with
75% coming from a combination of local and international donors (WWF-Namibia, unpublished
data). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, USD35 million was invested in the CAMPFIRE programme, 73% of
which came from donors (Taylor, 2009). In Zambia there would be a need for a substantial and
ongoing donor investment to permit emergence of productive community wildlife conservancies and
for facilitating their functioning thereafter. A key focus of donor investment should be in capacity
building and training to empower communities to engage effectively in wildlife management and
business. However, substantial donor funding is only likely to be obtainable following development
of an enabling legislative and policy framework (which is discussed in more detail below).
Identifying potentially suitable sites
To identify potentially suitable sites for the development of CWCs, a consultative process involving
the private sector, community representatives, chiefs, NGOs, ZAWA and other government
departments would be required. Such sites would likely have low human population densities
(and/or blocks of wilderness with no settlement), ideally evidence of high wildlife population
densities in the past compared to their current state, and most importantly, interest among the chief
and community of engaging in the development of a CWC.
Administrative basis and land ownership
At a prospective CWC site, a community would need to be clearly defined and structured such that
they form a legal entity that they are accountable, can sue and be sued, and can acquire exclusive
ownership of a block of land and the wildlife therein. This could be achieved by encouraging
communities at a prospective site to form a Community Trust, which could be comprised of existing
Community Resource Boards (the bodies organised to administer funds from trophy hunting in
GMAs), the Chief, elected representatives from the community, and would include trustees from
ZAWA and the Resource Management Trust (that would be formed by the investors, see below). The
development of community trusts as a means of enabling communities to engage in wildlife-based
land uses was suggested in management guidelines for game ranches developed by ZAWA
(Kampamba et al., 2005). Community Trusts would likely function more effectively if they involve the
most educated community members, and seeking such individuals (who may reside in town) would
be an important contribution for NGOs to make. The Community Trust would have to be a
democratically elected, inclusive and regularly audited entity to prevent elite capture and misuse of
the benefits.

36
With facilitation from the coordinating NGO, a resource inventory would be conducted to identify
what wildlife populations remain and to earmark land that could be designated for development of
the CWC. A land use plan would then be developed that would formally designate a block of land for
the CWC and other areas for human settlement, agriculture and other land uses.
The community, with support from the coordinating NGO, would request government to vest
ownership of the land comprising the prospective CWC to the Community Trust in the form of a 99-
year lease. The lease would contain clauses which prohibit the land from being sold off or being used
for anything other than wildlife production. Such a basis would achieve community ownership of the
land and prevent land alienation which could undermine the social and political sustainability of
wildlife as a land use in GMAs and Open Areas. The Community Trust would then have a platform
from which to attract investors to develop the CWC. The Community Trust should be audited
annually.
Models for investor participation and stake holdings in CWCs
The community leases the land or blocks of land in the CWC to an investor, to a consortium of
investors or to multiple independent investors for periods of 25-75 years. The length of the lease
would depend on the status of wildlife populations at the start of the lease: longer leases would be
required in more depleted areas. However, in all cases, long leases are likely to encourage greater
investment (so long as the leases are contingent on investor performance). The lease of blocks could
follow a public auction or a transparent tender process (where tenders are made available for public
scrutiny). The lease of land would include caveats outlining acceptable land use options and to
prevent overuse of wildlife by investors at the end of the lease period. In addition, mechanisms
would be required to ensure that investors actively developed land for wildlife and did not simply
lease the land for speculative or other purposes.
Developing a Resource Management Trust for management of wildlife
A Resource Management Trust would be formed to manage the wildlife and ecology of the CWC,
comprising the investors, with representation from elected community representatives, ZAWA
representatives, and independent experts from the NGO sector. The RMT would develop a wildlife
management plan for the CWC, detailing acceptable land use practices, and the parameters within
which investors were allowed to utilize wildlife. This wildlife management plan would be developed
in consultation with, and with approval from the Community Trust and ZAWA. The RMT, funded by
the investors, would be responsible for all wildlife management, including activities such as: anti
poaching; game counts; quota setting; trophy monitoring; land use monitoring; and, reporting. For
the RMT to conduct anti-poaching effectively, there would need to be provision for appropriately
trained scouts to carry suitable firearms and to have powers of arrest. Having a single body in charge
of management would ensure that the investors could collectively afford to employ high calibre
professionals, and that management was conducted in a professional and consistent manner and in
accordance with the wildlife management plan (Lindsey et al., 2009). The RMT would provide
regulated access for communities to other resources such as firewood, grass, invertebrates, honey,
fish etc, but in a strictly regulated manner agreed upon by both parties during the allocation of the
lease. The RMT would be expected to employ community members wherever possible. The RMT
would be expected to maintain publically open records and be audited annually.
The RMT would act as the interface between investors, the Community Trust, ZAWA and other
government departments. Having a single body do this would ensure that such interactions were
conducted professionally and appropriately. Regular meetings would be held between the RMT, the
Community Trust and ZAWA to ensure open and effective communication among stakeholders. The

37
RMT would invest in human resources to enable fund raising which would generate additional funds
for wildlife management. They could also conduct marketing to raise the profile of the area and
make it more attractive to prospective tourists, hunters and investors.
Models for how wildlife-based land uses in CWC would be managed
There are various possibilities for how the participation of investors in CWC could be structured in
terms of the practising of wildlife-based land uses. For example:
a) Investors could run their own financial affairs separately, such that they all form separate hunting
and/or tourism businesses. They would then pay a per-hectare levy to the Resources Management
Trust (who would then conduct all the necessary wildlife management) and pay an amount to the
Community Trust for every animal shot and/or a bed night levy for every hunter or tourist night.
b) Alternatively, the Resources Management Trust could form a company with a shareholding
structure. Each investor would receive a shareholding based on the value of his/her original
investment (taking into account land holding and wildlife stock purchase). In addition, the
Community Trust would receive a shareholding. The Resources Management Trust would then
conduct all tourism and hunting activities in the CWC (in addition to all other wildlife management),
though individual investors would be paid for the use of lodges or for services rendered (e.g.
professional hunters / guides). The investors and the Community Trust would then receive a pro rata
annual dividend in line with their shareholding.
Structuring of financial benefits for communities
Regardless of how the Resource Management Trust was structured, the Community Trust would
receive two income streams: a) an annual rental – which means that they would receive immediate
income without waiting years for wildlife to recover, and b) an annual dividend generated from
wildlife use in the CWC. The latter would be a performance-based reward that would increase if the
community desisted from illegal hunting and would decrease if wildlife populations declined. The
annual community dividend could either be based on a percentage of net profit, or based on a fee
for every animal shot (for consumptive wildlife ventures) or for bed nights (for ecotourism
operations), on a pro rata basis, in line with their shareholding. The latter option may be favourable
in that it is likely to make accounting easier and reduce scope for communities being short-changed
through creative accounting, given that capacity to monitor and verify financial transactions is likely
to be weak.
The finances of the Resource Management Trust would be audited annually in a transparent manner
to ensure that communities receive their due and that operations are conducted appropriately.
Equally, the accounts of the Community Trust would also be audited annually and transparently to
prevent elite capture of benefits and corruption which have plagued some of the Community
Resource Boards in GMAs to date.
Involvement of ZAWA and ownership of wildlife
Communities will be recognized as the owners of the land in CWCs and so ZAWA would forego
concession payments. Consequently, the involvement of ZAWA would differ from the way in which
they have positioned themselves in the management of GMAs to date. In CWCs, the involvement of
ZAWA would be either:

38
a) As a regulator and service provider only
ZAWA would play a purely regulatory role, simply acting to ensure that the area and management of
wildlife therein operates within parameters defined in the wildlife management plan. It is essential
that the regulatory role is largely hands off, with ZAWA intervening only to prevent gross
transgressions. The success of the game wildlife based land uses in Zimbabwe, South Africa and
Namibia was to a large extent the result of devolution of user-rights over wildlife to landholders and
minimal hindrance/red tape from the authorities (Bond et al., 2004). For this regulatory service, the
Resource Management Trust would pay a ZAWA an annual fee. ZAWA could also provide support for
anti-poaching, ecological censuses and other forms of wildlife management if required and desired
by the Resources Management Trust, for which they would be paid on delivery of service. In
addition, ZAWA could provide scouts to accompany the scouts employed by the Resources
Management Trust and play a role in the prosecution of poachers captured in the area.
In this model, ownership of wildlife occurring in the CWC would be vested in the Community Trust,
and would be conferred to the RMT for the duration of the lease period. ZAWA could facilitate the
development of CWCs by providing wildlife for free, at cost, or for a subsidized price to CWCs. The
government would benefit from such an arrangement because of tax revenues when the CWC was
functional, and because such units would provide cost efficient means of generating hubs for rural
development in areas with little economic activity. In depleted GMAs, ZAWA currently receives zero
revenue and so CWCs would not impact on earnings at all in such areas. In Namibia, the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism (MET) has played a key role in facilitating the development of the
community conservancies by providing large numbers of wildlife for free as founder populations. A
total of 9,786 individuals of 16 species have been reintroduced into Namibian communal land
conservancies, primarily by MET but with support from private game ranchers and an array of
donors (C. Weaver, WWF-Namibia pers. comm.). Given the depleted state of many state protected
areas, it is questionable as to whether ZAWA would be able to spare wildlife for reintroductions into
CWCs. Consequently, wildlife may have to be purchased from game ranchers in Zambia. Such
reintroductions would provide a good opportunity for government or NGOs to invest in the
development of such initiatives.
b) As an active shareholder
Under this scenario, ZAWA would act as a regulatory authority, would provide services (on a pay-as-
you-go basis, as above) but would also be a shareholder. We consider this option to be the less
favourable of the two due to potential conflicts of interest between ZAWA’s role as a regulator of
CWCs, while being a direct beneficiary. The basis for ZAWA’s shareholding would be through transfer
of ownership of wildlife already existing in the CWC to the Community Trust (though ideally such
wildlife should belong to the CWC by virtue of them being the landowners), and through provision of
additional animals for reintroduction. ZAWA could then redeem value from their contribution
through one of two routes:
i) Via license fees for all animals hunted and/or a bed night levy
In return for the provision of wildlife, ZAWA would be paid a license fee for all animals killed
or sold. In the case of non consumptive photo-tourism, the RMT could be charged bed night
levies. Such amounts would have to be agreed upon and set at the start of the agreement
(perhaps as a set percentage of the trophy fee charged to clients / live sale price of wildlife /
bed night charge) with an agreed annual inflationary increase) to prevent implementation of
drastic changes.

39
ii) Via an annual pro rata dividend based on their shareholding
Alternatively, ZAWA could be issued with shares in the business proportional to the value of
the wildlife provided. ZAWA would then receive a pro rata dividend as a proportion of the
net profit corresponding to their percentage shareholding. Such a system would require
thorough auditing of accounts and transparency of financial transactions.
Role of fencing
Fencing is currently a requirement for wildlife ownership but we strongly advocate that it should not
be a requirement for communities to gain ownership of land or for the formation of CWCs and
should only be considered where the ecological benefits are likely to exceed the associated
disadvantages. Potential problems associated with fencing include (du Toit, 2004; Lindsey et al.,
2009; Lindsey et al., 2012):
 The disruption of seasonal movements of wildlife, which can reduce the carrying capacity of
a block of land by preventing animals from moving in response to patchy rainfall.
 Fencing can reduce the connectivity of wildlife populations and habitat. This is potentially
particularly important for wide-ranging species that occur at low densities.
 Fencing can preclude the stocking of the full range of mammal species if the enclosed areas
are too small.
 If the wrong materials are used and there is not a strong anti-poaching effort and significant
budget for fence maintenance, fences can potentially create an effectively infinite supply of
wire for snares.
 Fenced areas tend to become over-stocked, which can create significant ecological
problems.
 Fencing is extremely expensive (USD4,000-5,000/km).
 Small fenced areas do not benefit from the economies of scale associated with large open
areas.
 Small fenced areas, if managed by individuals, are often associated with arbitrary and
unprofessional management.
However, in some cases there are some potential benefits associated with the judicious use of
fencing, including (Lindsey et al., 2012):
 Reduced scope for human-wildlife conflict.
 Clear demarcation of the boundaries to prevent encroachment by external immigrant
communities.
 Elevated control over poaching, by reducing trespassing into the area.
 Reduced losses of wildlife to poaching during the late dry season and early rainy season
when animals are likely to disperse in search of food and water (as may happen if early rains
occur in adjacent lands but not in the wildlife area).
In light of these pros and cons, we recommend the following with regards to fencing:
 Fencing should not be allowed to bisect adjacent blocks of wildlife habitat.
 Fencing should not be permitted between adjacent CWCs, or between CWCs and national
parks.
 Fencing should not be permitted around the landholdings of individual investors within
CWCs.
 Where proposed CWCs abut high human densities or incompatible land uses, partial fencing
should be considered where possible, and complete fencing only if completely unavoidable

40
 Fencing should not be permitted unless materials used are not easily turned into snares (e.g.
kinked, mesh fencing).
 Fencing should only be permitted if agreed to by the community and subjected to an
environmental impact assessment with stakeholders.
 Fencing should only be permitted if a plan and budget is in place to maintain the fence
effectively.
If CWCs are created next to national parks it is essential that connectivity is retained, so that CWCs
can fulfil a function as buffers for parks. Due to the involvement of ZAWA representatives in the
Resource Management Trust, and their involvement in the annual quota setting process, ZAWA need
not be concerned about such areas acting as a sink for and resulting in the loss of animals from
parks. Furthermore, because of the likelihood of high investment in such areas in anti-poaching
there is a high likelihood of CWCs protecting wildlife more effectively than is possible in the under-
funded parks network (as illustrated by the higher mammalian biomass that occurs in extensive
game ranches than in national parks). Consequently, national parks would likely incur a net inflow of
wildlife from CWCs if they were not required to erect fencing. For example, the biomass of wildlife in
the extensive Mushingashi game ranch is 6.4 times higher than in the adjacent Kafue National Park.
Zambian versus international investors
There is a strong feeling in Zambia (as in many other countries) that local investors should have
preferential access to national resources. However, in the case of developing depleted GMAs, there
is a strong case for providing a level playing field for local and foreign investors, because a) the CWCs
would be inherently Zambian already as the ownership of the land would be vested in local
communities; and, b) significant investment of finance and expertise is required to make these areas
work. Consequently, to increase the pool of potential investors, one would ideally consider local and
international investors equally.
Legislation that would need to change to make CWCs possible
According to the 1998 Wildlife Act, ownership of wildlife is vested on the President on behalf of the
nation (Sichilongo et al., 2013). On private land, ownership can be conferred to the landowner via a
certificate of ownership, but there is no such provision for communities. Similarly, there is currently
scope for investors to alienate land, but not for communities to do the same (Chemonics
International Inc, 2011). New legislation and policies are required which allows for the development
of CWCs in GMAs and Open Areas, which implicitly confer ownership of (and/or user rights over)
wildlife to the owner of the land, and which does not require fencing to be a pre-requisite for
ownership of wildlife by communities in CWCs.
At present, the management and user rights of various natural resources (forests, wildlife, fisheries,
etc) are governed by separate legislations and government departments, while the commercial use
of them is dictated primarily by traditional authorities (Simasiku et al., 2008) and is effectively open
access. There is an urgent need for coordination among such agencies so that communities and
investors in a CWC can gain exclusive right to utilize other categories of natural resources in addition
to wildlife.
Fundamental to providing CWC development is a strict definition of requirements for community
membership and the criteria necessary for an individual to engage in and benefit from CWC’s. While
explicit definitions are beyond the scope of this report we suggest this is critical to avoid continual
undermining and diluting of wildlife-generated revenue by immigration of non-community members
looking to take advantage of the resources.

41
Potential earnings from a model CWC
Shortcomings of our models
Modelling the impact of multiple predator species on prey populations is extremely challenging. Our
simplistic approach may or may not reflect the impact of predators in reality (which is likely to vary
from site to site). Consequently, we may have either under or overestimated the scope for
harvesting wildlife for financial gain. In reality, managers of such areas must monitor the populations
of ungulates and of predators and adaptively manage quotas to prevent either under or over
harvesting. We did not include an estimate of the impact of poaching on wildlife populations which
may result in us having over-estimated potential harvests, though we did include a very high budget
for anti-poaching (Table 2). Conversely, we did not assess potential earnings from the live sale of
rare species which could potentially boost earnings significantly. Overall, outputs from the model
should be treated as being indicative of general patterns. In reality, potential earnings are likely to
vary from site to site, based on variation in the various parameters that govern wildlife density,
survival and reproductive success.
Key findings from the modelling exercise and insights into policy issues
Significantly improved benefits for communities
The model CWC would generate significant income for communities (USD347-381-/km2 per year [c.f.
the USD11.9/km2 which is currently being earned]) (Table 7). In addition, significant quantities of
meat would be generated from CWCs: ~20-27 tonnes would be generated by year 10, 65-127 tonnes
/ year by year 20, and 48-104 tonnes / year by year 40 (Figure 8). Communities would also benefit
from employment as 126 employees were estimated to be required for a 1,000 km2 block.

42
Table 7. Results of financial and economic models for a 1,000 km2 CWC established in a depleted
GMA in the case of high rainfall, low soil nutrient setting (base case) and the high rainfall, high soil
nutrient setting (2012, annual figures given for year 20)
Case
High rainfall, low nutrients
High rainfall high nutrients
Value
USD or %
USD/km2
USD or %
USD/km2
Financial Values *
Total Initial Financial Capital
2,222,639
2,223
2,261,621
2,262
Annual Financial Turnover
2,254,662
2,255
3,090,788
3,091
Annual Variable Financial Costs
447,609
448
613,602
614
Annual Fixed Financial Costs
881,251
881
957,376
957
Annual Wage Bill
319,188
319
319,188
319
Annual Net Cash Income
925,801
926
1,519,810
1,520
Annual Resource Royalty
184,882
185
253,445
253
Annual Land Rental
37,500
38
37,500
38
Annual ZAWA trophy and land fees**
92,441
92
126,722
127
Annual Local Community Income***
347,129
347
381,410
381
Financial IRR (FRR @ 10 Years)
9.89%
-
7.6%
-
Financial NPV (@ 8%, @ 10 Years)
-1,953,528
-1,954
-2,646,182
-2,646
Financial IRR (FRR @ 20 Years)
15.1%
-
14.7%
-
Financial NPV (@ 8%, @ 20 Years)
2,439,425
2,439
3,108,993
3,109
Financial IRR (FRR* @ 40 Years)
16.0%
-
15.9%
-
Financial NPV (@ 8%, @ 40 Years)
3,855,535
3,856
5,576,392
5,576
Economic Values *
Total Initial Economic Capital
1,926,635
1,927
1,967,683
1,968
Annual Economic Gross Output
2,182,325
2,182
3,006,331
3,006
Annual Economic Costs
588,857
589
655,476
655
Annual Gross Value Added (GNI)
1,593,468
1,593
2,350,854
2,351
Annual Net Value Added (NNI)
1,424,791
1,425
2,182,137
2,182
Economic IRR (ERR @ 10 Years)
85%
-
127%
-
Economic NPV (@ 8%, @ 10 Years)
8,666,457
8,666
13,267,409
13,267
Economic IRR (ERR @ 20 Years)
85%
-
127%
-
Economic NPV (@ 8%, @ 20 Years)
12,787,550
12,788
19,474,866
19,475
Economic IRR (ERR @ 40 Years)
85%
-
127%
-
Economic NPV (@ 8%, @ 40 Years)
15,573,468
15,573
23,589,890
23,590
Number of Jobs Created
126
-
126
-
Economic Capital Cost/Job
15,291
-
15,617
-
Domestic Resource Cost Ratio
0.31
-
0.23
-
* IRR = Internal rate of return, FRR = Financial rate of return, NPV = Net present value, GNI = Gross
national income, NNI = Net national income, ERR = Economic rate of return
** ZAWA trophy fees and land fees according to 2012 rates (see text)
*** Community income assumed to be skilled and unskilled wages, and the remainder of land rental
and royalty after ZAWA trophy and land fees

43
Figure 8. Projected meat production (kg/year) in a 1,000 km2 CWC under conditions of high rainfall
and high or low soil nutrients
Low, slow financial slow returns and the need for long leases
These models illustrate that where wildlife in GMAs are severely depleted, significant investments
would be needed before financially attractive returns to wildlife use can be derived. For investors,
the CWC are projected to have poor financial attractiveness given the high levels of risk involved:
returns are modest and slow to accrue. It would take 15-20 years for wildlife populations to reach
carrying capacity. While returns are weakly viable financially by year 20 with financial rate of return
above the cut-off opportunity cost of capital of 8% (Table 7, Figure 9), they remain poor until year
40. Consequently the absolute minimum lease length for depleted GMAs (CWCs) should be in the
region of 40 years. Financial returns are much the same for both the high and low soil nutrient
models (Table 7), despite the fact that the high soil nutrient scenario allowed the attainment of
stocking rates twice as high as those of the low nutrient model by year 20.
Figure 9. Financial net-benefit stream over 40 years from a 1,000 km2 CWC in a high rainfall, low soil
nutrient area (data from every 5th year plotted)
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
kg meat produced
Year
High soil nutrients
Low soil nutrients
-2000000
-1000000
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 35 Year 40
B/C Flow

44
High economic returns and the case for government/donor investment
A striking finding is that the economic returns to investment in the wildlife stocks and use of the
resource were extremely high (Table 7, Figure 10). In both cases highly positive returns were
possible by years ten, 20 and 40. For the high-low case, the economic rate of return was 85% and for
the high-high case it was 127% for all time periods. These returns were extremely high relative to the
8% discount rate, which, as the economic opportunity cost for capital, served as a cut-off rate. The
investments would contribute significantly to economic growth, would be extremely economically
efficient and would definitely be in the national economic interest.
Figure 10. Economic net-benefit stream over 40 years from a 1,000 km2 CWC in a high rainfall, low
soil nutrient area (data from every 5th year plotted)
The high potential for economic gain from CWCs indicates that there is a case for government to
intervene to create a fiscal environment where investment in CWCs by the private sector becomes
more financially attractive. This could be achieved through subsidizing key inputs, such as wildlife for
reintroduction and fencing (if needed) and removing duty on the import of equipment/materials.
The base case model included the assumption that initial stock purchases would be almost entirely
subsidized with 1,000 head of wild ungulates costing only USD 150,000, instead of the >USD
2,000,000 that they would likely cost if purchased at market prices. Inclusion of the full cost of initial
stock purchase would reduce the 20-year financial rate of return from 15% to 9% rendering it
essentially non-viable (Table 8). If the government (or donors) could provide assistance to the
formation of CWCs through purchasing wildlife from the private game ranching sector, there would
be the twin outcome of making CWCs viable for investors and stimulating growth in the game
ranching industry (which is currently performing poorly in economic terms due to inappropriate
policy framework, (Lindsey et al., 2013a)).
Fencing represents an additional substantial cost for which the government could provide support,
either through direct grants, subsidization of costs or waivers on import duties. However, the cost of
fencing also stresses another advantage of avoiding its use if at all possible. The base scenario
included the capital cost of a perimeter fence for the CWC. Exclusion of this cost would increase the
20-year financial rate of return from 15% to 18% (Table 8).
-1500000
-1000000
-500000
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 35 Year 40
B/C Flow

45
Table 8. Results of sensitivity analysis on the base case high rainfall low soil nutrient GMA Game
ranch investment showing financial rates of return with viable returns in bold (2012)
Case
Financial rate of return (FRR)
Analysis period
10 year
20 year
40 year
Addition of photo-tourism lodges
Lodges – none
-8.7%
-3.0%
-1.5%
Lodges – one (base case)
9.9%
15.1%
16.0%
Lodges – two
25.6%
29.0%
29.3%
Subsidization of wildlife reintroductions
Initial stock subsidized (8% of cost) (base case)
9.9%
15.1%
16.0%
Initial stock - at cost (not subsidized)
2.4%
9.4%
11.0%
Erection of fencing
Fencing included (base case)
9.9%
15.1%
16.0%
Fencing – none
13.2%
18.2%
18.9%
Extent to which predators are hunted
Predators hunted and lions at high densities
10.7%
16.0%
16.8%
Predators hunted and lions at low densities (base case)
9.9%
15.1%
16.0%
Predators not hunted
9.5%
14.8%
15.6%
Impact of ZAWA trophy and land fees
ZAWA Fees from rental & royalty (base case)
9.9%
15.1%
16.0%
ZAWA Fees additional
4.7%
11.1%
12.4%
The inability of CWCs to support ZAWA ‘taxation’
Another way in which government could assist with the functioning of CWC is through ZAWA
desisting from extracting concession fees and safari license fees. If ZAWA animal license fees and
concession fees were paid out by investors in addition to the community royalties, the 20-year
financial rate of return to the investor would drop from 15% to 11% (Table 7). Concession and
animal license fees should ideally not apply if community ownership of land and wildlife is
recognized. If ZAWA feel such fees must be charged, they should be kept to an absolute minimum.
The importance of diversifying income streams
CWCs are likely to be largely dependent on consumptive forms of wildlife use due to low wildlife
densities in the early years, due to their remoteness and distance from infrastructure (such as tar
roads and airports) (Lindsey et al., 2006), and due to the fact that there are probably not enough
visitors to Zambia yet to allow CWCs to rely solely on photo-tourism. At present, most national parks
fail to attract enough tourists to support viable photo-tourism (Hamilton et al., 2007) due to poor
infrastructure, inadequate marketing and poor stocks of animals. Consequently, it is essential that
Zambia continues to permit trophy hunting and other forms of sustainable use in addition to photo-
tourism. However, photo-tourism operations in selected parts of CWCs may well be viable when
wildlife populations have recovered if such areas are marketed well. In fact, the inclusion of a photo-
tourism lodge in the base case model is essential to ensure the financial viability. Inclusion of two
lodges, instead of one, increases the financial viability of the investment in year 20 from 15% to 29%,
transforming it into an attractive private investment (Table 8). This shows the considerable gains
that can be made if photo-tourism becomes possible due to the investment in stock growth, driven
in turn by the initial returns on investment in hunting. Though we did not model such effects, one
would intuitively expect that viability would be further increased if there was scope for utilizing
other natural resources commercially, such as timber and honey.

46
The importance of allowing the hunting of high value species
Lions and leopards are two of the most valuable species for trophy hunting operators, as they
generate significant trophy fees (~USD6,000 and ~USD4,000) and daily rates (~USD2,500 x 21 and
~USD1,900 x 14). Prohibition of the hunting of lions and leopards results in a reduction of financial
viability of 7.5% by year 20 if lions occur at high densities (and thus higher off-takes are possible) or
2.0% if they occur at low densities. However, in terms of gross income from trophy hunting, allowing
lion and leopard hunting adds 11% when lions occur at low densities, and 33% if they occur at high
densities. Furthermore, lions and leopards are of key importance for operators to sell hunt packages
and if they are removed from quota it may be difficult for them to sell the full quota of other
species. That said, the projected importance of hunting lions and leopards in CWCs is probably lower
than in GMAs currently because; a) it is envisaged that income would be generated from the sale of
meat and ecotourism in addition to just trophy hunting, and because b) we only permitted very
conservative off-takes of those species in the model to ensure sustainability. If lions and leopards are
to be hunted, it is essential that emerging best-practises are followed in order to reduce potential
impacts (Balme et al., 2012; Hunter et al., Submitted)
Importance of not allowing resident hunting to undermine value of wildlife
Given the marginal financial viability of the model CWC, it is clear that all forms of resident hunting
should only be permitted above that which is sustainable on top of trophy hunting off-takes and if
desired by the investors and community owners. Furthermore, the price of resident hunting licenses
should be established at market-based prices higher than the meat value of the animals hunted and
incorporating the costs of allocating staff for supervision of the hunts. However, the potential for
generating additional income from resident hunters through sale of accommodation may provide
scope for boosting income.
Potential benefits associated with CWCs
The CWC model outlined above would confer an array of benefits relative to the current GMA
system:
Social and economic benefits
a) CWCs would secure land rights for communities and provide protection against the loss of
land, wildlife, forests and other natural resources which arises from open access to those
resources.
b) Communities would be empowered to form equitable partnerships with ZAWA and the
private sector.
c) CWCs would contribute significantly to food security by generating substantial and
sustainable incomes, jobs and significant quantities of animal protein.
d) CWCs would provide vehicles for attracting significant investment (including foreign direct
investment) in rural areas. The formal structure outlined above would likely be attractive for
investors because it would provide a simple, transparent and secure means of investing in
wildlife. Such investment could come from the private sector, conservation and
development NGOs, eco-philanthropists, and multi-nationals wishing to purchase carbon or
biodiversity credits/offsets. NGOs would be provided with a very direct and effective means
of investing in wildlife conservation, local development and human welfare in a manner that
is sustainable and that develops capacity, rather than through hand outs.

47
e) By securing land rights, CWCs would create scope for the generation of income from
communities from the sale of carbon credits. Without secure tenure over land, communities
cannot make a credible commitment to the supply of carbon and consequently most carbon
projects have been developed on private land.
f) Communities would benefit from significant training, capacity building and work experience.
g) The protection of wildlife in GMAs would be conducted by the communities and the private
sector, and would thus relieve ZAWA of a significant responsibility and cost.
h) CWCs would generate substantial economic benefits for Zambia as a whole.
Ecological benefits
i) By attracting significant and long-term investment, CWCs have potential to achieve vastly
elevated levels of anti-poaching enforcement and thus protection of wildlife and other
resources. The CWC model included a budget for 1 anti-poaching scout per 10 km2, as
opposed to the 1/187 km2 ZAWA scouts currently in place in the Zambian protected area
network.
j) The combination of secure and exclusive land rights has potential to drastically reduce
encroachment and unplanned human settlement in GMAs.
k) These factors, coupled with active wildlife reintroductions have potential to allow for
significant recoveries wildlife populations.
l) As a result, CWCs could enable GMAs to act as much more effective buffers for national
parks than they do at present and contribute in a regional conservation context through
viable connectivity to the three Transfrontier Conservation Areas that include parts of
Zambia.
Conclusions
An array of factors has combined to cause GMAs to fail in ecological, economic and social terms. The
tenure and management systems in place have created a scenario where all three stakeholders are
incentivized to over-exploit wildlife resources in GMAs and to under-invest in their protection.
Changes are needed which will enable and incentivize best practise by communities, ZAWA and the
private sector in GMAs. Key steps that would help achieve this are: a) the provision of greatly
elevated government funding for ZAWA and a change in focus for the authority such that their
primary role outside of the national parks network is to regulate, oversee and facilitate the
development of wildlife-based land uses; b) the development of models (and a conducive legislative
and policy framework) which recognizes community ownership of land and wildlife in GMAs while
creating conditions that are conducive to significant private and donor investment; c) changes in
legislation to allow (a) and (b) to transpire. To continue with the current system would almost
certainly result in perpetuation of the cycle of declining wildlife populations and falling revenues
with which to protect the resource. Without intervention soon, there is a risk that the enormous
opportunity that exists for wildlife-based land uses in Zambia will be foreclosed through
uncontrolled bushmeat poaching and encroachment of remaining wildlife habitat.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to WPAZ for providing funding for and organizing this study. Thanks to Belinda Pumfrett for
assistance with the surveys. We are grateful to all of the respondents who participated in this study
and particularly to the many ranchers who were so hospitable to our team during the fieldwork.
Thank you to ZAWA for permission for the study, for the provision of data and for the time taken by
key individuals to share opinions and insights.

48
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